economic globalization and transnational crime

Globalization and Transnational Crime 1

Economic Globalization and Transnational Crime:

An exploration of how making the world smaller also made it more dangerous

Ken Kodadek

Law 300-A1 Globalization Seminar

Professor Brietzke

April 24, 2012


Economic Globalization and Transnational Crime:

An exploration of how making the world smaller also made it more dangerous

Initially, the main thrust for this project was going to center

around the positive relationship between economic globalization and

transnational terrorism. After conducting countless hours of research

in preparation for a discussion on that topic, my findings led me to

take a different track. The reason for this diversion is simple.

Undoubtedly, terrorism continues to be a serious threat to economic

development and political stability. With that being said, there is a

much bigger problem brewing, and whose dangerous effects are far more

reaching. That problem is one of transnational crime and illicit

trade. As such, this paper will address the following:

1. What is globalization, and how did it contribute to a surge in

transnational crime and illicit trade?

2. The means and methods by which transnational crime groups and

illicit traders are profiting from the global economy.

3. Taking global responsibility for failure.

4. Suggestions for fixing a broken system.

It is my sincere hope, that at the conclusion of this paper, the

reader will come to appreciate the negative consequences of

globalization; the gravity of transnational crime/illicit trade and

its impact on global security and security; what concerns the world

community must address as it continues on its quest for the

development of new technology, trade, and capital flows.


What is Globalization and How Did it Contribute to a Surge in Transnational Crime and Illicit Trade?

According to Keohane & Nye Jr. (2000), globalization may be

defined as an integration of economic, social and cultural relations

across borders. Conversely, Kay (2004) states that “globalization

is best understood as the creation of a variety of transboundary

mechanisms for interaction that affect and reflect the acceleration of

economic, political and security interdependence” (p.10). Arguably,

increasing financial, trade and economic relations has had a positive

effect on developed and developing nations. As a result of

globalization, many communities in developing nations can finally say

that they have access to electricity, safe drinking water, health

systems and education where none was available before.

The keystone to globalization has been the tremendous advances

made in technology. Technology enlarged the market by lowering

transport costs, making it more efficient to engage in trade

with certain countries where in the past, the thought of doing so

would have been cost prohibitive. On the surface, this looks like a

win-win situation. Americans can enjoy bottled spring water from the

Fiji Islands or apricot jam from Egypt for a reasonable cost at a

local retailer. A producing country such as Egypt could then use the

profits derived from their products to improve their social and

political infrastructure. As a result, Egyptian citizens should

recognize a higher standard of living. Unfortunately, this is not

always the case.

Globalization created many negative consequences and the

marginalization of some groups, which led to global social and


economic inequalities. Karacasulu (2006) contended that persons at the

lower end of the social and economic spectrum realized that they

cannot have equal shares in the global world legitimately; therefore

these individuals turned their focus to illicit trade and

transnational crime. The current landscape in Afghanistan is a prime

example. The lack of alternative livelihoods, especially in the

agricultural sector and the need to sustain the bare essentials of

life are major factors which contribute to illicit opium cultivation

there. The UNODC (2006) published a study that reported that the vast

majority of Afghans still lack access to basic necessities needed for

survival. In addition, it was noted that “only 19 percent of Afghan

households have televisions and 6 percent have refrigerators. Finally,

of all Afghan farmers, only 2 percent own a tractor” (p. 96).

Debt in Afghanistan is extremely high, and farmers are much

poorer than in other regions with a comparable level of debt. The

UNRISD (1994) stated that opium poppy farmers in Afghanistan can make

10-50 times more in provisioning the illegal drug market than they can

in any other agricultural pursuit (p. 15). Given this information, it

should come as no surprise that Afghanistan is currently the world’s

major producer and exporter of opium and its morphine derivative,

heroin (UNODC, 2005). Assuredly, the situation in Afghanistan will be

revisited in greater detail in the sections to follow for the

following reasons: One, opium production and exportation in

Afghanistan is but one problematic market there affecting

world security and stability. Second, Afghanistan presents an

opportunity to address the complications associated with the


globalization process and how the world body can go about fixing that

which is broken.

Earlier, it was mentioned how technology enlarged the market by

lowering transport costs, but technology did something else.

