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  • 8/19/2019 Elections in the City of Buenos Aires during the First Yrigoyen Administration: Social Class and Political Preferences…

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    Elections in the City of Buenos Aires during the First Yrigoyen Administration: Social Class andPolitical PreferencesAuthor(s): Richard J. WalterSource: The Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 58, No. 4 (Nov., 1978), pp. 595-624Published by: Duke University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2513342Accessed: 11-06-2015 19:37 UTC

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  • 8/19/2019 Elections in the City of Buenos Aires during the First Yrigoyen Administration: Social Class and Political Preferences…

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    Hispanic American Historical Review

    58(4), 1978, 595-624

    Copyright

    ( 1978

    by Duke University Press

    Elections in the City of Buenos Aires during

    the

    First

    Yrigoyen Administration: Social

    Class

    and Political Preferences

    RICHARD

    J.

    WALTER

    IN

    recent

    years

    a

    growing number

    of scholars

    have sought

    to

    analyze Argentine elections to determine the socio-

    economic

    bases

    of

    political party support

    in

    that

    country. Many

    have focused on the post-World War

    II

    period, espe-

    cially the dramatic

    presidential victory of Juan Peron in 1946.1 Others

    have studied the early part of the twentieth century and a few the late

    nineteenth century.2

    An important contribution to these efforts was the the publication

    in 1968 of Darfo

    Canton's

    two-volume compilation of national presi-

    dential and congressional election results.3 Using Canton's data, social

    scientists have

    correlated election returns with a variety of information

    drawn from

    municipal, provincial, and national censuses. Although

    these

    censuses contain a wealth of information, they also pose several

    major problems.

    They appear irregularly, making

    the

    development

    of

    socioeconomic

    indicators over an

    extended

    period difficult.

    The cate-

    gories employed

    and the

    completeness

    of

    coverage vary greatly

    from

    one

    census to another.

    Moreover,

    most census material

    describes

    general

    characteristics

    of

    voting districts, but

    not

    necessarily

    of

    the

    voters themselves.

    *

    The

    author is Chairman of the Department of History at

    Washington

    Uni-

    versity. He wislhes o

    acknowledge

    the

    invaluable assistance

    of

    Mr.

    Michael Wolfe

    in

    preparationof the article.

    1.

    The best known

    of

    these

    is

    Peter H. Smith,

    "The

    Social Base of Peronism,"

    HAHR, 52

    (Feb. 1972), 55-73. See also Gino Germani'scritique of

    Smith's

    work

    and

    his own

    analysis

    in "El

    surgimiento

    del

    peronismo:

    El rol

    de los

    obreros

    y

    de

    los migrantes internos," Desarrollo

    Economico, 3 (Oct.-Dec. 1973), 435-488.

    2. For

    example, Dario Canton,

    Elecciones y partidospoliticos en la Argentina:

    Historia,

    interpretaciony balance, 1910-1966

    (Buenos Aires,

    1973);

    Oscar Corn-

    blit, "La opcion conservadoraen la politica argentina,' DesarrolloEcono6mico, 4

    (Jan.-Mar.

    1975), 599-640; and, Ezequiel Gallo and Silvia

    Sigal, "La formacion

    de los partidos

    politicos contempor'aneos:

    La

    U.C.R.,

    1890-1916,"

    in

    Torcuato

    S.

    Di Tella

    et al., Argentina,

    sociedladlle masas

    (Buenos Aires,

    1966).

    3. Darlo

    Canton,

    Materiales

    para

    el estudio

    de

    la

    sociologia politica

    en

    la

    Argentina,

    2 vols. (Buenos Aires, 1968).

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  • 8/19/2019 Elections in the City of Buenos Aires during the First Yrigoyen Administration: Social Class and Political Preferences…

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    596 HAHR

    I

    NOVEMBER

    I

    RICHARD J.

    WALTER

    In

    1955, sociologist Gino Germani called attention to these de-

    ficiencies in his own study of elections in the 1940s.4 He suggested that

    more meaningful analyses could be derived from data taken directly

    from voter registries. Several scholars have begun to use these registries

    for

    the city of Buenos Aires. Their work to date is suggestive but frag-

    mentary, based primarily on sample precincts rather than the city as a

    whole.5

    With

    these

    considerations

    in

    mind,

    this

    study proposes to examine

    congressional and municipal elections in the city of Buenos Aires during

    the

    first

    administration

    of Radical President

    Hip6lito

    Yrigoyen (1916-

    1922).

    The results of these

    elections, by party and by

    circurnscripcion

    (ward), compiled from Canton, newspapers, and reports of the national

    ministry of the interior, will be correlated with occupational data taken

    directly

    from

    the

    actual

    list of

    registered voters for the entire city

    of

    Buenos Aires for the year 1918. These correlations will provide a statisti-

    cal indication of the class bases of support for the main parties in these

    contests, the Union Civica Radical (UCR), or Radical party, the

    Partido Socialista (PS), or Socialist party, and the Partido Dem6crata

    Progresista (PDP) or Democratic Progressive party. In addition, using

    the

    same

    data,

    each

    election

    will

    be examined

    and

    described

    in

    detail to

    determine the particular issues, personalities, and conditions of the

    moment

    which might

    have

    affected party performance.

    Aside

    from

    the

    availability

    of

    data,

    a concentration

    on

    the

    years

    1916

    to 1922

    can be

    justified

    in

    other

    ways.

    For one

    thing,

    it

    was

    a

    period

    in which

    a

    new

    political party,

    the

    Radical,

    controlled the

    national executive

    for

    the first time in

    the twentieth

    century.

    It was

    also

    an important

    and

    formative

    period

    for

    Argentina's "experiment

    with

    democracy,"

    an

    experiment

    which

    eventually

    would

    end

    in failure.

    As will be noted below, under Yrigoyen, and unlike the case with most

    previous administrations,

    elections

    in

    the

    capital were

    honest and

    valid

    reflections

    of

    popular

    sentiment.

    Also, during

    these

    years

    the

    electorate

    expanded significantly.

    With

    this

    expansion,

    new social

    groups, par-

    ticularly

    the

    urban

    working

    and middle

    classes, markedly

    increased

    their weight and value within

    the

    electorate. Yrigoyen's Radicals, and

    their

    competitors, sought

    to

    represent

    the

    interests of these

    new

    groups

    and

    aimed

    their

    appeals

    to attract their

    support. Basically,

    the

    Radicals

    4. Gino Germani, Estructura social de la Argentiina: Analisis estadistico

    (Buenos Aires, 1955), p.

    251.

    5. Peter G. Snow, "The Class Basis

    of

    Argentine Political Parties," American

    Political Science Review, 63 (Mar. 1969), 163-167 and Walter Little, "Electoral

    Aspects of Peronism, 1946-1954," Journal of Inter-American Studies and World

    Affairs, 15 (Aug. 1973), 267-284.

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    ELECTIONS DURING THE FIRST YRIGOYEN ADMINISTRATION

    597

    claimed to champion

    the

    middle classes,

    the

    Socialists

    the working

    classes. However, as will be seen, in these years political

    parties at-

    tempted to move beyond single class support and develop a multiclass

    constituency, establishing

    a tradition which would persist

    throughout

    the twentieth century. One

    of the main objectives of this study, there-

    fore,

    will

    be

    not

    only

    to determine the basic class backing of the major

    parties, but also to gauge their successes and failures

    in trying to de-

    velop a broader base

    of

    support.

    Using the federal capital of Buenos Aires as a

    focus provides ad-

    vantages and disadvantages.

