element ibrd education
TRANSCRIPT
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Making Primary Education Work for India’s Rural Poor – A Proposal for Effective Decentralization
Lant PritchettVarad Pande
The World Bank
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Outline
Quality of education is a BIG problem…
especially for the poor
Lack of accountability is a majorreason for this poor quality
Decentralization and Primary EducationReform in India: The Two Questions
An Analytical Approach to Decentralization – Using First Principles
A ‘Modest Proposal’ for Reform
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Outline
Quality of education is a BIG problem…
especially for the poor
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24.7%
85.5%
0%
25%
50%
75%
100%
Bottom 40% Top 20%0
25
50
75
100
Karnataka Kerala Rajasthan WestBengal
65.4%
96.9%
0%
25%
50%
75%
100%
Bottom 40% Top 20%
Quality of Government Primary Schooling in Indiais very low…especially for the Poor
Enrolment
Framework for Judging Quality
AchievementCompletion
Percent of 6-14 yr oldscurrently in school
(1998-99)Average
78.8%
Percent of 15-19 yr oldscompleted at least Grade 8
(1998-99)
Average49.6%
Percent of children with InadequatePrimary Learning Achievement for
Math of Age for Class 5 or in Grade 5
Note: Framework adapted from Warwick and Reimers (1995); Enrolment and Completion data from ‘Educational Attainment and Enrollment Profiles’, Filmer (2004); test scores analysis forgovernment and government aided schools only based on data from Singh, Jain, Gautamand Kumar (2005)
…+ Anecdotal Evidence of low quality (Pratichi Trust, PROBE Report, etc.)…+ Evidence of student migration from government to private schools
67.6%
81.7%
69.7%
53.8%
Not reaching Grade 5Scoring < 50% in Grade 5(Govt School)
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Outline
Quality of education is a BIG problem…
especially for the poor
Lack of accountability is a majorreason for this poor quality
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The low quality is caused by ‘ systemic ’ and not ‘ managerial ’failures; and thus requires an institutional solution
TeacherAbsenteeism
19
15 1411
1617
2725
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Uganda India Indonesia Zambia Bangladesh Papua NewGuinea Ecuador Peru
Source: Kremer et al (2004), pg 9
% Teacher Absence Rates by Country
Country
Level of Parental
Satisfaction
Other Evidence
59.0%60.0%
0%
25%
50%
75%
with childprogress
with teacher
Source: The Pratichi Education Report (2002); Berliner and Biddle (1994) pg 113
Level of Parental Dissatisfaction(West Bengal)
Evidence
l ‘Non’ Teaching: “Teaching practices have been reduced to aminimum…it has become a way of life” ( PROBE)
l
Growth of Private Schooling …which meets the differentiated(quality) demand…even among the poor (Tilak et al.)
“Best practice”level of absence
7.0%
72.0%
21.0%
0%
25%50%
75%100%
A or B Grade C Grade D or F Grade
Grades given by Parents toChild’s school (USA)
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What is ‘Accountability’? –Demystifying the Elements of the Accountability Relations
Delegation
Feature
Financing
Enforcing
Performing
Informing
There are Five Features to Any Accountability Relationship
What
You give a task to theaccountable ‘agent’
Example 1:Buying a Sandwich
l You ask for asandwich
Example 2:Going to a Doctor
l You go to the doctorto be treated
You give the ‘agent’ themoney to do the task
l You pay for thesandwich
l You pay the doctor forthe treatment
The ‘agent’ does theassigned task
l The sandwich ismade for you
l The doctor treats youto try cure yourailment
You find out how wellthe ‘agent’ has done thework
l You eat the sandwichwhich informs you of itsquality
l You see if you are feelingbetter – you assess theperformance of thedoctor
You reward goodperformance and punish
bad performance
l You choose whether tobuy a sandwich from theseller the next time,affecting his profits
