electioneering, constitution writing and foreign policy making during early redemocratization

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Electioneering,Constitution Writingand Foreign PolicyMaking During EarlyRedemocratizationVincent Kelly Pollard aa Adjunct Faculty , Kansai Gaidai HawaiiCollegePublished online: 18 Apr 2012.

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Electioneering, Constitution Writing and Foreign Policy Making

During Early Redemocratization

Vincent Kelly Pollard*

Scholarly interest in democratization has only begun to stimulate systematic attention to linkages between presidential foreign policy making and the details of how a society moves toward a more open and representative governmental system (Stanger 1995:255-277). In the Philippines, events associated with the 1985-1986 "Snap Election" and the "EDSA Revolution" are important in their own right. However, in that transition, one element of presidential military relations policy was subordinated to measures intended to block a reversion to dictatorship; this development, in turn, led to problematic outcomes for supporters of a continued Military Bases Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America. Those relationships, in turn, suggest researchable topics for a variety of democratizing countries. The implications of the 1986 transition for foreign policy making, the short-term outcomes, and the testable propositions suggested for further research are the focus of this article.

Overview

In a majority of transitions to democracy since 1974, authoritarian rulers have played an active role in negotiating the shift to more representative forms of government; indeed, they or their parties sometimes remained in power for shorter or longer periods of time after the transition. Refusing to step down, President Ferdinand Edralin Marcos (who ruled the Philippines from 30 December 1965 to 25 February 1986) was an exception. Challenging Marcos in one of the few nonpacted (nonnegotiated) democratic transitions during the last quarter of the twentieth century, Mrs. Corazon Cojuangco Aquino followed an unusual pathway to become the seventh President of the Philippines (from 25 February 1986 to 30 June 1992). Campaigning and eliciting the voters' support was insufficient to achieve presidential power. Instead, Aquino's atypical road to Malacafiang Palace was powered by seven developments. Preeminent among these

·Adjunct Faculty at Kansai Gaidai Hawaii College.

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were the following: ( 1) her personal popularity generated before, during and after the contest for the votes of her co-Filipinos; (2) relatively sympathetic campaign coverage by international print and electronic media; (3) having received a probable narrow majority of votes cast (not all of which were ever counted); (4) highly publicized activities of international teams of scrutators from the United States and elsewhere; (5) partisan post-election picket lines, boycotts and rallies protesting vote fraud by supporters of President Marcos; (6) a faltering military mutiny surrounded and protected, in turn, by a massive and religiously fervent civilian demonstration; and (7) one-way air transportation from the Philippines offered to (and perhaps forced upon) former President Marcos by the United States (US). This combination of causes and circumstances also affected the focus and style of Aquino's military relations preferences with the US.

Redemocratization and Foreign Policy

Aquino's path to power, therefore, clearly depended on much more than vote-seeking behavior. Nonetheless, once she became President, did it matter what a candidate calling for a return to a more representative form of government and a fuller range of civil rights and political liberties had said to voters about a controversial foreign policy issue during an election campaign? Did campaign statements matter if that campaign is, in turn, understood as part of a broader movement for democratization? More specifically, does it matter whether a potentially controversial element of a candidate's external affairs preferences is superordinate or subordinate to other domestic and international preferences articulated by the candidate? And does it matter how discretely or how comprehensively a pro-democracy candidate frames and articulates the elements of her foreign policy before the national electorate?

The present article, part of a broader study of the sources of power in presidential foreign policy making (Pollard forthcoming, especially Chs. 5, 6 & 7), answers all four questions affirmatively (1) by documenting and assembling seven disparate, logically overlapping but not widely acknowledged elements of candidate Aquino's pro-American military relations policy; (2) by inferring the "intended audiences" to whom those elements were addressed by candidate Aquino; (3) by foregrounding the impact of seven structural, procedural and policy decisions made by her appointed Constitutional Commission in narrowing her options on the most controversial element of her military relations policy towards the US; and (4) by counterfactually explicating the implications of the subordination of the "open-options" facet of her policy to superordinate goals of her election campaign.

74 Philippine Political Science Journal (1995-1998) Nos. 39-42

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If these prospective answers seem surprising, perhaps some analysts have overfocused on the endgame of one facet of Aquino's policy-the defeat of the Military Bases Agreement in 1991. After ail, instead oflJecoming the President of the Philippines who finaiiy invited the foreigners to leave the military facilities they had been occupying for most of the twentieth century, Aquino played the unenviable role of a chief executive unable to prevent the Senate from teiiing the Americans to leave in 1991. Playing that role endeared her neither to opponents nor to supporters of extending the RP-US Military Bases Agreement. Opponents achieved their goal in spite of the President; supporters felt she could have tried harder. Yet, if we examine Aquino's "Snap Election" military relations foreign policy and then "fast-forward" to an analysis of the compromise on the future of the Military Bases Agreement she accepted from the Constitutional Commission in late 1986, other lessons may be inferred. In particular, one can readily discern the relationship between Aquino's military relations preferences and her superordinate goal of introducing from the dictatorship by way of a new and more democratic Konstitusyon.

Accounting for presidential foreign policy making outcomes during 1986 also demands attention to the Aquino administration's diplomacy with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the legislative and executive branches of the Government of the United States, and the American mass communications media. And elsewhere, I have documented public and private attempts in 1986 by Filipinos and others to link perceptions of"regional stability" to the future of the Military Bases Agreement (Pollard 1997:47-52: Pollard forthcoming:Chs. 5, 6 and 7), as weii as a historical and counterfactual analysis of the relevant role of the National Democratic Front before, during and after the Snap Election campaign (Poiiard 1993/1992; Poiiard forthcoming:Ch. 5). Instead, the present article focuses on the implications of domestic partnerships initiated and accepted by President Aquino in her political relationships with a constituency divided over military relations policy toward the US.

Sharing Power

Stretched organizational pluralism is my adaptation of "organizational pluralism," a middle-level Dahlian concept. By directing our attention to the expansion and contraction of organizational pluralism, we can tease out sources of power in achieving foreign policy outcomes. Stretched organizational pluralism is compatible with the "Second Image Reversed" orientation in that it focuses both on domestic and international forces. Stretched organizational pluralism

Foreign Policy Making I Pollard 75

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generically refers to the extent to which the foreign policy making power is shared, willingly or unwillingly, with other individuals and institutions. In contradistinction to Dahlian "polyarchy," however, stretched organizational pluralism does not necessarily imply, let alone require, a high degree of representation or contestation in the larger polity.

Stretched organizational pluralism sometimes overlaps (or occurs with) but is not isomorphic with Dahlian "polyarchy" (Dahll971:7-8; 1973: 1-4; 1982:4-12; 1985: 1-18; cf. Dahl1950:205-279; 1956:63-89; 1967:22-24; 1969/1966:395-401; and James G. March, in Shapiro and Reeher 1988:61-62). Whereas Dahl's "polyarchy" refers to the widest possible contestation and representation, stretched organizational pluralism is more useful in the comparative study of foreign policy making. Stretched organizational pluralism crosscuts authoritarian, transitional and democratic social movements and constitutional systems. Use of this concept sensitizes researchers to evidence identifying individuals and organizations with whom President Aquino shared the foreign policy making power.

If one still doubts the appropriateness of this conceptual adaptation or if one prefers the more familiar "polyarchy" from that contentious conceptual family, Robert Dahl's 16 May 1984 Rok:kan Memorial Lecture provides an authoritative caveat. In that presentation to a Scandinavian audience, Dahl warns of problems associated with the term polyarchy, ( 1) noting that it "does not appear to have a standard meaning" and, further, (2) conceding that he himself had "doubtless contributed to the confusion of usage" during the previous thirty-one years (Dahl 1984:227). Instead, stretched organizational pluralism includes interactions with close advisors involved in making foreign policy. But stretched organizational pluralism may also refer to the impact of institutions such as the press, risking a foreign policy discussions during an election campaign, and the utilization of constitutional provisions by citizens or governmental officials influencing foreign policy.

Operationa/izing "Policy"

In the present essay, policy refers to public and private presidential preferences for controlling, managing or responding to a future state of affairs. These preferences, for example, may be for ( 1) maintaining continuity, (2) initiating change or (3) managing some mix of continuity and change. Elsewhere, I have linked this operationalization of policy to its cognates in the international relations and comparative politics literature (Pollard forthcoming: Ch. 3).


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My operationalization of policy-as-preference includes but goes beyond the fourth and fifth meanings for the Filipino word patakaran given by Father Leo English and his colleague Teresita Castillo, namely, "policy; a plan of action; way of management" and "procedure; manner or way of conducting business." Patakaran comes from the root word takad meaning, among other things, "base" or "foundation" (English 1995/1986: 10 15). My operationalization of policy has an elective affinity with palakad and pamamaraan by both of which Consuelo T. Panganiban translates policy into Filipino; meanwhile, she translates patakaran as an "adopted course of action" (Panganiban 1994:429). I am interested in how (or to what extent) the presidential foreign policy maker did what she or he said s/he was going to do, as well as the extent to which others broadened or narrowed her alternatives. This relaxed operationalization of policy facilitates an increased number of contemporaneous and retrospective observations of foreign policy-related activities.

Foreign Policy in the "Snap Election" Campaign

Although foreign policy issues were not a high priority for candidate Aquino in the 1985-1986 "Snap Election" campaign, she did not avoid commenting on military relations with the United States. Given the roots of the Military Bases Agreement in the colonial past, its support from the Marcos government and the high probability that the treaty would be renegotiated during the presidential term of the election's winner, maintaining public silence regarding US military facilities on RP bases would have cost any viable challenger significant activist support. The domestic and international style with which Aquino set her foreign policy agenda and framed her military relations preferences during December 1985-February 1986 were nested among preferences associated with her primary agenda of ( 1) ousting Marcos from political power; (2) restoring a version of representative democracy; and (3) other aspects of what one might call demarcosification. The manner in which and the circumstances under which candidate Aquino articulated her military relations preferences during that election campaign both enhanced and limited her management of these matters during her presidency.

How does one explain the degree of short-term success achieved by President Aquino, as well as the vulnerability she incurred while pursuing a military relations policy consisting of seven tightly interwoven and overlapping preferences? These, in turn, were articulated asymmetrically, piecemeal, indirectly and even by default during a campaign primarily focused on driving Marcos from power and restoring a version of representative democracy.


