1.Paras v. COMELECG.R. No. 123169 (November 4, 1996)FACTS:A petition for recall was filed against Paras, who is the incumbent PunongBarangay. The recall election was deferred due to Petitioners opposition that underSec. 74 of RA No. 7160, no recall shall take place within one year from the date of theofficialsassumption to office orone yearimmediately preceding a regularlocalelection. Since the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set on the first Mondayof May 2006, no recall may be instituted.

ISSUE:W/N the SK election is a local election.

HELD:No. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to its context,and it must be considered togetherand kept subservient to its generalintent.Theevident intent of Sec. 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall once during histerm, as provided in par. (a) and par. (b).The spirit,rather than the letter of a law,determines its construction.Thus,interpreting the phrase regularlocalelection toinclude SK election will unduly circumscribe the Code for there will never be a recallelection rendering inutile the provision.In interpreting a statute,the Court assumedthat the legislature intended to enact an effective law. An interpretation should beavoidedunderwhichastatuteorprovisionbeingconstruedisdefeated,meaningless, inoperative or nugatory.2.LUCERO VS. COMELECAfter the issues had been joined in these consolidated cases, the Court resolved to give due course to the petitions therein and to decide the cases on the merits. It can no longer allow the parties to delay these cases. Their legal skirmishes, which have unduly magnified uncomplicated issues, have effectively deprived the people of the Second Legislative District of Northern Samar of representation in the House of Representatives for more than two years now.

These cases are sequels to G. R. No. 105717, entitled "Jose L. Ong, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections and Wilmar P. Lucero," which we finally resolved on 22 April 1993.1The petitioners were two of the five candidates2for the Second Legislative District of Northern Samar in the synchronized national and local elections held on 11 May 1992.

The canvass of the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBC) of Northern Samar credited Jose L. Ong, Jr. with 24,272 votes and Wilmar P. Lucero with 24,068 votes, or a lead by Ong of 204 votes. However, this tally did not include the results of Precinct No. 7 of the municipality of Silvino Lobos, where the submitted election returns had not been canvassed because they were illegible; of Precinct No. 13 of Silvino Lobos, where the ballot boxes were snatched and no election was held; and of Precinct No. 16, also of Silvino Lobos, where all copies of the election returns were missing.

On 22 May 1992, Lucero asked the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), in SPA No. 92-282, to:

1. Forthwith order Respondent Provincial Board of Canvassers for Northern Samar to suspend the proclamation of Private Respondent Jose L. Ong, Jr.;

2. Direct Respondent Provincial Board of Canvassers for Northern Samar to correct the Certificate of Canvass (CEF 20) for Las Navas and, accordingly, to correct the total votes so far counted by it for Petitioner from 24,068 to 24,088, thus reducing the margin it found in favor of Private Respondent Jose L. Ong, Jr. from 204 to 184 votes only;

3. Order a special election in Precinct 13, Barangay Gusaran, Silvino Lobos, pursuant to Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code;

4. Order a recount of the votes for Representative of the Second District of Northern Samar in Precinct 16, Barangay Tubgon, and Precinct 7, Barangay Camayaan, both of Silvino Lobos, pursuant to Section 234 of the Omnibus Election Code;

5. Order a recount of the votes for Representative in the 52 precincts herein above enumerated in order to correct "manifest errors" pursuant to Section 15 of Republic Act 7166 and for this purpose order the impounding and safekeeping of the ballot boxes of all said precincts in order to preserve the integrity of the ballots and other election paraphernalia contained therein.3On 2 June 1992, the COMELEC, acting on Lucero's urgent manifestation, directed the PBC to desist from reconvening until further orders.

On 8 June 1992, Ong moved to lift the suspension of the proceedings by the PBC, which Lucero opposed on 10 June 1992 on the ground that the canvass could not be completed even if the PBC were to reconvene because no election was held in Precinct No. 13 (Barangay Gusaran) of Silvino Lobos and there was no canvassing of the votes in Precinct No. 7 (Barangay Camayaan) and Precinct No. 16 (Barangay Tubgon) both of Silvino Lobos.

On 13 June 1993, the COMELECen bancpromulgated a resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads:

Accordingly, the Commission hereby orders the Provincial Election Supervisor of Northern Samar to bring to the Commission within three (3) days from receipt hereof the ballot boxes from Precinct 7 and 16 of Silvino Lobos, to be escorted by representatives from the petitioner and the respondents as well as other parties who have an interest to protect, and to notify said parties hereof. The Municipal Treasurer of said town is directed to turn over custody of said ballot boxes to the Provincial Election Supervisor, and the keys thereof shall likewise be turned over by the appropriate officials in custody thereof to the PES, who shall in turn give one key for each ballot box to the duly authorized representatives of the petitioner and the respondent.

The Commission likewise orders the Election Registrar of Silvino Lobos, Northern Samar, and the Chairman and members of the Boards of Election Inspectors of Precincts 7 and 16 of said municipality to appear before the Commission within three (3) days from receipt hereof.

Below the signatures of the Chairman and the six Commissioners, however, Chairman Christian S. Monsod and Commissioners Haydee B. Yorac, Dario C. Rama and Regalado E. Maambong directed as follows:

We vote in favor of this resolution except that portion which denied the correction of the Certificate of Canvass for Las Navas. Correction of the Certificate of Canvass for Las Navas is in order in view of the testimony of the election registrar of Las Navas to the effect that Wilmar Lucero garnered 2,537 votes for Las Navas and not 2,517. Petition for correction was duly filed by Lucero with the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Northern Samar on May 19, 1992. The Provincial Board of Canvassers of Northern Samar is therefore directed to retabulate the total number of votes for Las Navas for Lucero and enter the same in the Provincial Certificate of Canvass.4On 15 June 1992, Lucero filed an urgent motion to constitute a Special Board of Election Inspectors (SBEI) to count the votes of Precincts Nos. 7 and 16 of Silvino Lobos.5On 20 June 1992, Ong, in a special civil action forcertiorarifiled with this Court and subsequently docketed as G. R. No. 105717, questioned the order for the recount of ballots in Precincts No. 7 and 16. Despite the pendency of this petition, the COMELEC ordered the recount of the ballots in Precinct No. 16 by a SBEI which recorded 43 votes for Lucero and 2 votes for Ong.6On 25 June 1992, this Court issued in G. R. No. 105717 a temporary restraining order against the implementation by the COMELEC of its Order of 2 June 1992 and its Resolution of 13 June 1992.

On 23 December 1992, this Court promulgated its decision in G. R. No. 105717,7the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition forcertiorariis GRANTED and a writ of preliminary injunction is hereby ISSUED directing the COMELEC to CEASE and DESIST from implementing its order of June 2, 1992, and its resolution dated June 13, 1992, and the same are hereby declared NULLIFIED. Consequently, the election returns based on the recounted ballots from Precinct 16 are hereby DISCARDED and in lieu thereof, authentic returns from said precinct should instead be made a basis for the canvassing. The Provincial Board of Canvassers of Northern Samar is hereby directed to PROCEED WITH DISPATCH in the canvassing of ballots until completed and to PROCLAIM the duly elected winner of the congressional seat for the Second District of Northern Samar.

This decision is immediately executory.8Acting on the motions for reconsideration and clarification respectively filed by the COMELEC and Lucero, this Court, on 22 April 1993, modified9its aforesaid disposition in G. R. No. 105717 as follows;

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the dispositive portion of the December 23, 1992 Decision is hereby MODIFIED to read as follows;

"WHEREFORE, THE PETITION IS GRANTED. THE JUNE 2, 1992 ORDER OF RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS IN SPA NO. 92-282 IS HEREBY ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. ITS JUNE 13, 1992 RESOLUTION THEREIN IS LIKEWISE ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE INSOFAR AS IT AFFECTS PRECINCT NO. 7 OF SILVINO LOBOS, THE RECOUNT OF VOTES IN THE 52 OTHER PRECINCTS AND THE CORRECTION OF THE CERTIFICATE OF CANVASS OF LAS NAVAS, BUT IS AFFIRMED WITH RESPECT TO THE ISSUE OF HOLDING A SPECIAL ELECTION IN PRECINCT NO. 13 AND THE RECOUNT OF THE BALLOTS IN PRECINCTNO. 16.