l You go to him nexttime (if he was good)or choose to gosomewhere else if not
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Systemic failures are rooted in Inadequate Accountability
Relationship 1: VOICE – The Long Route, first leg
Citizens
Policy Makers
V O I C E
l Citizens can elect Policy Makers based on quality ofpublic services they receive(VOICE)…
l But, Citizens …
- may vote along ethnic /ideological lines(DELEGATION)
- may not be able to attributeservice to appropriatePolicy-Maker (INFORMING)
- may think Policy-Maker tenure is too short(ENFORCING)
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Systemic failures are rooted in Inadequate Accountability
Service Providers
Policy Makers
C O M P A C T
l Well-meaning Policy Makers can influence Service Providers to improve servicedelivery performance(COMPACT)…
l But, Policy Makers …
- may not be able to specifyexact contracts(DELEGATION)
- may not be able to monitorService Providers (INFORMING)
- may not be able to alterincentives of ServiceProviders (ENFORCING)
Relationship 2: COMPACT, long route second leg
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Systemic failures are rooted in Inadequate Accountability
Citizens Service ProvidersCLIENT POWER
l Clients can play major role in tailoringservice-mix to their local needs andmonitoring Service Providers (CLIENTPOWER)
l But, Clients …
- often do not have choice (lack ofcompetition)
- often cannot infer provider effort(INFORMING)
- often do not have powers to disciplinebad Service Providers (ENFORCING)
Relationship 3: CLIENT POWER – The Short Route
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Source: World Development Report, 2004
Systemic failures are rooted in Inadequate Accountability
The Three Relationships of Accountability in Service Delivery
Citizens Service ProvidersCLIENT POWER
Policy Makers
V O I C E
C O M P A C T
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5.9
1.8
7.3
1.8
0
5
10
15
UttarPradesh
West andCentralAfrica
South andEastern
Africa
Asia LatinAmerica
8-13.5
37.824.723.721.721.210
25
40
Kerala Karnataka Rajasthan West Bengal Bihar
0%
50%
100%
Boy Girl
Yes 98%
The key missing accountability relations in Primary Educationbetween parents and teachers are Informing and Enforcing
Delegation
Feature ofAccountability
Financing
Enforcing
Performing
Informing
Is this the KeyProblem?
Somewhat: Diffusedobjectives but Parentswant to delegate (i.e., sendchildren to school)
Yes, many teachersare not performing
adequately
Evidence
Yes, no usable info on classperformance; parents notactively involved in school /teaching matters
Is it important for your child to be educated?
Yes 89%
Source:PROBE Report, pg 14
No, teachers are paidvery well relative toother countries
Average Salaries as multiple of Income per capita by Region
Average = 6.1 Note: Uttar Pradesh figure isfor 1995-96; all others arequoted from Carnoy andWelmond (1996);Source: Mehrotra and
Buckland (2001)
% Teacher Absence Rates by Indian States All India Average 25%
34.0% 29.0%0%
25%
50%
VECs PTAs/MTAs
% Households Aware of Existence and activities of Community Structures
Source: CAG Report (2001)
Yes, parents have little orno powers to discipline orreward teachers
l
Kremer et al (2004) find only one case of teacher dismissal ever in3000 government schools surveyedl No monetary incentives possible for high performing teachers
under current government teacher terms of employment
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Alternative Explanations for Low Quality are Unlikelybe Sufficient
Lack of AdequatePublic Expenditure
Presence andDemand for ChildLabor
Lack of ParentInterest/ Involvement
1
2
3
l Child labor is not big enough – NSS (1993) shows only 8 percent
l Most child laborers work as family labor, so their time is fungiblel Even if child labor is ‘high’, direction of causality is not clear
Is it important for a boyto be educated?
Parents’ Attitude to Education in India
Yes 98%
No 1%No
Response 1%
Is it important for a girlto be educated?