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And although the "US-Marcos dictatorship" had been the target of criticism by some in a diverse nationalist movement, President Aquino did not intentionally disrupt an extant triad of military treaties with the United States during 1986. Continuing RP reliance on the United States was a pillar of Aquino's foreign policy, as it had been, in one way or another, of previous presidents of the Republic (Locsin 1996). As ex-President Aquino reaffirmed at the outset of an interview with this researcher, "One, I always considered the United States of America as the Philippines' friend and perhaps the best foreign friend" (Aquino 1995a). This is a key foundation for her RP-US military relations policy. Actions by candidate Aquino and President Aquino's, however, had both intended and unintended consequences.

More specifically, since Aquino's central goals were (I) exorcising the Marcos legacy; (2) building a semblance of national unity; and (3) returning to a version of democratic government in a society torn by politico-military conflict, how were her military bases preferences embedded or nested in ramifications of that superordinate policy?

Since Aquino was generally favorable toward continuing RP-US military cooperation and specifically favored continuation of the Military Bases Agreement, what events and specific decisions during early redemocratization limited her longer-term options? How did her commitment to redemocratization shape and limit achievement of her military relations preferences?

Aquino outlined her interim RP-US military relations preferences, piecemeal but in far more detail than has been acknowledged, during her 1985-1986 campaign speeches before business and foreign audiences, but hardly with such emphasis or repetition that she was able to build a domestic constituency for the longer-term policy that, belatedly, overtook her interim preferences. No single speech or inten>iew by candidate Aquino intended primarily for ordinary

Filipino voters explicitly publicized all elements ofher RP-US military relations

policy in 1985-1986. Information asymmetry, designedly or not, favored Aquino during the short run, that is, during her 1985-1986 Snap Election campaign. By not emphasizing or simultaneously revealing all the details, candidate Aquino obviated greater scrutiny and criticism. That, in turn, momentarily gave her greater leeway. How did she exercise this power? What helped the exercise of power? What hindered it?


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Seeking a Nonprovocative Label

Following Aquino's accession to power, as I will demonstrate, the "openoptions" label obscured understanding of important elements of her seven-point military relations policy. The label confuses one part with a more complex whole. Therefore, it is essential to keep firmly in mind what Aquino said and when she said it, as well as precisely to which short-term, medium-term and long-term implementation she was referring or implying.

Projecting herself as a unity symbol for anti-Marcos forces required, it seems, relatively nonprovocative clarity on the future of the Military Bases Agreement (MBA). Aquino's previous public statements on the MBA, however, were too recent to be forgotten, making this task more difficult than it might have been. For example, disparity between the 1984 Convenor Group Statement and portions of her December 1985 New York Times interview left her open to charges of backpedaling on the MBA. On 6 January 1986, for example, candidate Aquino addressed the MBA directly while outlining her "Minimum Program of Government" for the Makati Business Club and the Association of Management of the Philippines on 6 January 1986. She specified that, if elected, her administration would "respect the US military bases agreement up to 1991 when it expires. Since many events may occur between now and 1991, we shall keep all our options open" (Aquino 1986a:2, Part D, #5).

Aquino faced challenges as a leader of LABAN (meaning "struggle" in Filipino and doubling as the acronym for Lakas ng Bayan- "Strength of the Country"). Under pressure from longtime friend and former Senator Lorenzo Tanada (Salonga 1995), Aquino had signed the revised 26 December 1984

Convenor Group Statement which proclaimed that foreign military bases " .... shall be removed ... " Still in the United States during late 1984, former Senator Jovito Salonga, a longtime family friend of the Aquinos, spoke personally on the telephone with Mrs. Aquino concerning the contents of the unity platform, specifically its anti-bases clause. She signed the revised draft, Salonga infers, under pressure from former Senators Tanada and Diokno. Meanwhile, Steve Salonga was representing his father at that meeting of the Convenors' Group and signed the "Declaration of Unity" for him (Salonga 1995).

"The call for an end of the policy of allowing foreign military bases on Philippine soil," according to observer and New York Times Philippine correspondent Alicia "Alice" C. Villadolid, "was explained afterward by Mr. [Jose]


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Diokno, one of the signers, meant the eventual evacuation of Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base under terms to be worked out" (Villadolid 1984:A3).

The Convenor Group Statement had become a precedent from whose long reach Aquino- and her future Secretary ofF oreign Affairs Raul S. Manglapus -did not entirely escape. Barely a week prior to the 7 February 1986 Snap Election, a New York Times op-ed piece by former (and future) Senator RaulS. Manglapus, a close Aquino advisor whose proxy had also signed the 1984 Convenor Group Statement, hinted at his openness to a new RP-US bases treaty, especially ifUnited States Senator Richard Lugar's election observers were effective scrutators (Manglapus 1986:23A).

Although candidate Aquino privately preferred to say nothing about RPUS relations and even if she had not signed the 1984 "Declaration of Unity," she had little choice. As her campaign speech writer and future Minister of Information reflected on 14 March 1986, "Mrs. Aquino's public posture toward the United States was completely and wholly dictated by the politics of the situation." "She did not want to alienate" the Left. Nor did candidate Aquino wish to alienate "the vast majority of Filipinos who didn't give a damn," Locsin continued, "one way or another about the US bases." Her former speechwriter continued, "Filipino businessmen who rallied around her standard- I must say this- didn't care either about the US bases, but what they cared about was that she not alienate the United States," because "they just wanted Marcos out." In that context, "what they associated the bases with was the Marcos dictatorship." "The issue," from Locsin's perspective, "was whether or not the United States would continue to throw its support behind Marcos or withhold it." In other words, "Could we get the Americans to think of Marcos separate[ly] from the bases?" (Locsin, Jr. 1996). In another part of the same interview, when this researcher prefaced a question by stating, "We both know that the Military Bases Agreement or military relations with the US was not the big issue in the campaign ..... ," Locsin interjected, "But Marcos wanted it to be!" (Locsin, Jr. 1996; emphasis his).

Demarcosification as the Central Campaign Theme

Again, despite Aquino's expansive comments on the MBA to New York Times editors A.M. "Abe" Rosenthal and Warren Hoge on 15 December 1985, her election campaign was primarily anti-Marcos in focus. The US-RP Military Bases Agreement was never out of sight, yet it typically remained in the background. Tama na, sobra na, palitan na - the rousing campaign chant of her Filipino


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supporters did not specifically target the MBA. Rather, this militant single-issue expression of exasperation ("Enough already! Too much already! Replace him now!") centered on deposing Marcos, dismantling the dictatorship, and reintroducing a version of democracy.

After Salvador H. Laurel withdrew his candidacy for the presidency, Aquino agreed to run against Marcos on a unity ticket under the banner of the Batangas Province politician's eight-party United Democratic Opposition (UNIDO) coalition. And following President Marcos's 2 November 1985 announcement of the "snap election" on David Brinkley's American television news program, Aquino's own supporters remained in disagreement over military bases policies. One early campaign statement reflects the diversity of their views. According to a journalistic summary by Vicente B. Foz (later appointed by President Aquino to the Constitutional Commission of the Philippines), Aquino's views on the day she accepted the draft to run for president appeared to straddle the differences by respecting the MBA "until 1991 when the pact expires" yet adhering ''to the 'Declaration of Unity' which calls for the eventual removal of the present bases and the prohibition of any other bases" (Foz 1985: 1). By mid-December 1985, however, Aquino ceased referring to the "Declaration of Unity."

Divided Vtews on US Military Facilities

Seven weeks before the election, Aquino revealed a tripartite fault line dividing her camp over the post-1991 future of the Military Bases Agreement. Her discussion was published in a candid 15 December 1985 interview with the New York Times. She summarized the contending policy prescriptions of each of the three factions supporting her candidacy. These may be characterized as the Anti-MBA Faction, the Plebiscite Faction and the Center Faction. Aquino's summary also articulated some dimensions of stretched organizational pluralism for the Aquino presidency's pursuit of the "open-options" aspect of her broader military relations policy.

1. The Anti-MBA Faction, as candidate Aquino saw it, desired a clear, public statement from her disavowing any intent to renew the treaty: "Some in my group want a complete, how do you say that, they just want the bases out after 1991" (Aquino 1985:A-l0). Thus, she distanced herselffrom her apparently anti-bases comment reported by journalist Vicente B. Foz in early December 1985.

For example, on 9 December 1985, KAAKBAY (meaning "shoulders" and forming an acronym for Kapangyarihan at Karapatan ng Bayan which, in

Foreign Policy Making I Pollard B1

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turn, means "Power and Right of the People"), led by former Senator Jose W. Diokno issued a statement supportive of Aquino's candidacy six days prior to her New York Times interview. KAAKBAY's endorsement may or may not have

been partly grounded on a rnisperception of Aquino's stance toward the MBA. Probably referring to the Aquino statement quoted by reporter Foz, KAAKBAY was "encouraged" by what it believed to be Aquino's "recent unequivocal statement of her commitment to some crucial demands," first among them being "the unconditional removal of all US military installations in the Philippines not later than the expiration of the Military Bases Agreement" (KA.!\KB AY 1987 I 1985: 34 7).

Despite the benefit of hindsight for researchers today, the KAAKBAY statement may not have been as naive as it may seem. According to Maria Socorro "Cookie"

Diokno of the Free Legal Assistance Group and a daughter of Senator Diokno, more than likely, it was intended as a form of continuing pressure on candidate Aquino (Diokno 1996).

How effective was that pressure? Without explicitly repudiating the Convenor Group's "Declaration of Unity," by mid-December 1985 Aquino had ceased affirming its anti-bases content. Although other statements may yet come to light, candidate Aquino, apparently, was no longer quoting, paraphrasing or referring to it in a positive light.

