ee final draft

International Baccalaureate Diploma ProgrammeSession: May 2016

Extended Essay in Politics

To what extent was political culture the cause of the differences between the strategies used by university student

unions in the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 and the Hong Kong protests of 2014?

ByWan Hei (Hazel) Leung

Candidate #000017-0089

Word Count: 3993

May 2016 Extended Essay Candidate #000017-0089

Abstract Both the Hong Kong protests of 2014 and the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 featured student leadership and usage of civil disobedience. This brings about the question: “To what extent was political culture the cause of the differences between the strategies used by university student unions in the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 and the Hong Kong protests of 2014?”

This essay investigates the influence of the differences in political systems between China and Hong Kong on the Beijing Autonomous Federation of Students (“the Federation”) and the Hong Kong Federation of Students (“the HKFS”) by examining the degree to which students were able to participate in political processes and the relationship(s) they had (if any) with other groups in their respective movements. It also looks at the historical role of students and student movements in China and Hong Kong and the differences in national identity.

Newspaper and journal articles were particularly useful in this investigation. Where possible, original material either in Chinese or from the organization’s official website was used.

It was found that while there were many broad similarities between the two student unions, the relatively liberal democratic framework in Hong Kong enabled the HKFS to participate to a greater degree in political processes and to work with groups and individuals that provided them with greater political legitimacy. In contrast, the single-party nature of the Chinese political system at the time meant that the Federation was not able to participate in political processes and were not able to ally with members of the political elite, hence giving them less legitimacy.

Word count: 263

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Acknowledgements I would like to thank my supervisor Sylvi Wirtjes for her guidance and advice in the writing of this essay.

I would also like to thank my parents for directing me to resources and sharing their insights with me during the research stage of this essay.

This essay was formatted with the help of the Chicago Manual of Style 16th Edition.

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Table of ContentsIntroduction 1

Historical Context 2Role of students 2Establishment of student unions 2National identity in relation to Hong Kong-Chinese relations 3

Political Culture 3Participation in political processes 3Relationships with other groups in the respective movements 4

Protest actions and civil disobedience 5Class boycotts 5Hunger strikes 6Occupation of space 7

Conclusion 8

Bibliography 10News Sources 10Books 10Journal Articles 11Web sources 11Reports 11

Appendices 12Appendix 1: Table 5.5: How often participating in Demonstrations or Rallies since 1997? 12Appendix 2: Table 8.1: Summary of student movements in the 1960s and 1970s 13Appendix 3: 「6.22 民間全民投票」結果 Results of “6.22 Civil Referendum” 14Appendix 4: How do you identify yourself? 15

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Introduction The Hong Kong protests of 2014 were often compared to the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989; both were pro-democracy protests on Chinese territory and heavily featured students in the leadership of the movement. Media discourse around the Hong Kong protests discussed the characteristics of the two respective movements and the differences between Hong Kong and China. This brings the question “To what extent was political culture the cause of the differences between the strategies used by university student unions in the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 and the Hong Kong protests of 2014?”

The Hong Kong protests (encompassing both Occupy Central and the subsequent Umbrella Movement) have left a significant impact on Hong Kong’s political environment. The ultimate failure of the movement to bring about any sort of tangible political reform has led to gridlock in terms of political reform, particularly considering events such as the rejection of the political reform package by the Hong Kong Legislative Council in July 2015. The Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 also failed to bring about the democracy and social justice that the student leaders had hoped for and the treatment of dissidents in recent years have also led many to wonder about the future of political development in Hong Kong and China at large.

This essay will examine the following: - The historical context of the roles of students and student movements - Differences in the political cultures and systems of Hong Kong and China - Civil disobedience actions and strategies

While historical context did contribute somewhat to the differences between the civil disobedience strategies used by the student unions in the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 and the Hong Kong protests of 2014, the differences in the political cultures of Hong Kong and China was ultimately the most significant factor.

