ellis sla research and language teaching chap 4

108 The application of theory

Input in a classroom setting The characteristics of input in a classroom setting depend on the type of instruction. In instruction directed at teaching the linguistic code, ~2 features aTe made artificially frequent in theiQQut iQLtp~--12-eriQ_~glJil1:l_e-_devotecrto them. Thus, for instance; learners may be exposed to sudden dramatic increases in the frequency of particular features. As we saw in Chapter 2, Lightbown (1983) found precisely this occurring in her study of the input in Grade 5 and 6 classes in Canadian ESL classrooms. The verb + ing form, for instance, was largely missing from the initial input, but suddenly became very frequent once it was introduced in the textbook towards the end of Grade 5, resulting in apparent overuse of the form some time later in Grade 6. Later, its frequency declined. It is reasonable to suppose that frequent and salient forms are more noticed and, therefore, potentially more learnable than infreqllent and non-salient forms (Hatch and Wagner-Gough 1975). Furthermore, other aspects of formal instruction, such as the teacher's treatment of learner error, may increase the salience of selected features, thus enhancing their noticeability and karnability (Lightbown and Spada 1990).

Code-oriented i~struction may also provide the learner with a different kind of input-explicit information about the nature of linguistic features in the form of rules. Sharwood Smith (1981) suggests that deductive language teaching (which he calls-consciousness-raising) varies according to the degree of explicitness and elaboration. Explictness refers to the extent to which the teacher makes use of linguistic metalanguage. The teacher can simply hint with the help of an example or can provide a complete statem"ent of the rule. Elaboration concerns the amount of time taken up in the presentation of a rule. Other variables relating to explicit grammar teaching include the source of the explanation (the teacher, the students, a textbook) and the manner of presentation (oral, written) (see Eisenstein 1980).

Instruction aimed at providing learners with opportunities to communicate naturally (e.g. information-gap and role-play activities) typically makes no attempt to manipulate the input or output in order to focus on specific items. The frequency of different items, therefore, is not predetermined but rather is the product of the language the participants in the task choose to use" to

. complete it. However, as Loschky and Bley-Vroman (1993) have illustrated, it I ma also be ossible to ise tasks which will elicit the useoTspec111Cfeatures,

('Ii ~lthough devising focused commu~~cative tas s ~ IC t e use or-Specific y features is both natural and essential re~~~~_E~o~~I~I!latic (see Chapter 3l~-

Irrespective of whether the tasI

A theory of instructed SLA 109

changes in linguistic form (in relation to the forms that would be used in ~ornparable interaction wIth a native speaker). They can involve simplification (e.g. shorter utterances and the use of less complex syntax ancrre-xis), elaboration, and re~ndancy (e.g. through paraphrase or use of synonyms) and alterations to thematic structure (e.g. through the use of cleft constructions as in 'Where Mary and John live is in Chicago'). Interactional modifications involve discourse function. Teachers make efforts to manage the discourse so th~es ~sing-simple 1 topics) an~aTsotorepatf~cation problem when it a~s (e.g. by means of requests for clarIficatIOn or confirmation). '

It ~~s-~een liypothesiiciLthiuhe-cGmp-r--Mllsi-ble.inQut that resu~~ fro!!l_ \ input: modifications and, in particular, from inter.ac1ionaLrrH)~Lfi~qtillltLl

~~_cilitatesili~e1opI?ent~ond la~m:Lage..._l;o1$.. (1983b), for Instance,hasclIgued that allOWtn:gteamers to negotIate for meamng whe~r

~_communication problem arises promotes acquisition. One way in which this might happen is if the learner's attention comes to be focused on those forms which initially caused the problem in understanding. Negotiation may also help the learner to identify constituent boundaries in utterances-in other

I, words, it may provide a basis for syntactic parsing-or it may push the learner into modifying his or her own interlanguage production (Pica 1992). It is important to recognize, however, that, although there are now a few studies which suggest that meaning negotiation helps the acquisition of word

~eani~gs (e.g. Loschky 1~94, Ellis ~t ~l. 1994) t~r_e is ~t~l~ little evidence for all d.l


In a theory of instructed L2 acquisition, input is of special importance because it is amenable to external manipulation. Teachers can do nothing about the innate knowledge of language which learners bring to the task of acquiring an L2. However, they can make adjustments to the kind of input that

.- --

I' the learners experience. These adjustments can involve focused instrucJ:iQn (i.e~ deterriiining-to--;hat extent the instruction will provide negative, as . opposed to, positive evidence) and u~!9cused ins~~~ti~m (e.g. determining the extent and the nature of opportunities for th1i1King and communicating). Types of L2 knowledge The theory distinguishes two types of L2 knowledge-explicit knowledge and implicit knowledge. As Bialystok (1981) has pointed out this distinction is common in cognitive psychology. She lists a number of terms which have been used by different psychologists to refer to it-objective vs personal knowledge_ (Polanyi 1958), knowledge vs belief (Scheffler 1965) and knowing what vs. knowing how (Ryle 1949).