    A major advantage is

    that in contrast

    with many

    elections

    held

    outside

    the

    capital during this

    period,

    those

    in

    Buenos Aires were generally regular and free from fraud and violence.6

    However, the capital was a very special case, and voting

    patterns there

    should be used with

    care when generalizing

    for

    the

    entire republic.

    First,

    Buenos Aires was exceptional

    in

    that

    it

    was

    home for both the

    elite of the country and Argentina's greatest concentrations

    of middle

    class, urban working class,

    and immigrant groups.7 Also, as a group,

    the

    electorate

    of

    Buenos

    Aires

    was probably the most

    politically aware

    and politically active

    of

    any

    in

    the

    republic.

    Most

    major

    parties located

    their national headquarters and published their principal

    propaganda

    organs in the capital city. In addition, the

    portefio,

    living in Latin

    America's major publishing center, enjoyed easy

    access to a wide

    range of general newspapers, periodicals, and books,

    which covered

    many political subjects,

    both domestic and foreign. Moreover,

    the

    voters

    of the

    capital

    were

    by

    far

    the

    most

    literate

    in

    the

    republic,

    the

    third national census

    gauging

    the

    literacy

    rate of registered voters

    in

    the

    capital

    at

    just over

    ninety-six percent, well above the

    national

    average

    of

    about fifty percent.8

    Finally, capital

    turnout

    in

    congres-

    sional and presidential elections was consistently fifteen to twenty

    percent higher

    than

    the

    average for

    the

    republic as a whole.9

    Another notable characteristic was the rapid growth

    of the

    city

    and

    the related

    growth

    of the electorate.

    Between 1895 and

    1914, the popu-

    lation of

    the capital

    more than

    doubled,

    from

    663,854 persons

    to

    6. For a catalog of congressional debates

    on

    fraudulent elections, see

    Canton,

    Materiales,I, 3-29.

    7. By 1914, the capital had the highest number and percentage of foreign-born

    persons

    of

    any city

    in

    the

    republic. Although few foreigners became Argentine

    citizens and hence eligible to vote in these years, it should be noted that more

    than half

    of

    those

    naturalized

    by

    1914

    (18,450

    of

    33,219) lived

    in

    tlle

    city of

    Buenos Aires. Repu'blica Argentina,

    Tercer

    cen.so naciontal, 1914 (Buenos Aires,

    1916), II, 403-417.

    8. Ibid., IV, 480-494.

    9.

    Canton,

    Materiales,I, 83-91.

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    598

    HAHR

    I

    NOVEMBER

    I

    RICHARD

    J. WALTER

    1,576,597,10

    and by

    1936,

    it had reached

    2,415,142.1" Between

    1914

    and

    1922, the number

    of registered

    capital

    voters,

    representing

    about

    twenty

    percent

    of

    the national

    total, grew

    from 147,689

    to 246,567,

    the

    number of

    actual

    voters from 109,461

    to

    174,940 (see

    Table I).

    These

    increases

    were attributable

    not

    only to general

    population

    growth but

    also

    to the effects

    of the

    Saenz

    Pefia electoral

    reform

    of 1912,

    which

    made voting

    in national

    elections

    secret

    and obligatory

    for all

    Argentine

    males

    over

    the age of eighteen.

    It should be noted,

    however,

    that even

    with

    these

    increases

    the number of

    registered

    voters

    in

    these

    years

    represented

    only a

    little more than

    ten

    percent of the

    total population.

    This relatively small

    electorate can be explained

    by the fact that

    women

    and foreigners were not allowed to vote in national elections. Foreign

    males

    were permitted

    to vote in municipal

    elections,

    but only

    under

    very

    limited conditions.

    These factors,

    then, describe

    a well-informed,

    active,

    and

    growing

    electorate

    in

    Buenos

    Aires. Moreover,

    these voters

    were

    probably

    less

    influenced

    or intimidated

    by political

    bosses than

    their country

    cousins.

    Also, they

    were free

    from the consequences

    of federal

    intervention,

    an

    instrument

    by which

    the national

    executive

    often controlled

    politics

    and

    government

    outside of the capital.

    Although additional

    compari-

    sons must await further investigation of politics in the provinces, it

    can be

    assumed

    that party

    leaders were

    cognizant

    of

    the

    special

    nature

    of the

    capital

    voter and

    devised strategies

    and articulated

    programs

    which

    would

    appeal

    directly

    to these qualities.

    Undoubtedly, they

    also

    were aware

    of the

    significance

    of the

    capital

    vote,

    both

    in

    terms

    of actual

    numbers

    and

    the

    psychological

    impact

    of

    victories

    or

    defeats

    in

    this

    prestigious

    arena.

    Although,

    as Table I indicates,

    many

    parties participated

    in

    national

    and municipal elections in Buenos Aires,

    the

    two main competitors

    for

    the

    votes

    of this

    sophisticated

    and growing

    electorate were

    the Radical

    and

    Socialist

    parties.12

    These

    two

    parties

    will be

    the

    center

    of

    attention

    for this

    study. However,

    the

    position

    and

    performance

    of

    the

    Demo-

    cratic Progressive

    party,

    generally

    a

    less

    frequent

    and less

    successful

    competitor,

    also will be considered

    when relevant.

    The differences

    between

    the Socialists and

    Radicals

    were

    numerous.

    10. Tercer censo

    nacional,

    II, 115.

    11. Repu6blica rgentina,Municipalidadde la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, Cuarto

    censo general,

    1936

    (Buenos Aires,

    1939), II,

    12.

    12. The

    following analyses

    of tlhe

    Radicaland Socialist

    parties come essentially

    from David

    Rock,

    Politics in Argentina,

    1890-1930:

    The

    Rise and Fall

    of Radi-

    calism (Cambridge,

    1975) and

    Richard J.

    Walter, The

    Socialist Party

    of

    Argentina,

    1890-1930

    (Austin,

    1977).

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    ELECTIONS DURING

    TMIE

    FIRST YRIGOYEN ADMINISTRATION

    599

    The

    Socialist party, organized in the 1890s, was patterned on European

    models, professed an internationalist view and connections, presented

    a

    detailed program for social and economic change, and preferred

    evolution, gradualism, and reform to violent revolution. The party

    participated

    in

    every capital

    election from

    1896 and saw its membership

    in the city grow from about 100 in the 1890s to almost 3,000 in 1918.

    Nevertheless, the membership figure represented only a small fraction

    of the

    total votes which the party received in capital elections, indicat-

    ing its appeal to many independent voters.

    In contrast with the Socialists,

    the Radicals, also formed in the

    1890s, professed to be a purely Argentine, criollo party. Unlike the

    Socialists, the Radicals presented little in the way of a program beyond

    support for free suffrage, efficient and honest public administration,

    and

    respect

    for

    provincial autonomy. During the 1896 to 1912 period,

    the Radicals refused to participate in the electoral process until reforms

    were made

    to

    assure

    honest

    voting.

    Although agreeing

    with

    some as-

    pects of

    the

    Socialist program, the Radicals rejected the Socialists'

    analysis

    of

    Argentine development along

    the

    lines of class conflict and

    instead argued that they represented a broad, national consensus of

    various

    groups

    which

    sought

    to harmonize social

    differences.

    The

    Radicals particularly stressed their nationalism in contrast to socialism's

    internationalism and defended creole values

    of

    idealism, Catholicism,

    and

    federalism against

    what

    they perceived to be

    the

    materialism,

    anticlericalism,

    and

    centralism

    of

    the

    Socialists.