THE RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS IS HEREBY DIRECTED TO ASSIGN SPA NO. 92-282 TO ANY OF ITS DIVISIONS PURSUANT TO ITS RULE ON RAFFLE OF CASES FOR IT TO RESOLVE THE PRE-PROCLAMATION ISSUES THEREIN, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE ABOVE PRONOUNCEMENTS AND THE EXCEPTIONS PROVIDED FOR IN SECTION 15 OF R. A. NO. 7166.

WHENEVER WARRANTED BY THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE COMMISSION MAY (A) CALL A SPECIAL ELECTION IN PRECINCT NO. 13 OF SILVINO LOBOS, NORTHERN SAMAR, AND (B) RECONVENE THE SPECIAL MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS AND THE SPECIAL PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS IT HAD EARLIER CONSTITUTED OR CREATE NEW ONES.

ALL THE FOREGOING SHOULD BE DONE WITH PURPOSEFUL DISPATCH TO THE END THAT THE WINNING CANDIDATE FOR CONGRESSMAN REPRESENTING THE SECOND CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT OF NORTHERN SAMAR MAY BE PROCLAIMED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE."10As to the certificate of canvass of the municipality of Las Navas, this Court explicitly stated;

The correction of the certificate of canvass of Las Navas is likewise in order. Even though a pre-proclamation issue is involved, the correction of the manifest error is allowed under Section 15 of R. A. No. 7166.11Conformably with the aforesaid modified judgment in G. R. No. 105717, SPA No. 92-282 was raffled to the First Division of the COMELEC which conducted hearings thereon and received the arguments and evidence of both parties who then submitted their respective memoranda on 25 June 1994. However, during the consultations on the case by the Members of the First Division, the concurrence of at least two of them could not be obtained; accordingly, pursuant to the COMELEC Rules, the case was elevated for proper disposition to the COMELECen bancto which the parties submitted their respective memoranda on 19 November 1993.12On 7 January 1994, the COMELECen bancpromulgated a resolution13whose dispositive portion reads as follows:

1. To direct the special Provincial Board of Canvassers for Northern Samar (a) to include in the municipal certificate of canvass of Silvino Lobos the forty-three (43) votes of petitioner Lucero and the two (2) votes of private respondent Ong as reflected in the election returns of Precinct No. 16 (Barangay Tubgon) prepared by the special Board of Election Inspectors constituted by the Commission to recount the votes (ballots) in said precinct, as canvassed by the special Municipal Board of Canvassers for Silvino Lobos; (b) to include in the municipal certificate of canvass of Silvino Lobos, the sixty-one (61) votes of private respondent Ong and 29, 30, or 31 votes of petitioner Lucero as reflected in the election returns (MBC Copy submitted as "Comelec Copy") of Precinct No. 7 (Barangay Camaya-an), as canvassed by the special Municipal Board of Canvassers for Silvino Lobos; (c) to retabulate the total number of votes of petitioner Lucero for the Municipality of Las Navas and to enter in the provincial certificate of canvass the correct total which is two thousand five hundred thirty-seven (2,537) as reflected in the Statement of Votes (C. E. Form 20-A) prepared and submitted by the Municipal Board of Canvassers for Las Navas; and (d) to submit to the Commission a computation of the votes of the contending parties including therein all the votes of petitioner Lucero (with alternative totals) and private respondent Ong, in Precinct Nos. 7 and 16 of Silvino Lobos and the total votes of petitioner Lucero in the Municipality of Las Navas as corrected. However, under no circumstances should the Board proclaim any winning candidate until instructed to do so by the Commission;

2. To issue an Order calling for a special election in the last remaining Precinct No. 13 (Barangay Gusaran) of the Municipality of Silvino Lobos if justified by the result of the canvass by the Provincial Board of Canvassers for Northern Samar, and to notify the parties of the schedule of election activities for that precinct; and

3. After including in the tabulation the results of the special election of Precinct No. 13, to decide the issue of the recount of the votes (ballots) of Precinct No. 7 of Silvino Lobos, pursuant to Section 236 of the Omnibus Election Code, to resolve the discrepancy of the votes of petitioner Lucero in the same return, if such discrepancy of votes of the candidates concerned would affect the over-all results of the election after the totality of the votes of the contending parties shall have been determined.

Both Lucero and Ong have come to this Court by way of separate special civil actions forcertiorarito challenge the Resolution.

In G. R. No. 113107, Lucero maintains that (1) the count of the ballots in Precinct No. 7 of Silvino Lobos must be unconditional because the election returns therefrom are invalid; and (2) his chances in the special election in Precinct No. 13 of Silvino Lobos would be spoiled if the returns for Precinct No. 7 were to be included beforehand in the canvass.

In G. R. No. 113509, Ong questions (1) the authority of the COMELEC to order the correction of the alleged manifest error in the Municipal Certificate of Canvass of Las Navas despite the absence of any appeal; and (2) the authority of the COMELEC to call for a special election in Precinct No. 13 almost two years after the regular election.

As we see it, the core issues in these consolidated cases are:

(1) Whether there should first be a count of the ballots of Precinct No. 7 of Silvino Lobos before determining the necessity of holding a special election in Precinct No. 13 of Silvino Lobos:

(2) Whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in ordering the correction of the alleged manifest error in the Municipal Certificate of Canvass of Las Navas; and

(3) Whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in calling for a special election in Precinct No. 13 after almost two (2) years, or more specifically after one (1) year and ten (10) months, following the day of the synchronized elections.

We shall take up these issuesseriatim.

I.

The answer to the first issue is in the affirmative.

We find the COMELEC's disposition regarding Precinct No. 7 to be unclear. In the first paragraph of the dispositive portion of the challenged resolution, it directs the Provincial Board of Canvassers "to include in the municipal certificate of canvas of Silvino Lobos the sixty-one (61) votes of private respondent Ong and 29, 30, or 31 votes of petitioner Lucero as reflected in the election returns (MBC copy submitted as "COMELEC Copy") of Precinct No. 7 (Barangay Camaya-an), as canvassed by the special Municipal Board of Canvassers for Silvino Lobos," and "to submit to the Commission a computation of the votes of the contending parties including therein all the votes of petitioner Lucero (with alternative totals) and private respondent Ong, in Precinct Nos. 7 and 16 of Silvino Lobos. . . ." On the other hand, in the fourth paragraph of the said dispositive portion, it orders the Provincial Board of Canvassers, after "including in the tabulation the results of the special election of Precinct No. 13," to "decide the issue of the recount of the votes (ballots) of Precinct No. 7 of Silvino Lobos, pursuant to Section 236 of the Omnibus Election Code [and] to resolve the discrepancy of the votes of petitioner Lucero in the same return, if such discrepancy of votes of the candidate concerned would affect the over-all results of the election after the totality of the votes of the contending parties shall have been determined."

Obviously, instead of ordering an outright recount of the ballots of Precinct No. 7, the COMELEC would first give full faith and credit to the questioned election returns thereof, which it describes as the "Comelec Copy," and, accordingly, direct the PBC to include in the municipal certificate of canvass of Silvino Lobos the 61 votes for Ong and the uncertain votes for Lucero 29, 30, or 31. The recount would only be made if after a special election in Precinct No. 13 shall have been held, it shall be determined that such a recount would be necessary.

We fail to grasp the logic of the proposition. First, it is clear to us that the COMELEC, which has in its possession the so-called "Comelec Copy" of the questioned election returns of Precinct No. 7 and heard the witnesses who testified thereon, doubts the authenticity of the so-called "Comelec Copy" of the election returns of Precinct No. 7;14hence, it authorizes the PBC to decide the issue of a recount "pursuant to Section 236 of the Omnibus Election Code." Since it doubts such authenticity, it could not, without arbitrariness and abuse of discretion, order the inclusion of the "votes" of Ong and Lucero found in the doubtful "Comelec Copy" of the election returns in the municipal certificate of canvass. Second, it is an uncontroverted fact that an election was held in Precinct No. 7. None was held in Precinct No. 13 for reasons the parties fully knew. Pursuant to Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), a special election may be held in Precinct No. 13 only if the failure of the election therein "would affect the result of the election." This "result of the election" means the net result of the election in the rest of the precincts in a given constituency, such that if the margin of a leading candidate over that of his closest rival in the latter precincts is less than the total number of votes in the precinct where there was failure of election, then such failure would certainly affect "the result of the election"; hence, a special election must be held. Consequently, the holding of a special election in Precinct No. 13 can only be determined after the votes in Precinct No. 7 shall have been included in the canvass by the Provincial Board of Canvassers.