Technology also enabled the trade of a whole range of goods that

didn’t exist before such as pirated software, genetically modified

marijuana, counterfeit drugs that don’t cure but kill, human organs,

and nuclear weapons fissile material and. Transnational crime groups

have benefitted by more efficient ships, roll-on/roll-off cargo

container vessels, new loading and unloading tools, better port

management, improved logistics, advances in refrigeration, new packing

materials, satellite navigation and parcel tracking. To these-which

serve all forms of trade, legitimate and otherwise-traffickers, have

added creative applications of their own. Aggressive and inventive

adoption of new technologies has helped traffickers to lower risk,

increase productivity, and streamline their business (Naim, 2005). To

be certain, this is far from the end of the story.

Commerce of all kinds surged in the 1990s as country after

country lowered its barriers to imports and exports. Whether it was

the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in

1994; the establishment of the World Trade Organization in 1995 or the

enlargement of the European Union in 2004- one thing is clear.

Participant countries reformed their trade rules, and lowered

obstacles, which resulted in opportunity for transnational crime and

the explosion of the illicit trade market. According to Naim, one huge

obstacle removed for transnational crime and illicit trade was the


reduction of border controls either in number or stringency (p. 19).

It was largely thought that having border controls would result

in inefficiency due to back-ups attributed to the inspection of

vehicle cargo. Never were truer words spoken than the old adage that

“time is money.” Back-ups result in delay of product processing and

shipment, which in turn delays payment. Consequently, many border

controls were virtually abolished. For the border controls that

remain, one need not look farther than the problematic U.S.-Mexico

border. Inspectors there are time-pressured to check vehicles quickly;

to do otherwise will just tie up traffic for miles and overtax the

meager resources allocated to border patrol agencies.

A recently aired episode of “Texas Drug Wars” on the Discovery

channel confirmed the challenges associated with effective

border patrol. An interview with a border agent revealed that

4.5 million trucks cross the U.S.-Mexican border every year, and that

only 10-15% are searched. Because of this scant number, traffickers

are emboldened to transport contraband in this manner with virtual

impunity. In the event that a rig is searched and its contraband is

seized; the loss is simply chalked up as the cost of doing business.

Even more problematic is the situation surrounding the world’s cargo

container ports. More than 90,000 merchant and passenger ships dock at

U.S. ports. They carry about 18 million containers with 400 million

tons of cargo. Of these 18 million cargo containers that arrive by sea

each year, only 2% to 10% of them are searched (McDonald, 2002).

Finally, another 157,000 smaller vessels call at U.S. harbors

(Naim, p. 180). In addition, “Express custom clearance schemes, the


spread of free ports and export processing zones, the ubiquity of

air cargo and the impossibility of checking every FedEx or DHL

package all offer smugglers new ways to traverse borders with little

fear of being prosecuted” (Naim, 2005, p. 19). Arguably, to find

illegal contraband under such circumstances amounts to finding a

needle in a haystack.

At this juncture, it should be apparent that globalization has

led to economic inequalities, lack of rule of law, insecurity, the

need for survival by disadvantaged groups, and exaggerated

expectations of bilateral assistance through alternative livelihood

activities. Add the advances in technology to the cauldron and you not

only provide groups with reasons for engaging in illicit activities

and trade, but you also provide them with ease by which to make a

living. The next section of this discussion will center on how

transnational crime groups are hijacking the global economy. Specific

attention will be given to some of the larger “markets” transnational

crime groups and illicit traders are involved in and how technology

enables them to turn a profit.

The Means and Methods by which Transnational Crime Groups and Illicit Traders are Profiting from the Global Economy

A. Drug Trafficking

The trade and trafficking of illicit narcotics is an

international enterprise involving producers, distributors, money

launderers and the consumer (Shanty, 2008). It is a multinational

business, which employs tens of millions of people, and is worth

around $500 billion per year. The main source countries, for either


producing or trafficking, are Afghanistan, Bolivia, Columbia, Iran,

Myanmar, Pakistan, Peru and Thailand (“States of Disarray,” n.d.). To

understand the many layers involved in the production and sale of

illegal narcotics, the following example is intuitive. Consider that

the typical opium market includes the farmers (sharecroppers or

landowners), hawalars, farm-gate traders, provincial/zone traders,

main market traders, in some cases the military and government

officials, and in almost all cases- warlords and drug cartels (UNODC,

2009). Cocaine and Marijuana production and supply line chains nearly

mirror that of the opium example provided above.

