Public private partnerships in education in India

by

Geeta Kingdon

Quality crisis – primary level; secondary level Solutions not in inputs but in incentives for T and schools

Performance related pay for teachers Changed accountability system via PPPs

Table 10.3 Pass rates in exams of the UP High School Exam Board

Year Percentage of exam-takers who passed

Regular candidates Private candidates Total

1988 49.6 40.6 46.6

1989 47.6 39.4 44.8

1990 46.4 40.4 44.2

1991 61.2 52.2 57.0

1992 17.3 9.0 14.7

Source: Swatantra Bharat (High School Exam Results Supplement) Wed 15th July 1992, p3.

Public private partnerships Private schooling growing rapidly

If private schools attract HHs, they must operate with some competitive advantages

Its the nature of these advantages that shapes views

about how the private sector can be most effectively used

Challenge for policy – how to harness the efficiency / accountability of private schools to create better outcomes

PPPs are avowedly one way of doing that

PPPs permit separating operation from funding

Woessman’s findings suggest it makes fundamental diff how partnership between public & private is set up.

private op with public funding brings large gains public op with private funding brings large losses

PPPs in education

2 types of PPPs combine private operation / public funding

1. direct aid to private schools (supply-side funding)

2. school vouchers to parents (demand-side funding)

School Vouchers PPP – demand side funding

Govt funds go to schools via voucher to families

Aim - school choice sets up competition bet schools

Evidence – Colombia/Chile. 2 randomised studies

Critique - Exacerbate inequality poor parents cannot supplement V, have to remain in public schools private schools can reject poor applicants on grounds of low

achievement

Suggested solution (Nechyba, 2005) voucher amount made inverse to the economic status of HH, so

poorest receive highest-value vouchers

PPP in education in India

Aided Schools – extensive form of PPP Enrolment share History Funding formula Relative performance Political economy aspects

New proposed PPP in education

Inter-state variation in PA schools’ share of total public education expenditure

History

Inherited from British

Originally by religious/linguistic minorities

At independence avoided govt. regulations teachers recruited by school autonomy to set staff-discipline/firing policies teachers paid out of school revenues had to attract students to succeed – only partly

funded

Evolution, funding Over time, aided school teachers became unionised

Lobbied in mid-late 1960s - paid directly by state

Passage of important Acts in 1971 and 1972

In 1982, teacher recruitment by state appointed body

Massive centralisation; reduced local accountability

Efforts in 1990s to give local managers greater say opposed

Block grant, based on # of sanctioned teachers

No incentives in grant formula

12 – 22% of MLCs have been teachers

Grant formula devoid of performance conditions and unresponsive to needs

Block grant, based only on number of sanctioned T

To increase efficiency, there needs to be a formula pass rate fixed at a paltry 45 percent (pass mark set low 33%) No. of working days political manoeuvres overrule provisions to regulate grants

System of grants-in-aid same as 150 years ago. By contrast, British system underwent revolutionary changes,

became more objective. based on dozen needs indicators Japanese & other countries’ grant formulae

Rational grant structure a policy correction potentially high pay-offs in terms of improved cost-efficiency

Relative effectiveness of aided schools

Quantitative studies relied on small surveys – Govinda & Varghese (1993); Bashir (1994); Kingdon (1996)

Use different methods, diff levels of education, diff states

General conclusion P schools outperform G and A schools in all 4 states A schools outperform G schools in some states and the

vice versa in others

Summary of findings Bashir (1994, 1997) Tamil Nadu, primary schools

P performed better than G in math P performed no better than G in Tamil language but they were E/M A schools more effective than G schools

Govinda and Varghese (1993) Madhya Pradesh primary schools

achievement levels in P schools considerably higher – in both maths and language – than in G schools. But they pool A and P schools

Kingdon (1994, 1996) Uttar Pradesh, junior schools P school students outperformed their A and G counterparts A and G schools were similar

Non-standardised comparisons across G, A, P schools Tooley & Dixon (2003), Andhra Pradesh – don’t include A schools CBSE board data (2004) Delhi Municipality area

Problems of inference

Even with measured student traits inference is difficult

Need randomised experiment or correction for selection

Kingdon on UP, India, attempts to address SSB

Illustrate from that

math

Govt. maths score Aided maths score Private maths score

0 10 20 30 40

0

.05

.1

Political economy This form of PPP not cost-effective

Lack of incentives in grant formula

Suffered loss of local accountability

Strength of unions (NCT) - “some of the Principals deposing before us lamented that they had no powers over teachers and were not in a position to enforce order and discipline. Nor did the District Inspectors of Schools and other officials exercise any authority over them as the erring teachers were often supported by powerful teachers’ associations. We were told that that there was no assessment of a teacher’s academic and other work and that teachers were virtually unaccountable to anybody” (NCT, 1986, p68).

Aided school teachers hold political office Teachers are legislators (MLAs & MLCs) Aided teachers in politically advantageous position NCT 1986: “the most important factor responsible for vitiating the atmosphere in

schools, we were told, has been the role of teacher politicians and teachers’ organisations”.

Conclusions – so far

PPP not a panacea

The design of PPP matters

India’s experience has lessons whether/what are incentives built into grant capitulation to teachers’ demands for comparable treatment to G

and to be sheltered from local level accountability if A and G operate together, political pressure can mount, but? Why certain PPPs work well or not, is the Q: devil in detail

PPP reform in education Considering new per-student subsidy to private schools; again supply-side

Draft ‘Right to Education’ Bill 2005 : private schools to give 25% of places to ‘weaker sections’

Govt promises to reimburse the schools

Expect long queues; way of selection not specified

Implications for number of private schools / fee levels not thought through

unclear whether response will be to create new places or to replace 25% of existing students or both

If existing students replaced, departure of fee-paying students increases demand for establishment of new private schools, which will themselves allocate 25% places to poor students. Overall, number of private schools likely to increase

Govt will compensate schools at the lower of private school’s fee rate and PPE in public schools. Since public PPE is much larger, could increase private fee levels

Lack of PPP debate In many countries vigorous debate / experimentation with diff types of PPPs,

including demand-side funding (vouchers)

[1] Non-acceptability of profit-based approach

Unlikely reason for lack of consideration of vouchers India proposes to use P fee-charging schools

[2] Most obvious failure of schools – lack of resources seen as demotivating obvious solution – fix physical deficiencies/provide inputs other countries, focus of reform moved to improving incentives

[3] Fear of upsetting powerful vested interests teacher unions vehemently oppose decentralising reform also likely to oppose competition reform edu legislation follows teacher lobbying no state govt. courage to touch Acts that upset TUs possible TUs stronger force in India than others

[4] Disappointing past experience with PPP

[5] Voucher schemes raise equity concerns (Hsieh & Urquiola, 2003; Ladd, 2002)

Arguably potentially addressed by voucher design

Voucher can be an efficient targeting tool, with higher voucher amounts going to poorer children

However, devising PPP scheme which targets diff voucher amounts to diff groups carries own admin and implem problems

[6] Concerns about implementation Will adequate private entrepreneurs come forward How to implement choice in small villages Weak systems to ensure compliance with standards Illiterate parents making informed school choice Scope for corruption under weak monitoring

PPP design needs careful thought Formula needs reform, contracts encourage accountability widespread debate international evidence pilot testing