edward e. baptist
TRANSCRIPT
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Enslaved Human Beings as H istorical Synecdoche: imagini ng the U.S. futurethr ough the past.
Edward E. Baptist
Cornell University
Paper apresentado ao Seminrio Internacional
Escravido e Capitali smo H istr ico: H istr ia e Hi stori ograf ia
Br asi l , Cuba e Estados Unidos, sculo XIX.
Lab-Mundi/ Programa de Ps-Graduao em Histria SocialUniversidade de So Paulo
Sala 24 do Departamento de Antropologia
16 de Setembro de 2013
Verso provisria para discusso no Seminrio.Solicita-se no circular ou citar sem autorizao prvia do autor.
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In the summer of 2013, I took a long driving trip with my daughter Lillian. Our goal was to look
at the ways in which slavery was present or absent in the public spaces of the South. Lillian
brought her camera, and I brought my notebook and voice recorder so that I could interview
people. We traveled along the old slave traders' trail, the artery that populated the cotton South
during the years between the American Revolution and the defeat of the slaveholders' breakaway
republic in 1865. At the beginning of this time period, in the 1780s slavery in the U.S. was an
apparently dying institution. While 800,000 people, or nearly 20% of the new postcolonial
republic's non-Indian population were enslaved, and while the institution of chattel slavery
existed in law and fact in every one of the thirteen United States, slavery as a political economic
force was on the retreat.
Indeed, we started from a town in upstate New York that had been founded around 1800
by slaveowners and their slaves. But in this town, known as Ithaca, slavery had ceased to exist
by the 1810s. In state after northern state, slavery was ended or set on the road to extinction by
that time. To the south, in the Chesapeake, Carolinas, and Georgia, enslaved people were much
more numerous relative to the overall population. But in those places, too, slavery seemed to be
receding. In Chesapeake, many enslavers were voluntarily manumitting their enslaved captives
in the 1780s. Some did so because the institution seemed to have no political future in a world
where the slaveowning author of the nation's founding document had not only insisted that all
people were entitled to life and liberty, but who had also tried to block slavery's expansion into
the nation's continental territories, the zone of future growth. And some were manumitting their
slaves because the institution seemed to have no economic future, certainly not one that would
justify future capital investments of the massive sort that were always necessary to make slavery
expand.
Economically, slavery in the southeast appeared to be decaying. World tobacco demand
crumbled in the 1780s, just as Chesapeake planters started to take stock of the fact that most of
them were deeply indebted. Markets for other agricultural products, like the corn and wheat
consumed by slaves in the West Indies, had been closed to American producers by a British
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imperial administration determined to make the Americans pay for the offence of winning their
independence. Once the Haitian Revolution broke out in 1791, meanwhile, many educated
people in Europe and in the Americas believed that the old model of slavery was over. The cost
of sugar and other plantation commodities might too high for them, if it meant the continual
replenishment of the Americas' plantations with a slave trade from Africa that brought rebels to
the colonies. So many turned to trying to abolish the Atlantic slave trade, and often they
believed that by so doing they would also bring an end to slavery itself.
But the world turned. An era that had looked as though it would be one of emancipation
turned instead into one in which slavery grew at an unprecedented rate. Once a narrow strip of
plantations clinging to the coast, the slave South would become a massive complex
subcontinental in size, imprisoning four million people in an ever-widening cage built from the
steel of white folks' mutual economic interest in and political commitment to slavery. The
economic interest was real, mutual, and ever-growing, because in upland cotton, Southern
enslavers found a crop that they could force enslaved people to grow more efficiently than free
labor could accomplish. That crop, in no small measure because enslaved African Americans
churned it out at ever-increasing rates of productivity, turned out to be the most important raw
material of the First Industrial Revolution. As the world's economy, or at least some sectors of
it, began to break the Malthusian barriers of human social and economic organization that had
bound every society in the eighty-odd centuries since the invention of agriculture, the rate of
cotton-consumption only accelerated.
Making all of that expansion possible was the forced movement of enslaved African
Americans from the older parts of the South to the newer ones. Over the next lifetime, from the
1780s to the 1860s, U.S. enslavers would drive over one million people down one channel or
another of the slave trail leading from southeast to southwest. Some went by land. Some went
by sea. Some went by the rivers. Some went with their original owners. Even more went with
professional slave traders, a class of entrepreneurs who emerged in full bloom by the early
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1820s. Most forced migrants were young, and most were separated from loved ones and from
their community of origin. Their experience was a giant collective wound on the social and
cultural body of African-American life. That scar, visible in the maps of cotton production, 1860
slave population, and even the vote for Barack Obama in 2008 and 2012. must surely also be
visible in the ways in which people along the path talked about and memorialized the past.
If slave traders route had a particular origin point, it was surely in the Chesapeake
region--Maryland and Virginia--but in general the forced movement of enslave people began in
the older Southern states and moved southwest towards the Mississippi Valley. So from Ithaca
we headed to the District of Columbia, the national capital of the United States. We moved
south through Richmond and the Virginia-North Carolina Piedmont. Then we drove across the
southern spur of the great Appalachian Mountains. Once we reached the Black Belt of Alabama,
where the rich dirt had long ago told migrant entrepreneurs of the possibility that the region
could make incredible heaps of cotton, and where the still-high population of African descent
reveals that enslavers had moved in armies of the current residents' ancestors, we knew we were
in a different place. That impression did not change as we moved across the breadth of
Mississippi to find another landing place in Natchez, the first great cotton and banking center of
the southwestern interior, settled first by the French, and then by Anglo-American planters. For
the last one hundred years the city has made its money as a mecca for "Old South" tourism, as
the destination of what is literally called The Natchez Pilgrimage--an occasion for white people
to visit a vast array of well-preserved "great houses." Upon leaving Natchez, there was only one
place left to visit, if we were interested in looking at the way the U.S. South's past was
remembered. We had no choice but to continue south to New Orleans. And so we did, finishing
our journey where the Mississippi River binds a city as vital as a healing wound.
It should be no surprise to anyone who has visited New Orleans that there we found no
shortage of people willing to talk about the city's history and culture. But we found very few
who could incorporate into their narratives the fact that New Orleans was the ultimate terminus
of almost the domestic slave trading route-. Indeed, there was no public memorialization of the
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dozens of slave traders' pens that lined the boulevards of the CBD or Central Business District,
where coffee houses now stand between federal courts and boutique hotels. There was no
memorialization along the trendy streets of the Faubourg Marigny, where white hipsters and gay
professionals have waved their remodelling wand and created the city's most desirable real
estate. And there was no notice on the levee that runs along the French Quarter's riverfront that
this was the place where many of the ancestors of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas' African-
American inhabitants were unloaded from slave traders' boats. Some had come down the river
from Kentucky and Missouri, the overland one that Lillian and I had retraced by car. Some had
come by the seaborne one from eastern ports Richmond, which by themselves seem to have
moved more than 200,000 people through New Orleans in just the four and a half decades
following 1815--almost all of them across that levee. New Orleans has a neighborhood called
the "Irish Channel", whose name remembers the immigrants who came to work in the city's
cotton warehouses and dig its drainage canals. But we did not find that they called the strip of
piled earth and rock that protects the city from the river and once served as its main wharf by the
name the "Internal Slave Trade Levee."
In fact, everywhere Lillian and I traveled on this journey, we found two things. First, that
the route was invisible. It was invisible in the map, and it was almost everywhere invisible in
memory. And second, the route was invisible because most of the stories told in public about the
history of slavery in the U.S. have focused on other things, even though the pulsing of slaverys
expansion into the cotton South was at the heart of the stories that slaverys survivors told.
Instead, while the stories told about U.S. slavery have changed repeatedly since the late
nineteenth century, they have never really been stories about slavery. Instead, they have been
driven by the specific nature of African-American engagement in the political economy of the
United States at the point in time when people are telling the story. In other words, the
historiography of slavery in the U.S. is a series of synecdoches. A synecdoche is a small story
that is meant to represent a larger one, one more important to the teller. And so the history of
slavery has been deployed again and again as a synecdoche for the political economic status of
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African American people--and for what the teller of the particular tale thinks should be their
future status.