We may further state that the so-called "Comelec Copy" of the election returns of Precinct No. 7 can by no means be validly included in the municipal canvass. The summary of the evidence in the "preparation" of the election returns of Precinct No. 7, both in the challenged Resolution and in the separate Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Commissioners Gorospe and Claravall, leaves no room for doubt that there was actuallyno countingof the votes in Precinct No. 7. Quoted in the challenged Resolution is a portion of the testimony of Sabina T. Jarito, Precinct Chairman of Precinct No. 7, which clearly shows that on questions by COMELEC Chairman Christian S. Monsod and Commissioner Vicente B. de Lima, the witness candidly admitted that the election returns were prepared at the"munisipyo"or municipal building and not at the polling place of Precinct No. 7 in barangay Camaya-an.15This"munisipyo"is located at thepoblacionof Silvino Lobos. Under the law, the board of election inspectors shall prepare the election returns simultaneously with the counting of votes in the polling place.16There is no evidence whatsoever that the COMELEC had, for valid reasons, authorized the transfer of venue of the counting of the votes of Precinct No. 7 from the polling place in barangay Camaya-an to the municipal building and that the counting did in fact take place at the latter. Although in the Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Commissioners Gorospe and Claravall there is a reference to Exhibit "E," the Joint Affidavit of Sabina Jarito and Mevilyn Surio wherein they declare that after the voting the Board of Election Inspectors unanimously approved to transfer the counting of votes to the Municipal Building in the Poblacion of Silvino Lobos, which was allegedly concurred in by all the watchers of political parties and the candidates present, the alleged "counting" at the municipal building was denied by no less than the Municipal Election Officer of Silvino Lobos, Antonio Tepace, and the Municipal Treasurer thereof, Mr. Gabriel Basarte, in their affidavits marked as Exhibit "F" and Exhibit "G,"respectively.17Since there was no counting of the votes of Precinct No. 7, no valid election returns could be made and any copy of election returns purporting to come therefrom is a fabrication. Arecountthereof, which presupposes aprior count, would obviously be unwarranted.

Only a count then of the votes of Precinct No. 13 would heretofore be in order. Sections 234, 235, and 236 of the Omnibus Election Code are thus still inapplicable. And, in the light of what we stated before in relation to the holding of a special election, such a count of the votes of Precinct No. 7 must, perforce, precede the special election in Precinct No. 13.

II.

Ong's first grievance in G. R. No. 113509 is without merit.

The order of the COMELEC for the correction of the manifest error in the municipal certificate of canvass of Las Navas was made pursuant to the declaration made by this Court in G. R. No. 105717 (Ong vs. COMELEC)18that:

The correction of the certificate of canvass of Las Navas is likewise in order. Even though a pre-proclamation issue is involved, the correction of the manifest error is allowed under Sec. 15 of R. A. No. 7166.

Since no motion for reconsideration was filed in that case, the decision therein became final and entry of judgment was made on 4 August 1993. Consequently, Ong cannot now re-litigate the issue of the correction of the certificate of canvass of Las Navas.

III

On the authority of the COMELEC to order the holding of a special election, Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:

Sec. 6. Failure of election. If, on account offorce majeure,violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and if in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.

The first paragraph of Section 4 of R. A. No. 7166 likewise provides:

Sec. 4. Postponement, Failure of Election and Special Elections. The postponement, declaration of failure of election and the calling of special elections as provided in Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Omnibus Election Code shall be decided by the Commission sittingen bancby a majority votes of its members. The causes for the declaration of a failure of election may occur before or after the casting of votes or on the day of the election.

There are, therefore, two requisites for the holding of special elections under Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code,viz.,(1) that there is a failure of election, and (2) that such failure would affect the results of the election. The parties admit that the failure of the election in Precinct No. 13 was due to ballot-box snatching and do not dispute the finding of the COMELEC as to the necessity and inevitability of the holding of a special election in said precinct, even if the result of Precinct No. 7 should be based on the questionable "Comelec Copy" of its election returns. The COMELEC held:

Based on the adjudged correction of the votes in favor of petitioner Lucero in the Municipality of Las Navas, the results of the recount of votes (ballots) of Precinct No. 16 (Silvino Lobos), and the votes reflected in the available copy of the election returns for Precinct No. 7 (Silvino Lobos), it is safe to predict that when the special Provincial Board of Canvassers will reconvene to sum up the votes of the contending parties, the original lead of private respondent Ong of two hundred four (204) votes against petitioner Lucero 24,272 as against 24,068 will be reduced to either 175 or 173 depending on whether Lucero will be credited a low of 29 or a high of 31 votes as reflected in the election returns of Precinct No. 7.

Without preempting the exact figures which only the special Provincial Board of Canvassers can correctly determine, undoubtedly it is inevitable that a special election will have to be held in Precinct No. 13 (Barangay Gusaran) of the Municipality of Silvino Lobos.

. . .

Given the established lead of private respondent Ong over petitioner Lucero, We answer in the affirmative. According to Comelec records, the number of registered voters in Precinct No. 13 istwo hundred thirteen (213).Since the lead of respondent Ong is less than the number of registered voters, the votes in that precinct could affect the existing result because of the possibility that petitioner Lucero might get a majority over Ong in that precinct and that majority might be more than the present lead of Ong.19On the basis of the additional votes credited so far to the parties,20the following computation is in order: to Ong's 24,272 votes will be added 2 more from Precinct No. 16, to make a total of 24,274, while to Lucero's 24,068 votes will be added 20 more from Las Navas and 43 from Precinct No. 16, for a total of 24,131. Ong's earlier lead will thus be reduced to 143, which is admittedly less than the 213 registered voters in Precinct No. 13.21The two requirements then for a special election under Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code have indeed been met.

In fixing the date of the special election, the COMELEC should see to it that: (1) it should be not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of the postponement or suspension of the election or the failure to elect, and (2) it should be reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended, or which resulted in failure to elect. The first involves questions of fact. The second must be determined in the light of the peculiar circumstances of a case. In the instant case, the delay was not attributable to the poor voters of Precinct No. 13 or to the rest of the electorate of the Second Legislative District of Northern Samar. The delay was, as stated in the opening paragraph of thisponencia, primarily caused by the legal skirmishes or maneuvers of the petitioners which muddled simple issues. The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that G. R. No. 113509 is the third case Ong has brought to this Court.22Considering then that the petitioners themselves must share the blame for the delay, and taking into account the fact that since the term of the office of the contested position is only three years, the holding of a special election in Precinct No. 13 within the next few months may still be considered "reasonably close to the date of the election not held." Ong's postulation should then be rejected.

In the course of the deliberations on these cases, the Court considered the possible application, by analogy, of Section 10, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution providing that no special election in the event of a vacancy in the Offices of the President and Vice President "shall be called if the vacancy occurs within eighteen months before the date of the next presidential election," and of the second paragraph of Section 4 of R. A. No. 7166 which provides:

In case a permanent vacancy shall occur in the Senate or House of Representatives at least one (1) year before the expiration of the term, the Commission shall call and hold a special election to fill the vacancy not earlier than sixty (60) days nor longer than ninety (90) days after the occurrence of the vacancy. However, in case of such vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election.

