electrical and i&c codes and inspection · implementation of design requirements numark...

ELECTRICAL AND I&CCODES AND INSPECTION

1Numark Associates, Inc.

Day 7

DAY 7

Sessions:15. Digital I&C Standards

Student Activity: Mapping the Standards


16. Instrument Setpoints/Standards

Student Activity: Sources of Uncertainty

17. Fiber Optic Standards

15. Digital I&C Standards


15. Digital I&C StandardsObjectives

• Identify the major digital I&C standards

Pro ide a general o er ie of the


• Provide a general overview of the purpose of these standards

• Discuss how these standards relate to new reactor inspection


• IEEE Std 603 Safety Systems

• IEEE Std 7-4 3 2 Digital Computers in


• IEEE Std 7-4.3.2 Digital Computers in Safety Systems


IEEE Stds:• 828 Software Configuration Management

Plans

• 830 Software Requirements Specification


q p

• 829 Software Test Documentation

• 1012 Software Verification & Validation

• 12207 Software Life Cycle Processes

Digital I&C Standards - Introduction

• The performance of analog systems can typically be predicted by the use of engineering models.

• These models can also be used to predict the regions over which an analog system exhibits continuous performance


continuous performance.

• The abilities to analyze design using models based on physics principles and to use these models to establish a reasonable expectation of continuous performance over substantial ranges of input conditions are important factors in the qualification of analog systems design.


• These factors enable extensive use of type testing, acceptance testing, and inspection of design outputs in qualifying the design of analog systems and components.

• If the design process assures continuous behavior


• If the design process assures continuous behavior over a fixed range of inputs, and testing at a finite sample of input conditions in each of the continuous ranges demonstrates acceptable performance, performance at intermediate input values between the sampled test points can be inferred to be acceptable with a high degree of confidence.


• Digital I&C systems are fundamentally different from analog I&C systems in that minor errors in design and implementation can cause them to exhibit unexpected behavior.

• Consequently the performance of digital systems


Consequently, the performance of digital systems over the entire range of input conditions cannot generally be inferred from testing at a sample of input conditions.

• Inspections, type testing, and acceptance testing of digital systems and components do not alone accomplish design qualification at high confidence levels.


• To address this issue, the review of design qualification for digital systems focuses to a large extent on confirming that the applicant/licensee employed a high-quality development process that incorporated disciplined specification and implementation of design requirements


implementation of design requirements.

• Inspection and testing are used to verify correct implementation and to validate desired functionality of the final product, but confidence that isolated, discontinuous point failures will not occur derives from the discipline of the development process.


• In digital I&C safety systems, code, data transmission, data, and hardware may be common to several functions to a greater degree than is


g gtypical in analog systems.

• This commonality is the basis for many of the advantages of digital systems.


• However, the commonality introduces a CCF concern: a design using shared data or code has the potential to propagate a CCF via software errors, thus defeating the redundancy achieved by the hardware architectural structure.


• Greater commonality or sharing of hardware among functions within a channel increases the consequences of the failure of a single hardware module and reduces the amount of diversity available within a single safety channel.


• Because of this CCF concern, review of digital I&C protection systems emphasizes quality, diversity, and defense-in-depth as protection against propagation of CCFs

ithi d b t f ti


within and between functions.

• Additional guidance on assessment of diversity and defense-in-depth is provided in SRP BTP 7-19.

Software Review Process



• Audits of design outputs confirm that functional requirements are traceablethrough all intermediate design products to the final product.


• Audits of design outputs also confirm that the software development process characteristics and the required software functional characteristics are present.


• The conformance of the hardware and software to the functional and process requirements derived from the design bases is audited.

• A sample of software design outputs should be reviewed to confirm that they address the functional requirements allocated to the software, and that the expected software development process characteristics are evident in the design


goutputs.

• The review of validation and installation activities should include confirmation of the adequacy of the system test procedures and test results (validation tests, site acceptance tests, pre-operational and start-up tests) that provide assurance that the system functions as intended.

• SRP BTP 7-14, subsection B.3.3, describes functional characteristics and software development process characteristics that are verified by these audits.

Software Life Cycle Activities


Software - Definitions

• Software: Computer programs, procedures, and associated documentation and data pertaining to the operation of a computer system.