Period 1: from the end of Reconstruction to Kenneth Stampp
It is now well-known that the Confederate South lost on the battlefield between 1861 and
1865, but won the much long war to control the way the history of the war's causes and outcomes
were told. By late 1890s, the Northern U.S. had completely abandoned its all-too-brief
commitment to a rich version of emancipation, in which the formerly enslaved and their
descendants would participate in the Union as equal political citizens and economic actors.
Instead, for a variety of reasons, not least of which the fact that racism was a deeply-seated part
of white identity in the North as well as in the South, the North permitted Southern white
political actors to retake the high ground of the Southern political economy in the 1870s.
Within a few years, meanwhile, another startling transformation began to dawn. Union
victory had been a source of pride and identity for millions of Northerners. But in the 1880s and
1890s, Southern whites launched a massive campaign to memorialize and justify not only the
Confederacy--erecting statues, investing entire state budgets in supporting Confederate war
veterans--but to do the same for slavery itself. The argument that slavery was not wrong, that it
was selfless instead of exploitative became an article of faith in popular historical circles. And
then what had been told in local political speeches and novels of the Lost Cause slowly crept
upward into the brand-new history Ph.D. programs that were starting to appear in elite Northern
universities. This process, explained by recent historians David Blight, Peter Novick, Gaines
Foster and others, shows how the first generation of professional historians began to paint a
picture of U.S. slavery as a depicted slavery as a "school" in which savage Africans were trained
for civilization. The institution was paternalist and benign--at least, for enslaved people, who
loved their masters and mistresses and did not possess the desire for freedom until the
abolitionist snake entered the Eden of the timeless plantation. It might not have been so benign
for the South's whites, whose selfless choice to maintain their inherently lazy and uncivilized
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slaves in the gentle institution of the plantation--which these historians depicted as economically
premodern and unprofitable. The pastoral South fell behind the industrializing North, which was
led by cunning Yankees who put profits before people.
The leaders of this new ideological history included famous names like Ulrich B.
Phillips, who pioneered the collection and use of planter's personal and business papers, John
Dunning, who trained a generation of Reconstruction historians to insist that the process of
rebuilding after the war was fatally flawed by the North's enabling of "Negro domination" over
more civilized whites and Woodrow Wilson--who went on to be President of first Princeton
University, and then of the entire U.S. Wilson famously spoke at the Gettysburg on the 50th
anniversary of Lincoln's address--which had argued that what would define the U.S.
henceforward was not only emancipation but equality. And Wilson implicitly rebuked Lincoln.
This revisionist historiography had a purpose, and by the early 20th century, the payoff
was clear. The "Negro's" training in slavery might have futile, implied many such historians, for
they clearly doubted whether people of such an inferior race were capable of living as whites'
equals. But what was even less successful was Northern white interference in the relationship of
the races. Abolitionism, "Northern aggression" leading to the Civil War, and radical
Reconstruction had supposedly all failed, and had in fact made life worse for African Americans.
Southern white historians and politicians insisted that clear evidence for their case could be
found in the post-emancipation era, when supposedly black men who had listened to Northern
white claims that the races had been equal took that as license to unleash their savage natures an
alleged epidemic of black-on-white rape. Thus they justified the astonishing epidemic of
lynching that swept the South in the years after 1890. But thus they also provided justification
for "Jim Crow": the spatial segregation of life in the South. The creation of separate public
facilities like black and white water fountains, the denial of access to public transportation, and
above all the denial of equal economic and academic access was an attempt to denigrate African
Americans and convince them to behave as if they were inferior. (It also attempted to keep
African Americans from obtaining economic independence, achieving mobility, or any of the
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other things necessary to escape the status of being the hewers of wood and drawers of water at
the hard-labor foundation of the Southern agricultural economy.)
The new historiography also worked to justify the wave of disfranchisement that swept
through Southern states in the same time period. In state after state, white politicians and
political activists conspired to drive African Americans en masse from the voting rolls. With
grandfather clauses, literacy tests, poll taxes, and whites-only party primaries, the
dramatically reduced the black vote. The new laws all disfranchised many whites as well. By the
1904 Presidential election, only 29% of all adult males, white and black, voted in the South, as
opposed to 65% in the North.1The disfranchisement of such whites was no accident, of course,
since despite the stereotype of poor whites as the bearer of the most livid forms of anti-black
racism, the propertyless white sharecroppers and others being economically disfranchised by the
Souths postwar transformations had been the most likely to join with African-American voters
in third-party movements like the Readjusters and Populists. But then, to compensate all whites
for the massive shift in local and state electoral power from the hands of the many to the few,
states and municipalities also fully implemented the complex laws and customs we call Jim
Crow, or segregation.
Thus, between 1890 and 1910, Southern whites continued to drive African-Americans
into a status as close to slavery as they could manage. Of course, the reality is that without the
antebellum era's legal and societal bonds, many African Americans were mobile enough to leave
the South or at least change employers, while others were able to exercise the right to own
property. Jim Crow and slavery were different. But the hold that the racist South had on the
imagination of the broader nation was strong. For the next half-century or more, the historians'
vision of the African American as someone who should be kept in the South, in the status of
third-class citizen, and at the bottom of the economic pyramid was widely accepted throughout
the nation. Supposedly the history of slavery, emancipation, and Reconstruction proved that
equality was wasted on inherently inferior racesespecially Negroes.Immutable, biological
identity made access to granting any meaningfully sovereign form of citizenship to African
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Americans a futile endeavor for the whole white nation. This was the lesson Wilson drew in
1913: that fighting the Civil War had not produced a new birth of freedom. Instead, it had been a
giant mistake.
The Long Era of Civil Rights Influence on Slavery Historiography
After World War II, however, the way U.S. historians wrote about the experience and
legacy of slavery began to change dramatically. Recently, scholars of the Civil Rights
movement have begun to speak of a "Long Civil Rights Era" that began well before the U.S.
Supreme Court's 1954 Brown v. Board of Education decision, which ruled against separate but
"equal" schools and which has also been seen as the beginning of the Civil Rights Movement per
se. instead, scholars see the roots of both the anti-segregation commitment by organizations like
the SCLC and CORE, and broad popular movements like sit-ins or the Montgomery Bus Boycott
as stretching far back, even to World War I. Likewise, we should be aware that books like
Kenneth Stampp's The Peculiar Institution: Slavery in the Ante-Bellum South(1956) began well
before their authors sat down in the archive and put paper to pencil.
We should also pause to acknowledge the irony: that much of the vast archival base on
which the multiple revisions of the historiography of slavery would henceforth be based had
been collected by the architects of slaverys post facto defense. Spurred on by Ulrich B. Philips,
the master historian of the master class (the master at least until Eugene Genovese changed
teams and joined the right-wing noise machine in the 1990s), archivists in the South fanned out
across the region in the 1920s and 30s and collected vast quantities of surviving planter records.
Most of these archivists saw their job as saving the heritage of the Souths noble planter class,
and manylike the greatest, perhaps, J.G. de Roulhac Hamilton, of the University of North
Carolinas Southern Historical Collectionwere racist historians in their own right. Over time,
while some scholars would continue to ways this vast archive in ways that Philips and Hamilton
intended, growing numbers would turn the sources against the authors self-congratulatory
intent.
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Meanwhile, the WPA interviews with ex-slaves, which would by the early 1970s become
essential components of the archive on which a new historiography inspired by black protest
movements drew heavily, were themselves part of a broad turn during the 1930s away from a
national narrative dictated by the nation's business elite. Within many of the offices that directed
the different statewide campaigns to interview survivors of slavery--ultimately two thousand of
them--interviewers who wanted to document the brutalities of slavery clashed with those who
wanted to gather evidence that slaves loved their masters. And those who believed that in the
traditions of the folk--black folk included--lay wisdom stored up by centuries of ordinary people
typed up their interview notes and submitted them to the same directors who also employed
outright racists who tried to coerce African-American interview subjects into lampooning
memory of their own elders and peers.