A view was expressed that we should not hold the special election because the underlying philosophy for the prohibition to hold the special election if the vacancy occurred within a certain period before the next presidential election or the next regular election, as the case may be, is obviously the avoidance of the expense to be incurred in the holding of a special election when a regular election is, after all, less than a year away. The Court ultimately resolved that the aforesaid constitutional and statutory proscriptions are inapplicable to special elections which may be called under Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code. First, the special election in the former is to fill permanent vacancies in the Office of the President, Vice President, and Members of Congress occurring after the election, while the special election under the latter is due to or by reason of a failure of election. Second, a special election under Section 6 would entail minimal costs because it is limited to only the precincts involved and to the candidates who, by the result of the election in a particular constituency, would be affected by the failure of election. On the other hand, the special election for the Offices of the President, Vice President, and Senators would be nation-wide, and that of a Representative, district-wide. Third, Section 6, when specifically applied to the instant case, presupposes that no candidate had been proclaimed and therefore the people of the Second Legislative District of Northern Samar would be unrepresented in the House of Representatives until the special election shall ultimately determine the winning candidate, such that if none is held, they would have no representation until the end of the term. under the aforesaid constitutional and statutory provisions, the elected officials have already served their constituencies for more than one-half of their terms of office. Fourth, if the law had found it fit to provide a specific and determinate time-frame for the holding of a special election under Section 6, then it could have easily done so in Section 4 of R. A. No. 7166.

Another serious obstacle to Ong's proposition is that, considering the COMELEC's disposition of Precinct No. 7 in the challenged Resolution, he would then be declared and proclaimed the duly elected Representative of the Second Legislative District of Northern Samar despite the fact that as earlier observed, there was no counting of the votes of Precinct No. 7, and the results of the district elections for Representative would be affected by the failure of the election in Precinct No. 13. To accept the proposition is to allow a proclamation based on an incomplete canvass where the final result would have been affected by the uncanvassed result of Precinct No. 7 and by the failure of the election in Precinct No. 13 and to impose upon the people of the Second Legislative District of Northern Samar a Representative whose mandate is, at the very least, uncertain, and at the most, inexistent.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered:

I. DISMISSING, for lack of merit, the petition in G. R. No. 113509; and

II. In G. R. No. 113107, DIRECTING the respondent Commission on Elections to:

(1) Reconvene, in its main office of Manila, within five (5) days from notice hereof, the Special Board of Canvassers of the municipality of Silvino Lobos, Northern Samar, which shall then, as a special Board of Election Inspectors of Precinct No. 7 of said municipality, within forty-eight (48) hours from its reconvening, count the ballots of said Precinct No. 7, and deliver to the special Provincial Board of Canvassers of the said Province a copy of the election returns;

(2) Reconvene, in its main office in Manila, within the same period as aforestated, the special Provincial Board of Canvassers of Northern Samar which shall then, within seventy-two (72) hours from its reconvening:

(a) Include in the Municipal Certificate of Canvass of Silvino Lobos (1) the total number of votes for petitioner Wilmar P. Lucero and for petitioner Jose L. Ong, Jr., respectively, in Precinct No. 7 of Silvino Lobos as recorded in the election returns submitted by the aforementioned special Municipal Board of Canvassers, and (2) the forty-three (43) votes for petitioner Wilmar P. Lucero and the two (2) votes for petitioner Jose L. Ong, Jr. as reflected in the election returns of Precinct No. 16 (Barangay Tubgon) prepared, after a recount of the ballots, by the special Board of Canvassers; and after such inclusions to enter the new totals of the votes for the petitioners in the Certificate of Provincial Canvass;

(b) Retabulate the total number of votes for Wilmar P. Lucero for the Municipality of Las Navas, Northern Samar, which shall be two thousand and five hundred thirty-seven (2,537) as reflected in the Statement of Votes (C.E. Form 20-A) prepared and submitted by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Las Navas, and to enter the same in the Certificate of Provincial Canvass;

(c) After the accomplishment of all the foregoing, to sum up anew in the Certificate of Provincial Canvass the canvassed municipal certificates of canvass of all the municipalities of the Second Legislative District of Northern Samar and if the same would establish that the difference in votes between petitioner Wilmar P. Lucero and petitioner Jose L. Ong, Jr. is less than two hundred and thirteen (213), hence the failure of the election in Precinct No. 13 would unavoidably and inevitably affect then the result of the election, to report to the Commission on Elections such fact and to furnish the latter with a certified photocopy of the Certificate of Provincial Canvass;

(3) Within three (3) days after receipt of the aforesaid report from the special Provincial Board of Canvassers, to CALL a special election in Precinct No. 13 of Silvino Lobos, which shall be held not later than thirty (30) days from such call; a copy of the election returns of said special election shall forthwith be transmitted to the Special Provincial Board of Canvassers of Northern Samar, which shall then enter the results thereof in its canvass and make a final summation of the results in the Certificate of Provincial Canvass, and thereafter, pursuant to the Omnibus Election Code, pertinent election laws and rules and resolutions of the Commission, proclaim the winning candidate for Representative of the Second Legislative District of Northern Samar.

If for any reason whatsoever it would not be possible to immediately reconvene the Special Municipal Board of Canvassers of Silvino Lobos and the Special Provincial Board of Canvassers of Northern Samar, the COMELEC may create new ones.

3.SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY vs. COMELEC

FACTS:

On March 13, 1992,Congress enacted

RA. 7227(The Bases Conversionand Development Act of 1992), which created theSubic EconomicZone. RA 7227 likewise created SBMA toimplement the declarednational policy of converting the Subicmilitary reservation intoalternative productive uses.

On November 24, 1992,the American navy turned over the Subicmilitary reservation to thePhilippines government. Immediately,petitioner commenced the implementation of itstask, particularly thepreservation of the sea-ports, airport, buildings, houses and otherinstallations left by theAmerican navy.

On April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10,Serye 1993, expressing therein itsabsolute concurrence, as required by said Sec. 12 of RA 7227, to join the Subic Special Economic Zone and submitted such to the Office ofthe President.

On May 24, 1993,respondents Garcia filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to

annulPambayang Kapasyahan Blg.10, Serye 1993

The petition prayed for the following: a)to nullify PambayangKapasyang Blg. 10 for Morong to join the Subic Special Economi Zone,b) to allow Morong to join provided conditions are met.

The Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong acted upon the petition by promulgating Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye 1993, requesting Congress of the Philippines so amend certain provisions of RA 7227.

Not satisfied, respondents resorted to their power initiative under the LGC of 1991.

On July 6, 1993,COMELEC denied the petition for local initiative on the ground that the subject thereofwas merely a resolution and not an ordinance.

On February 1, 1995,the President issued Proclamation No. 532 defining the metes and bounds of the SSEZ including therein the portion of the former naval basewithin the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Morong.

On June 18, 19956,respondent Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845and 2848, adopting a "Calendar of Activities for

local referendum and providing for "the rules and guidelines to govern the conduct of the referendum

On July 10, 1996, SBMA instituted a petition for certioraricontesting the validity of Resolution No.2848 alleging that public respondent is intent on proceeding with a local initiative that proposesan amendment of a national law

ISSUE:1. WON Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Resolution No. 2848 which governs the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or repeal Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 102. WON the questioned local initiative covers a subject within thepowers of the people of Morong to enact; i.e., whether such initiative "seeks the amendment of a national law.

HELD:1.

YES. COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion. FIRST. The process started byprivate respondents was an INITIATIVE but respondent Comelec made preparations for a REFERENDUM only. In fact, in the body of the Resolution as reproduced in the footnote below, the word "referendum" is repeated at least 27 times, but"initiative" is not mentioned at all. The Comelec labeled the exercise as a "Referendum"; the counting of votes was entrusted toa "Referendum Committee"; the documents were called "referendum returns"; the canvassers, "Referendum Board of Canvassers" and the ballots themselves bore the description "referendum". To repeat, not once was the word "initiative" used in said body of Resolution No. 2848. And yet, this exercise is unquestionably an INITIATIVE. As defined, Initiative is the power ofthe people to propose billsand laws, and to enact or reject themat the polls independent of thelegislative assembly. On the other hand, referendum is the rightreserved to the people to adopt or reject anyact or measure which has been passedby a legislative body and which in most cases would without action on the part of electors become a law. In initiative and referendum, theComelec exercises administration and supervision of the process itself, akin to its powers over the conduct ofelections.

These law-making powers belong to the people, hencethe respondent Commission cannot control or change the substance orthe content oflegislation.2. The local initiative is NOT ultra vires because the municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage andnot yet an approved law.

The municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It is not yet an approved law. Should the people reject it, thenthere would be nothing to contest and to adjudicate. It is only when the people have voted for it and it has become an approved ordinance or resolution that rights andobligations can be enforced or implemented there under. At this point, itis merely a proposal and the writ or prohibition cannot issue upon a mere conjecture or possibility. Constitutionally speaking, courts may decide onlyactual controversies, not hypothetical questions or cases. In the present case, it isquite clear that the Court hasauthority to review Comelec Resolution No. 2848 to determine the commission ofgrave abuse ofdiscretion. However, it does not have the sameauthority in regard to the proposed initiative since it has not beenpromulgated or approved, or passed upon by any "branch orinstrumentality" or lower court, for that matter. The Commission on Elections itself has made noreviewable pronouncements about the issues brought bythe pleadings. The Comelec simply included verbatim the proposal in its questioned Resolution No.2848. Hence, there is really no decision or action made bya branch, instrumentality or court which this Court could take cognizance of andacquire jurisdiction over, in the exercise of its review powers.

4.PERALTA vs. COMELECFacts:Section 4 of the 1978 Election Code provides that the election period shall be fixed by the Commission on Elections in accordance with Section 6, Article XII[C] of the Constitution. The period of campaign shall not be more than forty-five days immediately preceding the election, excluding the day before and the day of the election. Petitioners questioned the constitutionality of the 45-day campaign period because: (a) it was decreed by the President and not by the Commission on Elections as provided by Section 6 of Article XII-C and (b) the period should cover at least ninety days (90). They argue that Section 6 of Article XII-C of the Constitution provides that the election period shall commence ninety days before the day of election and shall end thirty days thereafter.

Issue:Whether or not the 45-day period is unconstitutional

Held: The 45-day campaign period is constitutional. Although the campaign period prescribed in the 1978 Election Code for the election of the representatives to the interim Batasang Pambansa is less than 90 days and was decreed by the President and not by the Commission on Elections as provided by Section 6 of Article XII-C of the Constitution, the same does not violate the Constitution, because under Amendment 1, the manner of election of members of the interim Batasang Pambansa shall be prescribed and regulated by law, and the incumbent President under Amendment No. 5, shall continue to exercise legislative power until martial law shall have been lifted. Moreover, the election for members in the interim Batasang Pambansa is an election in a state of emergency requiring special rules, and only the incumbent President has the authority and means of obtaining information on the peace and order condition of the country within which an electoral campaign may be adequately conducted in all regions of the nation. But even assuming that it should be the Commission on Elections that should fix the period of campaign, the constitutional mandate is complied with by the fact that the Commission has adopted and is enforcing the period fixed in Section 4, Article 1, of the 1978 Election Code.

5. Occena vs. Commission on Elections

Facts:The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings against the validity of three Batasang Pambansa Resolutions proposing constitutional amendments, goes further than merely assailing their alleged constitutional infirmity. Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of the Philippine Bar and former delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention that framed the present Constitution, are suing as taxpayers. The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law, the Javellana ruling to the contrary notwithstanding.

Issue:Whether the 1973 Constitution was valid, and in force and effect when the Batasang Pambansa resolutions and the present petitions were promulgated and filed, respectively.

Held:It is much too late in the day to deny the force and applicability of the 1973 Constitution. In the dispositive portion of Javellana v. The Executive Secretary, dismissing petitions for prohibition and mandamus to declare invalid its ratification, this Court stated that it did so by a vote of six to four. It then concluded: "This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect." Such a statement served a useful purpose. It could even be said that there was a need for it. It served to clear the atmosphere. It made manifest that as of 17 January 1973, the present Constitution came into force and effect. With such a pronouncement by the Supreme Court and with the recognition of the cardinal postulate that what the Supreme Court says is not only entitled to respect but must also be obeyed, a factor for instability was removed. Thereafter, as a matter of law, all doubts were resolved. The 1973 Constitution is the fundamental law. It is as simple as that. What cannot be too strongly stressed is that the function of judicial review has both a positive and a negative aspect. As was so convincingly demonstrated by Professors Black and Murphy, the Supreme Court can check as well as legitimate. In declaring what the law is, it may not only nullify the acts of coordinate branches but may also sustain their validity. In the latter case, there is an affirmation that what was done cannot be stigmatized as constitutionally deficient. The mere dismissal of a suit of this character suffices. That is the meaning of the concluding statement in Javellana. Since then, this Court has invariably applied the present Constitution. The latest case in point is People v. Sola, promulgated barely two weeks ago. During the first year alone of the effectivity of the present Constitution, at least ten cases may be cited.

6.Laban ngDemokratikong Pilipino vs COMELEC

Facts:The General Counsel of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) informed the COMELEC by way of Manifestation that only the Party Chairman, Senator Edgardo J. Angara, or his authorized representative may endorse the certificate of candidacy of the partys official candidates. The same Manifestation stated that Sen. Angara had placed the LDP Secretary General, Representative Agapito A. Aquino, on "indefinite forced leave." In the meantime, Ambassador Enrique A. Zaldivar was designated Acting Secretary General.

However, Rep. Aquino filed his comment, contending that the Party Chairman does not have the authority to impose disciplinary sanctions on the Secretary General. As the Manifestation filed by the LDP General Counsel has no basis, Rep. Aquino asked the COMELEC to disregard the same.

Prior to the May 2004 elections, the Laban ngDemokratikong Pilipino (LDP) has been divided because of a struggle of authority between Party Chairman Edgardo Angara and Party Secretary General Agapito Aquino, both having endorsed two different sets of candidates under the same party, LDP.

The matter was brought to the COMELEC. The Commission in its resolution has recognized the factions creating two sub-parties: LDP Angara Wing and LDP Aquino Wing.

Issue:

Whether or not the COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion in recognizing the two sets of nominations and endorsements by the same party.

Held:

Yes. The COMELEC erred in its resolution. Only those Certificates of Candidacy (COC) signed by the LDP Party Chairman Angara or his duly authorized representative/s shall be recognized.

7.Ang Bagong Bayani vs. ComelecFacts:Herein case involves two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) on March 26, 2001. This Resolution approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners seek the disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented.

Issues:1.Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections. 2.Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations. 3.Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.

Held:1.Yes. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of Representatives may be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

2.Yes. The requisite character of these parties or organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941. (e.g. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution)

While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the party-list system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that words employed in a statute are interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by reference to, the words and the phrases with which they are associated or related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a statute may be limited, qualified or specialized by those in immediate association.

8. Peralta vs Comelec (SAME WITH # 4 CASE)

9.FRIVALDO VS. COMELEC

FACTS: Private respondent questioned petitioner governors candidacy and election for being null and void ab initio due to his alienage. Petitioner governor contends that his active participation in the elections had divested him of American citizenship under the laws of the US, and restored him of his Philippine citizenship.

ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of a certificate of candidacy by a naturalized American effectively recovers his Philippine citizenship.

HELD: No, Philippine citizenship previously disowned is not that cheaply recovered. Citizenship once lost may be reacquired either by naturalization or repatriation or by direct grant by law (CA 63) which was not invoked by the petitioner

10.LABO VS. COMELECGR No. 86564, August 1, 1989(Constitutional Law Loss of Citizenship)FACTS: Herein petitioner, claiming for recognition as a Philippine citizen is a mayor-elect who, through his marriage with an Australian national, was naturalized and took an oath of allegiance as an Australian citizen. Said marriage was found to be bigamous and therefore was annulled. Petitioner claims that his naturalization made him only a dual national and did not divest him of his Philippine citizenship.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was divested of his Philippine citizenship.

HELD: Yes, because Commonwealth Act No. 63 clearly stated that Philippine citizenship may be lost through naturalization in a foreign country; express renunciation of citizenship; and by oath of allegiance to a foreign country, all of which are applicable to the petitioner.

11.Caasi vs. ComelecFACTS:

Mateo Caasi is seeking the disqualification of Merito Miguel as candidate for municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan on the ground that he (Miguel) is a green card holder, hence, a resident of the United States. Miguel admits possessing a green card but contends that he only uses it for convenience to freely enter US for his medical treatment and to visit his children. He also alleges that he voted in all previous elections, including the plebiscite on 2 February 1987 for the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, and the congressional elections on 18 May 1987.