Yes 89%
NoResponse
1%
No 10%
Source:
PROBE Report, pg 14
Parents, evenpoor parents,seem keen toeducate theirchildren
65
70
75
80
1993 1999
%Enrollment rate among 5-11 year olds
Budget expansionapproaches don’t seem
to have worked in India – e.g.: District PrimaryEducation Program(DPEP)
DPEP Districts
Non-DPEPDistricts (withsame criteria)
Source: Jalan and Glinskaya (2003)
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Outline
Quality of education is a BIG problem…
especially for the poor
Lack of accountability is a majorreason for this poor quality
Decentralization and Primary EducationReform in India: The Two Questions
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Decentralization And Primary Education Reform in India
India is Trying toDecentralize
Indian NeedsPrimary Education
Reform
l 73 rd and 74 th Amendments to theConstitution devolve politicalpower to local governments
l States modify Acts and holdelections to local governments
l Functions in XI and XII Schedulesdevolved to local governments
l Continued low enrolment,completion and achievementdespite central and state schemes
(and Sarva Shiksha Abhiyaan)
l Much lower educational indicatorsfor poor, who sufferdisproportionately
Question 1:How to Do Education Delivery in this
Decentralizing Context
Question 2:Is Well-Designed Decentralization the Right
Model for Primary Education Reform
dd d l
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Addressing Question 1: How to Do Education Delivery inthis Decentralizing Context
India is Trying to
Decentralize
l 73 rd and 74 th Amendments to theConstitution devolve politicalpower to local governments
l States modify Acts and holdelections to local governments
l Functions in XI and XII Schedules
devolved to local governments
Question 1:How to Do Education Delivery in
this Decentralizing Context
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Decentralization is Neither a Necessarynor Sufficient Condition for High Quality Education
0.0 20.0 40.0 60.0
children not reaching grade 5 (%), 1992-95
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
F i s c a
l d e c e
n t r a l i z a t i o n ( S c
h n e
i d e r )
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
AA
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
AA
A
A
A
0.0 20.0 40.0 60.0
children not reaching grade 5 (%), 1992-95
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
P o
l i t i c a
l d e c e
n t r a
l i z a t i o n ( S c
h n e
i d e r )
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
0.0 20.0 40.0 60.0
children not reaching grade 5 (%), 1992-95
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
A d m i n d e c e
n t r a l i z a t i o n ( S c
h n e
i d e r )
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
A
AA
AA
A
A
A
A
AA
A
A
A
Correlation between Decentralization Indicators and Primary Education Outcomes
Source: Analysis based on data from Governance and Service Delivery Indicators Dataset, Pippa Norris, Kennedy School of Government, (2004)
No evidence of high correlation between decentralizationand education outcomes in cross-country analysis
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0
5
10
UP Rajasthan MP AP Kerala Poland Chile Colombia
FiscalAdministrativePolitical
‘Unbalanced’Decentralization
• PoliticalDecentralizationhas happened(election of PRIs)but…
• Administrative
and Fiscal Decentralizationremains weak
Source: World Bank (1999)
Decentralization in India Has Been Unbalanced andIncomplete
Unbalanced Decentralization in India in anInternational Context
D e c e n t r a
l i z a
t i o n
I n d e x
( 0 - 1
0 )
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Outline
Quality of education is a BIG problem…especially for the poor
Lack of accountability is a majorreason for this poor quality
‘Effective’ Decentralization,can help, if done in the right context
An Analytical Approach to Decentralization – Using First Principles
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UnbundlingFunctionalAllocation andRecommendations
Status quo
Analysis
First Principlesof Public Finance and Accountability
•Disaggregate intofunctions andactivities:
- Logical, mutuallyexclusive andexhaustive
(MECE)functionalclassification
- Consistent withIndian publicadministrationdelivery system
Who providesthese functionsand activitiestoday in India?
What are the keyfunctions andactivities in PrimaryEducation?
How to decide whoshould providewhich functions andactivities?
What changes arerequired to thecurrent system ofservice delivery?
•Analyze de jurefunctionalallocation of eachtier by studyingexisting legislation
•Analyze de facto
functionalallocation (on-the-ground picture) byconducting surveysand interviews
•Based on thissystematic analysis,propose changes tocurrent system
•Develop a detailedproposal for
reform of primaryeducation thatdraws on thefindings of ouranalytical approach
Our Analytical Approach To Effective Decentralization
•Use FirstPrinciples ofPublic Finance findoptimal allocationfrom public financeperspective
•Use FirstPrinciples ofAccountability toaddress theaccountabilityissues
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Step 1: Unbundling
Function Activity
G r a m
P a n c
h a y a t
U s e r
G r o u p s
Curriculum designLearning achievement standardsPlans for physical expansionPlans for quality improvementSocial Capital
Physical Capital Beneficiary Selection Choice of students for targeting programsEnrolmentRecurrent Textbook choice/purchaseLearning materialsMaintenance Maintenance of school buildings/facilitiesMonitoring of school processes
HiringAssignmentTrainingSalarySupervisionDismissal
Monitoring andEvaluation
Tests of learning achievement
BlockCentral
Standards
Planning
Asset Creation
Operation - NonTeacher
Operation -Teacher
Responsibility
S e r v
i c e
P r o v
i d e r
( s c
h o o l
)Village
State District
Question: What are the Key Functions and Activities in Primary Education?
