BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In the Matter of the Application of the Exposition Metro Line Construction Authority for an order authorizing the construction of a two-track at-grade crossing for the Exposition Boulevard Corridor Light Rail Transit Line across Jefferson Boulevard, Adams Boulevard, and 23rd Street, all in the City of Los Angeles, County of Los Angeles, California.

And Consolidated Proceedings.

Application 06-12-005(Filed December 6, 2006)

Application 06-12-020(Filed December 19, 2006)

Application 07-01-004(Filed January 2, 2007)

Application 07-01-017(Filed January 8, 2007)

Application 07-01-044(Filed January 24, 2007)

Application 07-02-007(Filed February 7, 2007)

Application 07-02-017(Filed February 16, 2007)

Application 07-03-004(Filed March 5, 2007)

Application 07-05-012(Filed May 8, 2007)

Application 07-05-013(Filed May 8, 2007)

REPLY BRIEF OF EXPO COMMUNITIES UNITED

DAMIEN WESLEY CLARK GOODMONExecutive Director, Get LA Moving3062 Stocker PlaceLos Angeles, CA 90008

On Behalf ofEXPO COMMUNITIES UNITEDP.O. Box 781267Los Angeles, CA 90016

SUBJECT INDEX

I. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT......................................................................................1

II. MEMORANDUM OF LAW........................................................................................4

III. DISCUSSION...............................................................................................................7

A. The Authority Miscalculates Grade Crossing Hazards......................................7

1. The Authority’s Grade Crossing Policy.............................................................8

a. GCP Application: Exposition Park.................................................................9

b. GCP Application: The Authority’s Blue Line.............................................10

2. Public Utilities Commission..............................................................................10

3. United States Department of Transportation (“USDOT”)............................12

a. Guidance on Traffic Control Devices at Highway-Rail Grade Crossings

................................................................................................................................12

b. Accident Prediction Formula........................................................................13

c. Hazard Index...................................................................................................13

d. Federal-Aid Policy Guide..............................................................................14

4. National Research Council Transportation Research Board.........................14

B. The Expo Line’s Shared Blue Line At-Grade Portion Should Require an

Applications Process...................................................................................................17

C. Photo Enforcement is Not a Safety Mitigation Measure..................................18

1. Red-Light Cameras (“RLCs”) Do Not Create Safer Intersections ...............18

2. Legality.................................................................................................................19

3. Inconsistency.......................................................................................................20

4. Required Annual Allocation..............................................................................20

D. Additional Impacts of Authority’s Crossings Designs.....................................21

1. Increased Likelihood of Jaywalking.................................................................21

2. Congestion in Residential Areas.......................................................................21

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3. Implications to Funding & CEQA....................................................................22

E. The Authority’s Discussion of the Alignment Classification is Misleading

and Irrelevant..............................................................................................................23

1. The Authority’s Transit Service Policy & Blue Line.......................................23

F. The Authority’s Cost Analysis is Deficient.........................................................25

G. The Authority Only Admits that Grade Separation is More Expensive; They

do not State They Can’t Find Additional Funding................................................28

1. The Authority Found $314 Million in Two Weeks.........................................28

2. The Authority Assets & Annual Budget..........................................................29

3. Funding Sources Yet to be Fully Explored......................................................29

a. 2006 California Propositions..........................................................................29

b. Federal New Starts Funding.........................................................................30

c. Public Private Partnerships ...........................................................................30

4. The Commission’s Authority to Apportion Capital Costs...........................30

5. The Metropolitan Transportation Authority Reform and Accountability

Act of 1998................................................................................................................31

H. Domino Effect.........................................................................................................31

I. The Authority’s Design Makes Redevelopment More Difficult.......................32

1. Challenging the Goals of the Community Redevelopment Agency, a

Fellow State Agency...............................................................................................32

2. Crenshaw Corridor.............................................................................................32

3. Property Rights....................................................................................................33

4. Los Angeles Trade Tech College Master Plan.................................................33

J. Culver City’s Assessments ....................................................................................34

K. Community Standards..........................................................................................35

1. Below-Grade is Preferred...................................................................................35

2. Noise Pollution....................................................................................................35

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3. Public Hearings...................................................................................................36

L. Defining Agency Compliance and Stakeholder Endorsement........................37

1. Hauser/Exposition.............................................................................................37

2. Farmdale/Exposition.........................................................................................37

3. Crenshaw/Exposition:.......................................................................................39

4. 7th Ave/Exposition:............................................................................................39

5. Arlington/Exposition:........................................................................................39

6. Gramercy Place/Rodeo Road:...........................................................................39

7. Western/Exposition............................................................................................40

8. Vermont/Exposition...........................................................................................40

9. 28th/Flower & HOV/Flower............................................................................41

10. Washington/Flower.........................................................................................41

11. Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) Compliance..............................42

M. The Authority’s Influence in the Proceedings..................................................42

IV. CONCLUSION..........................................................................................................43

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

California Cases

Breidert v. Southern Pacific Co.

61 Cal.2d 659 (1964)....................................................................................................36

City of San Mateo v. Railroad Commission of California

9 Cal.2d 1 (1937)......................................................................................................8, 10

Mineral Park Land v. Howard

172 Cal. 289 (1916).........................................................................................................2

San Franciscans for Reasonable Growth v. City and County of San Francisco

193 Cal.App.3d 1544 (1987).......................................................................................24

Schmeltzer v. Gregory

266 Cal.App.2d 420 (1968)...........................................................................................2

United California Bank v. People ex. Rel. Dept. of Public Works

1 Cal.App.3d 1 (1969).................................................................................................36

California Public Utilities Commission Cases

City of Bakersfield

Decision 04-08-013 (2004).......................................................................................7, 22

City of Oceanside

Decision 92-01-017, 43 CPUC 2d 46 (1992)............................................................4, 6

City of San Diego

Decision 03-12-018 (2003)...........................................................................................32

City of San Diego

Decision 98-09-059 (1998).............................................................................................6

City of San Mateo

Decision 82-04-033, 8 CPUC 2d 572 (1982)......................................................passim

Los Angeles to Pasadena Metro Blue Line Construction Authority

Decision 02-05-047 (2002)..................................................................................passim

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California Statutes

Public Utilities Code

Section 1202(c)...............................................................................................6, 8, 22, 32

California Environmental Quality Act

Section 15162................................................................................................................24

Section 15163................................................................................................................24

Section 15165................................................................................................................24

Section 15168................................................................................................................24

California Streets and Highways Code

Section 2450..................................................................................................................11

Section 2452..................................................................................................................11

California Health and Safety Code

Section 33000..........................................................................................................34, 35

California Public Utilities Commission Regulations

Rules of Practice and Procedure

Rule 13.11.......................................................................................................................1

Rule 38(d)...................................................................................................................6, 8

Rule 40............................................................................................................................6

Other Authorities

City of Culver City

General Plan Circulation Element 2.O.....................................................................37

Resolution 2001-RO63................................................................................................37

Federal Transit Administration

Record of Decision: Los Angeles Mid-City Westside Transit Corridor Mid-

City/Exposition Corridor Light Rail Transit Project by Los Angeles

Metropolitan Transportation Authority (February 2006)......................................24

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Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority

Final Environmental Impact Statement/Environmental Impact Review for the

Los Angeles Mid-City Westside Transit Corridor/Mid-City Exposition Light

Rail Project (October 2005).........................................................................9, 23, 33, 39

Final Environmental Impact Statement/Environmental Impact Review for the

Los Angeles Mid-City Westside Transit Corridor/Mid-City Exposition Light

Rail Project Findings of Fact and Statement of Overriding Considerations

(December 2005)..........................................................................................................19

Pasadena-Los Angeles LRT Project Draft Supplemental EIR (March 1994).......38

Draft Environmental Impact Statement/Environmental Impact Report for the

Los Angeles Mid-City/Westside Transit Corridor (April 2001)..........................46

2001 Long Range Transportation Plan (April 2001)...............................................35

County of Los Angeles

Metropolitan Transportation Authority Reform & Accountability Act (1998). .33

State of California

Proposition 1B (2006)............................................................................................31, 32

Proposition 1C (2006).................................................................................................32

State of Minnesota

State of Minnesota vs. Daniel Allen Kuhlman, Case No. A06-568............................21

United States Department of Transportation

Federal-Aid Policy Guide..........................................................................................15

Guidance on Traffic Control Devices at Highway-Rail Grade

Crossings....................................................................................................13, 14, 15, 27

Railroad-Highway Grade Crossing Handbook revised 2nd Edition (August

2007)............................................................................................................14, 15, 19, 36

United States Government

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. Section 12101 (1990)...........45

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Witkin’s Summary of California Law.................................................................................1

vii

REPLY BRIEF OF EXPO COMMUNITIES UNITED

In accordance with Rule 13.11 of the Rules of Practice and Procedure of the

California Public Utilities Commission (“Commission” or “PUC”) and the

schedule established at the prehearing conference held July 19, 2007 in the above-

captioned proceeding and memorialized in the July 23, 2007 Ruling of

Administrative Law Judge Koss, Expo Communities United (“ECU”) hereby

respectfully submits its reply brief in the above-captioned consolidated

proceeding.

I. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

If the Exposition Light Rail (“Expo Line”) design was the product of a transit

agency led by novice engineers, relatively inexperienced in light rail, who lack

access to volumes of studies and thousands of incident reports, perhaps the

Authority could claim, and the Commission could assume that the applications

are the result of incompetence. But as clearly shown in the opening brief and will

be expanded in this reply, the Authority is deliberately ignoring well-established

Commission precedence, state and federal criteria, and firmly stated local agency

objections. Thus, their callous pursuit of a proven defective design can only be

considered a result of a Ford Pinto cost-benefit analysis.

