Eliminativism

• Philosophy of Mind

• Lecture 5

• (Knowledge and Reality)

Today’s lecture plan:

• 1. The ‘theory-theory’ of common sense psychology

• 2. A Choice: Vindication or elimination (Isomorphic causal roles.)

• 3. Arguments for Eliminative Materialism

• 4. Arguments against Eliminative Materialism

(Long live structure!)

The Churchlands

Paul Churchland

• A claim about our common sense conception of psychological states.

• The ‘theory-theory’.

• A predictive device.

• Postulates mental states and a network of laws.

• Like theoretical terms in science.

• The structure of what folk psychology (‘FP’) says produces behaviour.

Compare that with:• The structure of what in brain produces behaviour. • Question: Is there an isomorphism? • The more similarity the more vindicationist; the

more dissimilarity the more eliminativist. • Degrees of fit.

Arguments for eliminativism

• Folk psychology is an empirical theory…. Has its successes, so Fodor says… But

• Churchland says… that it also has failings… mental illness, sleep, imagination, intelligence.

• Possible reply to Churchland: (as) That shows FP is incomplete.

• And (b) it might still be a good theory of what it does cover.

Stephen Stich

Stich

• He draws attention to the generalisations of FP. Science is supposed to explain why they hold.

• Structure of FP and the real structure of the mind uncovered by ‘cognitive science’.

• FP, is like folk biology, folk physics, folk astrology…

• Why think we are so good at knowing about our own minds?

• So it is possible that FP is false.

• Example: folk conception of earthquakes…actually rolling and tumbling are different…

• Similarly FP assumes one unitary belief state, which underlies utterances and also that figures in practical reasoning.

• Argument: FP hasn’t changed for 1000s of years.

• Reply? This doesn’t show much. The longevity of theory is due to the fact that it is true?

• Argument: FP doesn’t cohere with other fields, such as brain science, biology etc.

• Reply?: what about history, economics, anthropology?

Arguments Against Eliminativism

(1) Predictive success • makes it likely that FP is true, that the

entities and laws it postulates exist. (Fodor)

• And… there is isomorphism of folk functional roles with what brain science has discovered.

(2) FP not a theory

• Not clear that the existence claims of FP are due, or entirely due, to predicting behaviour of other bodies.

• we are not like scientists… instead we empathetically put ourselves in other’s shoes. (‘Simulation’ theory.)

• We do not use some sophisticated theory. • Autism/young children research seems to

support this.

(3) Self-refutation?

• Eliminativism... is it self defeating? Baker argues that it is

Eliminativism asserts/believes/thinks it is reasonable to think that:

• There are no assertions?• No beliefs? • Nothing is rationally acceptable?

– That all looks self-refuting.

Lynne Baker

• Reply by ChurchlandAnalogy with ‘life’ and ‘vital spirit’?

• Eliminativists say that it is question begging to use the old to terms to express an objection to the theory.

• BUT: there is a problem with dispensing with rational norms. • Perhaps one could think that another person has no beliefs,

and has no reason to believe anything. • Not of oneself! . . (Remember Nagel on 1st and 3rd person

perspectives.) • This argument doesn’t seem question-begging.

• So eliminativsm is problematic.

• It seems we exist as Descartes though.

• But it seems that we are stepping outside of science to say that. Is that ok? (A big question.)

• Next week… on to Free Will