Functions and Activities in Government Primary Schooling in Rural India
Output: A Mutually Exclusive and Exhaustive Classification of Primary Education into Functions and Activities
S 2 S Q A l i
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Function
G r a m
P a n c h a y a
t
U s e r
G r o u p s
O eration - Non teacherOperation - TeacherMonitoring and Evaluation little, not systematic
Responsibility
Service
Provider(school)
Village
StateGovt District Block
CentralGovt
Standards Setting
Planning
Asset Creation
little, not systematic
Functional Allocation in Primary Education – DE FACTO
Function
G r a m
P a n c
h a y a
t
U s e r
G r o u p s
Operation - Non teacherOperation - TeacherMonitoring and Evaluation
BlockCentralGovt
Standards Setting
Planning
Asset Creation
Responsibility
ServiceProvider(school)
Village
StateGovt
District
Question: Who provides these functions and activities today?
Step 2: Status Quo Analysis
Functional Allocation in Primary Education – DE JURE
Lessons
• Current system is
highlycentralized withlittle role for PRIs
/ User Groups
• Schools / teachers have
little or noautonomy… oraccountability
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Principle
What are the First Principles of Public Finance ?
Explanation
Unit Cost of productiondeclines as scale ofproduction increases
Implication
l Activities with significant economies of scaleshould be done by a higher level of government
The actions of one agentaffects other agents
l Activities with significant externalities should bedone at a higher level of government, so that the‘external’ effect can be ‘internalized’ in thesystem
l Equity may imply financial support to education ata large enough geographic scope to allow for
redistributive transfers to equalize across smallerunits
Step 3: Use First Principles
Economies ofScale
Externalities
EquityNeed for equitablespread in inputs,process or outcomes
l The more heterogenous the demand for theactivity is likely to be, the more locally it should bedone
Heterogeneity ofDemand
Variation in local needsand preferencesbetween regions
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Step 3: Use First Principles – Public Finance
What is the size of ‘optimally sized catchments area’ of aservice provider to jurisdiction?
StatePopulation: 30-80 million
Zilla Parishad
Population: 800,000-2 million
Block PanchayatPopulation: 60,000-600,000
Gram PanchayatPopulation: 2,000-20,000
Economies of Scale
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StatePopulation: 30-80 million
Zilla ParishadPopulation: 800,000-2 million
Block PanchayatPopulation: 60,000-600,000
Gram PanchayatPopulation: 2,000-20,000
Step 3: Use First Principles – Public Finance
Optimal Catchments Areas for LEVELS of Education
Primary schools Secondary Schools
Universities
l Whereas theoptimalcatchments areafor a primaryschool is atvillage level (GP
jurisdiction)…
l …the optimalcatchments areafor a Universityis district / statelevel (State
jurisdiction)
Economies of Scale
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Step 3: Use First Principles – Public Finance
StatePopulation: 30-80 million
Zilla ParishadPopulation: 800,000-2 million
Block PanchayatPopulation: 60,000-600,000
Gram PanchayatPopulation: 2,000-20,000
Operation
Setting learning achievementstandards
Monitoring and Evaluation(process and outcome)
AssetCreation
Planning
Primary
School
Optimal Catchments Area for FUNCTIONS of Primary Education
l Whereas theoptimalcatchments areafor Operationsis at villagelevel (GP
jurisdiction)…
l …the optimalcatchments area
for a SettingLearningStandards isstate level(State
jurisdiction)
Economies of Scale
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Step 3: Use First Principles – Public Finance
Functional Allocation according to Economies of Scale Criterion`
Economies of Scale
Function
StateDistrictBlockGPSchool
Monitoring and Evaluation
Public Finance First PrincipleExternalities /System-wide
EffectsEquity Heterogeneity of
DemandEconomies of
Scale
Operation - Non teacher
Standards Setting
Operation - Teacher
Planning
Asset Creation
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Equity Doesn’tRequire Centralization
Equity Concernsare Important
l Major inequity / variations in primary education levels existsbetween districts within states
l This creates equity rationale for centralization of educationdelivery
Step 3: Use First Principles – Public Finance
Equity
44.074.5
104.0
04080
120
Muzaffarnagar Lucknow Muradabad
59.885.6
120.0
04080
120
Kannur Kollam Idukki
Gross Enrolment Rate - UP (2003-04) Gross Enrolment Rate - Kerala (2003-04)
l This does not imply all functions in primary education shouldbe done by higher levels of government….