• Software Maintenance: (1) Modification of a f f f


software product after delivery to correct faults, to improve performance or other attributes, or to adapt the product to a modified environment. (2) The set of activities that takes place to ensure that software installed for operational use continues to perform as intended and fulfill its intended role in system operation. Software maintenance includes improvements, aid to users, and related activities.


• Hazard Analysis: A process that explores and identifies conditions that are not identified by the normal design review and testing process. The scope of hazard analysis extends beyond plant design basis


y y p gevents by including abnormal events and plant operations with degraded equipment and plant systems. Hazard analysis focuses on system failure mechanisms rather than verifying correct system operation.


• Verification: (1) The process of evaluating a system or component to determine whether the products of a given development phase satisfy the conditions imposed at the start of that phase. (2) Formal proof of program correctness.

• Validation: The process of evaluating a system or


p g ycomponent during or at the end of the development process to determine whether it satisfies specified requirements.

• Verification and Validation (V&V): The process of determining whether the requirements for a system or component are complete and correct, the products of each development phase fulfill the requirements or conditions imposed by the previous phase, and the final system or component complies with specified requirements.

IEEE Std 603 Safety Systems


IEEE Std 603 Safety Systems

• Minimum functional and design criteria for the power, instrumentation, and control

• Systems required to mitigate the consequences of design basis events


• Promote safety system performance and reliability

• Also applicable to equipment provided for safe shutdown, post accident monitoring display instrumentation, preventive interlock features, and other systems, structures, or components related to safety

IEEE Std 7-4.3.2 Digital Computers in Safety Systems



• Computer specific requirements to supplement IEEE Std 603-1998

• Scope: Computer hardware, software, firmware,


and interfaces

• Minimum functional and design requirements for computers used as components of a safety system

• RG 1.152 (with exceptions & clarifications)


• The use of software quality metrics shall be considered throughout the software life cycle to assess whether software quality requirements are being met. When software quality metrics are used, the following life cycle phase characteristics should be considered:

— Correctness/Completeness (Requirements phase)


— Compliance with requirements (Design phase)

— Compliance with design (Implementation phase)


— Functional compliance with requirements (Test and Integration phase)

— Onsite functional compliance with requirements (Installation and Checkout phase)


— Performance history (Operation and Maintenance phase)

The basis for the metrics selected to evaluate software quality characteristics should be included in the software development documentation.

IEEE Std 828 Software Configuration Management Plans



• Minimum required contents of plan

• Defines activities and requirements for


• Defines activities and requirements for any portion of a software products life cycle


IEEE Std 830 Software Requirements

Specifications


IEEE Std 830 Software Requirements Specifications

• Qualities of a good software requirements specification (SRS)


• Software requirements specifications outlines

• Commercial or in-house software products



• software requirements specification (SRS): Documentation of the essential requirements (functions, performance, design constraints, and attributes) of the software and its external interfaces


• software design description (SDD): A representation of software created to facilitate analysis, planning, implementation, and decision-making. The software design description is used as a medium for communicating software design information and may be thought of as a blueprint or model of the system.


• An SRS should:

– Correctly define all of the software requirements. A software requirement may exist because of the nature of the task to be solved or because of a special characteristic of the project.

– Not describe any design or implementation details; these


y g p ;should be described in the design stage of the project.

– Not impose additional constraints on the software; these are properly specified in other documents such as a software quality assurance plan.

• Therefore, a properly written SRS limits the range of valid designs, but does not specify any particular design.


• An SRS should be:

– Correct

– Unambiguous

– Complete


– Consistent

– Ranked for importance and/or stability

– Verifiable

– Modifiable

– Traceable

IEEE Std 829 Software Test Documentation



• Basic test documents associated with software testing


• Defines the purpose, outline and content of each basic document



• Test Design Specification: A document specifying the details of the test approach for a software feature or combination of software features and identifying the associated tests.


• Test Case Specification: A document specifying inputs, predicted results, and a set of execution conditions for a test item

• Test Procedure Specification: A document specifying a sequence of actions for the execution of the test


• Test Plan • Test-Design Specification• Test-Case Specification• Test Procedure Specification


• Test-Procedure Specification• Test-Item Transmittal Report• Test Log• Test-Incident Report• Test-Summary Report

IEEE Std 829 Software Test Plan Outline

1. Test Plan Identifier2. Introduction3. Test Items4 Features Tested


4. Features Tested5. Features not Tested6. Approach7. Pass/Fail Criteria8. Suspension Criteria & Resumption

Requirements

IEEE Std 829 SoftwareTest Plan Outline

9. Test Deliverables10. Testing Tasks11. Environmental Needs


12. Responsibilities13. Staffing and Training Needs14. Schedule15. Risks and Contingencies16. Approvals

IEEE Std 1012 Software Verification and Validation



• Software V&V life cycle process requirements for different integrity levels


levels

• The scope encompasses software-based systems, computer software, hardware, and interfaces.