In the case of langu'!Ke Bialystok (1981) defines explicit knowledge as knowledge that i an-alyse


However, it does not follow that explicit knowledge itself is not a component of L2 proficiency.

Implicit knowledge is intuitive, in the sense that the learner is unlikely to be aware of having ever learnt it and is probably unaware of its existence. However, as Reber (1989) has pointed out, it is incorrect to assert that implicit knowledge is completely unconscious. Matthews etal. (1989) have shown that learners of artificial languages are able to demonstrate a degree of awareness of knowledge that they have acquired under implicit learning conditions but that their implicit knowledge is always greater than their awareness of it. Reber (1989: 230) concludes 'a considerable portion of memorial content is unconscious' .

A ~of ~wledge is that it~ To understand what is meant by this it is necessary to return to the distinction between item e in l.and system :learnin~.briefly introduced in Chapter 2. Reber (1989) distinguis es etwee~tiated memory system' and 'an

;b~ct memory syste~ In the former, learning is bas~ on memory fbF R~~lar items, which are unrelated, or perhaps, ong loosely related to each other. In the latter:~ing takes the form of an understanding of some system (~ that ~as been induced from knowledg~ of ~!J,!~jn_d!:Y!Q!!al items. In such cases, learnerswil e a e to generalize-e knowledge they possess to items other

_/ than those they-'a-v-e-'---e-e-n-e-x-p-o-s-e-t-"to (e.g. as when learners overgeneralize the regular past tense -ed morpheme). Reber appears to view implicit knowledge as necessarily abstract, but the position taken here is that learners may have a tacit knowledge of both items and rules2

The theory, then, distinguishes two kinds of implicit knowledge; knowledge of discrete items and rule-based knowledge.3 ~ative speakers t~~ large numbers of words and formulas-fixed or semi-fixed expressions such as 'How are you?' and 'Think twice before you ... ' . These may exist in the lexicon as unanalysed units (Pawley and Syder 1983, Nattinger and DeCarrico 1992). Native speakers also know large numbers of rules which enable them to produce ~vel sentences. If aSkedto- judge whether sentences are grammaticaror ungrammatIcal they will be able to do so, often without reflection, but they will often not be able to explain the basis of their judgements. Implicit knowledge of L2 items and rules com rises the learner's interlanguage system. It is largely hidden and, as a result, we know very ittle about how it is represented in the mind of the learner. Implicit knowledge only becomes manifest in actual performance and, in this sense, is procedural. It is possible, of course, for someone to reflect on his or her actual use of language in order to try to make the underlying rules explicit. In this way, implicit knowledge can become explicit.

Another distinction of considerable importance to a theory of instructed L2 acquisition is Qntrolled and automatic 12!Qcessing. McLaughlin, Rossman, and McLeod (i983) use this distinction, which comes from Shiffrin and Schneider (1977), to account for acquisition as a progression from a more


McLaughlinet al. (1983) and Bialystok (1982) offer similar diagrams to that shown in Figure 4.1. It is also uncontroversial to claim that the acquisition of a new rule is characterized initially by controlled processing and subsequently by automatic processing-in other words, acguisition inyolves the process of ayJ:Qg!atizing new knowledge (see Bialystok and Sharwood Smith 1985). What is QLore controverial is the relationship between explicit and implicit knowledge. "-~According to the non-interface position of Krashen (1981), explicit and implicit knowledge (which he refers to as 'learnt' and 'acquired' respectively) are stored separately and are quite unrelated. Explicit knowledge cannot become implicit, no matter how much it is practised. Explicit knowledge of a rule does not help the acquisition of implicit knowledge of th~_~~me rul~~ The non-interface position has been attacked by a number of applied linguists (e.g. Stevick 1980, Sharwood Smith 1981, Gregg 1984), who argue in favour of an interface position, according to which explicit knowledge can convert into implicit knowledge and vice versa.

