El AlAMEIN, 1942

British imperial interests. The Suez Canal in Egypt provided a

short sea route to India and Australia. Mussolini, the Italian

Fascist leader, was keen to demonstrate his own mastery of

the region by capturing the canal. On 13 September 1940, Italy

invaded Egypt but Britain's desert force, commanded by

General Wavell, beat off the larger Italian army and threw it out

of Egypt. Wavell then captured the Italian colonies in North

Africa. Mussolini was in dire danger of being humiliated and

Hitler sent him help in the form of General Erwin Rommel and

his Afrika Korps

Rommel's force was a completely different quality of opposi­

tion and the British and Commonwealth forces were soon

thrown on to the defensive at Tobruk. The British and

Commonwealth desert force was renamed the Eighth Army

and at the end of 1941 it struck back at Rommel, halting the

German advance. Rommel withdrew and built up his reinforce­

ments for another offensive in 1942, receiving better supplies

than the British could manage for their forces.

In January 1942, Rommel launched his second offensive

and pushed back the Eighth Army to Benghazi. German tanks

proved adept at threatening the Allied positions and the

Eighth Army withdrew to Egypt. Tobruk fell and the situation

began to look perilous for the British and Commonwealth

troops. Rommel dominated the region and one more blow

would give him Egypt, but the enormous distances travelled

meant the German lines of supply were stretched. Hitler

urged Rommel to capture the Suez Canal, but he failed to give

him any extra support because he was fully committed to the

war in the Soviet Union.

In August 1942, Lieutenant General Bernard Montgomery was

made commander of the Eighth Army, or 'Desert Rats' as it

became known. Montgomery would never have been put in

charge if General Gott had not died in an air crash. He was the

second choice for command. Somewhat puritan in his person­

al habits - he did not drink alcohol or smoke and retired to bed

no later than 21.30 hours - he knew that good morale lay at the

heart of a successful army, and with a force that had been

pushed back to Egypt he knew this was particularly true of his

desert troops. He spent much time getting to know them and

keeping them informed about the situation. He created a char­

acter for himself - Monty - by wearing distinctive headgear

and being highly visible in the media. 'Not the least of

Montgomery's achievements,' writes leading military historian

Gary Sheffield, 'was to turn the Eighth Army into a "brand

name" with which soldiers and civilians could identify and of

THE 'DESERT RATS'

N

MONTGOMERY

EIGHTH ARMY

DePr

e s$/0

/1

Mediterranean Sea

Qattara

Rommel's invincible German army in North Africa seemed to be

on the verge of capturing Cairo when the British staged a major

counter-attack and threw the Germans and Italians backwards.

Using devastating artillery bombardments to open his attack,

Montgomery followed through decisively with aircraft to pound

the German panzers.

The Allied victory in North Africa marked a significant turning

point in the war. Control of the Mediterranean was vital to

10II

16

miles

kilometres

E GYP T

Below. The British

offensive at EI Alamein,

first breaking throughthe defensive lines of the

Germans and Italians

and then throwingthem back.

_ Allied armies

_ Germanforces

.~~Rahman

,--/ ::: \, :.. " ~ ~

2 NOVEMBER \ .",. ;: •• ~, •• ~~

Massivetank battl~ ~ .•••• _ !'.. ...~ ...Ridge •••~ - _ •••••••••••

ROMMEL I ",\~e~.••- - -- - •••..•.•.t"\.AFRIKA KORPS I,'" ~ ~-~':.:-"~"' I A~a ein, , , ,. " "-

" I Allies break •••••• '. '., ," , through • ••••• ',4" AL/!IED " Alexandria 50 miles ~

" I , Axis minefields:-: : •••••••••• ' ARMOU'k{D "

I I 11 NOVEMBER· .':' ••••• \CORPS' ~I I I ~ .: •••• ' 'I I I Axis tanks •••• , \

It I I move north' :: •• :., \I \ to meet ..••••••Co •••• • \ I

Italian retreat cut off \ ',Allied attack ••••••••••••••••• :. ~ \ I\" ••••• --. \ I\io.. ''''-1 . · .. '.'\ ~. \

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o

Io

_ Italian forces

••••••~ Axis movements

.:: Axis minefield defensive lines

- - ~ Allied movements

•:: Allied minefield defensive lines

3 NOVEMBER

120 EL ALAMEIN

i

,.- --,.

- - 4

. "~..'*

Top: Erwin Rommel,German commander of

the Afrika Korps, standson the road to Cairo in1942.

Above: General

Montgomery, victor atEI Alainein, painted byCaptain Neville lewisin December 1942.

Above right Britishsoldiers fire a six­

pounder anti-aircraftgun during the battleof EI Alamein.

which they could be proud.' Most importantly, he knew that a

little victory was needed immediately.

Since July 1942, Rommel had been only 160km (100 miles)

from the vital British naval base at Alexandria. A state of emer­

gency had been declared in Cairo and Rommel anticipated the

final stage of his long journey to Egypt. He hoped to catch the

British off guard with a sudden panzer thrust on 31 August, but

Montgomery was waiting for him. The German tanks initially

overlapped the British left flank but were stopped by a tank

brigade dug in at Alam el Haifa. The British armoured unit

repulsed the panzers, and with support from British aircraft it

pushed the Germans back.

Montgomery was cautious and did not counter-attack

straight away, preferring to prepare his knock-out blow

methodically. Suddenly, the situation was not looking so good

for Rommel. After 17 months of desert fighting, his 96,000­

strong army was below strength and suffering from illness,

and it possessed only 600 tanks against the Allies' 1,114.