2. The Plebiscite Faction had already coalesced around Salvador H. Laurel, Aquino's vice presidential running mate and son of the Japan-sponsored Second Republic's president. Unlike Aquino, Laurel declined to sign the 1984 anti-bases Convenor Group's "Declaration of Unity" (Convenor Group 1984: 9; Villadolid 1984:A3; Laurel 1995) and, earlier, had stayed away from a similarly focused but clandestine May 1981 Baguio City meeting of opposition groups eager to

assume leadership of a post-Marcos Philippines (Villadolid 1995). Subsequently, however, Laurel signed the 3 June 1983 "Declaration of Principles of the Allied Opposition." Point 2 ofthat "Declaration" called for an end to the MBA: "Foreign military bases in the Philippine territory must be removed. The Philippines must cooperate with its neighbors to make Southeast Asia a zone of neutrality, freedom and peace" ("June 1983 Philippine Bases Hearings," 87-88, Quoted in Paez 1985:25 8). Subsequent to having been elected to a seat in the Batasang Pambansa in 1984, Laurel himself was accused of having "backpedaled" or retreated from the anti-MBA affirmation in the first of the two sentences quoted (Paez 1985:258). The indirect reference in the second sentence to ASEAN's proposal for a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality in Southeast Asia was also part of a process of seeking allies, co-thinkers and supporters on the part of the anti-bases forces.


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The plebiscite is not the only MBA-related item in UNIDO's political platform, but Laurel seems to have regarded it as the most important aspect. On 12 June 1985, Laurel's UNIDO coalition of parties reached a decision on their common public stance toward the future of the American military facilities in the Philippines. The "Foreign Policy Agenda" of the UNIDO platform included a section on "Foreign Military Bases." In part, it stated:

{Wje shall respect the provisions of the Military Bases Agreement ... until it expires in 1991, or earlier, by mutual consent.

Beyond 1991, foreign military bases should not be allowed on Philippine soil without the free consent of the sovereign people obtained through a free and honest plebiscite or referendum especially called for the purpose by a truly democratic government.

Meanwhile, no nuclear weapons should be emplaced or stored in the bases or anywhere else in Philippine territory ("Towards a Just Society," quoted in Laurel 1995:2, #1).

As Laurel recollected these events in December 1995, the plebiscite and everything associated with the MBA were divisive issues for his UNIDO coalition. "Ang pagtawag ng 'plebiscite' sa nasabing isyu ay isang 'compromise formula' sapagka t may kasapi ng UNIDO na tutol sa pagkakaroon sa Pilipinas ng mga dayuhang base militar" ["The term 'plebiscite,' which is the issue at hand, was a 'compromise formula' because there were some members ofUNIDO who were opposed to having foreign military bases in the Philipines"]. On the other hand, Laurel continues, "Mayroon namang gustong magpatuloy ang pananatili sa bansa ng mga base militar ng Estados Unidos kahit lampas pang 1991" ['There were some who were willing to accommodate the continuation of US military bases in the country even past 1991"] (Laurel 1995:2, #I; translation supplied).

One of Laurel's conditions for a joint ticket, says political scientist Francisco E. Nemenzo, Jr., was Aquino's acquiescence in a plebiscite on the bases (Nemenzo, Jr. 1995). If so, this must have been one ofthe least contentious aspects of their joint effort. Equally plausibly, Laurel's advocacy of a plebiscite presented an opportunity to Aquino in the sense that it gave her a chance to distance herself from the 1984 Convenor Group Statement.

Aquino's preference for presenting a hypothetically extended MBA "to the people" certainly resembles Laurel's preference for a plebiscite. Nemenzo


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indicates that Aquino agreed with Laurel that, in exchange for his support, she would endorse an MBA-focused plebiscite (Nemenzo, Jr. 1995). Alicia C. Villado1id also emphasizes Laurel's influence (Villadolid 1995). On the other hand, when this researcher asked Ambassador Benjamin B. Domingo to react to the same claim, he immediately denied that Laurel made any such deal (Domingo 1995). It may not be necessary to resolve these differences of interpretation. Laurel's notion of a plebiscite was counterposed to "immediate removal of all foreign military bases" (Laurel 1992:26). Thus, his advocacy of a plebiscite provided Aquino an opportunity to shift away from her earlier public affirmation of the more clearly anti-MBA 1984 Convenor Group Statement. As candidate Aquino summarized her running mate's views in December 1985, "Doy would like to call for a plebiscite and to ask the people what they think of it" (Aquino 1985:/oc. cit.).

Among opponents of the Military Bases Agreement in the broader antiMarcos camp, however, plebiscites themselves were controversial. For example, at a conference of the International Studies Institute of the Philippines three months before Marcos announced the Snap Election, Aquilino "Nene" Pimentel, Jr., criticized advocates of plebiscites as abdicating leadership since, he argued, in 1947 there was no plebiscite over allowing US bases in the RP (McDonough 1986/1985: 136).

In any case, once the Aquino-Laurel campaign was underway, the future of the MBA apparently was not frequently discussed between the two running mates. Indeed, either due to the passage of time or because he had been excluded from discussions, Laurel has subsequently professed unawareness of the degree of detail with which candidate Aquino articulated her open-options aspect of her military relations policy during the campaign, responding pointedly to this researcher, "Ang 'open options policy[,]' sa aking pagkatanda, ay hindi napagusapan noong 1985-1986 snap election campaign" ["The 'open-options policy,' as far as I can recall, {just} didn't happen to be discussed in the 1985-1986 Snap Election Campaign]"] (Laurel1995:2; translation supplied; if the "exclusive-we" genitive-case pronoun namin is supplied here, it would refer primarily to Laurel and Aquino, allowing one to translate the sentence as follows: " ..... didn't [happen] to be discussed by us ..... ").

3. The ascendant Center Faction reflects candidate Aquino's own public preference. By mid-December 1985, she had begun selectively emphasizing areas of agreement with the Plebiscite Faction's outlook and increasingly promoted the


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"open-options" feature. Comparing and contrasting her latter preference with those she had just summarized, Mrs. Aquino said to The New York Times:

Mine is for having negotiations before the expiration of the agreement, and then maybe after the negotiations ..... [.} we present this to the people. As I said, so many things can happen between then and now, and so whatever I believe will be to the interests of the Filipino people and that is what I will do (Aquino: 1985: loc. cit.).

In her December 1985 New York Times interview, Aquino began staking out the "open-options" element of her policy: "[W]hile I am for the removal of the bases, I have not set my mind on the actual date" (Aquino 1985:/oc. cit.).

Recollecting the December 1985 New York Times interview, President

Aquino told a British writer she thought she was speaking "'off the record"' (White

1989: 147). Apparently, she should have known better. "Alice" Villadolid, then

Philippine Correspondent for The New York Times and subsequently appointed by Aquino to the Malacaiiang Press Office in mid-March 1986, remembers the negotiations leading up the event differently. On 26 September 1995, Mrs. Villadolid told Pollard that a visibly fatigued Aquino evidently forgot that, after

refusing twice, she had agreed to an interview (Villadolid 1995).

Shortly after that interview, Aquino's campaign organization contracted for the services of D. H. Sawyer and Associates, a New York consulting firm whose clients included Democratic Party candidates. Sawyer and Associates advised

Aquino that maintaining the open-options policy was necessary in order to get

elected, according to journalistic accounts (Karnow 1989:411-412; Burton 1989:320-321) and one well placed interviewee (Salonga 1994). Subsequent to successful FOIA requests, United States Department of Justice documentation

of subsequent Aquino administration public relations contracts with the "SawyerMiller Group" came into the hands of former supporters of President Aquino

and other individuals. Together with other public figures, the erstwhile Coryistas

released this documentation at a 20 March 1989 Kapihan sa Maynila (Tolentino 1990:813-814). In an interview with Pollard, ''Teddy Boy" Locsin emphasized

the importance of campaign media advice provided by the Sawyer-Miller Group, although, upon reflection, he attributed the "open-options" phrase to Mrs. Aquino (Locsin, Jr. 1996).


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On 6 January 1986, Aquino stated to the Makati Business Club and the Association of Management of the Philippines: "[W]e shall respect the U.S. military bases agreement up to 1991 when it expires. Since many events may occur between now and 1991, we shall keep all our options open" (Aquino 1986a:2, Part D, #5).

Thereafter and throughout 1986, Aquino's publicly stated preferences on the matter were relatively consistent. Reminiscing about the Snap Election and the Aquino presidency, a high ranking diplomat argued that Aquino's openoptions policy was "the only reasonable alternative" in a "fluid situation" when there was "no certainty." The diplomat believed that President Aquino had no other options, that is, no other way of avoiding offense to "business interests," some of whom belonged to the associations whose members heard the campaign speeches cited above. Those interests identified US military facilities "with stability" or, on the other hand, with the concerns of "activist" anti-bases groups about foreign domination (Special Interviewee #1 1995). However, if the faxed recollections of one well-placed taipan (or powerful Chinese-Filipino business leader) are accurate, that diplomat may have exaggerated the degree of business support for the bases (Sy 1996; cf. Locsin, Jr. 1996).

Aquino stated her preferences and did what was necessary to achieve her short-term public policy goal. Thus, while soliciting votes, she temporarily corralled anti-MBA sentiment running "high in the ranks of the left-of-center nationalist groups" supporting her candidacy (Burton 1987:535). Numerically, these activists were a tiny minority of the electorate, but Aquino valued and needed their skill in attracting foreign mass communications media attention and coverage. "Certainly, they [the Left] were great for conducting riots in the streets," her former Minister of Information commented, and this was part of the pressure that was being brought to bear on the Marcos regime" (Locsin, Jr. 1996). In other words, Aquino's campaign organization skillfully used the left for the sake of gaining media publicity during the election campaign and the unusual postelection protest period. In turn, one infers that she incurred a degree of utang na /oob to those active supporters.

Four days before the Snap Election, in a 3 February 1986 campaign speech before the Joint Philippine and Foreign Chambers of Commerce, Aquino repeated her pledge not to abrogate the MBA. As quoted in the New York Times then and as reprinted in a recent collection of her speeches, she went on to emphasize before her enthusiastic audience: "'[N]o sovereign nation should consent that a


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portion of its territory be a perpetual possession of a foreign power"' (Clines 1986:A8; Aquino 1995/1986c:37).