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Historical Context Role of studentsThe roles of students and intellectuals in China and Hong Kong differed on a few levels. Chinese intellectuals had the right to remonstrance and communicate their grievances against the government. However, this right to protest and dissent was tempered by the fact that, in comparison to Hong Kong, the Chinese political atmosphere was more authoritarian and there was always a risk of retaliation by the government.1

In contrast, while Hong Kong has a higher degree of press, demonstration, and civic freedom in comparison to China, students have traditionally been viewed as politically apathetic.2 79.3% of post 90s youth have never participated in a political demonstration or rally since 1997.3 However, while students and youth are less likely to participate in traditional political processes such as demonstrations, they are more likely to engage in acts of civil disobedience.4

Establishment of student unions The establishment and existence of both student unions posed challenges to government authority. The Beijing Autonomous Federation of Students was set up on April 19 th, 1989 at a meeting at Peking University held to discuss the effectiveness of past student protests and possible improvements for student leadership. While Chinese students had been involved previously in other pro-democracy movements in the late 1970s, their involvement in events such as the Democracy Wall Movement of 1979 was limited as students were splintered into small, separate groups based around personal connections or shared ideologies. These groups did not have widespread social backing and were unable to speak for students with authority and legitimacy. 5

The establishment of the Federation enabled the broad representation of university students in Beijing as representatives from 41 different universities elected delegates and the standing committee.6

In addition, the establishment of the Federation was a direct challenge to government authority. Prior to the Federation, non-autonomous student unions in Chinese universities were government-controlled and organized. The establishment and existence of the Federation sent the message that citizens could participate in politics outside the realm of government-sanctioned organizations. It also symbolized the rejection of government authority and legitimacy as the Federation was set up in response to student dissatisfaction with the government-run student unions. The decision to adopt democratic procedures was also significant in that it was a critique of the Party’s authoritarian decision-making procedures. 7

In contrast, the HKFS was an established organization prior to the protests. Established in 1958, the HKFS and other Hong Kong university students had a history of political activism in favor and against the Party. University students both sympathized with the Chinese government during the 1967 Leftist riots and also formed the Action Committee to Defend the Diaoyutai Islands in 1971. 8 However, Hong Kong students also participated in the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 and were active in Beijing and Guangzhou prior to the

1 Ruth Cherrington, “Tracing the heritage of the ‘Patriotic Democratic Movement” in China’s Students: The Struggle for Democracy, ed. Ruth Sherrington (London: Routledge, 1991), 112 Steven C.F. Hung, “Political Participation of Students in Hong Kong: A Historical Account of Transformation” in New Trends of Political Participation in Hong Kong, ed. Joseph Y.S Cheng (Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong Press, 2014), 2423 See Appendix 14 Steven C.F. Hung, “Political Participation of Students in Hong Kong: A Historical Account of Transformation” in New Trends of Political Participation in Hong Kong, ed. Joseph Y.S Cheng (Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong Press, 2014), 2705 Corinna-Barbara Francis, “The Progress of Protest in China: The Spring of 1989”, Asian Survey 29 (1989): 900, accessed July 20th, 2015, doi: 10.1525, 9006 Ibid.,904 7 Beijing Municipal Government, “Report on mourning activities for Comrade Hu Yaobang at Beijing institutions of higher education” in The Tiananmen Papers, ed. Andrew J. Nathan and Perry Link, comp. Zhang Liang (London: Little, Brown & Company, 2001), 278 See Appendix 2

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government crackdown on June 4th. It was this event and the subsequent government response that was the tipping point in terms of student attitudes towards the Chinese government.9 As such, its’ experience with political activism and the fact that it was established and recognized as a representative body for university students meant that it was recognized by more sectors of society.

National identity in relation to Hong Kong-Chinese relations Student rhetoric surrounding the Tiananmen protests emphasized the idea of creating a “strong and powerful China”.10 As students portrayed themselves as the “sons and daughters”11 of “Mother China”,12 subsequent government press releases, such as the April 26th editorial (which accused the students of undermining the “revitalization of China”13 and sabotaging “the political situation of stability and unity”14) inflamed many of the students as they were not happy about being accused of being disloyal to the country.

