Paper title:

Strategic difficulties of organizational experiments in

European Radical Left Parties. The case of SYRIZA

Dr. Loudovikos Kotsonopoulos, Panteion University.

Presented at  ╉The radical left and crisis in the EU: From marginality to the

mainstream?,╊ University of Edinburgh, Scotland, 17 May 2013.

1. Radical Left Party Family: The new role of coalition building

In the last thirty years the political landscape of the Radical Left in Europe has

been earmarked by three important developments; First, the severe ideological

and political blow suffered by the parties of the orthodox communist, but also of

the euro-communist and revolutionary/ extreme left parties, following the gradual demystification of ╉really existing╊ socialism,  the subsequent demise of the USSR and the gradual mutation of the People╆s Republic of China into a model of an extremely undemocratic ultra-capitalism; Second, the challenge to the Left parties╆  traditional organizational structures,  following to the emergence of  the antiglobalization movement and the ad hoc spontaneous national social

movements which appear as new actors in the political field; Third, the social

and political space opened to the Radical Left by the neoliberal turn of social

democracy, still at work.

Each of the developments listed above bore an impact on the organizational

trajectory followed by left party formations; an impact varied according to the

institutional framework within which the latter operated. Irrespective of space

and time, however, there is a common characteristic in the organizational

development of some key players of the European Radical Left (i.e. Die Linke in

Germany, the United Left in Spain, Bloco in Portugal, Red-Green Alliance in

Denmark, and the Left Front in France), despite significant differences among

themselves. The constituent parts of all these relative new political formations

come from various ideological and political traditions frequently with different

and/ or diverging strategic orientations. Initially, their main concern was how to

avoid political marginalization, which usually was connected to securing and/ or

expanding parliamentary representation. This led them to try and achieve a

greater or lesser degree of organizational integration. However, the diversity of

political forces with the subsequent plurality of views, while being in itself a new,

and promising, democratic development in the history of Radical Left, has at the

same time raised serious strategic issues regarding the functioning of these new

political formations, their decision-making process and ultimately their

effectiveness. The following table illustrates the duration of organizational

integration processes in the coalitions mentioned above.

Compared to other party families, the radical Left one singles out for its

coalition-driven organizational model. This does not build a case that Radical

Left Parties are predominantly outcomes of party coalition building processes.

Rather the point is that in key political systems of Western Europe, ( France and

Germany in particular) and throughout the South ( Greece, Portugal and Spain),

coalition building seem to be the driving organizational force behind attempts of

founding new parties in the radical Left political landscape; these attempts end

up to be longstanding processes of organizational integration with uncertain

results. Even when these processes are fruitful and new parties emerge out of

them, as in the cases of Germany, Spain and Portugal, still their functioning is

turbulent and early divisions between the initial players involved continue to

cast a shadow.

There is a wide array of factors, ranging from proximate institutional causes to

deeper politico-ideological ones, affecting both the instigation and the course

taken by each integration process. At the outset, the need to secure or expand

parliamentary representation is strongly related to proximate institutional

causes, i.e the operation of the electoral system. Most of the observed cases of

coalition building processes in the Radical Left party family takes place either in

political systems having electoral thresholds to secure parliamentary

1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020

IU

GR

BLOCO

LINKE

FG

representation ( Germany 5%, Greece 3%, Denmark 2%) or electoral systems operating  along  the  lines  of  D╆  (ondt  proportional  representation  method  ゅ Spain, Portugal and again Denmark). Later steps of organizational integration

process might be influenced by the number, size and ideological proximity of the

parties involved in the coalition, as well as the political environment

surrounding it. The following table offers a brief account of the integration

process that key party coalitions in the Radical Left Camp are undergoing.

Parties

Dimensions

of organisational

Integration

Level of

organisational

integration

Low High High Low High

Parties

involved in

the coalition

Preservatio

n

Peservation Dissolution

after six years.

Operation as

factions.

Dissolution

after two

years.

