efs plecture3

EU, NATO, AND THE POLITICS OF CONDITIONALITY

Angel Angelov

STRUCTURE OF THE LECTURE

I Introduction to Conditionality

II Enlargement Conditionality

III The EU and NATO Enlargement Conditionality

I INTRODUCTION TO CONDITIONALITY

1. Definitions

2. Generations

3. Characteristics

I. INTRODUCTION TO CONDITIONALITYII. Enlargement Conditionality III. EU and NATO Conditionality

1. DEFINITION

The law of conditionality:

Whatever comes into existence does so in dependence on conditions, and in the absence of those conditions ceases to exist.

(Sangharakshita, A Guide to the Buddhist Path)

A new world order can be created, and development aid, by its conditionality, is one of the instruments to do so.

(Peter Uvin, ‘Do as I Say, Not as I do’: The Limits of Political Conditionality)

I. INTRODUCTION TO CONDITIONALITY1. Definition 2.Generations of Conditionality 3. Characteristics of Conditionality

1. DEFINITION

I will provide you with ‘x’ on a condition you do ‘y’

The idea - old as politics itself

Recent addition to the lexicon of IR


1. DEFINITION

The use of fulfilment of stipulated political obligations as a prerequisite for obtaining

economic aid debt relief most-favoured nation status access to subsidized credit membership in desired regional or global

organizations


2. GENERATIONS OF CONDITIONALITY

A. First generation Economic conditionality

B. Second generation Political conditionality


A. First generation of Conditionality

Late 1970s - economic crisis in the Third World

Reasons - excessive government spending, over-valued currencies, etc.

Prescription - domestic economic reforms

Economic reforms - condition for assistance


B. Second generation of conditionality

The end of the Cold War

Democracy and human rights - primary concern in development

Free markets and free elections - essence of aid

Development aid - dependent on political reforms


3. CHARACTERISTICS OF CONDITIONALITY

Power asymmetry

Demander’s availability of alternative sources

Donor’s necessity for interaction with the demander

Elaboration of the conditions

Demander’s commitment to reform


II ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY

1. Enlargement conditionality: 3rd generation of conditionality

2. Rational

3. Limitations

I. Introduction to ConditionalityII. ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY III. EU and NATO Conditionality

1. ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY : 3rd GENERATION OF CONDITIONALITY

Triggering factors:

Financial crisis in the Third World First generation

End of the Cold War Second generation

NATO and EU post-Cold war enlargements Third generation

II. ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY 1. Enlargement Conditionality: 3rd Generation2. Rational 3. Limitations

1.ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY AS A THIRD GENERATION OF CONDITIONALITY

Focus:

First generation economic conditions

Second generation brought in the human rights consideration

Third generation ‘full package’

II. ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY 1. Enlargement Conditionality as a 3rd Generation2. Rational 3. Limitations

1. ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY AS A THIRD GENERATION OF CONDITIONALITY

Features of the enlargement conditionality

1990s - beyond a simple listing of membership criteria

Complex and elaborated system of conditions

Extensive and institutionalized monitoring

II. ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY 1. Enlargement conditionality as a 3rd generation2. Rational 3. Limitations

1.ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY AS A THIRD GENERATION OF CONDITIONALITY II. ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY

1. Enlargement Conditionality as a 3rd Generation2. Rational 3. Limitations

Goals:

Previous generations more immediate results

Enlargement conditionality longer term perspective and sustainability

1.ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY AS A THIRD GENERATION OF CONDITIONALITY II. ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY

1. Enlargement Conditionality as a 3rd Generation2. Rational 3. Limitations

Better equipped for bringing and sustaining reforms

The benefits associated with membership:

sufficiently large as to induce far-reaching concessions

2. RATIONAL

Justifying rejection

Ensuring the contribution potential of the newcomers

Protection of the club’s basic values and interests Motivating particular set of reforms in the candidates


Geographical limitation

Temporal limitation

3. LIMITATIONS


III EU AND NATO ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY

1. Membership conditionality

2. Characteristics

3. Rational

4. Limitations

I. Introduction to ConditionalityII. Enlargement Conditionality III. EU and NATO ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY

1. MEMBERSHIP CONDITIONALITY

A. EU membership conditionality

B. NATO membership conditionality

III. EU AND NATO ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY 1. Membership Conditionality 2. Rational 3. Characteristics

A. EU membership conditionality

Copenhagen conditions:

democracy and protection of human and minority rights

a functioning market economy implementation of the acqui

Fourth basic condition: ‘good neighbourliness’ (Agenda 2000 )

III. EU AND NATO ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY 1. Membership Conditionality 2. Rational 3. Characteristics 4. Limitations

B. NATO membership conditionality

‘Study on NATO Enlargement’

Functioning democratic political system Market economy Democratic civil-military relations Minority protection Good-neighbourliness Ability to provide a military contribution and achieve

interoperability

III. EU AND NATO ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY 1. Membership Conditionality 2. Characteristics 3. Rational 4. Limitations

2. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EU AND NATO ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY

Power asymmetry Is there a power asymmetry between EU/NATO and the applicants?

Demander’s availability of alternative sources Are there available alternatives to the EU/NATO membership?

Donor’s necessity for a particular interaction with the ‘demander Is there a lack of an urgent need for EU/NATO to enlarge?

Elaboration of the conditions Are EU and NATO imposing conditions unilaterally?

Demander’s commitment to reform Could the applicants have undertaken the required reforms if EU/NATO

membership was not conditioned on them?

III. EU AND NATO ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY 1. Membership Conditionality 2. Characteristics 3. Rational 4. Limitations

Is there a power asymmetry?

‘Carrot and stick’ approach

Carrot - positive conditionality If you do ‘x’ we provide you with ‘y’ membership - encourages a peaceful transformation of the

social, political and military systems

Stick - negative conditionality If you do not do ‘x’ we will not provide you with ‘y’ denial of membership

“Carrot and stick” approach = significant power asymmetry

III. EU AND NATO ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY

1. Membership Conditionality 2. Characteristics3. Rational 4. Limitations

Are there available alternatives to the membership in EU/NATO?

Membership affiliations during and after the Cold War

In economic terms - EU membership is the most attractive option

A dangerous security vacuum

Russia - not in a position, nor requested to assist

Neutrality is not an option

Membership in NATO – the most reliable option


1. Membership Conditionality 2. Characteristics 3. Rational 4. Limitations

Is there a lack of an urgent need for EU/NATO to enlarge?

No enthusiasm for ‘big bang’ enlargement

Significant mismatch between demand and supply



Are EU and NATO imposing conditions unilaterally?

NATO alone sets the conditions and the timetable for the accession

The applicants – excluded from the decision-making

Partnership for Peace / Stability Pact for SEE

‘Take it or leave it’


1. Membership Conditionality 2. Characteristics3. Rational 4. Limitations

Could the applicants have undertaken the reforms if membership was not conditioned on them?

At its best- form of paternalism

At its worst - imposes an alien agenda

Problem of timing



3. RATIONAL OF THE NATO ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY

Justifying rejection

- keep the unwanted applicants away

Ensuring contribution potential of the newcomers

- sensibility on the inclusion of ‘free riders’



3. RATIONAL OF THE NATO ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY

Protection of the club’s basic values and interests

- widening should not obstruct deepening

Motivating particular set of reforms

- enlargement is one the most influential foreign policy instruments



3. LIMITATIONS TO THE NATO ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY



Geographical limitation

limited to the North-Atlantic area

Temporal limitation

limited to the awarding of membership

CONCLUSION

Effective environment shaping instrument Reasons:

functions in an environment of power asymmetry has no viable alternative the demand of membership exceeds the supply many reforms are triggered by EU’s and NATO’s

carrot and stick approach

I. Introduction to ConditionalityII. Enlargement Conditionality III. EU and NATO Enlargement conditionality

efs plecture3

News & Politics

clubs basic

enlargement

cold war

enlargement

power asymmetry

3rd generation

conditionality

conditionality