elementary philosophy

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Elementary Philosophy.PART I.

BEING THE SCIENCE OF REASONING

THE ART OF CORRECT REASONINGACCORDING TO SCIENCE;

OR,

LOGIC,CRITICALLY TREATED AND APPLIED.

By JAMES M. WILLCOX, Ph. D.

PHILADELPHIAPORTER and COATES,822 Chestnut Street.


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Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1875, byPORTER & COATES,in the Office of the Librarian of Congress at Washington.MEARS & DUSENBERY,

Stereotypers.Sherman & Co.,

Printers.


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DEDICATION.To the American, people, who claim to be the em-

bodiment of human progress in what is great andgood, and the depositary of a stupendous manifestdestiny, this work is respectfully inscribed.God grant your aspirations to be substantially and

rightly founded ; and, if so, may He point out unmis-takably the whereabouts of the proper foundationAs an instrument in His hands, the author desires toassume and do his part ; and, in the pursuance of thatself-imposed duty, he has, amidst many cares of anactive business life (which fact may well be a validapology for many imperfections), collated the resultsof a long study of Christian Philosophy, which areherein submitted to you, with the assurance that adeparture from, or non-conformity to, the principlesof Christian Philosophy, will work disaster andhumiliation instead of prosperity and fame.We have all that could be asked of Nature for therealization of our hopes in time ; ample territory in adouble continent ; geographical position between theeastern and western extremes of the Old World ; all

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IV DEDICATION.varieties of climate and soil ; length, breadth and won-derful fitness of water communication ; incalculableresources in all minerals ; established self-governmentand an intelligent activity that is the wonder of man-kind. Here is an array of advantages and means suchas heretofore the world has never seen. Are they suf-ficient ? Most assuredly not ; for they are all adjuncts,not principles.

In days of pagan society, man was but a con-stituent of the state, and responsible to it alone forhis political acts. Pagan republics, kingdoms, em-pires rose and fell ; for pagan virtues, philosophiesand religions, though imposing, were but hollowfoundations. Christianity has emancipated man fromthe thraldom of the state and made him responsibleto God for his political acts ; has given him a politicalconscience, through which he knows the rights of, andfeels the pressure of duty to, his countrymen and allmankind. The same means only that has led uswhere we are, will lead us to the end. It is a meansabove the natural reach of man, and the abandonmentof it would throw us back upon those mere humanmeans that have so often failed.

Physical prosperity is not the highest; physicalstrength is not the strongest ; physical wealth is notthe most lasting. Policy is not principle ; license notliberty; politics not government; submission not obe-dience ; gratification not happiness ; science not wis-dom ; expediency not morality; and loose intellectualspeculation is not the solid Christian Philosophy, the


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DEDICATION. Vaccurate and enlightened thought, that has withstoodmaterialistic and skeptical degradation for many cen-turies. The fierce assaults of these upon society haverecently grown fiercer, their allurements more insidiousthan ever ; and where men vary and may vary as muchas we do in theological creedstoo much so to effecta solid religious unionit becomes us, whose philo-sophic science differs less, to present a solid wall ofChristian Philosophy in defence of our commonChristianity. The understanding of orthodox Philo-sophy and the defence of fundamental Christian prin-ciples are the defence of our prosperity, our socialintegrity and of our children's inheritance. To theconsideration of his fellow-citizens, then, this work ishopefully submitted by

The Author.


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EXPLANATION OF THE TITLE-PAGE.

This volume being a treatise on the elements ofLogic, i? entitled The First Part of Philosophy,because Logic is one of the four parts, and the first,viz.: Logic, Metaphysics, Ethics and Physics, whichconstitute what is properly termed Philosophy. Asufficiently full explanation of this is reserved untilafter a better preparation of the mind to understandit ; and it is made in The Division and Definitionof Sciences, at the end of the volume. The remain-der of the title of the treatise can be fully understoodonly in the progress of study, but it contains the totalcomprehension of the meaning of the first sciencethat ought to be studied by any one designing tolend himself to scientific pursuits.

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CONTENTS OF PART I.

PAGEPrologue to Philosophy. Spirit of this age material, . viiPhysical science of to-day leads from religion, .... viiiGeneral scope of Logic, Metaphysics and Ethics, . . . ixCommon conceptions of them crude and false, xPhilosophy. Reasons for studying it, . . xi, xiiAim of this Work, xii, xiiiLogic. How to interest the mind in it, . . . 15,16,17Analytical and synthetical methods compared, . . . .18Utility of Logic, . . . . . . . . .19Ideas. Subjective and objective, . . . . . .20Apprehension. Nature of ideas, . . . . . .21Ideas concrete, abstract, particular, ...... 22Ideas sensible, intelligible, universal, .... 23, 24Limitation of the human powers. The misunderstanding of it is

a cause of skepticism, 24, 25, 26Estimative power, ......... 26Observations on the brute mind, .... 27, 28, 29, 30Scholastic terms, . . . . . . . . .31Ideas material and formal, . . . . . . .32Ideas universal and particular resumed, . . . , '33Genus. Species. Extension. Comprehension, . . . 34Definition. Specific difference, 35, 38Idea transcendental. Essentials and integrals, . . . .36Genetic and nominal definitions, ...... 37(vii)


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CONTENTS OF PART I.Substance, Attribute, Accident, Quality,Division. Conclusion of Ideas, ....Judgment. It is the second mental operation in logical order,Matter and form of Judgment. Motive of Judgment,Evidence. Ultimate criterion of truth, .Consciousness. It is the nearest evidence to the mind,Consciousness immediate and mediate,External Senses. Their evidence subordinate,Different spheres of Intellect and Sense.Proper sphere of the senses' evidence determined,Memory. Its evidence, .....Induction. Its evidence, ....Its essence is law and its application discerned, .Its basis is design and not blind force,Bacon. He was not the author of induction, .Reason. Its evidence,Authority. Testimony. Their nature and evidence,Certainty and Belief. Difference between them,Certainty is one. Evidence has degrees and qualifications)Review of evidences in order of excellence,Faith. Its evidence Divine veracity,Why men differ much in creeds, ....Intrinsic Evidence,Synthetic and analytic judgments, ....Principle of Contradiction, 70Judgment and Will direct each other, 71Propositions. Their nature, 72Propositions divided according to matter and form, . . 73, 74Propositions affirmative and negative, . . . . -75Same simple and compound, complex and incomplex, explicit and

implicit, .......... 76Same contrary and contradictory, categorical and hypothetical, . 77(viii)

PAGE38,39. 40. 41 42 43. 44 45

46, 48, 49 47 5o. 5o 5i 5253.54

55. 5758,60

5960, 62 63. 64

65, 66, 67. 6768,69


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CONTENTS OF PART I.Reasoning. Syllogism. Vindication of syllogismPremises, Conclusion, Consequence. Terms,Syllogistic symbol, . .Eight rules for syllogism, .....Explanation of first rule, .....Explanation of third and fourth rules,Analysis of Middle Term, ....Quantitive syllogisms. Numerical terms, .Explanation of sixth and seventh rules,Equivocal and ambiguous syllogisms,Logic not to be confused with its subordinate sciencesEnthymeme. Sorites. Dilemma,Sophism. Various sophisms, ....Observations on the general plan,Division and Definition op Sciences. Containing definitions

of Logic, Philosophy, Metaphysics, Psychology and Ideology.Also, division of Philosophy into Objective and Subjective, withcritical examination of their merits and claims,

PAGB. 78. 81. 82 ^384,8586,8787,88. 8990,9192,93. 9495,96

97, 98 : 99100

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PROLOGUE. The noblest study of mankind is Man.

