eda lec4 handout

HC Investment Health & In. Health Poliy Costs & Benets of Edu. Growth Child labor Disrimination Int. Migration

Eonomi Development in Asia

Human Resoures: Eduation, Health and Labor

Tomoki Fujii


Outline

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Human Capital Investment: From general framework of

investment deision-making

I

Investment deision making

I

Health and Inome

I

Costs and Benets of Eduation

I

Gender

I

Migration


Human Capital Investment

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Not everyone is equal in produtivity. People differ in their

produtivity.

I

Physial strength

I

Cognitive skills

I

Communiation skills

I

Appearane

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Some of these differenes are geneti.

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People an investment in their

:::::::::::::::

.

I

Health

I

Eduation

I

Voational training


Investment Deisions

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Investment deisions involve both ost and benet

onsiderations. Let the size of investment be x.

I

B

0

(x) [C

0

(x): benets [ost from investment of size x.

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Minimum investment size, dereasing marginal benet

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Fixed ost of investment, onstant marginal ost

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NB

0

(x) = B

0

(x) C

0

(x): Net benet

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When net benet is

maximized,

:::::::::::::

, or

B

0

0

(x) = C

0

0

(x).

x

$ B(x)

C(x) NB Maximized

Fixed cost of

investment


Food intake as investment

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Let F be the amount of food you

onsume.

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Output I(F ) is produed.

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Cost of food C(F ) is proportionate to

F .

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Suppose that you want to maximize the

surplus I(F ) C(F ).

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Applying the previous model, a rational

individual would hoose investment

level F

to maximize the surplus.

I

If the individual is redit onstrained

and start from F < F

1

, the F would

onverge to zero.

F

C(F)

Maximized

Surplus

F* F0

F1

$

I

This an be

onsidered nutrition

poverty trap (More

on poverty trap in

Le. #5).


Child Malnutrition (1)

I

The previous model is oversimplied, but it does show the

possibility of poverty trap.

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Note that a sizable proportion of spending typially go to

non-food spending.

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See also Chap. 2 of Banerjee and Duo.

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More realisti dynami interpretation would be as follows:

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You are poor beause you were malnourished as a hild.

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Sine you are poor, your hildren are also malnourished.

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In fat, hild malnutrition is important as it has serious

long-term negative effets (See, Grantham-MGregor et al.

(2007)):

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Height lost due to malnutrition annot be reovered.

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Cognitive skills are negatively affeted by malnutrition.

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Malnutrition an result in permanent disability.



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So far, we only onsidered only the lak of food intake.

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Insufient energy intake indeed leads to malnutrition.

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Deieny of mironutrients are also important.

I

::::::

deieny: Can lead to goiter (abnormally enlarged

thyroid gland) and mental retardation.

I

::::

deieny: Can lead to anemia. Assoiated with

poorer mental, motor, soio-emotional or neurophysiologi

funtioning.

I

:::::::::

deieny: Can result in blindness.



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Lak of adequate hild are also leads to malnutrition.

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Pratie good hygiene (wash hands; use lean utensils,

ups and bowls; store food properly)

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Pratie responsive feeding

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Adequate stimulations

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Diseases also leads to malnutrition. Major issues inlude:

I

::::::::

(Esp. prevalent in the rst two years of life. About

1/4 to 1/3 of the observed growth failure is attributable to

enteri infetions (Brown, 2003).)

I

:::::::

(Inreased risk of death and neurologial and

ognitive impairments)

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Intestinal parasites (Poor language performane)

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HIV/AIDS (Higher mortality, brain problems and inreased

risk of development retardation)


Magnitude of the hild malnutrition

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Grantham-MGregor et al. (2007) estimate that 28% of

hildren under ve in developing ountries are stunted.

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Prevalene of malnutrition is highest in South Asia and

Sub-Saharan Afria.

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These hildren are prevented from realizing their

developmental potential beause of malnutrition.


Health and inome (1)

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Overall health indiators generally improve as the ountry

develops.

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People grow taller as the ountry get riher.

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Men's average height in Great Britain rose by 9.1 m

between 1775 and 1975.

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Prop. of young Duth men shorter than 168m fell from 2/3

in 1855 to 2% today.