In their attempt to overcome the established criteria of practicability, the

Authority’s insistence that the Commission employ a contractual definition,

citing Witkin’s Summary of California Law as its authority for such use, can only be

characterized as desperate. What a contractual relationship between two

businessmen could possibly have to do with grade crossing safety is beyond

conjecture, and the Authority makes no attempt to elucidate this rather bizarre

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application of the law of contracts to the situation at hand.1 Surely Professor

Witkin never contemplated that any portion of his treatise on substantive civil

law, no less than relating to contracts, would be utilized as safety criteria for at-

grade crossings.

The Authority also attempts to distinguish the mandate applied by the City of

San Mateo case (D. 82-04-033, 8 CPUC 2d 572 (1982)), which it admits held that

there must be separated grade crossings in all cases where such construction is

feasible, i.e., where it is physically possible (City of San Mateo, id., at 580-81), by

arguing that we are here dealing with light rail, as opposed to “long trains of

heavy cars moving at high speeds” (Authority’s Opening Brief – “AOB” - at p.

16). To this end, the Authority cites Los Angeles to Pasadena Metro Blue Line

Construction Authority D.02-05-047 (“Pasadena Blue Line”). But, as shall be shown

below, as a result of the urban setting and heavy traffic/pedestrian mix involved

in the subject crossings, analysis utilized to permit at-grade crossings on the

Pasadena Blue Line is not applicable.

Epitomizing the dangers mitigating against modifying the mandate of City of San

Mateo is the proposed Farmdale crossing: a complicated, sequentially timed,

gated intersection, consisting of a mishmash of horns, blinking lights and

confusing signs, attempting to regulate an admittedly heavy traffic flow coming

from four directions, which commingles with trains running in two directions,

and new bicycle lanes, exacerbated by hundreds of teenagers rushing twice daily

to and from Dorsey High School. In an effort to avoid this accident-waiting-to-

happen the Authority proposes to, each morning and afternoon, herd hundreds

1 The Authority makes the rather astounding assertion that the City of San Mateo criterion is “ill suited to light rail transit” (Authority’s Opening Brief – “AOB - at p. 16), arguing without any authority that “a definition of practicality better suited to the context of light rail transit is supplied by the law of contracts” (AOB p. 17). It then cites to Schmeltzer v. Gregory, 266 Cal.App.2d 420 (1968), a breach of personal service contract case, and Mineral Park Land v. Howard, 172 Cal. 289 (1916), another, and ancient, contract case. Again, one can only guess what these cases have to do with rail safety.

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of children into fenced “holding pens,” which are more akin to controlling farm

animals or inmates in a penal institution, (the only opening in the fences being

small pedestrian gates right onto the tracks), where the Authority believes these

youngsters will patiently wait until the coast is clear of the intermingling of

onrushing traffic and trains. Then the Authority believes these children will

cross the tracks (and streets) in what the Authority apparently envisions as the

typical orderly fashion for which teenagers are well known.2 All of this will be

going on while parents in their cars are making left and right hand turns over

two sets of railway tracks (apparently inside closed quad gates) in their haste to

get their children to school on time so that they themselves are not late to work.

Adding to this nightmarish scenario will be cars lining up on at least two sides of

the light rail tracks in order to get onto the school grounds to drop off their

children.

The Authority’s solution: moving the Farmdale driveway that heads onto school

grounds some arbitrary distance to the south so, hopefully, this line of cars

entering school grounds will not back up inside the gates and onto the tracks.

Let us not parse words, so that when it happens no one can say they were not

fully warned: children, perhaps along with their parents, will die and suffer

catastrophic injuries at this intersection if it is not grade separated. The

Authority’s explanation as to how this intersection will actually work miserably

fails to make “a convincing showing eliminat(ing) all potential safety hazards.”3

(bolding added)4

The Authority’s constant refrain that the cost of grade separation prohibits its

2 ECU respectfully suggests that the Administrative Law Judge view the Farmdale/Exposition intersection as school lets out on a typical weekday afternoon (May 11, 2007) at http://youtube.com/watch?v=YXtY-33nX8c (or by putting “Dorsey High School Crossing” in the “youtube.com” search window).3 Pasadena Blue Line, D.02-05-047, adopted May 16, 2002: Interpreting the “heavy burden” and “convincing standard” enunciated in City of San Mateo, supra.

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implementation flies in the face of this Commission’s very specific holding that

the cost of an at-grade crossing is “much less persuasive than safety

considerations.”5 As demonstrated in ECU’s opening brief and herein, not only

is the cost of separating crossings vastly outweighed by overriding and

paramount safety concerns, but also the Authority’s calculation of costs is

fundamentally flawed.

II. MEMORANDUM OF LAW

Notwithstanding the Authority’s attempt to stand the definition of practicability

on its head by applying a contractual definition, the now seminal case of City of

San Mateo, supra provides the rationale for the applicable standard of

practicability:

“Today in this state a proponent who desires to construct a new at-grade crossing over mainline railroad trackage carrying any appreciable volume of passenger traffic has a very heavy burden to carry. Against the aforesaid formidable backdrop of fundamental statutory and professional opprobrium, he must convincingly show6 both that a separation is impracticable and that the public convenience and necessity absolutely require a crossing at grade.” City of San Mateo, supra at pp 580-581 (emphasis added)7

City of San Mateo goes on to clarify, ”the statutory scheme controlling grade

crossings utilizes the terms ‘practicality’ and not ‘practical’ meaning being

possible physically of performance, a capability of being used, a feasibility of

construction”, utilizing Webster’s New Dictionary of Synonyms (1973 p. 625) to

exemplify its holding that “a plan might be practicable in that it could be put into

4 Indeed, the Authority fails to explain how it will balance its desire to refrain from disrupting classes at Dorsey through the lowering and mitigating of its warning horns with the need to amplify these sounds so as to catch the attention of the very children whose education is being disrupted while on their way to classrooms. The only reference in the AOB is to the use of quacker horns at p. 40.5 Pasadena Blue Line id., at p. 106 Where there is a request for an at-grade crossing a mere preponderance of the evidence will not suffice. The safety of the proposed at-grade crossing must be convincingly shown. Pasadena Blue Line, pp. 11-127 See also City of Oceanside, Decision 92-01-017, 43 CPUC 2d 46 (1992).

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practice, though not practical because...too costly...” City of San Mateo, at 581.

Of paramount importance to this proceeding is City of San Mateo’s recognition

that:

“Safety is an issue of overriding importance. Despite substantial advances, there are numerous situations remaining where grade crossing protection can never provide a satisfactory solution due to limiting physical and operating conditions. In such locations grade separation is the only solution.” id.,at p. 582 (emphasis added)

It is beyond cavil that the Farmdale crossing epitomizes just such a scenario. The

Authority argues that the cost of grade separation at Farmdale and other

crossings should compel the Commission to ignore the holdings of City of San

Mateo.8 In support it cites the Pasadena Blue Line decision, wherein the

Commission determined that “it is the rare case where it is physically infeasible

or impossible to construct a grade separation,” and accordingly determined that

there are “a number of factors that should be considered in reviewing an

application for an at-grade crossing.” The Commission then went on to

enumerate six such factors, which are well known and need not be repeated here

in their entirety. Pasadena Blue Line, supra at p. 10.

The most important of the six issues enumerated in Pasadena Blue Line to be used

as criteria for judging practicability is “a convincing showing by the applicant

that all potential safety hazards have been eliminated.”9 (emphasis added) The

8 The only “evidence” of what grade separation would cost is provided through the “Prepared Testimony of Richard D. Thorpe” attached to the Authority’s Opening Brief, where he states on page 7 thereof that an undercrossing at Flower Street and Figueroa cost approximately $20 million. The Authority makes no attempt to estimate the cost of crossing over the Farmdale Avenue, or any other, intersection. Most importantly, although decrying this increased cost, the Authority fails to even attempt to balance any such cost estimate against the safety and lives of our children, which are clearly at substantial risk.9 Indeed, the Authority’s Chief Project Officer, Eric R. Olson, readily acknowledges that the “primary criterion of ‘practicality’ is a ‘convincing showing that all potential safety hazards have been eliminated’” But then, as he must, Mr. Olson admits that the best the Authority can do in attempting to comply with this criteria is “identify and address significant safety hazards.” (AOB - Olson Testimony at p. 5)

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least important (“a factor much less persuasive than safety considerations”) is the

cost of grade separation. Pasadena Blue Line at pp. 10-11.

The Authority attempts to avoid the clearly defined standard of optimal safety of

all crossings by alleging cases such as City of San Mateo and others involved

freight or commuter rail and that these proceedings involve light rail. It is a

distinction without a difference that the Commission does not recognize. PUC

Section 1202(c) and Rules 38(d) and 40 make no distinction between the

operation of heavy rail or light rail over a crossing. Indeed, the 240 light rail

trains per day, pose greater risks than the weekly freight rail that utilized the

right-of-way in the past. Nonetheless, safety and practicability are two different

subjects, and the need to address practicability does not disappear with the

removal of heavy rail.

In City of San Mateo the crossing involved a combination of commuter rail trains

and freight rail. (Supra at 578.) In City of Oceanside (Supra at 49.) the Commission

citied City of San Mateo, and the need to show that a grade separation was

impracticable in denying application for an at-grade crossing that featured 16

Amtrak trains and 6 freight trains per day with more commuter rail trains

planned. In City of San Diego, supra (D.98-09-059 (1998)) the Commission denied

an at-grade crossing, again relying on City of San Mateo for a crossing involving

only two freight movements and 150 light rail trains per day.

Instructive to the situation at hand is the recent case of City of Bakersfield, Decision

04-08-013 (2004). Although an at-grade crossing was approved there, it was

based upon what the Commission found to be “an adequate level of safety when

considering the low volume of traffic (2-3 a day), the low train speed (10 mph),

the type of crossing (flat, no line of sight difficulties), and the type of railroad line

(single track branch line with no rail passenger traffic).” As noted, “The unique

facts of this case overcome any presumption against an at-grade crossing...” City

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of Bakersfield, supra.