The first viewpoint, that of people energized by the great rethinking of capitalism sparked
in the Depression and Popular Front eras, was the one ratified by the utterly transformative
experience of World War II. Engaged in a the greatest war of history, against two enemies who
openly endorsed genocidal ideologies of racial superiority, President Franklin Roosevelt and the
U.S. took up instead the mantle of human equality and rights. This required Southern and other
racists to dial back the public intensity of their defense of their apartheid-like regime. Not all
went along with the program, but Roosevelt--pushed by African-American activist movements
and organizations--used the muscle of the state to impose desegregation on key sites of the war
effort. In war factories where the weapons to defeat the Axis were being forged, the federal
government imposed at least de jure desegregation. And after the war, as revelations about the
German state's campaign of racist genocide against European Jewry and other peoples shocked
American soldiers and others, Southern white racists infuriated the federal government with a
series of vicious attacks on African American soldiers. In response to the new climate,
Roosevelt's successor Truman imposed integration on the armed forces. And as the nation
reignited the engines of its military-industrial complex for what proved to be a long Cold War
against the Soviet bloc, the federal government and all who sought to justify U.S. international
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hegemony knew that segregation's survival was incompatible with the claim that the American
part of the world was "free."
It was in this environment that new work on the history of slavery in the U.S., and of its
end, began to appear. The first was not Stampp, whose axiomatic position that he began from
the point of view that enslaved African Americans were no different than "white men in black
skin" has, by the way, been willfully misinterpreted. Stampp meant that he was casting off the
old claim that enslaved people, because of their racial nature, were happy to be slaves and were
indeed not fit for full citizenship--and nor were their descendants. Like the students sitting at
King's sandwich Shop in Durham, North Carolina in 1957 he was insisting that black people
claimed the same rights as white people. And that even if those rights were denied in the harshest
possible ways, as in slavery, those people were still aware of the righteousness of their claims to
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
Actually, the first historian in this new lineage ought to be John Hope Franklin, whose
position on these issues would never change. And that was this: that enslaved African
Americans were not happy to be slaves and that they were the objects of brutality inflicted by an
unstable and militaristic set of violent Southern whites. From his first book, The Free Negro In
North Carolinato one of his last,Runaway Slaves(with Loren Schweninger), Franklin argued
that over the years opposition to slavery was constant and was enabled through alliances with
free African Americans and others. What's also notable is the way that these histories, notably
that of Stampp, looked fairly carefully at labor and acknowledged that violence, including that in
the cotton fields, was a crucial prop of the system slavery. Indeed that violence was in the short
term successful, since it enabled a disruptive and profitable system of expansion that Stampp
spent nearly a chapter describing in general terms.
While neither Stampp nor Franklin could be described as historians of the labor process,
they acknowledged that it existed. Of course, they didnt argue that slavery equaled capitalism,
or that it was a formative stage dialectically linked to the great transformations of the Anglo-
Atlantic and even wider world in the nineteenth century. (That task was left to W.E.B. DuBois
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and C.L.R. James, although their influence was even more segregated from the history of 19th
century U.S. slavery.) But perhaps it was inevitable that as the civil rights movement grew and
encountered more and more violent opposition in the early 1960s, it shied away from a
fundamentally economic analysis of African-American inequality. While local movements
would push for equal access to jobs or to the opportunity to use credit and buy houses, the
broader movement had to appeal to an American majority well-known to shy away from
redistributive, much less socialist solutions. So the ongoing historiography of 19th-century US
slavery, which ended in a burst of federally mandated emancipation not unparalleled in its
character and ambiguous outcomes by the unsteady defenses of 1960s activists mounted by
federal officials, and more clearly by the Civil Rights legislation which reached its high point
under Lyndon Johnson, focused on other matters than the way that wealth was produced in
slavery, and where it went. In fact, slavery tended to be depicted as economic foolishness. But
instead, the historiography chewed first on the question of how change happened. And the
model for change, for resistance to oppression, that is encoded deep in the U.S. psyche, is that of
violent and uncompromising rebellion against would-be tyrants. For a nation birthed from a
revolution against a foreign monarch, a rebellion supposedly driven by a commitment to self-
determination of both the nation and the individual citizen, what else could the central
assumption be? And going back all the way back to founders like Sam Adams was a corollary
assumption: that those who were willing to die of old age as the subjects of tyranny were not
worthy to live as free men.
But were the enslaved sufficiently rebellious to be taken seriously as potential citizens?
Some argued that they had rebelled. Earnest Marxist Herbert Aptheker combed pre-
emancipation newspapers and court documents uncritically for decades, and produced a thick
book,American Negro Slave Revolts, which listed hundreds of purported slave rebellions and
plots. Yet as African historian David Johnson once put it, conspiracy-minded antebellum whites
had spotted a slave revolt every time they say two negroes behind a tree having a
conversation, and Aptheker accepted their reasoning.
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Meanwhile, using a bogus argument drawn from a bogus precedent, Stanley Elkins
argued inAmerican Slavery: A Problem in Intellectual and Institutional Life[1959] that just like
the victims of German concentration camps, enslaved people in the U.S. slipped into an
infantilized state and did not oppose slavery. The analogy was a deadline-inspired lift from
Bruno Bettelhiems account of the death camps. That in turn, with its claim that camp inmates
identified with their captors, surrendered their moral sense, and submitted willingly to death has
been seriously questioned by those who question Bettelheims research ethics and the actual
existence of his evidence. Well before the excavation of Bettelheims unethical methods,
however, Elkins' story had spurred a firestorm of assertion of the widespread nature of black
resistance under slavery. And this happened just as frustration about the slow pace of change for
African Americans in the US of the late 1960s began to reach a boiling point.
As progressive political leaders were felled by assassins, and as political, fiscal, and
monetary costs of the Vietnam War caved in Lyndon Johnsons Great Society plans, massive
white resistance to black self-assertion began to discourage and splinter the various elements of
civil rights protest. Many young African-American leaders put down the mantle of nonviolent
protest and took up the ideas of black nationalism. Some would even take up the gun, like Black
Panthers who defended their communities against violent law enforcement activities in
Alabama, Oakland, Chicago, and elsewhere. Others flirted with international revolutionary
factions, read Mao, moved to Cuba, and so on. The socalled Black Power turn in African-
American protest and reform was once dismissed or mourned by historians as a declension from
the triumphal arc of the King-led movement. More recently, a new generation of historians has
produced a series of brilliant works that set these movements alongside a vibrant explosion of
creative cultural forms that in turn has fertilized the most recent half-century of relentless
African-American cultural innovation. And they encouraged readers to see Black Power
movements not only as a response to white aggression and the declining efficacy of nonviolent
protestespecially in Northern cities against whom very little leverage could be brought, in
contrast to the Southbut as a position with a deep heritage. Black nationalism had been around
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since David Walker, if not before. It had continually asserted not only equality and the need to
hold violence as the stick if whites would not accept the carrot of reconciliation and permit
radical change, but also the richness of African-American life, society, and culture.
Responding to a changing environment in which cultural self-assertion and the flirtation
with revolutionary self-defense took the headlines away from the SCLC's nonviolent
confrontation of violence segregation, historians followed political currents and began to study
African-American resistance to slavery. One imperative behind the new move was the desire to
reject Elkins' claim that enslaved African-Americans were submissive "Sambos" who submerged
their own interests in those of their "masters." John Blassingame, Robert Starobin, and others
found revolutionary resistance in various places. And it was amazing how much like the radicals
of the late 1960s they made Nat Turner and Denmark Vesey sound, depicting them as nationalist
rebels who envisaged a pan-African rebellion against not only slavery but capitalism. All the
authors needed were allies, more than Turner had been able to boast. Again, we have the
appearance of synecdoche: historians painting their subjects as the models of present and future
roles for African Americans.
