Slide 1

Effects of Campaign $ on Public AttitudesThe argumentCompetitive US elections communicate with negative information$4b on TV ads

People learn that candidates, representatives, and Congress up to no good

There are consequences of thisNot yet sure if they are interesting or important.What effects of electoral competition (ad spending)?Beneficial effectsAccountability (monitor, reward, punishless corruption)

More information for public, deliberationMore information = better information

Mobilization, engagement

Broader policy appealsWhat effects of electoral competition (ad spending)? Less beneficial effectsWinner-take-all, more losers

Negativity, demobilization

Corruption of candidates, parties motivated by re-electionThey must seek/find campaign resourcesExpectations about electoral competition (2 party system)Competition (spending) should produce effects on:

1) Ideological position of partiesConvergence

2) Candidate recruitment / candidate entryQuality

Non competitive district, one partys voters dominantCompetitive district, each party same # of voters: ConvergenceCandidate recruitment & $$Quality challengers and strategic entryFundraising experience

Emerge in competitive races where best chance to win

Parties recruit aggressively to field quality candidates in competitive districtsSend them fundsContext of competitive districts in US Congressional electionsMore likely to be populated by moderate incumbents (??)

More likely to attract campaign spendingBy candidatesBy partiesBy outside groups

More spending, more negative informationAlso changed over past 15 years: Fewer marginal districts.

Congress, 2006: Narrow Margin = Moderate RepresentativeIn 2006 (etc.) incumbents in most expensive races more moderateExpensive 2006 races (examples)Nancy Johnson, CT 4th least conservative GOP ($7.6m)Rob Simmons, CT 5th least conservative GOP ($5.6m)Curt Weldon, PA 8th least conservative GOP ($6.0m)Chris Shays, CT 9th least conservative GOP ($6.8m)Jim Gerlach, PA 10th least conservative GOP ($7.6m)Clay Shaw, FL 14th least conservative GOP ($9.4m)Jon Porter, NV 23rd least conservative GOP ($4.5m)Heather Wilson, NM 35th least conservative GOP ($8.3m)

Expensive 2010 races (examples)CT Senate, Blumenthal (D) v McMahon (R) $48mFL Senate, Crist (I) v. Rubio (R) $40mCA Senate, Boxer (D) v. Fiorina (R) $30mAR Senate, Boozman (R) v. Lincoln (D) $15m

FL22, $11.8mNM 1 $8.8mPA 15 $7.9mSC 2 $7.9MFL 8$7.3mCA 9 $6.1m

Expensive 2012 races (examples)1) MA Senate, Brown (R) vs. Warren (D) $82.4m2) CT Senate, McMahon (R) vs. Murphy (D) $65.4m3) OH Senate, Mandel (R) vs. Brown (D) $43.5m4) MO Senate, Akin (R) vs. McCaskill (D)$38.4m

4) CT 5$12.9m5) CA 30 (Dem vs Dem)$11.9m6) CA 33 (Dem v Ind)$11.0m8) NY 27$8.8m9) IL 10$8.5m

Spending as negative informationMore money spent overallFewer competitive seatsChange in tone in 2000s

Little reason to inform votes other guy is OK, similar to opponentCampaign information2006 DCCC against Chris ShaysClay Shaw ad 2006DCCC hit on ShawDCCC hit on SweenyDCCC attack on Ozinga

Debbie Halvorson gun attack adAikin hit on McCaskil McCaskil hit on Aikin Rove hit on WarrenWarren as CheScott Brown kills kidsTea Party for Brown

Campaign information in competitive settingX = extremist, not one of usX = the bad guysX =special interestsX raised taxes to pay her salaryX is a liarX is not X, X = [George Bush; Bin Laden, etc][If X inc.], Then Congress sucks

Y = extremist, not one of usY = the bad guysY =special interestsY didnt pay her taxes but is richY is a liarY is not Y, Y = [Nancy Pelosi, Che Guevara, etc.]

ExpectationsAwareness of candidates

Less approving of candidates

Perceptions of candidates ideology as distant

From respondentFrom rival candidate

Data: Cooperative Congressional Election Study2006, 2010 CCES

2006, ideological placement of candidates, approval of Congress

2010: Assessment of candidate competence, integrity 2012 CCES

Experiments on perceptions of campaign finance

Attitudes about influence of campaign funds, Approval of representative, CongressMuch shown with 2006 data could be endogenous: What about effects on challengers?

Perceptions of challengers should suffer as well (despite quality bias)Summary of (apparent) effectsInformation: To know them is to loath them

Awareness of candidates

Able to rate candidate ideology (accurate or not)

Candidates seen as more ideologically distant

Candidates seen as less competent, less integrity

Other consequences2006 CCES

What is the most important problem facing the nation today?War in IraqTerrorismCorruptionMore likely response in competitive districts2010 CCES

Do you approve of Congress as an institution?

Respondents in competitive districts more likely to disapproveEffects of expensive campaignsExtend beyond the targets of the campaigns

Expensive campaigns highlight that candidates chase money

Being inundated with ads may trigger perceptions of quid pro quo corruption

Exposure to campaigns associated with perceptions of representation, corruption of public officials

% saying corrupt if campaign money gets to the candidate% saying corrupt if corporate money gets to candidateMostly corrupt if money spent independently, on behalf of candidateSo, If people think campaign finance is corrupt, what if they are exposed to greater campaign spending?

Assume some know TV is not cheap; candidates need & receive financial support to pay for it

How then, do campaigns affect perceptions of representation / institutions?

Possible consequences (other than mobilisation)Perceptions of politics are affected

Accountabilitynot possible w/o competition

Institutional legitimacy do these perceptions matter?

Political polarizationWhy keep running moderate candidates?So what.Suggests people make distinctions about what sources of $$ are more corrupt (whatever that means)

Suggests perceptions of institutional legitimacy and corruption affected by real events Meaningful variation in cynicism

Highlights a paradox: more information = less legitimate institutions