ISSUE:

WON a green card is a proof that the holder is a US resident

HELD:

In Miguels Application forImmigrantVisa and Alien Registration" (Optional Form No. 230, Department of State) which he filled up in his own handwriting and submitted to the US Embassy in Manila before his departure for the United States in 1984, Miguel's answer to Question No. 21 therein regarding his "Length of intended stay (if permanently, so state)," Miguel's answer was,"Permanently." On the green card itself, it identifies Miguel as a Resident Alien. Miguels immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines.To be qualified to run for elective office in the Philippines, the law requires that the candidate who is a green card holder must have waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country. Also, Miguel only resided in Bolinao for 3 months after returning to the country which is in violation of the 1 year residency requirement.

*Miguel is disqualified to run for mayor.

12.Dela Torre vs COMELEC (Municipal Corporation, Disqualification of Local Elective Officials, Moral Turpitude)Facts: Section 40 (a) of Republic Act 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) provides that a prior conviction of a crime becomes a ground for disqualification from running for any elective local position i.e. when the conviction is for an offense involving moral turpitude.

Citing above as ground, the COMELEC in a resolution, declared petitioner disqualified from running for the position of Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna. COMELEC held that petitioner was found guilty by the MTC for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law, an offense whose nature involves moral turpitude.

Petitioner claimed that Section 40 (a) of the Local Government Code does not apply to his case inasmuch as the probation granted him by the MTC which suspended the execution of the judgment of conviction and all other legal consequences flowing therefrom, rendered inapplicable Section 40 (a) as well. However, he admits all the elements of the crime of fencing.

Issue: WON the petitioner applicant is disqualified for the coming elections due to a crime involving moral turpitude.

Held: Yes. Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.

From the definition of fencing in Sec. 2 of PD 1612, an element of the crime of fencing may be gleaned that the accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.

Moral turpitude is deducible from this. Actual knowledge by the fence of the fact that property received as stolen displays the same degree of malicious deprivation of ones rightful property as that which animated the robbery or theft which, by their very nature, are crimes of moral turpitude. And although the participation of each felon in the unlawful taking differs in point in time and in degree, both the fence and the actual perpetrator/s of the robbery or theft invaded ones peaceful dominion for gain thus deliberately reneging the process private duties they owe their fellowmen in a manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty and good morals.

Note: In determining whether a criminal act involves moral turpitude, the Court is guided by one of the general principle that crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude while crimes mala prohibita do not. However, SC admitted that it cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by merely classifying as crime as mala in se or as mala prohibita. Whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstance13.Grego vs Comelec

Facts:

In 1981, SC found Humberto Basco, then Deputy Sheriff of the City Court of Manila, guilty of serious misconduct in an administrative complaint lodged by Nena Tordesillas. SC ordered Basco dismissed from service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to reinstatement to any position in the national or loca government, including its agencies and instrumentalities, or GOCCs ("Tordesillas ruling").

Subsequently, Basco ran for and won as Councilor in the Second District of the City of Manila during the 1988 local elections.

He sought reelection in the 1992 election and won again.

However, a case for quo warranto was filed by Cenon Ronquillo (another candidate for councilor), who alleged Basco's ineligibility to be elected councilor on the basis of the Tordesillas ruling. Other complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman and in the DILG.

In 1995, Basco ran for the third time as councilor.

William Grego, claiming to be a registered voter of District II, City of Manila, filed with the COMELEC a petition for disqualification, praying for Basco's disqualification, suspension of his proclamation, and declaration of Romualdo S. Maranan as the sixth duly elected Councilor of Manila's Second District. T

Manila BOC however proclaimed Basco as a duly elected councilor of the Second District of Manila.

In view of the proclamation, Grego filed an urgent motion seeking to annul the illegal proclamation.

The COMELEC dismissed the petition for disqualification ruling that the administrative penalty imposed by the SC on Basco was wiped away and condoned by the electorate who elected him.

Issue 1:WON Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160 applies retroactively to those removed from office before it took effect on January 1, 1992.

Petitioner:

Although the Code took effect only on January 1, 1992, Section 40 (b) must nonetheless be given retroactive effect because the provision of the law as worded does not mention or even qualify the date of removal from office of the candidate in order for disqualification thereunder to attach.

Hence, as long as a candidate was once removed from office due to an administrative case, regardless of whether it took place during or prior to the effectivity of the Code, the disqualification applies.

Since the past tense is used in enumerating the grounds for disqualification, the provision must have also referred to removal from office occurring prior to the effectivity of the Code

Held:NO. While the Legislature has the power to pass retroactive laws which do not impair the obligation of contracts, or affect injuriously vested rights, it is equally true that statutes are not to be construed as intended to have a retroactive effect so as to affect pending proceedings, unless such intent is expressly declared or clearly and necessarily implied from the language of the enactment. There is no provision in the statute which would clearly indicate that the same operates retroactively. That the provision of the Code in question does not qualify the date of a candidates removal from office and that it is couched in the past tense are noy deterrents to applying the law prospectively. The basic tenet in legal hermeneutics that laws operate only prospectively and not retroactively. A statute, despite the generality in its language, must not be so construed as to overreach acts, events or matters which transpired before its passage. Lex prospicit, non respicit. The law looks forward, not backward

Issue 2: WON private respondent's election to office as City Councilor of Manila in the 1988, 1992 and 1995 elections wipe away and condone the administrative penalty against him, thus restoring his eligibility for public office.

Petitioner: According to Frivaldo v. COMELEC, a candidates disqualification cannot be erased by the electorate alone through the instrumentality of the ballot.

Held: ISSUE IS IRRELEVANT. Petitioner's argument proceeds on the assumption that he was in the first place disqualified when he ran in the three previous elections. This assumption, of course, is untenable considering that Basco was NOT subject to any disqualification at all under Section 40 (b) of the Local Government Code which, as said earlier, applies only to those removed from office on or after January 1, 1992.

Petitioners' allegations that (1) Basco circumvented the Tordesillas ruling and that (2) the term "any position" therein is broad enough to cover without distinction both appointive and local positions merit any consideration are unmeritorious. Contrary to petitioner's assertion, the Tordesillas decision did not bar Basco from running for any elective position. The term used was "reinstatement." Under the former Civil Service Decree (PD 807), the law applicable at the time Basco was administratively dismissed, the term "reinstatement" had a technical meaning, referring only to an appointive position. Thus, what is contemplated by the prohibition in Tordesillas is reinstatement to an appointive position.

Issue 3: Is Basco's proclamation as sixth winning candidate on May 17, 1995, while the disqualification case was still pending consideration by COMELEC void ab initio?

Petitioner: Basco violated the provisions of Section 20, paragraph (i) of Republic Act No. 7166, Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, as well as the rulings in Duremdes v. COMELEC, Benito v. COMELECand Aguam v. COMELEC.

Held: NO. RA 7166 Section 20(i) does not apply considering that the same refers only to a void proclamation in relation to contested returns and NOT to contested qualifications of a candidate.

On the other hand, RA 6646 Section 6 does not support petitioner's contention that the Manila City BOC, should have suspended the proclamation. The use of the word "may" indicates that the suspension of a proclamation is merely directory and permissive in nature and operates to confer discretion. What is merely made mandatory, according to the provision itself, is the continuation of the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest. Moreover, there is no reason why the Manila City BOC should not have proclaimed Basco as the sixth winning City Councilor. Absent any determination of irregularity in the election returns, as well as an order enjoining the canvassing and proclamation of the winner, it is a mandatory and ministerial duty of the Board of Canvassers concerned to count the votes based on such returns and declare the result.

Finally, the cases of Duremdes, Benito and Aguam cited by petitioner are all irrelevant and inapplicable, These three cases do not in any manner refer to void proclamations resulting from the mere pendency of a disqualification case.

Issue 4: WON Romualdo S. Maranan, a seventh placer, be legally declared a winning candidate

Held:NO. Basco was a duly qualified candidate. Petitioner's emphatic reference to Labo v. COMELEC, where we laid down a possible exception to the rule that a second placer may not be declared the winning candidate, finds no application in this case. The exception is predicated on the concurrence of two assumptions, namely: (1) the one who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified; and (2) the electorate is fully aware in fact and in law of a candidate's disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety but would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. Both assumptions, however, are absent in this case. Petitioner's allegation that Basco was well-known to have been disqualified in the small community where he ran as a candidate is purely speculative and conjectural.