Aquino repeated that sentence verbatim three days later in her final televised pre-election interview. In an election-eve 5 February 1986 American Broadcasting Corporation "Nightline" interview not telecast in the Philippines on the other side of the internatiqnal date line (6 February), Ted Koppel of ABC's "Nightline" aggressively probed Aquino's preference concerning the future of the Military Bases Agreement asking, "Would you tell me now in these final hours of the campaign precisely what your position on the - on the - bases at Subic [Aquino interjected: 'and Clark'] are [sic]." Videotaped from her Hacienda Luisita home in Tarlac for an exclusively foreign television audience, Aquino responded, "All right, I respect the Military Bases Agreement which will expire ... [in] 1991. And in the meantime, I will keep- uh- all my options open. I know that - uh - no sovereign state can ever allow any part of its territory to be in the perpetual possession of a foreign power. And I think no ally of ours will be demanding this of me." As if an advocate for Ronald Reagan or the US Department of State, Koppel reacted in a puzzled, disappointed tone of voice, "I am not hearing from you the kind of reassurances that I think Washington really wants to hear ..... " The ABC anchor person coachingly qualified his comment, "But I wonder whether that is deliberate." Aquino responded, "No it is not deliberate. Before the ..... bases agreement expires in 1991, we will be in consultation with the United States, with our neighboring countries, especially the ASEAN countries - and above all, we will be consulting with the Filipino people so that we will be able to reach an agreement which will be to the best of- uh - the world, but in particular - uh - the Philippines" (Corazon Cojuangco Aquino, Videotaped in American Broadcasting Corporation News 1986, Transcribed by Vincent Kelly Pollard; emphasis supplied). However, "Teddy Boy" Locsin, her campaign speechwriter, later countered in response to two successive interview questions that, during the "Snap Election," "ASEAN doesn't count" (Locsin 1996).


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Figure 1 Aquino's Prospective Foreign Policy Commwlity, 1986:

Four-track Consultation Process for Military Relations

Consultative partners Locale & status of partners

Aquino's personal advisors National/domestic (Philippines)

United States of America Superpower (North America & with

military facilities in the Philippines;

media, military, Congress)

Governments of neighboring Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia,

countries, especially those Singapore & Thailand

in ASEAN

"The Filipino people," amplified National/domestic, sectoral, nongovem-

with allusions to "a plebiscite" mental, media & bureaucratic partners

- of varying import depending on the

depth & duration of democratization

Note: In referring to possible domestic partners in foreign policyrnaking, candidate Aquino did not single out nongovernment organizations, a prospective constitutional commission or the legislature.

Source: Corazon Cojuangco Aquino, in American Broadcasting Corporation News (1986); confirmed by Aquino (1995a).

Meanwhile, the anti-Marcos thrust, tenor and focus of Aquino's campaign motivated her subsequent dismissal of the legislature and her appointment of constitutional commissioners. These two decisions reflected her commitment to a type of redemocratization. In turn, they alternatively strengthened and weakened the open-options aspect of Aquino's military relations policy, nested as it was among other, higher priority policies.

To recapitulate, Aquino's short-term military relations policy, as articulated during the Snap Election campaign, was much broader than a catchphrase like "open-options." Her policy consisted of seven interlocking preferences (Figure 2, below), as well as a commitment to unprioritized multitrack consultations (cf. Figure 1, above) before committingherselfpubliclyon one aspect of that policy- the post-1991 policy of the MBA. Aquino articulated these points before key Philippine business and cause-oriented (activist) audiences. And she spelled out her policy for foreign print and electronic media audiences during


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the same period. Yet taken in their entirety, the seven points were apparently not well known among Coryistas, as Aquino's more fervent supporters were known. Information asymmetry dominated; the atomized, disparate presentation of Aquino's military relations preferences would have complex consequences.

Viewed holistically in terms of likely intended audiences and expected time frames for implementation, the campaign version of Aquino's low-key RPUSA military relations policy is decidedly "pro-bases" to the extent that it (l) keep the door open to a renewed treaty with the Americans; (2) reveals a willingness to consider an extension of the MBA provided it does not last for many decades and as a concession to anti-bases forces; (3) only postpones early public

reassurances to the United States (Figure 2, below).

Although the open-options feature was but one aspect of Aquino's military bases policy, it became the most prominent feature after the campaign. That shift misled some journalists and scholars into utilizing Aquino's "open options" stance as a metaphor for the full range of Aquino's broader RP-US military relations policy. To make that error is to underestimate the breadth of her preferences and the degree to which she actually realized the elements of her policy during the 1986 and even later.

To discern more nuantially the beneficiaries of Aquino's RP-USA military relations policy, one asks: Who were the "Snap Election" campaign audiences for Aquino's US-Philippines rnili tary relations policy? Aquino articulated her policy for the following groups: ( l) Filipino readers of newspapers as diverse in editorial policy as Malaya and the Manila Bulletin; (2) American readers of The New York Times; (3) women members of organizations affiliated with the national federation GABRIELA; (4) MABIN! (Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism, Inc) and FLAG (Free Legal Assistance Group); (5) Bishops-Businessmen's Conference; (6) Association of Management of the Philippines; (7) Makati Business Club; (8) Joint Philippine and Foreign Chambers of Commerce; (9) American politicians; and (l 0) other viewers of Ted Koppel's television program "Nightline." Figure 2, below, summarizes printed, videotaped and interview data. The political rewards stemming from seven closely related aspects of Mrs. Aquino's policy, couched and nuanced somewhat differently for each of her audiences, are inferred and outlined, as are the timetables for implementation.


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Campaign preferences: Putative beneficiaries: Continuity & managed change Domestic & foreign audiences

1. Tacitly accepting 2 of the 3 legs of * Armed Forces of the Philippines the continuing Philippines-United States (AFP) officers & others desirous military cooperation triad -- the Military of continuing US military Assistance & Mutual Defense Treaties training, sales & support Inferred imQlementation: * US White House, Congress,

immediately upon takinR power Departments of State & Defense

2. Rejecting protests of the left-labor * A majority of PDP-Laban BAY AN coalition against the 3rd leg of (Aquino) and UNIDO (Laurel) the RP-USA treaty triad--instead, coalition voters eschewing immediate abrogation of the * AFP officers concerned over Military Bases Agreement (MBA) Aquino's overtures to the National Inferred imQiementation: Democratic Front

immediately upon taking power * 5 other ASEAN governments *USA

3. Apparently maintaining public silence *USA over the presence of US nuclear weapons Inferred imQlementation:

immediately upon takinR power 4. Withholding early explicit public * "Activists in some anti-bases, reassurances on the likelihood of her anti-nuclear weapons and women's seeking a renewal of the MBA -- the organizations who needed a reason "open-options" stance to justify not boycotting the Snap Inferred imQlementation: Election

until1988 5. Continuing "to respect" the MBA in * "Pro-bases" Filipinos, including accordance with the reduced duration some AFP officers stipulated in the 1966 Ramos-Rusk * ASEAN Five Agreement (implementing the 1959 *USA Serrano-Bohlen Agreement) Inferred imQlementation:

1 or more years after 1991

Figure 2a Information Asymmetry of a Fragmented Military Relations Policy: Reassembling Candidate Aquino's Military Relations Preferences:

15 December 1985 to 6 February 1986


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Campaign preferences: Putative beneficiaries: Continuity & managed change Domestic & foreign audiences

6. Declining to specify a tem1inal date * "Pro-bases" Filipinos (a 4-to-1 for the MBA, instead endorsing a majority in 1986 public opinion plebiscite & thereby keeping the door polls) open to an extension of shorter duration * ASEAN Five than the original 99-year treaty *USA Inferred imglementation:

durinR Aquino's presidency & later 7. Expressing discomfort at the * Mildly "anti-bases" Filipinos not prospective "perpetual" presence of US inclined to demand a timetable for bases & favoring their eventual removal terminating the MBA Inferred implementation: * ASEAN Five

probably past the end of her term Sources: Foz (1985: 1 ); Aquino (1985:A-1 0); McGill 1986: I, 15; Aquino (1986a:2,Part D,#5); Aquino (1995b/1986c:37); Locsin, Jr. 1987; Clines ( 1986:A-8); American Broadcasting Corporation News ( 1986); Melchor 1992:57, 63, n. 3; Aquino 1995a; Thompson 1995:175; Hernandez 1996; Melchor 1996; Locsin, Jr. 1996.

Figure 2b Information Asymmetry of a Fragmented Military Relations Policy: Reassembling Candidate Aquino's Military Relations Preferences:

15 December 1985 to 6 February 1986

Transition from Marcos to Aquino

Instead of negotiating with Marcos the rules governing who would rule and how they would rule and instead of simply receiving power from the military, Aquino negotiated those rules with her uneasy partners in the limited revolution that had pushed Marcos from power- and from the country (Thompson 1995: 13).

On the fourth day of the EDSA revolt and at the precise moment when Marcos was being sworn in at the Malacanang Presidential Palace, Aquino, surrounded by military mutineers and opposition Batasan members, proclaimed her provisional government at Club Filipino in San Juan, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, asserting, "I and Salvador H. Laurel are taking power in the name and


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by the power ofthe Filipino people" (Corazon Cojuangco Aquino, Videotaped in Carroll and Couchman 1986, Transcribed by Vincent Kelly Pollard; cf. Corazon Cojuangco Aquino, Proclamation No. 1, In Arroyo and Frianeza 1987; emphasis supplied). Aquino's phrasing pointedly avoided reference to the martial law-era constitution under which the Snap Election had been conducted (Cf. Crisostomo 1986:254; Yap 1987:99, 126-127, 221-222; Pollard 1993:42-46; Nemenzo 1986:32, 39, 41, 44, 49; Aquino 1994:603).

In one respect, the pro-bases policy Aquino articulated as a candidate was an imperfect vehicle for an incumbent president listening to the treaty clock ticking for the RP-US Military Bases Agreement. In particular, Aquino's inability to shed the vague "open-options" label, arguably, prevented her from exerting efforts to build a pro-bases constituency among opinion makers and shapers active in the increasingly powerful mass communications media.

Gendering the transition with threats of military coups

Aquino's surprising road to power provided her momentary impetus during the weeks after 25 February 1986. On the one hand, Aquino's persona as the first woman president, arguably, enhanced and accelerated her initiatives. Consequently, as Jeanne-Marie Col writes, "During Aquino's presidency, especially because of the dramatic political shifts that led to her election, there were opportunities not only to establish a new style of leadership but also to create a new policy agenda" (1993:27; cf. Matsui 1989:118-119, 128-129).