These are the words of a philosophic poet, and, iftrue, they belie the spirit of this age we live in, whoseabsorbing study is to create and multiply man's wantsand to gratify them ; not to adequately understandthe essentials, and the destiny these point to, of manhimself. If the poet be right, the spirit of our age iswrong. The would-be philosophers of the times saythat they have studied and know man ; and they un-fortunately play an important part in directing him.They have given him much mental work to do, andnot a proportionate mental peace and satisfaction.What stimulants have they given him to work ? Thedesires of the flesh, the desires of the eyes and thepride of life. When these are partially satisfied (forthey cannot be wholly so) the result is called mate-rial prosperity. For this material prosperity hu-man genius and modern science are restlessly directedto subduing, more and more, the ancient powers ofnature ; and the passions and yearnings of man'slower nature are ministered unto. Education is cer-tainly more diffused and most men's understandings

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Vlll PROLOGUE.are more cultivated than formerly; but in whatbehalf? Certainly in the behalf, mainly, of his mate-rial, not moral, well-being. Individual wisdom orculture is no greater now than in the days of Solo-mon, of Socrates, of Cicero, of Paul or of Augustine;and I am not sure that the aggregate of human intel-lectuality is to-day greater, in proportion to numbers,than it was then. It is more spread out, the coat-ing thinner and reaching further, but clothing moresparely the leaders of this age than it did the giantswho are dead, those grand old masters whose dis-tant footsteps echo down the corridors of time.Pride, ambition, ostentation, greed, the love ofnovelty, luxury and style, and human honors ; theseare the gods whose kingdom is of this world and inwhose service the science of to-day, physical science,is wearing and tearing the forces and faculties of menwithout rest. How little is done for self-denial,humility, purity and faith and those many otherChristian virtues whose service does not pay, andwhose only reward here is interior peace

How mysterious to them were these virtues whenfirst held up to the masters of politics and of physicalscience, the pagan Romans of eighteen centuries ago

And how mysterious, after the lapse of that long time,are they to the leading scientists of this day Is scienceleading to faith or doubt ; to God or from Him ?Does it glorify God and humble man before Him, ordoes it glorify man in his own eyes and call God toaccount for what it does not understand, or drag Him


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PROLOGUE. IXdown to the level of blind, unreasoning force ? Doesit seek human happiness in exteriors ; satisfaction innever-ending strife for the unattained ; hope in uncer-tainty and bliss greater than that of sweet love inhating and reviling whatever is opposed to it ? Cer-tainly, were I summoned to behold the working ofSatanic powers on earth, it is just such signs as Ihave indicated that I would look for. The spirit ofthe age rages and imagines a vain thing. It hasdiscovered that knowledge is power, but has not dis-covered the ultimate utility of the power.

If the noblest study of mankind be man, it is man asGod has made him, with his intellectual, rational, affec-tive and moral faculties ; not the man of the materialist,of the skeptic, of the scientist, of the politician, of thesoldier, of the utilitarian or of the humanitarian. Itis man as the philosopher regards him. This is thenoblest study of man that has been pursued for somethousands of years, and the noblest study of him thatwill be pursued, to the end of time. In Logic we shallstudy his perceptive and rational powers and opera-tions as a means of knowledge, preparatory to abroad philosophic view of him in his entirety. Weshall discover in Metaphysics the nature of his ideasand their origin, and shall study those wonderfulhuman faculties that grasp, retain, store up and orderall knowledges attainable ; as also the nature andnatural destiny of the human soul, the subject of themall. Thereafter we may, in Ethics, study man's sub-jection to natural moral law and its foundation ; and


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X PROLOGUE.in all we shall endeavor to keep in sight the utilityof what we are doing, and to derive intellectual andpleasurable satisfaction from it.

It will not do to grant as true the poet's propositionthat the noblest study of mankind is man. Godand Infinity, and Truth and Good, as being of andcoeternal with God, are grander and nobler studiesand our noblest study after these is to know and seethings truly, just as God knows and sees them in theirreal being, as nearly as we possibly can with ourlimited minds ; not in their mere qualities as physicalscience views them. Weight, color, hardness, affinity,attraction, repulsion, motion, extension, mode, formare all qualities, not realities ; and it is realities thatwe shall seek for in Metaphysics.

Logic is commonly regarded as intensely dry anduninteresting, and as an unprofitable study. Espe-cially is this the case with those who know little ornothing about it. The same may be said of Meta-physics, with this addition, that the common mind,knowing nothing of it as a science, and not recogniz-ing its own metaphysical conceptions as such, believesit to be simply a system of incomprehensibles.Ethics, to uneducated minds, is a confused aggregateof moral particulars, modified in each by self, cir-cumstances and prejudices, and to such an extent thateach individual is pretty much a casuist, determiningcases by a code of his own. He is a partial judge inhis own causes and in those of others, and is unable tolocate the force of moral obligation anywhere in par-


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PROLOGUE. XIticular in the entire universe. As for Philosophy, itis either indefinable or confused with simple science.As we proceed, we shall learn, in the proper place,that Science is a series of systemized reasonings de-duced from facts or from other reasonings, throughpremises furnished by evidence or authority, andgoing back to self-evident metaphysical truths as fun-damental knowledge. Such truths are universal andeternal ; all others are to our minds discovered andaccidental.

Reasoning is a process of the mind and Logicis the science of reasoning. Human thought ismuch broader than reasoning ; and all experiences,authorities, sciences with their elements and all eternalmetaphysical truths are correlated within its realm,the realm of Philosophy, which is the science of thathuman thought which contains all human knowledges.Philosophic wisdom is a structure built up of allknowledgesgrand and sublime ; permanent, not ofthe present nor of the past ; and he who has it, has amental abode wherein to dwell which other men havenot and do not conceive. His quality is changed. Isthis abode worth attaining? Every man judges ofknowledge according to his stock of it and hisquality; that is, his worth as manifested to himself.The man of inferior quality cares little for the factthat it is inferior ; but the man of superior quality hasa consciousness of the fact, knows his quality to bethat which makes him who and what he is, and wouldsuffer any other loss whatsoever rather than that of a


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Xll PROLOGUE.particle of his mental excellence. This would be apartial destruction of himself, and every normal na-ture recoils from self-destruction as the greatest ofevils to it.

This volume is intended for those only who wish toimprove themselves mentally, to understand them-selves better, and who already set a value on theirquality in the scale of existences. It will interest noother. To such the study of Philosophy crowns allother knowledges. It is a learning to look upon themand upon all things in a way analogous to that inwhich their Author and Creator himself looks uponthem ; from a stand-point high above the creationsand conceits of men, and with an eye fashioned in thelikeness of that of God. If these reflections move inyou desire, the desire is healthy. Go on and read,and I hope that progress will keep alive desire. Ifthey do not, to read might be simply to waste, and thebook would benefit you but little.It is not my aim to write a mere class-bookbook of dry nomenclature and explanations in theordinary synthetic way. I wish to start with a mindmature in capacity, earnest in purpose and desirous tounderstand. To such I hope to make, by analysis,the study of mental sciences intelligible, and thereforeinteresting, in slow and short advances (a little way-ward as I may be drawn) along the foreground only ;noticing but such elements as are important for mypurpose, and pointing out but those relations of thingswhose perception should afford mental pleasure or


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PROLOGUE. Xlllwhose knowledge will be of important utility. I askyour attention especially to my reservation of theright of waywardness, as by this I hope to afford illus-trations and present important reflections which ourpaths may naturally lead to, and to which the strictestmethodical writer might object. A book can be mademore interesting and instructive in this way, althoughnot according to the established rules for class-books ;and meditation upon the different subjects of mentalscience is so suggestive to a trained mind of importantreflections, that it is better they should be made bythe author than left to the chances of each reader'smaking them for himself. In this, Philosophy has theright to be exceptional, for its field is full of objects,since it embraces everything.

I hope we shall go far enough for most minds toproperly appreciate themselves and for some to purgethemselves of their conceits ; for the more we knowthe greater appears the expanse of the unknown, andthe better we realize how small we really are in itspresence. The ardent student will go further and willthirst for the scholastic Philosophy of the Middle Ages.He will arm himself with his little rudiments gatheredout of this, and will there be hurled like an atom in thefierce dialectic contests of champions whose powers ofabstraction were superhuman, whose thrusts of distinc-tion and sub-distinction went straight to every flaw, andwhose doubly-refined mental weapons dazzled withtheir very refinement. He will behold much that wasonly contestgame for the love of victory, like any2


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XIV PROLOGUE.other game ; and he will take wisdom, too, from deepsources, from those sublime old Doctors who evolvedChristian Philosophy from chaos, fixed it upon eternalcertainty and planted land-marks throughout themental realm that skeptics cannot uproot, and whichwill guide Christian philosophers of all sects to theend of time.