Using the opium production and supply line chain illustrated

above, it would be appropriate to flesh out some numbers

as it is imperative to gain a perspective on just how lucrative the

drug business is. As such, the situation in Afghanistan will now be

revisited for it is also one of the most documented. According to a

survey conducted by the UNODC (2008), “farmers from the southern and

western regions of Afghanistan earned US $6.3 billion from opium

between 2002 and 2008. During the same time period, Afghan drug

traffickers earned more than US $18 billion. Further, Afghan farmers

paid 10% of their total income, or $600 million to the Taliban,

warlords, Mullahs or government officials as tax to ensure safe

passage of the product across the Pakistan and Iran borders for

distribution in those networks as well as China, India, and Central

Asia” (p. 99). Finally, processed heroin from Afghanistan,

provided the Taliban with an estimated $8 billion in 1999 (Ehrenfeld,

2003, p. 52).


Other countries enjoying the fruits of drug revenues include

Bolivia whose coca-cocaine revenues for 2005 were estimated to be

worth as much as 20% of GNP (“States of Disarray,” n.d.). Kershaw

(2005) reported that Canada’s B.C. bud business netted $7 billion in

that same year.

Given the staggering amounts of drug revenues previously

presented, one must wonder how traffickers are so successful in

generating these figures. This question has many answers with

technology being at the heart of it all. Take the Internet. Its value

to traffickers is immense. One can broker the sale of narcotics behind

a fictitious screen-name while sipping on a latte at a cybercafé. Once

the sale is complete; the trafficker can then track his shipment

online using the tracing services made available by the USPS, FedEx,

UPS and others.

The Internet allows traffickers to communicate privately and

efficiently-consummating deals in virtual rather than geographic

space, thus effectively covering their tracks and minimizing the odds

of being caught. To demonstrate how prolific Internet use is in the

drug trade, the DEA announced that in 2005, they successfully shut

down a drug ring that used two hundred Web sites based in the United

States, Costa Rica, Canada, and Australia to sell methamphetamine,

ecstasy, ketamine, GHB, and other drugs manufactured in India and

shipped illicitly anywhere in the world (Kaufman, 2005).

The advent of cell-phones has also greatly benefitted the drug

trafficker. By purchasing a pay-as-you-go phone, one can use it to

orchestrate a specific purchase. When the sale has been completed, and


there is any apprehension of being prosecuted, the trafficker can

simply remove the sim card and discard the phone. Like the Internet,

cell-phones allow for great mobility. Prior to the introduction of

this technology, groups usually had to come together at one place to

conduct business. Such practices, more often than not, put everyone at

risk and led to large scale arrests. Now, it is all about speed. Drug

networks are simultaneously local and global, and operate with such

speed that national and local governments cannot contain them.

While much has been mentioned regarding the various forms of

technology that drug traffickers employ to get shipments from point A

to B, and at least another 20 pages could be committed to this

endeavor, I would be remiss to end this topic without mentioning the

utilization of honey coated latex condoms laden with pellet sized

packages of heroin, which are then swallowed by human mules prior to

entering an airport security checkpoint. Another common practice is

surgically implanting packaged drugs into the thighs of humans or the

backs of dogs and then surgically removing them in safe houses.

Regular security measures used by the airport will generally render

these methods undetectable. Britain’s High Commission in Jamaica

estimates that one in ten passengers flying to the U.K. from that

island is smuggling cocaine in this manner (Steele & Millward, 2002).

As one can see, drug trafficking is an international epidemic. As

new technology is developed as part of the globalization process, the

unintended consequence is that traffickers learn to adapt the means

and methods by which they operate. This is to say that traffickers and

transnational crime groups either learn to negate the technology


intended to impede their activities or they turn it into an advantage.

B. Arms Trafficking

The following are all examples of arms being trafficked: U.S.

manufactured Stinger shoulder antiaircraft missiles (SAM),

Sagger anti-tank missiles, long-range Katyusha rockets, rocket

launchers, mortars, anti-tank mines, and AK-47 assault rifles. The

foregoing is an example of the items being trafficked by arms dealers

in Iran. These weapons are then distributed to regional neighbors such

as Afghanistan and Syria. Coker (2001) reported that “of the 550

million small arms and light weapons in circulation today, only 3% are

used by government, military, or police forces” (A1). It is thought

that with the exception of the SAM, most of the weapons on the market

today originated from the overstock weapons and military materials

from the vastly oversize Warsaw Pact armies and the state owned

factories set up to supply them (UNOCHA, 2006).

