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ELITE AND MASS SUPPORT FOR FOREIGN AID VERSUS GOVERNMENT 

PROGRAMS: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FROM UGANDA 

MichaelG.FindleyDepartmentofGovernmentUniversityofTexasatAustinmikefindley@austin.utexas.edu

AdamS.Harris

DepartmentofPoliticsNewYorkUniversityasharris4@gmail.com

HelenV.Milner

DepartmentofPoliticsPrincetonUniversity

hmilner@princeton.edu

DanielNielsonDepartmentofPoliticalScienceBrighamYoungUniversitydan_nielson@byu.edu

March30,2015

Abstract Extantstudieshaveleftunresolvedwhetherforeignaidenablesorconstrainselitecapture,whichin turnhas effectson thepublic.Buildingonprominentdebates in the foreignaid literature,wetheorizethatforeigndonorswieldsubstantialcontrolovertheflowofaiddollars,makingelitecap‐turemoredifficultandbyextensionmassbenefitsmorelikely.Toassesstheargument,wecompareelite and mass support for foreign aid versus government spending on development projectsthroughanexperimentandsurveyonmembersoftheUgandannationalparliamentandaparallelstudyonarepresentativesampleofroughly3,600Ugandancitizens.Fortwoactualaidprojects,werandomlyassignedexposuretotheprojects’differentfunders.Significanttreatmenteffectsonatti‐tudesandbehaviorsrevealthatmembersofparliamentsupportgovernmentprogramsoverforeignaid, whereas citizens prefer aid over government. The argument also implies that respondentsshould favor foreign aidmore as their perceptions of government clientelism and corruption in‐crease.Usingsubgroupanalysis,weexplorethispatternandalsoreportonseveralpossiblecom‐peting mechanisms: partisanship, co‐ethnic bias, nationalism, incumbency, and a foreign mediaeffect.Effectsaremostapparent formembersofparliamentandcitizenswhoperceivesignificantgovernmentcorruption,suggestingthatcitizensseeforeignaidasanescapefromcorruption,butelitesperceivemoreavenuesforthecaptureofgovernmentresourcescomparedtoaid.

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Introduction 

Academic disputes rage over what foreign aid allows politicians to do. For some

scholars,aidenablespoliticalelitestobuyvotes,buildmilitariesforrepression,andenrich

themselvesthroughcorruption(Svensson2000,AlesinaandWeder2002,Bräutigamand

Knack2004,Easterly2006,Morrison2009,Moyo2009,Morrison2012).Aidmaythusun‐

dermine citizens’ ability to hold political elites accountable for how public revenues are

spent(Ross2004,Knack2009,Morrison2009,Moyo2009).Inthisview,foreignassistance

is often capturedbypowerfulpolitical elites in recipient countries, thusbenefitingelites

andhurtingmasses.

Alternatively,othersarguethatforeignaidcanbypasscorruptpoliticiansandtarget

thedeliveryofneededpublicgoodsdirectlytorecipientsevenasitpromotescivilsociety

actors thatcandemandbettergovernance(Finkel,etal.2007,WrightandWinters2010,

McLean and Schneider 2014,Bermeo2015,Mosley forthcoming). Additionally,much aid

targetsgovernmentcapacitybuildingandmightcontributeto thedevelopmentofbetter‐

functioninginstitutionsandthusconstrainpoliticianstocleanupcorruptionandmisman‐

agement(Riddell2007,BaserandMorgan2008).Bythisaccounting,foreigndonorshave

considerableinfluenceoverthedistributionofforeignassistance,thusbypassingelitesand

benefitingthemasses.

Thedebateremainsunresolvedforanumberofreasons;weconsidertwoimportant

elements.First,greaterattentionneedstobefocusedontheperceptionsofandpreferences

foraidofbothpolitical elitesandcitizens in recipient countries.Manyscholarshavead‐

dressedthedebatebylookingatflowsofaidandcorrelatingthemwithvarious“objective”

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measures of economic or political development outcomes. This is an important exercise

andhasyieldedmany,althoughinconsistent,resultsabouttheimpactofaid.Weareinter‐

estedinadifferentelementoftheaidequation.Wethuswanttoknowwhatelitesandciti‐

zenswhohaveexperiencedforeignaidbelieveaboutit,andhowmuchtheysupportit.

Thesesubjectiveattitudesmaymatter justasmuchasobjectiveoutcomes. These

attitudesandbeliefsmayhaveastrongcorrelationwithhowaidprojectsareactuallyper‐

forming. After all, Ugandans are likely to experience aid projects continually since aid is

suchanimportantpartoftheireconomy,aswedetail later. Moreover,eveniftheseper‐

ceptionsdonotcorrelatewithobjectiveoutcomes,theymaybemoreimportantforpolitics,

policy,anddevelopment. Citizensandeliteshaveattitudesandbeliefsfirstandthentake

actionsornot;objectivemeasuresofoutcomesmaynotbeknowntothemandarefiltered

throughtheirbeliefsinanycase.1Evenifwecouldagreeonkeyobjectivedevelopmentin‐

dicators,2itisnotclearthattheyareasimportantasperceptionstocitizenandelitebehav‐

ior.Thisisespeciallytrueofpublicgoodsprovisionsinceobjectivemeasuresofthemare

even lessdeveloped.3Research shows that attitudes andbeliefsmatter a greatdeal and

1Asamajorrecentstudyconcluded,“thereoftenseemstobeamarkeddistancebetweenstandardmeasuresof importantsocioeconomicvariables likeeconomicgrowth, inflation,unemployment,etc.andwidespreadperceptions.Thestandardmeasuresmaysuggest,forinstancethatthereislessinflationormoregrowththanindividualsperceivetobethecase,andthegapissolargeandsouniversalthatitcannotbeexplainedbyref‐erencetomoneyillusionortohumanpsychology.Insomecountries,thisgaphasunderminedconfidenceinofficialstatistics(forexample, inFranceand in theUnitedKingdom.onlyonethirdofcitizenstrustofficialfigures, and these countriesarenot exceptions),witha clear impacton theway inwhichpublicdiscourseabouttheconditionsoftheeconomyandnecessarypoliciestakesplace.”(Stiglitz,etal.2009,p.7)2SeeforinstancethedebatesaboutusingGDPpercapitaversustheHumanDevelopmentIndex(Srinivasan1994).3“Governmentsplayanimportantpartintoday’seconomies.Theyprovideservicesofa“collective”nature,suchas security, andofamore “individual”nature, suchasmedical servicesandeducation.…Beyond thecontribution of collective services to citizens’ living standards, individual services, particularly education,medicalservices,publichousingorpublicsportsfacilities,arealmostcertainlyvaluedpositivelybycitizens.

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evenmorethanobjectiveindicators. Subjectivewell‐beingisnowamajorelementofde‐

velopment policy. Research on happiness—or life satisfaction, for instance, shows both

that it isnotcloselyrelatedtoobjective indicatorsandhas importanteffectsondevelop‐

ment (Easterlin1973,1995, Sen1999,FreyandStutzer2002,Layard2005,Kroll2011).

Researchontrustissimilar. Itisnothighlycorrelatedwithobjectiveindicatorsofdevel‐

opment,butitisessentialforfosteringdevelopment(ZakandKnack2001,Tabellini2010,

Bjørnskov2012).Finally,aswedetailbelow,differenttheoriesabouttheimpactofaidde‐

pend on andmake assumptions about citizens’ and elite attitudes, beliefs, and behavior.

Examiningthesevaryingassumptionsagainstevidencemightyieldaclearerpictureabout

theroleofaid.Itshouldhelpustounderstandunderwhatconditionsdifferenttheoriesof

aid and its effects aremore likely to be operative.Hence perceptions and preferences—

especiallyasrevealedbyourbehavioraloutcomes‐‐matter,notjustobjectiveindicators.

Second, aid does not occur in an institutional vacuum, so we need ameaningful

baselinetowhichtocompareit,andgovernmentprojectsprovidethemostrelevantalter‐

native.Mosttheoriesshareexpectationsaboutdomesticelites,arguingthattheyplayasig‐

nificant role in shaping how foreign aid affects their country. Yet, to our knowledge, no

directandsystematicevidencehasbeengatheredthatemployspoliticiansasrespondents

instudieswheretheyreflectonthedispositionofaid.Studiesofrecipientcitizens’support

for aid are likewise rare. And yet probing elite andmass perceptions about foreign and

Theseservices tend tobe large inscale,andhave increasedconsiderablysinceWorldWar II,but, inmanycases,theyremainbadlymeasured.Traditionally,measureshavebeenbasedontheinputsusedtoproducetheseservices(suchasthenumberofdoctors)ratherthanontheactualoutputsproduced…Forasatisfacto‐rymeasureofeconomicperformanceandlivingstandardsitisthusimportanttocometogripswithmeasur‐inggovernmentoutput.”(Stiglitz,etal.2009,pp.11‐12)

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governmentassistancemaybepreciselywhatisnecessarytounderstandaidallocationand

use.

Herewepresenttwotheoriesabouttheflowofaidwithinrecipientcountriesand

discussthe.Weexaminetheirassumptionsaboutmassandeliteperceptionsofandpref‐

erences for aid and government development projects.We point out several hypotheses

thatderivefromthesearguments.Thefirsttheory,whichwecalltheaidcapturetheoryas‐

sumes thataid ispurely fungibleandcanbeusedby recipientpoliticiansat theirwill. It

impliesthatelitesshouldbeatleastindifferentbetweenthetwosourcesoffundingforde‐

velopmentprojectsormorestronglypreferforeignassistancebecausetheycancaptureit

likeothernon‐taxrevenuesanduseitfortheirownpurposes.Citizens,ontheotherhand,

shouldnotsupporttheforeignassistancestronglybecauseelitesarecapturingtheaidand

societycontinuestosuffersimilartowiththeproblemwithsubstantialnon‐taxrevenues

suchasoil.Thesecondtheory,whichwecallthedonorcontroltheory,arguesthatdonors

havemuchmoreinfluenceoveraidandcanchannelandconditionit.Unabletocapturethe

aid easily, elitesdonot strongly support foreignaid and insteadprefer governmentpro‐

grams. Alternatively, benefitting more fully from the foreign assistance, citizens evince

strongerpreferencesfortheforeignaidrelativetoelite‐dominatedgovernmentprograms.