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Just in a entury, average height of Japanese men at the

age of 18 inreased by 13m. Height is very losely

orrelated with the inome level (see above).

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Height is indeed related to produtivity.

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In Brazil, where malnutrition is extensive, a 1% differene in

height is assoiated with a 7.7% differene in wages. In US,

a 1% differene in height is assoiated with a 1% differene

in wages.

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Morbidity, mortality and life expetany are also often used.


Health and inome (2)


Cross-ountry relationship

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In rih ountries, life expetany ranges approximately

between 75 and 80 years, while most of the poorest

ountries have a life expetany below 60 years.

I

In Latin Ameria, the rihest 20% has per-apita food

onsumption that is 50% larger than that of the poorest

20% of the population.


Interation of Health and Inome (1)

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Better health ausing higher inome

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If you are too unhealthy, you annot work.

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In the UK, the poorest 20% adults in 1780 were so badly

nourished they did not have the energy for even one hour of

manual labor per day. By 1980, suh malnutrition had been

ompletely eliminated, ontributing to the inrease of output

by 25%.

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Inreased alori intake ontributed to further 56% inrease

in the amount of labor input that ould be provided. These

effets ombined, better nutrition raised output by a fator

of 1:25 1:56 = 1:95 over 200 years, or 0.33% per year,

a

ording to Fogel (1997).

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But the reverse ausality is possible.


Interation of Health and Inome (2)

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Higher inome ausing better health

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Riher people an afford sufient amount of food, lean

water, mediine, better and safer living and working

environment, and better health servies.

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Average number of dotors per 1,000 people is 2.2 in rih

ountries, 0.8 in the world, and 0.3 in sub-Saharan Afria.

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A third fator orrelated with health and inome (e.g.,

ommuniation and transportation infrastruture)

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Improved road helps market a

ess of a remote village.

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This an help inrease the inome level of the village.

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At the same time, the patients an reah the nearest lini

more easily.


Modeling Inome to Health

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Health h(y; a) and inome

y(h; b).

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Parameters a and b affet

only

:::::::

and

::::::::

respetively.

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You an think of a as

a

ess to lean water and

b as prodution tehnology.


Exogenous Inrease in Produtivity

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Consider an exogenous

tehnologial progress so

that the parameter value

hanged from b to b'.

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For every h, we have

y(h; b

0

) > y(h; b). This

shift orresponds to the

arrow on the graph.

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Health and inome move

from point A to point C.

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A to B: Due to exogenous

shift in tehnology.

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B to C:

::::::::::::::::::::::::

.


Eonomi and Poliy Impliations

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Health and nutrition are important.

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Eonomi ost of ill-health and malnutrition is sizable.

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Grantham-MGregor et al. (2007) estimate that average

deit in adult yearly inome for stunted/poor hildren to be

19.8%.

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Further, poor health and nutrition an sustain existing

inequality in soiety.

I

Government an onsider health and nutrition

interventions for two reasons (Engle et al., 2007)

I

:::::::::

: As shown earlier, efient level of onsumption

may not be reahed. Better health and nutrition may pay

themselves and lead to faster growth. Also, subsidizing

preventive measures of infetious diseases makes

eonomi sense beause it helps to internalize the negative

externality of infetion.

I

::::::

: Children fae unequal opportunities.


Implementation Issues (1)

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When implementing health and nutrition poliies, a number

of problems may o

ur (See, Chap 3 of Banerjee and

Duo).

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There are a number of (potentially) fruitful preventive

measures in health and nutrition.

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For diarrhea, we have hlorine bleah (for purifying water),

and sugar and salt (key ingredients of oral dehydration

solution).

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For malaria, we have insetiide-treated bed net.

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Others inlude deworming drugs, exlusive breast-feeding

for the rst six months, iron-fortied our against anemia,

and so on.


Implementation Issues (2)

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However, these measures may not be used even when

they are provided for free.

I

Banerjee and Duo argue that ertain faith/beliefs prevent

people from adopting them or hanging behavior.

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But some nudging may help.

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For example, those who are inentivised to buy their rst

bed nets are more willing to pay the seond one at the full

prie than those who paid the full prie for their rst bed

nets.