The Authority has fallen miserably short of meeting the “very heavy burden” it

must carry in order to overcome the presumption against at-grade crossings.

Quite the contrary, the very nature of the complex machinations it has had to

employ in its failed attempt to “convincingly show that grade separation is

‘impracticable’” definitively proves that grade separation is mandatory.

The Authority has failed to demonstrate that a grade separation at the subject

crossings, particularly the one at Farmdale and Exposition, is “impracticable”

pursuant to the Commission’s Rule 38(d), PUC Section 1202(c), and City of San

Mateo v. Railroad Commission of California, 9 Cal.2d 1 (1937), which holds:

“In these days of heavy automobile traffic the hazards to life and limb by reasons of numerous railroad crossings at grade is of great public concern. To eliminate unnecessary grade crossing and to minimize the hazards created thereby has become a definite government state policy. To effectuate the desired results it is necessary that some public authority be vested with power to compel compliance with regulatory orders. The Constitution and statues have vested that power in the...Commission” id., 9 Cal.2d at 9-10.

Therefore, ECU respectfully asserts that the Commission must now exercise its

exclusive jurisdictional responsibility. The Farmdale Avenue, and other crossings

have not been adequately addressed by the Authority and, on that basis, the

Commission must, respectfully, order grade separation of crossings.

III. DISCUSSION

A. The Authority Miscalculates Grade Crossing Hazards

ECU submits that the Authority’s Grade Crossing Policy (“GCP”) does not

adequately determine the appropriate level of mitigation at crossings, due in part

7

to fundamental deficiencies in the evaluation of crossing hazards, especially in

comparison to well-established federal and Commission standards.

Consideration of the principles, established by higher and more credible sources,

along with application of lessons learned from the Authority’s own Blue Line

should have led to a determination of immitigable hazards on the Exposition

corridor and full grade separation. Yet, the Authority arbitrarily deems such

criteria secondary to a high peak hour per lane vehicular count to train frequency

ratio.

The Commission should go much further than stating they have “major

concerns” with the Authority’s GCP, as declared by PUC Staff (a.k.a. “RCES”) in

response to the FEIS/R,10 and completely repudiate it on the basis of being

fundamentally inadequate to addressing the intrinsic hazards of grade crossings,

and thereby antithetical to the mandate bestowed to the Commission by the

people of California for the safety of all crossings.

1. The Authority’s Grade Crossing Policy

As the engineering basis of their suggestion that the Commission throw out its

long-established standard and so approve a proven defective design, the

Authority advocates a policy that is tempered more towards providing political

justification for not implementing grade separations, rather than the actual safety

of crossings.

Crossings are required to pass a high initial threshold of vehicular lane volume to

train frequency ratio, immediately placing almost all crossings in the second

most populous city in the country, regardless of their site conditions into a

category that places the burden on proving the necessity of a grade separation,

instead of disproving the feasibility of grade separation. This is the antithesis of

10 RCES Letter to FEIS/R (November 23, 2005)

8

the Commission’s mandate as expressed clearly in City of San Mateo (1937). The

policy supercedes the many standards, criteria and conditions established by the

Commission, and outlined in numerous rail safety studies and manuals,

including the Authority’s own.11

The Commission does not have to look very hard to find examples of the

crossing policy deficiencies.

a. GCP Application: Exposition Park

The Exposition Park at-grade crossings have been labeled by the General

Manager of the Los Angeles Department of Transportation (“LADOT”) as

“unsafe for pedestrians” and the event management plan as “fundamentally

flawed.” RCES has formally and repeatedly requested the Figueroa trench be

extended to Vermont, as the problems are immitigable. Area stakeholders have

all expressed reservation about the safe operation of vehicles during Exposition

Park events. In the face of strong opposition (see Sec. 8) the Authority maintains

that these concerns are inconsequential in comparison to the vehicular lane

volume to train frequency ratio:

“The CPUC expressed concerns over the proposed at-grade crossing at Vermont Avenue, citing major traffic generators at both sides of the tracks at this location. The feasibility of constructing an at-grade crossing at Vermont has been evaluated for grade separation using the Metro Grade Crossing Policy. The Policy applies a milestone-based approach to grade crossing analysis. Milestone 1 comprises an evaluation based on traffic volume and train frequency; the conclusion based on these criteria alone indicates that grade separation is not warranted.”12

11 Evaluation of the Current Grade Crossing Safety Improvement Program of the Metro Blue Line - LACMTA – Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc (November 1998)12 EMLCA Response to RCES Comments on the Preliminary Grade Crossing Hazard Analysis Report (PGCHAR) for the Exposition Light Rail Transit Project - Section L (August 22, 2006)

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b. GCP Application: The Authority’s Blue Line

Perhaps even more illuminating is the fact that application of the Authority’s

GCP would have resulted in few, if any, additional grade separations on the

deadliest light rail line in the country, the Authority’s own Blue Line. As

illustrated in Figure A-2 of the GCP (Page A-7), 22 select crossings of the 100 at-

grade crossings on the Blue Line would not have passed Milestone 1, and thereby

would not have been grade separated had the policy been in place during the

planning of the line. Yet, 222 train-vehicle and train-pedestrian accidents

occurred at these crossing from 1990 to 2006.13

ECU submits that placing any confidence in a policy that would have failed to

sufficiently mitigate the hazards of the least safe light rail line in the country

would irreparably harm the Commission’s reputation.

2. Public Utilities Commission

The California Transportation Commission allocates funding for grade

separations based on an index formula established by the Commission

(California Streets & Highways Code Section 2452). The very small fund14

requires a calculation that computes the actual hazards of at-grade crossings and

benefits of grade separation, and is thereby far more comprehensive than the

Authority’s GCP. The formula places ten-year accident history at a level equal

with the daily (not just peak hour per lane) vehicular and train volume.

Additionally, significant weight is given to the amount of time the crossing is

blocked.15 The vehicular speed limit, train speed, crossing geometry, presence of

13 Summary of Metro Blue Line Train/Vehicle and Train/Pedestrian Accidents – LACMTA (July 1990 – June 2006)14 The Grade Separation Program is established by Section 2450 et seq of the California Streets and Highways Code15 Grade Separation Priority List Index Formula Revision Workshop Report – PUC RCES Report (March 2001)

10

routes for transit buses, school buses and vehicles carrying hazardous waste, and

the community impact are all part of the calculation. The computation and

assessment of major hazards are made early in the screening process, whereas in

the Authority’s GCP they are secondary and only considered an initial

determination of grade alignment.

Indeed, the defining philosophical difference between the Commission’s optimal

safety approach and the Authority’s acceptable casualties position is reflected in

the RCES Comments on the Preliminary Hazard Analysis Report, where the PUC

staff lectures the Authority on their insufficient criteria for evaluating crossing

safety hazards.16

At p. 1:

“In our opinion vehicle count is not a good indicator of the probability of [automobiles driving around crossing gates]. Other indicators which are more appropriate are roadway geometrics that allow easy access to circumvent the gate, length of time crossing is blocked, frequency of trains, Level of Service (LOS) rating of the road, etc.”

At p. 2:

“In our opinion vehicle count is not a good indicator of the probability of [automobiles entering ungated crossing with train approaching]. Other indicators which are more appropriate are the presence of traffic signals or presignals, sightlines, distance between nearby intersection and railroad tracks, frequency of trains, LOS rating of the road, etc.”

At p. 2:

“In our opinion a more important factor [to the hazard of pedestrian crossing tracks with train approaching] is the amount of pedestrian traffic at the crossing, which can be estimated by the presence of a nearby pedestrian traffic generators (such as train stations, schools, parks, etc.).

16 RCES Comments on the Preliminary Rail Crossing Hazard Analysis Report, rev. 3 (June 16, 2006) (PRCHAR, rev 3)

11

Another important factor is the sightlines to the crossing.”

3. United States Department of Transportation (“USDOT”)

a. Guidance on Traffic Control Devices at Highway-Rail Grade Crossings

The USDOT Guidance on Traffic Control Devices at Highway-Rail Grade

Crossings manual suggest that there are several safety variables when

considering closure, grade separation or active control: Annual average daily

traffic, legal and/or operating speed, train frequency and speed, design level of

service, proximity to other intersections, proximity to schools, industrial plants

and commercial areas, accident history and predicted accident frequency, and

available clearing and corner sight distance, including the ability of the driver to

see an approaching train in both directions, with sufficient time to stop 15 feet

before the near rail.

As stated in the opening brief, there are several crossings on the Expo Line that

violate the important sight distance principle, due to obstructed line of sight

and/or non-perpendicular crossing geometry.17 ECU also referenced the

proximity of intersections and elements that can lead to queuing on the tracks.

The manual goes to state that highway-rail grade crossing should be considered

for grade separation whenever the cost of grade separation can be economically

justified based on fully allocated life cycle costs (see Sec. F) and one or more of the

following conditions exist, “An average of 50 or more passenger trains in urban

areas; [….] Passenger train crossing exposure (the product of the number of

passenger trains per day and AADT) exceeds 500,000 in urban areas; The

17 Under optimal conditions, at perpendicular crossings necessary sight distances at crossings where trains travel at 55 mph ranges from ~900 to ~1300 feet for pedestrians, buses and trucks and ~550 feet for cars. For trains approaching at 35 mph the range is ~600 to ~900 feet for pedestrians and trucks and ~350 feet for cars. (Table 2 Clearing Sight Distance)

12

expected accident frequency (EAF) for active devices with gates as calculated by

the USDOT Accident Prediction Formula including 5-year accident history,

exceeds 0.2; Vehicle delay exceeding 30 vehicles hours per day; An engineering

study indicates that the absence of a grade separation structure would result in

the highway facility performing at a level of service below its intended minimum

design level 10% or more or the time.”18

b. Accident Prediction Formula

The USDOT Accident Prediction Formula19 is a comprehensive evaluation that is

used to determine, in absolute terms, the likelihood of accidents at a crossing

given certain conditions. Among the variables are the 5-year accident history of

the intersection, number of daytime trains, product of daily vehicular and train

traffic, number of tracks, number of lanes, and type of street (urban, rural,

principal arterial, collector, etc.). The formula can also be manipulated to predict

the likelihood of fatalities and severity of injuries.