Inthispaper,wecontendthatdonorsdoindeedexercisesignificantcontrolovertheflow

ofaidfundsand,therefore,theexpectationsofthedonorcontroltheoryaremorelikelyto

findsupportinempiricalanalysis.

Wereporttwoparallelexperimentsperformedin2012inUgandathatcontrastelite

andcitizensupportfordevelopmentprojectsintreatmentconditionsattributedtoforeign

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donorscomparedtoidenticalprojectsinacontrolconditioninwhichnodonorwasexplic‐

itlymentioned and thatmost sampledUgandans took tobe thedomestic government.A

sizableminorityofsubjectsbelievedtheunnamedfunderinthecontrolconditionwasac‐

tuallyaforeigndonor,butthisworksinfavorofthenullhypothesisofnosignificantdiffer‐

ence between treatment conditions and control. The differences reported below thus

understateelites’andcitizens’contrastingpreferencesforaidversusgovernmentprojects

giventheinformationwehave,aresultweshowindetailintherobustnesssection.

In all, wewere able to conduct nearly hour‐long interviewswithmore than two

thirdsof the sittingNinthUgandanParliament (276outof375membersofparliament).

Wealsoconductedthestudywith78formerMPsfromtheEighthParliament.(Totalcur‐

rentandformerMPssurveyedis354.)Moreover,werandomlysampledanationallyrepre‐

sentative group of roughly 3,600 Ugandan citizens for comparisons. The parallel

experimentsprovidedanopportunity foreach setof subjects todemonstrate individual‐

levelsupportforforeignaidorgovernmentfundsthroughbehavioralactionsthatimposed

personalcostsaswellasthroughresponsestoattitudinalsurveyquestions.

Interestingly,elitesandmassesinUgandadistinguishbetweenthesetwosourcesof

developmentfunding.Membersofparliamentaresignificantlymorelikelytosupportpro‐

jects in thecontrolconditionthatmost tooktobethegovernmentratherthantreatment

projectsidentifyingforeigndonors.However,citizensaresignificantlymorelikelytosup‐

port foreigndonors,precisely theoppositeof theelites.Effectsizesaregenerallymodest

and approach a ceiling, but the differences are significant and robust across a variety of

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specifications.ThesedifferencesbetweenthepublicandeliteinUgandaformaninterest‐

ingandnovelpuzzleandoffersupporttothedonorcontroltheory.

Thesedistinctpreferencesregardingaidshouldberelatedtootherbeliefsandpref‐

erencesthatelitesandmasseshold, if thedonorcontroltheoryaboutaid isoperative. In

particular, if citizens perceive corruption and clientelism, then they should even more

stronglypreferforeignassistanceasdonorsmightbetheonlysourceofassistance.Ifelites

perceive corruptionandclientelism, then they shouldevenmore stronglyprefergovern‐

mentprogramsbecauseinfluentialforeigndonorswouldnotallowskimmingfromforeign

funds.Weevaluatepossiblesubgroupeffectsandtheresultsareconsistentwiththedonor

control theory.MPswhoperceivegreater government corruptionare especially likely to

prefergovernmentprojectsoverforeignaid,whereascitizensperceivinggovernmentcor‐

ruptionwere significantlymore likely to support the aid projects. Subjectswho did not

perceive government corruption appeared indifferent between aid and government pro‐

jects. Effect sizes for corruption subgroup analyseswere considerably larger than in the

mainanalysis.

Wealsoexplorealternativemechanismsthatmightunderliethesedifferences:par‐

tisanship, ethnicity, nationalism, incumbency, and a foreign reputation effect. In general,

theremainingsubgroupresultsprovidenullorweakevidenceforallofthepossiblemech‐

anisms.Taken together, our results tell an interesting storyaboutmass andelitebeliefs,

preferences,andbehavior. Inparticular theysuggest that–at least in themindsof those

withdirectexperience–aidmaybelesssusceptibletopoliticalcapturethangovernment

resources.

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Thisstudyaddresseskeygapsinourunderstandingofthepoliticaleconomyofde‐

velopment.First,webuildonrecentdebatesabouttheroleofforeignassistanceindevel‐

opingcountriesbyadvancing the theoreticalargumentthatdonorsexerciseconsiderable

controlovertheflowofaid.Thisincreasedcontrolresultsingreatersupportforforeignaid

fromcitizensandlesssupportfromelites.Second,itisthefirstdetailedstudyofforeignaid

versusdomesticgovernmentfundingtoemploymembersofparliamentinarecipientgov‐

ernment as respondents. This comparison of masses and elites provides a novel puzzle

aboutdivergentpreferencesfordevelopmentassistance.Third,itconsidersadditionalim‐

plicationsofthedonorcontroltheory,namely,thatcitizensperceivinggreatercorruption

and clientelism shouldprefer strongerdonorswho cannonethelessdeliver aid,whereas

elitesshouldprefertheopposite.Theresultsbearoutthisadditionalimplication.

The Debate 

Indevelopingcountries, foreignaidhasanon‐trivial influenceonthepoliticaland

economic landscape,bothat the levelof leadersandcitizens. Politicalandhumanitarian

motives for aid allocation (e.g., Alesina and Dollar 2000) as well as aid effectiveness in

termsofobjectivemeasuressuchaseconomicgrowth(e.g.,BurnsideandDollar2000)are

wellrepresentedintheaidliterature.Sensingadiminishingutilityincontinuingthesede‐

bates, scholarshave turned tounpacking the specificpolitical economiesof aid indonor

andrecipientcountries.

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Avigorousdebateisunfoldingstakingouttwokeypositions.Oneapproachwecall

theaidcapturetheorypositsthatdonorsprovideforeignaidinexchangeforpolicyconces‐

sions from the recipient government;donors give aid thenwithoutmuch concern for its

usebytherecipient.Aid is thusassumedtobeasourceof fungiblegovernmentrevenue,

likeothernon‐taxrevenuesincludingoil–andwithpotentiallysimilarnegativeeffectson

theeconomyandpolityasinthewell‐knownresourcecurse(seeRoss1999,Humphreys,et

al.2007).Bythisaccounting,donorsprovideaidinminimally invasivewaysand, inturn,

benefit fromrecipientpolicy concessions (BuenodeMesquitaandSmith2007,2009). In

exchange,donorsprovidehighlyfungibleaidsuchthattherecipientpolitical leaderswho

mustapprovepolicyconcessionswillbenefit.Anapproachemphasizingdonorself‐interest

isnotwithoutfoundation;indeed,conventionalwisdomcontendsthatdonorsgiveaidfor

politicaloverhumanitarianreasonsandwouldthereforeprioritizeaiddeliveryaccording‐

ly.

Forrecipientleaders,fungibleaidisaboonbecausetheycancaptureaidandbenefit

directly;forrecipientcitizens,itisabanebecause,asaresultofelitecapture,theysuffer.

Thus,analystshavelikenedaidtonaturalresourcesinthewayresources“curse”develop‐

ingcountrieswithconflict,autocracy,andpoorgovernance(Morrison2009,Moyo2009,p.

59,Morrison2012).Prominentstudieshaveheldthatexternalsourcesofmoney,suchas

natural resources and aid, enablepoliticians to entrench themselves rather thanbeheld

accountableasisthecasefortaxrevenues(Bräutigam2000,Smith2008,Morrison2009,

Gervasoni2010).Citizens,itisclaimed,demandmoreaccountabilityandbetteroutcomes

when their tax dollars are at play (Schumpeter 1954, North and Weingast 1989, Ross

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2004),thusmakingaidandoilnetcostsforcitizens.Bythislogic,politicalelitesinthedo‐

norandrecipientcountriesarethemajorbeneficiariesofaid,asaidfunctionstoincrease

theirpoliticallongevity,whereascitizensinpoorrecipientcountriesarethebiggestlosers

fromaid,asmasspublicsare forced toacceptpolicyconcessions theyopposeand toen‐

duremorecorruptionfromtheirownleaders(BuenodeMesquitaandSmith2009,p.311).

Otherscholarshaverespondedwithadifferenttheoryaboutforeignaid.Inthisver‐

sionwecallthedonorcontroltheory,donors—especiallythoselessmotivatedbyforeign

policygoals—havedifferentmotivationsandaremoreinterestedinandcapableofmoni‐

toringhowaidisusedintherecipient.Bythisaccounting,donorsdomorethanseekpolicy

concessionsinminimallyinvasiveways.Instead,theyplan,commit,disburse,andmonitor

aidinwaysthatdonotsimplybenefitleaders,butratherprovidenovelmeansofpursuing

broader recipient‐level goals including reaching the citizenswho comprise the set of in‐

tended beneficiaries. Donors understandmany of the challenges they face in developing

countriesandtrytoactstrategicallytoadvancetheirgoals.Incontrasttoastoryemphasiz‐

ingdonorallocationofrelativelyunrestrictedfungibleaid,donorsattachconditionstoaid,

providebothnon‐fungibleand fungibleaid, alter the channelofdelivery, andevenwith‐

hold(orthreatentowithhold)aidinresponsetorecipientleaderdecisions.

Atabroadlevel,Bermeo(2010,2011)showsthatdonorsgoalshavechangedsince

theendoftheColdWarandthattheyarenowmorefocusedondevelopmentanddemocra‐

cypromotion.Shedemonstratesthatdonorspursue“strategicdevelopment,”instrategical‐

lyallocatingdifferenttypesofaidtodifferenttypesofcountries.Often,aidexplicitlytargets

improvements in government capacity rather than providing narrow benefits to specific

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leaders.Forexample,Bermeo(2015,p.4)showsthataiddoesnotinhibitdemocratization,

noting that “aid is not oil. Foreign aid comes fromdonors and donors havepreferences.

Theyalsohavetoolstoprovideaheterogeneousbasketofaidwhichcanlookverydifferent

fromtherevenuestreamattachedtoastate‐ownedenterprise.”