    Finally,

    the

    number

    of

    persons

    who

    belonged actively

    to the

    UCR,

    at least

    in the

    capital,

    far

    outstripped

    the number

    of

    Socialists.

    According

    to David

    Rock,

    in

    Yrigoyen's

    first term the number of

    Radicals participating

    in

    internal

    party

    affairs

    in

    the

    city grew

    from

    20,000

    to

    30,000.13

    Although extensive data on the class composition of the two parties

    are

    not readily available,

    the extant information does

    indicate

    certain

    contrasts.

    The

    Socialist

    leadership

    came

    predominantly

    from

    urban,

    professional,

    middle-class

    backgrounds. However, party

    directors

    and

    congressmen

    also

    included

    some

    working-class representatives.

    The

    rank and

    file

    of

    the

    party generally approximated

    the

    composition

    of

    the

    capital electorate overall, mostly

    skilled

    working

    class and white-

    collar middle class.14 Radical

    committee

    members and

    congressional

    candidates also

    came from middle-class

    backgrounds but,

    in

    some

    instances, from what Peter Smith has called the upper-class "aristo-

    13. David Rock,

    "Machine Politics

    in

    Buenos Aires and the

    Argentine

    Radical

    Party,"Journalof LatinAmerican Studies,

    4 (Nov. 1972), 251.

    14. Walter,

    The Socialist

    Party, pp.

    174-176.

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    ELECTIONS

    DURING

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    602

    HAHI

    I

    NOVEMBER

    I

    RICHARD J. WALTER

    cratic" sector.15

    In

    1916,

    for

    example, of

    the UCR's seven candidates

    for

    congress

    from the

    capital,

    three

    belonged

    to the Sociedad Rural Argen-

    tina,

    the

    nation's

    leading defender of the interests of wealthy landown-

    ing groups."6

    Few, if any, from the working class served as Radical

    deputies

    or held

    important party positions.

    General impressions of

    rank-and-file Radicals

    also indicate little active working-class

    repre-

    sentation. Most

    Radical party members

    in the capital probably were

    public employees, directly dependent for

    their livelihood upon

    Radical

    control of the national

    government.17

    The

    basic organization

    of both parties in the capital exhibited

    cer-

    tain similarities.

    Both established committees in each of

    the city's

    twenty circunscripciones and most of its circuitos (precincts). A cen-

    tral committee oversaw and coordinated

    the activities of these

    smaller

    groups which distributed

    propaganda,

    provided information on elec-

    toral procedures,

    organized rallies, and got voters to the polls.

    In terms

    of

    function, the Radical organization

    depended to a much greater

    extent on the dispensation

    of material

    rewards to its actual and po-

    tential adherents than

    did the Socialists. These rewards included

    gifts

    of

    food, clothing,

    sometimes money,

    and, most importantly, employ-

    ment, either within

    the party structure or more commonly in

    the Radi-

    cal-controlled municipal or national government.

    The

    general pattern

    of campaigning for both parties was

    essentially

    the

    same. Active

    electioneering began

    one

    to two

    months

    before

    the

    actual

    balloting.

    Party

    leaders

    and

    candidates gave frequent speeches

    (conferencias) throughout

    the

    city,

    sometimes

    in

    open squares,

    some-

    times

    in

    meeting

    halls

    or

    theaters. Party

    newspapers,

    La

    Vanguardia

    for the Socialists and

    La

    Epoca

    for the

    Radicals,

    were

    important

    propa-

    ganda

    instruments. All

    parties plastered posters

    on the

    city's

    walls and

    distributed thousands of printed leaflets. Several days before the elec-

    tion

    the

    parties

    organized

    massive

    rallies

    for

    the final

    presentation

    of

    candidates.

    These

    rallies, attracting

    tens

    of

    thousands

    of

    people, usually

    began

    at

    night

    in

    one

    of the

    city's

    main

    plazas. There,

    the

    assembly

    heard fiery speeches extolling

    the virtues of the

    party holding

    the

    meeting and condemning

    the

    vices

    of

    the

    opposition.

    Following

    these

    speeches, partisans

    marched

    down one

    of

    the central

    avenues,

    accom-

    panied by

    banners, torches, appropriate

    music,

    and

    displaying

    certain

    15.

    Peter H. Smith,Argentina

    and the

    Failure of

    Democracy:

    Conflict Among

    Political Elites,

    1904-1955

    (Madison, 1974), pp. 23-40.

    16. Walter,

    The Socialist Party, pp.

    136-137.

    17. Rock, "Machine

    Politics,"passim.

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  • 8/19/2019 Elections in the City of Buenos Aires during the First Yrigoyen Administration: Social Class and Political Preferences…

    10/31

    ELECTIONS DURING THE

    FIRST

    YRIGOYEN ADMINISTRATION

    603

    symbols; for the Radicals, the white beret; for the Socialists, the red

    flag or armband.18

    Party unity was an important factor in determining campaign

    effectiveness. During this period both the Socialists and the Radicals

    were

    subject to violent internal disagreement and resultant fragmenta-

    tion which weakened campaign efforts. The Socialists suffered three

    major schisms, in

    1915,

    1918, and 1921, producing three new parties

    led

    by

    former

    Socialists and competing for Socialist votes. During the

    same period, the Radicals, while not experiencing formal

    schisms,

    were

    wracked by internal dissension which severely affected their per-

    formance at the polls.

    Although party leaders in their campaigning probably did not have

    as

    precise an idea of the occupational profile of the

    city's

    voters

    as

    provided

    in

    this article, the results of the third national

    census

    did tell

    them something about the composition of the electorate

    overall. From

    this data, it could be determined that eligible voters were

    rather evenly

    distributed between working class and middle class. Significant groups

    earmarked in the census were 55,169 Argentine males

    over fourteen

    years of age in industries and manual arts (of 197,990

    total), 36,551

    in

    public administration, 26,181 in commerce, 14,229 in

    education (includ-

    ing students), and 13,135 in transportation.19

    The census data did not provide occupational breakdowns by

    circunscripcion, but

    by 1916, party leaders had gained

    a

    reasonably

    sophisticated understanding

    of the

    socioeconomic distribution

    of

    the

    electorate throughout

    the

    capital. Reviews of campaign

    literature

    indicate that parties tailored their speakers and their

    appeals to the

    particular composition

    of

    individual districts.

    Moreover, politicians

    were

    keenly

    aware

    of

    the

    relationship

    between

    public

    policies,

    the

    concentration of certain kinds of voters in certain

    districts,

    and

    party

    performance.

    For

    example, during a September 12,

    1919

    congressional

    debate

    on

    budget allocations

    for

    postal employees

    in

    the

    capital,

    con-

    servative

    critics observed

    that

    the

    passage

    of increased

    sums

    would

    benefit

    directly

    the Radical

    party

    in

    circunscripciones

    12 and

    13,

    both

    with

    large concentrations

    of

    public employees.20

    Before

    turning

    to the elections

    themselves,

    some

    further

    introduc-

    18.

    A

    useful description of

    campaigning during this period

    is

    Donato Chaque-

    sien,

    Los

    partidosporteiios en

    la

    vta pu'blica(Buenos Aires, 1919).

    19. Tercer censo nacional, IV, 201-212.

    20.

    Repu'blicaArgentina,

    Diario de

    sesiones de la Camara de Diputados, aiio

    1919 (Buenos Aires, 1920), IV,

    601-622.

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  • 8/19/2019 Elections in the City of Buenos Aires during the First Yrigoyen Administration: Social Class and Political Preferences…

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    604 HAHR

    I

    NOVEMBER

    IRICHARD

    J.