Use of these factors indicates that crossing hazards go well beyond the simple

vehicular lane volume to train frequency ratio. Among many other factors,

certainly the corridor’s large percentage of elderly citizens, who have slower

pace and reflexes, would have been considered had these established principles

been applied.

c. Hazard Index

Conditions at a crossing are computed to determine an index that objectively

results in a quantifiable comparison of the hazardous level of crossings. There

18 Guidance on Traffic Control Devices at Highway-Rail Grade Crossings – United States Department of Transportation (November 2002)19 Railroad-Highway Grade Crossing Handbook rev. 2nd edition - Section III. B. 2 – United States Department of Transportation (August 2007)

13

are various indexes throughout the country that in addition to the variables

specified in the Accident Prediction Formula and Guidance on Traffic Control

Devices at Highway-Rail Grade Crossings, consider the presence of automatic

gates, flashing lights, crossing width, number of school bus crossings, and

population.

ECU submits that application of a hazard index at Western Ave and Denker Ave

would have considered the high percentage of accidents involving pedestrians,

and school bus stops for lots of special needs children arriving from other Los

Angeles Unified School District schools.

d. Federal-Aid Policy Guide

The USDOT Federal-Aid Policy Guide requires a calculation of the potential

danger to large numbers of people at crossings used on a regular basis by

passenger trains, school buses, and vehicles transporting hazardous materials be

considered when state agencies prioritize crossings for grade separation

funding.20

4. National Research Council Transportation Research Board

The 1996 National Research Council Transportation Research Board report on the

Integration of Light Rail Transit into City Streets specifies several causes of LRT

accidents, several design induced errors, and identifies design principles:21

“Design, controls, and operating practices should provide recovery oppor-

tunities for errant motor vehicle and/or pedestrian movements. In other

words, the system design should be forgiving.”

20 Railroad-Highway Grade Crossing Handbook rev. 2nd edition - Section III. B. 1 – United States Department of Transportation (August 2007)21 Integration of Light Rail Transit into City Streets – Sections 3.2 and 3.4 - National Research Council Transportation Research Board (1996)

14

“Provide adequate storage areas (turn bays or pockets) for turning traffic

and provide separate turn signal indications. When left- or right-turning

movements across the LRT tracks are preempted, an adequately sized

storage area should be provided to accommodate those vehicles that are

expected to arrive during the preemption phase.

“Motorists often violate the red left-turn arrow when leading left-turn ar-

row indications are preempted by LRVs. Usually, this illegal movement is

not a conscious choice on the part of the motorist, who has simply learned

to expect the green arrow indication before the through movement.”

“Red time extensions resulting from multiple LRV preemptions cause mo-

torists waiting to turn left across the LRT tracks to become impatient. This

impatience develops further when the signals do not recover to the left-

turn movements. (Typically, signal preemption strategies are designed to

return to the cross-street traffic movement.) Often, motorists will assume

that the traffic signal has malfunctioned and will then violate the signal.”

“Traffic control devices and roadway geometry must be clear and unam-

biguous; they must never confuse the motorist or pedestrian about any ac-

tion to be taken. Unusual or complex intersection treatments should be

avoided.”

“Complex intersection geometry complicates motorist and pedestrian de-

cisions”

“If LRT is designed to operate on a one-way street, LRVs should only op-

erate on a side alignment in the direction of motor vehicle.”

“Two-way, side aligned LRT operations on one-way or two-way streets

confuse motorists and pedestrians and result in high accident frequencies.

Typical problems include the following: Pedestrians and motorist are con-

fused as to which way the LRV is approaching. [….] Two two-way street

couplets are effectively formed when a two-way LRT is side aligned on a

two-way street. This type of geometry especially when turning traffic is

involved, forces the motorist to make complicated decisions. Drivers may

15

be especially confused at night, when the headlights of an approaching

LRV appear on the right-hand side of the road.”

“Pedestrians jaywalk across LRT rights-of-way, having received mixed

messages about relative crossing ease from block to block.”

“Channel pedestrian flows on sidewalks, at intersections, and at stations

to minimize errant or random pedestrian crossings of the LRT track envi-

ronment. This channelization could be accomplished by landscaping

and/or aesthetically pleasing bollards and chain along the curbside of the

sidewalk (between intersections). This channelization also helps prevent

jaywalking across the LRT track environment.

“Unless a specific urban design change is desired (e.g. converting a street

to a pedestrian mall), attempt to maintain existing traffic and travel pat-

terns. If existing traffic patterns are changed when LRT is implemented,

the road user’s expectancy is violated. Despite restrictions or limitations

(e.g., left- or right-turn prohibitions, closure of pedestrian sidewalks or

crosswalks), motorists and pedestrians often try to use the travel routes

they used before the LRT was implemented. Often this type of violation is

committed not intentionally but rather out of habit.

“[P]edestrians do not have adequate, safe queuing areas. Additionally,

LRV dynamic envelopes are not marked clearly, are marked improperly at

LRV turns, or are implied to be smaller than they are by de facto pavement

delineation, such as concrete paving above railroad ties or just between

the rails that are installed in an asphalt roadway.”

“Motorist make illegal left turns across the LRT right-of-way immediately

after termination of their green left-turn arrow. They know it will take a

few seconds for the parallel through traffic to enter the intersection from

the stopped position; however they might be unaware that an LRV is ap-

proaching the intersection at a higher speed.”

“Differences between standard and preempted traffic signal phase se-

quences violate motorist expectancy. For example, preemption of coordi-

16

nated traffic signals in a grid network violates what motorists expect as

they progress along cross-street arterials.”

“Motorists violate active and passive NO LEFT/RIGHT TURN (R3-2/R3-

1) signs, especially where left turns were previously allowed before the

LRT system was constructed. Permanently prohibiting a traffic movement

that was previously allowed disrupts normal, expected travel patterns.”

The Authority is clearly ignoring lessons learned has failed to show an

elimination of all hazards in their applications.

B. The Expo Line’s Shared Blue Line At-Grade Portion Should Require an Applications Process

ECU is concerned about the frequent and numerous catastrophic events in the

short segment that the Expo Line is proposed to share with the Blue Line. The

0.6-mile portion on Flower Street between 12th Street and Washington Blvd has

lead to 138 accidents in the past 17 years,22 and the increase in the risk, by more

than doubling the number of trains operating on the tracks, should require strict

safety oversight, including submission of new crossing applications. Train

frequency in this short segment will amount to a combined Blue Line and Expo

Line headway of 2 minutes – a crossing every minute. The pressure to maintain

headways has already been citied as creating a high level of stress on the light

rail operators. (see Sec. 1) The increased train volume, presence of numerous

driveways opening directly to the tracks, and substantial existing and projected

high-density mixed-use development in the sports and entertainment district

will lead to more vehicular and pedestrian traffic at crossings23 already proven to

22 Summary of the Metro Blue Line Train/Vehicle and Train Pedestrian Accidents - LACMTA (July 1990 - June 2006)23 ECU shares the belief conveyed by AEG/L.A. Arena Company, LLC that the traffic projections are underestimated and inconsistent with year 2008 forecasts discussed in the Los Angeles Sports and Entertainment District EIR. (FEIS/R Findings of Fact and Statement of Overriding Considerations at p. c-16 (December 2005))

17

be extraordinarily unsafe.24 ECU maintains that it is not acceptable to grant the

Authority permission at the crossings absent an applications process.

C. Photo Enforcement is Not a Safety Mitigation Measure

The Authority’s apparent assertion that they can overcome the many deficiencies

in their proven defective design with photo enforcement, should be as unsettling

to the Commission as the many others proclaimed. The Commission should find

no confidence in photo red-light enforcement as a sufficient safety mitigation

measure given the mounting evidence showing it does not make intersections

safer, numerous court cases challenging their constitutionality, required annual

allocation for operation, and substantial public opposition.

1. Red-Light Cameras (“RLCs”) Do Not Create Safer Intersections

In accordance with their overall applications, the Authority is actually proposing

a safety “mitigation measure” that will make intersections less safe:

a. Urban Transit Institute: “The results do not support the conventional

wisdom expressed in recent literature and popular press that red light cameras

reduce accidents. [….] In many ways, the evidence points toward the installation

of RLCs as a detriment to safety.”25

24 Railroad-Highway Grade Crossing Handbook rev. 2nd edition - Section III. B. 1 – United States Department of Transportation (August 2007): “[A] new residential or commercial development may substantially increase the volume of highway traffic over a crossing such that its hazard index would greatly increase”25 A Detailed Investigation of Crash Risk Reduction Resulting from Red Light Cameras in Small Urban Areas - Urban Transit Institute (July 2004)

18

b. The most recent of several Virginia Department of Transportation/Federal

Highway Administration studies of photo red light enforcement in large Virginia

counties, concluded that the RLCs lead to an increase in the number of accidents,

specifically an increase in total crashes at intersections, increase in rear-end

accidents, and increase in the frequency of injury crashes.26

c. In 2005, the Washington Post published the results of their study of the

District of Columbia’s photo red light cameras:

“The Post obtained a D.C. database generated from accident reports filed by police. The data covered the entire city, including the 37 intersections where cameras were installed in 1999 and 2000.

“The analysis shows that the number of crashes at locations with cameras more than doubled, from 365 collisions in 1998 to 755 last year. Injury and fatal crashes climbed 81 percent, from 144 such wrecks to 262. Broadside crashes, also known as right-angle or T-bone collisions, rose 30 percent, from 81 to 106 during that time frame. Traffic specialists say broadside collisions are especially dangerous because the sides are the most vulnerable areas of cars.” -D.C. Red-Light Cameras Fail to Reduce Accidents (Washington Post - October 4, 2005)

d. In their Response to RCES Comments on the Preliminary Grade Crossing

Hazard Analysis Report,27 the Authority even admits that photo enforcement is

insufficient: “The Authority accepts that photo enforcement may not necessarily

be the most effective solution in every situation.”