Speaking only of AK-47s, the weapon is officially manufactured in

fourteen countries, but with advancements in technology, illegal

production has become quite common. The recipe for making an AK-47 has

remained largely unchanged by technology. What did change, was the

ability to establish production facilities where labor is cheaper and

the ability to transfer the necessary know-how to locations far away

from the headquarters RUAG Ammotec or Remington. As a result of

clandestine AK-47 manufacturers, the price of the rifle has plummeted

to about $200 in Nicaragua (Kipling, 2002). Moreover, Ghana now has

over 2,500 clandestine small and medium arms manufacturers that

produce fully functional copies of modern assault weapons and pistols


that are sold for as little as six dollars apiece (Aning & Florquin

2004).

As of this writing, there appears to be much disagreement over

how much revenue is generated globally each year due to the arms

trafficking industry, and with good reason. In Afghanistan and

Tajikistan, opium is used as a surrogate currency rather than cash to

procure weaponry from northern stockpiles or trafficked from Central

Asia (Ibrahimi, 2008). In addition, arms are traded for licit goods,

which creates yet another obstacle in the revenue calculation.

Finally, there is the issue of money laundering. Given the huge volume

of financial transactions that occur on a daily basis- the most recent

estimates place that number in excess of $1 trillion, and it becomes

obvious that accurately tracking and computing revenues generated from

arms trafficking and other forms of illicit trade is next to

impossible (Weintraub, 2002).

C. Alien Smuggling and Human Trafficking

Economic desperation is at the root of political and social

movements, and is a major source of pressure on people to migrate.

Repression brought to bear on those movements also leads to migration

(Bacon, 2008). A great starting point for this discussion is the

current situation in Oaxaca. Oaxacan poverty is the result of failed

Mexican economic development policies. “For more than two decades,

under pressure from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund

(IMF), and conditions placed on U.S. bank loans and bailouts, the

government has encouraged foreign investment while cutting

expenditures intended to raise rural incomes” (Bacon, 2008, p. 25).


Oaxaca is comprised of small rural farmers, whose main crop is corn.

Once NAFTA went into effect, U.S. corn products were then dumped on

this region and Mexico government subsidies ended. Consequently,

prices were decontrolled, and necessities like milk, gasoline, and

other products rose dramatically while the price of Mexican grown corn

tanked. Widespread poverty ensued and led to thousands of Oaxacans

looking for work elsewhere in other parts of Mexico, but mainly in the

U.S. This situation, and many others like it, plays right into the

hands of human traffickers and smugglers.

Alien smuggling is a $10 billion a year business and according to

the UN (2012) and is the fastest growing business of organized

crime. Technology has once again reared its ugly head as fraudulent

document providers have little to no difficulty creating a high

quality Social Security card or Driver’s License that is almost

indiscernible from genuine issue. The incurred cost for a new life is

not cheap. The price of passage for an alien can range from $2,000 to

as much as $60,000 (Meissner, 2003). In the event that the alien

cannot afford the transport toll, modern day slavery takes hold. In

such a case, the alien may work at a factory during the day, and be

stashed in a safe house where they are beaten and raped until the

smuggler is convinced that the debt has been paid.

To avoid confusion, please understand that alien smuggling and

human trafficking are two different concepts though their lines can be

blurred depending on the specific circumstances. Alien smuggling can

be defined as knowingly purchasing an illegal service to gain access

into a foreign country” (Miko, 2002). The National Security Council


(2002) estimated that 500,000 to 600,000 illegal migrants who entered

the United States that same year were Mexican, and that there were

another 225,000 from Central America. Given the bleak outlook in

Oaxaca, it is understandable why aliens will pay a smuggler, and take

the inherent risks associated with the process of traversing the

border in search of a better life. In the next subsection, our focus

turns to human trafficking.

If Alien Smuggling is 1(C), then Human Trafficking is 2(C). In

the case of human trafficking, the trafficker deceives or coerces the

migrant and sells his or her labor. The U.S. Congressional Research

Service issued a report of which stating that trafficking in persons-

mainly women and children, involves upwards of 900,000 individuals who

cross international borders. Of this number, at least 20,000 find

their way into the U.S. Further, of the estimates presented,

approximately 35% are under the age of thirty-five (Miko, 2002).