    WALTER

    tory comments are in order. First, the occupations

    listed in the voter

    registry for 1918 have been grouped according to the

    classification sug-

    gested by Mark D.

    Szuchman

    and Eugene F.

    Sofer and ranked

    in

    absolute and percentage terms for each of the city's

    wards (see Table

    II).21

    The eight principal subgroups were also

    aggregated for totals of

    blue collars

    (working class), nonmanuals (middle

    class), and profes-

    sionals (upper class

    ).22

    The two largest subgroups, skilled

    workers

    (with blacksmiths, bricklayers, carpenters,

    conductors, electricians, me-

    chanics,

    and

    painters the largest groups represented) and low non-

    manuals

    composed 63.2 percent of all voters. Of

    the 50,673 low

    non-

    manuals, 42,754 were white-collar employees,

    two-thirds of whom

    were

    probably government employees.23 Of the 17,028 in the middle non-

    manual category, 16,704 were

    comerciantes,

    or mostly small business-

    men. Except for students, the remaining subgroups

    were more diversi-

    fied, without heavy concentrations of any single occupation.

    The distribution of voters by occupational groups, as described

    in

    Table II, corresponds roughly to what one would

    expect from general

    descriptions of

    the city.24

    Blue-collar voters were concentrated pri-

    marily

    in

    the southern districts (1-4, 6-8) and the large outlying

    cir-

    cuiscripciones

    (15-18). Nonmanual voters were found in largest pro-

    portion

    in

    central districts (8-14, 3,

    5

    and 20).

    Professionals

    clustered

    in central and near northern wards (10, 11, 13, 14,

    19 and 20), areas

    including and immediately surrounding the city's

    main governmental

    and

    commercial

    heart.

    Students

    also could be

    found

    in greatest pro-

    portion

    in

    roughly

    these same

    districts.

    21.

    Mark

    D.

    Szuchman and Eugene

    F.

    Sofer, "The State

    of

    Occupational

    Stratification Studies in Argentina," Latin American Research Review, 11:1

    (

    1976),

    159-172. I would like to thank these authors for kindly providing me with their

    complete occupational dictionary.

    22. Students, who because

    of

    their importance and size within the capital

    electorate were placed

    in

    a separate category, were not included

    in

    these totals.

    Moreover, several of the Szuchman-Sofer categories-rural occupations, unskilled

    and menial,

    miscellaneous and unknown-were

    not

    used

    because their numbers

    for

    the

    city

    were

    negligible. It

    should also be noted that the total

    number of

    voters in Table

    II

    (154,325) differs considerably from the total registered

    (196,385) in Table

    I. This

    difference can be explained

    in

    part by difficulties

    in

    transcription

    from tlhe

    registries wherein

    it

    was often impossible to determine who

    remained and who had been eliminated from the rolls. Moreover, with literally

    hundreds of occupations listed, it was necessary to include only those with signifi-

    cant

    numbers in

    the final tallies.

    23. Walter, The Socialist Party, p. 240.

    24. CharlesS.

    Sargent,

    The

    Spatial Evolutiotnof Greater Buenos Aires, Argen-

    tina,

    1870-1930

    (Tempe, Arizona, 1974), pp. 59-66 and James R. Scobie, Buenos

    Aires: Plaza to

    Subturb,

    1870-1910 (New York, 1974), pp. 13-36.

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    ELECTIONS DURING

    THE FIRST YRIGOYEN ADMINISTRATION 605

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  • 8/19/2019 Elections in the City of Buenos Aires during the First Yrigoyen Administration: Social Class and Political Preferences…

    14/31

    ELECTIONS DURING

    THE

    FIRST YRIGOYEN

    ADMINISTRATION

    607

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    608

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    I

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  • 8/19/2019 Elections in the City of Buenos Aires during the First Yrigoyen Administration: Social Class and Political Preferences…

    16/31

    ELECTIONS

    DIJRING THE FIRST YRIGOYEN ADMINISTRATION

    609

    No circunscripciones

    were

    pure

    in terms of class composition. Even

    aristocratic 19

    and

    20, where James

    Scobie has noted "the

    striking

    con-

    trasts of slums and

    mansions," had significant percentages of

    working-

    class

    voters.25

    Many districts (3, 6-8,

    17-18) were almost

    evenly

    bal-

    anced between blue-collar and

    nonmanual. Certain wards,

    however,

    did exhibit striking class concentrations.

    District 4,

    for

    example,

    had

    the highest percentage of blue-collar workers

    in the city. This

    district

    was a stronghold

    of the Socialist party

    until 1946. On the other hand,

    sections

    5

    and 12 through

    14 had the highest percentages of

    nonmanuals

    in

    the capital and

    ranked at the bottom in terms of blue-collar

    voters.

    During the period under consideration,

    these districts regularly

    turned

    in large margins for the UCR over the Socialists, although on occasion

    conservative parties captured 14, the district

    with

    the

    second

    highest

    percentage and number of professionals

    in Buenos

    Aires. Circunscrip-

    cion

    5, in particular, was considered the

    strongest Radical

    district

    in

    the city. It should be noted that 5, along

    with 12 through 14,

    contained

    the

    highest percentage

    of low nonmanuals, presumably representing

    mostly governmental

    employees (see Table

    II).

    The

    relationship between social class

    and party performances,

    as

    described

    in

    Tables III-V,

    was determined

    by correlating percentages

    of each occupational group with the percentage of the total of regis-

    tered

    voters gained by the principal competing

    parties in each

    circun-

    scripcicin.26

    The formula used was Pearson's

    r, with a .05 significance

    level

    =

    +,

    -.45. Although other methods

    might have been

    employed,

    Pearson's r was considered

    most appropriate for the data, which

    provide

    essentially only two

    variables, class composition and voting percentages.

    This method

    gives

    a

    clear

    and

    straightforward

    measure

    of the

    strength

    or

    weakness of the relationship between

    these two variables.

    It should

    be

    noted

    that

    although

    the election data

    used covers

    an

    eight-year span, the occupational data

    is only for

    the

    year

    1918.

    Ideally, of course, we should have

    an occupational profile

    for each

    election year, particularly

    for outlying districts

    such as

    1,

    15 and 16,

    which

    experienced

    extremely rapid growth

    at this time. However,

    since this information is not presently

    available, we must assume

    that

    25. Ibid., p. 32.

    26.

    The percent of total registered was employed since ticket-splitting in

    national elections often produced a greater number of total votes than total voters.

    It was felt that determining these percentages on the base of registered

    voters

    would provide a more accurate measure of the true level of support for

    each party.

    Due to space limitations, the party percentages for each district in each election

    were

    not

    included

    in

    tlhis presentation. These and all other data used lhave

    been

    stored on computer tape and are available upon request.

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    610

    HAHR

    I

    NOVEMBER

    I

    RICHARD

    J.

    WALTER

    TABLEIII: Pearson's r

    Coefficients for Occupational

    Groups and

    Radical Party Proportion

    of Registered Voters.

    Occupa-

    tional Mar.

    Apr. Mar. Oct. Mar. Mar. Nov. Apr.