l As long as Standard Setting and M&E are done by higher levelof governments, AND redistributive equalizing fiscal transfersare done, goal of equity can be achieved
Source: DPEP MIS Database http://www.dpepmis.org/webpages/edatabase.htm
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Function
StateDistrictBlockGPSchool
Monitoring and Evaluation
-
Operation - Non teacher
Standards Setting
Operation - Teacher
Planning
Asset Creation
-
Public Finance First PrincipleExternalities /System-wide
EffectsEquity
-
-
Heterogeneity ofDemand
Economies ofScale
Step 3: Use First Principles – Public Finance
Functional Allocation according to Equity Criterion
Equity
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Function
StateDistrictBlockGPSchool
Monitoring and Evaluation
Public Finance First Princi leExternalities /System-wide
EffectsEquity
-
-
-
Heterogeneity ofDemand
Economies ofScale
-
Operation - Non teacher
Standards Setting
Operation - Teacher -
Planning
Asset Creation
- -
Step 3: Use First Principles – Public Finance
Functional Allocation according to First Principles of Public Finance
Standard Setting and Monitoring by State Government, and AssetCreation and Operation by low-level PRIs is effective
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What are the First Principles of Accountability ?
Activities that requiredecisions to be made usingindividual judgment in localcontext
Activities that requireseveral repeatedtransactions at the locallevel
Step 3: Use First Principles - Accountability
Discretionary Transaction-Intensity
InferringPerformance
Where can performancebe better inferred –locally or technically
Examples
Does the service requiremany localtransactions?(Transaction Intensive)
Does the service require decisions madein local context? (Discretionary)
No YesNo - Central Banking
Yes Immunization Ambulatory Care
ImplicationActivities that are Discretionary, Transaction- Intensive and Locally Observable require local
input for accountability
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Step 3: Use First Principles –Accountability
Discretionary , Transaction-intensive and Locally Evaluatable activitieslike Asset Creation and Operations should be decentralized to PRIs
Functional Allocation according to First Principles of Accountability Function
Operation - Non teacher High High Local
Operation - Teacher High High Local / Technical
Monitoring and Evaluation Medium Medium Local / Technical
Technical
Asset Creation High
Standards Setting
Planning Medium
Accountability First Principle
TransactionIntensive?
Who Can Best InferPerformance
(Technical or Local)?
Medium
Local /Technical
Local /Technical
Low
Medium
Low
Discretionary?
Step 4: Optimal Allocation based on
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Function
G r a m
P a n c
h a y a
t
U s e r
G r o u p s
Operation - Non teacher
Operation - Teacher
Monitoring and Evaluation
Support
BlockCentralGovt
Standards Setting
Planning
Asset Creation Support
Support
Responsibility
ServiceProvider(school)
Village
StateGovt
District
Step 4: Optimal Allocation based onFirst Principles Analysis
Functional Allocation in Primary Education –Based on First Principles Analysis l States doStandardsSetting andMonitoring
l PRIs assumeresponsibility for
actual Operation- As much as
possible as low aspossible
- Higher PRI tiersback-up on
professionalism,technical
First Principles of Public Finance First Principles of Accountability Function
Operation - Non teacher Yes Yes Local
Operation - Teacher Yes Yes Local / Technical
Monitoring and Evaluation No Y es Technical
Accountability First Principle
TransactionIntensive?
Who Can Best InferPerformance
(Technical or Local)?
Yes
Bit Technical
Local
No
Somewhat
No
Discretionary?