On the other hand, as the former president recalled to another foreign researcher, "Well, the military found it extremely difficult to accept a woman commander-in-chief. And certainly it was difficult for me ... " (Corazon C. Aquino, Interviewed in Liswood 1995:5). In the same interview, she reminisced further in response to the question "Would people go at you more, as a woman, than at a man?" To which Aquino responded, "Well, I think in my case that did happen, because here were the people under the dictatorship for 20 years, and so, you cannot fault them for having such great expectations" (Liswood 1995:68).

Assuming dictatorial powers

The "EDSA Revolution" of 22-25 February 1986 forced Marcos out of the government. One month later, on 25 March 1986, President Corazon C. Aquino


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issued Proclamation No. 3 (In Arroyo and Frianeza 1987). Known as the ''Freedom Constitution" in pro-Aquino Filipino and American newspapers, the document reserved near-dictatorial powers to herself until the product of the 1986 Constitutional Commission gradually superseded them during February-July of 1987 (cf. Locsin, Jr. 1996). As Aquino's Jesuit advisor wrote on 30 March 1986, the document "'does not pretend to be a normal constitution"' (Joaquin G. Bernas, Quoted in Mamot 1987:413). Aquino's former Minister of Information stated to this interviewer, "At this point, she already ruled as a dictator" (Locsin, Jr. 1996). Then President Aquino expressed herself in similar language. Indeed, Aquino's Proclamation No. 3 was, arguably, similar to Amendment 6 in the martial law-era 1973 Constitution. Speaking to the UNIV Conference in Rome, Italy, on 5 April 1993, she stated, "I assumed the powers of the dictatorship, but only long enough to absolve it." Emphasizing the point in different language during the same speech, the former president claimed, "I had absolute power, yet ruled with restraint" (Aquino l995/1993a: 141, 142).

And as she relived the experiences of 1986 in an interview with this researcher nine and a half years later, the purpose of Proclamation No. 3 was "to impress on the people that we must start over" (Aquino 1995). President Aquino retained Article VII ("The President") from the 1973 martial law-era Constitution, as amended (Proclamation No. 3, Art. I, Section 2. p. 1, In Arroyo and Frianeza 1987). She dismissed the Batasang Pambansa, (Proclamation No. 3, Art. I, Section 3, p. 2, In Arroyo and Frianeza), referring to the legislature elected in 1984 as "a cancer" (Teodoro Locsin quoting Aquino, in Komisar 1987: 130, 269). As Article II of her decree states: "Until a legislature is elected and convened under a new Constitution, the President shall continue to exercise legislative power." Thus, she cut herself loose from any possible legislative opposition (Section l, p. 2, In Arroyo and Frianeza) on foreign policy matters until late July of the following year, including from among her own supporters since anti-Marcos politicians elected in 1984 were among the dismissed Batasan members. With no legislature and with a self-proclaimed revolutionary constitution, Aquino also obviated greater power-sharing with Vice President Laurel who otherwise might have been elected Prime Minister by the Batasan under the old 1973 Constitution (Laurel 1992:42; 1996).

As noted, to "start over" included writing a "new Constitution." Unilaterally abolishing the Batasan also obviated its likely obstructionism (Aquino l995/l986b: 22) toward writing a new constitution. By the same token, however, President Aquino also chose to appoint the constitutional commissioners rather


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than ordering an election of delegates. And she sought nominations from individuals and political organizations. Immediately responding to that opening, nongovernmental "cause-oriented" organizations opposed to the foreign bases assiduously campaigned for the appointment of Constitutional Commissioners who shared their opposition to the postcolonial vestige. In a 21 May 1986 United States Embassy telegram marked "Confidential," Bosworth shared his concerns with his superiors at the Department of State: "Cause-oriented groups have submitted a large number of nominees, and the lists published in the papers contain a virtual who's who of the 'parliament of the streets"' (Bosworth to Secretary of State, In United States Embassy Manila 1986a::Section 1, p. 3, #5; 3/FOIA edition 00046-00047).

Despite her own military relations preferences, Aquino appointed a substantial minority of 18 Commissioners with firm anti-bases views. Already, at the outset of deliberations, about one-thi~ d of the commissioners were firmly opposed to continuing the Military Bases Agreement past 1991. A declassified ("CONFIDENTIAL") 7 July 1986 memo from Mr. Richard "Dick" Holmes, United States Embassy Political Section, to Herb Hoffman in the Department of State discussed "The Bases and Concom." The proportion of anti-bases commissioners was, Holmes reveals, half again larger than what the United States Embassy had expected. More interestingly, President Aquino's appointment process had been flawed by failure adequately to vet the applications of nominees:

We knew as soon as the Concom was formed that there were 12 or 13 members who would take a strong anti-base position. When {John} Maisto met with Paul Aquino {President Aquino's brother-in-law}, Paul said that he counted 18 strong anti-base members, and that this was something Cory [Aquino} had not counted on when she made the appointments. There is a slight possibility someone in the Palace set her up on this (Joker [Arroyo]?) since three of the appointees who were not in the original/is! of nominees published in the papers have sponsored the nationalist resolution (Bennagen, Braid, and Regalado). It would be interesting to know who supported their candidacies at Afalacanang .... .I would not have been able to predict in advance that [Adolfo S.j Azcuna, [Floredo D.} Regalado, {Lugum L.j Uka, or [Wilfrido Vj Vil/acorta would sponsor an anti-base resolution. Of the four, Regalado and Villacorta are the biggest surprises. As the Con Com opened, I also would not


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have predicted that Davide would have taken such a position (Holmes, In United States Embassy Manila 1986d:3/FOIA edition: page 001 02; material between parentheses in the original; emphasis supplied; information within brackets supplied).

With such executive-generated laws and other initiatives, Aquino conducted foreign relations by decree (Art. IV, Sec. 1-2, pp. 3-4) until 27 July 1987. Former Minister of Information "Teddy Boy" Locsin, Jr., who freely spoke on audiotape of the close ties Aquino's advisors had with the US intelligence community, also expressed surprise nine and a half years later, upon learning from this researcher that the 1984 Convenor Group Statement had been circulated to the Constitutional Commissioners on days when key votes were scheduled (Locsin 1996; but cf. Simbulan 1995). However, the former Minister oflnformation should have been aware that former Senator Lorenzo Tafiada had, on 17 June 1986 and in behalf of the BAY AN coalition, submitted anti-bases constitutional recommendations while quoting the anti-bases 26 December 1984 Convenor Group Statement cosigned by Mrs. Aquino.

The Americans certainly knew. In a declassified 27 June 1986 memo to Mr. Herb Hoffman attached to Ambassador Bosworth's cablegram to United States Secretary of State George Shultz, Sylvia L. Alejandro of the United States Embassy's Political Section commented that Tafiada's "mention of the Declaration of Unity as having been signed by President Aquino is an indicator that he and his group intend to ensure that she [Aquino] keeps her word on this signed document despite press releases [from Malacafiang Palace] to the contrary" (Constitutional Commission of the Philippines, Communication, No. 40, 1, #2; reproduced in United States Embassy Manila 1986b: 2,#2; attached with Alejandro memo to Ambassador Bosworth's 27 June 1986 cablegram to the United States Secretary of State: United States Embassy Manila 1986: Attachment, 2, #2; FOIA edition: 00089). That interpretation was borne out by subsequent events. And by early July 1986, the United States Embassy no longer believed ''Teddy Boy Locsin's assurance and those of [Constitutional Commission President Cecilia Munoz] Palma and [Father Joaquin] Bernas" regarding President Aquino's "firn1

control" of the Military Bases Agreement issue (Holmes, In United States Embassy Manila 1986d:3/FOIA edition:page 00103).

Later, however, former Constitutional Commissioner and Aquino advisor Father Joaquin Bernas, S.J., downplayed the effect of the Convenor Group's "Declaration of Unity" during 1986. In response to this researcher's question


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on that point, Bernas replied, "In my dealing with Mrs. Aquino and in my

conversations with people around her, the ''Declaration of Unity was hardly ever

referred to." Bernas continued:

Those seriously working with her just went on working not paying much attention to whatever carping there might have been about the Declaration. In fact, I do not recall any carping that was

taken with any seriousness (Bernas 1996a).

The apparent difference in views expressed by US Embassy employee Alejandro and those by Aquino advisor Bernas, respectively, are not fundamental.

Both are focused on the putative direct impact of anti-bases lobbying on President Aquino. At the same time, neither summary nor analysis is focused on two closely related but different uses for the "Declaration of Unity," namely, (1) to energize

anti-bases forces during the Constitutional Commission's proceedings and (2)

to influence wavering commissioners. Further, the above-cited statements by Bernas

and Locsin lead to an additional inference, viz., that President Aquino was intermittently isolated from the rhythm of events affecting the future of the Military

Bases Agreement at the Constitutional Commission.

Alejandro's comment comes close to capturing the essence ofthe dilemma

faced by Aquino and the Americans on how to react to anti-bases initiatives by cause-oriented groups in league with similarly inclined nationalist Constitutional Commissioners. Aware of President Aquino's pro-MBA orientation, Embassy personnel nonetheless also believed that, having stated her commitment to restoring a version of representative democracy, President Aquino risked undermining confidence in herself if she explicitly, repeatedly and publicly repudiated the 1984

"Declaration of Unity." The unstated assumption in this context, I believe, is that the leader of a democratic transition is more vulnerable to deviate from her public commitments than the dictator she helped drive from office.

According to former Ambassador to Moscow Alejandro Melchor, Jr.,

President Aquino privately began modifying the "open-options" aspect of her

military relations policy toward the United States during the second half of 1986. (Cf. Figure 2a, #4, above.) From Melchor's perspective, "overwhelming support

on the part of the US Congress for her personal leadership" led to "an apparent change of heart" by Aquino. Melchor cites Ambassador Emmanuel N. Pelaez alluding to an unnamed "someone in her Cabinet" who prevented Aquino from

communicating this shift to anti-bases cabinet members (Melchor 1992:57).

