9 Purvis Street #03-01 Singapore 188588 Email: singapore@burgoynes.com.sg

Tel: (+65) 6225-9011

Dr J H Burgoyne & Partners (International) Ltd. Incorporated in London, U.K. Registration No: 1970580. Registered Address: 11-12 Half Moon Court, London EC1A 7HF, UK.

With offices in Singapore and Hong Kong and associated offices in Dubai and the U.K. http: // www.burgoynes.com

EDWIN LOW BEng, EE

After six years’ military service in the Republic of Singapore Air Force as a Ground

Equipment Technical Specialist, Edwin studied Electronics and Electrical Engineering at

Glasgow University in Scotland, graduating with a BEng honours degree in 1996.

Prior to joining Burgoynes, Edwin worked at an Engineering and Construction company as

an Electrical Engineer, being responsible for project management, installation, testing and

commissioning electronic control equipment of security, fire, CCTV surveillance and home

automation systems. From 1998 to 2002, he was with an international company

manufacturing cranes and hoists suitable for use in hazardous and explosive

environments.

Edwin joined Dr J.H. Burgoyne and Partners (International) Ltd in 2002. Since that time he

has specialised mainly in the forensic investigation of electrical failures and fires on behalf

of insurance clients and their legal advisors. The fires he has investigated range from

small domestic incidents to vessels, warehouses, large industrial premises and power

stations, in many countries within Asia and in the Middle East. He has investigated

electrical failures of equipment in the medium, high and extra high voltage ranges,

including transmission cables, switchgear equipment, uninterruptible power supply units,

induction motors, turbine generators, and distribution, power and generator transformers.

The cases are investigated in anticipation of litigation and Edwin has given expert witness

evidence in court proceedings and in arbitrations.

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High Voltage Equipment – Generators and Transformers

Edwin has undertaken forensic investigation of numerous transformer and generator

failures, for example:

• A failure at the windings of a 500/23kV 685MVA oil-filled generator step-up unit

(GSU) transformer, most likely due to a manufacturing defect.

• A failure at the windings of a newly commissioned 345/18.05kV 650MVA oil-filled

generator transformer (GT) that led to internal flashover arcing, as a result of a

synchronisation error when it was being connected to the electrical grid.

• A failure and severe arc damage to the tap changer of a 528/18kV 470MVA oil-

filled generator transformer, caused by some movements of the winding coils.

• An explosion and fire in an oil immersed 230kV cable junction box of a 230/66kV

200MVA oil-filled power transformer, caused by a hairline crack at an insulation

bushing that had not been detected during installation.

• A fire at a 150/16.5kV 319MVA oil-filled generator transformer, caused by

deterioration of the paper insulation of the winding, associated with corrosive

sulphur attack of the windings.

• A failure of the stator coil components at a steam turbine 13kV 190MVA

generator, as a result of conductive particles from the metal structure of the unit

coming into contact with stator coil components.

• A failure and heat damage to a set of combined cycle gas/diesel turbine 11.5kV

142kVA hydrogen-cooled generator and a 150/11.5kV, 105/140kVA oil-filled

generator step-up (GSU) transformer, caused by a reversal flow of power from the

electrical grid to the generator and the windings of the transformer, or backfeeding.

• Multiple failures at the windings of a 150/31.5kV 80MVA oil-filled transformer, as a

result of an inherent defect in manufacture such that it was unable to meet its

specified duration of withstanding an external short-circuit fault.

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• A fire at a 150/22kV 80MVA oil-filled transformer, caused by an oil-leak at its high-

voltage bushing.

• A failure at a combined cycled gas turbine 11kV 39.375MVA generator, caused by

loose insulation support blocks at the overhang winding.

• A failure at a 11kV 39MVA generator of a hydro-power plant, inspecting the extent

of damage, commenting and limiting the scope of repairs necessary.

• A failure at the On-Load-Tap-Changer (OLTC) of a 77/6.6kV 30/36MVA oil-filled

power transformer, as a result of poor installation.

• A failure of the stator coil components at an 11kV 19MW squirrel cage induction

motor, as a result of a manufacturing defect.