Operation as

factions

Preservation

Influence of

the Parties

involved

High Low Significant

and informal

Significant

and

institutionali

sed

High

Membership Double Double Single

membership in

the new party

Single

membership

in the new

party

Double

Ideological

consensus

Low High/

Common

political

program

after 13

years

High

/Common

political

program after

6 years

Low/

Minimun

political

platform

after 6 years

Low

It is in the context of this wider comparative framework of coalition building and

organizational integration, that the case of SYRIZA will be studied. However

before scrutinize the latter, it is of particular importance to narrow down the

comparative framework at a southern European level. Not only because, as

stated above, coalition building is an organizational pattern that dominates the

Radical Left party family across the countries in this particular region; but also

because these organizational patterns unfold in similar political environments.

Some traits compiling the latter are:

The preservation of Communist parties and their establishment as the principal

political actors in the political camp left to social democracy. The remarkable

resilience of southern  European  communist  parties  is  rooted  in  the  region╆s political history. Having been banned from the interwar years, these parties

survived as illegal organizations of resistance against authoritarian or semi-

authoritarian regimes, thus building a profile of democratic champions that

secured them a foothold in the democratic regimes established after the collapse

of dictatorships from the mid-70s onwards. Their record of democratic struggles

preserved them as active political actors in the political scene, yet on the other

hand their political influence was conditioned upon their ability to adopt

changes taking place in the left ideological milieu. In Greece and Portugal, the respective  communist  parties  left  no  room  to  accommodate  ╉renovating╊ ideological currents, while in Spain the communist party itself formed the subject of ╉renovation╊. As a result, in the first two cases the communist parties stood against the emergence of post-communist cum Left democratic political

actors and in the third case the communist party rode along with these new

actors.

The hegemony of socialist. or social-democratic parties as principal actors of

democratic consolidation and subsequently of the respective countries╆ adhesion to the Eurozone. This feature marked a clear-cut barrier in the formation of the

radical left political space and constituted, simultaneously, a recurrent source of

ideological tension inside it.

Both in Portugal and Spain the organizational integration process resulted in the

transformation of the coalitions into parties, since eventually they acquired their

own institutions of decision-making and their own party members. However in

the Portuguese case integration seem to be consolidated, albeit ideological

differences still preponderate, since the initial parties involved- more or less of

the same size- were eventually disbanded and mutated into fractions. In the

Spanish case the coalition ended up in a party, although the initial parties

involved preserved their separate identities. This is not only due to the

ideological differences, but it is a product of power asymmetry between the

initial actors involved, since the Spanish Communist Party was the dominant

force behind the coalition representing, in organizational terms, nearly 80% of it.

In terms of political environment SYRIZA has been always much closer to the

Portuguese case since it was forced to contest the hegemony of the communist

party in the political space Left to the Social democracy. On the other hand, the

course of organizational integration taken by SYRIZA, though still incomplete,

pay striking resemblances to the one followed by the United Left , in the sense

that there is a significant power asymmetry between the actors involved in the

whole process. Synaspismos is the dominant political actor inside SYRIZA,

accounting to approximately 80% of its power in organizational terms, hence the

fortunes of SYRIZA was, and to a certain extent still is, conditioned upon the

struggles taking place inside Synaspismos. What makes the case of SYRIZA

unique in the constellation of European radical left parties, though, is the

prospect of acquiring governmental powers. Then the question emerges, in what

way this prospect affects the organizational integration process of the coalition;

a process so far facing similar predicaments with the Spanish case.

The rest of this paper will scrutinize first the course of integration process taken

by Syriza until 2012, by associating it with the strategic and tactical battles

taking place inside its principal component Synaspismos. We will then conclude

by examining the impact of the 2012 elections on this process.

2. Neither/nor tactics: The politics of Synaspismos on the road to SYRIZA

Synaspismos (first name: Coalition of the Left and Progress, was initially founded

in 1988 (during the Gorbatchev era) as a real coalition mainly of the Communist

Party of Greece (KKE) and the GREEK LEFT (the reformed part of the ex

Communist Party of Greece-Interior, after the split of this euro-communist party

in 1987), some smaller social-democratic groups and a number of distinguished

personalities of the Socialist Left. Its explicit aim was to challenge the hegemony

of bi-partyism and right-wing politics and to forge a coalition of social and

political forces with a prospect of ascending to power (SYN 1989). This coalition

excluded PASOK, the socialist party in office for eight years because of its

involvement in financial scandals and political corruption.