Traffickers initially tempt victims with promises of lucrative

careers such as modeling, clerical, and retail awaiting them in

another country. These offers are possible through fictitious job

placement services running ads on the Internet. In the case of

children, impoverished villages are targeted whereby parents are

coaxed through payment into allowing their children to leave with a

handler on the premise that some wealthy family would like to adopt

and could offer their child a more fruitful life (Naim, 2002). What is

most repugnant, is that the U.S. Congressional Research Service (2002)

reported that young girls are acquired in this manner from villages in

Nepal and Bangladesh, and then sold to brothels in India for $1,000.


Sulavik (2003) states that numerous children are bought in Myanmar,

China, Russia, and the Philippines and then placed for sale on online

markets. From there, they are then sold to prostitution rings

operating in Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and the United States.

In the same vein, UNICEF (2002) reported that approximately 200,000

children are enslaved by cross border traffickers in Central and West

Africa. Arguably, globalization did nothing to improve the lives of

these victims.

D. Money Laundering

Perhaps the most challenging problem facing governments in their

regulation of international commerce is that of money laundering. To

fully understand the problem; one has to come to grips with its cause.

Beginning in the early 1990’s, criminal networks and illicit traders

became privy to new technologies, resources, and possibilities that

before this time did not exist. For instance, computers, chips, and

satellites change significantly the structure of international

finance, thereby reducing the risks associated with illegal

transnational financial transactions. (Vaithilingham & Nair, 2007).

The digitization of money blew the door open for the use of wire

transfers and credit cards for the instantaneous transfer of funds

across transnational borders. In addition, consider the cost of using

a wire transfer or credit card to conduct such a transfer. It is

minimal at best, and helps to explain why the sheer volume of

financial transactions are astronomical. When banking fees are

reduced, banking transactions increase. As a result, monetary

authorities simply cannot exercise the level of oversight required to


curb the manipulation of international trade of between $800 billion

and $2 trillion each year (Wechsler, 2001).

Another issue complicating matters is that of banking secrecy.

International banks are vying for new customers all of the time. Open

competition among banks for new customers only exacerbates the problem

of money laundering even more. If a bank cannot reassure a new

customer that his/her privacy will not be compromised; the bank runs

the risk of alienating the potential customer base and losing future

profits. Li & Schaub (2004) prophesize that banks will continue to

side with the customer and the business they bring, irrespective of

how their client’s funds were derived.

The situation in the Cayman Islands seems curious. With a

population of approximately 35,000, there must be a real need for 600

banks and trust companies, 2,200 mutual funds, 500 insurance

companies, and 45,000 foreign businesses. Its banking system has

almost $700 billion in assets (Wechsler, p. 42). Obviously this is

but one example of an Offshore Financial Center (OFCs). Included in

OFCs are shell banks and shell companies, all of which offer the owner

of the funds anonymity and easy transferability (“Offshore Financial

Centers IMF Background Paper” 2000). The same International Monetary

Fund report placed estimates of global offshore assets at roughly $4.8

Trillion (IMF, 2000). Finally, the U.S. Treasury “estimates that it

loses $70 billion a year through offshore tax evasions by individuals,

while developing countries lose about $50 billion a year in taxes

through these modalities” (Naim, p. 12).

If you are interested in laundering money, and do not have access


to an OFC in the Cayman Islands or Switzerland, do not worry. One can

still launder money by simply converting cash into money orders

provided that the transactions are limited to less than $10,000. For

those in Columbia, money can be laundered through systems similar to

the Black Market Peso Exchange (BMPE). Columbian drug cartels make

regular use of this method by selling Columbian drugs in the U.S. and

receiving U.S. currency in exchange. The U.S. currency is then sold

back to a BMPE agent in the U.S. at a discounted rate. The BMPE then

deposits into the cartel’s account whatever equivalent sum in pesos

the cartel and the BMPE agent previously agreed to. The U.S. dollars

that were sold to the BMPE agent are then sold to Columbian

businessmen who then use the dollars to import products from the U.S.

into Columbia. In sum, the cartel has converted their drug proceeds

into pesos without having to transfer money abroad, all while avoiding

U.S. reporting requirements (“National Money Laundering Strategy”,

2002). The BPME recycles an estimated $5 billion annually (Naim, p.

79). The hallmark of globalization is the free movement of capital.

Based on the aforementioned examples of money laundering, the movement

of capital couldn’t be any freer.