Eduation as human apital investment

I

Investment that inreases one's mental ability is also an

important form of investment in human apital.

I

Fous on formal eduation, but informal eduation and

training are also important.

I

The level of eduation has inreased in both developing

ountries and developed ountries between 1960 and

2000.

I

Yet, 34% of the adult population in the developing world had

no eduation at all.


Determination of the level of eduation

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How is the level of eduation determined? A

ording to the

model of investment

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Cost: higher ost of eduation

:::::::::::

eduation level.

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Benet: higher returns to eduation enourages eduation.

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Disount rate: higher disount rate

:::::::::::

eduation

level.

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Most the (high-shool/ollege) students are

::::::

.


Cost of Eduation

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In 2000, the US government spent $443 billion on

eduation, and private individual spent another $164

billion, totaling 6.2% of GDP.

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The

:::::::::::::::::

of eduationthe forgone wages

while people are being eduatedare not inluded.

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One estimate is that the opportunity ost is roughly equal

to all other eduational spending in the US. So, total ost of

investment in eduation is 12.4% of US GDP in 2000.

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Corresponding gure for the investment in physial apital

was 17.9%.


Benets of eduation

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Investment in physial apital entails returnsapitalists

are willing to pay for mahines beause they an produe

more with more mahines.

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We an measure how muh of a return a piee of physial

apital ommands in the market.

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We an similarly nd the return to eduation by the

inrease in wages that a worker would reeive from one

additional year of shooling.


Measuring Return on Eduation (1)

I

Typially, the return on (additional year of) eduation is

alulated as follows :

I

First, the logarithmi wage is regressed on the number of

years of eduation (or more ompliated form of eduation

variable), experiene and possibly other orrelates.

I

The estimated oefient on the number of years of

eduation show how muh more wage you ould earn from

one more year of eduation (Minerian Rate of Return).

Then, you have an estimate of the annual stream of

additional earnings over the ourse of life.

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Then, estimate the additional ost of eduation and the

annual stream of forgone wage due to one additional year

of eduation.

I

One the stream of osts and benets assoiated with one

more year of eduation is found, you an alulate the

internal rate of return and the net benet in present value.



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However, the Minerian rate of return equals the internal

rate of return under some assumptions.

I

We onsider a very simple version here. See Hekman et

al. (2003) for more thorough treatment.

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Suppose that everyone has the same ability, lives forever

and the same interest rate r.

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In eah period, eah individual an study or work. Assume

that eduation is ostless.

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The wage depends only on the level of eduation E. So,

the wage rate an be given by w(E).

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Everyone tries to maximize the present-value lifetime

earnings

:::::::::::::::::::

.

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Note that the summation starts from t = E.



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If there are too little eduated people, the wages for

eduated people would be very high.

I

Hene, more and more people would get eduated.

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In an equilibrium, I(E) should be equated for all the

eduation levels, so that

:::::::::::::::::

.

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Notie here that we an rewrite

I(E) = w(E)

(1+r)

E

1

1

1+r

= w(E)

(1+r)

(E1)

r

, sine I(E) is a

sum of a geometri sequene.

I

Therefore,

:::::::::::::::::::::::::

, and hene

lnw(E) = lnw(0) +E ln(1 + r).



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ln(1 + r) is the ontinuous-time version of the disount

rate, but for a small r, ln(1 + r) r.

I

If we observe w and E, we an estimate r (or ln(1 + r)).

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In this model, the internal rate of return on eduation is

equal to the interest rate.

I

Notie that we an estimate r without the observed interest

rate.

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A more ompliated version of the Miner model

inorporate the training after formal shooling.



I

Table below is taken from Psaharopoulos (1994). Hall and

Jones (1999) [ited in Weil used the gure for

Sub-Saharan Afria (13.4%) for the returns to eduation for

the rst four years, the world average (10.1%) for the next

four years and the OECD (6.8%) for eduation beyond 8

years.

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Using these numbers, we an nd the effet of eduation

on wages.


Effet of Eduation on Wages

I

Using the numbers in the

previous slide, we an

draw the graph on the

right.

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For example, if you have

four years of eduation,

you would earn more than

those without eduation by

the fator of

(1:134)

4

= 1:654

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If you have eight years of

eduation, the ratio is

:::::::::::::::::::::::::

.