    Group

    1914

    1916

    1918 1918

    1919

    1920

    1920 1922

    Semiskilled

    -.42

    -.73

    -.45

    -.07

    -.34

    -.22

    -.11

    .04

    Skilled -.73 -.79 -.27

    .08 -.38 -.13

    -.06 .14

    Low

    Nonmanuals

    .55

    .48

    .45 .50

    .71

    .61 .59 .47

    Middle

    Nonmanuals

    .56 .64

    .54

    .03

    .39 .27 .10

    .13

    High Nonmanuals

    .41

    .62

    .01 -.34

    .00 -.21

    -.34

    -.54

    Low Professionals

    .25

    .53

    .31 -.19

    .13 .00

    -.09

    -.05

    High Professionals .43

    .59

    -.05

    -.37

    -.03 .24

    -.31

    -.56

    Students .58

    .70

    .09

    -.19

    .15

    -.07

    -.03

    -.33

    Total Blue Collar

    -.72

    -.85 -.35 .03

    -.41 -.18

    -.10

    .13

    Total Nonmanual .76

    .81

    .59 .26 .68 .50 .36

    .24

    Total Professional .44 .65

    .04 -.37

    .00

    -.20

    -.29

    -.50

    the basic social composition of each district remained

    approximately

    the

    same.

    Certain impressionistic observations suggest

    that this was

    the

    case, but

    the

    need for more specific evidence remains.27

    Finally,

    the

    discussion of the particular elections which

    follows will

    concentrate

    primarily on major issues and trends. Each contest is

    worthy of much greater

    attention

    and

    undoubtedly occurred within

    more

    varied and complex

    circumstances than can be

    described

    in a

    few paragraphs. Practical

    limitations dictate a summary

    approach.

    Also, it would be

    burdensome to discuss all party

    relationships with all

    groups

    in

    all elections.

    Instead, only those issues considered most im-

    portant

    will

    be

    noted.

    The

    tables, however, can be used by the reader

    to

    answer many overlooked

    questions.

    TheElections of April 2, 1916

    The

    1916

    congressional elections

    in

    the

    capital

    occurred simulta-

    lieously with the presidential contest and were

    overshadowed by

    the

    national

    competition

    for

    the

    chief executive office.

    Nevertheless,

    Radicals and Socialists considered

    the

    Chamber of

    Deputy positions

    important and campaigned hard to win them.

    The Socialists

    chose

    their

    candidates

    in

    convention two

    months

    prior

    to election

    day

    and

    began

    active

    campaigning shortly

    thereafter. The

    Socialist program sought to reach both working-class and middle-class

    voters. It

    stressed

    the

    elimination

    of

    repressive legislation, general

    political reforms, increased

    state aid to

    secular

    education,

    separation

    of

    27. See Scobie, Buenos Aires, p.

    255.

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    ELECTIONS DURING

    THE FIRST YRIGOYEN

    ADMINISTRATION

    611

    TABLE

    IV: Pearson's r Coefficients

    for Occupational

    Groups and

    Socialist Party Proportion

    of Registered Voters.

    Occupa-

    tional

    Mar.

    Apr.

    Mar. Oct. Mar. Mar.

    Nov. Apr.

    Group

    1914 1916 1918 1918 1919 1920 1920

    1922

    Semiskilled

    .66 .61

    .48

    .46 .52

    .58

    .62

    .53

    Skilled

    .74 .63 .52 .73

    .55 .87 .86

    .65

    Low

    Nonmanuals

    -.28

    -.22

    -.24

    -.16

    -.32

    -.24

    -.25

    -.14

    Middle Nonmanuals

    -.50 -.59 -.48 -.50 -.53

    -.56

    -.54 -.32

    High

    Nonmanuals

    -.71

    -.55 -.45 -.72

    -.44

    -.82 -.83

    -.81

    Low Professionals

    -.55

    -.56

    -.51 -.48 -.45 -.56

    -.59

    -.39

    High

    Professionals -.69

    -.53 -.40 -.69 -.40 -.81 -.82

    -.75

    Students

    -.70 -.56 -.40

    -.61 -.41

    -.79

    -.80 -.62

    TotalBlue Collar .78 .68 .55 .70 .59 .85 .86 .67

    TI tal Nonmanual

    -.62

    -.60 -.52

    -.55

    -.60 -.66 -.66

    -.46

    Total Professional

    -.74

    -.61

    -.48

    -.73 -.47

    -.85 -.86

    -.75

    church and

    state,

    tax

    reform,

    and social

    legislation.28

    But

    specific

    programmatic

    issues remained less prominent than severe

    partisan

    criticism

    of the

    Radicals and their

    leader

    and presidential

    candidate,

    Hipolito Yrigoyen.

    The

    Socialists

    took

    particular aim at

    the Radicals'

    programmatic vagueness, the few differences they perceived between

    Radicals and conservatives, and

    what they considered

    the excessive

    personalism

    of

    Yrigoyen.29

    The Radicals,

    for their part, chose deputy candidates

    in convention

    about

    one month prior

    to the election. These

    candidates

    then appeared

    daily

    and

    nightly throughout

    the

    city, relaying

    the Radical message to

    the voters. The

    message was a diffuse one, basically a repetition

    of the

    main themes

    of the

    Radical

    presidential

    campaign.

    Those themes had

    been

    decided

    at the UCR

    presidential

    nominating

    convention

    on

    March

    22,

    where a detailed and specific forty-point program had been

    rejected

    in

    favor

    of

    a

    general promise

    to

    adhere to

    the

    principles of

    constitutional

    government.

    A

    March 31

    "manifesto

    to

    the

    people" from

    the

    Radical National

    Committee assured the

    electorate

    that a

    UCR

    administration

    would

    bring

    the

    country a "profound renovation of its

    ethical

    values"

    and a "fundamental reconstitution of its

    moral and

    material

    structure."30

    Beyond this

    fanciful

    rhetoric, the Radicals made

    their first

    serious

    bid

    for the

    working-class

    vote

    with generous dispen-

    sations of material favors and sharp attacks on the Socialist opposition,

    28. La Vanguardia,

    Feb. 7, 1916, p. 1.

    29. For example,

    La Vanguardia,

    Mar. 4, 1916, p. 1.

    30. La Prentsa, Mar. 31, 1916, p. 11.

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    612

    HAHR

    I

    NOVEMBER

    I

    RICHARD

    J.

    WALTER

    TABLE

    V: Pearson's r Coefficients for Occupational Groups and

    Democratic Progressive Party Proportion of Registered Voters.

    Occupational Apr. Mar. Mar. Nov. Apr.

    Group 1916 1918 1920 1920 1922

    Semiskilled -.61 -.71 -.67 -.60 -.41

    Skilled

    -.67

    -.78 -.81 -.73 -.31

    Low Nonmanuals -.10

    .01

    .05 -.11 -.32

    Middle Nonmanuals .36 .49 .48 .49 .31

    High Nonmanuals .86 .91 .93 .86 .41

    Low

    Professionals

    .56 .61

    .68 .65 .63

    High Professionals .85 .91 .90 .84 .39

    Students

    .82 .91

    .90 .85 .49

    TotalBlueCollar -.71 -.84 -.85 -.76 -.35

    Total Nonmanual .34

    .49

    .52 .40

    .06

    Total Professional

    .88 .95

    .96 .90 .50

    which

    up

    to 1914 had

    strong support

    in

    proletarian

    districts.31 (See

    the

    results

    for 1914 in

    Table VI.)

    Intense

    maneuvering accompanied

    the

    presidential contest as con-

    servative

    forces

    sought

    to

    deny Yrigoyen

    the

    victory.

    In

    the

    capital,

    the

    Democratic

    Progressive party,

    at that time

    a

    conservative coalition,

    urged its adherents to support the Socialist presidential ticket, osten-

    sibly

    because

    the

    Socialist

    and

    Democratic

    program coincided

    on

    many points.32 This

    last-minute

    ploy did not work.

    The

    Radical slate

    of

    presidential

    electors

    comfortably

    defeated the Socialist slate

    by a

    vote

    of

    61,550

    to

    52,898.