Montgomery's victory at Alam el Haifa lifted the morale of his

troops tremendously and he used the pause to reinforce them,

bringing their strength up to 150,000. The British Desert Air

Force had complete mastery of the skies and relentlessly

attacked the German positions. Rommel himself fell ill and

flew back temporarily to Germany, leaving General Stumme in

command. Montgomery would not be rushed. A minefield

separated the two armies and neither could have flanks

turned. To the north was the Mediterranean coast and to the

south was the impassable Qattara Depression on the edge of

the Sahara Desert.

THE BEGINNING OF THE END

Montgomery began his major assault on the evening of

23 October. He had been trained as an officer during the First

World War and knew the value of good artillery. The battle

began with a massive thousand-gun barrage along a 10-km

(six-mile) front. It lit up the night sky. Rommel himself was

impressed by its impact, later writing, 'Never before had we

experienced such rolling fire in North Africa, and it continued

EL ALAMEIN 12

,

Below: British Crusader

tanks advance in a

column. Retreating lines

were frequently

overextended in rapidadvances across vast

distances in the desert.

Sahara

Mediterranean Sea

_ Allied armies

__ ~ Allied movements

_ Allied seaborne landings

". Allied parachute landings

'fG ._ erman armIes

__ ~ German movements

••••• German front lines

\\~,•..•.....

AtlanticOcean

8 NOVEMBER 1942 Tangi

PATTON '- •••• ~

US WESTERN ~ ~ ~TASKFORCE ~ ""

\~

Above: Montgomery's

victory at EI Alamein in

October 1942 allowed

Allied troops to land and

reoccupy North Africa in

an offensive called

Operation Torch. This

gave them a base from

which to invade Italy.

throughout the entire course of the battle at EI Alamein. With

extraordinary accuracy, British gunners shelled our positions,

resulting in very heavy casualties.' Montgomery had prepared

his attack perfectly.

Some twenty minutes later, a diversionary attack surged for­

wards near the Qattara Depression, but the main assault came

in the north when the Allied Armoured Corps struck the weak­

er Axis left flank defended by Italian forces. British infantry

opened two corridors through the minefields along which

tanks could advance. The Italians fought harder than expected

and a German panzer counter-attack nearly halted the advance.

Stumme, the German commander, had a heart attack and died,

but Rommel resumed command on 25 October.

On 26 October, Montgomery halted his diversionary attack in

the south and put all his efforts into pressing ahead along the

coast. The Australian 9th Division held the German 164th

Division against the sea, while tanks battled away at each other

for a week. But aerial superiority helped the Allies tremendous­

ly and as their planes and tanks pounded the German panzers,

the armoured power available to Rommel declined rapidly.

Rommel could not keep up with the demand for fuel, ammuni­

tion and new vehicles. His supplies had been difficult to begin

122 EL ALAMEIN

Above: British soldiers of

the Eighth Army fire on

retreating Germans.

with and now he was stretched to breaking point. With the

Australians nearly surrounding the German 164th Division, he

pulled back his troops to a new defensive line on 1 November.

BREAKTHROUGH

This time Montgomery left no time for rest, knowing that

impetus was important at this stage of the battle. He quickly

regrouped his soldiers and plunged ahead south of Kidney Hill,

using a creeping barrage to shield the New Zealand 2nd

Division as it carved a route through the minefields for more

tanks to follow. Panzers fought a last-ditch action to stem the

advance, but with only 35 tanks left at the end of the day, there

was little they could do. Allied aerial bombardments and

artillery fire silenced the previously deadly German 88mm anti­

tank guns. Rommel wanted to withdraw but Hitler insisted he

face the British.

Two more days of fighting bled the Afrika Korps dry

and Montgomery's forces finally broke through at Kidney Hill,

leaving Rommel no choice but to disregard Hitler and retreat,

HEINZ WERNER SCHMIDT, LIEUTENANT, AFRIKA KORPS

leaving the Italians behind. Reverting to caution, Montgomery

halted, but the battle was over and German resistance had

been destroyed. Some fifty-nine thousand Germans and Italians

were killed, wounded or captured, and more than five hundred

tanks and four hundred guns had been destroyed. Montgomery

had casualties of thirteen thousand, with 432 tanks destroyed

He had been careful not to waste his men in needless attrition

but had not been faint-hearted when aggression was needed.

Although the fighting in North Africa was a sideshow com­

pared to the colossal struggle on the Eastern Front, the Battle

of EI Alamein was a decisive victory because it ended Axis

aggression in the Mediterranean region. It provided a turning

point for the Allies, allowing troops to land in North Africa as a

prelude to invading Italy and the opening of the much-needed

second front against Hitler (thus relieving pressure on the Red

Army). It had a huge effect on Allied morale too, with Churchill

claiming, not exactly accurately, 'Before Alamein, we never had

a victory. After Alamein, we never had a defeat.' The tide had

turned for the Allies and Hitler was on the defensive.

Above right An Afrika

Korps motorcycle

combination. Although

well equipped, theGermans could not

replace their losses fast

enough to avoid.defeat.

DEADLY CHRISTMAS TREES

'We moved through the Sidi Barrani

region by night. The track was sandy

and in places almost impassable.

Several times we nearly capsized trucks

and guns. An hour or two before

midnight the first parachute flares

opened al50ve us. I never saw them, but

they struck me as emerging from the

darkness with an almost idiotic

exultancy. In a few minutes the heavens

were filled with "Christmas trees", the

countryside was lit as though by

limelight, and bombs thundered down

from the low-flying planes. At times we

raced madly amidst the thunder and the

flashes. If we halted and went to ground

the aircraft attacked even solitary

soldiers whom they caught erect: their

grotesque shadows danced revealingly

across the ground as the flares flamed

down to low levels. If we were not prone,

we were visible.'

Quoted from With Rommel in the Desert

by Heinz Werner Schmidt (George Harrap

& Co., 1951)