One of the problems with a number of discussions of the interface position is that they conflate the explicitlimplicit and the controlled/automatic distinctions. For example, O'Malley, Chamot, and Walker (1987) describe a

~~~arning process tEat typi


attention that learners pay to form (Tarone 1983). PEformanc~ in tasks that permit the learner to acces~ explicit knowledge (e.g. grammaticality judgement tasks) is likefy to vary from that in tas~s that require the use of implicit knowledge (e.g. free conversation). In@!)(1987), for instance, I found that low intermediate learners of L2 English were able to mark regular

1 verbs for past tense in narratives when they had plenty of time to access their . formal knowledge of the rule, but were less able to do so in tasks that required Immeruate unplanned production. ThIs KmdofvariaDility can be explained WJ:tnreference to the exphclt/imphcit distinction. However, learners have also been found to vary within a single style. In Ellis (1988b), I found clear evidence of variability in the use of copula be in the communicative speech of two pre-adolescent learners who almost certainly possessed no explicit knowledge of the form. In this case, the learners used contracted copula -5 (as in 'He's old.') variably with zero copula (e.g. 'He old.'). This behaviour can best be explained by crediting them with implicit knowledge of copula -5 which they did not yet fully control. To explain variability, then, it is necessary to consider both the explicit/implicit and, the controlled/automatic dimensions of L2 knowledge.

While both a non-int~~~~erfac_e 12osition_~_~_d_nuhtfuJ~ a weak interface position is tenable.. If it IS assumoothat most communication cillsfurthe use of implicit knowledge, a test of whether explicit knowledge can become implicit is whether form-focus~d instJ;uction directed at a specific linguistic feature results in the use of that feature in spontaneous communication. In Chapter 2, I reviewed evidence that suggests this may not happen where developmental rules are involved see a e 62 . However, form-focuse mstruction may prove successful if the learners are developmenta y ready. Also, it may work with features that are not developmentally constrained (e.g. copula be).

instruction

explicit knowledge I I I

t filter]

implicit knoJedge (IL system)

Figure 4.2: The weak interface position


The weak interface model which this research supports is shown in Figure I 4.2. E)SQlicit knowledge derived from formal instruction may convert into I iI?plicit knowledge,--huLonly_ifJe_a(~nh~nT_~_.!'~ache_~L~J~:y~l9i_4~y~192~!2!.. that enables them to laccommrui~~\the n~w linguistic material. I~ such cases t~~ learners' existing implicit knowledge consiliu~in~ of fil~r that sift~F e:cplicit knowledge and lets through only that ~hey are ready to ~~ iQcorporate into the interlangua~ystem. However, in other cases-when the focus of the instruction is a grammatical property that is ll.pt subject to qeyelopmental constraints-the filter does not operate, permitting learners to integrate the feature directly into implicit knowledge.

A weak interface position also acknowledges the value of formal instruction as a way of helping learners develop greater control over the L2 knowledge (explicit or implicit) that they already possess. Figure 4.2 refers to the acquisition of new L2 knowledge. However, many formal language lessons are not directed at teaching new properties but in enabling the learners to use features they have already partly acquired with greater accuracy (see Chapter 2).

To sum up, a weak interface position proposes the following:

1 Explicit knowledge can be converted into implicit knowledge in the case of non-developmental grammatical rules.

2 Explicit knowledge can be converted into implicit knowledge in the case of developmental rules, providing the learner has reached the stage of acquisition that allows for integration of the new rule into the interlanguage system.

3 Explicit knowledge cannot be converted into implicit knowledge in the case of developmental rules if the learner has not reached the requisite stage of acquisition.

4 Not all knowledge originates in an explicit form-more often than not L2 knowledge begins as implicit knowledge.

5 Formal instruction can help to automatize both explicit and implicit grammatical knowledge.

From input to knowledge It seems reasonable to assume that as explicit and implicit knowledge are represented differently in the mind of the learner they result from different learning processes. Th~ discussion of consciousness in language learning provided by Schmidt (see Schmidt 1990 and 1994 is im ortant in hel in to iaentl ow these learnin roc s differ.

_c midt suggests that language learning involves cqnsciousness in four different senses. First, it can be conscious in the sense of 'intention.1ll'. In this respect, it contrasts with incidental learning. Learners call knowingly focus their attention on trying to understand and memorize features of the L2 or they can concentrate on message conveyance but in the process acquire new L2

. !


knowledge as a by-product. Schmidt makes the important point that we should not assume that incidental acquisition is unaccompanied by awareness or that it results only in implicit knowledge. '

Second, Schmidt discusses consciousness as attention. Attention is characterised as noticing properties of the inputY Schmidt argues that attention is necessary for any learning to take place. His own position is that attention involves a degree of consciousness on the part of the learner but he acknowledges other points of view. In Schmidt (1994), for example, he refers to the model proposed by Tomlin and Villa (1994), according to which detection of input signals can occur without consciousness, a position analogous to that of Krashen (1985). There is general agreement, how~r, that detection is necessary for both expliCit and implicit learning.