    Nor

    did

    this

    strategy

    have much

    influence on

    the

    congressional contest,

    where

    the Democrats

    ran

    their own slate.

    The Socialist

    deputy

    candidates ran

    about

    10,000

    votes behind

    their

    presidential ticket,

    the Radicals

    about 2,500 behind.33

    The Radical

    victory

    in the

    capital congressional

    contest was

    spec-

    tacular and definitive. The leading UCR candidate bested the leading

    Socialist by 17,310 votes,

    a

    dramatic reversal

    from 1914

    when

    the

    Socialists

    had defeated

    the

    Radicals

    by 5,750

    tallies

    (see

    Table

    I).

    Moreover,

    the

    UCR

    swept eighteen

    of

    the

    capital's twenty voting

    dis-

    tricts.

    The

    Socialists,

    who

    fell

    about

    1,500

    votes

    and almost nine

    per-

    centage points

    from their

    previous effort, probably

    were hurt

    by

    the

    defection

    in

    1915 of

    former

    Socialist

    congressman

    Alfredo

    L.

    Palacios

    and his

    participation

    at

    the

    head of

    the

    ticket

    of the

    recently

    formed

    31. Rock, Politics

    in

    Argentina,

    pp. 121-122. The sharp Radical attacks

    on

    the Partido

    Socialista can be found

    throughout

    the pages of La Epoca for the entire

    month

    of March.

    32.

    La

    Prensa,

    Mar. 30, 1916, p. 12.

    33. La Prensa, Apr. 14, 1916, p. 11.

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    ELECTIONS

    DURING

    THE

    FIRST YRIGOYEN

    ADMINISTRATION

    613

    TABLE VI: Elections

    in the

    City

    of Buenos

    Aires,

    1914-1922:

    Winning

    Parties*

    by Circunscripcion.

    a

    b c

    d

    e

    f

    g

    h

    Mar.

    Apr. Mar.

    Oct.

    Mar.

    Mar. Nov.

    Apr.

    22,

    2,

    3,

    6,

    23,

    7,

    21,

    2,

    1914

    1916 1918

    1918

    1919 1920

    1920

    1922

    1

    S R

    R R

    R R

    S

    R

    2

    S

    S

    R S

    S

    S

    S

    S

    3

    S

    R

    R

    S

    S

    S

    S

    S

    4

    5

    S

    S

    S

    S

    S

    S

    S

    5

    R

    R

    R

    R

    R

    R

    R R

    6

    S R

    R

    S

    S S

    R

    R

    7

    S

    R

    R S

    S

    S

    S

    S

    8 S R R S S S S S

    9

    S

    R

    R

    S

    S

    R R

    S

    10 S

    R R

    S

    S R

    R R

    11

    R

    R R

    S

    S

    PDP

    R

    R

    12

    R R

    R

    R

    R R

    R

    R

    13

    R

    R R

    R R

    R

    R

    R

    14

    R

    R

    R

    R

    R

    PDP

    R

    R

    15 S

    R

    R

    S

    S

    S S

    R

    16

    S

    R

    R

    R R

    R

    R

    R

    17

    S

    R

    R

    R R

    R

    R

    R

    18

    S

    R

    R

    S S R

    R

    R

    19

    R

    R

    R

    R

    S

    PDP

    R R

    20

    R

    R

    R

    R

    S PDP

    R

    R

    *

    Key:

    R

    =

    Union

    Clvica Radical (Radical

    party),

    S

    =

    Partido

    Socialista

    (So-

    cialist

    party),

    PDP

    =

    Partido

    Democrata

    Progresista

    (Democratic

    Progressive

    party).

    Sources:

    a.

    Canton

    Materiales,

    II,

    7.

    b.

    Ibid.,

    p. 17.

    c.

    Ibid., p.

    35.

    d.

    La

    Vanguardia,

    Oct.

    22-Nov.

    1,

    1918.

    e.

    Repu'blica

    Argentina,

    Memoria

    del Ministerio

    dcel

    Interior,

    1918-1919

    (Buenos

    Aires,

    1919), p.

    22.

    f.

    Canton,

    Materiales,

    II,

    49.

    g. La

    Vanguardia,

    Nov.

    22-Dec.

    4,

    1920.

    It. La Prensa, Apr. 21, 1922, p.

    10.

    Partido

    Socialista

    Argentino.34

    However,

    even

    without

    this

    schism

    it

    is

    doubtful

    that the

    Socialists could have

    bested

    the Radicals

    in this

    election.35 The

    Democratic

    Progressives

    finished

    with

    less than

    ten

    percent

    of the

    total vote.

    34.

    For details

    of

    the

    Palacios

    dlefection,see Walter,

    ThteSocialist Party,

    pp.

    130-133.

    35. David Rock, Politics in Argentina, p. 122, downplays the significance of

    the Radical victory

    in the

    capital

    in

    1916. He notes

    that

    the Radical vote

    there

    "increased rom 33%

    in 1914

    to over 40%

    (in 1916)

    .

    .

    .

    still a

    minority."

    He

    credits

    the

    victory primarily

    to conservative

    disintegration

    and the Socialist schism

    of 1915. "The two

    Socialist

    parties, led by

    Justo and

    Palacios,"he

    observes,

    "won

    on

    50%

    of

    the

    vote,

    a

    proportion

    considerablyhigher

    than

    in 1914." However, it

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    614

    HAHR

    I

    NOVEMBER

    I

    RICHARD J.

    WALTER

    In terms

    of support from particular occupational

    groups,

    the So-

    cialists suffered

    a slight decline

    in their backing from blue-collar dis-

    tricts from a coefficient of .78

    in 1914 to one

    of .68 in 1916. Socialist

    attempts to

    expand their class

    base came to naught, as the relationship

    of their votes

    with nonmanuals

    (-.60), professionals (-.61),

    and stu-

    dents (-.56)

    were strongly

    negative. The Radicals, for their

    part,

    showed strong correlations

    among

    the

    very

    groups with whom the

    Socialists

    did poorly (.81 for

    nonmanuals, .65 for professionals,

    .70 for

    students),

    and

    a

    strong negative correlation

    (-.85) with blue

    collars.

    The Democratic

    Progressive

    vote, as was the case throughout

    this

    period, showed

    strong correlations with high

    nonmanuals

    (.86), stu-

    dents (.82), and professionals (.88). (See Tables III, IV, V.)

    The Elections

    of March

    3,

    1918

    The first

    two years of the Yrigoyen administration

    provided

    the

    Radical party a wide range

    of political opportunities

    and problems.

    Many of these were related,

    directly and indirectly,

    to

    World

    War

    I,

    which

    had serious

    consequences

    for the

    Argentine

    economy.

    The

    war

    disrupted

    the

    flow

    of

    exports

    and

    imports

    and

    prompted

    unem-

    ployment, rising prices, and labor agitation. At the same time, as Ger-

    man submarines

    attacked ships carrying

    Argentine goods,

    pressure

    mounted

    on Yrigoyen to abandon diplomatic

    neutrality

    and

    enter the

    conflict on

    the side of

    the

    Allies.

    All of

    these

    matters were felt

    most

    keenly

    in

    the

    federal

    capital,

    the

    Argentine

    city

    most

    closely

    tied

    to international

    affairs.

    Yrigoyen

    responded to the

    various war-related crises with

    a num-

    ber

    of economic measures intended to

    alleviate

    pressures on

    the Argen-

    tine consumer. With

    regard

    to the conflict itself, he steadfastly

    pur-

    sued

    a course

    of strict

    neutrality.