2. Legality

Civil liberties advocates throughout the country have challenged the legality of

photo red-light enforcement, arguing among other reasons that it violates due

26 The Impact of Red Light Cameras (Photo-Red Enforcement) on Crashes in Virginia – Virginia Transportation Research Council (June 2007)27 Response to RCES Comments on the Preliminary Grade Crossing Hazard Analysis Report for the Exposition Light Rail Transit Project – Section D (August 22, 2006)

19

process of law. Earlier this year, the Minnesota State Supreme Court awarded the

party’s challenging the new technology their first major victory, in State of

Minnesota vs. Daniel Allen Kuhlman (MN Case No. A06-568), striking down photo

enforcement in the entire state.

3. Inconsistency

RCES Comments on PRCHAR at p. 2:28

“LACMTA has informed us that at other locations where photo enforcement cameras were installed, they were eventually taken out for a variety of reasons. We are concerned that cameras may be initially installed at these locations and then taken out. Therefore, we do not have confidence in the usage of photo enforcement cameras as a long-term measure for deterring illegal left turns.”

4. Required Annual Allocation

Additionally, red-light cameras require annual allocation from finite resources to

their operation. Elected politicians make the decisions, and can cut their

operational funding at any time. The Commission should have no confidence in

any safety mitigation measure proposed by the Authority whose continued

operation requires annual allocations from the finite budgets of local

governments, school districts or other entities over which the Commission has

limited jurisdiction.

Comparatively, Public Utilities Code Section 1202(c) grants the Commission the

“exclusive power” to allocate the capital expense of grade separations among the

Authority, the State, the County, the cities of Los Angeles and Culver City, as well

as any political subdivision along the route of the Expo Line’s second phase,

between Culver City and Santa Monica, which will be affected by the project.28 RCES Comments on the Preliminary Rail Crossing Hazard Analysis Report, rev. 3 (June 16, 2006) (PRCHAR, rev 3)

20

D. Additional Impacts of Authority’s Crossings Designs

1. Increased Likelihood of Jaywalking

The many street closures in the Authority’s design are likely to disrupt current

travel patterns and lead to jaywalking and unsafe vehicle movements. The

Authority admits as much in their response to the RCES Comments on the

Preliminary Grade Crossing Hazard Analysis Report, where they justify leaving

some low traffic crossings open to vehicular and pedestrian traffic because they

consider the long distance pedestrians would have to walk to cross will lead to

jaywalking:29

“Regarding the pedestrian volumes at Halldale Road, the CPUC is cored in noting that the pedestrian volume crossing Exposition Boulevard is not significant. Incorrect information was presented in the PCHAR. However, although the pedestrian volume is not significantly high, those pedestrians who do wish to cross will be forced to walk significant distances to adjacent crossings, which in turn may encourage jaywalking for impatient pedestrians.”

In their opening brief the Authority suggests adding a median fence to prevent

jaywalking between Denker Ave and Western Ave, but this fence is not identified

in the FEIS/R or anywhere in the application.

2. Congestion in Residential Areas

The Authority goes on to state that closure of the street would also adjust traffic

circulation in the area:

“Halldale Avenue is a collector street. [….] [A]ccording to LADOT, the closure of this crossing would alter the traffic pattern within the local neighborhood. The traffic at this intersection would be displaced to adjacent through crossings thereby increasing local traffic, travel time and

29 EMLCA Response to RCES Comments on the PGCHAR - Section D (August 22, 2006)

21

inconveniencing local residents.”

Vehicular and pedestrian access via Halldale, along with the many other closed

intersections, are needed to improve traffic circulation, reduce congestion, and

improve air quality. It therefore cannot be closed. (City of Bakersfield) Grade

separation is the Commission’s only option that ensures the safety of this and

other crossings.

3. Implications to Funding & CEQA

Increasing local traffic and travel times through street closures, extended gate

down time and/or higher than expected train frequency would also seem to

challenge the air quality benefits assessed from the project,30 inviting a CEQA

challenge, and unseating the justification for several sources of the funding.

Further, ECU submits that the inadequate horizon year (just 10 years into

operation), inadequate traffic counts supplied to the Commission (several were

taken during the summer when regular school was not in session), the

availability of 2035 traffic projections through the Southern California

Association of Governments (CEQA Section 15162, 15163, 1516531), and the

omission of Phase 2 impacts and possible Crenshaw LRT impacts, preclude the

Commission from approving the applications. Grade separation must be

required, or the clearly defined CEQA laws against segmentation, environmental

justice and others, make it appropriate for the Commission to order the

Authority to formulate a supplemental or subsequent environmental impact

report. (San Franciscans for Reasonable Growth v. City and County of San Francisco,

193 Cal.App.3d 1544 (1987)).

30 Record of Decision – Congestion Mitigation and Air Quality Funding31 CEQA Section 15165: “Where individual projects are, or a phased project is, to be undertaken and where the total undertaking comprises a project with significant environmental effect, the Lead Agency shall prepare a single program EIR for the ultimate project as described in Section 15168.”

22

E. The Authority’s Discussion of the Alignment Classification is Misleading and Irrelevant

As part of their justification for the repetition of the proven defective design, the

Authority states that light rail is primarily at-grade.32 This tactic is an intentional

distraction to the voluminous unidentified, ignored and unmitigated safety

hazards along the Expo Line alignment, and speaks less to crossing safety than

good lawyering and public relations. The statement even conflicts with the

Authority’s own Transit Service Policy, study of Blue Line accident causation,

and classification of their rail lines.

1. The Authority’s Transit Service Policy & Blue Line

The Authority’s Transit Service Policy Planning Warrants (Section 2.14) states

that any rail line expected to serve over 50,000 passengers per day be designed

100% grade separated, and is classified as heavy rail.33 ECU submits that the

operations department of the Authority developed the policy based heavily on

their lessons learned from operating the Blue Line, the light rail line with the

highest ridership in the country. The debate of what is and is not light rail is

secondary to the safety hazards caused by high travel demand realities34 and

operational challenges.

32 The Authority’s Opening Brief – Testimony of Rick Thorpe at p. 733 Yet if one must, the Authority has always and continues to refers to it’s own 20-mile, 100% grade separated Green Line as “light rail” (Metro Construction Program Summary – LACMTA (March 2006)), and it is recognized as such in the media and among the public. As is relevant to other aspects of the ECU statement of benefits of grade separation, the Green Line, which is dubbed the train “from nowhere to nowhere” (MTA's Green Line Is Ridden and Derided; Boardings are up on what critics say is 'the train that goes from nowhere to nowhere.' - LA Times - July 10, 2004) is the fastest light rail line in the country, which reduces the line’s operating costs because of increased ridership – more than 40,000 riders per day.34 ECU Opening Brief at p. 5: EMLCA was established by California Senate Bill 504 (Kuehl), for the purpose of completing the Expo Line from Downtown Los Angeles to Downtown Santa Monica. The Applications before the Commission are for Phase 1 from Downtown LA to Culver City. Phase 2 is from Culver City terminus to Downtown Santa Monica. Ridership for the full Expo Line is expected to be 72,000 – 44% higher than the threshold.

23

As stated in the Authority’s own report, the high ridership on the Blue Line

(“MBL”) is the most important contributing factor to the accident rate of the

deadliest and most accident-prone light rail line in the country:

“The MBL has one of the highest ridership counts for light rail lines in the Country. This factor is perhaps the most important contributor to the grade crossing accident rate. The high ridership results in increased pedestrian traffic near stations as compared to other light rail systems. In addition, although MTA Operations does not allow high passenger loads [to] dictate safe operations, there is pressure to maintain travel times and headway schedule requirements (e.g., passenger trip from Los Angeles to Long Beach in less than one hour).” (emphasis added) –Evaluation of the Current Grade Crossing Safety Improvement Program of the Metro Blue Line – LACMTA – Prepared by Booz-Allen & Hamilton Inc. (Nov. 1998)

Booz-Allen also identifies other conditions, which are intensified on the

Exposition Corridor that contribute to exorbitant accident rate:

“The MBL travels through a high population density area with a diverse varied social-economic community. The high density results in increased pedestrian and automobile traffic as compared to other transit properties. In addition, the communities through which the MBL travels requires special attention to language and literacy issues when disseminating public outreach and education information.

[…]

“The MBL traverses through an industrial center of Los Angeles. The industrial center results in increased trucking and shipping traffic near the MBL. The increased truck traffic results in increased driver frustration due to slower street traffic speeds. This frustration may result in increased crossing gate running and illegal left turns.”

The Authority clearly has not learned from it’s Blue Line as the Expo Line is

projected to serve similarly high ridership at a considerably higher passengers

per mile ratio,35 travel through an area with greater residential density, large

social-economic diversity, more vehicular, pedestrian and bicyclist traffic and

35 Blue Line = 75,000 / 22 miles = 3400 riders per mile (LACMTA Facts at a Glance); Expo Line = 72,000 / 15 miles = 4800 riders per mile

24

adjacent to industrial properties. The callous repetition of the defective Blue Line

design in the applications before the Commission is indefensible, and the

Authority admits as much through their continued attempt to sidetrack the

public and Commission’s attention from the demonstrated reality that building a

light rail line at-grade in such environments is not safe.

F. The Authority’s Cost Analysis is Deficient

Although comparative alignment cost is the least persuasive factor among the

well-established criteria for practicability, the Authority apparently expects the

Commission to make its decision on that basis alone, and assumes that the public

and responsible agencies should accept their elementary cost estimates. As

explained by the United States Department of Transportation, assessing the

economic costs and benefits of grade separation at a crossing requires a far more

comprehensive analysis than the Authority’s.