Elaborating the prior point, Melchor has written that he arranged for a meeting


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between Dr. Jesus Estanislao, Aquino's future finance secretary, and Richard Childress, US National Security Advisor on Southeast Asia. Estanislao, in Melchor's summary, told Reagan's NSC advisor "that President Aquino was not opposed to the bases" (Melchor 1992:57,63, n. 3). This researcher mentioned Melchor's article to Aquino's former Minister of Information. The EstanislaoChildress meeting seemed normal to President Aquino's former Minister of Information. "I'll tell you," Locsin responded, "relationships between the United States' intelligence community and the Aquino Government were really close." As far as Aquino was concerned, according to ''Teddy Boy" Locsin, Jr., the Americans simply "had to make the case for the continuation ofthe bases" (Locsin, Jr. 1996; emphasis his). In an interview four years after publication of Melchor's article and in response to this researcher's direct question, the former ambassador to Moscow indicated that the Estanislao mission was undertaken at President Aquino's initiative (Melchor 1996). Dr. Estanislao has declined several opportunities to be interviewd on that mission.

"What was perceived as the worst-case scenario for Aquino's visit," Debra Lynn Petersen summarizes, "did not occur because the Con Com rejected a committee proposal banning the US military bases" (Petersen 1991:267-278; cf. Greene 1988: 13). Meanwhile, in Lewis M. Simons' summary of the subsequently released Adaza copy of a bugged telephone mid-September 1986 conversation between President Aquino and Executive Secretary Joker Arroyo, "the two had meddled with the drafting of the national constitution in order to assure that nuclear weapons could continue to move in and out of the US bases" (Simons 1987:311). President Aquino rode out the controversy and, indirectly, helped turn aside a threat to the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. (Cf. Figure 2a, #1, above.) Whether her action counterproductively motivated anti-nuclear weapons activists to dedicate themselves more assiduously to blocking any extension of the MBA several years thence is another matter.

Survey research on citizen attitudes conducted by Ateneo de Manila University and Social Weather Stations in June and October 1986 reported 19 to 20 percent of the respondents (from national samples) taking a clear-cut position against retention of the American bases (Ateneo de Manila University and Social Weather Stations 1986:49; 1987: 129). Without prompting, Raul S. Manglapus, Secretary of Foreign Affairs during 1987-1992, indicated to this researcher that he was aware of the reported percentages (Manglapus 1995). In September 1986, Mrs. Aquino had, through an emissary, let the Americans know that she was not opposed to the bases. If anything, awareness of the Social Weather Stations


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survey results would have strengthened her resolve to have a plebiscite on the issue. The survey results must also have been reassuring to the United States.

In spite of her temporary ability to make foreign policy unchecked by a legislature, implementation of Aquino's demarcosification agenda triggered unprecedented constitutional checks and balance on presidential foreign affairs powers, some of which had been anticipated in her "Freedom Constitution." Article V of President Aquino's Proclamation No. 3 (25 March 1986) announced the impending Constitutional Commission on (Proclamation No. 3, Art. V, p. 4, In Arroyo and Frianeza 1987).

Aquino appointed the commissioners after inviting and considering over 900 nominations from individuals and groups throughout the Philippines (Percival 1986: 8; Villacorta 1995). Nine years later, she gave this researcher three reasons for not ordering an election of convention delegates: (1) the expense; (2) the likelihood that a majority ofthe delegates would be supporters of the former dictator; and (3) the delay in starting the drafting of a new constitution (Aquino 1995).

President Aquino s decision to appoint the writers of the new constitution, unintentionally, increased her chances of getting a constitution with some kind

of anti-bases clause. Given the large mildly pro-bases majorities reflected in public opinion polling, one might have expected constitutional convention delegates elected at the local level to reflect their respective constituencies on issues like the MBA. On the other hand, the constituency which nominated commissioners included media-savvy cause-oriented groups, many of which had explicitly antibases politics and platforms, campaigning for their nomination. Their dedication and skill paid off.

Interlocking reinforcement of foreign policy-related constitutional changes

On 23 April 1986, Aquino proclaimed ''The Law Governing the Constitutional Commission (ConCom) of 1986" (Proclamation No. 9, In Arroyo and Frianeza 1987). The Con Com appointed by Aquino made three types of foreign policy decisions. In the short-term, these actions facilitated "keeping her options open" on the future of the MBA. First, the Con Com enshrined isang malayang patakarang panlabas (or "an independent foreign policy") as an overarching motif for the conduct of foreign policy (Art. II, Sec. 7, In Sison 1988). Second, the ConCom altered lines of intragovernmental treaty-making authority,


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unprecedentedly augmenting the Senate's veto power over international executive agreements. Third, the Con Com formulated foreign policy guidelines for specific situations and contingencies, such as foreign military bases, foreign debt, and nuclear weapons. (Philippines 1986a(l 00]: 460-4 71).

In my view, the three types of decisions, interlockingly, reinforce one another. Underpinned by broader structural changes in the new Konstitusyon, the decisions of the Con Com presented Aquino with a long-term scissors crisis, constraining her with procedures on one side and with specific foreign affairs preferences on the other.

Quota sample of MBA-related resolutions

A quota sample of unpublished resolutions filed in the Legislative Archives was derived from (1) 60 references in the Subjectlndex to the Proposed Resolutions

Filed with the 1986 Constitutional Commission (Legal Resources Center 1981:passim); (2) those excerpts reflect the range of some 30 related resolutions submitted to the Constitutional Commission of 1986; (3) the compromise version (Art. 18, Sek. 25) is from the 1987 Konstitusyon ng Republika ng Pilipinas; cf. Bernas (1987: 128, nn. 35-3 8). In order to foreground and highlight the compromise nature of the approved Transitory Provision (Art. 18, Sek. 25), I will first quote from a representative sample of four competing Con Com resolutions, two of which would have kept the door wider open to an extended .MBA and two others would have shut it more tightly than the final version.

In favor of explicitly keeping the door open to a renewal or replacement of the MBA were, for example, Proposed Resolutions 268 by Commissioner Gregorio J. Tingson and Resolution 430 by Bias F. Ople and colleagues. The former urged "that the lease for these military bases be extended for another

one hundred years from the date of the new constitution" (Tingson 1986; emphasis supplied). The latter proposed that ''The Military Bases Agreement... .. shall be deemed terminated upon its expiration in 1991, without prejudice to the conclusion of a new agreement ..... " (Ople et al. 1986; emphasis supplied). In contrast, Commissioner Felicitas S. Aquino and her co-thinkers insisted in Proposed Resolution 402, "It is [the State's] duty to .... .forbid all foreign military bases, facilities, and troops from the national territory" (Felicitas Aquino et al. 1986; emphasis supplied). So, too, the Committee on Preamble, National Territory and Declaration of Principles preferred to close the door on the military bases with its Proposed Resolution 537. It urged, "Upon the expiration of the RP-US bases


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agreement, foreign military bases, troops and facilities shall no longer be allowed in any part of Philippine territory" (Committee on Preamble 1986; emphasis supplied).

Situated in a compromise position is the Bernas-supported Transitory Provision that was finally approved by the Commissioners:

"Sa pagwawakas sa 1991 ng Kasunduan [At the expiration date in 1991 of the Agreement] ..... tungkol sa mga Base Militar, ang mga dayuhang base militar, mga tropa o mga pasilidad ay hindi dapat pahintulutan [shall not be allowed] sa Pilipinas maliban sa ilalim ng mga termino ng kasunduang-bansa na kinatigan gaya ng nararapat ng Senado [duly concurred in by the Senate], at kung hinihingi ng Kongreso ay naratipikahan sa pamamagitan ng mayoryang boto ng mga mamayan sa isang reperendum ..... at kinikalalang kasunduang-bansa ng kabilang panig na nakikipag-kasunduang Estado [in a referendum ..... and recognized as a treaty by the contracting State] (boldface supplied; official translations of boldfaced phrases are italicized).

Weaker than the explicitly anti-bases Proposed Resolutions 402 and 537, the final version of the Transitory Provision on the MBA (Art. 18, Sek. 25), was, nonetheless, greeted as an advance by some anti-bases groups. Father Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., Ateneo de Manila law professor and confidant of President Aquino, may have proposed the compromise version as a way of assuring support for the constitution by elements of the left. The compromise version would narrow President Aquino's "options" in the future.

Etiology of the compromise

Ten years after the event, this interviewer asked former Constitutional Commissioner Bernas the following question on the Internet: "From your position and perspective during September 1986, what were the decisive influences motivating the final (compromise) version of the Transitory Provision [Art. 28, 15] of the Konstitusyon." Father Bernas responded as follows:

The Commissioners went into the work already with firm

positions about what they wanted. It became immediately clear,

however, that neither the 'out with the bases now' position nor


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the 'be completely silent about the bases' would win. It was a matter of looking for a position with which both sides could be reasonably comfortable. In one protracted evening session, what we have now was the result (Bernas 1996a).

Counteifactual analysis

If Aquino's co-thinkers on military relations with the US had a comfortable working majority of votes, why did Aquino advisor Bernas and his co-thinkers in the Constitutional Commission feel it was important for anti-bases commissioners to be "reasonably comfortable"? President Aquino occasionally spoke out to warn the Constitutional Commissioners against "usurping," as the US Embassy summarized it, what President Aquino described as the "policymaking functions of the representative institutions they are called upon to create" (Corazon C. Aquino to the Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 21 July 1986, as quoted in Kaplan to Secretary of State, United States Embassy Manila 1986e:p.2,#2/FOIA edition 00182-00183). So, why then did Aquino acquiesce when she and her co-thinkers had the votes to defeat the Nationalist Bloc?

As the Constitutional Commission began its work, Aquino administration officials feared the prospect of lack of Nationalist Bloc support for the new Konstitusyon. Declassified American Embassy telegrams and memoranda reflect that fear. In a 19 August 1986 meeting with US Senator Richard Lugar, Vice President and Minister ofF oreign Affairs Salvador H. Laurel "predicted the Left will oppose the Constitution if it is silent on foreign bases" (Bosworth to Secretary of State, in United States Embassy Manila 1986f #1, p. 1/FOIA edition[2nd series]:60). And on 19 September 1986, Kaplan commented on the compromise Transitory Provision (Art. 18, Sek. 25), "Fr. Bernas has stated both privately and publicly that he is concerned about the possibility that the consititution being drafted may be rejected by the people and, if so, [about] the impact this will have on the stability of the Aquino Government. His amendment appears to be an attempt to keep the left from opposing the draft constitution" (Kaplan to Secretary of State, in United States Embassy Manila, 1986f: Sect. 2, p. 2, #7/FOIA edition (page 5)/00269).