    The Radicals' political strategy

    duiing

    this

    period

    was to

    hold

    on to the

    middle-class

    vote, already

    should be noted that

    the

    Radical percentage

    of

    the capital

    vote

    in the presidential

    contest was 48.8 percent (Canton, Materiales, I, 86) and in the congressional, when

    calculated as a percentage

    of

    total

    registered voters, 47.1 percent, both figures

    very close to the majority

    50

    percent. Moreover, Palacios, who received 33,683

    votes, ran well ahead

    of

    his

    ticket, which rang;

    d

    between 7,461 and 9,802 (La

    Prensa, Apr. 14, 1916, p. 11). Votes reported

    by

    Canton, from whom Rock took

    his data, are for leading vote-getters, not party averages. Therefore, it distorts

    Socialist strength to add the Palacios total

    with those of the regular party.

    Finally, Rock also errs

    in

    citing the

    1916

    victory

    as the first for the UCR in the

    city of Buenos Aires.

    In

    1912, the Radicals captured

    eight of the twelve national

    deputy seats in congressional elections

    in

    April

    of that year. La Prensa, Apr.

    23,

    1912, p.

    .12.

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    ELECTIONS

    DURING THE FIRST YRIGOYEN ADMINISTRATION

    615

    reasonably secure, and to cut into

    the Socialists'

    apparent hold on the

    working class. Accordingly, the president intervened actively on the

    side of labor during a number of

    important strikes and

    evidenced more

    sympathy for the trade union movement

    than any previous

    executive.36

    As the 1918

    congressional elections

    approached, the Socialists led

    a growing chorus of criticism of the

    Yrigoyen administration.

    The first

    two articles of their program underscored

    what they considered the

    inadequLaciesof

    Yrigoyen's response to current economic

    difficulties.

    They called for an end to taxes on

    basic necessities and

    the imposition

    of a

    progressive

    tax on land, the

    nation's greatest source of wealth.

    Unlike

    the president,

    the Socialist

    leadership favored active support of

    the Allies and advocated an end to secret diplomacy and the direction

    of

    foreign relations

    by congress.37 In addition, articles

    in La Vanguardia

    attacked the administration's protectionist

    tariff policy and sought to

    shake loose

    Radical

    strength

    among public employees by noting that

    UCR senators had voted against

    a proposal to establish

    a minimum

    wage

    for

    state workers.38 Finally,

    the Socialists labeled Yrigoyen's

    apparent sympathy

    for the working class as demagogic,

    insincere, and

    concocted only for

    political purposes.39

    Without

    survey

    data

    on

    the

    political

    opinions

    of the

    city's voters,

    it

    is difficult to determine the precise impact of these issues on tl-he lec-

    tion of 1918.

    Moreover, while the above-noted items

    were the most

    frequently debated

    in the campaign, other matters, such

    as provincial

    interventions and nascent

    economic nationalism, also

    might have

    in-

    fluenced the outcome.

    Nevertheless, the results of this

    contest indicate

    general support

    for

    Yrigoyen's policies.

    The

    Radical

    candidates,

    who

    still eschewed a formal

    program

    but ran

    clearly

    on

    the

    basis

    of

    what

    they claimed to be

    the

    accomplishments

    of

    their national

    administra-

    tion,

    defeated

    the Socialists

    by

    almost

    25,000

    votes.

    In the

    process,

    they captured

    every capital

    circunscripcion except

    the

    faithful

    So-

    cialist

    four. The Socialists

    blamed

    their

    defeat on

    the

    patronage

    policies

    of

    the Radical government

    and

    the

    demoralizing

    attacks of

    those who

    had

    left

    the

    parent

    party

    to

    form

    rival organizations.

    Alfredo

    L.

    36. For

    more information

    on the first two years

    of the

    Yrigoyen administration,

    see Gabriel

    del Mazo,

    El Radicalismo:

    Ensayo sobre sU historia

    y

    doctrina

    (Buenos

    Aires,

    1957), I, 162-307;

    Felix Luna, Yrigoyen (Buenos Aires,

    1964), pp.

    196-287;

    and Rock, Politics in Argentina, pp. 107-156.

    37. La Vanguardia,

    Jan.

    21, 1918,

    p.

    1.

    38. La Vanguar-dia,

    Jan. 28, 1918, p.

    1 and Feb. 9, 1918, p.

    1.

    See also

    Carl

    Solberg,

    "The Tariff and

    Politics in

    Argentina,

    1916-1930,"

    HAHR,

    53 (May

    1973), 260-284.

    39. La

    Vangitardia, Jan.

    31,

    1918, p. 1.

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    616

    HAHR

    I

    NOVEMBER

    I

    RICHARD J.

    WALTER

    Palacios did register

    35,281 votes

    in

    this contest, but

    ran well ahead

    of

    the rest

    of the Partido Socialista Argentino ticket,

    which

    ranged

    be-

    tween 4,173

    and 5,111

    tallies.40

    The Partido Socialista

    Internacional,

    formed

    by those who opposed

    the

    older party's

    stand on

    the

    war,

    polled

    only 2,753

    votes (see Table I).

    In terms

    of

    votes,

    then, the competition

    from

    these two factions

    was only a

    minor factor affecting Socialist

    per-

    formance; of much

    greater

    significance

    was the

    burgeoning

    Radical

    hold on the general

    electorate

    and what appeared

    to be

    the

    UCR's

    growing

    strength in working-class

    areas.

    The magnitude of

    the

    Radical

    victory

    in

    1918,

    as

    in

    1916,

    was im-

    pressive,

    but should not be overstated.

    Although

    the Radicals increased

    their absolute vote significantly from the previous contest, their pro-

    portion

    of the total grew by

    only 3.3 percent.

    The

    Socialists

    also

    im-

    proved

    in absolute

    terms and retained about

    the same

    percentage

    of

    the

    total

    vote (see Table I).

    Looking at the

    relationship between occupational

    groups and party

    performance,

    the

    correlation between blue

    collars

    and Socialists in

    1918 was .55,

    as

    compared with

    .68

    in 1916, suggesting some slippage

    in this base

    of support.

    The Radicals' correlation

    with

    their main base,

    nonmanuals,

    dropped from .81

    in

    1916 to

    .59 in 1918. Among students

    and professionals, it was .09 and .04 in 1918, as compared with .70 and

    .65 respectively

    in 1916. The correlation between

    UCR

    votes and blue

    collars

    in

    1918, was -.35, as compared

    with

    -.85

    in

    1916. This

    result

    would

    suggest that the party did

    less

    poorly

    among these voters than

    it

    had previously and

    indicates some moderate

    success

    for the Radical

    prolabor

    strategy.

    The Elections of October

    6, 1918

    The

    municipal

    elections of October 6,

    1918, the first held

    for the

    capital's city

    council, provided

    the most

    dramatic

    reversal of

    Radical

    fortunes

    in

    any

    contest

    during

    the first

    Yrigoyen

    administration.

    The

    elections

    occurred

    at a

    time of

    great

    internal

    dissension

    within Radical

    ranks.

    The

    underlying

    division

    was between

    the

    more conservative,

    upper-class,

    officeholding

    wing

    of the

    party,

    the

    so-called

    Azul or

    Blue faction which

    opposed

    many

    of

    Yrigoyen's

    methods

    and

    policies,

    and

    those

    persons,

    mostly

    middle-class and

    holding

    secondary positions

    of

    leadership,

    who

    firmly supported

    the

    president.41

    40. La Prensa,

    Mar. 23,

    1918, p.