In contrast, Hong Kong youth have less of a sense of patriotism to the Chinese government as many identify as Hongkongers first and Chinese second.15 Where many Tiananmen students saw their protesting grounded in a desire to jiuguo (save the country),16 Hong Kong students did not have the same sense of loyalty to China as a country. Indeed, it can be said that since the attempt to introduce Moral and National Civic Education in Hong Kong in 2013 and the subsequent opposition by university and high school students, the sense of belonging to China as well as Hong Kong has decreased drastically. The Federation framed their narrative around defending Hong Kong from “NPCSC, CPC and the commercial tycoons”17 instead of national salvation.

Political Culture Participation in political processes The differences between Hong Kong and Chinese political culture informed the degree to which the respective student unions could participate in political processes. The Tiananmen students were limited to on-campus “democracy salons”,18 writing dazibao,19 and street demonstrations. Students would demonstrate in response to news articles or government announcements. While these demonstrations eventually became almost routine and did not have any immediate political impact, they developed public demonstration as a tool for activism.

In contrast, the HKFS, along with high school student group Scholarism, had the opportunity to develop an alternative proposal for electoral reform for the 2017 Chief Executive election.20 In a civic referendum, the proposal garnered 3.4% of the vote, coming in second place.21 The involvement of the HKFS in proposing

9 Stephan Ortmann, “The Umbrella Movement and Hong Kong’s Protracted Democratization Process”, Asian Affairs 48:1 (2015): 40, accessed July 13th, 2015, do: 10.1080/03068374.2014.994957 10 Ibid., p. 11 11 Minzhu Han and Sheng Hua, Cries For Democracy: Writings and Speeches from the Chinese Democracy Movement, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1990), 19912 Ibid., 19913 Ibid., p.3 14 Ibid., p.2 15 See Appendix 4,16 Craig J. Calhoun, “Introduction” in Neither Gods nor Emperors: Students and the Struggle for democracy in China, ed. Craig J. Calhoun et al. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 2317 “Frequently Asked Questions”, The Hong Kong Federation of Students, last modified September 22, 2014, https://www.hkfs.org.hk/strike-faq/?lang=en, accessed July 13, 201518 Student meetings such as these to discuss democracy and politics had been in existence since early 198819 Trans: Character posters 20 “6.20-29 「全民投票」：三方案詳情”, Occupy Central with Love and Peace, accessed July 20, 2015, http://oclp.hk/index.php?route=occupy/activity_detail&activity_id=62 21 See Appendix 3

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alternatives to electoral reform and the relative popularity of their proposal elevated their social standing. This meant that in addition to being seen as a student group, they were also able to gain recognition as a legitimate political organization during the protests. In contrast, the Chinese political system and culture in 1989 did not allow for such a form of political participation and discourse; Chinese students did not have the ability or the framework necessary to propose alternatives to the existing electoral system.

In addition, the differences in political systems also informed the decisions made by the respective student unions; Hong Kong’s relatively democratic political system under the “One Country, Two Systems” policy and the existence of different political parties in Hong Kong enabled the HKFS to communicate with other pan-democratic politicians and political groups prior and during the protests. In addition, Hong Kong youth had experience protesting and operated under the assumption that Hong Kong political culture would allow them certain rights (such as the freedom to assemble and speech).