The problem, of course, was that late-60s radicals claimed that revolution of some sort
had a chance. And Nat Turner never did, as anyone can see. Meanwhile, the vast majority of
generation after generation had died in slavery before freedom came. In fact, as historians dug
deeper and learned more about slavery in the rest of the New World, it slowly grew apparent that
the U.S. had relatively fewer major rebellions than most other slave societies. Elkins himself had
drawn upon the scholarship of Frank Tannenbaum and others, who compared the Catholic slave
societies of Brazil and the Spanish Caribbean to the Anglo-Protestant U.S. In the latter, they
found, manumission rates were miniscule. There were few legal avenues for whites to recognize
and free their mixed-race children, or the childrens mothers, and anyway, cultural norms seemed
to dictate against that. To these historians, Protestant churchesthe backbone of the Civil
Rights movement in many parts of the South, and a key component of black political
organization in the North, seemed less helpful than the Catholic church in Ibero-Catholic
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societies, where saints could disguise African gods and black confraternities provided social
networks outside of enslavers direct control. This compared well to plantation churches where
whites handpicked the black preacher and sat in on his sermons.
To shoot down the charge that enslaved people were submissive, compliant, and
complicit, and therefore poor ancestors for black nationalists and radicals who wanted to draw on
a tradition of resistance, historians would have to demonstrate that enslaved people did resist,
and in a meaningful way. They chose to argue that enslaved African Americans resisted in the
realm of culture: specifically, that they created a separate and resistant culture that welded people
transported from various corners of Africa into one people who identified with each other. You
could already see this happening in John Blassingame's critique of Elkins, but it emerged most
clearly in his book The Slave Community(1972). More work would follow, arguing that African
Americans were the bearers of African tradition, that their speech, diet, family life, stories and
traditions, religious practices were African--and later, that this cultural retention itself constituted
a resistance to slavery. This was a fight against Elkins, but also against all of the post-
reconstruction white-supremacist claptrap which he retransmitted. Blassingame's argument was
the clearest: if enslaved people saw each other as the significant others in their own lives, if they
rejected their enslavers' values and practices, and if they insisted that resistance, when it
happened, was morally justified, then they were indeed engaged in significant resistance.
Numerous studies followed, many depicting the mix of African traditions and local
adaptations that defined particular communities. They saw the world the slaves made, as Eugene
Genovese subtitled his famousRoll Jordan Roll, as a world apart. This world, a nightly
Brigadoon, emerged every Sundown and lasted till Sunup, to reference the title of George
Rawick's individually authored work. And the best of these used extensive primary source
research to unpack deep histories that surely reflected real solace and survival for millions of
enslaved people. One must mention Deborah Gray White'sAr'n't I A Woman, which finally
convinced historians to look at enslaved women's experiences, or Charles Joyner'sDown By the
Riverside, which used anthropology and folklore to detail life along the South Carolina rice
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probably communal, and built on African traditions. Plantations and their owners were in but not
of capitalism). Everything in the current of his argument ultimately swam to his conclusion that
enslaved people saw each other and their appropriated Christian God as the sources of value.
They created a culture that celebrated those things, and it sustained them against the forces
Elkins assumed would have destroyed them. But at the end, of course, the river Jordan bent.
And we saw that by accepting master as a fellowalbeit particularly sinful and unwise
Christianthe slave accepted the duty not to kill his erring brother as he slept. This bound the
enslaved in turn to live within the outer shell of rules of the plantation world, and even as they
built its inner, rich life, they lived within the hegemony of the constraints the master class had
set. They might not have been ofthe masters cultural patterns in their daily lives, but they were
most certainly inhis power.
The historians of the slave community had little to say about forced migration and the
slave trade. They drew most of their source material from the southeast. There was very little
about cotton, which--unlike rice--was not worked by the "compromise" task system. The one
body of scholarship that drew heavily on the labor and financial documentation left by planters,
source material that was created to record and calibrate the exploitation of African-American
labor, was the so-called "cliometric" work that centered on Stanley Engerman and Robert Fogel.
These economic historians employed work gangs of research assistants and fed the data of slave
labor camps via punch cards into massive mainframe computers. What came out wasn't cotton
thread or sugar cane juice, but means and medians, regression coefficients, and the like. They
discovered many important facts, like the extremely high profitability of slave labor camps in the
cotton states--profitable even vis-a-vis Northern factories or commercial farms worked by free
labor. This should've punched a hole in the old claim that slavery was unprofitable and external
to the history of capitalism. Instead, Fogel and Engerman chose to focus their energies, at least
at first, on a series of not-so-defensible claims that amounted to an argument that 1974 African
Americans antecedents were neoliberal rational-calculators of economic welfare. Slavery's
success and survival, Fogel and Engerman suggested, depended on enslavers' ability to inculcate
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a quasi-Puritanical work ethic in the enslaved. They argued that positive incentives were also
important, while their masterwork Time on the Cross misread a single document to argue that the
average slave on the average plantation supposedly endured only .5 whippings per year.
Time on the Cross attracted initial praise from the neoliberal presseven an article in
Timebut then a flood of criticism from historians. Part of the criticism was driven by the
studys problematic assumptions, which werein turn dictated in part by the neoclassical temple
in which the authors chained themselves. But another aspect of the critique, over time, was
driven by the deepening assumption that the most important things to know about slavery, and
indeed, about history in general, lay not in economics but in the dimension of culture. And that is
already obvious from the turn towards slave culture as the site of autonomous creation within the
slave community, the resistance to power, the place where enslaved peoplehad agency, to
use a term that was soon used with unthinking regularity. As Walter Johnson pointed out in
brilliant 2003 essay, again and again historians proved in this era what was already evident, that
slaves asserted their humanity. This was not really transformative history, in his rendering, for
it merely proved the proposition that a=a. But the turn did have causes when it began; it came
from debates in the field from those who tried to impose an interpretation of history in which
enslaved people were passive and behaved like the subhuman trope of the racists and paternalists
who defended slavery. It came from the shift in the political and social movement for African-
American rights, as well.
In part the cultural turn in U.S. slavery history grew from a discernible trend in U.S.
society: a turn towards the belief that one could choose how to affiliate oneself, and a sense that
class affilations in particular could be escaped by choice. The labor historian Jefferson Cowie
argues that a culture-wide move towards identification with popular culture heroes who reject
their entangling working-class roots in favor of flight towards a horizon of consumption and
choice was one of the major forces that undermined the U.S. organized labor movement in the
1970s. Indeed, in a Thompsonian sense, this unmade the U.S. working class, for if it was a
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process of interpreted experience that made class in the 19thcentury, Americans were now
refusing to interpret their experience in the same way.
And if critics like Bertram Wyatt-Brown or Clarence Walker charged that those who
extolled the virtues and successes of resistance by enslaved people who built an oppositional
culture were erasing the realities that made slavery a brutal form of oppressionwell, one could
see how they got the idea. The hope of 1960s movements turned into the frustrations of
progressive political defeat in the early 1970s. The synecdoches of both the slave as citizen-like-
any-other, and the one of the slave as a Black Panther, which had seemed so relevant in that
stretch of the long Civil Rights era, began to fade. Instead, the face of the enslaved subject
turned inward, in a circle that looked to peers. And thus the assessment of the future of race
relations was also one in which African-Americans went their own way and created their own
institutions.
The Achievements of Discourse
The turn towards culture in the study of U.S. slavery carried on the momentum generated
by the reemergence of black nationalismwhich had its own long historyin the late 60s, and it
was also driven by the broader cultural currents of a nation shocked by the end of the near-total
economic dominance which the U.S. had enjoyed since 1945.