14.REYES vs. COMELECFACTS:Dr. Manalo filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan an administrativecomplaint againstincumbent Mayor Reyes of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro. It was alleged that Reyes exacted and collected P50,000,00 from each market stall holder in the Bongabong Public Market. Also, that certain checks issued to him by the National Reconciliation andDevelopment Programof the DILG were never received by the Municipal Treasurer nor reflected inthe booksof accounts of the same officer; and that he took 27 heads of cattle from beneficiaries of a cattle dispersal program. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan found petitioner guilty of the charges and ordered his removal from office.

Reyes filed apetitionfor certiorari, prohibition andinjunctionwith the RTC of Oriental Mindoro. Later, the Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan issued an order for Reyes to vacate the position of mayor and to turn over the office to the incumbent vice mayor but he refused to accept the service of the order.

Thereafter, Reyes filed a certificate of candidacy with the Comelec but apetitionfor disqualification was filed against him. Thus, the Comelec canceled Reyess certificate of candidacy. However, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Bongabong unaware of the disqualification of Reyes by the Comelec, proclaimed him the duly-elected mayor.

The COMELEC en banc declared him to have been validly disqualified as candidate and, consequently, set aside his proclamation as municipal mayor. Hence thepetitionin G.R. No. 120905, which was filed on July 20, 1995, alleging grave abuse of discretion by the COMELEC on the ground that the decision in the administrative case against petitioner Reyes was not yet final and executory and therefore could not be used as basis for his disqualification. Invoking the ruling in the case ofAguinaldov. Santos, petitioner argues that his election on May 8, 1995 is a bar to his disqualification.

Garcia, who obtained the highest number of votes next to Reyes, intervened, contending that because Reyes was disqualified, he was entitled to be proclaimed mayor. The Comelec en banc denied Garcias prayer.

ISSUES:1. WON the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is not yet final because he has not been served a copy thereof.

2. WON petitioners reelection rendered the administrative charges against him moot and academic

3. WON the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified.

HELD:1. No. The failure of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to deliver a copy of its decision was due to the refusal of petitioner and his counsel to receive the decision. Repeated attempts had been made to serve the decision on Reyes personally and byregisteredmail, but Reyes refused to receive the decision.If a judgment or decision is not delivered to a party for reasons attributable to him, service is deemed completed and the judgment or decision will be considered validly served as long as it can be shown that the attempt to deliver it to him would be valid were it not for his or his counsel's refusal to receive it. Reyess refusal to receive the decision may, therefore, be construed as a waiver on his part to have a copy of the decision.

Petitioner was given sufficient notice of the decision. Rather than resist the service, he should have received the decision and taken an appeal to the Office of the President in accordance with R.A. No. 7160 Section 67. But petitioner did not do so. Accordingly, the decision became final 30 days after the first service upon petitioner. Thus, when the elections were held the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan had already become final and executory. Thefilingof apetitionfor certiorari with the RTC did not prevent the administrative decision from attaining finality. An original action of certiorari is an independent action and does not interrupt the course of the principal action nor the running of the reglementary period involved in the proceeding.

Consequently, to arrest the course of the principal action during the pendency of the certiorari proceedings, there must be a restraining order or a writ of preliminaryinjunctionfrom the appellate court directed to the lower court. In the case at bar, although a temporary restraining order was issued by the Regional Trial Court, no preliminaryinjunctionwas subsequently issued. The temporary restraining order issued expired after 20 days. From that moment on, there was no more legal barrier to the service of the decision upon petitioner.

2. No. Petitioner invokes the ruling inAguinaldov. COMELEC, in which it was held that a public official could not be removed for misconduct committed during a prior term and that his reelection operated as a condonation of the officers previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. But that was because in that case, before thepetitionquestioning the validity of the administrative decision removing petitioner could be decided, the term of office during which the alleged misconduct was committed expired. Removal cannot extend beyond the term during which the alleged misconduct was committed.If a public official is not removed before his term of office expires, he can no longer be removed if he is thereafter reelected for another term. This is the rationale for the ruling in the twoAguinaldocases.

The case at bar is the very opposite of those cases. Here, although petitioner Reyes brought an action to question the decision in the administrative case, the temporary restraining order issued in the action he brought lapsed, with the result that the decision was served on petitioner and it thereafter became final on April 3, 1995, because petitioner failed to appeal to the Office of the President. He was thusvalidly removed from officeand, pursuant to 40 (b) of the Local Government Code, he wasdisqualifiedfrom running for reelection.

It is noteworthy that at the time theAguinaldocases were decided there wasno provisionsimilar to 40 (b) which disqualifies any person from running for any elective position on the ground that he has been removed as a result of an administrative case. The Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) could not be given retroactive effect.

Indeed, it appears that petitioner was given sufficient opportunity to file his answer. He failed to do so. Nonetheless, he was told that the complainant would be presenting his evidence and that he (petitioner) would then have the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. But on the date set, he failed to appear. He would say later that this was because he had filed a motion for postponement and was awaiting a ruling thereon. This only betrays the pattern of delay he employed to render the case against him moot by his election.

3. The candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified.To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter.The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate the results under the circumstances. The votes cast for Reyes are presumed to have been cast in the belief that Reyes was qualified and for that reason cannot be treated as stray, void, or meaningless.The subsequent finding that he is disqualified cannot retroact to the date of the elections so as to invalidate the votes cast for him. Rule 13, 3 and 7 of the Rules of Court provide for the service of final orders and judgments eitherpersonally or by mail. Personal service is completed upon actual or constructive delivery, which may be made by delivering a copy personally to the party or his attorney, or by leaving it in his office with a person having charge thereof, or at his residence, if his office is not known. Hence service was completed when the decision was served upon petitioners counsel in his office in Manila on March 3, 1995.

In addition, as the secretary of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan certified, service by registered mail was also made on petitioner Reyes. Although the mail containing the decision was not claimed by him, service was deemed completed five days after the last notice to him on March 27, 1995.

If a judgment or decision is not delivered to a party for reasons attributable to him, service is deemed completed and the judgment or decision will be considered validly served as long as it can be shown that the attempt to deliver it to him would be valid were it not for his or his counsels refusal to receive it.

Indeed that petitioners counsel knew that a decision in the administrative case had been rendered is evident in his effort to bargain with the counsel for the Sangguniang Panlalawigan not to have the decision served upon him and his client while their petition for certiorari in the Regional Trial Court was pending. His refusal to receive the decision may, therefore, be construed as a waiver on his part to have a copy of the decision.

The purpose of the rules on service is to make sure that the party being served with the pleading, order or judgment is duly informed of the same so that he can take steps to protect his interests, i.e., enable a party to file an appeal or apply for other appropriate reliefs before the decision becomes final.

In practice, service means the delivery or communication of a pleading, notice or other papers in a case to the opposite party so as to charge him with receipt of it, and subject him to its legal effect.

In the case at bar, petitioner was given sufficient notice of the decision. Prudence required that, rather than resist the service, he should have received the decision and taken an appeal to the Office of the President in accordance with R.A. No. 7160, 67. But petitioner did not do so. Accordingly, the decision became final on April 2, 1995, 30 days after the first service upon petitioner.

15. Mercado vs Manzano [307 SCRA630]

(Municipal Corporation, Local Government Code)Facts: Under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, those holding dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective local position.

Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati.

The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification. The Second Division of the COMELEC issued a resolution, dated May 7, 1998, granting the petition and ordered the cancellation of the COC of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen.

Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. The motion remained pending even until after the election held on May 11, 1998.

Pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No. 3044, of the COMELEC, the board of canvassers tabulated the votes cast for vice mayor of Makati City but suspended the proclamation of the winner.

Subsequently, petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification. Private respondent opposed contending that at the time of the Elections, the resolution of the Second Division adopted on 7 May 1998 was not yet final so that, effectively, petitioner may not be declared the winner even assuming that Manzano is disqualified to run for and hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati.

Issue: WON petitioner who intervened prior proclamation will hold the elective office of the Vice-Mayor when respondent is disqualified.

Held: Yes. Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither legal interest in the matter in litigation nor an interest to protect because he is a defeated candidate for the vice-mayoralty post of Makati City who cannot be proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City even if the private respondent be ultimately disqualified by final and executory judgment.