Standards Setting
Planning Somewhat
Technical
Asset Creation Yes
Key Messages
Function
Monitoring and Evaluation
Public Finance First PrincipleExternalities /System-wide
EffectsEquity
-
-
-
Heterogeneity ofDemand
Economies ofScale
-
Operation - Non teacher
Standards Setting
Operation - Teacher -
Planning
Asset Creation
- -
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As discussed, Many Models of EducationDecentralization have not worked well
Decentralize withoutunbundling
Decentralize Non-Teacher Operations
(But not TeacherOperations)
DecentralizeFunctions, withoutdevolving Finance
1
2
3
l Indonesia Experience
l Latin America Experience
l India Experience (1995-2005)
-Pushed all functions to district level (below provinces)-Bad monitoring systems means that little information aboutregional performance is available to stimulate competitionor disseminate good or bad practices
-Pushed responsibility to local governments…-…But without enhancing operational control at local level(e.g.: Argentina)
-Devolved functions (including primary education) to PRIs…-…But PRIs do not have adequate finance or control overfunctionaries to implement their mandate
But our Analysis Avoids these Pitfalls by Suggesting
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G r a m
P a n c
h a y a
t
U s e r
G r o u p s
StandardsPlanningAsset CreationOperation - Non TeacherOperation - Teacher
HiringAssignmentTrainingSalarySupervisionDismissal -
Monitoring and Evaluation
Responsibility
S e r v
i c e
P r o v
i d e r
( s c
h o o
l )Village
State District
Function
BlockCentral
Greater Operational Responsibility to
PRIs, especially ofTeachers
But our Analysis Avoids these Pitfalls by SuggestingCountervailing Forces
Strengthen Centreand State for
Standard Setting andMonitoring
1
2
l Consistent Standard Setting is Critical To Provide the GuidingFramework for Local Governments to Operate and Manage
l Uniform Monitoring is Essential for Quality Control, DesigningRewards & Recognition Systems and Generating Credibility
The Two Big Messages from Our Analysis
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Outline
Quality of education is a BIG problem…especially for the poor
Lack of accountability is a majorreason for this poor quality
‘Effective’ Decentralization,can help, if done in the right context
An Analytical Approach to Decentralization – Using First Principles
A ‘Modest Proposal’ for Reform
Shifting Teacher Operations to PRIs is Already Happening
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370%
50%
100%
Orissa MP
Shifting Teacher Operations to PRIs is Already Happeningin India through the Various ‘Para-Teacher’ Schemes
l Approach Paper to 10 th Fiveyear Plan envisagedimportant role for para-teachers
l Sarva Shiksha Abhiyaan(SSA) Funding can be usedfor para-teacher programs
l Donors are funding para-teacher programs in States(eg: SK in Rajasthan fundedby SIDA)
l States are using SSAFunding for para-teacherprograms (eg: Orissa)
Central GovernmentPolicies
State GovernmentPolicies
95%
~100%
Teachers Hired as Para -Teachers as % of All Government Teachers Hired
Note: Orissa numbers for 2001-2003, MP numbers for ‘last 4-5 years’ from text on pg 16Source: Govinda and Josephine (2004)
Almost all incrementalhiring of teachers by mostlarge States is being donein the para-teacher model
Para-teacher Model Seems To Be the Chosen Pathfor Hiring New Teachers
And Evidence Suggests These Are Showing Considerable
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38
55
63
33
42
51
60
4652
0
20
40
60
Other RuralRajasthan
SK School
…And Evidence Suggests These Are Showing ConsiderableSuccess
64.0%51.0%
0%
25%
50%
75%
100%
PrimarySchool
SSK
Source: Analysis based on data from - West Bengal: Pratichi Education Report 2002; Rajasthan:World Bank PAD for Rajasthan DPEP, 1999, SIDA Evaluation Study and NSSO 52nd Round
Student Attendanceon day of visit
Experiment One: SSK Schooling in West Bengal
25% higher
20.0%14.0%
0%
25%
50%
75%
PrimarySchool
SSK
43% lower
Teacher Absenteeismon day of visit
9.0%24.0%
0%
25%
50%
PrimarySchool
SSK
Dissatisfaction withTeacher (Parent Response)
62% lower
Experiment Two: Shiksha Karmi (SK) in RajasthanTest Scores
15% higher
27% higher
16% higher
14% higher
Math LanguageGrade 1 Grade 4 Grade 1 Grade 4
83
72 71
85
51
63
0
20
40
60
80
100
Enrolment Rate Attendance Rate
SK
Rajasthan
All India
% Enrolment and Attendance
l HigherAccountabilitycan offsetenormous otherdisadvantages
l Greaterautonomy forperformanceand localresponsivenessworks
l Lower wages donot appear toreducemotivation
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But the ‘Para-Teacher’ Model Is Not a Sustainable SystemicSolution to India’s Primary Education Crisis – Its Only a Quick Fix
Variance in Pay forIdentical Work is
Starkly Visible
Index of Primary School Teacher Salary in India
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
Index
‘Regular’ Government
School Teacher(Rs 5000-9000)
Para-teachers(Rs 900-3500)
‘Regular’GovernmentTeachers get paid3-6 times morethan para-teachers
Note: Analysis of Teacher pay based on survey of para-teacher schemes in Govinda and Josephine (2004) and other studies of para-teacher systems in India
Pressure for ‘ex-postregularization’
l States under pressure to ‘regularize’ para-teachers when para-teacher lobby becomes substantial
l Unplanned and ad hoc regularization can bankrupt already fiscallydrained states
Variance in Quality ofTraining, Instruction
and Outcomes
l
Quality of instruction varies immensely as no standards areestablished for hiring, training, performance evaluation andcontract duration, e.g.:
- Qualification requirement for para-teacher varies acrossstates from Grade 5 pass to Higher Secondary
- Training requirement for para-teachers varies across statesfrom 12 days to 2 years
1
2
3
Rs.