In contrast, the single-party nature of the Chinese political system meant that the Federation was unable to ally with politicians that were for or sympathetic to democracy. The pro-democracy leadership of the Hong Kong protests included legislators, politicians and senior academics and as such, the HKFS was part of a movement that had greater social backing. In contrast, the other groups that actively participated in the Tiananmen Square protests were made up of factory workers, university intellectuals and Beijing residents. Weber’s theory of legitimacy can be applied to evaluate the differences between both protests; through the participation of the pan-democratic legislators in the Hong Kong protests, it can be said that the legislators, who were elected by voters, enjoyed power by consent of the governed and thus lent legitimacy to the student protesters. In both movements, student protestors by themselves did not have legitimacy, as there was no wide societal belief in their authority.22 Instead, the movements drew support from other groups. The Tiananmen students had support from the upper-middle and working class; however, in comparison to the Hong Kong students who, at least in the early days of the movement, had support from some members of the political elite, they did not have as much political legitimacy. Relationships with other groups in the respective movements The degree of leadership and ownership the Tiananmen students had over the movement was greater than that of the Hong Kong students. Due to the single-party nature of the Chinese political system, the Tiananmen students were unable to ally with sympathetic members of the political elite or work within the political system itself. As such, the Tiananmen Square protests were referred to as the “students’ protest” 23

and remained student-led throughout the movement. Although workers’ associations and work units came out and participated in the protests as well, they came out for the purpose of supporting student demands or in sympathy with the student hunger strikers.24 These “sympathy brigades” were made up of citizens and while they made an immediate public impact when they did appear, their presence was limited to 1 or 2 marches.25 While there was grassroots support for the students, societal support was limited and as such, leadership was primarily concentrated in the hands of the students.

In contrast, the Hong Kong Federation of Students had to share the leadership of the Occupy Central movement with other groups. This led to differences in opinion regarding strategy and timing of the movement. One example of this would be the disagreements between the OCLP and the HKFS/Scholarism

22 “Power, Domination, Legitimation, and Authority”, the University of Regina, last modified October 12, 1999, http://uregina.ca/~gingrich/o12f99.htm, accessed September 20, 201523 Craig J. Calhoun, “Mounting Protest” in Neither Gods nor Emperors: Students and the Struggle for democracy in China, ed. Craig J. Calhoun et al. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 4124 Andrew G. Walder, “Protest Brigades: Demonstrating for the Students” in Popular Protest in the 1989 Democracy Movement: The Pattern of Grass-Roots Organization (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute for Asia Pacific Studies, 1992), 1125 Ibid., 11

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camp on road blockades and occupation of other spaces that affected the lives of non-participants. 26 In addition, the students’ disruption of OCLP’s original plans for the civil disobedience movement through storming Civic Square on September 26th, 2014 and the subsequent early start of the movement meant that there was miscommunication with the other, non-student leaders of the movement from the outset. Although OCLP wanted to start Occupy Central on October 1st, Benny Tai 27 announced after the storming of Civic Square that they were “being encouraged by the students”28 to start the civil disobedience movement earlier. However, although the leadership of the movement was fragmented at the beginning, the role of the students’ increased as time went on as the non-student leaders of the occupation left to resume work.29

Protest actions and civil disobedience Hunger strikes, class boycotts, and occupation of space were characteristics of both student movements. According to Rawls’ theory of civil disobedience, whereby the actions taken are a breach of law, are grounded in moral conviction and the aims of which are communicated adequately, only the illegal occupation of space would fit all three criteria. Since hunger strikes and class boycotts do not strictly breach the law, it is debatable whether or not these acts fit Rawls’ theory.

Class boycotts Class boycotts were utilized in both protests and were generally considered to mark the start of the civil disobedience movements. In Beijing, the class boycotts began on the morning of April 24 th, 1989 and lasted for 2 days. In contrast, the class boycott in Hong Kong was held for a longer period of time (from September 22nd-September 26th) and also involved secondary school students. The Hong Kong class boycott was initially held at University Mall at the Chinese University of Hong Kong from September 22nd-23rd. However, the boycott was moved to Tamar Park in Admiralty on September 23rd and rallies were held at the site.30

Both class boycotts were advertised as ways in for students to take charge of their futures; Beijing students were urged to “boycott classes, not studies”31 and the HKFS emphasized the fact that “we do not cease learning even if we go on strike”.32 It can be seen that the moral conviction aspect of Rawls’ theory was applied in this case; through drawing on their identities as students, both groups were able to draw on and exploit the image of young intellectuals being devoted to a cause greater than book learning and studying.