The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner sought to intervene in the proceedings before the COMELEC, there had already been a proclamation of the results of the election for the vice mayoralty contest for Makati City, on the basis of which petitioner came out only second to private respondent. The fact, however, is that there had been no proclamation at that time. Certainly, petitioner had, and still has, an interest in ousting private respondent from the race at the time he sought to intervene. The rule inLabo v. COMELEC,reiterated in several cases, only applies to cases in which the election of the respondent is contested, and the question is whether one who placed second to the disqualified candidate may be declared the winner. In the present case, at the time petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File Intervention on May 20, 1998, there had been no proclamation of the winner, and petitioners purpose was precisely to have private respondent disqualified from running for an elective local position under par 40(d) of R.A. No. 7160.

16.Valles vs. COMELEC

Principle of jus sanguinis

How Philippine citizenship is acquired

Effect of filing certificate of candidacy: express renunciation of other citizenship

FACTS:

Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Australia to a Filipino father and an Australian mother. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the Philippines, where she later married a Filipino and has since then participated in the electoral process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as well. In the May 1998 elections, she ran for governor but Valles filed a petition for her disqualification as candidate on the ground that she is an Australian.

ISSUE: Whether or not Rosalind is an Australian or a FilipinoHELD:

The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. There under, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth.

Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born a year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect and at that time, what served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the United States governed the country. These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of Aug. 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law.

Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private respondents father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on Jan. 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte.... Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforos daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.

The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the principle of jus sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship, xxx

So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood relationship, was subsequently retained under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.

17.Marquez vs COMELEC GR 112889 (April 18,1995)

FACTS:Bienvenido Marquez, a defeated candidate in the Province of Quezon filed a petition for certiorari praying for the reversal of the COMELEC Resolution which dismissed his petition for quo warranto against Eduardo Rodriguez, for being allegedly a fugitive from justice. It is averred that at the time private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy, a criminal charge against him for ten (10) counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property was still pending before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles Judicial District, County of Los Angeles, State of California, U.S.A. A warrant issued by said court for his arrest, it is claimed, has yet to be served on private respondent on account of his alleged flight from that country. Petitioners subsequent recourse (in G.R. No. 105310) from the COMELECs May 8, 1992 resolution was dismissed without prejudice, however, to the filing in due time of a possible post-election quo warranto proceeding against private respondent.

Before the 11th May 1992 elections, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC for cancellation of respondents CoC on account of the candidates disqualification under Sec. 40 (e) of the LGC. Private respondent was proclaimed Governor-elect of Quezon on 29 May 1992. Forthwith, petitioner instituted quo warranto proceedings (EPC 92-28) against private respondent before the COMELEC.

ISSUE:Whether private respondent who, at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy (and to date), is said to be facing a criminal charge before a foreign court and evading a warrant for his arrest comes within the term fugitive from justice contemplated by Section 40(e) of the LGC and is, therefore, disqualified from being a candidate for, and thereby ineligible from holding on to, an elective local office.

HELD:Section 40(e) of the LGC (RA 7160) provide that a Fugitive from justice in criminal cases here and abroad are disqualified from running for any elective local position.

It has been held that construction placed upon law by the officials in charge of its enforcement deserves great and considerable weight (Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corp. vs. CA, 182 SCRA 166,181). However, when there clearly is no obscurity and ambiguity in an enabling law, it must merely be made to apply as it is so written. An administrative rule or regulation can neither expand nor constrict the law but must remain congruent to it.

The confinement of the term fugitive from justice in Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC of 1991 to refer only to a person who has been convicted by final judgment is an inordinate and undue circumscription of the law. Unfortunately, the COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether or not private respondent is in fact a fugitive from justice as such term must be interpreted and applied in the light of the Courts opinion. The omission is understandable since the COMELEC outrightly dismissed the petition for quo warranto on the basis instead of Rule 73 of the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Oversight Committee. The Court, not being a trier of facts, is thus constrained to remand the case to the COMELEC for a determination of this unresolved factual matter.

18.RODRIGUEZ vs. COMELECFacts:The petitioner Eduardo T. Rodriguez was a candidate for Governor in the Province of Quezon in the May 8, 1995 elections. His rival candidate for the said position was Bienvenido O. Marquez, Jr., herein private respondent. Private respondent filed a petition for disqualification before the COMELEC based principally on the allegation that Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice. Private respondent revealed that a charge for fraudulent insurance claims, grand theft and attempted grand theft of personal property is pending against the petitioner before the Los Angeles Municipal Court. Rodriguez is therefore a fugitive from justice which is a ground for his disqualification/ ineligibility under Section 40 (e) of the Local Government Code according to Marquez.

Rodriguez, however, submitted a certification from the Commission of Immigration showing that Rodriguez left the US on June 25, 1985- roughly five (5) months prior to the institution of the criminal complaint filed against him before the Los Angeles Court.

Issue:Whether or not Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice.

Held:No. The Supreme Court reiterated that a fugitive from justice includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise who, being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. The definition thus indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that animates ones flight from a particular jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only be an intent to evade prosecution or punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already instituted indictment or of a promulgated judgement of conviction.

19.PANGKAT LAGUNA vs.ComelecpREMATURE CAMPAIGNING

Facts: On January 30, 2001 then Vice Governor Teresita Lazaro succeeded to the office of the Governor of Laguna when then Gov. Jose Lina was appointed Secretary of the DILG. Upon assumption of office as Governor, Lazaro publicly declared her intention to run for Governor in the coming May 2001 elections. Subsequently, she ordered the purchase of trophies, basketballs, volleyballs, chessboard sets, t-shirts, medals and pins, and other sports materials worth P4.5 millions. Gov. Lazaro bidded 79 public works projects on March 28, 2001. Pangkat Laguna, a registered political party, filed a petition for disqualification of Gov. Lazaro for premature campaigning.

Held: 1. The act of Gov. Lazaro in ordering the purchase of various items and the consequent distribution thereof of Laguna, in line with the local government units sports and education program is not election campaigning or partisan political activity contemplated and explicitly prescribed under the pertinent provisions of Sec 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.2. Evidence is wanting to sufficiently establish the allegation that public funds were released, disbursed, or expended during the 45-day prohibitive period provided under the law and implementing rules. Absent such clear and convincing proof, the factual findings of the COMELEC cannot be disturbed considering that the COMELEC is the constitutional body tasked to decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections.20.PNOC vs NLRC

Constitution; Under the 1987 Constitution, the Civil Serviceshall include government-owned or controlled corporations only if created under aspecial law.

In National Service Commission (NASECO),et al. v. NLRC, et al., etc., decided on November 29, 1988, it was ruled that the 1987 Constitution starkly varies from the 1973 charterupon which the Juco doctrine rested

in that unlike the latter, the present constitution qualifies the term, government owned or controlled corporations, by the phrase, with original charter; hence,the clear implication is that the Civil Serviceno longer includes government-owned or controlled corporations without original charters, i.e., those organizedunder the general corporation law. NASECO further ruled that theJuco ruling should not apply retroactively, considering that prior to its promulgation on January 17,1985, this Court had expressly recognized the applicability of the Labor Code to government-owned orcontrolled corporations.

Same; Election Laws; Under the Omnibus Election Code, employees ofgovernment-owned or controlled corporations, whether with or without original charters,shall be considered ipso facto resigned from office upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy.

Be this as it may, it seems obvious to the Court that a government-owned or controlled corporation doesnot lose its character as such becausenot possessed of an original charter but organized under thegeneral law. If a corporations capital stock is owned by the Government, orit is operated and managed by officers chargedwith the mission offulfilling the public objectives for which it has been organized, itis a government-owned or controlled corporation even if organized under the Corporation Code and not under a special statute;and employees thereof, even if not covered by the Civil Service but by the Labor Code, are nonetheless employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, and come within theletter of Section 66of the Omnibus Election Code, declaring them ipso facto resigned from * * office upon thefiling of * *(their) certificate of candidacy.

Same; Same; Labor Laws; Termination; Filing of certificateof candidacy of employees of government-owned or controlled corporations subject to theLabor Code constitutes ajust cause for termination ofemployment.

In other words, Section 66 constitutes just cause for terminat