The Guidance on Traffic Control Devices at Highway-Rail Grade Crossings (at p.

27), clearly states that the costs of grade separation can not be solely based on a

calculation of construction cost, but instead on the actual economic impact to the

public:36

“The decision to grade separate a highway-rail crossing is primarily a matter of economics. Investment in a grade separation structure is long-term and impacts many users. Such decisions should be based on long term, fully allocated life cycle costs, including both highway and railroad user costs, rather than on initial construction costs. Such analysis should consider the following:

36 In the same report, USDOT suggests similar calculations should be made with street closures (at p. 27): “The crossing closure decision should be based on economics; comparing the cost of retaining the crossing (maintenance, accidents, and cost to improve the crossing to an acceptable level if it would remain, etc.) against the cost (if any) of providing alternative access and any adverse travel costs incurred by users having to cross at some location. [….] “Whenever a crossing is closed, it is important to consider whether the diversion of highway traffic may be sufficient to change the type or level of traffic control needed at other crossings.”

25

eliminating train/vehicle collisions (including the resultant proper-ty damage and medical costs, and liability);

savings in highway-rail grade crossing surface and crossing signal installation and maintenance costs;

driver delay cost savings; cost associated with providing increased highway storage capacity

(to accommodate traffic backed up on a train); fuel and pollution mitigation cost savings (from idling queued ve-

hicles); effects of any “spillover” congestion on the rest of the roadway sys-

tem; the benefits of improved emergency access; the potential for closing one or more additional adjacent crossings;

and possible train derailment costs.”

Given the extraordinary burden placed on public agencies to protect the public

interest, the Authority has no more important mandate than to meticulously

prove grade separations are impracticable. The gravity of the proceedings and

the inexplicable callous repetition of a proven defective design that will result in

predictable catastrophic consequences, compel the Authority to make public

their life cycle cost calculations for each crossing, as proper judgment requires

the Commission to apply the USDOT life cycle cost standard when considering

this less persuasive aspect of practicability.

A crash on the Authority’s prized Gold Line just last week37 resulted in injuries to

half dozen passengers,38 the train operator, and a Sheriff’s deputy. The reduced

speed of the train (15-20 mph) and lower comparative weight (60 passengers on a

2-car Gold Line compared to fully-occupied 3-car Expo Line) still resulted in 37 Gold Line Train Hits Truck in Highland Park – LA Times – September 12, 200738 “[V]irtually all the passenger deaths that occurred on such [light rail] vehicles in collisions were the result of secondary impacts of riding passengers with structures within the passenger area due to the sudden stop, particularly older passengers. More than half the passenger fatalities recorded did not involve another vehicle. [….] Interiors are not designed to cope with secondary impacts of passengers into interior fittings following sudden stops. Interior furniture is too angular and stainless steel grab-handrails have no resilience. Often seats are of stainless steel construction for durability and vandal resistance but unyielding in collisions.” – Incident-Friendly and Secure Light Rail Vehicle Design – Joint International Light Rail Conference/John Swanson (April 9, 2006)

26

derailment, crumbled the F-150 Ford pick-up,39 and left the driver in critical

condition. Thus, specifically, but not exclusively, consideration of the costs for

accidents alone should include:

Lost employee time and employment disability for traumatized and in-

jured train operators, public employees and staff

Capital expenditures for repair or replacement of damaged infrastructure

and equipment

First responders cost

Cost of damage to public property

Cost of service disruption

Economic cost of delay for rerouted transit passengers

Economic cost of detoured or delayed cars queued at the crossing

Air quality costs or detours around incident sites

Even more meaningfully the Authority needs to explain the cost of a human life;

and describe to the Commission and the public if the life of a Dorsey, Foshay or

Trade Tech student is less or equal in value to a Culver City student.

The Authority needs to elucidate the economic costs to victim’s families; and

clarify if a family in South LA is likely to incur less or more economic damage

than a family in Culver City.

The Authority’s cost assessment needs to include a comparison of a grade

separation to the deaths of elderly Leimert Park residents due to impeded access

of emergency services.

Further, the Authority needs to justify how at-grade crossings, street closures,

elevated structures, impeded pedestrian access, and reduced access to parks is 39 ECU respectfully suggests that the Administrative Law Judge view the damage to the F-150 truck and substantial amount of emergency services required at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kF8EEsWJx_k

27

defensible when it limits land use capabilities, resulting in less investment,

smaller projects, and fewer job and housing opportunities (including affordable

and low-income) in communities still struggling to recover from civil unrest over

a decade ago.

ECU is certain the Commission shares in their belief that it would be

contemptible for public agencies to be complicit in the production of a massive

public works project, built at taxpayer expense, which actually creates

immitigable risks to the public and harms community cohesion. Surely the

design is the product of such a life cycle cost analysis. Therefore, such

calculation and explanation of methodology should be made public for the

Commission’s consideration, and the initial calculations for the Blue Line should

be made for comparative purposes.40

G. The Authority Only Admits that Grade Separation is More Expensive; They do not State They Can’t Find Additional Funding

The Authority does not state anywhere in their opening brief or testimony that it

cannot find additional funding. ECU submits the Authority is plenty capable of

financing grade separations.

1. The Authority Found $314 Million in Two Weeks

The recently passed budget of the California Legislature initially cut nearly half

the funding for the Expo Line.41 Just two weeks later, funding was allocated from

other sources.42

40 A 1994 LACMTA study (Los Angeles Metro Blue Line Enforcement Program – LACMTA) estimated the cost of grade separating the entire mid-corridor section from Washington/Long Beach to Long Beach/Willow as $277 million. There have been 139 accidents in this portion and numerous near misses since ‘9441 After 51-day stall, Senate OKs budget – LA Times - August 22, 200742 State OKs final piece of Expo light-rail funding – LA Times – September 6, 2007

28

The action should completely eliminate any and all costs considerations of grade

separations for the Commission. Surely if the Authority can secure $314 million

in just two weeks after being stripped by bipartisan support from both houses of

the California legislature, at the urging of the Governor, the Authority can find

all necessary resources to build crossings that meet the City of San Mateo criteria.

2. The Authority Assets & Annual Budget

The Authority is one of the largest transit agencies in the country with assets

valued at nearly $6 billion and an over a $3 billion annual budget.43 Surely if the

Commission has required far smaller public agencies to grade separate crossings,

then the Authority is capable of making the investment, the benefits of which go

beyond safety to include reduced annual operating cost, and increased ridership

as a result of reduced travel times.

3. Funding Sources Yet to be Fully Explored

a. 2006 California Propositions

Additionally, in November 2006, area voters overwhelmingly supported the

passage of Proposition 1B and Proposition 1C. Included in Proposition 1B is $250

million dollars dedicated solely to grade separations and $4 billion dedicated to

capital rail projects.

Proposition 1C dedicates $850 million to infrastructure improvement projects

when tied to transit oriented development, and given the projected increase in

density around the stations and existing Community Redevelopment Agency

43 LACMTA Comprehensive Annual Financial Report – June 2006: “Metro’s total assets exceeded its liabilities as of June 30, 2006 by $5,796,673,000. Of this amount, $1,380,134,000 is reported as unrestricted net assets and may be used for system expansion, acquisition, and general and special revenue obligations.”

29

(“CRA”) project areas, substantial funding should be lobbied. To date there has

been no formal public action to pursue additional funding from these two rich

resources for additional grade separations.

b. Federal New Starts Funding

In 2003, the Federal Transit Administration (“FTA”) New Starts Funding

Program gave the Expo Line project a rating of “Not Recommended” for the

Fiscal Year 2005 in part because of a deficient funding plan. The following year

the project was reevaluated and given a rating of “Not Rated,” in part because it

failed to meet the New Starts criteria for “user benefits.” Expressing that it

would be too time consuming to remodel the project in spite of the FTA’s offer to

help (to the tune of $300 million dollars), the Authority chose to seek funding

elsewhere, and it did so successfully.

c. Public Private Partnerships

When public-private partnerships for grade separations were offered, including

an effort to levy a benefit assessment district specifically for grade separation led

by the University of Southern California (“USC”), the Authority failed to

successfully negotiate such offers.44

4. The Commission’s Authority to Apportion Capital Costs

If the Authority can demonstrate it is impossible to execute the minimal operable

segments construction options identified in the FEIS/R,45 impractical to secure

additional funding for grade separations, and a revenue short fall, Section 1202(c)

44 USC President Steve Sample Letter to Roger Snoble (March 31, 2006)45 Sections 4.15.1.1, 4.15.1.2 and 2.4.4.2 of the FEIS/R identifies the minimum operable segments construction option, which allows the Authority to build from Downtown Los Angeles to two temporary termini – Vermont Avenue or Crenshaw Blvd.

30

grants the Commission the authority to apportion the expense of grade

separations among the Authority, the State, the County, the cities of Los Angeles,

and Culver City, as well as any political subdivision along the route of the Expo

Line’s second phase, between Culver City and Santa Monica, which will be

affected by the project:

The commission has the exclusive power: “To require, where in its judgment it would be practicable, a separation of grades at any crossing established and to prescribe the terms upon which the separation shall be made and the proportions in which the expense of the construction, alteration, relocation, or abolition of crossings or the separation of grades shall be divided between the railroad or street railroad corporations affected or between these corporations and the state, county, city, or other political subdivision affected.”

5. The Metropolitan Transportation Authority Reform and Accountability

Act of 1998

In their opening brief, the Authority references the MTA Reform and

Accountability Act of 1998,46 neglecting to mention that the ban on expending

sales tax revenue for subway construction does not apply to station construction

costs (one of the most expensive elements of subway capital cost), and that the

ban does not apply to trench construction. Additionally, the varied sources of

funding for the project provide the Authority with the flexibility to direct the

non-sales tax portion of funding to subway construction, and commit the sales

tax portion of the budget to other Expo Line costs, such as tracks, signaling and

rolling stock.