In the years after 1980, a set of attitudes imported from literary criticism and Continental
poststructuralist philosophy swept through U.S. history departments like a cane-field fire. The
critics of this philosophy already by that point were calling it as deconstruction, which was a
term coined by Jacques Derrida, one the major early proponents of a new way of understanding
texts. Deconstruction held, if one can generalize about so vast a phenomenon, that texts were
full of political struggles. That authors tried to impose meanings on text, but that if you pulled
the texts apart you would see that they were all unstable. That readers could shape
interpretations as they went, that our ways of reading texts shape our worlds, and that by
understanding how those processes take place, we are all shaped in turn by the unstable language
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within texts. And that ultimately, there was no meaning, for that ultimately was an attempt to
impose a logosor fixed system of meaning on language, a game in which meaning always
receded in slippery futility. As one of Derridas American acolytes argued Deconstruction is not
a dismantling of the structure of a text, but a demonstration that it has already dismantled itself.
Its apparently solid ground is no rock, but thin air.2
The architectswell, one perhaps should not use a metaphorical term implying
constructionof this philosophical trend acquired superstar status in the 1970s and 80s. Their
canons were mined with devotion that seemed contradictorygiven their oft-stated design of
undermining the status of the author as one who creates emotional and psychological truth.
Invoking their names brought power beyond that of more ordinary forms of truth to confer. Their
persons were adorned with first-class transatlantic plane tickets and young graduate and
undergraduate hangers-on of all sexes and sexualities. And young people heading for graduate
school flocked to study Theory with their minds set on one day adorning a dais with a Derrida,
a Lyotard, a Kristeva, a Fish; on living the life of a Butler or a Jameson.
The storm of deconstruction and poststructuralism convulsed literary criticism,
destabilizing (a favorite term) the role of the author, making traditional projects like finding
out what Ralph Ellison really meant seem quaint. For no one really can mean any particular
thing, and certainly no text has a particular meaning, all of them being ultimately the product of
many contending and fruitless attempts to establish meaning. It then invaded the field of
anthropology, which was wide open for conquestclaiming to be a social science, but relying of
the interpretive, personal attempt to establish transcultural rules. It consumed much of the
history of science, systematically attempting to undermine sciences claims to achieve objective
truth via the experimental method. It redrew the world that led (for instance) from Galileo to
Newton to Einstein to Oppenheimer as a movement from one paradigm to anotherdriven by
sociocultural factors, not a process of gradually unveiling unchanging physical, objective truth.
And then deconstruction reached history.
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Now, certainly historians of slavery were well aware that the politics of texts shaped their
sources. The WPA narratives are one of the best examples, and by the 1980s a hot debate raged
about how to use these documentsconsidering that elderly African Americans interviewed in
the 1930s said very different thingsat least on the surfacedepending on the race of the
person interviewing them. Historians have always known that documents must be read in
context, that what is documented and how it is documented is also a map to political and social
realities, and that in them we often see strategies and struggles, cries and complaints structured
by ideas and power. The earliest arrivals of poststructralist papers about history usually
unfolded along this sort of first-contact script: A literary critic who had decided to write about a
historical phenomenon for their second book, examined couple of sourcesone or two books,
one set of institutional recordsand now was ready to chide historians for thinking that the
archive was transparent.
Soon, however, poststructuralist theory began to influence historiansespecially those
who looked at popular culture, or those who drew on postcolonial theory to show how cultures
and races were studied and to no small extent created and consumed in the colonizing process.
Broadly speaking, within history the deployment of Theory marshaled its forces around
questions that had to do with the politics of identity. Most famously, Michel Foucaults work on
the history of sexuality argued that identity was constructed. This meant that the identity of
members of a class, or a gender, or a racial group was a system of ideas rather than innate or
objective or fixed characteristics. It also meant that the best way to study identity was by reading
the texts that were read by the sort of people who not only read texts but also wrote them.
Further, those sorts of texts ideas about identity were deep and unconscious and revealed in the
rules their authors tried to follow and impose, for will-to-power became all mixed up with will-
to-knowledge. That identity was very important, for it supposedly structured who could
participate in the wielding of power in society and the shaping of identity through language.
And that ideas about identity could change, made these theoretical attitudespost-structuralist,
and justified a commitment to a politics of identity both in and outside the classroom. Oddly
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Those years were accounted by some contemporary critics as the Second Nadir of race
relations in the U.S., comparing the Reagan and Bush I years to the 1890s. In those years, a
Republican Party now well-trained in forming campaigns by antagonizing African Americans to
the delight of white voters set the contours of national policy. They starved cities of funding, cut
back programs for social support in the name of reducing dependence, and incited a recession
that may have killed inflation and high interest rates, but which also damaged the most
vulnerable cells of the national political economy. Increasing drug addiction, the collapse of
neighborhood communities and physical infrastructure, the murder of young men by each other,
at rates not seen since white men fought each other for political currency and honor in the slave
South, the reduction of public education to a bad joke rather than a ladder leading upward, the
collapse of nuclear families were all but symptoms of two intersecting deeper diseases.
The first was the rapid collapse of the manufacturing sector, part of a long delamination
inside the U.S. economy from 1970-2008. By the 1980s, much of the pattern was clear: the top
third or less of the workforce continued to experience real income gains (and the top one percent,
extraordinary gains) while the remaining two-thirds slipped backwards. Some plummeted, in
fact, especially in the increasingly all-black cities of the old factory nodes. There, margins were
thinner because household wealth and networks were too weak to sustain job loss. And at the
same time, multiple processes of intentional residential segregation by policy makers and real-
estate gatekeepers, white flight driven by terror of schools that became too black to sustain the
social prestige needed to advance ones children into the top ten percent where the real gains
were being made, and the relentless drumbeat of crime-focused news; all these factors left
African-Americans to fight with the newest immigrants over desolated concrete blocks where
plastic wrappers blew and glass vials crunched underfoot.
From this world Public Enemy emerged. This doesnt mean just the rap group that turned
hip-hop into a political force with their Nation of Islam-tinged nationalist vision. Rather I mean
a wider movement towards a celebration of African-American identity that focused on present
crises and historical continuities. This attitude embraced the longstanding position of being the
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excluded, separate, unfairly scapegoated and unassimilable element in U.S. society and culture.
This was paralleled by the elevation within hip-hop, the emergent and characteristic culture-form
of the era, of the second element within black musics age-old dialectic. That interplay between
popularityin which black creators and performers adapted to white media conventions only to
conquer and rewrite them, with an ultimate outcome in which non-black Americans sincerely the
performance of blacknessand on the other hand, authenticity, which demanded familiarity with
the secret inner world, identity that could only come to those for whom blackness was the mother
tongue. And so, canonizing the culture heroes of the 1960s and 70sMalcolm X, the Black
Panthers, Muhammad Ali, Bob Marley, as well as more obscure nationalists and conspiracy
theoristsan efflorescence of culture activity burst out of the most devastated sectors of New
York, Los Angeles, and elsewhere to challenge white accounts of African-American culture. By
1990, Africa pendants in red, black, and green were everywhere. Public Enemy was making the
world familiar with both the more peculiar theories of Elijah Muhammad.
But Public Enemy also checked Vesey, Prosser, Nat Turner. And meanwhile, an
Afrocentric impulsethat put Africa at the center of the understanding of African America was
changing the way history was taught in the late 1980s. The focus of much new scholarshipor
at least the most publicizedturned to identifying African origins, both among African-
American and white social structures and cultural practices. Black Athena, by Martin Bernal,
infuriated culture conservatives with its claim that the Egyptians begat the Greek, and hence
Africa created Western civilization. On a smaller scale works by Sterling Stuckey, Margaret
Washington, Michael Gomez, Robert Farris Thompson, John Thornton, and many others drew
the threads of African antecedents through the warp of slave culture. The claim that African
antecedents led to African-American culture repeated in some ways the hermetic vision of
populist Afrocentrism, which rarely flirted with supremacist fantasy (despite the truly
supremacist fantasizing of white conservatives who were only too happy to publicize the
outrageous sayings of Leonard Jeffries.). More dangerous for white conservatives, or so they
seemed to believe, was the possibility that multiculturalism would become the common
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practice of U.S. historiography and the way it was taught in schools. One supposes that then they
would know that their whiteness would no longer count as a trump card in every exchange. They
launched but ultimately fruitless campaign to force historians back into the pre-Civil Rights idea
of history as a parade of white men.