The differences in political culture distinguished the characteristics of both class boycotts. The Tiananmen class boycotts only took place on university campuses and as such, did not have as significant a position in the public consciousness Even though the vast majority of students in Beijing universities were participating in the boycott by the end of the second day,33 there was no widespread support from other members of society (such as workers and other academics) or even other groups of students (such as graduate or

26 Gary Cheung and Jeffie Lam, “Original Hong Kong Occupy plan veered off script”, South China Morning Post, December 3, 2014, accessed July 20, 2015, http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1654286/original-hong-kong-occupy-plan-veered-script 27 One of the three leaders of the OCLP group 28 Tony Cheung, Ernest Kao and Timmy Sung, “Occupy Central is on: Benny Tai rides wave of student protest to launch movement ”, South China Morning Post, September 27, 2014, accessed July 20, 2015, http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1601625/hong-kong-students-beat-us-it-benny-tai-declares-start-occupy-central?page=all29 “Post-Occupy Series- Leaders Review Key Moments of the Occupy Movement,” The Real Hong Kong News, December 31, 2014, accessed July 30, 2015, https://therealnewshk.wordpress.com/2014/12/23/post-occupy-series-leaders-review-key-moments-of-the-occupy-movement/ 30 Tony Cheung and Jeffie Lam “Thousands join Hong Kong students' democracy protest as classroom boycott begins”, South China Morning Post, September 23rd, 2014, accessed July 20th, 2015, http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1598337/thousands-take-part-reform-protest-student-class-boycott-starts?page=all31 Craig J. Calhoun, “Mounting Protest” in Neither Gods nor Emperors: Students and the Struggle for democracy in China, ed. Craig J. Calhoun et al. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 4632 “Frequently Asked Questions”, The Hong Kong Federation of Students, last modified September 22nd, 2014, https://www.hkfs.org.hk/strike-faq/?lang=en, accessed July 13th, 201533 Craig J. Calhoun, “Mounting Protest” in Neither Gods nor Emperors: Students and the Struggle for democracy in China, ed. Craig J. Calhoun et al. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 46

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secondary school students). In contrast, on September 26th, 3000 secondary school students joined the HKFS’ class boycott at Tamar Park, a public space close to government offices.34 In addition, there were academics and legislators who gave speeches and lectures at the Hong Kong boycott, showing greater involvement and support from other sectors of society.35

Hunger strikes Arguably, the hunger strikers in both movements caused rifts between the respective leaders of the movements. In Tiananmen, due to the fact that it was a mostly student-led movement, the beginning of the hunger strikes and the subsequent consequences marked a shift in student tactics and highlighted internal dissent with the overall direction of the movement. In contrast, the Hong Kong hunger strikes divided and alienated non-student members of the multi-party leadership.

The proposed hunger strikes were a source of contention between some of the Tiananmen student leaders and the students. Student leader Shen Tong and some moderate students thought that the main focus of the student movement should have been on preparing for dialogue with the government and improving public relations. However, it soon became apparent that the majority of students favored more radical action. 36As such, the Federation thought it would be prudent to support this initiative, despite reluctance from certain student leaders.37 There was also reluctance from graduate students, as they doubted the effectiveness of the tactic and various student leaders worried that such radical action would jeopardize the existence of the Federation and other autonomous organizations.38

Student leader Chai Ling championed the hunger strike. In her speeches to galvanize support for the strike, she depicted the students as “children”39 who were “ready to die”40 in order to “pursue the truth”.41 The theme of students depicted as sons and daughters was deliberately chosen to invoke sympathy and solidarity with the students’ struggle and the choice of hunger strike as a means of action further sent the message that the students were willing to sacrifice their physical comfort and wellbeing on behalf of the people.42 This attempt at garnering sympathy worked, as on May 15 th onwards, there was a significant increase in the number of people from all walks of life who were supporting the students in different ways.43