Less than pleased with the outcome in mid-October 1986, President Aquino subsequently made public statements in an effort to stretch the meaning of the constitutional language so as to maintain executive discretion, particularly regarding the "consistent with the national interest" limitation on the nuclear


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weapons prohibition. Even so, she hardly exhausted every resource within reach to push for different constitutional language.

At the same time, she did not regard the Constitutional Commission's decision as completely shutting the door on extending the Military Bases Agreement. Instead, former Minister of Information Locsin offers a twofold interpretation that, in his recollection, recreates the alternatives as Aquino saw them during the Constitutional Commission at the point when the Transitory Provisions were passed. "She felt," Locsin states, "that when the real decision [regarding the future of the Military Bases Agreement] needed to be made, if the Americans had made a convincing case for continuing the bases, she'd find a way-to bring it around." Perhaps recollecting Marcos's interference in the 1971-1972 Constitutional Convention and now speaking in the present tense, Locsin elaborates his answer as follows:

It's worse if she had tried to ..... {but] how could she do it? How could she interfere in the Commission? She would have to do it with instrumentalities who in fact had cooked up those provisions- her leftist advisors. So, the first thing they would do is spread the word in the media that she was tinkering with the constitution. So, she couldn t trust them. She was stuck in the Palace. The main thing in her mind [was], well: 'Unpopular -when push comes to shove, if the Americans are worth it, if we really need them, 'I 'II just- I don t know- I'll campaign for it- or whatever has to be done' (Locsin 1996; emphasis his).

Following ratification of the new constitution in the 2 February 1987 plebiscite, the Jesuit legal scholar and presidential adviser conceded that the Transitory Provision left the loopholes for the anti-bases forces (Bernas 1987: 128, nn. 35-39). According to activist Roland Simbulan, he and his co-thinkers perceived the Transitory Provision as nested among and buttressed by other implicitly and potentially anti-bases foreign relations-focused constitutional provisions. In other words, anti-bases organizations viewed Seksiyon 25 as but the final link- rather than the first opening - in a step-by-step pathway towards the ultimate defeat of any renegotiated MBA (Simbulan 1995).

Most significantly in the view of some anti-bases activists, the 1987 Konstitusyon also affirmed "a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its


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territory" (Art. II, Sec. 8, In Sison [1988:5]. The outcome of the 26-0 final vote came unexpectedly, surprising American Embassy personnel observing the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission. In their view, the provision was a "pre-cooked" compromise offered to the Left in order to gain their support for a "Yes" vote during the prospective plebiscite for the new constitution (Kaplan to Secretary of State, in United States Embassy Manila 1986h:#l, Section 1, page 1/FOIA edition 00276).

Although attenuated by the "consistent with the national interest" proviso, Artikulo II, Seksiyon 8, was intended to become the opening wedge of the antibases senators' attack during 1987-1991, according to Professor Roland G. Simbulan of the University of the Philipines-Manila. He would become defense advisor of Senator Wigberto Taiiada during the quadrennium leading up to the Senate's rejection of the proposed MBA extension. Professor Simbulan, as already noted, was also a longtime leader in the Nuclear-Free Philippines Coalition.

Strict enforcement of a clear-cut anti-nuke provision would, of course, have diminished the then-present and anticipated value of military bases to the Americans. However, the anti-nuclear weapons clause in the Konstitusyon was not self-enforcing. Instead, although the very short-term future of the Military Bases Agreement element of Aquino's military relations policy survived the Constitutional Commission's deliberations, an even broader view of seven clusters of decisions by that Commission indicates that Aquino's acceptance of the results of those deliberations entailed a compromise which preserved all elements of her military relations policy in the short run at the expense of endangering the most salient element in the longer run, that is, of enhancing the future chances of the anti-bases movement. To summarize, differently-sized majorities of commissioners (1) rejectedparliamentarism and (2) as an element of a presidential system, reintroduced a relatively independent bicameral legislature (3) whose upper house is (4) elected at-large and which has broad and innovative foreign policy functions, including (5a) ratifying treaties and (5b) other international executive agreements and (5c) retroactive review of Marcos-era international executive agreements- and in which context it could utilize (6) a compromised anti-nuclear weapons clause, as well as (7) the transitory provisions governing the possible termination, continuation or replacement of the Military Bases Agreement.


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Thus, driven by (1) redemocratization; (2) demarcosification; and (3) both anti-bases and anti-nukes concerns, the functional and substantive constitutional pathways thus created may be visualized as in Figure 3, below.

Figure 3 Constitutional "Scissors," June-October 1986:

Limiting the Future of the Military Bases Agreement

rejectillg parliamentarism & returnillg to presidentialism (Artikulo VII, I)

I declarillg "an independent foreign policy" (Artikulo II, 7) I I rejecting unicameralism &

reviving bicameralism I (Artikulo VI, I)

I I opposing nuclear weapons storage & passage in, through

I or over the Philippines by ships, submarines or planes

I transporting nuclear weapons (Artikulo II, 8)

reintroducing at-large elections of candidates for the Senate (Artikulo VI, 2)

expanding traditional Senate foreign policy veto over "treaty" ratification explicity to include current & future "international executive agreements" (Artikulo XVIII, 4)

I I I

conditioning any extension of the Military Bases Agreement on its ratification as a "treaty" by 2/3 of the senators (Artikulo XVIII, 25)

J

LEGEND: (a) Seven pivotal cluster.; of interdependent decisions by Constitutional Commisioners during June-October 1986 ~th increasingly direct implications for presidential foreign policy making are boxed & summarized in boldfaced, italicized type. 1n their final form and in logically descending order as above, these are Artikulo V11 (1)["Ang Kagawarang Tagapagpaganap" {The Executive Department}), Seksyon (1); VI ["Ang Kagawarang Tagapagbatas" {The Legislative Department}), (1) and (2); XV111 ["Mga Tadhanang Lilipas" {Transitional Provisions}], (4); 11 ["Pahayag ng mga Simulain at mga Patakoran ng Estado" {Proclamation of Principles and Policies of the State}), (7 & 8); and XV111 ["Mga Tadhanang Lilipas" {Transitional Provisions}], (4 & 25), respectively, of the 1987 Konstitusyon.

(b) Broken lines(----) trace logical pathways circumscribing presidential foreign policy making po'Mlr. (c) Arrow.; (~) trace the focus of foreign aJfairs preferences.


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In this respect, the foreign affairs-related activity of President Aquino's 1986 Constitutional Commission was driven by demarcosification and, more specifically, the anti-bases minority's efforts to revise the domestic and international rules of the foreign policy game. The commissioners reshaped the sharing of treaty making power between executive and legislative branches of government. A hardening legacy of distrust of the chief executive and of the Americans, combined with the felt need to seek strong citizen approval of a new Konstitusyon, stimulated unprecedentedly stringent restrictions on any subsequent renegotiation of the Military Bases treaty. Even Letizia R. Constantino, an anti-bases opponent of ratification, conceded that "the conditions set by the Constitution do make the conclusion of a new [Military Bases] treaty more difficult" (Constantino: 1986,11 ).

Since commissioners sharing Aquino:\" views on the bases were in the majority, why didn t they push through and defeat the Nationalist Bloc? Endorsing and campaigning for that constitution followed naturally from Aquino's focus on democratization and demarcosification. Indeed, if one emphasizes the uncontestable fact that the Batasang Pambansa did not proclaim her the winner of the 1986 election, then, of course, her self-proclamation as President on 25 February 1976 was extraconstitutional.

Less than twelve months later, however, Aquino did receive ex post facto constitutional approval on 2 February 1987 from Filipino voters who ratified a new constitution by a 4-1 margin, thereby extending her term till 30 June 1992. Even in the view of Arturo M. Tolentino, legal scholar and Marcos's 1985-1986 vice-presidential running mate, the February 1987 referendum overtook and rendered moot earlier claims that the Aquino government was extraconstitutional (Tolentino 1990: 878-885). Ratification of the new constitution in a popular referendum on 2 February 1987 would give the legislature its broadest "treaty veto" ever (Pollard forthcoming:Chs. 1 and 7). However, to avoid teleological errors and false assumptions of path dependency, one must emphasize that President Aquino's landslide 80 percent margin was by no means assured in mid-October 1986.

Precedent, presidential initiative and stretched organizational pluralism

Candidate and President Corazon Aquino's RP-US military relations policy was based on support of a triad of military treaties with the former colonial


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power. Especially after ED SA, attention increasingly focused on her preferences concerning just one of those three legs, namely, the future of the Military Bases Agreement. If one keeps in mind that Aquino actually implemented her stated preferences regarding RP-US military relations (see Figures 2a and 2b, above), then her "open-options" stance regarding what she would do in 1990 and 1991 is an incomplete and unsatisfactory metaphor for the full range of her broader military cooperation policy with the US.

Only in painstaking retrospective reconstruction does Aquino's policy during the latter part of her Snap Election campaign seem clear. Reconstruction from Philippine and foreign print and electronic documents published or broadcast in the United States during the Snap Election campaign reveals the analytical and audience specificity of Aquino's policy. One infers that the concomitant information asymmetry favored candidate Aquino, apparently leaving some of her anti-bases supporters with less than full comprehension of her preferences.

Nonetheless, as an interim policy by a caretaker and (initially) extraconstitutional government, her open-options policy served in minimizing, containing and even obviating dissent. Maintaining the open-options aspect of Aquino's military bases policy helped her keep the future of the MBA from becoming a higher-profile issue at the beginning of her administration. As a temporary way of dealing with early manifestations of a brewing political crisis over the bases, the "open-options" aspect of her policy was, for the most part, nested among and was dependent on other more salient steps taken to dismantle the Marcos dictatorship and to reintroduce and modify key features of pre-martial law democracy. In the words of Ambassador Benjamin B. Domingo, "Ang mga isyu noong ... pagdating ni Pangulo ang survival ng bansa" ["At the time of President [ Aquino]'s arrival {at the presidency} then, the issues were ... the survival of the country''] (Domingo 1995; translation, ellipsis and clarifications supplied). That was paramount, ranking higher than publicly making a promise to extend the MBA at all costs. Thus, there is an additional inference to be made. President Aquino, in a sympathetic but more drastic interpretation, "would not have completed her presidency if she had pursued any other course" (Special Interviewee #1 1995). Inability to complete her term in office would, arguably, have led to the failure of her demarcosification and democratization policies.