Shooling and Wages

I

As the following table shows, a majority of people in

developing ountries have not ompleted primary

eduation whereas a majority of people in advaned

ountries have at least some seondary eduation.


Rate of Return to Eduation

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Psaharopoulos (1994) also alulates the IRR for

eduation

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High rates of return to eduation at all levels.

I

:::::::::::

returns, i.e. tertiary eduation has lower

returns per dollar invested than seondary eduation.

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The highest returns are on

::::::::

eduation.

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Note that the private and soial returns are different:

I

Private alulations are based on the

:::::::::::::

ost,

whereas soial alulations onsider the osts paid by the

government and external effet (next).


External Effet

I

Shooling is onsidered to have positive external effet.

That is, other people benets from your shooling.

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What are the possible benets?

I

the value of being able to vote intelligently

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follow the rules set down by soiety

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make possible ontributions to soiety through ulture,

siene, soial siene and the arts that exeed private

returns of the individual.


Poliy impliations

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Given relative high returns to eduation investment, why

don't people invest more?

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Eduation is ostly and poor people are redit onstrained.

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People don't see the benets or have misguided beliefs

about the returns to eduation.

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Then, inentivising may help (e.g.,

::::::::::::::::::::::::

suh as PROGRESA).

I

But, when the lak of inome is the major obstale,

unonditional ash transfer also would help.

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See also Chap 4 of Banerjee and Duo.


Quality of Shooling (1)

I

So far, we only looked at the number of years of shooling.

I

However, one year of primary eduation in Singapore is not

equal to one year of eduation in Cambodia, for example.

I

Quality of shooling is not easy to measure, espeially in a

manner that allows international omparison.


Quality of Shooling (2)

I

In 1997, the student/teaher ratio in primary shool among

developed ountries was 16.7. In developing world, the

ratio was 29.7. In Afria, it was 34.2.

I

The teahers in developing ountries are not as well

trained as those in developed ountries.

I

In Mozambique, 70% of the teahers in grades 1-5

themselves have only seven years of shooling.

I

In many developing ountries, textbooks, lassrooms and

teahers are all sare.

I

Students are able to learn less in a year in poor ountries

beause of the widespread health problems.


Output of Shooling

I

The standardized

test sores tend

to be better in

rih ountries.

I

Japan, China and

Four Tigers

tended to do well

for the given level

of inome.


Modeling Growth with Human Capital

I

Now let us take into a

ount the differenes in the quality

of labor.

I

Suppose that eah worker supplies h units of labor. The

ountry has K units of apital and L units of worker.

I

The total labor input is hL. So, the output is

Y = AK

(hL)

1

.

I

Remember k = K=L. Then, dividing both sides of the

equation above by L, we have: y = Ak

h

1

.


Finding the Steady State

I

Let us now nd the steady state.

I

Suppose the rate of depreiation is , and the rate of

investment (=saving) is .

I

Then, the hange in the apital per worker is:

k = y k = Ak

h

1

k.

I

So, apital grows faster when h is larger and thus the

output grows faster when h is larger.

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Now, onsider a steady state, whih o

urs when k = 0.

I

So, we have:Ak

h

1

k = 0.

I

Therefore, k

SS

= [Ah

1

=

1=1

= h[A=

1=1


Steady State Output

I

So, we have found the steady state apital per worker k

SS

.

I

To nd the output per worker, we just need to plug this in

y = Ak

h

1

. So,

y

SS

= A(k

SS

)

h

1

= A(h[A=

1=1

)

h

1

= A

1=1

[=

=1

h

:

I

So, the steady state output per worker is proportional to

the value of h.


Numerial Example

I

Let us use the gures in the previous slide (Shooling and

Wages).

I

Let ountry i have average shooling of 12 years and

ountry j have average shooling of 4 years (and they are

otherwise equal).

I

Then, the ratio of the steady state level of inome for these

two ountries are:

y

SS

i

=y

SS

j

= h

i

=h

j

= 3:16=1:65 = 1:92.


Child Labor and Eduation (1)

I

The returns to eduation we have disussed are the

average returns to eduation.