Taking Global Responsibility for Failure

It would be easy to squarely place all of the blame for

globalization’s many failures at the feet of NAFTA, the WTO, and the

EU. Undoubtedly, the passage and or creation of these three, really

motivated participant countries to relax (the term is used loosely)

controls necessary to compete in the world market. The IMF and the

World Bank seemed to have the picture of an ideal country, though we


know now that none such exist. The ideal country was supposed to have

an economy that would be largely self-regulating through open

competition, and its public sector would need not provide more than

the minimum services necessary for the conduct of private business and

the protection of society’s weakest members. Judging by the examples

presented in Oaxaca and Afghanistan, the theory of the IMF and World

Bank couldn’t have been more misguided. As a result, the poor got

poorer because these institutions hedged their bets that short-term

social costs could be offset against long-term economic gain. When

farmers in Oaxaca could no longer make a living on Mexican grown corn,

they became illegal migrants searching for jobs in the U.S. The day

peasant farmers in Afghanistan found growing wheat and apples

unprofitable, they adopted coping strategies by switching to opium

poppy cultivation.

At this juncture, it would be unrealistic to suggest that the

current trend is totally reversible. The power of the profit is much

too strong for those involved in licit as well as illicit trade. You

see, profit is what unites these two groups together and creates a

symbiotic relationship. For the illicit trader or crime group, many

citizens see them as a provider of goods and services as well as jobs.

Opium poppy cultivation is a labor intensive crop. As more poppies are

cultivated per hectare, jobs become plentiful and the wages earned are

then funneled into the local economy. For the licit trader, he/she

depends on making money and in a place such as Afghanistan; the licit

trader could care less who is buying his goods because at the end of

the day it is all about profit and survival. Place the blame for this


situation where you will, but this is a global problem in need of a

global solution.

Suggestions for Fixing a Broken System

Given that transnational crime and illicit trade are global

problems threatening world security and stability, it would appear

that the first place to start would be greater cooperation among

governments. So much has been made about state sovereignty. Consider

the recent stance of Venezuela. State sovereignty occupies a higher

order than drug interdiction efforts led by the U.S. Venezuela is

content to let drug growers and traffickers have free reign rather

than allow U.S. planes enter its airspace because this is somehow seen

as demeaning and a sign of weakness were Venezuela to allow otherwise.

Another starting point would be one of value reduction.

Governments and various agencies need to figure out how to make it

less profitable for transnational crime groups and illicit traders to

operate. Afghanistan presents an interesting opportunity. By

legalizing opium production, supply goes up and prices should fall.

Pharmaceutical companies such as Merck could benefit from

this since many medications contain heroin derivatives. Merck’s cost

to acquire the heroin would be reduced, and the cost of the final

product to the patient should also be cheaper. One glaring weakness to

this theory is how this affects heroin addiction in Iran, which at the

present time is rampant. If Iran’s problem could be integrated into a

final solution, it may be possible to kill two birds with one stone.

Next, the time has come to develop new mechanisms and

institutions aimed at this problem. Common complaints one hears when


listening to law enforcement agencies is that of underfunding and

understaffing. Perhaps the time has come for us to reevaluate what we

are asking from agencies such as the DEA, ICE, INTERPOL, and others.

If funding and staffing lie at the root of the problem, then those

limitations need to be addressed. If it is determined that the

creation of a new institution would be better suited for dealing with

certain problems, then the duties of the DEA, ICE, and INTERPOL should

be reduced or reconfigured so that limited resources (funding,

staffing) are not overburdened to the point that they hamper

enforcement efforts. Better yet, perhaps resources such as monetary,

staffing, and intelligence could be merged between border patrol

agencies in the U.S. and Mexico with the net result being greater

effectiveness.

Finally, as a whole, more effort must be expended in order to

better understand differences between cultures and how laws,

regulations, licenses, taxes, embargos, and all the procedures that

nations employ to organize commerce, protect their citizens, raise

revenues, and enforce moral codes, affect them for each will be

affected differently and respond differently. From this information,

the marginalization of certain groups could be avoided, which in turn

would help to alleviate the problem of transnational crime and illicit

trade rather than exacerbate it.

Because of globalization, the world is smaller and it is more

dangerous. Illicit trade allows for people to reject government, and

it invites corruption. Economic shelter is provided for crime groups

and terrorists. Further, economic development is impaired, which leads


to tremendous enforcement costs that could be better spent improving

social and political infrastructures. As long as competition remains

fierce within the world marketplace and technology continues to

advance at the speed of light, there is no reason to think that we

will be able to right the ship anytime soon. Transnational crime

groups and illicit traders are like parasites. To kill a parasite,

sometimes you have to kill the host. The host in this case is

globalization.


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