Three years after the establishment of the Synaspismos, KKE decided to

withdraw from the coalition, a decision derived from the victory of hardliners

within the party. The result was a serious party split, with those of its members

remaining in Synaspismos turning the coalition, together with the members of

the Greek Left, into a unitary party under the same name.

This crucial and ambiguous decision, taken at a high level of both partners of the

coalition, created a new situation, which was not easy at all. Members coming

from the two conflicting sides of the Greek communist movement suddenly had

to co-exist as comrades in the same party, without any previous discussion

among themselves about the ideological, political, historical and cultural issues

which had divided them in the not so far past. The introduction of tendencies (at

the time, a big novelty of the non-communist Left) was actually a way for the

survival of the new party, with (actual) segmentation substituting an

(impossible) homogenization. Since that time and until recently, Synaspismos has been divided  in  two main  factions,  the  ╉Left Current╊  ゅconsisting mainly of the ex-KKE membersょ  and  one  or more  ╉Renovating╊  tendencies, which  at  the end were united  in  the  ╉Renovating Wing╊. The two following figures illustrate

the development of the factions in the Left and in the renovating wing, up until the party╆s split in にどなど1.

Development of factions in the Left Camp

Development of factions in the «Renovating» Camp

1 See Eleftheriou, K, ゅにどどひょ, ╉The ╉uneasy╊ symbiosis. Factionalism and Radical Politics in Synaspismos╊, paper presented at ねth Hellenic PHD Symposium, pp.10.

Given the fact that in the first national election following its formation as a party,

Synaspismos did not manage to cross the electoral threshold of 3% and acquire

parliamentary representation, the whole debate regarding the tactics and

strategy of the party was its political survival, which involved necessarily

parliamentary representation. To achieve that the party had to demarcate its

political space against on the one hand the major rival from the left (KKE) and

from the centre-left (PASOK). In the elections of 1996 the goal of parliamentary

representation is achieved, but still the cleavage of the tendencies over the

prospects of coalitions with other political players remained a constitutive

element of the party. The Left Current (Aristero Revma) was aiming at the so-called ╉unity of the Left╊, that is a coalition that would bring once again under the

same roof the Communist Party and the Left forces outside of it. On the other

hand, part of those clustering around renovating tendencies envisioned an

alliance with Centre-Left forces open enough to include the socialist party

(PASOK), which was then in government and was looking after ideological support for its ╉modernization╊ project from the ╉moderated╊ Left . The different

strategic perspectives of the party tendencies stroke a balance with a decision taken by the central committee in March なひひば run as follows ╉ neither support PASOK╆s  government,  nor  containment  in  a  mere  critic╊.  This  political  logic combined with the leadership of a president, Nikos Konstantopoulos a political

figure of the Centre who participated actively in the resistance during the

Dictatorship period, not belonging to any particular tendency ease the tensions

between the different fractions until roughly 2000.

At that point, one can trace the beginning of the Synaspismos╆s ╉Left turn╊ both in its internal politics and its general political standing. For the first time

tendencies clustering on the left side gain a foothold at the expense of the

renovators, a part of which walked out at that time to ╉critically support╊ Pasok╆s government. However this shift in the balance of forces brought with it a new

consensus. So far the party and its factions considered their political survival as a

by-product of their activity inside the political system. In 2000 the tides changed

and the party was heavily involved in the social movements, a tactic embraced by

nearly all irrespective of tendencies. The impact of this involvement on the party╆s  profile  can  be  demonstrated  by  the alteration of its title in 2003 to

Coalition of the Left of Movements and of Ecology. Via its involvement with the

movements Synaspismos expanded its influence in the youth and came into

contact with extra-parliamentary forces of the far-left, predominantly maoist,

troskyite and some ex-communist party cadres.