Evenifaidfailstostrengtheninstitutionsorbuildcapacitydirectly,thisalternative

literature claims that aid—especially for democracy and governance—can find ways

aroundincumbentpoliticians.Dietrich(2013)showsthatdonorsstrategicallydecidehow

muchaidtoprovidedirectlytogovernmentsandhowmuchtobypassthem.Inweakerand

more corrupt institutional environments, donors aremore likely todecide tobypass the

governmentandchannelaidtohelpingbuild targetedprojects in therecipient.This “cir‐

cumvention”aidcansupportoppositionparties,watchdogmedia,andcivilsocietyorgani‐

zations that might effectively demand more accountability. Indeed, some evidence

suggests that aid contributes significantly to democratization in recipient governments

(Finkel,etal.2007,ScottandSteele2011,Aronow,etal.2012).

In strategically targeting and delivering aid, donors provide less fungible aid. As

AltincekicandBearce(2014)argue,aidmayneverhavebeenasfungibleasmanyscholars

imply.Theyastutelypointoutthattheresearchonfungibilityrelieslargelyonasinglepa‐

per (Feyzioglu, et al. 1998),which found high fungibility only in one sector: agriculture.

Moreover,donorshavegrownlessinclinedovertimetogiveaidasdirectbudgetsupport,

whichislikelyeasierforelitestocapture.Thus,aidmaybehighlyrestrictedinwaysthat

stymierecipientpoliticians’rapaciousdesigns.

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Foreign aid – especially if it ismonitored, has conditions attached to it, or is less

fungible–maythusservemoreasapublicgoodthatpoliticiansstruggletodiverttothem‐

selvesandtheirallies(MavrotasandOuattara2006).Aidmaynotbe,infact,similartooth‐

er non‐tax revenues such as oil. If donors exercise substantial control over aid, thenwe

shouldexpectleadersandcitizenstoviewaiddifferently.Incontrasttocitizenswhomay

preferforeignaid,leaderswhodonotbenefitasmuchpersonallymaysupportaidlessen‐

thusiastically.

Thedebateremainsunresolved.Extantstudiesaddresstheproblemfrommultiple

methodologicalperspectives,butthusfarhavenottakenthestudydirectlytothepolitical

eliteswhomay use (or abuse) foreign aid nor to themasseswhomay benefit or suffer.

Whilenomethodologyisperfect,andourexperimentalapproachdoesnotresolvethedis‐

pute, focusedexperimentsusingelitesandcitizensassubjectsmaycontributeto thisde‐

bate by providing evidence about who supports foreign aid or government funding for

developmentprojects,andtheirreasonsfordoingso.Supportfordifferentsourcesofreve‐

nueamongmassesandelites–particularlytheirbehavioralsupport–oughttoshedsome

lightonthepoliticaleconomyofdonor‐recipientrelations.

If the aid control camp is correct in claiming that donors do not exercise control

overaidand that therecipientgovernmentcanuseaidas itpleasesunlike taxrevenues,

then like other non‐tax revenues politicians should prefer foreign aid over government‐

fundedprograms.Leaderswouldthusbefreertousetheaidfortheirownpurposescom‐

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paredtotaxrevenuesforwhichtheymustanswertothepublic.4If,ontheotherhand,the

donorcontroltheoryiscorrectandforeigndonorsexercisemorecontrolandaccountabil‐

ityoveraidfunds,anddonorshavethecapacitytoaudit,constrain,andpunishpoliticians

who try to use aid for their own political ends, thenwe expect a different result: elites

should prefer government programs to foreign aid projects. MPs should be keen to use

available resources tomaintain their privilegedposition and should thereforeprefer the

fundingsourcewithfewerconstraints(seevandeWalle2003,p.313).5

Preferencesofcitizensshouldmoveintheoppositedirection.Ifdonorsexercisesuf‐

ficientcontroloveraidsuchthatitreachesthecitizensingreatervolumeandefficacy,then

citizensshouldpreferforeignassistanceovergovernmentspending.Thisfindingshouldbe

especiallylikelyforthosewhoperceivethegovernmenttobeveryclientelistorcorrupt.If

donorscannotimposecontrolandaidisseenasreinforcingtheproblemscharacterizingall

non‐taxrevenues, thencitizensshouldmorestronglysupportgovernmentspendingover

aid.6

AlongnearlyeverymajorbywayinUganda,asinmanydevelopingcountries,signs

tyingprojectstoforeignordomesticdonorscrowdtheroadsideandthereforewouldmake

theconnectionofaidtooutcomespossible.Ofcourse,citizens’perceptionsmaybemistak‐

enabouttheeffectsofaid,andweareopentointerpretingourdatainthislight.However,

4Totheextentthattaxrevenuesarealsonotconstrainedbythepublicandaidisfungiblewiththem,thenelitesshouldbeindifferentbetweenthetwosources.5Similarly,whatRothchild(1986)called“hegemonialexchange”andBayart(1993)“reciprocalassimilationofelites,”clientelismpervadesAfricasincepoliticalstabilitytherehasoftenbeenconstructedbyusingstateresourcesto forgealliancesacrossdifferentsocialelites,often in the formofovertpower‐sharingarrange‐ments(vandeWalle2003).6Wealsoinvestigatedpreferencesoflocalgovernmentofficials(similartostateandcitylevelofficialsintheUS),butfoundnosignificantpreferenceforgovernmentoraid‐fundedprojects.Thisislikelythecasebecausetheseofficialsmostlyreceivefundsfromthecentralgovernmentthatareearmarkedalready.

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evenifcitizensaremisinformed,politicians,wewouldargue,haveabettergraspoftheef‐

fectsofdifferentsourcesofrevenueontheirpoliticalcareers. Membersofparliamentof‐

ten influencehowaid isdistributed inrecipientcountries.LearningMPs’dispositionand

behavior toward aid, especially as it compares with government funding, appears im‐

portanttounderstandinghowaidmightbechanneledthroughdomesticinstitutions.And

socombiningstudiesofthetwosubjectpoolsandcomparingtheirattitudesandbehaviors

towardthesameexperimentalconditionsisusefulandnovel.

The results of this study – especially for theMP experiment –may reflect on our

theoriesofaidandonkey links in thecausalchainconnecting thepoliticaleconomiesof

donorsand recipients. Ifwe find that citizensandelitesare indifferentbetween the two

sources,thissuggeststhattheaidcapturetheoryisrightandaidisveryfungibleandnei‐

thergroupcandistinguishthetwosources. Ifwefindthatonaveragecitizenspreferaid

andelitesprefergovernment,wemightconcludethatthedonorcontroltheoryaboutdo‐

norsbeingabletochannelaidhadmoresupport.Andifwefindelitespreferaidandciti‐

zens prefer government projects, itmight suggest that again the aid capture theory has

moresupportandthattaxrevenuescanbebettermonitoredthanaidfunds.

The Ugandan Context 

Contextmatters for the theoriesweareexamining. Ingeo‐strategically important

developingcountriesandinonesthataredemocraticandwellgoverned,thetheoriessug‐

gestthatdonorsshouldbelessworriedabouttherecipient’suseoffunds.Channelingaid,

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monitoring and bypassing the government should be less necessary. Uganda likemany

Sub‐Saharan countries does not fit this description. Uganda currently has a semi‐

authoritarian regime inwhich thegovernmentofYoweriMuseveni’sNationalResistance

Movement (NRM) has retained power for nearly 30 years (van de Walle 2007, Greene

2010). In2006,Ugandabeganholdingmultiparty elections; yet theyhavenotbeen fully

freeandfair(Cheibub,etal.2010,HydeandMarinov2012).Scholarsdescribetheparty’s

rulingmethodsasrelyingheavilyonpatronageandclientelismtoretainitscontrol(vande

Walle2003,2007,Muhumuza2009,Green2010,Tripp2010).Asonerecentstudypoints

out,“InUganda,therulingNRMhasestablishedpatronagenetworksthroughoutthecoun‐

trythroughtheuseoflocalgovernment.Thecivilserviceisanothersuchnetworkofpat‐

ronage,andperhapsthemost important is themilitary.Theseclientelistnetworks,while

consolidatingkeysourcesofsupport,at thesametimeunderminegovernanceanderode

theviabilityofinstitutionsandleadership”(Tripp2010,p.25).Asof2010,Ugandaranks

onthehigherendofcorruptionscales,scoringinthe72ndpercentile(129thoutof178)on

TransparencyInternational’sCorruptionPerceptionsIndex.

Partisanshipandethnicattachmentshavealsoplayed important roles inUgandan

politics at both the citizen and elite levels, revolving around the NRM‐opposition split.

However,recently,theNRMhasfacedimportantoppositionnotjustfromoppositionpar‐

ties,whoarefracturedandcurrentlyonlyhold16%oftheseatsinparliament,butmainly

fromwithintheNRM’sownranks. Intherun‐uptothe2011parliamentaryelections, for

example,theNRMprimarieswerehotlycontested(inmanyinstancesmorecontestedthan

thegeneralelections).Ballotboxeswerestuffedandelectionsriggedtoensurethatparty‐

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leaderfavoriteswontheNRMpartynomination(Malinga2010).This ledtowidediscon‐

tentamongthelosersoftheprimaries.Manyoftheseindividualsthenranasindependents

in2011,andnowthecurrentparliamenthasmore independents thananysingleopposi‐

tionparty,whichmakestheroleofpartisanshipmorecomplicatedandlesspredictable.7

EthnicityisalsoimportantintheUgandanpoliticalcontext.Critically,sharedethnic‐

itywiththechiefexecutiveofthecountryhasimportantpoliticalanddevelopmentalcon‐

sequencesinthattheleader’sco‐ethnicsarelikelytobenefit(FranckandRainer2012).In

Uganda,itiscommonlyunderstoodthatwhenNorthernerssuchasPresidentMiltonObote

wereinpower,theNorthernregionofthecountryreceivedthemostbenefitsintermsof

development, government employment, and othermaterial goods.Now, under President

Museveni,manycitizensarguethattheWesternregion,especiallythoseareasinwhichhis

fellowMuyankolearedominant,receivethenewroads,schools,andclinics.Whetherornot

thisisinfacttrue,citizenstendtooperateundertheseassumptions(seePosner2005).