I

However, they may vary from individuals to individuals.

I

Poor families may have lower private returns to eduation

beause the opportunity ost is higher.

I

That is, the hildren may be working if they are not in

shool.

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On the other hand, the rih hildren would not be working if

they are out of shool.

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Then, hildren in the poor families tend to have lower

eduation, leading to the persistent inequality.

I

Poliy interventions neessary?

I

hild labor tends to disappear as the eonomy grows. But,

this takes time.



I

Ray (2000) tests the

:::::::::::::::

(a family sends the

hildren to the labor market only if the family's inome from

non-hild-labor soures drops very low).

I

In Pakistan, he nds that poverty is positive assoiated

with hours of hild labor and negatively assoiated with

hild shooling. Hene, the luxury axiom is onrmed.

I

When a Pakistani household falls into poverty, eah hild's

involvement in the labor market is inreased by

approximately 500 hours.

I

The shooling is also redued, and the redution is higher

for girls than boys.



I

In Peru, there is no empirial support for the luxury axiom.

I

The differene between Pakistan and Peru may be due to

(i) the lak of good shools in Pakistan and (ii) the fat that

Peruvian hildren ombine employment and shooling.

I

Ray (2000) also shows the eduation of adults, espeially

mothers, positively inuene hild labor and shooling.

I

This linkage is partiularly strong in Pakistan, leading to a

viious yle of reeiving little eduation.

I

He argues that a large and sustained investment in adult

eduation and shooling infrastruture will be neessary to

break this yle.


Takling hild labor

I

One ould think of banning hild labor.

I

Most agree there should be a minimum rule (e.g. Children

should not be working in exploitative or ruel onditions).

I

However, banning hild labor altogether may not be the

best interest of the hildren.

I

With the earnings from the hild labor, hildren may be able

to obtain nutrition and eduation they annot get otherwise.

I

Most working hildren work at home, and it thus would be

difult to enfore the ban.

I

Improving the shooling infrastruture and reduing the

ost of shooling (esp for the poor) help redue hild labor.

I

In PROGRESA program in Mexio, parents are given ash

transfers (and other benets) when hildren ontinue to

attend shool.

I

In other words, parents have stronger inentive to send

hildren to shool in this program.

I

This, in turn, means the problems with monitoring do not

arise.


Gender

I

Gender disparity is observed in many soioeonomi

indiators (suh as shooling and wages) in many

developing ountries, and this disparity is often persistent.

I

Asia is relatively equal among developing ountries, while

South Asia has a high level of disparity a

ording to the

index of gender equality index [b/w 1 (low equality) and 4

(high equality) (World Bank, 2001).


Labor market disrimination

I

One obvious differene the wage. Why?

I

There may be gender differenes due to the differenes in

the produtive harateristis (eduation, work experiene,

et).

I

In developing ountries, women are on average less well

eduated than men.

I

Observed differenes in o

upation, job titles, or wages

aross the gender may be due to the differenes in

distribution of the produtive harateristis.

I

Labor market disrimination

I

Workers who have idential produtive harateristis are

treated differently beause of the group (e.g., gender, rae,

et.) they belong to.


Consequenes of disrimination

I

Setting aside the issues of fairness and morality,

disrimination leads to eonomially inefient outome.

I

If the employer replaes a less produtive man with a more

produtive woman, the employer an be more protable.

I

Those who are not disriminated against may beome

worse off, one disrimination is removed.

I

However, they an be potentially ompensated.


Gender inequality in eduation (1)

I

There is a large gender disparity in shooling in many

developing ountries.

I

What happens as a result? Consider the argument of

Klasen (2000). Assuming...

I

Boys and girls have a similar distribution of innate abilities.

I

Children with more abilities are more likely to reeive

eduation

I

Then, less able boys than girls have the hane to be

eduated in the presene of gender inequality.

I

If the amount of human apital of a person is the outome

of a ombination of innate abilities and eduation, gender

inequality in eduation would lower the average level of

human apital in the eonomy and therefore

:::::

eonomi growth.



I

The previous argument is supported by empirial evidene.

I

In many developing ountries, marginal returns to

eduation are higher for girls than for boys, probably

beause of the seletion effet and delining marginal

returns to eduation.