H. Domino Effect

In their opening brief and preceding applications the Authority explains that that

grade separations at individual crossings require inclines and declines that

46 Authority’s Opening Brief at p. 2

31

impact other crossings. ECU respectfully submits that this “domino effect”47

precludes the Commission from making any decisions at any crossings, until safe

solutions can be determined at all crossings.

I. The Authority’s Design Makes Redevelopment More Difficult

1. Challenging the Goals of the Community Redevelopment Agency, a

Fellow State Agency

The Authority’s continued pursuit of the Expo Line design will limit the

effectiveness and challenge the objectives of another state agency, the CRA. 48

Section 33000 et. Seq. of the Health and Safety Codes mandates the CRA retain

and expand affordable housing stock, yet forcing future projects to mitigate the

negative traffic impacts of the Expo Line would limit potential investment in a

corridor that needs as many resources and opportunities as possible.

2. Crenshaw Corridor

Similarly important to the economic growth and revitalization of South Los

Angeles is the probable Crenshaw Light Rail Transit line, which is in the

Authority’s 2001 Long Range Transportation Plan constrained funding plan. The

environmental impact report process is funded and has begun. Among the

alternatives heavily being considered is a branch line of the Expo Line. By failing

to study and build the trunk portion of the Expo Line from Downtown Los

Angeles to Crenshaw Blvd in a manner that provides the necessary capacity to

operate a spur, the Authority is jeopardizing redevelopment efforts in the CRA

project areas that line the corridor.

47 City of San Diego D.03-12-018 (2003) at p. 1148 The CRA/LA was established by resolution of the Los Angeles City Council in 1948 pursuant to Community Redevelopment Law of the State of California (Section 33000 et. Seq. of the Health and Safety Code) - http://www.crala.org/internet-site/About/index.cfm - September 15, 2007

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3. Property Rights

Several existing property owners, including Charles Dunn Real Estate, have

already expressed the adverse impacts of the at-grade crossings.49 In a July 2007

letter to the Authority from representatives of a separate property owner,50 the

legal ramifications of the loss of vehicular access to their property is placed in the

appropriate context:

“In California it is well-established that property abutting a major roadway has ‘an easement of ingress and egress’ as well as a right to ‘free and convenient use of access’ to such roadway. See, for example, United California Bank v. People ex. Rel. Dept. of Public Works (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 1, 7. See also Breidert v. Southern Pacific Co. (1964) 61 Cal.2d 659, 721 (‘We have long recognized that the urban landowner enjoys property rights, additional to those which he exercises as a member of the public, in the street upon which his land abuts.’). In situations involving substantial reductions in the accessibility of a property (not necessarily a total loss of vehicular ingress and egress), courts have found actionable inference with the above-described right of access, and awarded compensation to property owners. United California Bank, supra, at 7.”

4. Los Angeles Trade Tech College Master Plan

The frequency of trains (one every minute) at the Washington/Flower crossing is

sure to conflict with the Los Angeles Trade Tech College master plan that seeks to

convert current automotive instructional buildings into more traditional

classrooms. Additionally, the increase in the student vehicular, pedestrian and

bicyclist traffic volume will increase the hazards at this already complex

crossing.51 In an environment where educational pursuits are difficult enough,

LATTC should not be forced to mitigate the traffic impacts of the Expo Line.

49 ECU Opening Brief at p. 2050 Jeffer, Mangels, Butler & Marmaro, LLP Letter to Rick Thorpe on behalf of Orthopedic Hospital Campus property owner G.H. Palmer Associates (July 3, 2007)51 Railroad-Highway Grade Crossing Handbook rev. 2nd edition - Section III. B. 1 – United States Department of Transportation (August 2007): “[A] new residential or commercial development may substantially increase the volume of highway traffic over a crossing such that its hazard index would greatly increase.”

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Further, LADOT is unwilling to accept a crosswalk on the east side of Flower St.

“due to the long distance that pedestrians would be expected to clear” across two

tracks,52 yet inexplicably they are willing to accept a longer north side crosswalk

across four tracks.

J. Culver City’s Assessments

It is ECU’s contention that the City of Culver City has been accorded a different

and more stringent design standard than the rest of the Exposition corridor.

While the Authority consistently maintains that light rail is designed to run

primarily at-grade,53 the Authority has committed to respecting the Culver City

General Plan Circulation Element 2.O, which prohibits at-grade crossings of light

rail within Culver City or any elevated alignments of light rail transit adjacent to

residential neighborhoods, and reiterated Resolution 2001-RO63 passed by the

City Council of Culver City in 2001.

ECU shares Culver City’s “concerns related to safety, traffic, fiscal responsibility”

cited in the Element Memorandum,54 which were based on extensive assessments

of emergency response times (among other safety hazards), impacts to land use,

and threats to community cohesion.55 However, it is troubling that upon receipt

of the information, the Authority failed to apply the principles throughout the

corridor. It is apparent the Authority simply recognized that approval from

Culver City was a requisite, negotiated a deal the City could tolerate, and

dismissed the legitimate issues raised. The double standard creates obvious

issues of environmental justice.

52 RCES Meeting Notes Re: LATTC Driveways and Proposed Farmdale Crossing at p. 1 (April 24, 2007)53 Authority’s Opening Brief – Testimony of Rick Thorpe at p. 754 Culver City Redevelopment Agency Agenda (March 7, 2005)55 Culver City Senior Management Analyst Memo to Culver City Senior Planner (November 10, 2005) & Culver City Traffic Manager Memo to Culver City Public Works Director & City Engineer (October 10, 2003)

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K. Community Standards

The Commission’s consideration of the community standard, as a component of

the legal definition of practicability, is accented by the substantial safety risks the

Authority proposes to place on local communities. ECU maintains that not only

does the Authority disrespect community standards, they refuse to acknowledge

that there are any, stating that only a few “disgruntled voices” have expressed

any safety concerns.

1. Below-Grade is Preferred

ECU believes that ample precedent exists in the form of the Authority’s Gold

Line to require below grade separations in conformance with community desires.

The Pasadena-Los Angeles LRT Project Supplemental EIR adopted in 1994,56

outlines a process in which a crossing initially planned at-grade was evaluated as

an aerial grade separation and built as a below grade separation:

“The Projects FEIR cleared an at-grade LRT crossing at the intersection of Marmion Way and Figueroa Street in the community of Lincoln Heights. Upon the request of the City of Los Angeles, an aerial grade separation was evaluated as an alternative for the intersection in the Project’s first SEIR. The above-grade alternative, however, resulted in unavoidable visual impacts which the community found to be unacceptable. For this reason, a below-grade alternative to the previously cleared aerial option is proposed in this SEIR.”

2. Noise Pollution

ECU recognizes the desirability of crossing gate bells cessation when the crossing

arms reach the down position, especially in the area between Crenshaw Blvd and

Farmdale Avenue where there is no sound wall proposed on the north side of the

tracks. But in consideration of the conditions delineated in the ECU opening and 56 Draft Supplemental Environmental Impact Report Pasadena-Los Angeles Light Rail Transit Project – Section 3.3.6 - LACMTA (March 25, 1994)

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reply briefs and protest of the Farmdale crossing, the lowered safety mitigation

measure is simply unsafe. The community is being expected to negotiate the

safety of our children against the tranquility of our community and ECU submits

that they are both non-negotiable. Below grade separation, which is the optimal

solution for safety and community cohesion should be implemented instead.

3. Public Hearings

Accordingly, ECU welcomes the public hearings assured by ALJ Koss, and

respectfully submits that since community input is a condition of practicability

that no crossings decisions can be made until such public hearings. ECU

requests the two public hearings take place (one at Foshay Learning Center and

another at Dorsey High School) during weekday evening hours or on a non-

holiday weekend Saturday, outside the holiday season, and that an aggressive

community outreach strategy, implemented over a period of no less than 8 weeks

be developed in coordination with Commission’s Public Advisor’s Office, ECU

and the impacted neighborhood councils.

The importance of an aggressive public outreach strategy cannot be overstated.

As reflected in the FEIS/R, the 2001 Public Hearing at West Angelus Church was

the only location where the majority of participants voiced opposition to the

Expo Line,57 largely due to the lowered safety and noise mitigation standards the

Authority was proposing for South Los Angeles communities. Several of the

participants stated that they were not adequately notified by the Authority

despite living on or within a few blocks of Exposition Blvd.

The disrespectful public relations tactics of the Authority continue to this day

with monthly Project Status Update set in the communities along the alignment,

where the Authority fails to permit, and in fact will shout down, any request by

57 FEIS/R Volume 2

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the community to have an open public forum.58 As a result community

participation in the meetings has noticeably declined.

L. Defining Agency Compliance and Stakeholder Endorsement

It’s clear from the official communication between agencies that the Authority is

very liberal in its definition of concurrence and input, as it treats the concerns of

fellow agencies as dismissively as the concerns of the community. Several safety

hazards were raised by various entities and engineers and remain unresolved.

1. Hauser/Exposition

The Authority’s Opening Brief at p. 36:

“The gate crossing ha[s] been designed…to provide a safe environment.”

DCA Civil Engineering Group Report:59

“[T]he proposed Service Road, the geometric layout, rail crossing, and the almost unavoidable use of opposing traffic lanes will inherently create problems that will prohibit efficient and free flowing traffic. In addition, it is our belief that a completely safe, efficient crossing through the Hauser Boulevard Access Intersection may not be possible under the current design or other design due to the geometric limitations of the area.”

2. Farmdale/Exposition

The Authority’s Opening Brief at pp. 39 - 40:

“The pedestrian flows were modeled using this concept and it was demonstrated that this arrangement allows adequate pedestrian flow and storage.”