S W M k M d P l h C bi h B
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So, We Make a Modest Proposal that Combines the BestElements of the Current Formal and ‘Para-Teacher’ Systems
Apprentice(Shiksha Karmi)
Associate(Adhyapak)
Master(Maha-Adhyapak)
Phases of Teacher Professionalization
A District Professional Teacher Cadre (DPTC)
• Initial hiring done onrenewable contractbasis by ZP on GPrecommendation
• Assignment to
schools depends onGPs
• Permanence granted atend of contract periods,based on comprehensiveevaluation- Technical Criteria: training, input indicators,teacher tests- Bottoms Up Criteria: Performance review andrecommendation byGP/SMC
• Few promoted to‘Maha-Adhyapaks’based onconsistentlyexceptionalperformanceevaluation ratings
Phases ofEmployment
The DPTC will have an initially fixed and then a
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Step jump whenqualify for Adhyapak
1
Annual increment based onreview, when Adhyapak
2
Step jump if qualifyfor Maha-Adhyapak
3
Compensation(Rs.)
Years of service
The DPTC will have an initially fixed, and then aperformance and seniority based compensation system
Apprentice(Shiksha Karmi)
Associate(Adhyapak)
Master(Maha-Adhyapak)
l Initially fixed pay,later performanceand seniority-based
l Big jumps insalary levelsacross phases toserve asincentive toperform
l Jump to Maha-Adhyapak rareand controlled,
most spendcareer asAdhyapaks
Key Messages3 Elements ofPerformanceBased Pay
Lo w-per forming teacher track H i g h
- p e r f o r m
i n g t e a c h
e r t r a c k
How Does Our Proposal For Teachers Stack Up
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How Does Our Proposal For Teachers Stack UpAgainst Existing Systems in India?
Hiring
Assignment
Training
Salary
Supervision
Dismissal
Existing FormalGovernment
ExistingPara-teacher
ExistingPrivate
Our Proposal(DPTC)
•Done by stategovernment
•Done by stategovernment
•Done by stategovernment, anddistrict-level lineagency
•Fixed (andgenerous) scalefor life
•Little or none insubstance
•Almost neverdone
•Done by GP,criteria varies
•Stays withinvillage
•Varies: district lineagency or parallelagency
•Fixed and small(‘honorarium’)
•Closely monitoredby SMC/VEC orGP
•At will forunsatisfactoryperformance
•Done by schoolmanagement
•Done by schoolmanagement
•Varies: states haveguidelines + largeunrecognised sector
•Usually fixed (andsomewhere betweenformal and para-
teacher scales)
•Closely monitoredby schoolmanagement
•At will forunsatisfactoryperformance
•Done by ZP oncriteria + GPrecommendation
•Done by ZP on GPrecommendation(GP has veto)
•Organized by ZPbased on guidelinesfor phased training
•Fixed when SK;seniority andperformance-based
when Adhyapak
•Closely monitoredby GP/SMC +technical criteria
•At will when SK;For cause whenAdhyapak stagereached
D t li ti th Right M d l f P i Ed ti
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Decentralization the Right Model for Primary EducationReform?