• An explosion at the prime mover of an 11kV 10MVA diesel-powered generator, as

a result of a control failure.

• A failure at a 24kV/153.1V 8.625MVA oil-filled rectifier transformer. Commenting

on the disputed findings of two other electrical experts.

• Desktop review on a failure at a 7.8MVA rectifier transformer, most likely due to

lack of maintenance.

• A failure at the cast resin insulation of a 3.15MVA distribution transformer, as a

result of the use of defective insulation during manufacture.

• An explosion at a 22kV oil-filled cable connection box of a 3MVA oil-filled

distribution transformer, as a result of water accumulating inside the box.

• Flashover arcing at a 2.5MVA two-tier cast resin distribution transformer, due to a

lack of preventative maintenance in not tightening securing supports of the

transformer coils.

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• A failure of the cast resin insulation of a 2.5MVA distribution transformer, as a

result of a malfunctioning forced ventilation system that was unable to prevent

overheating of the insulation.

• A failure at a 2MVA generator in a wind turbine generator (WTG), as a result of a

manufacturing defect. This was a desktop review of documents including reports,

commenting on matters pertaining to disputes between the insurance companies

and their insured.

• A failure and fire at a 22kV/690V/480V 2.1/1.75MVA cast resin transformer in a

wind turbine generator (WTG) cabin, as a result of a manufacturing defect.

• A failure of the insulation at a primary winding of a 2MVA oil-filled distribution

transformer, as a result of a high short-circuit current introduced by human error.

• A failure and fire at a 1.75MVA wind turbine generator (WTG), as a result of a fault

at a circuit breaker (CB) in the nacelle.

• Flashover arcing at a 22kV cable terminals of a 1.6MVA cast resin distribution

transformer, as a result of a poor electrical contact at a 22kV termination sprout.

• A failure of the insulation at the inter-coils of a 1.5MVA oil-filled transformer, as a

result of deterioration over its entire 20 years of operation.

• An explosion and fire in an oil-filled 22kV cable connection box of a

1MVA distribution transformer, as a result of degradation and deterioration of the

insulating properties of the oil.

• A short-circuit fault at the 6.6kV terminals of a 1MVA cast resin distribution

transformer, as a result of a cable jumper that was carelessly left in a test position

after servicing, at the time of energisation.

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High Voltage Equipment – Others

• An oil leak at a 230kV oil-filled underground cable, caused during manufacture,

which is a known inherent defect in the method used to form its aluminium sheath.

• An explosion at a 230kV oil-filled underground cable, consideration of whether the

incident was the result of an externally inflicted damage or a manufacturing defect.

• A failure at a 170kV gas insulated switchgear (GIS) circuit breaker during

energisation, caused by ingress of conductive material in the gas insulation tank

when an access was made recently.

• An explosion at a gas insulated switchgear (GIS) double busbar system in a

66kV Substation, as a result of human error during energisation.

• A failure at a 35kV marine cable on a sub-seabed at approximately 120 metres

depth, due to punctured insulation, likely damaged by deep sea fishing activities.

• A failure at a 35kV marine cable on a sub-seabed at approximately 150 metres

depth, due to punctured insulation, likely damaged by deep sea fishing activities.

• A failure at a ±15kV marine cable on a sub-seabed, due to punctured insulation,

likely damaged by bottom trawling.

• An explosion at 22kV switchgear equipment, as a result of insulation degradation

of a badly designed switchgear truck.

• A failure and fire at a 22kV electric signboard, as a result of insufficient clearance

between the electrically live conductive component and the electrically earthed

backplate.

• An explosion at a 22kV underground cable joint due to bad workmanship when the

joint was made.

• A fire and flashover arcing of related equipment at a 15kV static VAR compensator

(SVC), caused by a contact failure of a vacuum circuit breaker (VCB).

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• A failure at a 6.6kV surge diverter that served an auto-transformer, as a result of

operating the diverter at the end of its useful life.

• Repeated failures of an induced draught (ID) 690V fan motor, caused by voltage

surges originating at the variable speed drive inverter (VSDI) of the motor circuit.