Ugandaprovidesausefulsettingfortheexperimentbecauseitreceivessubstantial

amounts of foreign development assistance. Since the 1990s, aid including off‐budget

sourcesequalsapproximately70percentofgovernmentexpenditures.Moreover, aiden‐

compassedabout15percentoftotalGDPformuchofthatperiod,thoughthesharehasde‐

clinedtosomeextentinthelastfewyearsaseconomicgrowthhasincreased.Somebasic

7ThecurrentUgandanparliamenthas375membersrepresenting7politicalparties:238ConstituencyMPs,112WomanMPs,10UgandanPeople’sDefenseForce(UPDF)representative,and5representativesforeachofthefollowingspecialinterestgroups:peoplewithdisabilities(PWD),workers,andyouth.ThevastmajorityofMPsareelectedunderpluralityrulesinsingle‐memberconstituencies.Eachdistrictelectsonefemalerep‐resentativeandeachconstituency(usually twoor threeconstituenciesarecontained inonedistrict)electsoneConstituencyMP.Elevenex‐officiomembersareappointedinaddition,andeachofthefivegeographicalregionselectsonePWD,Worker,andYouthrepresentativeandtwoUPDFrepresentatives.

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informationgarneredfromoursurveyconfirmedthatcitizenshadgeneralawarenessboth

of foreign aid and their parliamentary representatives.More than two thirds of subjects

knewthatmorethan30percentof theUgandanbudgetcomes fromforeignaid; thevast

majority(66percent)couldnameboththeirConstituencymemberofparliamentandDis‐

trictWomanmemberofparliament;andthemajorityofsubjectswereawareofforeignaid

flowingtotheirlocalareas.

UgandaisalsotypicalofAfricancountriesintermsofitsdemocratizationprocesses,

current level of democratization, and executive dominance (Bratton and van de Walle

1997,ResnickandvandeWalle2013).Likewise,much likemanyof thecountriesacross

the continent, the Ugandan parliament sees quite competitive elections and while it is

muchweakerthantheexecutiveitismuchmorethansimplyarubberstampandisavenue

forimportantandlivelydebates(HumphreysandWeinstein2012).Indeedthereadingof

thebudgeteachyearisoneofthemostcontroversialandimportantmattersforeveryMP.

IfweconsiderUganda’slevelofdemocracy(PolityIVscore)anddegreeofaiddependence

(World Bank’s World Development Indicator of net official development assistance per

capita),UgandaisverysimilartoEthiopia,Guinea‐Bissau,Togo,Chad,andtheCentralAfri‐

canRepublic.Whiletherearevariousotherconsiderationssuchasethnicdiversity,coloni‐

alhistory, levelsofeconomicdevelopment,etc.,similarityonthesetwokeymeasuresare

importantforunderstandingtowhichcasestheseresultsmostlikelygeneralize. Inthese

contextsthen,weexpectdonorstobeactiveandconcernedabouttheiraiddollars,andof‐

tenunwillingtoletrecipientgovernmentsdoastheypleasewiththefunds.

18

ResearchDesign

Toinvestigatecompetingexpectationsregardingeliteandmasspreferencesforfor‐

eign aid compared to governmentprograms,we conducted twodifferent experiments in

thefield,eachwithcompanionsurveys.First,wecarriedoutanexperimentonaconven‐

iencesampleof276ofthe375Membersofthe9thUgandanParliament(thesittinglegisla‐

ture)and78formerMPsfromthe8thParliament(totalcurrentandformerMPssurveyedis

354).AlthoughwesampledMPsbyconvenience,thedistributionisstrikinglysimilartothe

actualparliamentatthattime,whichwediscussbelow(SeeTable1).Second,weconduct‐

edanationallyrepresentativeexperimentonnearly3,600citizens in42ofUganda’s112

districts.Weusedaclusteredrandomsampleforthecitizensurveytoensureregionaland

political representativeness.Bothexperimentsweresimilar,butnot identical.Theywere

performedbetweenJuneandOctober2012bylocalUgandanenumerators.8

[TABLE1ABOUTHERE]

TomaximizethenumberofresponsesintheMPsurvey,weattemptedtoconducta

censusofallcurrentMPsandachieveda72percentresponserate.Inaddition,wealsocon‐

tactedasmanyformerMPsaspossible(fromthepreviousparliament)andobtaineda55

8ItispossiblethatsubjectsbelievedthelocalUgandanenumeratorsrepresentedaforeignaiddonororthegovernmentratherthanacademicresearchers. Indeed,datafromtheAfrobarometersuggeststhatmostre‐spondentsthinkthegovernmentistheonedoingsurveys.WeexaminedtheAfrobarometerquestionsaboutsubjects’perceptionsofwhosenttheenumerators. Inthe2012roundofUgandaAB(Round5),56%ofre‐spondentsthoughtthegovernmentsenttheinterviewer.Inthe2008roundfor20differentcountriespooledtogether,58%ofrespondentsthoughtthegovernmentsenttheinterviewer.Thisshouldbiasagainstthere‐sultswefind.

19

percentresponserate.9Whilekeyaspectsof theexperimental instrumentswere identical

foreachgrouptofacilitatecomparisons,thecitizensurveywaslengthier.

Thesamplesofrespondentsreflecttheunderlyingpopulationswell,andassignment

to treatment conditions is not predicted by available observables, providing evidence of

randomassignment.FortheMPsurvey,wedonothavedataonafewrelevantindividual

MPcharacteristicsincludingreligionandeducationlevels.10Table1,however,presentsde‐

scriptivestatisticsfromoursampleandfromParliamentasawholeforgender,party,re‐

gionandMPtype,whichgenerallymatchesthe9thParliamentasawhole.Thedistribution

ofMPsby region is largely representative, though it slightlyoversamples those from the

CentralregionandundersamplesthosefromtheNorthernregion.Andfinally,assignment

totreatmentconditionsamongMPsisnotsignificantlyrelatedtoparty,gender,MPtype,or

region,so there isgoodcovariatebalanceacrossexperimentalconditions.For thecitizen

survey,balancingandrandomizationproceduresalsoworkedwell.Keyvariables,suchas

education,gender,age,party,religion,andregion,werenotsignificantlyrelatedtowhether

citizenswereassignedtoagivenexperimentalcondition.

9TheformerMPresponserate is likely lowerbecausemanyformerMPsarescatteredthroughthecountryandnotaseasilyaccessible.10GiventimeconstraintsintheMPsurvey,wewereunabletoobtainmuchdemographicdataonMPstocom‐parewiththemasssample.Beyondthecomparisonsinoutcomedataexploredbelow,wecanidentifysomecomparisons.Forexample, theMPsamplehasmoremen,which isunderstandablegiven theparliament isdisproportionatelymaleandtheMPsamplealsohasahigherproportionofNRMthanthemasssample.

20

Interventions 

The experimentalmanipulation presented each subjectwith a randomly assigned

projectdescriptionandarandomlyassignedfunderforthatproject.Thisbetween‐subjects

designisimportantforelicitingcomparisonsbetweengovernmentandforeigndonorpro‐

jectswheredirectcomparisonsmightbetoosensitive.Werandomlyassignedthemanipu‐

lationforactualpipelineprojects.Assuch,thestudyavoidedactivedeception.Theprojects

wereco‐financedbytheWorldBankandmultipleagencies,whichallowedustomanipu‐

latewhichofthemultipledonorswaspresentedtothesubjectsasfunderoftheproject.We

also randomly assigned the type of project: an infrastructureproject (electricity) and an

educationproject.Inordertogeneralizemore,weusedsixdifferentdonors,includingvari‐

ousmultilateral and bilateral ones, and two different project types.MPs, in order to in‐

crease the number of observations, were presented with and asked to express their

supportinvariouswaysforboththeelectricityandeducationprojectsindividually(andin

randomorder)butonlyonedonor.Citizensreceivedonlyoneofthetwopossibleprojects.

Wechosetheelectricityandeducationprojectsbecausetheyrepresentthetypesof

projects that can be given selectively to constituencies that support politicians. For the

masssurvey,werandomlyassignedthedonorandtheprojecttype.Neitherprojecttypein

themasssurveywassignificantlypreferredovertheotherinthebetween‐subjectsdesign,

whichmayreflectthefactthatbothtypesofprojectsaredesperatelysoughtafterinUgan‐

da.Becausetherewerenosignificantdifferencesbetweenprojecttypesandamongforeign

donors,wefocusourdiscussionsonthedifferencebetweenallaiddonorsandthegovern‐

ment.

21

Our framing question read, “The Electricity Sector Development Project will im‐

provethereliabilityofandincreaseaccesstoelectricity.Onemajoraspectoftheprojectis

toextendelectricitytothosewhodonotyethaveaccesstoit.Theprojectmayrequireyour

communitytoprovidefundingformaintenanceinthefuture.[Thisprojectwillbefunded

bythe{RANDOMLYASSIGNEDFUNDER}.]Howmuchwouldyousupportthisproject?”We

includethetextfortheeducationprojectintheappendix.

Weincludedthesentenceaboutfutureexpenses(“mayrequireyourcommunityto

providefunding…”)toincreasetherespondents’sensethatthisprojectmightcostthemin

themediumandlongtermtosupportit.Giventhataidmaybeperceivedas“freemoney”

whereasgovernmentprogramsmayimplyincreasedtaxes,wewereconcernedthatoffer‐

ingaprojectwithoutanynotedcostsmightleadallsubjectstosupportit.Askepticmight

worrythattheaddedcostconditionisnotsufficienttoovercomeabiastoward“free”re‐

sources among subjects. Aidmay feel like a windfall, but government programs appear

costly.This isa reasonableconcern,andwe tooksomemeasures toaddress it in the ro‐

bustnesssectionbelow.