The Tiananmen hunger strike also marked the students’ shift in focus from dialogue to more radical action; it was clear that Chai Ling’s radical approach had managed to rouse support from the masses. Moderate student leaders, such as Shen Tong, called for a stop to the hunger strike as they felt the movement’s objective was to enable “other sectors of society”44 to “gain their own political awareness”.45 However, these moderates were unable to significantly decrease broader student support for the hunger strike. In addition to

34 Jeffie Lam, Chris Lau, and Shirley Zhao “Up to 3,000 secondary students join pro-democracy protest on final day of class boycott”, South China Morning Post, September 26th, 2014, accessed July 20th, 2015, http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1600735/hong-kong-secondary-school-pupils-join-student-protesters-class?page=all 35 Apple Daily: “24 大專院校師生 9.22 ”抗命萬人罷課 , Apple Daily, September 22, 2014, accessed July 20, 2015, http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/news/first/20140921/18873666 36 Craig J. Calhoun, “Fear, Uncertainty and Success beyond Expectations” in Neither Gods nor Emperors: Students and the Struggle for democracy in China, ed. Craig J. Calhoun et al. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 6037 Ibid., p. 6138 Ibid., p. 6139 Shen Tong and Marianne Yen, Almost a Revolution, (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1998), 237 40 Ibid., 237 41 Ibid., 237 42 Douglas J. Guthrie, “Political Theater and Student Organizations in the 1989 Chinese Movement: A Multivariate Analysis of Tiananmen”, Sociological Forum 10:3, 44143 Craig J. Calhoun, “Fear, Uncertainty and Success beyond Expectations” in Neither Gods nor Emperors: Students and the Struggle for democracy in China, ed. Craig J. Calhoun et al. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 7144 Shen Tong and Marianne Yen, Almost a Revolution, (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1998), 23445 Ibid., 234

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shifting the focus of the movement, the hunger strike also led to a new group of leaders centred on Chai Ling. Members of the Hunger Strike Group were also members of the Federation; however, the hunger strikers were only loosely coordinated with the Federation as many Federation members were primarily active only on university campuses.46

Hong Kong’s political culture allowed for the involvement of other groups, which in turn, informed the civil disobedience actions taken and societal reaction. While individual Hong Kong university students chose to participate in the hunger strike, which was actually a Scholarism initiative, the HKFS was not directly responsible for the hunger strikes. While the HKFS was in charge of escalating action in November, Alex Chow, the HKFS secretary-general, admitted that attempts failed.47 Although the hunger strike was not a HKFS initiative, university students who were part of Scholarism also participated. The hunger strikes in Hong Kong were emblematic of the growing rift between the students (university and high school) and the adult leaders of groups such as the OCLP. Lawmakers criticized the shift to radical tactics such as the hunger strikes and escalation of action as “meaningless”48 and warned of the movement “losing backing in the community”.49 While the students advocated for radical action, pro-democratic lawmakers and groups such as OCLP were strongly against the escalation of the campaign, with 23 out of 27 pan-democratic legislators urging the students not to do so.50

Both hunger strikes symbolized the shift to more radical action; for the Tiananmen students, the hunger strikes arose out of a sense of frustration with the moderate path the Federation leaders were taking whereas the Hong Kong hunger protests were an alternative to the failed attempts at escalating action by HKFS. The Tiananmen hunger strikes caused a rift in the student movement and resulted in the creation of a competing student faction. The rise of the Hunger Strike Group threatened the legitimacy of the Federation; although the Federation claimed to represent student demands, it was clear that through the creation of the splinter group, certain students felt that the Federation was not representing them adequately. While the HKFS did not initiate or take a leading role in the hunger strikes, its’ failed attempt at escalating action sparked the need for the hunger strike. Although Scholarism was a separate, albeit closely aligned, high school student organization, its’ aims were similar to the HKFS and there was participation in a Scholarism-led protest by university students, showing an overlap in interests and goals. However, while both student groups were in favor of radical action, the HKFS’ consideration of retreating from the protests51 showed that it was somewhat less radical than Scholarism.