Low Voltage Equipment – 480V and below

• A fire at an inverter equipment of a 10MW solar power plant project, caused by

contract workers dropping wood screws into the energised conductors of the

inverter.

• Multiple failures of navigation equipment and electrical equipment on a research vessel, caused by 440V from the shore side supply being accidentally connected

to the 230V mains circuit of the vessel.

• A power failure in a refuse incineration plant that led to extensive consequential

damage to machinery and commercial boilers, as a result of a deficiency in the

design of the controls of switchgear equipment.

• Dust explosion of a newly installed commercial electrostatic precipitator, caused

by ignition of a combustible mixture of coal dust and incompletely burnt

combustion products that was produced by the furnace of a steam boiler.

• Power interruptions in a production plant, as a result of flashover arcing inside a

switchgear panel.

• A disruption to a 3G network of a service provider, as a result of an electrical

short-circuiting when a contract worker was adding more electrical modules to a

networking panel.

• A fire at a switchgear panel, caused by ingress of a leaked chemical liquid.

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• A failure and fire at a 2,500A air circuit breaker (ACB) truck, as a result of a bad

connection between its terminal and a common busbar.

• Failures and fires at a 6,000A main breaker panel, as a result of a misalignment of

the current contact components during a maintenance servicing.

• Power interruption to multiple water pumps of several rooftop cooling towers

causing extensive water damage to a shopping mall, as a result of a component

failure in the trip-unit of an air circuit breaker (ACB) assembly.

• Multiple failures at electrical load circuits, as a result of over-voltages occurring

that were caused by faulty capacitor bank of an uninterruptible power supply

(UPS) unit.

• A fire at an uninterruptible power supply (UPS) unit in a base transceiver station (BTS), as a result of condensation in the unit.

• A fire and spontaneous electrical failures at separate locations on the premises, as

a result of a lightning strike.

• A failure at a Busbar Tap-Off box, as a result of improper installation two

decades ago.

• A failure at a newly fitted Busbar Tap-Off Unit (TOU), as a result of a poor

installation by contractors.

• A failure of a busduct system, as a result of condensation caused by flooding on

the premises.

• A fire at a starter unit of a chiller, as a result of a surge of current damaging

electronic components.

• A fire at a row of five commercial cooling towers, as a result of damaged

insulation of energised supply cables.

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• Failures and fires at air-conditioning systems, associated with poor installation

practices.

• An external fire that subsequently involved a beverage vending machine.

Commenting on potential electrical sources of ignition at the equipment.

• Failures and fires in display lighting circuits, associated with poor electrical

installation.

• Fires at electroplating lines, caused by inadequate safety design of solvent

heating circuits.

• A fire at a coal belt-conveyor system, caused by friction heat igniting coal

particles.

• A fire at a coal belt-conveyor system, caused by failure of a real-time coal

analyser machine.

• A fire at an escalator in a shopping mall, caused by damage sustained to the

supply cables of the equipment.

• A failure and fire in an electrical cabinet that controlled several condenser water pumps, as a result of a poor cable connection.

• A fire at a ground power unit (GPU), caused by a poor termination of a battery

supply cable to the battery clamp.

• A fire involving an electric mosquito trap. Consideration of the potential

electrical sources of ignition at the device.

• A fire at a lift relay box, caused by a capacitor failure.

• Providing independent advice to opposing legal advisors on the cause of frequent

power failures on the premises.

• An explosion at a lead-acid battery, caused by excessive precipitation of lead

sulphate (Battery Sulphation).

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• The electrocution of a spray paint contractor onboard a cargo vessel, as a result

of damage sustained to the insulation of an electrical supply cable.

• Desktop review on the non-activation of an electronic security alarm system at

the time that the premises were broken into.

• A failure at an electrical control panel, as a result of water ingress.

• Failures of electronic control equipment, as a result of ageing of some

components.

• Damage assessment of electrical equipment that controlled a milling machine,

which was involved in a previous fire.

• To consider whether faulty capacitors in equipment could cause injury to the users

of the equipment.