The funding organizationswe randomly assigned in theMP experimentwere the

WorldBank,theGovernmentoftheUnitedStates,agenericmultilateralinstitution(“anin‐

ternationalorganizationfundedbymanycountries”),agenericbilateralagency(“asingle

foreigncountry”),andNoDonor,inwhichweomittedthesentenceindicatingwhichagency

was funding theprojectandservedas thecontrolcondition. In themassexperiment,we

22

also included the African Development Bank and the Government of China because the

largersubjectpoolenabledthepossibilityformoretreatmentconditions.11

Inthecaseofthecontrolcondition,weassumedthatrecipientswouldassociatethis

casewithdomesticgovernmentspending.Wementionednothingaboutforeignaidorfor‐

eigndonorsinthisversionofthesurvey.Weelectednottonamethegovernmentexplicitly

forthecitizensurveyoutoffearthatgeneralizedparanoiatowardgovernmentorassocia‐

tionswith therulingpartymightbiasresponses.12Wedid thesame for theMPstoavoid

socialdesirabilitybias(i.e.,governmentMPsmightfeeltheyshouldsupportprojectsbythe

government,andthuswhenthegovernmentisexplicitlynamed,wewouldreceiveinaccu‐

rateresponses).

Althoughwemadethisdesignchoiceingoodfaithatthetime,inretrospectthisde‐

signchoicemaynothavebeenoptimal:explicitidentificationoftheUgandangovernment

wouldhavepresenteda lessambiguouscontrolcondition.Butaswedescribebelow,this

design choice actually works in favor of the null hypothesis of no difference between

treatmentandcontrol;andthereforeourresults likelyunderstatethefullextentoftreat‐

menteffects.Moreover,giventheinformationwehave,ourresultsholdevenifsomesub‐

11Inadditiontotestingthetreatmenteffectofreceivinganaiddonorrelativetothegovernmentcontrol,wealsotestedtheeffectofindividualdonorsacrossgroups.BecauseelitesdidnotreceivetheAfricanDevelop‐mentBankandGovernmentofChinatreatments,weestimateddifferenceinmeansteststodetecttheeffectofthevarioustreatmentsrelativetothecontrolandtheothertreatmentconditions.Acrossallgroups,thereisneveraconsistentlysignificanteffectforanyoftheindividualdonors.12Concern for biased responses out of fear about the government seems fairly reasonable in a non‐democraticcontextlikeUganda.Inround5ofAfrobarometerdonein2012,thesameyearasourstudy,50%oftherespondentssaidtheydidnotfeelcompletelyfreetosaywhatevertheybelieve,and1/3saidtheyfeltsomekindofpressureaboutwhomtovotefor.Moreover,63%admittedfearofbeingintimidatedinelectioncampaigns.

23

jectsmisinterpreted the control condition; see the detailed discussion in the robustness

sectionbelow.

Further,our intervention focusesonone typeofaid:projectaid.Thus,ourresults

maynotapply togeneralbudget support.Project aid ismuchmore infungibleandchan‐

neled than budget support. However,we chose to focus on project aid because it is the

mostcommontype,itconstitutestheoverwhelmingmonetaryshare,anditisthemostvis‐

ibletocitizensandthuswouldmaximizeourabilitytoobtaininformedpreferencesregard‐

ingaid.According to theAidData informationbase,which is the largestrepositoryofaid

statistics,between2000and2012Ugandareceived157budgetsupportgrantsandloans

summingto$3.2billion.Overthesameperiod,thecountrywashostto16,019aidprojects

summingto$24.5billionintotalaid.Thissuggeststhatbudget‐supportaidinUgandacon‐

stitutes1percentofthecountbut13percentoftotalUgandanaid.Thisisroughlyonpar

withtherestofSub‐SaharanAfrica,whichreceived3,811budgetsupportgrantsandloans

for$57.5billioninrelationto352,839projectsthattotaled$615billion.Budgetsupportin

theregionthuscomprised1percentofthecountbut9percentofthemoney(Tierney,etal.

2011).

Weacknowledgethatprojectaidandbudget‐supportaidmighthavedifferentpolit‐

icaleffects.ThefindingsofTripp(2013)andGazibo(2013)inTanzaniaandBenin,respec‐

tively, suggest that budget support aid is more corruptible than project aid. In fact,

perceptionsofincreasedcorruptionhaveleddonorstoreducebudgetsupportinBeninand

Ugandainfavorofprojectaid.

24

Outcomes 

Eachsurveyaskedavarietyofdemographic,political,andaid‐relatedquestions.To

avoidprimingeffects,weposedallaidquestionsaftertheexperimentalportionofthesur‐

vey.Tomeasuretheoutcomeofsupportoroppositionfortheforeignordomesticfunded

projects,weaskedallrespondentstofirstexpresstheirlevelofsupport,thentoreportto

ustheirwillingnesstotellahigherauthority(PartyleaderforMPs,andLocalCounciloffi‐

cialforcitizens)oftheirsupport(ornot)fortheproject,theirwillingnesstosignapetition

voicingtheirsupport,andtoactuallysignthepetition.13

MPswereaskedtoexpresstheirwillingnesstocoordinatewithpeersinsupportof

(orinoppositionto)theproject,tellconstituentsabouttheproject,rallylocalsinsupport

of(orinoppositionto)theproject,andsignalettertothePresidentinsupportoforoppo‐

sitiontotheprojects.Citizens,butnotelites,werealsoaskediftheywerewillingtosenda

textmessage(SMS)andtoactuallysendtheSMSinsupport(ornot)oftheproject.

BecausetheMPswerepresentedwithbothprojects,wehavetwoobservationsfor

eachonalloftheseoutcomes,exceptthepetitiontothepresident.EachMPwasaskedto

signasinglepetitionthatreportedtheirlevelofsupportforbothprojectstothePresident,

thuswehaveoneobservationforeachMPonthisoutcome.Thisdesignchoicewasmadeto

reducetheburdenontheMPsandtoreduceredundancyofsendingtwonearly identical

letterstothepresident.BecausetheMPsreceivedthesamedonoracrossthetwoprojects

13Full textof thepetition language is included in theAppendix.Note that the language in thepetitiononlyasksthemtosignwithoutspecifyingaforeigndonororgovernment.Ifadonorwouldhavebeennamedinthepetition language, then the treatmentcondition(withadonornamed)wouldnothavebeencomparable tothecontrolcondition(wherenoonewasnamed).Instead,weoptedtosimplyaskthemtosignapetitioninsupportoropposition.

25

thisshouldnotaffecttheresultswereportherebecausewearecomparingdifferencesin

donors and not sectors (given that therewas nomeaningful difference between project

types).Thesevariousmeasuresofsupportpresenttherespondentswithvaryinglevelsof

cost(attitudinalvs.behavioralresponses)andwillbeusedasthekeyoutcomevariablesto

gaugesupportforprojectsacrosstreatmentarms.

Results 

Inthissection,first,weaskwhetherMPsaremoresupportiveofgovernmentpro‐

gramsorforeignaidprojects.Second,weaskwhetherthemasspublicismoresupportive

ofaidorgovernmentprogramsandthencomparethemtoUgandanMPs.Andfinally,we

considerpossiblemechanismsthatcouldexplaintheoveralltrendsinpreferences.

Differences across groups 

Table2reportsresultsfromdifference‐in‐meanstestscomparinglevelsofsupport

underalloftheaidtreatmentconditionscomparedtothegovernmentcontrolconditionfor

MPsandmasses.PanelAreportsoutcomesthatweremeasuredforallrespondents(plus

theSMSandPresidentialLetteroutcomesforcitizensandMPs,respectively),andPanelB

reportsoutcomes for thoseonlymeasured forMPs.Theseoverall results showthatwith

onlyoneexception,MPsareconsistentlymoresupportiveofgovernmentprojectsthanfor‐

eignaid.Thisdifferenceinsupportissignificantin3ofthe9outcomes,andtreatmentef‐

26

fectsrangefromlessthan1to12percentagepoints.14SeeFigureA1intheAppendixfora

graphicrepresentationofthetreatmenteffectsandsignificancelevelsforasubsetofout‐

comes.

Theresults inTable2alsoshowthatcitizensconsistentlypreferaidovergovern‐

mentprojects;thisdifferenceinsupportissignificantin5ofthe6outcomes,includingthe

behavioraloutcomes.Thetreatmenteffectsrangefrom2to4percentagepoints,whichare

notlargebutnonethelesssignificantstatistically.Themodestsubstantivedifferencesmay

resultfromstrongceilingeffectsgiventhattheprojectsareextremelypopularandthere‐

foreclusteredneartheupperboundof100percentsupport.

[TABLE2ABOUTHERE]

Why do these differences appear? 

These results present some interesting and counterintuitive findings. Since they

seem tobe consistentwith thedonor control theory about aid,weaskwhatmechanism

mightaccountforthesedifferences.Thelogicofthedonorcontroltheoryimpliesthatper‐

ceptionsofcorruptionandclientelismoughttomagnifytheeffectsobservedabove.Weal‐

so explore other possibilities—partisanship, ethnicity, nationalism, government

incumbencybias,andabiasduetoforeignmedia—andreportonthemintheappendix.To

14NotethatTable2reportsintent‐to‐treateffects.Forthemasses,weaskedamanipulationcheckthatallowsustodeterminethelevelofcompliance.Thoseresultsarequalitativelythesameastheintent‐to‐treateffects.Moreover,ifwerestricttheanalysistothosesubjectspassingthemanipulationcheck,theresultsshowstrongdifferences in favorofmasses supportingaid in everypossibleoutcomecategory.Becauseof the statusofmembersofparliament,weoptednottoaskmanipulationcheckquestions.Wethusmustrelyontheintent‐to‐treateffectsalone.