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

1989 1990 1993 1996 2000 2004 2007 2009 2012 2012

SYN

PASOK

KKE

SYRIZA

DIMAR

This  turn  towards  the  movements  modified  the  party╆s  direction  of  political survival by trying to forge coalitions ╉from below╊. )n this respect, it decided to

participate in 2004 elections by forming an electoral coalition called SYRIZA

(Coalition of the Radical Left); a decision largely driven by the motive of securing

parliamentary representation.

3. SYRIZA – Synaspismos’s electoral mask

The initial parties forming SYRIZA were Synaspismos, AKOA( Renovative

Communist Ecological Left), DEA (International Labour Left) –trotskyite group-,

Active Citizens- a group centered around Manolis Glezos a prominent figure of

the Left during the post-war years, KEDA (Movement for the United Action of

the left) –mostly populated by expelled Communist party members. Latter

additions were KOE (Communist Organization of Greece ) – a maoist group,

Kokkino (a trotskyite group), ROZA (a team associated with an independent

Leftist group for the promotion of social and political rights).

Both clusters of fractions in Synaspismos considered SYRIZA as an electoral

alliance and as a means for a formation of wider political coalitions, which

corresponded, grosso modo, to the same strategic priorities they had during the ╅ひどs.  Those  clustering  at  the  Left were  clung  on  the  idea  of  using  SYR)ZA  as  a means  of  achieving  the  ╉unity  of  the  Left  project╊.  Part  of  them  included  the Communist Party in this Unity, while another part did not consider the

participation of the latter a necessary condition and focused mainly on a

coalition of far left non-parliamentary political forces. Those clustering on the

right conceded in the SYRIZA undertaking because they as well saw it fit with

their initial planning of forming a wider coalition of Centre-Left forces. Their

aspiration was to consolidate the tribunician function2 of the coalition that is to

neutralize the centrifugal forces of the Far Left and integrate them into a Centre-

Left political alliance.

It should be noted here that despite allegations made by each cluster against the

other of attempting to dissolve Synaspismos, in fact nearly all fractions were

2 Lavau,G.ゅなひはひょ, ╉Partis et systemes politiques: )nteractions et fonctions╊ in Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 2(1).

supporting the preservation of the party as a precondition for the mounting of

any political strategy of coalition. This is well reflected by the very structure of

SYRIZA. Experience in the coalition integration processes demonstrates that in

the first steps, and until the creation of new party bodies, the decision-making

process is carried out under a rule of unanimity and only in the later stages

majoritarian politics comes in. Furthermore, in some cases leadership is

collective or is conducted by a leader who is selected according to the center of

gravity principle3, i.e. by someone who is located at the center of the coalition╆s ideological constellation- a case in point here is Konstantopoulos╆s  presidency mentioned above in Synaspismos. In the case of SYRIZA we have the application

of the majoritarian rule. The leader of Synapismos is to lead SYRIZA and the first

word in the title of the electoral coalition is to be the name of its major

component, hence Synaspismos RIZospastikis Aristeras.

Ultimately, behind the two opposing clusters of factions a different political logic

of political survival lied. Those on the left, despite differences pertaining to the

composition, share the opinion that Synaspismos should use Syriza to create an

independent third pole that will attempt to encompass the largest possible forces

of the Left camp. Those on the right had the idea that the party could expand its

closed minimal coalition range4 and render itself a pivotal political player at the

Centre-Left political space . These two logics of political survival were implicit in

the first steps of the coalition, however as the process advanced they became all

the more explicit and at this very moment they are both engraved in the tactics

of Syriza and DIMAR respectively.

On their part, the smaller components of SYRIZA were trying to maximize

political profits from the electoral coalition by pressing for a fair share- on their

account- on parliamentary representation. They considered that while through

SYRIZA Synaspismos was gaining the marginal vote needed for parliamentary

representation the pay off was meager since all MPs were its members.