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LOGIC.We naturally commence with Logic, by which we

shall get a better and clearer use of our understandingas an aid towards all knowledge that we shall everpursue. It has the repute of being dry. hard and oflittle real utilityof being a study whose end is theart of splitting hairs, of puzzling adversaries, of dodg-ing blows, of avoiding truth and of making generallythe worse appear the better part. All this is notinteresting to an honest mind, and Logic is too oftenmade uninteresting to students. The reason is thatit appears at first too objectless, or that its object isvague. Now, I hold that in Logic, as in all studies,if a worthy and intelligible object be presented to anearnest mind, interest will be aroused and an efficientmotive for work will be supplied. The mind mayweary in its powers, but will not weary of its workif the work interest it ; but a true, pleasurable interestcannot be felt in anything that is not understood.This last appears a false statement, from the knownfact that students are thought to be most interested inwhat they are investigating. It is, however, discovery

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1 ELEMENTARY PHILOSOPHY.that interests them, not the as yet undiscovered. Itis desire, pursuit and victory, not the unknown game,that excites the hunter. The game may not be known,but chase and hope and victory are known, and thesatisfaction of desire is known ; and it is these thatgive excitement and pleasure. These supply the mo-tive and the work follows. The mind tends always tounderstanding, and is as much the subject of motivepotency as are bodies. Present a sufficient object toits attention, and attention will be moved. Presentseveral ideas that have relations of some kind to eachother; those relations will be seen and a judgmentwill be moved and formed. Knowledge is both apleasure and a thirst to the mind, and entirely occu-pies it pleasurably. Present, then, the object of logicalstudy clearly, and a pleasurable interest will move tothat study ; maintain its explanations and the objectsof its several parts clear, and the pleasurable interestwill be sustained. Arouse in any one a military spirit,a law spirit, a medical spirit, a gaming spirit, a logicalspirit (all of which have their origin in an especialappreciation of their respective objects), and you willawake sufficient action in response. To a raw andignorant recruit, military drill is objectless and dis-tasteful, although he is told that its object is victoryover his enemies. He is ordered to lift his head, turnout his feet, stand erect, to place his arm stiffly by hisside ; and he wonders what these things have to dowith victory. He has not sufficient intelligence oftheir relations to other things to interest him. Behold,


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LOGIC. 17however, his comrade, a smart, ambitious youth, fullof military intelligence, who appreciates the utility ofdrill and knows all that it accomplishes in trial. Heexperiences an interest and pleasure in the disciplinethat is to fit him to be an accomplished soldier, andwhich is a necessary stepping-stone to distinction,wealth and fame.

Scientific writers generally overlook the creation ofan interest in their work, depending upon people tobecome their readers through an interest previouslyexisting. This restricts very much the number oftheir readers. To create a love for his subject shouldbe held by a scientific writer to be a prime duty; andsubjects, great and small, are in this like men, greatand small, that the interest will much depend upon aproper presentation. If, therefore, I can sufficientlymake clear the object, aim and utility of Logic, andmaintain them clear, the reader of thus far will con-tinue, pan passu, to absorb truth. I shall make aneffort in my new way, adding much to the mentallabor, since the labor of generalizing is much greaterthan that of particularizing in the traditional way.The method will be mainly that of analysis. When a

writer's object is to teach science of any kind to thoseunacquainted with its rudiments, the most intelligibleand satisfactory way is to start from the clearestknown facts ; then proceed in some manner to thediscovery of the unknown. The clearest known factsare those of common knowledge and experience, andfrom these progress (according to order of knowledge)


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l8 ELEMENTARY PHILOSOPHY.in physical sciences and in metaphysical sciences pro-ceeds in opposite directions. In physical sciencesknowledge is added to knowledge of what is exteriorto the thinker, and progress is, according to growth,synthetic ; whereas in elementary metaphysical sci-ences knowledge is deduced from knowledge of whatis interior to the thinker, and progress towards theunknown is, by way of decomposition, analytic. Thesynthetic method, which is proper for higher meta-physics, is unsatisfactory to a beginner, althoughclear to a scholar. It starts with definitions and pre-supposes much knowledge ; whereas the analyticstarts with the consciousness of one's own existence,ideas and powers, which are, to a beginner, the first,strongest and most satisfactory of all knowledges.Proceeding from these first facts, the genesis of fur-ther knowledge is followed intelligibly, and under-standing follows understanding easily. From a studyof the ordinary synthetic class-books of Logic andMetaphysics, I do not hesitate to say that an able andearnest beginner can make but little progress withthem without a teacher to analyze the difficulties thatconstantly obstruct his way; and I equally do nothesitate to say that the same beginner would follow awell-ordered analytic treatise intelligently and plea-surably, without aid. After thorough acquaintancewith the ground acquired in this manner, Philosophymust grow by relations, which is by synthesis.

In entering upon this study, you will naturally askyourself why you do it at all, and I will reply for you


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LOGIC. 19that you do so, first, in the pursuit of truth, and,secondly, in the pursuit of utility. Your intellectseeks truth, impelled by its own nature, sponta-neously, just as heavy bodies seek the ground ; andit seeks, and can seek, nothing else. It is a facultywhose dealing is with truth only, as that of memoryis with the past only, as that of the eye is with lightonly, and as that of the ear is with sound only. Truththat interests the mind draws its action unresistingly,unless this be diverted by an act of the will.As for the utility of Logic, it is the thorough

knowing and sharpening of your reasoning powers,as a means of reaching truth, avoiding error and betterunderstanding any science or knowledge whatever,that you may wish to acquire.To these ends, we shall first examine the elements

and processes of reasoning, and arrive at the art ofdeducing correct conclusions and destroying falseones, according to rule ; and whilst we are doing so,we shall look for the sources of truth themselves.Logic, therefore, does not end with theoretical science ;it is also practical ; and the dialectician becomes asskilled in the art of attack and defence as the trainedswordsman. It is both a science and an art ; thescience of reasoning and the art of correct reasoningaccording to science. It teaches the elements, natureand order of rational process, and how to best employall in the cause of truth ; and the desire for truth isuniversal, for it is a realitya possession ; whilst itsabsence is a voida deprivation. It is a gain, and


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20 ELEMENTARY PHILOSOPHY.error is a loss. Now, to understand elaborate func-tions we must first know elements ; and to arrive atthese, we will take the first step in examination by agrand look at the whole universereal, possible, finite,infinite, temporal and eternal.

All known things have two existencesone inthemselves and one in the human mind, according toits conception of themso grand and comprehensiveis the human mind. The first of these is on the partof the object thought of, an objective existence; thesecond is on the part of the thinking subject, a sub-jective existence. Something exists ; the mind thinksof it ; when, instantaneously, two things exist, viz.the original object and the something in the mind, thethought of it. This thought is termed in Logic anidea, and the idea is the first radical of rational ope-ration. It is that which exists in the mind whilst themind simply thinks. My own idea which exists inmy mind can be seized by another act of thought; inwhich case it has an objective existence, whilst theact which seizes it is subjective. The objective is onthe part of the known thing ; the subjective, on thepart of the knower. That may be anything of whichan idea may be formed ; this is only my internal ver-sion of it. That is passive under the activity of this.There is always something in the mind to think about,and that something is the elementary idea. In Logicit is not important to know the nature or origin ofideas, only to know them as being the simplest andfirst element of reasoning. Their nature and origin


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LOGIC. 21will be considered in the more advanced science ofMetaphysics.It is well, however, to call your attention to thefact that the formation of an idea being essentially ahuman act, as distinguished from a mere animal act,is a compound act, as all essentially human acts are.We are here somewhat within the domain of Meta-physics, as we shall frequently be during the conside-ration of the different parts of Logic ; not merelyemditionis gratia, but likewise for a more completeunderstanding of the subject and for a better distin-guishing of logical and metaphysical conceptions.Man is both animal and spiritual, and performs cer-tain animal acts as preliminary to intellectual comple-tion of them. Among these is simple apprehension,which man, in common with other animals, performsand the intellect elaborates it into an idea. Manylogicians term this intuition (from tueor, to behold)but I object to this term, for the reason that simplybeholding does not put the mind in possession ; and tohave appropriation, ownership, possession and treat-ment of objects by the mind is the notion which weform of mental action.The faculties which elaborate simply apprehended

things into ideas or conceptions are frequently termedelaborative or discursive. The process is certainly anintellectual one, and it is better to be more precise andcall the elaborative faculties intellectual faculties. Thenature of these we shall separately consider in Meta-physics, and shall reduce them to two distinct pri-


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22 ELEM ENT ARY PH I LOSOPH Y.mary faculties. Let us, then, be very precise, and saythat the first act in the order of knowledge is simpleapprehension, and that idea is a product of intellect.

Several ideas may exist simultaneously in the mind.Indeed when a comparison is made or a judgmentformed, they must, of necessity, coexist, in order thattheir relations be perceived along with them. Some-times they are perceptions of external objects, withtheir qualities of color, size, form, &c, all perceivedtogetherwhen they are called concrete ideas ; andthese much resemble the apprehensions that bruteanimals have. Sometimes also ideas drop off thequalities of things, regarding subjects as abstractedfrom their qualities ; as when you think of mankindgenerally, or vegetation generally, in which case youhave no color, size, &e., in your mind. Such ideasare called abstract. One quality may be abstractedfrom the whole, or all of them from their subject;and such ideas also are abstract, as whiteness, hard-ness, smallness, virtue, vice, &c. The brute minddoes not form abstractions ; and abstractions arenot regarded as inherent in any particular subject,only in specific subjects generally. From this youwill understand that all concrete ideas are particidar,representing a particular object or a number of themand that most abstract ideas are universal, whichmeans without regard to any number of their objectsconsidered. Not all abstract ideas are universal, foryou may have an universal idea of motio?i and a par-ticular idea of a body in which it inheres ; in which


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LOGIC. 23case the idea of the motion would be abstract, butwould become particular and not universal. Someideas are called sensible, because derived from theexterior senses as sight, color, sound, &c. ; andsome are derived from interior memory, imaginationor intellect, and are termed intelligible. There are,of course, different degrees of clearness and complete-ness in ideas.