• Software development, maintenance, or reuse

Includes firmware microcode and


• Includes firmware, microcode, and documentation

• Includes analysis, evaluation, review, inspection, assessment, and testing

IEEE Std 1012 Software Verification and Validation - Definitions

• Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V): V&V performed by an organization


(IV&V): V&V performed by an organization that is technically, managerially, and financially independent of the development organization.

IEEE Std 12207 Software Life Cycle

Processes


IEEE Std 12207 Software Life Cycle Processes

• Common Framework

• Applications:– Acquisition of systems and software products

d i


and services– Supply, development operation, maintenance,

and disposal of software products– Software portion of a system

• Joint project of IEEE/EIA and ISO/IEC


• The purpose of this International Standard is to provide a defined set of processes to facilitate communication among acquirers, suppliers, and other stakeholders in the life cycle of a software product


cycle of a software product.

• Written for acquirers of systems and software products and services and for suppliers, developers, operators, maintainers, managers, quality assurance managers, and users of software products.


• Provides over 50 definitions of terms used in commercial agreements and documentation

• Provides detailed definition of various


Provides detailed definition of various processes associated with software life cycle activities

• Does not detail documentation in terms of name, format, explicit content, and recording media

Inspection of Digital I&C



Inspection Procedure 52003, “Digital Instrumentation And Control Modification Inspection”

• NRR evaluates the applicant’s design (vendor design) as part of the safety evaluation process


design) as part of the safety evaluation process

• Regional inspectors perform documentation and functionality reviews after the system leaves the vendor

• Regional inspectors review specific documentation to gain familiarity with the system, but should not duplicate NRR review efforts


• Verify that the as-installed digital modification is in accordance with the NRC SER, design drawings, and licensee commitments

• Verify that surveillance, abnormal operating, emergency operating and alarm response procedures have been updated and correctly reflect the new system attributes


updated, and correctly reflect the new system attributes

• Verify that plant drawings, the UFSAR [FSAR], and other relevant documentation have been updated to reflect the replacement system. In those cases where the update to the UFSAR and other relevant documentation has not been completed, ensure that the process is underway, and is properly planned and proceeding in a timely manner.


• Adequacy and quality of the power and grounding system

• Electrostatic discharge (ESD) precautions and considerations have been incorporated into relevant procedures, and are followed.

B tt i b dd d i th t h ld b


• Batteries embedded in the system should be on a periodic replacement schedule, if recommended by the battery manufacturer. This includes batteries used for battery backed random access memory (RAM).

• The handling and storage requirements of spare system parts are consistent with manufacturer and licensee requirements (periodic power-up, battery life, etc.).


• Determine if the licensee implemented any special procedures for ensuring that stored parts will be correctly handled (such as ensuring stored chips with embedded software are the correct revision).

• Inspect the installation environment and verify that


p ythe licensee-specified environmental parameters accurately reflect the installation environment.

• Review the software test plan in accordance with BTP 7-14, Section B.3.1.12, and determine if the software test plan is sufficiently detailed to provide site acceptance tests, installation tests, and startup tests for the digital system.


• Review the procedures for the SAT, installation test, and start-up tests; and review the final V&V reports on these test procedures.

• Determine if the SAT will adequately test the licensee (not vendor) system specification and that


licensee (not vendor) system specification, and that the test procedures are sufficiently detailed, clear, and unambiguous to allow site personnel to perform this test.

• Review any hardware and software failures that have occurred to determine if they were properly resolved or if there are system weaknesses that require correction


• Verify that setpoints and related uncertainty terms have been adequately evaluated and reflect the system requirements, and have been accurately installed in the software. Request the licensee to download the current system setpoints and coefficients to a selected sample and compare


coefficients to a selected sample and compare these to the system requirements documentation.