Therefore, apart from the wider ideological and strategic disagreements the electoral  coalition╆s  fine-tuning was in question. Disagreements arose on the

3 Von Beyme, K. (1970), Die parlamentarischen Regierungsysteme in Europa,

Piper: Munchen, p.502. 4 De Swaan, A.ゅ なひばのょ, ╉ A classification of parties and party systems according to coalitional optins╊, in  European Journal of Political Research, 3(1).

selection of persons for the party lists in European elections as well as in the national  elections,  because  Synaspismos╆s  grassroots  voted  only  for  its  own candidates in the party-lists ballots. Some examples of these tensions are in

order. Straight after the national elections of 2004, and few months after its

initial inception, SYRIZA was disbanded because its components could not reach

an agreement on the ordering of candidates in the party list compiled for

European elections. The coalition got back on track after the election of a new President  in  Synaspismos,  Alekos  Alavanos,  who  supported  strongly  SYR)ZA╆s reoperation. However issues of compiling party lists in national elections kept

recurring in the following years. In 2007 national elections in an attempt to

water down tensions Synaspismos went for a renovated parliamentary team by

including members of other SYRIZA components that had an ideological

proximity ( mostly belonging to the eurocommunist tradition].

4. The point of rupture (2007-2010)

In the years 2007-2010, SYRIZA apart from being an electoral coalition started to

leave its mark on the public sphere as a potential autonomous political formation

with a particular appeal to the younger generations. Three factors conspired to

this development.

First, the participation of the coalitions╆s  components rank and file, and

particularly the youth sections, in a massive student movement against the

amendment of clause 16 of the Greek Constitution, which provisioned free

education for all. The movement lasted two years (2006-2007) and finally

managed to block the amendment after the split of PASOK on this matter.

Second, Alekos  Alavanos╆s  political  plan  to  exploit  clause  なは  movement╆s momentum and render SYRIZA a hegemonic force in the youth. He did it so by

instigating a change of guard in Synaspismos and bringing fourth the younger

generation of party cadres. A case in point, Alexis Tsipras who initially run for

mayor of Athens in 2006 local elections and subsequently was elected president

of Synaspismos in late 2007 after Alavanos stepped down in favor of him.

Third, after 2007 national election Pasok was plunged into a severe leadership

crisis that lasted until 2008. In the course of this period SYRIZA scored high at

the polls, ranging from 10% to 18%, and was identified as a potential key player in the political system that could challenge PASOK╆s hegemony.  The three aforementioned factors brought the brand name of SYRIZA at the

forefront of political agenda, although still many confused it with Synaspismos,

its major component. However, SYRIZA build a permanent political identity

largely because of an internal factional battle similar to the one taking place in

Spanish United Left5. Although the two cases unfold in a different political and

ideological setting, however the institutional sources of factionalism are similar.

Internal crisis arose when the leader of the coalition is different than the one of

the predominant party in it. Having step down in favour of Tsipras from Synaspismos╆s  presidency in December 2007, Alavanos remained president of SYR)ZA╆S  parliamentary  group.  )n  the mid  にどどぱ  until  the  national  elections  of 2009 there is an ongoing antagonism between the two leaders, reflecting in reality  the  antagonisms  between  SYR)ZA╆s  different components, revolving around the issue of the coalition╆s organizational integration. Alavanos held that Synaspismos existing organizational structure operating on the basis of factions

was obstructing the plan of the creation of one modern party of the Left. He

stressed the need of transforming SYRIZA into a unison party with its own

members and decision-making processes a step that, according to his view,

would lead eventually in the political unity of the Left camp. Tsipras on the other

hand acting as Synaspismos╆s president insisted on the preservation of his party, sided in this matter with all party factions against Alavanos, and supported SYR)ZA╆s coalitional character. The showdown was terminated shortly the にどどひ national elections after Alavanos withdrawal from SYRIZA. However, the issue of SYR)ZA╆s political  identity and prospects was well on the table, only this time a deep  seated  and  silent  change  occurred.  All  Synaspimos╆s  factions  came  to realize that in the context of the crisis SYRIZA was turning from a tactical issue

into a strategic one.