I wish now to recall your attention, in a very espe-cial manner, to the distinction made above betweenideas particular and universal, as a confusion of theseis a common source of error. Particular is anythingshort of universal, and singular you will understandas being a solitary part of particular. The idea of theuniversal cannot be reached by adding and multiply-ing numbers, but only by abstracting for contempla-tion those essential attributes which are common toevery normal individual. Any number of men of thewhole human race, living or dead, may be spoken ofas particular; but when the whole race of mankind isthought of, you think of the attributes of man withouta thought of individuals or numbers of them. Youcomprise in your thought not only all that exist, butall that ever did, will or can exist ; in short, all pos-sible men. If you say man is rational, you mean allpossible men, not merely all present and past ; andyou employ man in an universal sense. When youthink of any genus or species of things, your idea isabstract and miiversal, because you think, first, onlyof attributes and not individuals ; and, secondly, you


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24 ELEMENTARY PHILOSOPHY.think of all possible, without limitation. All uni-versal ideas are abstract, but not vice versa, as we haverecently seen. The idea of the universal is formed inmost cases like the idea of the infinite, by denyinglimits ; and series upon series of numbers, multipliedindefinitely, cannot bridge the gulf that separates theinfinite from the finite, or the universal possible fromthe particular.

All objects or numbers of objects included in theuniversal are called its subjects or inferiors.Upon possibles no limitation in numbers can be

placed, and nothing less than the spiritual mind ofman can conceive the non-limitation of possibles;consequently, nothing less can conceive the universal.Even by man such ideas as universal, eternal, infiniteare inadequately conceived by negation, yet they areadequately conceived by God as the positive thingswhich they are. They are in the order of His intellect,but not in that of ours ; and are intelligible to an ade-quate intelligence.

I wish to make your understanding of this sub-ject and of the limitation of the human mind asclear as possible, because the lack oi such under-standing has made many a skeptic and atheist byshaking belief in what simply is not comprehended,no matter how well proved. Many indeed are soirrational as to refuse belief to whatever is notmade manifest through the external senses or provedby a pliori demonstration, which is like mathematicalequations. It requires but a poor logician to perceive


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LOGIC. 25that, although a thing be not understood or provedby the senses or a priori, it may nevertheless existyet the skeptic does not rise to this logic. The skep-tical or atheistic mind is negative, and believes onlywhat is easy of belief, what is so easily demonstratedthat the mind can rest comfortably and easily, and, asit were, seeing by sense what it believes. This is avery material mind, and one that cannot rise to abelief in anything whose demonstration excludes allintellectual doubt, yet which is not proved like amathematical conclusion. This is simply absurd andunworthy of the human intellect. God has so consti-tuted us, according to His inscrutable design, thatsuperior minds reach a belief in Him through reasononly perhaps ; the mass of mankind through the con-cert of alt the faculties ; but, no matter how, it isalways through sufficient light for that purpose ; andto bury that light in negative darkness is, like theburying of the talent, a most serious dereliction.Belief, however, in the infinite is not the understand-ing of it ; and the most towering intellect is infinitelyshort of such understanding, because itself is finite.It seems easy to comprehend that everything whichacts must act according to its nature ; that its acts arelimited by its nature ; that they are qualified anddetermined by it, and that they must be in the sameorder as that nature, absolutely incapable of eveigoing above or outside of it. Sight is in the sameorder as the eye ; sound in the same as the ear ; tastein the same as the tongue. The eye cannot hear, nor


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26 ELEMENTARY PHILOSOPHY.the ear see, nor can the tongue see or hear. Theidea is absurd and monstrous even to the skeptic.Let him, then, make an effort of intelligence, andreflect that sense is in the order of the organic, ma-terial and particular ; intellect in the order of thespiritual, abstract and universal ; that both are finite,and that their acts cannot go beyond the order of thefinite. Nothing whatever that is finite can by actreach the idea of the infinite, or become an integralpart of it, or approach it, or do anything further thanknow that it exists, infinite and perfect in every waythat the mind can conceive, and in an infinity of waysthat the mind cannot, and never can, conceive. Whenthe skeptic's grovelling mind can awake to the per-ception that its powers are limited ; that there is aregion of existence beyond them, and, shaking offdull and material sense, with its yearning to see andfeel, shall rise into pure intelligence, he will under-stand, not the infinite, but that the infinite existsinfinitely.The finite mind of man stops very far short of

infinity, and the estimative power of his senses is soonexhausted. The Almighty has set a lesson in thestars, as though to lift the skeptical mind from apathyand the caresses of sense that beguile it. The im-measurable Universe is visibly spread out, and dis-tances inconceivable are made manifest to humanvision. How much more inconceivable are theywhen the power of vision is multiplied by telescopicpowers, and nebular systems in embryo appear in the


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LOGIC. 27remotest depths like vast spectres among the SunsThe astronomer, with his highly cultivated sense ofsize and distance, is borne so far in his contemplationof them that all estimation ceases ; that fancy droops,and thought, astonished, leaves sense behind andpursues with intellect and abstraction alone. Heknows that there are existences beyond sense andestimation, beyond conception and limitation, by evi-dence of induction, as we, by evidences of many kinds,know the existence of an infinite first causeof God.How pitiable is the condition of the skeptical mind,incapable of making progress, stationary in doubt,and deteriorating in absolute stagnationYou will observe that I have used freely my

reserved right of going aside ; but the diversionseemed natural, and I hope it is not without profit.

I think it well to here recall to your minds the dis-tinction made between the particular and the universal,to more deeply impress this important distinction, andto point out that herein lies the principal differencebetween the human and the brute mind. Many philo-sophers maintain that the brute mind is entirely ma-terial, the result of organism only, merely passiveunder the action of whatever moves the senses, imagi-nation and memory. According to this view, it wouldbe simply moved by impulses, its will be constrainedby appetites, desires and passions, without ever beingfree. The deductions from this view are according tosound philosophy, because without intellect there isno freedom of will ; but I cannot admit the entire ma-


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28 ELEMENTARY PHILOSOPHY.teriality of the brute mind, and my opinion on thissubject will be given more fully in the science of Psy-chology. It is sufficient here to say that the mindsof irrational creatures differ ; some being more highlyorganized than others, and many of their species pos-sessing different systems of faculties from each other.The highest, however, are entirely destitute of what iscalled intellect, and they have, in consequence, nopowers of reflecting, abstracting or generalizing,although possessed of some organic faculties in com-mon with man, among which is organic memory,oftentimes equal to ours. They are capable of im-pressions, but not of ideas, in the true sense of theword ; these being the product of the intellect acting,through its meditative powers, reflexly upon senti-ments and relations.

Ideas are not impressions, but intellectual forms,mostly derived proximately or more remotely fromthem.We know, by general observation, that the brutemind perceives only the concrete and particular, thesubject and its modes together, the individual asit is, without separating by analysis the individualfrom his qualities or parts; as, a person friendly,a person hostile, a thing loved, a thing hated, &c.All men may seem, to a wild animal, hostile ; butonly seriatim, as they happen to appear; not asmankind, of which the animal would have no percep-tion, except the particular numbers of it that becomemanifest. Though comprehending an army of hunt-


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LOGIC. 29ers at one time, a perception of them would be con-crete and particular, as being short of universal. Thewhole scope of the brute seems to be, as to its mind,the perception of the concrete ; as to its will, submis-sion to senses and passions, which sway it withoutany free election or moral dominion ; and as to itsacts, blind obedience to that will necessitated by appe-tite, love, hatred, passion and habit. No intellectualfaculty or spiritual essence is proved to be absolutelynecessary to explain brute mental phenomena, evenif the mystery of them seem to persuade us to thesupposition of spirituality. The truth of this asser-tion appears very clear when we reflect upon thewondrous mechanical, chemical, vital and solar dis-coveries of modern days. The infinitesimal finenessof chemical atoms and their diverse powers of attrac-tion and repulsion ; the effect of diverse vibrations ofcomponents of light ; the mysteries of sound, heat,electricity, magnetism and materia medica, with stillsubtler animal sympathies ; all go to prove that theremay be animal powers and sensibilities much morerecondite and refined, sufficient perhaps to explainthe brute mind to an adequate intelligence, withoutrecourse to the supposition of any spiritual essencewhatever.There is a metaphysical principle, which I have

already enunciated, and which should here apply, viz.that acts and natures are concordant with, and limit,each other. This requires that the brute, whose actsare pai'ticular, concrete and principally organic, should