Although both the Federation and the HKFS had to contend with competing student groups, the HKFS also had to grapple with the condemnation by the pro-democracy lawmakers and politicians. The divergence in goals of the OCLP leaders and the students’ eventually resulted in the withdrawal of the OCLP leaders from the protests,52 giving the students full leadership over a movement that was rapidly losing momentum.

46 Craig J. Calhoun, “Fear, Uncertainty and Success beyond Expectations” in Neither Gods nor Emperors: Students and the Struggle for democracy in China, ed. Craig J. Calhoun et al. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 6447 Julie Chu, Chris Lau and Peter So, “Hong Kong student federation to consider a retreat from Occupy zones within a week”, South China Morning Post, December 4 2014, accessed July 24, 2015, http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1655533/federation-students-set-decide-occupy-withdrawal-within-week?page=all 48 Gary Cheung and Jeffie Lam “Occupy Central organisers heading for a split after failed escalation?”, South China Morning Post, December 2, 2014, accessed July 25, 2015, http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1653505/occupy-central-organisers-heading-split-after-failed-escalation 49 Ibid. 50 Ibid.51 Julie Chu, Chris Lau and Peter So, “Hong Kong student federation to consider a retreat from Occupy zones within a week”, South China Morning Post, December 4 2014, accessed July 24, 2015, http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1655533/federation-students-set-decide-occupy-withdrawal-within-week?page=all 52 Vicky Feng, “Hong Kong's Occupy co-founders to 'surrender', urge students to retreat”, South China Morning Post video, 2:02, December 2, 2014, http://www.scmp.com/video/hong-kong/1654019/hong-kongs-occupy-co-founders-surrender-urge-students-retreat

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Occupation of space Although a defining characteristic of both movements was the occupation of space, the type of space occupied differed. The Tiananmen students occupied Tiananmen Square, the space directly in front of the Forbidden City, a closed center of bureaucracy and imperialism. The Square was also the site of the May Fourth Movement in 1919, an event from which the Tiananmen students took inspiration.53 As such, the Square has an entrenched position in the national consciousness as a public space for voicing grievances against the government. However, the antigovernment nature of the space decreased somewhat in the Mao era as, in addition to the various Party-led political activities that were held in the square (i.e such as the announcement of the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the gathering of the Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution), the Party made various changes to the physical structure. In addition, given its’ history as the space directly in front of the Forbidden City, the Square also represents the last open public space before the literal and figurative centers of government power.54

In contrast, the spaces occupied during the Hong Kong protests included Admiralty and Mong Kok. Admiralty is the financial district whereas Mong Kok is a busy residential area with lots of shops. It was evident, particularly in the later stages of the occupation, that the decision to occupy residential and financial districts resulted in decreased public support as many citizens complained about the inconvenience road blockades and occupation brought to their lives.55 The occupation of these spaces also meant that instead of citizens choosing to come out to visit the student protestors (as was the case in Tiananmen), residents of the area had to confront the occupation on a daily basis.

The student occupation of Civic Square, a space in government headquarters, brought on the early start of the Occupy Central movement. Civic Square received its’ name from the Anti-Moral and National Education protests in 2012 and was also the site of the HKTV licensing demonstration of 2013. 56 According to official guidelines, members of the public are entitled to hold public assemblies in the space. However, from July 2014 onwards, access to Civic Square was limited, with protests needing to be approved in advance by building management.57 The student occupation of the space on September 26th was a symbolic reassertion of the right to assemble and reclamation of a public space.