5 For an account see Verge, T.ゅにどなどょ, ╉The Spanish United Left –the belated and

troublesome transition from policy to office seeking╊, in Olsen, J, Koss, M, Hough,D. (eds.)(2010), Left Parties in National Governments, London: Palgrave

Macmillan

5. The mask becomes the face? SYRIZA and the crisis imperative (2009-

2013)

After Alavanos╆s withdrawal things remained stagnant in SYRIZA and the battle

has been moved inside Synaspismos. In the context of the incumbent political

crisis that accompanied the economic one, the old strategic differences

separating the two clusters of factions surfaced once again, only at this moment

the time was ripe for decisions. In June 2010 a significant part of the ╉revonating╊ wing walked out of Synaspismos and formed a new party called the

Democratic Left (henceforth DIMAR). DIMAR after the second election of 2012

played the role of the pivotal player in coalition government building along with

PASOK remnants and New Democracy, the conservative party.

At the opposite side of the spectrum the remainder forces in Synaspismos had make  crucial  decisions  about  SYR)ZA╆s  strategic  perspective.  The wheels were set in motion after 2012 elections and a conference is scheduled sometime this

year to transform the coalition into a single party; Whether the initial parties

involved in the process of integration will retain their status is not yet settled. The  expansion  of  SYR)ZA╆s  political  power  offers  a window  of opportunity for

surpassing older obstacles hindering the road to organizational integration, yet

at the same time it poses new challenges.

The old question of parliamentary representation of the smaller components of

SYRIZA- a question directly related to the issue of organizational resources- is

now settled, since Maoist and Troskyite political groups managed to elect MPs

because of the volume of votes that the formation attracted in the national

periphery. The following chart illustrates the representation of the coalition

components in the parliamentary team elected in the second National election of

2012 that took place in June.

45 6

5

1 2

3

6 2

SYRIZA's components in the parliamentary team

Synaspismos

Former PASOK members

KOE

DEA

Active Citizens

AKOA

independent SYRIZA

DIKKI

Another new factor affecting the integration process is the influx of formerly PASOK party cadres. This  is a reverse tendency compared to the  ╅ひど╆s and  ╅どどs

when the third way politics-╉Greek  style╊  attracted  parts  of  Synaspismos  to PASOK. Nowadays PASOK╆s left factions adhered to SYR)ZA after being expelled

or walk out of the former as a result of rejecting the neoliberal policies imposed

by the Memoranda. All these groups are keen on transforming SYRIZA into a

unitary party capable of filling the void that PASOK left in the political system. On

the other hand, there are some countervailing tendencies from the Left ( the Left

current inside Synaspismos along with some small Left forces of Trotskyite

persuasion) looking suspiciously this kind of development and pressing for the

unity of the Left camp. Still there are those inside Synaspismos that envision

SYRIZA as a unitary new party centered around the institution of the president

and at the same time democratically run by the rank and file. All these

approaches are nurtured by different strategic perspectives vis-à-vis the role of

the Left in the context of the incumbent capitalist crisis, so the question remains

open whether programmatic settlements could reconcile strategic differences- a

sine qua non condition for the amelioration of the organizational integration

process in the radical Left coalitions-.

In parallel with the aforementioned strategic vicissitudes lies a silent process of

integration from above, hard to detect from the outside yet omnipresent in the

day-to-day party politics. Since its election as the major opposition party, SYRIZA

had to assume additional functions without having disposable the appropriate

bureaucratic infrastructure. Synaspismos╆s  organizational  resources  filled  this lacuna assuming the co-ordination of the parliamentary team as well as party

operation. To put it bluntly, the outcome of Synaspismos╆s  bureaucracy

operations has the brand -name of SYRIZA on it. An additional trait of this silent

process is the gradual shift of power from the party to the parliamentary team. In the  latter╆s  context  there  is  a  gradual  integration  of  SYR)ZA╆s  components  on programmatic issues, since their representatives are forced under the burden of

parliamentary procedures, to reach decisions on policy oriented issues.

In a sense, SYRIZA is entrapped in a paradox. Its electoral success marked the

development of features pertaining to a mass party- power to the parliamentary

team, enhanced role of bureaucracy- without having the appropriate ╉armour╆ to 

use Duverger╆s words.  )n an age where parties are without  ╉partisans╊ and are clustered in cartels, SYRIZA seems to be a party in search of its mass.