27

provideaplausible explanation, a subgroupmechanismneeds todiffer substantivelybe‐

tweenthemassesandMPs, toexplainthedifferencesbetweenthetreatmentandcontrol

withineachsubgroup,andmostofalltoaccountforthedifferencesbetweentreatmentand

control across the elites and masses. For the perceptions of clientelism and corruption

mechanism,whichwasbestsupportedbytheevidence,wereportresultsbelow;therestof

theresultsarereportedgraphicallyintheAppendix(FiguresA2‐A13).15

Beforeweproceed, it is important to first establish thatMPsdonot simply think

thatgovernmentprojectsaremoreeffectiveorsuperiorsimplybecausetheUgandangov‐

ernmentisinvolved.Ifthatwerethecase,thenourstorywouldbesimple:MPsprefergov‐

ernment projects because they view the government, of which they are a part, as a

preferablemanagerofaidfundsandprojects.

MPsonaveragedonot, infact,holdtheviewthatgovernment‐fundedprojectsare

superior.Only32percentofMPsbelievegovernmentfundsaremorelikelytogotothose

mostinneedcomparedtoforeignaidfunds,which59percentbelievegomoretotheneed‐

iest.Inaddition,only34percentofMPsbelievethatgovernmentfundsaremoreeffective

andlesswastefulcomparedtoforeignaidfunds.Only39percentofMPsbelievethatgov‐

ernment‐funded projects better meet the needs of their constituents than do foreign‐

fundedprojects.Andonly31percentbelievethatgovernment‐fundedprogramsaremore

transparent than foreign aid projects. Finally,when askedwho they thinkwould be the

15Wedonotdiscusstheforeignmediaeffectindetail,butnotethatmassrespondentscouldbemorelikelytovoicetheirsupportforaprojectwhenitisassociatedwithaforeigndonorratherthanwhenitisadomesticsource.Citizensandelitesthatpreferforeignmediaaremorelikelytobebiasedinfavorofforeignprojectsbecausethoseprojectsarereferencedfavorablyintheforeignmedia.WethusseparatedmassesandMPsbytheextenttowhichtheypreferforeignmediaoverUgandanmedia.SeeFiguresA2andA3inappendix.Theresultsgenerallyareinconsistentandweak.

28

mosteffective incarryingouttheelectricityoreducationproject,only23percentofMPs

namedtheUgandangovernment.Moreover,roughly80percentofMPsthoughtforeignaid

had a positive effect on the government and their constituents. Therefore,MPs actually

tendtohavelessconfidenceingovernment‐fundedprojectscomparedtoforeignaideven

thoughtheytendtomorereadilysupportgovernmentprograms.Onealternative implied

bythedonorcontrolargumentisthatperceptionsofclientelismandcorruptionmayshape

supportforforeignassistancevs.domesticprograms.

Evidenceinfavorofthecorruptionandclientelismmechanismwouldindicatethat

citizenswhobelievethatthegovernmentiscorruptandclientelisticwouldpreferforeign

aidprojects.MPsshouldhavetheoppositepreference.Whenpoliticiansseecorruptionin

governmentitmaybeaboontothempersonallyorelectorally,andhencetheymayprefer

government projects because theyprovide an easierway to accessmoney for their own

personalgains.

Inthesurvey,weaskedbothMPsandcitizenswhethergovernmentfundsaremost

likely“tobenefitgovernmentofficialsandtheirpoliticalallies”or“helpthosemostinneed”

to capture aspects of both clientelism and corruption (usingmoney to help friends and

themselves).BothareintimatelylinkedconceptsinAfricabecausecorruptionlargelysus‐

tainsclientelism(Szeftel2000).WeseeaverylargedifferencebetweenthepublicandMPs

in their perceptionsof corruption and clientelism:75percentof thepublic believes that

current government leaders take government money to benefit themselves and their

friendsratherthaneveryoneinthecountry,whileonly35percentoftheMPsagreewith

29

thisstatement.Wethereforeusethisquestiontodividethesampleintothosewhoseegov‐

ernmentfundsasmoresusceptibletocaptureandabuseandthosewhodonot.

Weacknowledgethefactthatthecorruptionquestionmaybesusceptibletosocial

desirability bias; however, further analysis mitigates the concern. We can leverage evi‐

dencefromoursurveytoseeifsocialdesirabilityisatplay.IfsomeMPsaremoresuscepti‐

ble to social desirability pressures, then we should expect a strong positive correlation

betweenlowresponsestothecorruptionquestionandavarietyofotherquestionsreflect‐

ing socially desirable responses, such as reportingmore visits to theMP’s constituency,

perceivingagoodeconomy,andclaimingbetterattendanceatplenarysessionsofparlia‐

ment.However, answers to thesequestionsareneverstronglypositivelycorrelatedwith

low corruption perceptions. There is aweak negative correlation (Pearson’s r) between

lowcorruptionreportsandclaimingmoredaysspentintheMP’sconstituencyeachmonth

(‐0.1189).Thereisaweakpositivecorrelationbetweenlowcorruptionreportsandmain‐

taining that the national economy is in at least a “good” condition (0.1017). And finally

thereisaweaknegativecorrelationsbetweenlowcorruptionreportsanddeclaringhigher

ratesofattendanceatplenarysessionsofparliament(‐0.0183).Thereseemstobenocon‐

sistent socialdesirabilitybias.Whilewecannot ruleout thepossibility, ourdata suggest

thatMPswhoarecorruptarenotnecessarilyunder‐reportingcorruption.

TheanalysisforMPs(reportedinTable3)showsthatMPswhobelievegovernment

fundsaremorelikelytobeusedforcorruptionandclientelismaresignificantlymorelikely

toprefergovernment‐fundedprojects.For5ofthe9outcomes,MPswhoseegovernment

funds asmore corrupt and clientelist are significantlymore likely to prefer government

30

funds.Importantly,theseeffectsarestronglysignificantforthebehavioraloutcomes.The

treatmenteffectsrangefrom4%to19%,thusindicatingmoremeaningfulsubstantiveef‐

fectsizes.

[TABLE3ABOUTHERE]

Conversely,thedifferenceinsupportforaidandgovernmentprojectsisnotstatisti‐

callysignificantforMPswhodonotperceivesignificantcorruptionandclientelism(thisis

trueforalloutcomemeasures;seeTable3).ThissuggeststhattheMPswhoseefewave‐

nuesforcorruptionandclientelismexpressnopreferenceforgovernment‐fundedprojects

overaid.Oneplausible interpretationoftheseresultssuggeststhat if theMPcannotcap‐

turesomeofthefunding,thens/hedoesnotmanifestaclearpreferencetowardsuchpro‐

jects.

The results inTable 4 report the difference‐in‐means tests and support the claim

thatcitizensupportforaidisalsoconditionalontheirperceptionsofcorruptionandclien‐

telism,but in theoppositedirection.Thecitizenswhobelievethatgovernment fundsare

used forcorruptionandclientelismaresignificantlymore likely tosupportaidovergov‐

ernmentprojectsfor3ofthe6outcomes(4ofthe6atthe0.1level).Amongsubjectswho

donotperceivethecorruptuseofgovernmentfunds,therearenosignificantdifferences,

butmostofthenegativesignssuggestaslightpreferenceforgovernmentprojectsoveraid.

(TheresultsforMPsandmassesarealsoplottedinFiguresA12andA13.)

[TABLE4ABOUTHERE]

Wealsoranadditionalteststodetermineiftheeffectofcorruptionandclientelism

ismediatedbyethnicity,partisanship,orregionalidentities.Eventhoughmanystudiesar‐

31

gue that clientelism operates along ethnic or regional channels or through partisan net‐

works(i.e.,Wantchekon2003,Stokes2005),wefindnoclearevidencethattheeffectofcli‐

entelismfoundhereismediatedbyanyofthesevariables,asreportedinAppendixFigures

A14andA15.

Thisanalysisprovidessupportfortheargumentthatcitizenssupportaidovergov‐

ernmentprogramsconditionalontheirperceptionsofcorruptionandclientelism.Further,

wefindthatcitizensdoinfactconsidercorruptiontobeabadthing:peoplewhoperceive

theretobemorecorruptionaresignificantlylesslikelytotrustparliament,theirMPs,and

thepresident(effectsaresignificantatthe0.01levels).Takentogether,thisanalysisoffers

someevidencethatpoliticalelitesmaybelievethatgovernmentfundsaremoresusceptible

toclientelismandcorruption. Inaddition,ordinarycitizenswhoperceivecorruptionand

clientelism ingovernmentbehave inways that suggest they seeaid‐fundedprojectsasa

morepreferredmechanism thangovernment action toobtain thepublic goods that they

expresstheysodesperatelyneed.

Discussion of Robustness 

Aswithanyexperimentnumerousdesignchoiceswererequired,allofwhichpre‐

senteddifficult tradeoffs. In thissection,wediscuss two importantaspectsof theexperi‐

mental design. First,wediscuss the cost condition,which tries to address thedifference

between“tax‐based”governmentprojectsand“free”aidprojectseventhough,asweargue

below,thischaracterizationisnotaccurateinthecontextofthestudy.Second,wediscuss

32

thefactthatthecontrolconditiondoesnotexplicitlynamethegovernmentasthefunder

butisneverthelessinterpretedasthegovernment.

Taxed Government Projects versus Free Aid Projects: A False Dichotomy 

Afirstdesignobjectionmightbethatthepublicmaypreferaidbecauseitisviewed

asfree,whereasgovernmentprojectsrequirecitizenstopaytaxes.Wedonotbelievethis

isthefactordrivingourresultsforseveralreasons.First,weaddedthecoststatementto

both the treatmentandcontrolconditions,so that individualsareawarethatanyproject

mayrequirelocalfunds.

Second,weundertookafollow‐upstudywherewerecruitedanadditional460sub‐

jectsandrandomlyassignedthemtoreceivethecoststatement(ornot)inassociationwith

oneofthetworandomlyassignedprojectdescriptions.Thecoststatementhadnosignifi‐

canteffectonsubjects’supportfortheproject.Thismaybeeitherbecausethecoststate‐

mentwas tooweak toproduce treatment effectsorbecause subjectswere indifferent to

costsforprojectstheyfeeltheydesperatelyneed.Whilethecoststatementmaybeweak,

multiplereasonsleadustobelievethatcitizensarerelativelyindifferenttocostsforpublic

goods.