Student Activity

Student Activity: Mapping the Digital I&C Standards to Software Life Cycle Activities


Activities

Software Life Cycle Activities


15. Digital I&C StandardsObjectives Review

• Identified the major digital I&C standards


• Provided a general overview of the purpose of these standards

• Discussed how these standards relate to new reactor inspection

16. Instrument Setpoints


16. Instrument Setpoints Objectives

• Identify setpoint standards and guidance


• Provide a general overview of the purpose of the setpoint standards


16. Instrument Setpoints – Standards & Practices

• International Society of Automation (ISA) (formerly Instrument Society of America)

• ANSI/ISA-67.04.01, Setpoints for Nuclear Safety R l t d I t t ti (A t d b RG 1 105 ith


Related Instrumentation (Accepted by RG 1.105 with some exceptions/clarifications)

• ISA-RP67.04.02, Methodologies for the Determination of Setpoints for Nuclear Safety-Related Instrumentation (Guidance/background)

Instrument Setpoints – Definitions

• Limiting Safety System Settings (LSSS) for nuclear reactors are settings for automatic protective devices related to those variables having significant safety functions. Where a limiting safety system setting is specified for a variable on which a safety


g p ylimit has been placed, the setting must be so chosen that automatic protective action will correct the abnormal situation before a safety limit is exceeded (10 CFR 50.36-2002).

Instrument Setpoints – Definitions

• Uncertainty: The amount to which an instrument channel’s output is in doubt (or the allowance made for such doubt) due to possible errors, either random or


systematic. The uncertainty is generally identified within a probability and confidence level.

Instrument Setpoints - Relationships


Instrument Setpoints –More Definitions

• Safety Limit (SL): A limit on an important process variable that is necessary to reasonably protect the integrity of physical barriers that guard against the uncontrolled release of radioactivity. (See 10 CFR 50.36[c][1][i][A].)

• Analytical limit (AL): limit of a measured or calculated variable established by the safety analysis to ensure that a safety limit is


y y y ynot exceeded.

• Trip Setpoint - Trip setpoints are chosen to assure that a trip or safety actuation occurs before the process reaches the AL. Trip setpoints are also chosen to assure that the plant can operate and experience expected operational transients without unnecessary trips or safeguards actuations.

Instrument Setpoints –More Definitions

• Limiting Trip setpoint (LTSP): The limiting value for the nominal trip setpoint so that the trip or actuation will occur before the AL is reached, regardless of the process or environmental conditions affecting the instrumentation.


g

• Nominal Trip setpoint (NTSP): A predetermined value for actuation of a final setpoint device to initiate a protective action.

Instrument Setpoints – More Definitions

• The choice of a LTSP requires determining the Total Loop Uncertainty (TLU).

• The TLU represents the expected performance of the instrumentation under any applicable process and environmental conditions.


• The trip or actuation is only required to mitigate certain postulated events; therefore, only the process and environmental conditions that occur during the postulated events (e.g., LOCA) need be considered.


• The LTSP and NTSP for a trip or actuation on an increasingprocess variable would be:

LTSP = AL – TLU

NTSP = AL – TLU – Margin


• “Margin” is discretionary or may be chosen based on the methodology applied.

• Data used to calculate the TLU should be obtained from appropriate sources, which may include: operating experience, equipment qualification tests, equipment specifications, engineering analysis, laboratory tests, and engineering drawings. The TLU shall account for the effects of all applicable design-basis events and process instrument uncertainties (unless they were included in the determination of the analytical limit).

Instrument Setpoints - Uncertainties


Instrument Setpoints – Digital Uncertainties

• Sampling rate uncertainty: The sampling rate must be 2 X the analog signal bandwidth, to be a good representation of the analog input signal containing all of the


g g gsignificant information.

- If the analog signal contains frequencies that are too high with respect to the sampling rate, aliasing uncertainty will be introduced. Anti-aliasing band-limiting filters can be used to minimize the aliasing uncertainty; otherwise, it must be accounted for in setpoint calculations.


• Signal reconstruction uncertainty: Some information is lost when the digitized signal is sampled and held for conversion back to analog form after digital manipulation. This uncertainty is typically linear and about ± 1/2 least significant bit (LSB).


• Jitter Uncertainty: The samples of the input signal are taken at periodic intervals. If the sampling periods are not stable, an uncertainty corresponding to the sampled signal’s rate-of-change will be introduced. [Insignificant if the clock is crystal-controlled]


• Digitizing (or Quantizing) Uncertainty: When the input signal is sampled, a digital word is generated that represents the amplitude of the signal at that time. The signal voltage must be divided into a finite number of levels that can be defined by a digital word “n” bits long. This word will describe 2n different voltage steps.