    8.

    41. Rock, Politics in

    Argentina, pp.

    111-112.

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    ELECTIONS

    DURING

    THE FIRST YRIGOYEN ADMINISTRATION

    617

    The

    split

    revealed itself

    openly

    in

    the elections of local UCR com-

    mittee

    officers in the capital and in the selection of council

    candidates.

    These

    selection procedures were marked by delay,

    confrontation, and

    resignations

    throughout the month

    of September as each faction sought

    to

    control

    the internal party apparatus and the candidate

    list. Active

    campaigning began late

    in

    September, but up to a few days before the

    election, there were rumors

    that

    members

    of one

    faction would

    cross

    out the

    names of representatives

    of another on

    the

    ballot to indicate

    their

    displeasure with the party's choices. As late as

    October 3, La

    Prensa reported that the UCR

    was consideiing

    abstaining from

    the

    contest

    altogether because of its

    internal difficulties.42

    One of the major points of criticism from the Azul faction was the

    party's lack of a program.

    Accordingly, in this contest the

    Radicals pub-

    lished a nine-point platform

    which promised gradual

    elimination

    of

    taxes

    on

    basic necessities, municipalization of public services

    and utili-

    ties,

    amplification

    of

    various free services and benefits for the

    working

    class, construction

    of

    inexpensive

    public housing,

    and

    appointment

    of

    municipal

    employees by merit only.43 Radical

    candidates stressed

    various

    aspects of the program,

    emphasizing particularly

    measures

    to

    improve public health,

    working

    and

    living conditions

    in the

    city's

    poorer districts, and legislation to lower the cost of living.44

    The

    Socialists,

    free

    for

    the

    moment from

    any important internal

    differences, prepared

    for

    the

    municipal

    contest

    with

    characteristic

    efficiency.

    In

    late

    August, they

    produced

    an

    extensive program which

    called

    for

    a

    minimum

    wage

    and improved

    working

    conditions for city

    employees, regulation

    of

    hygiene

    in

    low-cost

    housing, municipalization

    of all

    markets, price

    controls

    on

    consumables,

    restrictions

    on the sale

    of

    alcoholic

    beverages, and revenue reform.45

    The party chose its candi-

    dates

    on

    September

    2

    and

    campaigned energetically

    throughout

    the

    month.

    Socialist spokesmen stressed

    the

    role

    the

    party had played

    in

    implementing

    the

    municipal

    election

    reform,

    the

    importance

    of

    a

    popularly elected

    council

    to

    counterbalance the

    influence

    of

    the

    federal

    government

    which appointed

    the

    city's mayor, and

    the need

    to clean

    up

    notorious

    corruption

    at

    the

    local

    level.46

    In the

    balloting

    the Socialists notched

    a

    surprising

    victory, edging

    42. La Prensa, Oct. 3, 1918, p. 11.

    43. La Epoca, Sept.

    21, 1918, p. 5.

    44. La Epoca, Sept.

    23, 1918, p. 3; Sept. 25,

    1918, p. 4; Sept. 27, 1918, p. 5;

    and

    Oct.

    3, 1918, p.

    5.

    45. La Van

    guardia,

    Aug. 29, 1918, p. 1.

    46.

    La

    Prensa,

    Oct. 3, 1918, p.

    11.

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    618

    HAHR

    I

    NOVEMBER

    I

    RICHARD J. WALTER

    the Radicals by 838 votes (see Table I). The Socialists regained

    the

    advantage

    in

    wards with significant working-class groups, such as 2

    through 4, 15 and 18, districts lost to the Radicals

    only a few months

    earlier. As Table IV indicates, the Socialists enjoyed renewed support

    among blue collars, with the correlation between Socialist votes and

    this category rising

    from

    .55 in 1918 to .70 in October

    of that year. The

    correlation between

    Socialist

    votes and skilled workers,

    in particular,

    increased from .52 to .73 for the same period.

    However, what was most significant in this election

    was not Social-

    ist gains, but rather Radical losses. The Socialists, indeed,

    declined by

    some

    1,389 votes between March and

    October. The Radicals, however,

    dropped 27,061 votes between the two contests. The losses, as Table III

    reveals, did not occur with blue-collar

    voters,

    where

    the correlation

    with

    Radical

    performance changed from -.35 to .03 between

    March

    and October, but rather among nonmanuals (from .59

    to

    .26), pro-

    fessionals (.04 to -.37), and students (.09 to -.19).

    These findings are

    consistent

    with an interpretation which emphasizes

    the importance of

    the internal party dispute in explaining the Radical

    debacle since

    nonmanuals composed the rank and file of party

    membership most

    affected by these dissensions.47

    The Elections of March23,1919

    The

    elections of March 23, 1919, to fill one senate seat and two

    deputy positions, found the Radicals

    under

    heavy

    fire from several

    fronts. The internal disputes continued unabated.

    Following the

    municipal election defeat of October 1918, leaders of

    the Azul faction,

    charged with analyzing

    the

    reasons for

    the

    UCR loss, published

    a

    re-

    port

    which

    severely criticized

    the directors of

    the

    party

    in the

    capital

    and reiterated

    objections

    to

    Yrigoyen's personalistic

    style

    of administra-

    tion.48

    In

    January 1919, the dissidents managed to force the resignation

    47. Rock,

    in

    discussing this election,

    which

    he mistakenly places in November

    and

    in

    which he claims

    that "the

    Radicals

    were

    soundly defeated by the Socialists"

    (emphasis mine), implies that foreign policy was a major consideration

    in

    this local

    contest

    and

    that

    the UCR defeat "was

    widely regarded as

    a

    condemnation

    of

    Yrigoyen's

    neutralist

    position."

    Politics in

    Argentinau, p. 174. However, an exami-

    nation of newspaper coverage

    of

    the campaign and post-election analyses reveals

    little attention to the war issue by candidates of any party and much more concern

    with

    specific municipal

    matters.

    The same

    reading

    also reveals the

    great disarray

    within the UCR at

    this

    time, resulting

    in

    weak organization, late and sporadic

    campaigning,

    and

    dissident

    abstention from the contest.

    48.

    Reprinted as

    "Programa

    y

    accion

    del

    partido radical,"

    Revista

    Argentina

    de Ciencias Politicas, 17 (1918), 484-487.

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    ELECTIONS DURING THE FIRST

    YRIGOYEN ADMINISTRATION

    619

    of

    the

    pro-Yrigoyen members of the capital committee, and

    in

    early

    February, succeeded in capturing

    the top committee

    posts for them-

    selves.49 The first order of business

    for the new

    directors was to select

    candidates for

    the upcoming elections, but this

    process was delayed

    until the end

    of February, due to difficulties in

    assembling the nomi-

    nating convention.

    These

    internal party maneuvers

    took place within the context

    of

    a

    major labor disturbance, the famous

    Semana

    Tragica

    of January 1919.

    The nationwide general strike

    and resultant violence

    of this week had

    the greatest impact on the federal

    capital. Yrigoyen

    who was slow

    to

    respond to the

    crisis lost support

    from all sides. Labor objected

    to

    the harsh measures used to quell the disturbance. Middle-class and

    upper-class elements criticized

    the president both

    for his past prolabor

    sympathies

    which, they

    believed,

    encouraged the outbreak

    and

    his

    failure

    to react more firmly once

    the series of strikes

    began. Following

    the "tragic

    week," Yrigoyen,

    fearing possible

    military

    intervention

    against his

    own government, moved cautiously

    to rebuild

    his

    bridges

    with the

    working

    class and at the same

    time

    to reass