First, subjects likely do not see government projects as costly to themselves any

morethanforeignaidiscostly.ThevastmajorityofUgandans–86percentinournational‐

ly representative subject pool – fall below the earnings threshold forpaying income tax,

whichisroughly600dollarsperyear.AndasMartin(2013)andFjeldstadandTherkildsen

(2008)note,Ugandantaxrateshavebeenreducedrecently.MostUgandansalsodonotpay

indirecttaxes.EightypercentofUgandansliveinruralareasandmorethanninetypercent

33

ofoursubjectsreportedearninglessthantwodollarsperdayinincome.Mostarenotpart

oftheformalmarketandhencedonotpayindirecttaxesliketheVAT.16Further,thegov‐

ernmentraiseslittlerevenuefromtaxesandwhatrevenuesexistareoftentransformedin‐

to private goods and/or directed to political allies for the purposes of corruption or

clientelism(seeCoxandMcCubbins2001,Martin2013).

The Government Control Condition 

Aseconddesignobjectionmightbethatthegovernmentwasnotnamedinthecon‐

trolcondition.Wewereconcernedaboutsocialdesirabilityinresponsesifweactuallyla‐

beled the control as the government. This is not a trivial concern in this context as the

Afrobarometer data show (see footnote 9). For the citizens,weworried that theymight

feargovernmentreactionsandsoalwaysrankthegovernmentprojectsfirst.FortheMPs,

wefearedsocialdesirabilitybiasinwhichtheyalwayssaidtheypreferredthegovernment

projectssincetheywerepartofthegovernmentandwouldwanttoavoidbeingseenasnot

supportinggovernmentdevelopmentprojects.

Toassesswhatcitizensperceivedwhentheyviewedthecontrolcondition,aswell

aswhattheimplicationsofthisare,weconductedafollow‐upsurveytoensurethatsub‐

jectsinthemassexperimentdidinfactinterpretthecontrolconditionasthegovernment,

16AsKagambirwe(2014,p.62)notes,“ThemajorityofUgandansthatstayinruralareasofUgandahavenostableincomeamongstwhichthegovernmentcantaxthem.ThisthusleadstohavingaverylimiteddomestictaxbaseamongstwhichURAcan tax its citizens. Italso limits the informal taxes suchasValueAddedTax(VAT)incometaxandpayasyouearn(PAYEE)becausethelevelofconsumptionofthesecommoditiesislow.Alsothelevelofunemploymentissohighthuslimitingthecitizensinearningmoneyamongstwhichtheycanbetaxedinformofpayasyouearn(PAYEE).”

34

andwefoundthatthemajorityofsubjectsdidso(52%and51%fortheeducationandelec‐

tricityprojects, respectively) (Milner, etal.2014).More thanone thirdof subjects in the

follow‐upstudy,however,attributedthecontrolconditiontoaforeigndonor.Whileamore

directcomparisonmayhavebeenpreferable,attributionofthecontrolprojectstoforeign

donorsworksinfavorofthenullhypothesisofnotreatmenteffects.

Theconcernisthatthecontrolconditionrepresentedacombinationofpeoplewho

believeitimpliedeitherthegovernmentoraforeignaiddonor;thatis,supportforthecon‐

trolisequaltosomeaverageofsupportforforeignaidprojectscombinedwithsupportfor

government projects. Becausewe know two of these three values—the outcome in the

controlconditionoverallandtheoutcomeintheforeignaidcondition,wecancalculatethe

third:thelevelofsupportthatsubjectswouldprovidehadtheybeengiventhegovernment

controlconditionexplicitly.

First,weknowtheaveragevaluethatmassandMPrespondentsgaveinsupportof

theprojectsiftheywereassignedaforeigndonor.Inthetwosurveysweaskedaboutsup‐

portfortheprojectsusing6differentaiddonorsforthemassesand4fortheMPs,assign‐

ingeachsubjectadonoratrandom.17Ourdatashowthatacrossalltheseforeigndonors,

themassrespondentsdidnotdifferentiatesignificantlybetweenthem,butonaveragethey

supportedtheforeign‐fundedprojectsatahigherlevelthandidthecontrolgroup.Wehave

similarevidencefortheMPs,excepttheMPs,ontheotherhand,supportedalltheaidpro‐

17Respondentswererandomlyassignedoneof6donors:US,China,WorldBank,AfricanDevelopmentBank,genericbilateralandmultilateraldonor.MPsdidnotseeChinaortheAfDB.

35

jectsonaveragelessthanthecontrolcondition.Thisimpliesthatwecancalculateanaver‐

agevalueofsupportamongthemasspublicandMPsforprojectsledbyanyforeigndonor.

Second,onaveragethecontrolgroup's levelofsupport fortheprojectswas lower

thantheaverageforalltheforeign‐donortreatmentgroupsforthemassexperiment.For

theMPs,thecontrolgroups’supportwashigherthanforalltheforeignaidprojects.Third,

ourpost‐surveydatashowthat51or52%,dependingontherandomassignmentofelec‐

tricityoreducationproject,respectively,believethatthecontrolwasagovernmentproject

andmostoftheremainingbelieveditwasaforeigndonor.Sotheactualvalueofsupport

for thecontrolgroupfor thosewhothought itwasthegovernmentcanbededucedfrom

this information. In themass experiment itmust necessarily be lower than that for the

group thatwas given the foreign aid conditions,while in theMP experiment itmust be

higher.

Wecanusethesethreepiecesofinformationtocalculatethemeanandstandarder‐

rorsofthemassrespondentswhoattributedthecontrolconditiontothegovernment.We

canonlyobtainanestimatefortheMPssincewedidnotaskthemwhotheythoughtwas

funderinthecontrolcondition,butthisstillimplieswhatthecontrolgroupwhoattributed

ittothegovernmentwouldhavescored.Calculatingthemeanisstraightforward.Weknow

thatthemeanofthecontrolgroupismadeupoftherespondentswhothoughtthatthecon‐

trolwasaforeigndonorandthosewhothoughtthecontrolwasthegovernment:

∗ 1 ∗

where and aretheaveragelevelsofsupportforthedevelopmentprojects

underthecontrolandtreatmentconditions,respectively.Thesevaluesareknownfromthe

36

data and is the percentage identifying the control as the government. Rearranging to

solvefor wederive:

1 ∗

Calculatingthestandarderrortocreatetheconfidenceintervalsisalittlemoredifficultand

wedescribe theprocedure in the following footnote.18Using these calculatedmeans and

standarddeviations,wecanthencomparethosereceivingtheforeigntreatmenttothecon‐

trolconditionasreportedinthepapertotheportionofcontrolrespondentswhothought

theconditionwasthegovernment.Figure1demonstratestherelativedifferences for the

strongsupportconditionamongthemasses.Forallotheroutcomeconditions formasses

andMPs, this relative orderingholds and sowedonot display themhere.As the figure

shows, the difference between those receiving the explicit foreign condition and those

thinkingthecontrolrepresentedthegovernmentismuchlargerthanbetweentheexplicit‐

lyforeignconditionandtheundifferentiatedcontrol.Thedirectionoftheeffectisopposite

intheMPcase.Thus,theresultswereportinthepaperworkagainstourstatedhypotheses

andthereforeprovide themostconservative test; that is,hadwenamedthegovernment

18WeknowthatthestandarderroristhestandarddeviationdividedbythesquarerootofN.Thestandarderrorforthecontrolwillbecomprisedofthestandarderroroftherespondentswhobelievedthegovernmentwasthedonorandthosewhobelievedthatitwasaforeigndonor:

2

Againwecanrearrangetheformulatocalculatethestandarddeviationofthegovernmentrespondents:

2 ∗ ∗

SincethestandarderrorisjustthestandarddeviationdividedbythesquarerootofN,wecancalculate

togetthestandarderrorsofthegovernmentrespondents.

37

explicitly in thecontrolcondition,wewouldhaveobservedamuch largerdifferenceand

thereforetheresultsreportedwouldbeevenstronger.

[FIGURE1ABOUTHERE]

ForcostandlogisticalreasonswedidnotperformthesamefollowupstudyonMPs,

butweexpectthatMPsmighthavevoicedsimilarperceptionstootherUgandans.Thisof

coursemeansthatsomeMPs,likesomecitizens,probablyperceivedthecontrolcondition

assponsoredbyforeigndonors.Again,thiswouldhaveledtoanunderstatementofthedif‐

ferencebetweentreatmentandcontrolintheMPexperiment.

Ontheotherhand,itisalsopossiblethatMPsmaymerelyhaveapreferenceforun‐

specifiedoverspecifiedfunding.Theprojectdescriptionswereidenticalacrossconditions

savethestatementofthefundingsource,sothedetailsoftheeducationandelectricitypro‐

jectswereequallyspecifiedbetweentreatmentandcontrol,whichdiminishesourconcern

here.Moreover,twooftheforeigndonorconditionsweredeliberatelygenericinthatthey

attributedtheprojectstoeitheranunspecifiedmultilateralorbilateraldonor.MPsdidnot

significantlypreferthesegenericconditionstoconditionsinwhichtheWorldBankorthe

United Stateswere named,whichmoves us toward discounting the possibility thatMPs

simplypreferprojectswithunspecifieddonors.Rather,itappearsmorelikelythattheirat‐

tributionofthecontrolprojectstothegovernmentpromptedthetreatmenteffects.

38

Conclusion 

Thispaperprovideswhatis,toourknowledge,thefirstexperimentalstudytocom‐

pareaidpreferencesandactionsformembersofparliamentandanationallyrepresenta‐

tive, random sample of ordinary citizens in a prominent developing country. We were

specifically concerned with preferences towards foreign vs. domestic development pro‐

jects. Citizens preferred aid over government programs consistently, andwithmost de‐

pendentvariablestostatisticallysignificantdegrees,especiallyinthebehavioraloutcomes.

Thiswasparticularlysoamongtherespondentswhoperceivedproblemswithgovernment

corruptionandclientelism,thusprovidingevidenceconsistentwiththeargumentthataid

can help overcome governance problems. Likewise,members of parliament consistently

preferredgovernmentprogramsoveraid.