3


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30 ELEMNTARY PHILOSOPHY.have a nature principally material and organic, toaccord with them. The human mind reflects, thebrute does not. The first is active, the latter passive.Both passively receive an impression ; one passivelyallows it to go to its term, to work its way to the endthrough passions and habits, because it only transmitswhat it receives ; the other, by reflex action, turnsupon it, arrests it, modifies it or sends it on to itsterm, as it elects. Reflection is peculiar to man, andthrough his acts we will determine his powers and hisnature, which correspond with them. We know that,in common with brutes, he is material and organicbut he performs certain acts entirely disproportionateto matter and organism, and which are entirely dif-ferent from results of any known or possible materialfunction. They are in a different order, and one ofthem is reflection. Let us for a moment examine this.To reflect is to commence a new act, not to con-

tinue one act. It is second to a primary. True it isthat an act may rebound and take a new direction, butit must be sent by something. This something is adetermining principle, which may arrest, modify ordeflect, according to its nature, and it is the efficientcause of an effect produced. In man it is the exerciseof intelligence and free will, commencing after theprimary act is expended. The human thinking sub-ject is therefore both passive and initiating action. Ithas a permanent potentiality ; is a permanent causeeither actually or potentially, capable of translation toeffects of its own producing. Consequently it is not a


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32 ELEMENTARY PHILOSOPHY.sible tendencies confuse us and make it hard to takehome to us truths which we cannot, in some way, feel.It does not seem to be enough to exclude rationaldoubt from the result of our reasonings, but, in ourweakness we must needs yield to sensible hesitancyand yearn to see and feel intellectually the truth whichwe intellectually know. This refusal to accept boldly,in spite of prejudice and habit, the truth from whichthe intellect has sifted all rational doubt, punishes byprovoking doubt itself to become a habit of the mind;and the lower nature asserts itself over the superior.This is the explanation of most skepticism ; and itshould be remembered that too much belief is notmore irrational than too much doubt, and the naturewhich nurses it is certainly not so low as that whichnurses the opposite.Among the scholastic terms introduced to distin-guish things are material and formal, and they areapplicable to ideas. The first is that which, being out-side, has its representation in the mind ; the latter isthat representation according to how it is conceivedby the mind. Thus, ivory is materially what its quali-ties manifest it to be ; a thing white, solid, heavy,hard, &c. It is formally precisely what it means ac-cording to the meaning actually had. It is accordingto the conception. In the mind of a carver it is stat-uary substance of a certain quality ; in the mind ofa brush-maker it is brush-handle substance ; in themind of a chemist it is a certain chemical compound;


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LOGIC. 33in the mind of a naturalist it is a weapon of offenceand defence ; and so on.Having explained the meaning of ideas as concreteand abstract, objective and subjective, particular and uni-versal, sensible and intelligible; complete and incomplete,material and format*, I will revert once more to thedistinction between particular and universal. This isdone, first, to insist on a most thorough knowledgeof the distinction as holding the highest importancein Logic, since any confusion here leads to dire andnumberless errors ; and secondly, as leading directlyto the path which we have to take in further progressin Logic. Bearing in mind the inadequacy of lan-guage to express the precisions of the mind, we mustbe always on the lookout for precise sense, in order tofind truth and avoid error. In reasoning it is a com-mon fault to express the same idea at one time in anuniversal sense and at another in a particular sense ;and this is frequent even without change of words,thus: the Americans live west of the Atlantic; and,the Americans introduced the electric telegraph. Thesame word is used in both universal and particularsenses ; and this confusion of the two, or of one par-ticular with another, is the most frequent source oferror. It is therefore a logician's place to sift well thesense, to reject the ambiguous and irrelevant, and laybare the clear and naked point of sense. All else isconfusion and error. You will now learn that the dis-tinction which we have so much insisted on leads us


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34 ELEMENTARY PHILOSOPHY.to the conception of what is geitus, species and defini-tion.

It has been said that the universal idea embracesall existing and possible individuals of any seriesthat have certain qualities in common. It is gen-eric. That is, all comprehended in it constitute agenus. Genus however is a relative term, relative tospecies, which are divisions of it. The two terms arerelative to each other. This is because many univer-sal ideas can be had as specific ideas or as genericideas ; and that some can have certain properties incommon which associate them in a higher universalidea. This is the containing of species in the superiorgenus.

The standard idea is the specific, and it containsall those attributes of a thing by which it is con-ceived to be what it is, and without which the thingcould not be adequately conceived. Thus, man's dis-tinguishing attributes by which he is conceived areanimality and rationality; and rational animal, man,is a species under the genus animal. If you specifyanimal by considering its essential attributes of vitality,sensibility and mobility, you make it a species under thegeneric term of living things which comprises also thevegetable species. Genus is broader than species, sim-pler by having fewer attributes, but having greaterextension of numbers. Species is narrower than genusby being more restricted in extensiojt, but more com-plex in the comprehension of attributes. Extension issaid of numbers of individuals ; and comprehension is


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logic. 35said of numbers of attributes. Where there is moreof one there is less of the other ; extension and compre-hension are in inverse ratio.

There is always a difference that distinguishes thedifferent species under one genus from each other,and this is called the differentia ultima, or final differ-ence, or specific difference. We will take, for example,the genus animal, which has, as species under it, therational and the irrational animals ; and rational andirrational are specific differences. This explanationwill inform you at once what constitutes a scientificdefinition.

DEFINITION AND DIVISION.A definition is designed to so describe a thingthat nothing else can be mistaken for it; and thisis done by adducing always the nearest genus tothe thing to be defined and qualifying it by thething's own specific difference. Thus the nearest genusto be found to man (if you wish to define him) wouldbe either animal or rational being ; in either of whichcases you would qualify by the other term as a specificdifference, and you would define man as a rational a?ii-mal. If we go up the ladder of genera we shall findthat animal is a species of living things ; these a speciesof bodies ; these a species of created things ; and these infine a species of being, which is the transcendentalidea, containing in extension everything, and in compre-hension only one thing, existence.You will gather from what is said that a scientific


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36 ELEMENTARY PHILOSOPHY.definition differs entirely from an explanation or adescription. A thing maybe explained or describedfor a long time without having a true definition uponwhich scholars can reason ; and I cannot too stronglyurge you to attain to the precision of mind and gen-eralizing powers that will enable you to go forth atany time into the broad domain of existences, take anexpansive view of the numberless genera that lie thereenfolding their species ; with an eye that marks everydifferential tint, and defines every boundary as sharplyas the lines upon a map. Truth is always single, andobscurity lies only in that which envelops it ; it isalways clear, but only to a mind capable of perceiv-ing it.

The transceiidental can never be specific, since thereis nothing above it of which it can be a part. As itcontains but one ideaexistence,and can be predi-cated of all things, it has no nearest genus to includeit, and is beyond definition. Its idea is perfectlysimple, like the idea of one. Thus do we have a simpleidea at each end of the category of existences oneand all,and they are incapable of definition.

I have said that species comprehends essential attri-butes ; and you must distinguish between essentials andintegrals, since things cannot be specified by these.Animal, for instance, cannot be specified by head, arms,legs or other integral parts, which may, or may not, bewanting; but by life, sensibility and motion, which,being essential, cannot be wanting. A definitive de-


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logic. 37scription regards only the comprehension of a thing,not its extension ; enumerates attributes, not indivi-duals ; and in this it is just the opposite of division,which enumerates individuals and not attributes.The method of defining given above is by collocat-

ing words which determine the thing defined, withoutshowing the generation of its idea. Definitions,according to it, are synthetic, and are styled nominal.A definition affording the generation of the idea iscalled genetic or real. If I should say, man is arational animal I find united by mental synthesis, thenearest genus and specific difference', the components ;and I fully understand the nominal definition only byanalysisthat is going from the words to the compo-nent ideas. If, however, I commence a descriptionof man by beginning with the elementary ideas ; andproceed, by showing the generation of the complexidea, from the ideas to the words, I make a geneticdefinition. The process would be as follows. An ani-mal is an extended body endowed with life, sense andmotion ; most of such being incapable of formingjudgments and deducing a judgment from the agree-ment of two others ; which latter is a rational act.Some, however, are shown to be capable of such acts,and are rational animalsall of which are human,mankind, or man.

Genetic definitions are analytic, proceeding fromthe known ideas to the unknown or not understoodword to be defined ; whereas nominal definitionsare synthetic, proceeding from the unknown word to


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38 ELEMENTARY PHILOSOPHY.known ideas which compose it. The analytic methodin science commences with the known, and progresses,by decomposition, to the genesis of other ideas ; thesynthetic commences with nominal definitions, pro-gresses to axioms which are self-evident truths, andthence to theorems which require demonstration. Inthis manner it constructs knowledge upon knowledgewithout limit, save that determined by the nature ofthe human faculties. Euclid's geometry is accordingto strict synthesis ; and the study ofanatomy is accord-ing to strict analysis.