I

The annual growth in poorer regions ould have been up to

0.9 perentage point faster, if these regions had started

with more balaned eduation ahievements in 1960 and

done more to promote gender-balaned eduation growth.



I

The reverse ausality is also possible.

I

Eonomi development may help to promote gender

equality.

I

Higher expeted rate of return to human apital and

inreased inentives to invest in girls

I

Labor market for women

I

Better infrastruture.

I

Impat depends on the state of rights, a

ess to and

ontrol of produtive resoures and politial voie (World

Bank, 2001).


Poliy Impliations

I

There are several areas that World Bank (2001)

addresses:

I

Promote gender equality in a

ess to produtive resoures

and earning apaity. (e.g. make the ost of shooling

heap to inrease private returns)

I

Reduing the personal osts to women of their household

roles. (e.g. Low-ost hild are)

I

Provide gender-appropriate soial protetion (e.g. Take into

a

ount the gender differenes in risk and vulnerability)

I

Strengthening women's politial voie and partiipation

(e.g. Minimum number/proportion of politial parties'

andidates or of eletoral seats in national or loal

assemblies)


International Migration (1)

I

Migration an be also onsidered as investment.

I

You inur an initial investment ost assoiated with moving.

There may be additional psyhi osts as well.

I

One you move, you may gain from better job opportunities

and better living environment.

I

Why do people migrate?

I

Politial reasons

I

Employment / business opportunities

I

Insurane motives.


International Migration (2)

I

Eonomially, if people are free to move, they move to their

advantage.

I

As a result, the wage and marginal produtivity of labor

would be equated aross the world.

I

There are winners and losers, but the winners an

potentially ompensate for the losers, if suh movement

o

urred.

I

In suh a ase, the global GDP ould more than double.

But, due to politial obstales, freer migration is often not

popular (See, Migration and development Eonomist May

6, 2004).


International Migration and Development (1)

I

::::::::::::

I

Migration of high-skilled labor (suh as aademis,

engineers and dotors) from poor ountries to rih

ountries has beome an issue.

I

The large investment in human apital made by a poor

ountry ould only benet rih ountries.

I

:::::::::::::

I

International labor migration an be good for the

development of the ountry, as remittanes to the poor

ould help lift a ountry out of poverty. (more on this later)


International Migration and Development (2)

I

Soial and politial remittanes

I

Migrants may bring home useful values and knowledge

I

Large-sale return migration has oinided with (and

perhaps boosted) politial and eonomi hange (e.g.,

Turkey, Greee and Portugal)

I

People of Indian origin in US and elsewhere are pushing for

transpareny and simpler regulations for foreign investors

who want to start businesses in India.

I

Soure of apital

I

Emigrants in rih ountries as a soure of apital (west

Afrian ountries).

I

Mathing funds for remittanes to pay for small ommunity

projets (entral Ameria).


Remittanes (1)

I

Remittanes to developing ountries have soared from

$17.7 bn in 1980 to $30.6bn in 1990 to nearly $80 bn in

2002.

I

It has beome an important soure of foreign exhange

I

Double the amount of foreign aid and 10 times higher than

net private apital transfers

I

Remittanes are the most

::::::

soure of nanial ows

(not subjet to the onditions imposed by donors or the

herd behavior of investors).


Remittanes (2)

I

Further, unlike foreign aid that goes through government

bureauraies, remittanes go diretly to households.

I

Who benets from remittanes? Depends on the ountry

(and its geography)

I

In Mexio and Central Ameria, remittanes largely go to

poor households.

I

In the Philippines, Vietnam and Pakistan, relatively

better-off families get the larger share.

I

Japan is the largest ountry soure of remittanes in East

Asia in 2001 (Balane of Payment Statistis, IMF(2002))

and one of the top ten ountries.

Referenes

Required reading

I

Kapur and MHale (2003).

I

Weil. Chapter 6.

I

Banerjee and Duo. Chapters 2-4.

I

Sikness or symptom? Eonomist Feb 7, 2004,

370(8361): 73. This provides some additional disussion

on hild labor.

I

Migration and development Eonomist May 6, 2004 (web

only). Available from

http://www.eonomist.om/node/2608019.