Focus on African origins for black cultural patterns like secret societies, or drum majors
subject might seem trivial, and the more extreme, non- or quasi-academic practitioners could be
caricatured as crackpots. But the African-continuities quest changed the way that slavery was
taught in the U.S. It made it impossible to ignore African culture in accounts of slavery. It
connected African-American students to the idea of an alternative, and not an inferior heritage.
It also changed the politics of the late 1980s classroom. Empowered, even radicalized by new
scholarship, African-American students challenged instructors and students. More than one
history class turned into a shouting match that pitted clueless white apologists for the slave trade
(as a fortunate chance for Africans transported to the New World instead of being trapped in the
intense disease environment of West Africa, for instance) against African Americans wielding
Black Athena.
In other ways, however, the modes of argument and analysis remained resistant to the
cultural turn for many years, or at least to the other variety, the one cooked up on Rue de
Sorbonne and not Lenox Avenue. But cultural theory, at least of the linguistic-turn variety, was
always more persuasive at the lower register. For in unusual ways it moved in harmony with
other changes in the American classroom, academy, and other spaces of bourgeois access. At
first these changes cut against the broad downward grain of black communities in the post-Great
Migration U.S. Later, as the Clinton boom of the 1990s lifted some boats, more African
Americans were able to escape the declining inner urban cores and Southern rural districts where
they had been trapped. Clawing their way up through the education system, often against the
odds, surviving at times their parents own failure to survive, they entered the interstices of an
economy that did offer more access points for persistent and well-educated African Americans
than it had a half century before. Some made their way into academe. Among some of them,
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and among some of their white contemporaries who began to publish in the late 1990s, a new
bend in the cultural turn brought into view at last a junction where slavery history would meet
poststructuralism. Or, at least, a particular iteration of the latter, one that permitted the readers of
these historians works, rightly or wrongly, to construct a new synecdoche of the slave as the
shrewd African-American student making his or her way upward through an unfriendly white
world.
In the new histories, identity and action were both complex; documents are texts that
reveal contestation, the attempt of the enslaver to impose a control revealed by that very attempt
of imposition to be unstable. Bringing that statement, which proceeds from a set of theoretical
assumptions about what is important to know about history, and how we can know it, was the
key achievement of Walter Johnsons Soul By Soul, certainly the most acclaimed work on U.S.
slavery in the Clinton-Bush years. His book was not a simple literary-scholars reading of a
few documents, with predictable theoretical exercises and evolutions resembling the required
program on gymnastics apparatuses. But among all of the many documents about the internal
slave trade in the 19th
century, he focused in particular on fugitive slaves narratives and the
court records of New Orleans cases in which buyers were trying to claim that particular slaves
were flawed. And in these documents, he found, identity was always a mask, question and
answer were strategies of feint, attack, retreat. In his book, students and other readers were often
struck most vividly by a particular chapter in the middle of the text. Here Johnson discussed the
way in which slaves in traders yards who tried to sell themselves by convincing prospective
buyers that they would be the ones to fulfill the white purchasers hope of remaking his or her
word by buying the right slaves.. His slaves were self-making their way to better deals: kinder
buyers, promises of good treatment, laying thick strategies and stories that would peel off
eventually into outcomes over which they had more control. This accountwhich was not even
the core of his argumentwas the one people often remembered, for it struck so many chords in
the zeitgeist.
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Other key historians who led the way, for instance, included Paul Gilroyno historian,
but a literary and cultural critic. IN his The Black Atlantic, the interesting people in the first
century or more of Anglo-Atlantic slavery were not the masses of enslaved below the hatches or
in the fields, but those who became free and in some cases served as sailors on the slave ships.
In general, the small minority of Africans who broke the field slave mold and criss-crossed the
Atlantic were creators of a new modern culture, one that continually changed. Vincent Carretta
took things a step further in one iteration within a series of unmaskings that supposedly
stripped away the veil of pious orthodoxy surrounding African-American slaves as historical
subjects. (Another was Michael Johnsons revisiting of the documents and secondary literature
about the Denmark Vesey slave insurrection scare in Charleston in 1822 .) Though Caretta was
too coy to draw the argument out in so many wordsothers would show less modestyhe won
great publicity with his spectacular claim that Olauduh Equiano was born in South Carolina. To
some, the claim seemed to undercut Equianos claim to speak with authority about the slave
trade itself. Equiano was also one of the main sources historians used to understand the culture
of eighteenth-century southeastern Nigeria, his claimed homeland. With his biography
demystified and delegitimated, it would be hard to draw antecedents in slave culture from that
area of Africa.
It was surely no accident that the new generation of historians wrote about complex
relationships between individual enslaved people and racial (and other forms of status-related)
identity. The Theory was there, was part of their academic upbringing. Home training in the
graduate seminars of the 1990s required close attention to shifting cultural politics Shifting
trends of theoretical fashionability were also important. One was expected, at least by some
professors and peers, to know not only ones Homi Bhaba and Edward Saidthough perhaps not
Saids antagonist Noam Chomskybut to also know who trumped who. Yet less flippantly, one
must recognize that structural factors in the intellectual history of the profession in that era
moved people towards a new interpretive stance. Even as U.S. schools rapidly resegregated
themselves in the 1980s and 1990s, the historians who chose to study slavery at top U.S. grad
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schools were disproportionately likely to have experienced secondary and university
backgrounds where a narrow band of high-achieving African-American students had made their
way through doors that had been closed to previous generations. In some cases they had been
those African-American students; in other cases they had been white students who had witnessed
the clashes over identity politics that had shaped the all-too-brief era of Public Enemy and Black
Athena. Those clashes had taken place between black and white students, but also between
black students and other black students. The latter clashes, in particular, were sometimes over
questions of group solidarity against sometimes openly hostile majority-white student
communities. Often the question posed by African-American students to each other had been
understood as this: will you sit with us and us only, or will you assimilate?
So when historiansmost of them young onesemerged from personal histories
suffused with individual African-American achievement in white universities, and personal
histories in which both white racists and black nationalists were major pains in the ass, it was no
surprise that these scholars would question what were now old views about the slave community
as one thing and African-American identity as essentially uniform. It was no surprise that they
would not only deconstruct such ideas, but that they would also show enslaved people trying to
deconstruct the oppressive and annoying structures around them. The enslaved heroes and
heroines of their accounts could thus be read as synecdoches of themselves and their friends as
they moved from adolescence and young adulthood. They passed first through university towns
suburban-styled high schools or big-city magnet schools or private boarding schools (the latter
concealed in some cases in the peculiar humblebragging in which graduate students sorted out
their social hierachies) and on into elite universities that bragged that their African-American
student body had reached six percent.
The reality, of course, was that black solidarity in those settings was always far less
coercive than white solidarity could become. But black unity was seen as a social Problem. In
the 1990s and early 2000s, people of African descent who critiqued the myth of black unity
about this from the inside could often find a wide audience. Of course, most conservative think-
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tanks had long kept a black-conservative intellectual in-house to inoculate themselves against
charges of casual racism. Now what they were directing was a broad cultural assault, not a set of
policy bulwarks being erected against the logical outcomes of post-New Deal liberalism.
Instead of resisting the clear policy implications to be drawn from a) a national commitment to
access to opportunity for all and b) proof of exclusion, conservative political forces sensed that
the momentum for fulfilling the implicit promises of liberalism was utterly spent. Now they
accepted the idea that identity can be chosen, that texts-- like the text of our livesare malleable,
and that therefore those who failed in the game of life had chosen to fail by adopting antisocial
identities like thug or unwed mother..