Indian NeedsPrimary Education
Reform
l Continued low enrolment,completion and achievementdespite central and state
schemes (and Sarva ShikshaAbhiyaan)
l Much lower educationalindicators for poor, who sufferdisproportionately
Question 2:Is Well-Designed Decentralization the Right
Model for Primary Education Reform
And Our Proposal is Better Than the Alternatives
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Privatization/Vouchers
§ Unlikely to be politicallysupportable (teachers
unions)
§ Entirely new system(not tried and tested inIndia) - likely to bedifficult to implementacross the country
§ Diffusion question -only one country adoptsnew voucher system in130 years
Our Proposal (DPTC)
§ Builds on what alreadyexists – adapts best of
current formal and para-teacher systems
§ Does not hurt interestsof existing teachersunions while givingexisting para-teachers abetter deal
§ Channelises thedecentralizationmomentum in India
‘Business As Usual’Reforms / SSA
§ Unlikely to substantiallyimprove outcomes
without systemicchanges in servicedelivery
§ Previous similarapproaches (e.g. DPEP)didn’t show muchsuccess
§ Substantial fiscal burdenon state and centralfinances
And Our Proposal is Better Than the AlternativesOne Extreme—
get rid ofsystem
Onlyincremental
reform
Reform ofexisting system
Accountability Linkages in Existing System:
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HRD Ministry (ElementaryEducation Bureau)
Project Approval Board
Policymaker (State and Central Government)
State Department of SchoolElementary Education
State Implementation Society
District Education Committee / Office
Block Education Committee / Center
School ManagementCommittee (SMC) or
VEC
Parent TeacherAssociation (PTA)
Schools(Teachers)
Organizational Provider
FrontlineProvider
COMPACT
Client Groups
State Government
VOICE
CLIENTPOWER (?)
MANAGEMENT
‘Client Power’ isparticularly weakin the presentframework
Accountability Linkages in Existing System:The SSA Framework
Accountability Linkages in Our DPTC Proposal:
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l COMPACT strengthened as PRIsget management ofTTEs
l VOICE getsstrengthened as clientssee importance ofparticipation ingovernance andservice delivery
decisionl CLIENT POWER gets
strengthened asSMCs/PTAs areinvolved in meaningfulperformanceevaluation
y g pRedefining Voice , Compact and Client Power
HRD Ministry (ElementaryEducation Bureau)
Project Approval Board
Policymaker (State and Central Government)
State Department of SchoolElementary Education
School ManagementCommittee (SMC) or
VEC
Parent Teacher
Association (PTA)
Schools (Teachers)
Organizational Provider
Frontline Provider
Client Groups
State Government
VOICE
Zila Panchayat
Taluk Panchayat
Gram Panchayat
Policymaker (PRIs)
Gram Sabha
CLIENT POWER
COMPACT
Our Proposal Addresses Many of the Central Concerns of
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Our Proposal Addresses Many of the Central Concerns ofthe Political Economy of Reform and Transition
Issue / Concern How It is Dealt With in Our Proposal
• ‘Grandfathering ’: i.e., TTEs of all existing regulargovernment school teachers to remain unchanged – noone is dismissed + salary protection
Opposition from existing‘Regular’ Government
Teachers
• Para-teachers no longer exploited, as they are given aclear track for tenure (career progression plan) as pertechnical and bottoms -up criteria
Unfair Exploitation of‘para-teachers’
• State gives transitional funds to PRIs to bear premiumwage cost of existing ‘regular’ teachers
• Large block grants to PRIs to fund their new role
Bakrupting the PRIs bymaking them pay the
teachers
• Balances local control with higher level support fortraining, professional standards and monitoringQuality of Schooling
Outcomes
Our Proposal is a Winner
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Our Proposal is a WinnerBecause it Addresses BothQuestions
l Gets decentralization ‘right’
- Learns from bad models ofdecentralization
- Based on analytically rigorousapproach
- Uses decentralizing momentumto drive reform
l Combines best elements ofexisting Indian systems (Formal +Para-teacher)
l Addresses root problem ofaccountability
l Is a systemic / institutional reform,not a managerial solution
l Has a viable plan to addresspolitical economy concerns andissues of transition
Question 1:How to Do Education Delivery in India’s
Decentralizing Context
Ours is a ‘well-designed decentralization’ proposal for education reform, and the
present decentralization momentum provides the opportunity to make it happen
Question 2:Is Well-Designed Decentralization the Right
Model for Primary Education Reform
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APPENDIX
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Why We Think OurProposal is a Winner
Addresses the RootIssue: Accountability
Uses StrategicIncrementalism
Likely to be PoliticallySupportable
l Framework rewards good teachers and punishes bad ones
l Effective Functional Allocation Based on Analytical Framework:- States do Standards Setting and Monitoring- PRIs assume responsibility for actual Operation
l Combines the best elements of existing Indian models (formal +para-teacher), and does propose something entirely new
l Uses existing momentum for decentralization to design thenew system
l Does not alter contracts of existing formal government systemteachers
l Provides increasing mass of ‘para-teachers’ with concrete andsystematic career progression plan