The signal le els bet een these steps ill go


- The signal levels between these steps will go undetected. The digitizing uncertainty can be expressed in terms of the total mean square error voltage between the exact and the quantized samples of the signal.

- An inherent digitizing uncertainty of ± 1/2 LSB typically exists. The higher the number of bits in the conversion process, the smaller the digitizing uncertainty.


• Computational uncertainties could also exist (e.g., curve fit using numerical methods for thermocouple characterization).



• Allowable Value (AV): A limiting value that the trip setpoint may have when tested periodically, beyond which appropriate action shall be taken.

• As Found (AF): The condition in which a channel, or portion of a channel, is found after a period of operation and before recalibration (if necessary).


• As Left (AL): The condition in which a channel, or portion of a channel, is left after calibration or final setpoint device setpoint verification.

• Drift: A variation in sensor or instrument channel output that may occur between calibrations that cannot be related to changes in the process variable or environmental conditions.

Instrument Setpoints – Calculations

• Safety-related calculations must be performed to account for these uncertainties in determining specific setpoints.

• Calculations for RTS and ESFAS setpoints are t i ll f d b th NSSS d


typically performed by the NSSS vendor.

• However, for all setpoint calculations, it must be assured that plant-specific calibration procedures and the installation conditions are consistent with the assumptions, design inputs, and results of the setpoint calculations.

Instrument Setpoints – Calculations

• Square-Root-of-the-Sum-of-Squares (SRSS) Method

It is acceptable to combine uncertainties that are random, normally distributed, and independent by the SRSS method.

When two independent uncertainties, (± a) and (± b), are combined by this method, the resulting uncertainty is (± c),

h


where: • c = SQRT(a² + b²)

• Arithmetic Method

Combine uncertainties that are not random, not normally distributed, or are dependent by the arithmetic method.

In this method, the combination of two dependent uncertainties, (+a, -b) and (+c, -d), results in a third uncertainty distribution with limits + (a+c), - (b+d).

Instrument Setpoints – Attributes

Student Activity: Sources of Uncertainty


Instrument Setpoints - Uncertainties


16. Instrument SetpointsObjectives Review

• Identified the major setpoint standard


• Provided a general overview of the purpose of the setpoint standard

• Discussed how this standard relates to new reactor inspection

17. Fiber Optic StandardsObjectives

• Identify the major fiber optic standards of interest to NRC

P id l i f th


• Provide a general overview of the purpose of these standards



IEEE Stds:

• 1222 Self Supporting Fiber Optic Cable


• 1590 Electrical Protection of Fiber Optic Communication Facilities

• P1682/D Qualification of Fiber Optic Cable

IEEE Std 1222 Self Supporting Fiber Optic Cable

• All-dielectric, nonmetallic, self-supporting fiber optic (ADSS) cable.

• Scope:


p– Construction, mechanical, electrical, and optical

performance

– Installation guidelines, acceptance criteria, test requirements, environmental considerations

– Dielectric capabilities of the cable components

– Maintenance of optical fiber integrity


Cautions:– The standard does not purport to address

all of the safety issues associated with its


use.

– It is the responsibility of the user to establish appropriate safety and health practices and to determine the applicability of regulatory limitations prior to use.


• The ADSS cable shall consist of coated glass optical fibers contained in a protective dielectric fiber optic unit surrounded by or attached to suitable dielectric strength members and jackets.

• The cable shall not contain metallic components


• The cable shall not contain metallic components.

• The cable shall be designed to meet the design requirements of the optical cable under all installation conditions, operating temperatures, and environmental loading.


• Manufacturer Tests

– Cable Tests


– Fiber Tests


• Cable Tests:– Water blocking– Seepage of filling/flooding compound– Electrical tests– Aeolian vibration (from crosswinds)– Galloping


p g– Sheave– Crush– Impact– Creep– Stress/strain– Temperature cycle– Cable aging– Ultraviolet resistance


• Fiber Tests

– Attenuation


– Water peak

– Temperature cycling


• Color coding is essential for identifying individual optical fibers and groups of


individual optical fibers and groups of optical fibers. The colors shall be in accordance with TIA/EIA 598-A-1995


• The SOCC is a descriptive code that offers a relatively complete mechanical and optical definition in a minimum number of characters

• The SOCC characters are imprinted on the cable jacket The code has three fields:


jacket. The code has three fields:

M1 M2 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 N N N

• The first field, M1 M2, is a manufacturer codedefined by either the manufacturer or the user.