Yet what new historians wrote could sometimes fall into uncanny resonance with those
who wanted to say that race was over. With those who now had the confidence to Sister Soulja
any open claim that federal government policy on welfare was systematically racist, or that New
York Citys crime management policy was self-evidently a violation of constitutional rights. Of
course, the way they were read was often not what they said. Peningroth, who focused on
conflict among black communities, agreed with Peter Kolchin and Wilma Dunaway that a
counterrevision of whitewashing of internal conflict was needed. Like Brenda Stevenson, in
her account of African-American women and families in northern Virginia, he excoriated
historians who assumed that there was some sort of slave community to which all enslaved
people subscribed. He could be heard, and was deployed, as support for the claim that where
violence, family disruption, and general devastation existed in contemporary African-American
society, African Americans should be blamed more, and white racism or government policy or
the history of slavery should be blamed less. But he was also pushing historians to confront their
seemingly predilection for understanding and assessing the nature of race relations into the
core subject of enslaved peoples history.
Likewise, no one, save a few scholars who wrote about the slave trade, seemed interested
in transforming their histories of slavery (much less of capitalism in the U.S.) around Johnsons
most sweeping argument: that in the antebellum South all slaves were always in the market.
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They focused instead on the image of negotiation by slaves being sold in the slave market to
argue that everything was a constant interplay of master and slave. Of course, not everything fits
into the category of these histories of exceptions, of negotiations and ambivalence, of individuals
constructing individual identity as the main story of history. Vincent Browns devastating
account of violence and slavery in eighteenth-century Jamaica, like Stephanie Smallwoods work
on the transatlantic slave trade, uses close readings of texts in a way that is clearly shaped by
poststructuralist anthropology and other influences, but refuses to let the reader believe that all
meanings were malleable and everything was a text. A slave rebels severed head remained the
evidence of an act of extraordinary immorality. Now, however, we understood why it had been
severed. Stephanie Camps work on resistance, meanwhile, particularly female resistance,
mapped a kind of black solidarity that would later be given philosophical form by the
philosopher Tommy Shelby. It acknowledged conflicting interest and even conflict between
enslaved people. Yet even though some enslaved peoplemost, in fact, at one point or
anothercould not or would not risk all for resistance, all understood however that the forces
that confronted them were implacable and that all were targeted by it.
It would be unfair to say that the new authors intended all the uses that were made of
their work, or even that all of those interpretations were reasonable. (With Ann Patton Malone,
and with William Dusinberres devastating study of mortality in the slave communities of the
Carolina-Georgia rice plantations, he reminded readers of the extraordinary suffering of children
and anyone else vulnerable in the low-calorie, high-disease, high-family-disruption environment
of U.S. slavery.) But his point about the physical devastations of slavery was not attractive or
useful to some of those taken with his insistence that African Americans were individual and that
the idea of a slave community could be a form of internal coercion. In an environment in which
politicians and media figures appeared on television every night claiming to speak for forty
million people of African descent, this argument could be used to complicate the public debate in
useful ways. Just as often, however, it could be misused to argue that when contemporary
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African Americans complained about systematic disfranchisement in political processes, or
systematic exclusion from the benefits of a growing economy, they were peddling false claims.
This sort of move was in the air by the late 1990s, at least up at the rarefied heights of
Manhattan literary agencies, television and newspaper newsrooms, and Ivy League history
departments. Skepticism about claims that slavery was primarily responsible for continuing
African-American equality was the new fashion. Historical novels by successful authors like
Edwidge Danticat or Fred DAguiar were panned when they engaged too much with the
tiresome story of racial oppression. On the other hand, more interesting were books about
black slaveholders. Or the works of a new series of cosmopolitans like Zadie Smith, the later
Paul Gilroy, Colson Whitehead, or Kwame Anthony Appiah, who questioned the need to identify
with universalizing African or African-American identities. There was always a complication,
another fold, and white America ate it up.
Lashed by the Invisible Hand
But by the time many of these works had appeared in print, the world had turned, again.
In 2000, the Republicans replayed a tried and true strategy, one that had been working
since 1968. Get out the Southern white vote, suppress African-American turnout. Yet this time,
they could win the presidency against an unpopular Democratic candidate only by massive fraud
and the Supreme Courts most indefensible decision tothat point in history. Among the many
lessons to be drawn from the Republicans increasingly difficult time winning elections between
1996 and 2008 is that of demographic change. In large part due to the effects of changes in
federal immigration law passed in 1965, America was becoming less white, and the Census
Bureau began to predict that whites would drop below the 50% level by 2040. This would
certainly make race relations between black and white less crucial to national identity. It also
promised to weaken the equation made by so many, that whiteness=American-essence. So more
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diverse versions of slavery history, ones not so bound to the idea of seeing in the character of the
enslaved person an image write small and in the past of the future of not only African Americans
but white Americans might be possible. Whether this would be a salutary development is a
question for debate, but it is possible that historians slavery would no longer be hijacked by
contemporary debates that distort the past while offering no exit strategy leading to equal
opportunity, reparation, full access to rights, or reconciliation.
Second, on September 11, 2001, Islamic fundamentalists murdered thousands of
Americans. Their attacks became the pretext for two wars, including one in Iraq waged almost
entirely on false pretenses and at great human, financial, and moral cost. The reality of that
attack, these wars, and the way in which they were engineered was a massive shock. It came
after a decade of complacency in which self-styled progressive academics often complained that
there was no policy difference between the two parties, and that they voted Democrat for the
culture-politics parts of their platforms. Some began to consider that violence and war could be
agents or even causes (though cause was still a word to be avoided) of massive
transformationtransformation on a scale and of a non-negotiability different from the world of
the nuanced and contested text. Likewise torture and mass imprisonment now seemed more
immediate issues for many white progressives. They were not new for those living-while-black,
of course.
Listening to those who had spent their career undermining moral absolutes with the tools
of moral and/or epistemological relativism make an attempt to draw clear lines against torture
was awkward. Even more awkward was watching conservatives who in the previous two
decades had posed as defenders of moral absolutes come out of the closet and reveal themselves
to be wild-eyed Nietszcheans. Most famously: the Bush administration official who scoffed at a
reporters complaint that every word the administration said about Iraqi WMDs had been false,
replying that the reporter and the Democrats were all trapped in reality-based thinking. We
create our own realityour own rhetorical text, and then we impose it on the world, which
comes to believe it. Suddenly, progressives discovered that reality-based thinking including
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previously scoffed-at fields like statistical analysis and science, had truth claims that theyd
rather not dismantle and demystify.
The effect of the impulse on progressive politics was salutary and energizing, at least for
a time. Old internecine debates calmed down, and political organizers and bloggers made a
valiant effort to create a structure of communication and argument alternative to the TV and
mainstream mediawhich had been largely captured by the Right and its terms of argument.
Thus practical political organization and participation, activities in which reveling in ambiguity
was decidedly not conducive to success, were a third social force that might have been pushing
historians of slavery towards a rethinking of some of their persistent habits of argument and
rhetoric. More of them could have followed the leads suggested by Steven Hahn, Stephanie
Camp, and Walter Johnson: suggesting that historians should look more closely at enslaved
peoples networks and rethink the politics that grew and spread through such networks.
The massive organizing effort made by Obama For America over the years between 2006
and 2008 showed that it was possible, at least under the right circumstances, to organize a
massive popular majority in the face of Republican advantages in the media, in gerrymandered
districting, and artificial limits on the electorate. The Obama victory, which built around a
brilliant rhetorician with a compelling biography, might have also provided an indication that the
United States had accomplished exactly what Obama himself suggested it could do. And that
was to transcend at last the central idea of whiteness: that people of African descent were not
equal and that every quantum of increase in their practical access to rights was a quantum of
decrease in the rights and power and freedom of white people.