There are certain rules to be observed in defining,which are founded on the nature of things. A defini-tion must be clearer to the mind than the thingdefined ; it must not be more, nor less, extensive, normust it be negative. The reasons for the first twoare patent, and that for the last is based upon the factthat from what a thing is not you can only gatherwhat it is by exclusion, not by definition.Things are either substances, existing in themselves,

or are qualities, inhering in something else, and theirdefinitions must correspond ; definitions of substancesbeing according to themselves, and those of qualitiesbeing according to the substances in which theseinhere. Color is a quality, and is defined a quality ofvisible bodies, by which they decompose light, and reflectone or more of its component rays.

Substance, Attribute, Accident, Quality.I have several times introduced substance, attnbute


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logic. 39and accident, and think it well to here explain moreprecisely what I mean, although these terms will bemore fully developed hereafter. Substance is thatwhich has an independent existence of its own, anddoes not suppose the existence of something else, ofwhich it is a quality or mode. Schoolmen define it id quod in se subsistit, what exists in itself. In thisit differs from both attributes and accidents, whichrequire something in which to inhere. These twodiffer in this, that attributes are according to the na-tures of things, and necessarily result from their con-stitutions or essences ; as reason in man, life in ani-mals, liberty in a moral being ; whilst accidents may, ormay not, belong to their particular subjects ; and arewithout regard to the essences of their subjects, anyfurther than merely being in conformity with them ;as nationality in a man, or whiteness in a horse. Attri-butes and accidents are both qualities of things.

It was said that division differs from definition byenumerating individuals, and not attributes ; and theobject of division is to divide a subject into its indi-vidual components, to avoid confusion from too manythoughts about its different parts at the same time. Itis real and logical as contra-distinguished ; or essentialand integral as contra-distinguished. If, for example,you divide man as a subject really you enumerate thereal, substantial divisions of his nature ; as body andsoul : if logically, according to logical divisions ofgerms and species ; or other purely mental conceptions.If you divide the same subject essentially, you enume-


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40 ELEMENTARY PHILOSOPHY.rate the essential parts, without which the subject can-not be conceived ; as soul and body : if integrally, thematerial and natural parts; as feet, hands, face, &c.

Division should be full and complete, embracing allthe parts and no more. No one part must includeanother, and no one be equal in extent to the wholesubject. The subject should be divided according tothe order of nearnessthe nearest first ; as substanceinto corporeal and incorporeal ; corporeal into organicand inorganic ; organic into vegetable and animal ;animal into irrational and rational ; and irrational intoinsect, bird, lizard, quadruped, mammal, &c.

This treatment of the subject ideas has been longerthan was intended, but the importance of having itwell understood, in order to gain a fair knowledge ofLogic, could not be overlooked ; and a second readingof it is recommended before going further.


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LOGIC. 41

JUDGMENT.We shall now consider the mental operation which

is second in order towards reasoning. This is judg-ment ; and the formation of it is so often true and sooften false that differences in judgment always did, andalways will, divide mankind. To learn its nature,therefore, and the process by which it is formed, can-not be other than a very interesting investigationfirst, in the cause of truth, and, secondly, in that ofscientific progress.Judgment is defined an act of the mind by whichit apprehends several ideas as agreeing or disagree-ing. From this you will know thatjudgment requiresat least three perceptions : a distinct one of each ofthe component terms, and another of the relationshipaffirmed or denied between them. Judgment is anact of reflection ; it is deliberate ; and therefore a mereconcrete perception of a thing and its modes is not ajudgment. If you see a man walking, and do not, byattention, distinguish the separate ideas of man andwalking, you do not form a judgment in the matter.To form this you must not only perceive separatelythe ideas, but must unite or disunite them in yourmind by a separate mental act which affirms or deniessome relationship between them. If no relationshipbe perceived, although it exist, nojudgment is formed.It is clear, then, that a comparing of ideas and a per-


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42 ELEMENTARY PHILOSOPHY.ception of relation; ofagreement or disagreement; sub-sisting between them, are both necessary to the forma-tion of judgment ; and that the perception of thatrelation is really the reason why the mind acts inuniting or disuniting the ideas. Perception of rela-tions, then, is a moving power upon the mind towardsfurther action, and is properly termed the motive ofjudgment. Logicians call the motive of judgment evi-dence, and this very interesting subject we shall reachin a short time.The subject of a judgment is that about which some-

thing is affirmed or denied, and the predicate of ajudgment is that which is affirmed or denied of thesubject. In the judgment John loves James, John isthe subject and the loving of James is the predicate.The subject and predicate, regarded without the link,are the material ofjudgmentthe link is the form.Thus, in the judgment John loves James, John andthe loving of James are the material, and by them-selves they contain no knowledgethey mean no-thing ; but the link which effects meaning, and affirmsthe loving, is theform. It is merely the constructionof language which disguises the formality that John isloving James. The form, then, is in the affirmation ordenial of the union of terms, and is contained in theexpressions is or is not. All the rest is materialterms.From this it follows that a judgment may be simple,

with only one subject and one predicate ; or complex,by having complex subject or predicate. Both of


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logic. 43these may be very long and contain many ideas,making a very complex judgment, of which the termsare united or separated by is or is not. Any thing orthings said about the subject, which can be affirmed ordenied by one act of the mind, is the predicate. Thewhole of the first paragraph of the Declaration ofAmerican Independence, in which the duty of a revolt-ing colony to make known to mankind its reasons forrevolt is affirmed, constitutes one judgment throughthe synthetic unity of thought in that affirmation.Comparison, embracing all the ideas simultaneously,forms an union of them, out of which comes the men-tal unity of the act of judgment. It affords the crite-rion or rule by which the mind discriminates or dis-cerns whether it should affirm or deny; and thatdiscerning moves it to one thing or the otherthusbecoming the motive of the final mental act.

Evidence.Direct evidence is the perception of relations ; indi-

rect evidence is the knowledge of them through theauthority of other men, or other authority which maybe natural or supernatural. We have no knowledgewhatever but what is derived from evidence, direct orindirect.

Evidence is properly called the ultimate criterion oftruth subjective, or certainty; because, in last analy-sis it is by evidence that we judge. The last criterioncannot require demonstration, or it would not be reallythe last ; neither can it be extrinsic to the mind be-


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44 ELEMENTARY PHILOSOPHY.cause this would have to be tested by the internalprinciple, and it would not be last or ultimate. Sub-jective evidence is that which finally determines afterobjective evidence has been sifted.The last and nearest evidence in the mind, to move

it to judgment, is consciousness, of a fact. By fact Imean philosophically whatever is and is made manifestto the mind. This proposition requires your strictestattention and understanding; for consciousness is afaculty; the revealer of all other faculties ; the revealerof self to self; and the revealer to self in last analysis,of every evidence and every knowledge. It reveals toyou your self-existence and all its modifications ; andit is by it that you know yourself to be different fromevery other self; and by its evidence you know yourpossession of every other evidence whatever. Younever form a judgment that you do not exercise yourfaculty of consciousness. The schoolmen call it thesensus intimus, or inmost sense, because it is analogousto feeling, and feels, as it were, the reality of what ispresented immediately to the soul. It makes knownto the soul its existence, its unity, its identity, its par-ticular ever-varying conditions ; and, by reflection,the reality of its faculties and the reality of each par-ticular evidence x whether this be of the senses, au-thority, memory or reason.

Self-consciousness is a primary fact made known tous, through the self-sufficiency of God's infinite mindparticipated by us sufficiently to afford us fundamentalcertainty. It cannot be demonstrated and cannot be


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logic. 45denied. Being self-evident, it is, like other self-evidentfacts, such as thinking, feeling, incapable of beingproved ; since all are out of the bounds of reasoning,not in the sphere of its operations.To deny consciousness is to deny everything, be-

cause it is universally the ultimate motive of judg-ment, the evidence of all other evidences whateversince all other evidences are perceptions of rela-tions, and all perceptions are revealed proximatelyby consciousness.We have now seen this faculty under two aspects,under one revealing immediately the particular con-ditions of self; under the other revealing mediately,that is, through the medium of other evidences,other facts. These mediate evidences are those ofexternal sense, memory, induction, reason, testimonyand authority. We shall now proceed to the ex-amination of these different species of evidence, andin so doing we shall be really examining all thesources of human knowledge. The importance there-fore of attentively and critically studying them I neednot impress upon you.The external senses and memory are already reason-

ably well understood by you, perhaps sufficiently so fortheir logical functions. They are two of the element-ary faculties, and will be more fully treated, as regardstheir natures, in Metaphysics. What we wish tounderstand in Logic is, not so much their natures, astheir sufficiency or insufficiency to afford indubitable