58 Culver City Light Rail Countdown at Less Than 1100 Days, Expo Reports – The Front Page – July 18, 200759 DCA Civil Engineering Report sent to Expo Authority (December 12, 2006)

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LADOT:

“LADOT is concerned that the gains made due to the increased width of the sidewalks and crosswalks to the south of Exposition Blvd. will be negated due to the lack of sidewalk space on Farmdale Ave north of Exposition Blvd. Currently, the eastern sidewalk on Farmdale north of Exposition Blvd. is 8 ft wide. It was clearly indicated on the pedestrian model that there is some spill-over of pedestrians into the street after crossing Exposition Blvd. to the north. Currently there is no problem because the intersection is controlled by a “STOP” sign which allows for a fairly constant flow of pedestrians across Exposition Blvd. At the future signalized intersection pedestrians will cross Exposition Blvd. in larger groups resulting in congestion at the north-west corner of the intersection as pedestrians reach the existing 8 ft wide sidewalk.” -RCES Meeting Notes Re: LATTC Driveways and Proposed Farmdale at p. 3 (April 24, 2007)

The Authority’s Opening Brief at p. 40:

“The ECU Amended Protest also expressed concern about the safety of stopping the sounding of crossing bells once the gate has reached the horizontal (closed) position. [….]“This measure reasonably balances the need for public safety with the mitigation of noise impacts.”

RCES:

“Silencing the bells when the gates are down was also discussed, but staff did not support that option due to the large number of pedestrian activity.” -RCES Meeting Notes Re: LATTC Driveways and Proposed Farmdale at p. 3 (April 24, 2007)

The Authority’s Opening Brief at p. 41:

“In summary, the at-grade crossing at Farmdale Avenue…has been designed with the cooperation of…LAUSD.”

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LAUSD:

“Habitable school buildings and places of assembly shall be located outside the 128-foot setback” for active rail lines. -LAUSD Distance Criteria for School Siting (February 27, 2007)

3. Crenshaw/Exposition:

“MTA is concerned about the eastbound right turn; expecting the same kind of troubles they’ve experienced on the Orange Line.” EMLCA Field Diagnostics Meeting #4 Minutes at p. 6 (November 6, 2006)

4. 7th Ave/Exposition:

“PUC asked if the two driveways south of the tracks could be closed.” -Field Diagnostic Meeting #2 Minutes at p. 2 (October 23, 2006)

5. Arlington/Exposition:

“PUC wanted the northbound bus zones to be re-located from the current location south of Exposition to just south of Rodeo.” (Field Diagnostic Meeting # 2 Minutes at p. 6 (October 23, 2006)

6. Gramercy Place/Rodeo Road:

The Authority’s Opening Brief at p. 34:

“[The crossing] ha[s] been designed with the cooperation of LADOT.”

LADOT:

“Okazaki also said that LADOT’s Bicycle unit was concerned about the tire slippage crossing the tracks, and although we’ve designed the bike lane to cross the tracks perpendicular to it, they believe that bicyclist will take a short cut and ride across the track along the roadway.” -Field Diagnostic Meeting #4 Minutes at p. 5 (November 6, 2006)

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7. Western/Exposition

The Authority’s Opening Brief at p. 35:

“[The crossing was] designed…consistent with past experience and current guidelines, to provide a safe environment.”

LAUSD:

“Habitable school buildings and places of assembly shall be located outside the 128-foot setback” for active rail lines. -LAUSD Distance Criteria for School Siting (February 27, 2007)

8. Vermont/Exposition

The Authority’s Opening Brief at p. 38:

“Expo Authority, in cooperation with LADOT, the Memorial Coliseum, Exposition Park, and USC, developed the Event Management Plan to integrate light rail service as a means to facilitate safe and efficient arrivals and departures for the large numbers of people attending events at the Coliseum.”

LADOT General Manager Gloria Jeff to Rick Thorpe (May 18, 2007):

“This study is based on an assumption that the Trousdale Station will be built and operated. [….] This is a fatal flaw of the study.”

[….]

“This study proposes that, during a post event, passengers taking the westbound LRT from a Coliseum event are required to line up in westbound traffic lanes on Exposition Boulevard east of Vermont Avenue and to be directed across Vermont Ave on unmarked westbound travel lanes. This proposed operation is not safe for pedestrians.”[….]

“The proposed 50-50 split requirement creates significant impacts to the Coliseum post event traffic control. Vermont Avenue capacity will be cut

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by at least 20% and delay will be doubled. Traffic congestion at Exposition Boulevard and Vermont Avenue will cause major gridlock at Martin Luther King Jr. Boulevard and Vermont Avenue, thus will prolong post event traffic congestion, and is no acceptable to LADOT.”

“LADOT raised the above concerns in numerous meetings with the Expo Authority. As of today, none of these concerns have been addressed.”

Expo LRT Ped Simulation Analysis Coordination Meeting Minutes November 8,

2006 with LADOT, Classic Parking, Expo Park, Expo Park Dept of Public Safety,

USC Dept of Public Safety, USC Transportation, LA Coliseum and LAMCC:

“Several individuals note their concerns regarding operating LRT service along Exposition Boulevard under an event situation. The pedestrian flows are extremely large and it would be very difficult to imagine how LRT service could be safely operated at-grade through this area.”

RCES:

“[W]e recommend extending the grade-separation another 0.30 miles to Vermont Avenue. This will result in eliminating four proposed crossings (Vermont, Menlo, Watt and Trousdale), and eliminate hazards associated with severe traffic congestion and traffic surges expected during venue use.” –RCES Comments on PRHCAR rev. 3 at p. 4

9. 28th/Flower & HOV/Flower

“Okazaki started off by saying that traffic moves very fast and erratic as drivers merge onto the HOV lane just south of 28th Street.”

10. Washington/Flower

“PUC was concerned about the long crosswalk on the north leg when the median island is removed.” -Field Diagnostic Meeting #3 Minutes at p. 2 (October 30, 2006)

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11. Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) Compliance

“MTA pointed out that ADA recommends at least an 8-foot sidewalk. However, we only have a 6-foot wide sidewalk on the south side, and there were no property takes proposed in the Project EIR to address this situation” -Field Diagnostics Meeting #6 Minutes (November 21, 2006)

ECU is disturbed that in a country that so profoundly values the rights of the

disabled that mom-and-pop small businesses can be forced to shut their doors

because the owners lack the financial ability to implement ADA compliant

changes to their property, that the Authority, with it’s Expo Line capital budget

of $640 million, over $3 billion annual budget and an army of lobbyists, would be

absolved from making alterations to accommodate disabled citizens.

M. The Authority’s Influence in the Proceedings

Indeed the entire process of permitting the Commission to exercise its voter-

approved oversight is under attack. Though their own Gold Line management

consultants advised subsequent projects to file grade crossing applications early

to plan for the possibility of protests and Commission proceedings,60 that

guidance went unheeded and construction schedules were developed with no

regard to the process. So here again, just a few years later, the Authority (with

many of the same project managers) is before the Commission complaining

about interference to their scheduling, and this time they attempt to undermine

the process altogether by pursuing sponsorship of legislation that attempts to

shorten the time that the Commission has to approve grade crossing

applications.61 Shortening the time frame would no doubt expedite the

construction of light rail projects in California, but to whose benefit and to whose

detriment? 60 Lessons Learned on the Gold Line Rail Project – Project Management Consultants Monica Born & Christopher Burner (APTA): Born and Burner stated applications should be submitted early to guard against at-risk construction, but the stated goal is also to provide “less time for small but vocal opposition groups to become established.”61 California Senate Bill 724 (Kuehl)

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IV. CONCLUSION

In the face of pending catastrophes and in defiance of all logic and fact, the lead

managers of the Expo Line project continue to profess the company line that they

are building a safe system, as a component of their Baghdad Bob

communications strategy. The Authority's CEO, dismissively labels ECU as “a

few disgruntled voices,” a category which he apparently lumps members of his

own staff, a former Los Angeles City Councilmember,62 the president of the

University of Southern California,63 the Los Angeles Unified School District, the

General Manager of the Los Angeles Department of Transportation, the City of

Culver City and the Rail Crossings Engineering Section of the Commission.

The numerous uncovered smoking memos, along with the Authority's political

actions, reveal an organization acting defensively under the crisis of transparency

and oversight. The Authority attempts to deceive elected officials with

misrepresentative design analogies64 as they develop and abet sponsorship of

end-around legislation that seeks to pressure Commissioners to grease the

wheels en route to disaster lest the Commission be stripped of it's California

voter-approved mandate. From publication of the Draft EIS/R to the current

applications the entire process has been more akin to political damage control

than engineering that is principled, in both senses of the term.

As the proceedings continue the Commission will either, like others, fall victim to

the Authority's strong arm tactics or apply the clearly defined legal definition of

practicability using sound engineering principles and lessons learned from the

black-eye of American rail transit safety – the Authority's Blue Line.

If the Commission buckles under the pressure of the Authority, perhaps it should

62 Don’t Turn Exposition Park Into A Rail Yard – LA Times - June 28, 200163 USC President Steve Sample Letter to Roger Snoble - March 31, 200664 Exposition Line Transit Project Status Update Legislative Staff Briefing – EMLCA (May 17, 2007)

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voluntarily or be forced to close its doors and the responsibility of rail crossing

safety should be transferred to a public agency willing to perform the duties

bestowed by the people of California and granted by the Federal Transit

Administration. Approving the verifiably defective design of the deadliest and

most accident-prone light rail line in the country on a corridor with more intense

site conditions and hazards would constitute a total abdication of responsibility

and betrayal of the people's trust. And failure to perform its well-defined duties

would make the Commission liable for the resulting catastrophes.

It is the belief of ECU that the Commission understands its duty. And it is the

hope of ECU, along with those for whom it stands (the muzzled and ignored

engineers and operators, the children, the parents, the teachers, and the citizens),

that well-established engineering principles and stare decisis will triumph.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ DAMIEN WESLEY CLARK GOODMON Date: September 17, 2007

Damien Wesley Clark Goodmon

Executive Director, Get LA Moving

On Behalf of Expo Communities United

P.O. Box 781267

Los Angeles, CA 90016

(323) 932-1959; email: csimmons@successnet.net

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