Ourstudyprovidesevidenceconcerningtwodifferenttheoriesoftheeffectsofaid.

Wefindlittlesupportfortheideathataidishighlyfungibleandthatrecipientgovernments

candoastheypleasewithit.Neitherelitesnorthepublicareindifferentbetweenaidand

government–funded projects. Both perceive aid and government projects to be different

fromoneanotheronaverage.Butelitesandcitizenshavedistinctpreferences.Citizensare

morewilling to supportaidby takingbehavioralaction imposingpersonal costs through

signingapetitionandsendinganSMS.Theyviewaidas lesspoliticizedthangovernment

programs.Thisseemstobeconsistentwithaviewofaiddonorsasbeingstrategicintheir

control of aid and of channeling, monitoring, and bypassing governments. In a weakly

democraticcontextwithknowncorruptionproblems,weexpectdonorswhodonotseethe

government as a critical geo‐political ally to try tomaintain control over aid, to limit its

39

fungibilityandtargetittowardparticularprojects.Giventhatourdatashowthatthepublic

knowsaboutforeignaiddonorsandtruststhemmorethandomesticinstitutions,thisevi‐

dencesuggeststhepublicisperceivingaidprojectsdifferentlythangovernmentones.

Forthesesamereasons,itperhapsmakessensethatpoliticaleliteswerelessenthu‐

siasticaboutaidthantheywereaboutgovernment‐fundedprojects.MPs’likelyfacefewer

constraintsoverhowtheymightutilizethesedomesticgovernmentresources.Highlevels

ofcorruptionandclientelismexist indevelopingcountriesevenintheabsenceofforeign

aid.Anddomesticresourcesmaybeeveneasierforgovernmentstodiverttothesepurpos‐

essincethereareoftennostrongaccountabilitymechanismsatworkinpoordeveloping

countries.Theseperceptionsandpreferencesmaythentellusagreatdealaboutthecon‐

tendingtheoriesaboutaid’s impact.Ourevidencesuggeststhatelitesandmassesarenot

indifferentbetween the two typesofdevelopment funders, that they seeproject aid ina

differentlightfromgovernmentsponsoredprojects,andthatdonorsmaywellbeactingin

waysthatproducethesedistinctviews.

Our study brings together two complimentary literatures. The large literature on

clientelismandcorruptionindevelopingcountriesstronglyimpliesthatgovernmentshave

the desire andwill to use their funds to promote their own political purposes first and

foremost.Stayinginofficeiscriticalandusinggovernmentprojectstobuildsupportisone

way todo this.Uganda’sgovernment isnoexception.However,aid scholarsoftenassess

foreignassistancewithoutanydirectcomparisontothemostrealisticalternative,whichis

governmentfunding.Ourstudyexaminesthebeliefsandactionsofbothelitesandcitizens

bycomparingtheirsupportforthesetwodifferentdevelopmentmechanisms.Theseforms

40

ofevidenceshednewlightontwoveryprominentliteraturesbymakingmorecentralthe

preferencesofpoliticalelitesandcitizens.Weexpectthatmuchistobegainedbycomple‐

mentingexistingmacro‐levelstatisticalapproacheswithmicro‐levelexperimentaldataon

politiciansandbeneficiariesofaidindevelopingcountries.

41

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Table 1: Comparison of MP Sample to the Actual 9th Parliament 

Sample 9thParliamentGender %Male 67 65%Female 33 35Party %NRM 74.6 73.5%Independents 10.2 11.2%FDC 8.5 8.8%DP 3.1 3.4%UPC 3.1 2.6%CP 0.25 0.25%JEEMA 0.25 0.25Region %fromCentral 28 25%fromEastern 28 27%fromNorthern 18 22%fromWestern 26 26MPType %ConstituencyMPs 59 62%DistrictWomenMPs 28 29%SpecialInterestMPs 6 7%Ex‐OfficioMPs 8 2

47

Table 2: Citizen and MP Preferences for Government versus Aid  Projects 

PanelA:MPandCitizenOutcomesMPs Strong

SupportTell Willing to

signSigned Willing to

SignPres.SignedPres.

Govt 0.84 0.97 .89 .78 .86 .75N 136 136 136 138 59 59Aid 0.83 0.99 .82 .75 .75 .68N 567 567 567 570 292 292Difference ‐0.01 0.02 ‐0.07** ‐0.04 ‐0.12** ‐0.06 Strong

SupportTell Willing to

signSigned Willing to

SMSSentSMS

Masses Govt 0.73 0.91 0.82 0.77 0.59 0.02N 528 520 528 538 538 202Aid 0.77 0.94 0.83 0.80 0.64 0.05N 3007 2967 3008 3017 3017 1143Difference 0.03* 0.03** 0.02 0.04* 0.04* 0.02*

PanelB:EliteOnlyOutcomes TellConstituents RallyLocalOfficials Coordinatewith

PeersMPs GovtNAidNDifference

0.991360.98567‐0.00

0.981230.97501‐0.01

0.991360.97567‐0.02**

Anegativedifferencemeansthattheproportionofsupportforprojectsinthecontrolcondition(government)islargerthantheproportionunderthetreatmentcondition(aid),implyingthegovernmentconditionispre‐ferredtotheaidone.Notethatifasubjectstateds/hedidnotwanttosignthepetition(thirdcolumn)westillpresentedthemthepossibilityofsigningthepetition(fourthcolumn).ThehigherNsforwillingnesstoSMSinthefifthcolumn(e.g.,538and3017)arearesultofsubjectrefusalstoanswerthepetitionquestions(wherecorrespondingNsarelower:528and3008).Thatis,ifasubjectrefusedtoanswerpetitionquestions,westillaskedaboutSMSand fewer subjectsdeclined toanswerSMSquestions.Also, theNsdecrease in the “SentSMS”condition(relativeto“WillingtoSMS”)becauseweonlycalculateSentSMSforsubjectswhoownedaphone.

48

Table 3: Testing the Corruption Mechanism (MPs) 

MPSupportConditionalonPerceptionsofCorruption Strong

SupportTell Willing to

SignSigned Willing to

SignPres.SignedPres.Pet.

Yes,GovernmentFundsusedforCorruptionGovt 0.86 0.98 0.95 0.89 0.94 0.89N 44 44 44 45 18 18Aid 0.82 0.98 0.85 0.78 0.77 0.70N 195 195 195 197 103 103Difference ‐0.05 0.01 ‐0.10** ‐0.11** ‐0.18** ‐0.19**No,GovernmentFundsnotusedforCorruptionGovt 0.82 0.97 0.86 0.73 0.83 0.68N 90 90 90 91 41 41Aid 0.83 0.99 0.81 0.73 0.74 0.68N 366 366 366 367 188 188Difference 0.01 0.02 ‐0.05 0.00 ‐0.09 ‐0.01

MPSupportConditionalonPerceptionsofCorruption Tell

ConstituentsRallyLocals Coordinate

WithPeersYes,GovernmentFundsusedforClientelismGovt 0.98 0.97 1.00N 44 39 44Aid 0.98 0.96 0.96N 195 171 195Difference ‐0.01 ‐0.01 ‐0.04***No,GovernmentFundsnotusedforClientelismGovt 0.99 0.98 0.99N 90 82 90Aid 0.98 0.97 0.97N 366 324 366Difference ‐0.01 ‐0.00 ‐0.02Anegativedifferencemeansthattheproportionofsupportforprojectsinthecontrolcondition(government)islargerthantheproportionunderthetreatmentcondition(aid),implyingthegovernmentconditionispre‐ferredtotheaidone.Apositivedifferenceimpliesthattheaidconditionispreferredtothegovernmentcon‐dition.Notethat ifasubjectstateds/hedidnotwanttosignthepetition(thirdcolumn)westillpresentedthemthepossibilityofsigningthepetition(fourthcolumn).

49

Table 4: Testing the Corruption Mechanism (Masses) 

MassSupportConditionalonPerceptionsofCorruption Strong

SupportTell Willing to

signSigned Willing to

SMSSentSMS

Yes,GovernmentFundsusedforCorruptionGovt 0.71 0.90 0.80 0.74 0.69 0.03N 393 386 393 402 157 157Aid 0.77 0.94 0.83 0.80 0.71 0.05N 2274 2241 2274 2279 894 894Difference 0.06** 0.04** 0.03 0.05** 0.02 0.03*No,GovernmentFundsnotusedforCorruptionGovt 0.82 0.93 0.87 0.85 0.86 0.00N 126 126 126 176 42 42Aid 0.76 0.94 0.84 0.82 0.78 0.03N 695 688 696 699 236 236Difference ‐0.06 0.01 ‐0.04 ‐0.03 ‐0.08 0.03***Anegativedifferencemeansthattheproportionofsupportforprojectsinthecontrolcondition(government)islargerthantheproportionunderthetreatmentcondition(aid),implyingthegovernmentconditionispre‐ferredtotheaidone.Apositivedifferenceimpliesthattheaidconditionispreferredtothegovernmentcon‐dition.Notethat ifasubjectstateds/hedidnotwanttosignthepetition(thirdcolumn)westillpresentedthemthepossibilityofsigningthepetition(fourthcolumn).ThehigherNsforwillingnesstoSMSinthefifthcolumn(e.g.,538and3017)arearesultofsubjectrefusals toanswerthepetitionquestions(wherecorre‐spondingNsarelower:528and3008).Thatis,ifasubjectrefusedtoanswerpetitionquestions,westillaskedaboutSMSandfewersubjectsdeclinedtoanswerSMSquestions.Also,theNsdecreaseinthe“SentSMS”con‐dition(relativeto“WillingtoSMS”)becauseweonlycalculateSentSMSforsubjectswhoownedaphone.

50

Figure 1: The Value of the Control if Government was Named 

Calculationofcontrolvalueifithadspecifiedgovernmentusinginformationfromsurveys.

.7.7

5.8

.85

.9.9

5%

Su

ppor

ting

Foreign Control Gov (calc.)

Mass MP

Foreign and control show actual values; gov (calc.) estimates the meanfor respondents believing control was government

% Strongly Supporting project by treatment