Out of the three tactics and actions carried out by the student unions during the respective protest movements, the occupation of space fitted the Rawlsian definition of civil disobedience. The government in the Hong Kong protests highlighted the illegality of occupation more, in order to turn public opinion against the protestors. This was increasingly effective because the type of space occupied in Hong Kong directly affected the daily life of citizens. In contrast, the Tiananmen students did not manage to expand their occupation (at least in Beijing) beyond Tiananmen Square itself; however, the fact that it did not directly impact citizens’ lives meant that there was less opposition to the movement itself.

53 Ruth Cherrington, “Tracing the heritage of the ‘Patriotic Democratic Movement’”, in China’s Students: The Struggle for Democracy, ed. Ruth Sherrington (London: Routledge, 1991), 2954 Jonathan Spence “The Gate and the Square” in Children of the Dragon (New York: Macmillan Publishin, 1990), http://www.tsquare.tv/links/spence.html 55 Gary Cheung, “Overwhelming majority of Hongkongers want Occupy protests to end: survey”, South China Morning Post, November 19, 2014, accessed July 26, 2015 http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1643998/overwhelming-majority-hongkongers-want-occupy-protests-end-survey?page=all 56 Sarah Karacs, “‘Unconstitutional’ rules on access to Civic Square set to face legal challenge”, South China Morning Post, September 11, 2014, accessed July 27, 2015, http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1590211/unconstitutional-restrictions-access-civic-square-set-face-legal?page=all57 Chi- Fai Cheung and Jeffie Lam, “Popular protest spot Civic Square closed for security works, public access limited”, South China Morning Post, July 17, 2014, accessed July 29, 2015, http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1555573/popular-protest-spot-civic-square-closed-security-works-public-access?page=all

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Conclusion Broadly, both movements had very similar aims. However, the differences in political culture and systems between Hong Kong and China ultimately informed the effectiveness of the civil disobedience actions taken by both respective movements.

On the one hand, the Hong Kong protests had more political legitimacy (at least in the earlier days of the movement) as a result of participation from other sectors of society, such as intellectuals and members of the political elite. However, the involvement of different stakeholders also meant that there was greater societal backlash against certain civil disobedience actions (most notably the occupation of space). In addition, the fact that the political system allowed the participation of the HKFS meant that civil disobedience was seen as the last, most radical step and this was definitely apparent through communications from the HKFS and societal reaction.

While the Tiananmen students did not enjoy the support of the political elites and hence had lesser legitimacy, the students enjoyed much more grassroots support as work units joined in as well. This stood in stark contrast to the Hong Kong protests, where small business owners and transport workers did not support the movement. Since there was not as much political openness in the Chinese political system at the time, the students were unable to participate in political processes to develop viable alternatives and hence, the civil disobedience actions taken were the only resort, in conjunction with attempts at dialogue with the CCP.

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Public Policy Research Centre, Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Social Attitudes of the Youth Population in Hong Kong. By Stephen Wing-Kai Chiu, Leung Yee-kong. Hong Kong.: Central Policy Unit, The Government of the Special Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, 2010.

Appendices Appendix 1: Table 5.5: How often participating in Demonstrations or Rallies since 1997?

Source: Public Policy Research Centre, Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Social Attitudes of the Youth Population in Hong Kong. By Stephen Wing-Kai Chiu, Leung Yee-kong. Hong Kong: Central Policy Unit, The Government of the Special Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, 2010.

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Appendix 2: Table 8.1: Summary of student movements in the 1960s and 1970s

Source: Cheng, Joseph Y.S. ed. New Trends of Political Participation in Hong Kong, Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong Press, 2014, 251, Table 8.1

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Appendix 3: 「6.22 民間全民投票」結果 Results of “6.22 Civil Referendum”

Source: 「6.22 民間全民投票」結果 Results of “6.22 Civil Referendum, The University of Hong Kong, http://hkupop.hku.hk/chinese/release/release1164.html, Accessed July 20, 2015

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Appendix 4: How do you identify yourself?

Source: Center for Communication Research, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, The Identity and National Identification of Hong Kong People Survey Results, Hong Kong: The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2011

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