• The middle field, S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6, is a structural description where each alphanumeric character carries information about the cable structure.

S1 - type of fiber


ypS2 - cable unit type S3 - cable structure unit; identifies the number of

working fibers per unit S4 - mechanical configuration S5 - maximum rated cable load (MRCL) S6 - defines the cable jacket suitable for

application in electrical fields


• The last field NNN, indicates the number of working fibers in the cable. Nonworking


of working fibers in the cable. Nonworking fibers are not counted.


• The installation techniques and equipment for ADSS cable correspond to those normally used for overhead lines. It is recommended that the manufacturer’s


recommended installation procedures be used for the installation of ADSS cable.

• Refer to IEEE Std 524TM-1980 [B15] for additional details on installation techniques.


• The strength of the electric field where ADSS cable is installed will have an effect on the performance of the cable.

• Where possible, ADSS cable should be located in areas of minimum electric field strengths.

• Electrical stress will contribute to the aging of the outer jacket, the electric field strengths must be taken into consideration


the electric field strengths must be taken into consideration when determining the type of cable jacket which will be required.

• ADSS cables are designed with different type jackets for use in the varying electric fields, and the proper jacket must be used in order for the cable to provide the expected service life

.

IEEE Std 1590 Electrical Protection of Fiber Optic Communication Facilities



• Engineering design of optical fiber communication facilities


• Methods for providing telecommunication facilities serving electric supply locations


• During a power fault that occurs externally to an electric supply location, some portion of the fault current will return to the power systems source(s) of generating power in the network, through the electrical supply location grid impedance.

• This may cause a large increase in potential to be developed in and around the electric supply location i e


developed in and around the electric supply location, i.e., ground potential rise (GPR) zone of influence (ZOI), with respect to remote earth locations.

• This GPR will result in current flowing into the wire-line networks or the power system neutral or any metallic infrastructures connected to the grid under study.

• For communication facilities, this creates a “transferred voltage” condition


• A properly engineered and installed all-dielectric optical fiber cable will provide


immunity from the effects of fault-produced GPR and induction, as well as lightning-induced phenomena, at these locations.


• The optical fiber cable(s) shall be all-dielectric, i.e., the cable(s) do not contain metallic members, including copper pairs.


• There shall not be any metallic wires placed along or near the optical fiber cable(s).

• The optical fiber cable shall be in conduit (PVC Schedule 80 minimum).

IEEE Std P1682/D Qualification of Fiber Optic Cable



• This Draft Standard is Not Publicly Available.



• Provides general requirements, directions, and methods for qualifying Class 1E fiber optic cables, terminations, field splices, and connectors [fusion or mechanical] for service in nuclear power generating stations

Cables optical fibers and splices within or integral to other


• Cables, optical fibers and splices within or integral to other devices (e.g., instruments, panels, etc.) shall be qualified using the requirements in the applicable device standard or IEEE Std 323-2003, as appropriate.

• However, this standard’s requirements may be applied to the fiber optic cable, terminations, field splices, and connectors within these devices.


• Primary objective of qualification


– Demonstrate that the cables and components for which a qualified life has been established can perform its safety functions without experiencing CCF before, during, and after applicable design basis events


• Principles of qualification

T t ti


– Type testing

– Operating experience

– Analysis (analysis alone is not acceptable)


• Analysis is used only as a supplement to type testing and / or operating experience

– Support test assumptions and results– Evaluate test data


Evaluate test data– Evaluate operating experience data– Determine cause of test failure and justify qualification to

less severe service conditions / acceptance criteria– Apply type-test results for in-plant application– Augment generic test to demonstrate that performance

related physical properties are similar, materials are compatible, and materials interact in a similar manner


• The standard addresses, in part:

– Minimum specifications or descriptive information to be provided for the cables, field splices, and connectors


– Test procedures for thermal aging, radiation aging, and synergistic effects

– Effects of radiation and temperature on attenuation

– Recovery from signal attenuation after radiation aging

17. Fiber Optic StandardsObjectives Review

• Identified the major fiber optic standards of interest to NRC

P id d l i f th


• Provided a general overview of the purpose of these standards

• Discussed how these standards relate to new reactor inspection

QUESTIONS ?


electrical and i&c codes and inspection · implementation of design requirements numark...

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