Although Aquino promised to consult with the "Filipino people," the future ofUnited States military facilities in the archipelago was not a high-priority, high-profile issue for most Filipinos. Subsequently, Aquino's repeated use of the


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"open-options" phrase increasingly conflicted with her changed private preference. Perhaps because she (somewhat) underestimated the need to build a broader activist constituency for the bases, supporters of continuing the Military Bases Agreement might argue that Aquino spent more time consulting with the leaders of ASEAN governments and the Americans and not enough time building a constituency within the Philippines.

But since leaders of democratizing and democratic countries are, reputedly, more responsible than dictators for their words and other actions (and perhaps because citizens read their own hopes and aspirations into their leader's pronouncements), Aquino's pre-campaign and Snap Election period statements on how to handle the future of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement helped her in the short run - and probably hindered her in the long run.

For example, whatever misgivings Aquino may have subsequently had for having signed the 1984 Convenor Group Statement and for having affirmed it at least once at the beginning of the Snap Election campaign in 1985, its symbolism and long "half-life" among some opponents of the former martial law regime was such that she never explicitly and publicly repudiated it during 1986. Thus, having dismissed the legislature, she shared power with her advisors, a diverse cabinet, and a Constitutional Commission and even local and international media. Aquino was also perceived as being (mildly) anti-bases by some of her supporters. Understandably, during a volatile transitional period with threats of military coups looming, she may well have wished to obviate a negative media and activist reaction to shifts in her public policy.

An interim policy, presumably, covers a temporary situation and is then replaced by a longer-term policy. The focused time frame of the present case study closes in mid-October 1986. That time frame punctuates three key developments: (1) Marcos had been forced out of government and out of the Philippines; (2) a revolutionary constitution had been promulgated unilaterally and then (3) replaced with one whose ratification Aquino was about to seek from Filipino voters. As

with previous presidents who often preferred not to involve the legislature in the early phases of foreign policy making (and with Marcos during martial law years), Aquino derived freedom of action from the absence of countervailing power in the former Batasan or (until 27 July 1987) the Congress. But she did not have absolute power: Along with the nongovernmental organizations, an unleashed press (something President Marcos did not face after 21 September 1972) was another force standing in the way of absolutism.


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Even if Aquino's private preference for handling the future of the MBA diverged from the "open-options" element in her military bases policy earlier than September 1986, her search for a way to shift to a different, more finelytuned public policy was frustrated. This is clearly the case with the (appointed) Constitutional Commission, a majority of whose members unprecedentedly revised the rules of the game for handling an extension or replacement of the MBA -some because this was their agenda and others because they felt they needed the support of the anti-bases commissioners in the constitutional plebiscite to obviate the political instability likely to ensue if the constitution were rejected. Further, Aquino and her co-thinkers waited in vain for their ASEAN neighbors in 1986-1987 (and beyond) to publicly embrace and "share the moral burden" of the American military facilities - a tactic believed likely to undermine anti-bases forces in the RP.

Conclusion

While encountering relatively limited opposition to most elements of her seven-point military cooperation policy towards the US, President Aquino postponed some divisive debates by "keeping her options open" on the future of the Military Bases Agreement during her first 22 months in office.

Instead of becoming the president who brought an end to the postcolonial presence of American military bases in her country, President Aquino, ironically, was the chief executive who failed to stop them from being closed by a seasoned, vibrant, persistent and imaginative intra- and extraparliamentary nationalist leadership. None~heless, during 1986, she did exactly what she said she would do regarding the broader range of her RP-US military relations preferences (cf. Figures 2a and 2b, above).

Several of Aquino's key initiatives were near-dictatorial in character. Just as the military played an essential role in Marcos's ability to extend his stay in office beyond the constitutional term limit, so a military mutiny was a key element in the extraconstitutional synergy that brought Aquino into the presidential palace. Somewhat like Marcos, she dismissed the sitting legislature (on 25 March 1986) and governed by executive decree- but only for 16 months, that is, until 27 July 1987.

To reintroduce a form of democracy and prevent a return to the Marcos dictatorship, Aquino appointed a Constitutional Commission rather than order


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an election of delegates. Like Marcos, Aquino looked to her neighbors in the governments of the ASEAN member-countries. And like Marcos, Aquino very much depended on the loyalty of key officers in the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

Unlike Marcos, however, Aquino did not suppress opposition newspapers or radio stations whose reporters or commentators opposed her military relations preferences, although like Marcos she faced several insurgencies. Despite her domestic and international initiatives, she acceded in compromises in a new Konstitusyon that, eventually, would undermine her ability to achieve those goals

because of her desire to reintroduce a degree of democratization in the Philippines.

To the extent that Aquino's RP-US military relations initiatives were successful during 1986, her success lies in the way those initiatives were imbedded or nested in her democratizatioo!demarcosification agenda.

President Aquino's private preferences for an extended MBA, one element in a broader array ofRP-US military relations preferences (Summarized in Figure 2a, #4, above), came into conflict with her public statements at the very moment when her initiatives to restore a version of democracy achieved a degree of success. On the one hand, her semi-dictatorial initiatives kept the increasingly salient issue of the future of the Military Bases Treaty off the table for much of 1986 and 1987, thus helping to preserve the triad of military relations treaties with the United States- but not completely. At the same time, Aquino's pro-American military relations preferences were nested and imbedded in her commitment to facilitating one version of early redemocratization. The opportunity cost of making an early public expression ofher openness to a post-1991 extension of the Military Bases Treaty would have been high. The 1985-1986 phase of early

redemocratization brought Aquino into the presidency sharing power with a politically diverse group of partners. Although Aquino purged her Cabinet of Left-leaning members within less than two years, she had to proceed carefully less she destabilize the government. Caught on the horns of a dilemma, Aquino almost certainly undermined the chances of extending the Military Bases Agreement by publicly adhering overly long to the "open-options" rhetoric (Cf.

Pelaez 1996). Meanwhile, in June 1986, a Nationalist Bloc of Constitutional Commissioners quickly emerged. It was composed of dedicated anti-bases forces who had been honing their organizational and political skills for years in the movement against martial law. When their opportunity arose, those commissioners exercised their hard-won abilities and utilized extra-parliamentary ties of solidarity more astutely than their opponents (cf. Pollard forthcoming:Ch.6) in a delicate


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high-stakes contest whose outcome changed the rules of the negotiating game that would be played out some four years later.

President Corazon Cojuangco Aquino took initiatives in support of a limited agenda of redemocratization and demarcosification. Within that context, Aquino faced challenges not experienced in most other transitions to democracy since 1974. She survived in office (a major achievement) and preserved a triad of military treaties with the United States during her first year. Intended and unintended consequences of pursuing that agenda explain the largest part of the military relations policy outcomes of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. Within that process and during 1986, tactical errors by Aquino, imagination and persistence evinced by the Commision's Nationalist Bloc, a temporary near-consensus among American politicians on refraining from demanding early, explicit public reassurances about President Aquino's post -1991 intentions and dis sensus among pro-bases forces inside and outside the Commission account for most of the rest (Cf. also Pollard 1997:passim; Pollard forthcoming:Chs. 5-7).

Propositions to be Tested in Further Research

Linkages between redemocratization and foreign policy making in the Philippines during 1986 are important in and of themselves. However, the transition from President Marcos to President Aquino in 1986 has further meaning internationally. As the analysis from this study suggests, a set of crossnationally researchable inferences begins to emerge concerning continuity and change in foreign policy decision making. To make these more explicit, below I have outlined the hypothesized linkages between presidential foreign policy making and the manner in which a society may move toward a more open and representative governmental system:

1. In nonnegoti a ted transitions to democratization (more fully representative and contested forms of government), institutional precedent will account for smaller amount of foreign policy outcomes than in negotiated

transitions from authoritarian government.

2. In nonnegotiated transitions to democratization, public commitments by leaders of pro-democracy forces will account for a larger amount offoreign policy outcomes than in negotiated transitions.


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2a. Near-congruity or even isomorphism between a chief executive's personal desires and public stance is essential to stability and longterm effectiveness, particularly when the related issues are potentially divisive.

2b. This is more likely to be the case in presidential systems than with parliamentary varieties of government.

3. The opportunity cost of presidential reneging on foreign policy campaign promises is higher in transitional democracies than in more stable democracies.

4. In nonnegotiated transitions to democratization, the quality ofleadership and organizational skills of the chief executive and his/her staff are likely to have a greater impact on the achievement of controversial foreign policy preferences than in negotiated transitions.

4a. This is more likely to be the case in presidential systems than with other forms of government.

5. In nonnegotiated transitions to democratization, the alliances, networks and political organizing skills accumulated by oppositionist partners and allies prior to the time of transition will typically have a greater impact on controversial foreign policy outcomes than in otherwise similar negotiated transitions.

Sa. This is more likely to be the case in presidential systems than with other forms of government.

6. In nonnegotiated transitions to more open and more contestable governmental systems, the rules of foreign policy making that might have been decided on (or just left alone) during a negotiated transition are typically negotiated but only after the transition to a more representative government is further under way.

7. Sitting legislatures are more likely to facilitate executive foreign policy making in parliamentary during democratic transitions to representative democracy than in presidential systems.


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References

ABS-CBN Television. 1987. "U.S. Bases: The Price of Power." Produced and narrated by Robert Ng. [Undated but telecast shortly after the 11 May 1987 elections]. Betamax copy of television program in audiovisual collection of the Thomas Jefferson Library, Makati.

American Broadcasting Corporation News. 1986. "Nightline." Televised interview of candidate Corazon Cojuangco Aquino by Ted Koppel. Videotape dub in the Wong Audiovisual Center, Sinclair Library, University of Hawai'i at Manoa. 5 February.

Aquino, Belinda A. 1987. Politics of Plunder: The Philippines Under Marcos. Quezon City: Great Books Trading and University of the Philippines College of Public Administration.

Aquino, Corazon C. 1985. "Excerpts from Aquino Interview on Candidacy." New York Times. A-10. 16 December.

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electioneering, constitution writing and foreign policy making during early redemocratization

Documents