4


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46 ELEMENTARY PHILOSOPHY.proof; in other words, their functions in reachingtruth and aiding in the process of right reasoning.When the senses are normal and not deceived them-selves, they do not, in their proper sphere, deceive usaffording under proper circumstances certainty innatural and physical things. Their order is only thenatural and physical, not the real or the supernatural.In these they are entirely out of order, the real beingin the order of intellect, and the supernatural in theorder of authority. At the baptism of Christ, theHoly Spirit was present under visible form, but theeyes beheld only a dove. In investigating its naturethey were out of their sphere. Again, when Christappeared after his resurrection in a supernatural bodywhich could pass through closed doors, the eyes sawthe appearances of a natural body and the hand ofThomas felt the appearances of a natural body. Tothe senses all that appeared natural was phenomenalwhat was real they could take no cognizance of.These instances are given only in illustration. It

is not the province of Logic to investigate the myste-ries of another science, only to show that those of thesciences of Theology or Metaphysics are beyond thereach of the senses of man. It is not necessary torecur to Theology to mystify our senses ; for all therealities of Metaphysics, many of which are clear tothe intellect, are unrevealed to sense. The physi-cal order alone is apparent to external senses, and itcomprises only qualities, not realities, of materialthings ; such as color, weight, hardness, form, taste,


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logic. 47smell, sound, &c. The senses may report on these, butnot on the realities in which these inhere. They aremeans to all physical knowledge, but immediately tono metaphysical knowledge whatever. The intellectonly, through its powers ofabstracting and generalizing,is a means to the latter.The Almighty is provident and economical in the

highest degree, and has provided us with sufficientphysical senses for physical well-being or pleasure,and for physical safe-guards against physical dangerfrom without or within. Their daily warnings in thisline can scarce be counted. This is in the order ofhis providence. In his economy he has confined thesesenses to a special sphere and not designed them tooperate in a higher sphere for which he expresslycreated the intellectual faculties. If then any one,ignoring this order of God, looks to his senses for evi-dence in intellectual things ; or to his intellect forevidence in sensible things ; he reverses the orderand reaches only error. A man born blind cannotreach the ideas of colors by intellect ; nor a man borndeaf reach the ideas of sounds and harmony by theintellect ; and the rule will apply to all the othersenses. In like manner a man born idiotic will notreach true reasoning by any or all the senses, no mat-ter how perfect he may have them. A misunder-standing of the system of God is not an uncommonsource of error, by which the mind affirms that whichis not, and denies that which is. Many atheists will notreceive God and His grace intellectually because


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48 ELEMENTARY PHILOSOPHY.they cannot sensibly. They are simply out of order.God is not revealable by the evidence of senses, whichfail to know him ; just as dark objects at night arenot revealable by the evidence of sight. There isno failure of dark objects, only failure of vision.

The external senses afford infallible testimony onlywhen acting within their proper sphere, that spheredetermined by reason. We have seen that the super-natural is out of their sphere ; likewise the pure intel-ligible ; but the sphere in which they afford infallibletestimony is far more restricted still. It occupies buta small spot even in the order of the sensible. Themost perfect eye cannot distinguish one human facefrom another at a mile's distance. The hearing, thetaste, the smell, the feeling, are all frequently confused,deceived ; but the sensation such as it is, correct orwrong, is truthfully conveyed to the interior by normalsenses. A sore finger may not distinguish hardnessfrom softness, roughness from smoothness, warmthfrom coldness ; an eye may be color-blind, not dis-tinguishing several colors from each other; but thesupplanting and spurious sensations are imposed uponthe nervous system somewhere between the foreignbody and the sensorium, and are faithfully deliveredto the latter.The senses must be subordinate to reason or they

give but unreliable evidence. In a natural life thereare certain distances inside of which we are ordi-narily liable to natural dangers ; and certain minute dis-


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logic. 49tances outside of which only we are so liable. Provi-dence has provided us with sufficient sensible facultiesto operate within these limits, for our natural protec-tion (to say nothing of rational enjoyment); and theselimits about circumscribe the sphere of certainty insensible evidence. There are factitious dangers, how-ever, but not natural ones, which are ordinarily liable tothreaten us from beyond either extreme ; as the tonguemay be touched by poison, whose action is near, with-out distinguishing it ; and the body may be struck bya ball from the distance of several miles. Reason mustthen admonish us as to when we can trust the evi-dence of senses ; it is the higher evidence, and senseis subordinate to it.

All the senses are capable of affording certaintywhen employed according to the design of theirauthor and within the limits fixed by him. Whenthis limit is approached, their evidence becomes un-certain and must be fortified by the higher one ofreason before we trust it. This leads us to reflectthat our mere physical existence is not the great ob-ject in view in the mind of the Creator; for it appearsfrom the fact that the domain of the senses' certaintyis nearly co-extensive with their importance in self pre-servation ; no greater. There is a realm beyond themwhich he has in view. Distance beyond the threat ofordinary natural dangers to us renders the eye and earuncertain ; and distance too small, makes them equallyuncertain : the telescope, the microscope, chemical an-alysis or reason, must compensate. The extremes of


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50 ELEMENTARY PHILOSOPHY.these distances are astronomical and chemical ; themean and true distance for certainty is about where theefficiency of the senses in self-preservation wouldplace it. The system of God extends to all our facul-ties. A limit proportionate to their functions in con-stituting man to be what he is, is placed upon all, andoutside of that limit all is uncertain ; for the facultiesare there out of order. How everything, exterior andinterior, remotest and nearest, confirms the naturalknowledge that all is systemized by one author

All the physical and all the mental sciences are partsof one universal science ; and no two things outsideof creatures' free creations conflict. All else is order,and only our free will acting irrationally makes dis-order.

What memory distinctly presents with circum-stances and time is true and certain evidence. Theevidence is in the distinctness. What is indistinct isnothing at all, for it is a failure of a memorial attempt.An appeal from memory indistinct, to memory dis-tinct, is like that from Philip drunk to Philip sober.In each case the appeal is from one thing to anotherthing.The evidence of memory depends entirely upon itsdistinctness as regards circumstances. If time, place

and surroundings are perfectly distinct in the mind,their recognition as being true repetitions of the pastcan be relied upon with certainty. If these are notperfectly distinct there is no failure of memorial re-


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52 ELEMENTARY PHILOSOPHY.rises from the knowledge of particular to that ofgeneral; as when, from the knowledge that all theparticular dogs that you have seen bark, you inferthat all dogs bark. To induct and to infer; inductionand inference, mean the same. From the uniformityof particulars you reason that there is a law, and youmay reason correctly or incorrectly in the matter. Ifyou were to watch the steamships leaving the Mersey,crowded with people going to America, and shouldinfer that all the people of Europe are going toAmerica, you would have a false induction ; but if youwere to discern that they are emigrating according toa law of humanity ; were to ascertain the applicationof the law, and should infer that emigration will con-tinue according to that law, you would have a trueinduction. The essence of it, then, is law and itsapplication discerned. From this you will understandthat when we apply the law of cause and effect, andinfer the existence of God from His physical laws,whilst atheists fail to do so ; we do not differ as to theexistence of law, but as to the nature of it ; theymaking it consist in mere blind, unreasoned uni-formity of particulars ; whilst we know it to be the en-actment of an intelligent and efficient first cause. Fromthe past you can know the law that will govern thefuture before the particulars of the future exist, andcan so reach the law-giver; but only by your know-ledge that intelligent order is the rule everywhere.This is the only link binding knowledge of the pastto law operative in the future ; and all men, whosoever


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54 ELEMENTARY PHILOSOPHY.order of nature, can be counted upon as within thedesign of the Author of that order. All men basecalculations upon, and have a certainty of, the contin-uation of the human race and certain other animaland vegetable races ; knowing that, no matter whatparticulars fail, the general will not. This is theknowledge of a law which cannot be blind force, andwe prove that there is no such thing as a law of blindforce as follows :

ist. There is a law, as we have seen, acknowledgedby all.

2d. Particulars may, and do continually, fail ; andany one may fail as well as another.

3d. Since each particular, one and all, seriatim,could and might fail under blind law ; the actualfailure of all would prove that there is no blind lawor any law.

4th. Nothing less than the preventive power of theAuthor of order could so far stay the failure as togive the stay the force of real law.

5th. There always has been, is now, and will con-tinue to be, a stay of failure, which is acknowledged.

Therefore there is a law which is not blind force,and it must be from an intelligent source.