Referenes

Further reading

I

See Ehrenberg and R.S. (2008) for the disussion of the

theory of disrimination. It is on the ourse reserve.

I

Other relevant soures inlude Hanushek (1995),

Edmonds and Pavnik (2005), Kremer (1995),

Psaharopoulos (1994), Straus and Thomas (1998) and

World Bank (2001).

Referenes

Brown, K.H. (2003) `Diarrhea and malnutrition.' Journal of

Nutrition 133(1), 328S331S

Edmonds, E.V., and N. Pavnik (2005) `Child labor in the global

eonomy.' Journal of Eonomi Perspetives 19(1), 199220

Ehrenberg, R.G., and Smith R.S. (2008) Modern Labor

Eonomis: Theory and Appliation Tenth edition (Addison

Wesley). Read pp.281-292, and pp. 395-427. (Chapters 9-12

are generally useful)

Engle, P.L., M.M. Blak, J.R. Behrman, M. Cabral de Mello, P.J.

Gertler, L. Kapiriri, R. Martorell, M.E. Young, and the

International Child Development Steering Group (2007)

`Strategies to avoid the loss of developmental potential in

more than 200 million hildren in the developing world.'

Lanet 369, 229241

Fogel, R.W. (1997) `New nding on seular treands in nutrition

and mortality+ some impliations for population theory.' In

Handbook of Poluation and Family Eonomis: Vol. 1A., ed.

M.R. Rosenzweig and O. Stark (North Holland)

Referenes

Grantham-MGregor, S., Y.B. Cheung, S. Cueto, P. Glewwe,

L. Rihter, B Strupp, and the International Child Development

Steering Group (2007) `Developmental potential in the rst 5

years for hildren in developing ountries.' Lanet 369, 6070

Hanushek, E.A. (1995) `Interpreting reent researh on

shooling in developing ountries.'World Bank Researh

Observer 10(22), 227246. Available from

http://go.worldbank.org/Q0O0F7MOG1

Hekman, J.J., L.J. Lohner, and P.E. Todd (2003) `Fifty years

of miner earnings regressions.' Disussion Paper 775, IZA.

Available from

ftp://ftp.iza.org/RePE/Disussionpaper/dp775.pdf

Kapur, D., and J. MHale (2003) `Migration's new payoffs.'

Foreign Poliy 139, 4857

Klasen, S. (2000) `Low shooling for girls, slower growth for all?

ross-ountry evidene on the effet of gender inequality in

eduation on eonomi development.'World Bank Eonomi

Review 16(3), 345373

Referenes

Kremer, M.R. (1995) `Researh on shooling: What we know

and what we don't: A omment on hanushek.'World Bank

Researh Observer 10(2), 247254. Available from

http://go.worldbank.org/Q0O0F7MOG1

Psaharopoulos, G. (1994) `Returns to investment in eduation:

A global update.'World Development 22(9), 13251343

Ray, R. (2000) `Child labor, hild shooling, and their interation

with adult labor: Empirial evidene for peru and pakistan.'

World Bank Eonomi Review 14(2), 347367

Straus, J., and D. Thomas (1998) `Health, nutrition, and

eonomi development.' Journal of Eonomi Literature

36(2), 766817

Walker, S.P., T.D. Wahs, J.M. Gardner, B. Lozoff, Wasserman,

Pollitt G.A., J.A. E., Carter, and the International Child

Development Steering Group (2007) `Child development: risk

fators for adverse outomes in developing ountries.' Lanet

369, 145157

Referenes

World Bank (2001) Engendering Development: Through

Gender Equality in Rights, Resoures, and Voie (Oxford

University Press). Read pp. 1-29. Available from

http://go.worldbank.org/K22ADFICI0

HC InvestmentHC Investment

Health & Inc.Health & Inc.

Health PolicyHealth Policy

Costs & Benefits of Educ.Costs and Benefits of Educ.

GrowthGrowth

Child laborChild labor

DiscriminationDiscrimination

Int. MigrationInt. Migration

Appendix

eda lec4 handout

Documents

size of investment

investment of size x

iminimum investment

migrationchild malnutrition

surplus f

malnutrition annot

investmentilet f

f wouldonverge