As the next few years would show, the depths of white resentment were not yet drained.
And in the meantime one more significant phenomenon occurred, one that also emphasized the
inability of the most popular ways of thinking about the history of slavery to explain the events
that were happening in the U.S. That, of course, was the detonation of long-laid landmines in the
U.S. financial sector. The chain reaction caused by bad debts in securitized mortgages had been
caused by both greed among financial-industry insiders who had already captured untold wealth,
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and by foolish dogmas run amuck in the regulatory realm. The idea that markets, especially
markets in innovatively constructed debt and credit, could regulate themselves has been proven
foolish again and again. But then that is the kind of mistake that can be made when historians do
not study economic history.
As everybody knows, the explosion in the U.S. financial markets in 2008 spread
throughout the world economy. The broader economic crisis produced political and other
tremors in Europe and elsewhere. The neoliberal Washington consensus, accepted by or
imposed on much of the worlds economy in the years since 1991, was called into question in
multiple ways that at writing remain unresolved. However, the takeaway for historians of
slavery in the U.S. ought to be this: we would do well to think much more seriously about
financial history and the history of capitalism. Because, to return to the beginning of this essay,
the expansion of U.S. slavery was deeply embedded in the creation of the worldwide capitalist
economic system whose most recent storm spun off tornadoes that affect people around the
globe. And recent events should remind us to consider the implications of that fact. Here are
some of those key implications, none of which can be fully comprehended through any of the
cultural-history paradigms that have garnered most of the attention and energy in the last century
or more of historiography.
First of all, slavery in the U.S. was enmeshed in the history of capitalisms expansion
especially once cotton textile factories became the central point of creative destruction that drove
the emergent industrial sector. And, of course, once enslavers in the U.S. created a new system
for producing cotton through slave labor, a system that would encompass a vast subcontinental
region, produce 80% of the worlds supply of its most widely traded product, and drive most
competitors from the field. That enmeshment in turn meant that the history of U.S. slavery must
be understood in relationship to the development of capitalism. The implications of this are
many. They demand new kinds of learning and new tools, including a much closer engagement
with world economic history, greater attention to political economy (which could incorporate
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culture and rhetoric, of course, more thought about the implications of slavery for long-term
transfers of wealth, and above all, engagement with these three issues.
Historians of U.S. slavery must engage financial history. The expansion of U.S. slavery,
like the expansion of U.S. consumption since 1970, demanded a massive build-up and
transformation of the Atlantic worlds financial links and capacities. The result was a series of
transformation that shaped slavery on the ground, the political conflict that ultimately brought
down U.S. slavery, and the economies of all trading partners. The effects are still with us, and
are part of everybodys history. Indeed, Lehman Brothers, the Wall Street bank whose collapse
triggered the chain reaction of September 2008, began its history as a cotton-trading firm in
Alabama during the 1840s. It was founded in order to capitalize on an opportunity. The collapse
of a great bubble in securitized mortgage debtalbeit on mortgages on slaves, not on suburban
homesin 1837-1839 had left a tremendous opportunity for new firms to soak up market share
in the trading of cotton.
Second: Lehman Brothers is no morejust like many of the New Orleans and Natchez
and Mobile (and New York, and Philadelphia) banks and merchant firms that made vast sums
and borrowed even vaster ones during the 1830s, before the crisis. But the source of cotton, the
commodity whose earnings were supposed to pay off the debts incurred to buy slaves and
transfer them to the deep South states was of course the labor of the slaves themselves. Labor
has vanished as a central analytical subject in the historiography of U.S. slavery. At most, it has
been a means to social and cultural analysis, like the claims that slave labor relied on African
collective-labor antecedents. A close lookeven a cursory oneat the labor process in the
cotton field reveals not only the ridiculousness of that specific assessment, but that labor in the
cotton field was of tremendous significance to the wider development of the U.S., the formation
of African-American culture and society, and the growth of modern capitalism. Whether we
look at production, finance, or consumption, every path traveled by slave trader or cotton bale or
bill of exchange or mortgage document or political plan for expanding slavery geographically
each one leads to the cotton field. And not between sundown and sunup, but during the long
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hard daylight hours during which, day after day, year after year, millions of people were
systematically robbed.
Third, looking at U.S. slavery from the perspective of the history of capitalism will
require us to reconsider the epistemology and hermeneutics of historical documents. The recent
economic explosion reminds us that economic dynamics have power not entirely different from
natural forces. It reminds us that that numbers and flows can act as causes in ways that cannot be
entirely accounted for by the claims of social constructionism upon which much the linguistic
turn in history ultimately rest. This is not to say that economics is a science like physics, no
matter what economists say. But it is to say that while culture modifies economics, economics
can modify culture and can use forces (like simple supply and demand) that are not words or
texts. Likewise, the claims of behavioral economics, which can be read to imply that physical
structures in the brain have effects on behavior, including decisions about buying and saving,
earning and spendingthese merit consideration as well.
Yet resistance to the necessary rethinking of the relationship between economic change
and the way we do history is strong. As many cultural historians have noted, paradigms shape
the rules of what can be known or said. Ill briefly relate an anecdote. I presented to a faculty
seminar a paper that argued that the rapid increase in the production of cotton in the 1830s
rendered unpayable the debts enslavers had incurred in order to ramp up cotton production. The
results included the 1837-39 worldwide financial mentioned before, the collapse of many
merchant firms and banks, the shift of banking power out of the South, the disruption of many
enslaved peoples lives, and the emergence of both political abolitionism and Southern
secessionism. Afterwards, a historian at least as well-versed as me in the intricacies of Theory
took me aside and gently explained that I had used the term economy in an insufficiently
unproblematized way. I had written as if the economy was an entity that existed in some
objective sense. But as Tim Mitchells recent book about oil production and Keynesian political
economy after World War II had shown, the concept economy wasnt really in use by policy-
makers until about 1950s.
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Whether or not that is an accurate analysis of the history of a specific term, the
assumption was clear. If there was no concept economy in 1837, it is of no value to us as an
analytical term for understanding 1837. For if it did not exist as a term, it could have no
influence on thoughts or events. In that particular analytical framework, there is no room for
concepts and forces and phenomena that act outside of the world of language and of the text. In
fact, it may also be implied that there is no room for concepts not named and recognized by
important text-writing people.
I think that view of history is of no use to us anymore. Instead, I submit that historians of
U.S. slavery need to engage with the history of world capitalism, to understand financial history,
to study the labor of enslaved forced laborers, and to challenge a hermeneutics of historical
interpretation that walls historians off from the social and natural sciences. The irony is that
what we have learned about cultural history will be of great use to us along these paths. How
people understand the world always shapes their own attempts to shape it, and their experience
of it. All of these points of departure would link the history of slavery in the U.S. more
effectively to other Second Slavery societies. Above all else, they would lead us to understand
better the way that the travels and toils of the enslaved people whose climb up the levee at New
Orleans is still unmarked are fundamental to the history of the rise of capitalist modernity and the
US as capitalisms foremost state. And thus they would link the past to the present in a way that
is more helpful to us than a simple synecdoche of what some people in the present should be the
future role of African Americans in the endless but constraining interplay between whiteness and
American national identity.
But these tasks will not be easy. It would be pleasant to imagine that the many
transformations of the United States over the years between 2001 and 2014 had finally broken
the link between the history of U.S. slavery and the idea that African Americans ought to be the
players in someones script. This synecdochal move repeatedly puts the onus on African
Americans and distances them, makes them appear different and on a different historical
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trajectory from other Americans. It would be nice to imagine that the end had come for the long
pattern of rendering the portrait of the historical enslaved as a synecdoche of an idealized
African American who at some future date was no longer a problem. But the last clause points
to the heart of the matter: the fact that the national identity of the U.S. has for centuries included
the caveat thatAfrican Americans are different. Whether this means that they are the objects of
nationwide reviling by a massive white majority, or whether this means that many whites see
African Americans as the objects of