The subjects, however, of this law are only actionswhich flow from the nature of things, spontaneously,not actions of free will ; in man only his spontaneousmodifications, not the modes that the race may assumein different phases of society, government, commerce,education or religion. The modes of brutes are


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LOGIC. 55according to fixed laws, but not some modes of manshowing the exceptions to be owing to the exerciseof free will. Inductive evidence leads us to the know-ledge of intelligence, design and law in the order ofnature ; that is, the knowledge of God ; also to theknowledge of free will in man. All the particularsthat can be counted will not evidence a law, or provean uniform sequence to be a law, unless the supposi-tion of intelligent design be of its essence. Free actsprove free nature ; acts of design designing naturesomewhere. Codrdinative acts throughout the mate-rial universe prove codrdinative nature either in it orin its cause ; and since such nature cannot be otherthan intelligent the intelligence must be in the cause.The principle that acts and natures gauge each otheris one never to be overlooked in Philosophy.

I have said that the whole essence of induction liesin law; and Lord Bacon, frequently styled the fatherof modern Philosophy, because he gave the greatestimpulse to inductive reasoning, and so changed in ameasure the current of philosophic investigation, dis-covered nothing new. Men had known law and prac-tised induction from time immemorial, and we all doit frequently every day. You scarcely ever lookabout you without inductive reasoning. As vouwalk along the street, you see, not a row of houses,but a row of walls, windows, doors, &c, all so orderedthat you see design and law, affording inductive evi-dence that behind the row of walls are systems ofcompartments, floors and chimneys ; in short, houses.


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$6 ELEMENTARY PHILOSOPHY.Again, you see men excavating a cellar ; you risefrom the particular to the general by your discerningthat cellars are intended for houses ; and you inferthat in the future a house will be built there. Yousee system ; and, by evidence as strong as the evi-dence of eyes, you see designing man as plainly asthough he were before you, instead of his design.So is it with the workings of nature. The seasons

succeed each other every year, and we know thatevery year is the order in the future as in the past.The motion of the earth in its orbit, in union with itspole's inclination to the plane of the ecliptic, is thecause of the seasons ; and I see in them originaldesign and the Designer. Without them there wouldbe no change of seasons, temperature or winds ; norain, no springs, no streams nor rivers on the landonly desert and death. The rain would fall fromgreat heights into the ocean whence it came, obedientto blind force, instead of filling the land with life, obe-dient to design. Mothers have always cared for theiroffspring, and they will continue to do so. Seedshave always sprouted, grown and reproduced theirkind, and so will they continue. The designed lawsof nature with which we are familiar are withoutnumber, and any one would prove God; yet the atheistperverts his judgment by his will and stultifies him-self by denying intelligent design in nature, whilst hiswhole life is a series of acts based on the certaintythat there has been design and law ; that the sameexist, and that they will continue to exist to sustain


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58 ELEMENTARY PHILOSOPHY.which we know generally that whatever is, is. Theconsideration of identical propositions we shall reachin a short time.The next evidences moving to judgment are autho-

rity and the testimony of men. These two terms arenot identical, for there may be testimony of men with-out authority. By the evidence of authority I meanthe evidence, on his ipse dixit, of one authorized tospeak, whether by his recognized jurisdiction or bydelegation from a higher positive authority. A childaccepts information on the authority of a parent, notbecause the parent may be a man to be trusted, butbecause it regards the source of information as supe-rior, by right, to its own judgment. If you regard aman as an apostle, a prophet ; or in any way inspired,delegated, or guided, by God, you accept, on his word,the evidence of his authority ; not because you trusthis natural powers, but the delegated authority whichyou believe him to hold. This is quite different fromthe testimony of men, based upon laws common tothe human race, and which we shall now consider.

That the testimony of men affords us certain evi-dence, does not seem to need proof, as it is a factmanifest to the mind by experience. Every person iscertain of things of which he has no knowledgeexcept from the testimony of others. He knowsthem to be facts. We all know the existence of suchcities as New York and Liverpool, and that shipssail regularly between them ; and our subjective cer-tainty is not affected by whether we have seen them


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logic. 59or not. We know as well the prominent facts of his-tory : the Grecian republic, the Roman empire, theCrusades, Demosthenes, Cicero, Charlemagne, St.Austin, Henry VIII. , and a host of historical events ;and we no more doubt these than we doubt the realityof what we see. The reason is that this species ofevidence, being on the testimony of others, is basedon the normal exercise of men's mental and moralfaculties ; that is, it is according to the laws of man'sbeing. Because the exercise is normal, it is accordingto law ; and because it is of the faculties, it is said toafford moral certainty. This, therefore, is based me-diately on law, and is referred to the Creator andDesigner of man's faculties, in final reference.

If human testimony could not afford both subjectiveand objective certainty, the system of which manforms a part would be incomplete.

It is a common thing to hear men, and even philo-sophers, talk of more or less certainty, as though cer-tainty were a compound divisible and had degrees ofmore or less. Certainty must not be confused withbelief; both consist in the adhesion of the mind to aknowledgeable object ; the former perfectly, the latterimperfectly. Subjective certainty is a condition ofthe mind excluding all doubt and fear of doubt ; theless perfect belief does not exclude fear of doubt.When I say belief I mean it in a philosophical sense,not in the theological sense of faith. If there be acondition of the mind which does not exclude fear ofdoubt, it does not conform to certainty; and the


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6o ELEMENTARY PHILOSOPHY.failure is not in the condition of mind, but in the evi-dence which fails to move judgment as far as certainty.The fault which many philosophers make is in attri-buting to certainty the variation which resides in theevidence, causing degrees of more or less strength inthis ; consequently, degrees in adhesion of mind toobject. Every evidence moves to a judgment of sub-jective certainty or fails to do so ; and it will accom-plish in one mind what it may fail to accomplish inanother. Its effect is according to the constitution,natural or other, of the particular mind ; and in thisthe mind may be modified by habit and desire. Thewish is often father to the mental condition. Whenthe elements of evidence are apprehended as fixed,either in themselves or according to laws, a judgmentof certainty should be effected ; but when they aremutable, the evidence is weaker, and only beliefstronger or weaker is likely to be generated. Whenman's free will enters the combination, a study ismade as to whether it operates in the testimonyaccording to fixed laws of humanity or according toappetites and passions ; immutably or mutably. Evenfree will follows by necessity some fixed laws, since itcannot prevent man from loving his own good. Thecase is studied in the individual, and the particularman is measured. If appetites and passions are likelyto rule, the elements are mutable ; and the conditionof the mind may vacillate, reach persuasion, or evenbelief; not certainty. If they are apprehended as qui-escent, subdued, or in any way inoperative, the evi-


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LOGIC. 6dence is stronger and the judgment higher towardscertainty, perhaps reaching it. The judgment, how-ever, may, or may not, conform to reality; it may betrue or false whilst the mind is in a condition exclud-ing doubt and the fear of doubt entirely. The moremen unite together in testimony, the more do weapprehend them acting according to fixed laws oftheir being ; the more uninfluenced by perverse willtherefore the greater the number the more fixed dowe apprehend the elements of evidence to be. Thusdo we see that a law of God underlies the certaintyarising from the testimony of men. Most philosophersdo not reach this conclusion, but are satisfied byreducing the testimony of men to the testimony ofself, through judging of others by one's self. This,however, is not a principle, only a rule ; and the ruleeven is less educed from the knowledge of self thanfrom the knowledge of mankind. It can be educedfrom either and is confirmed by both.In the pursuit of our subject of subjective certaintyin judgment and of the characters of the different sortsof evidence leading to it, we saw that the nearest andfinal revealer of truth, that which presents immediatelyall truth, is consciousness. The external senses, memoryand reason come next, as presenting their facts to con-sciousness. Induction, authority and testimony aremore remote, as having their facts undergo the ordealof reason before presentation. Consciousness is thebasis of the whole structure of knowledge, and with-out it we would have no knowledge. Against this

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62 ELEMENTARY PHILOSOPH Y.true system some illogical men argue that the solecriterion of truth is what they call common sense,which is nothing else than the common consent ofthe mass of mankind. In this they argue in a viciouscircle, for they pre-suppose the evidence of other facul-ties in reaching their fundamental truths ; viz., theexistence of the mass of mankind, and the fact thatmankind have a common consent in knowledge. Theevidence of the senses cannot prove the existence ofmen and then be proved in turn by the consent ofthose men. When we agree to receive as evidencethe consent of men it is because our reason finds thewherefore, and not because the wherefore is placed inus by other men. The final motive is personal.

In the apprehension of those logicians who claimthat there are degrees and qualities in certainty thedegree is owing to strength of evidence, and the qualityto sort of evidence ; and they term certainty physical,moral or rational, accordingly as we have it fromsenses, testimony of men, or reason. We have seen,however, that there is but one certainty, which consistsin adhesion of mind to object with exclusion of doubtand fear of it ; there is, however, physical, moral andrational evidence according to sense, testimony orreason.When we attain to a knowledge we naturally loveto repose at ease and without effort in the evidencewhich affords it ; and that commonly first sought byman is physical evidence. This is connatural withour lower nature, being the evidence of the

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