Third, Schmidt considers consciousness as awareness. This refers to the idea of le'a;-;ers being co'gnizant of the knowledge_they have learnt in the s.~I1se of being aware orarure or generalization. Schmidt points out thatrtls-riecessary to distinguish different levels or types of awareness. A_t a low level there is awareness in noticing. At a higher'level, however, there is awareness of the system that underlies phenomena that have been noticed. It is this kind of awareness, I would argue, that is found In explicit knowledge.

The fuurth sense of consciousne~that Schmidt examines is that of control. He notes that learning'-a: language has 'a skill aspect as well as a knowledge

asp~ct' (Schmidt 1994: 20). Initially, learners need to focus their cOIisdous attention on the choice of lingUISticform but as theyprogress,"iliese cOntto1led responses become automatIzed enabling learners to give more conscious attention to other aspects of m~~age construction. In this sen;~~" then,

consciou~I]..~o.s.dy to the extent to which knowledge has become p~ralized, as discussed in the previous section. --, .. _.....--

r. _____ , -------- -- . ~.- - .... --- ----. -- .. _ ... -~. --_. --,, __ .. "..,...,..-~...,.,_~

Learning explicit knowledge

It is now possible to attempt a characterization of eifit~and implicit language learning. EEQlicit lea' is necessaril ntentionaL It requires learners tl.onsciously attend to the formal propertie~ t e InQ.Ut, po~si~!y~t the expense of attending to meaning. Alternatively, it requires learners to ident[[y ,elements iri- the-ir implicit 'knowledge and renect, on them (what BIalystok (1991) refers to as 'analysis'). Irrespective hether ex licit

'I i k.nOWled e is derived from input or from ear ier acquired implicit knowledge, It Involves an attem t to construct ru es or genera IzatlOns 0 w lEn-rhe

learne~i1l b.AYf a high1evel of awareness. As Bia ysto : puts-it, 'exPlicit knowledge is knowledge that includes precise boundaries and is o'rganise in nown systems' .

I assume that thi~s involves non-specialized cognitive mechanisms and processes-that is, it proceeds in much the same way as the learning of any other type of declarative knowledge. Two basic processes would seem to be


involved, memorization and problem-solving. The former occurs when the learner attempts to consciously consign grammatical information to memory, as when an attempt is made to memorize verb conjugations or the gender of nouns in L2 French. The process is presumably the same as that involved in memorizing mathematical formulae or history dates. It can be aided by the use of various strategies such as mnemonic techniques and other memory-enhancing techniques (Thompson 1987, Cohen 1990).

Problem-solving is evident when learners attempt to induce explicit information about the L2 from the input data they are exposed to or from their implicit knowledge. It can occur during the course of communication, as when the learner pays conscious attention to some formal feature in the input and tries to understand it. In such cases the learner's attention may switch backwards and forwards from meaning to form in the manner Lennon (1989) found in the advanced learners of L2 English he studied. Problem-solving is catered for more directly in certain kinds of formal instruction. Rutherford (1988) and Fotos and Ellis (1991) have given examples of consciousness-raising activities, which require learners to analyse specially structured data in order to discover a grammatical rule. Even language drills can be viewed as a kind of problem-solving activity. Although the pedagogic aim of such activities is implicit rather than explicit knowledge (see Chapter 3), learners often seem to treat the drill as a problem requiring the application of various strategies for reaching a solution (Hosenfeld 1976).

In fact, there have been few empirical studies of how L2 learners develop explicit knowledge (but see Aljaafreh and Lantolf 1994). One issue that has received some attention is the relative effectiveness of directly presenting an explicit rule as opposed to providing data from which learners are required to induce the rule. These studies, which were examined in Chapter 3, indicate that presenting learners with rules supported by examples works best.

Even less is known about how learners organize their mental representations of explicit knowledge. Is explicit knowledge of grammatical rules, for example, learnt in some kind of natural sequence? This would seem unlikely. Are certain linguistic facts intrinsically easier to understand and remember than others? Green and Hecht's (1992) study of German learners of L2 English revealed that some rules were consistently easier to learn as explicit knowledge than others. The rules that were easy to learn were those that referred to easily recognized categories, could be applied mechanically, and were not dependent on large contexts. Examples were morphological distinctions such as 'a/an', 'who/'which', straightforward cases of 'some/any' and simple word order. Difficult rules were those that did not permit 'simple exhaustive descriptions' or were not always governed by features of the immediate context (e.g. rules involving aspect). One of the assumptions that underlies the traditional grading of items in a structural syllabus is that some items are easier to learn than others. However, the criteria that have been used to grade items lack precision and there is no precise method for determining the optimal teaching sequence.


Another issue is the extent to which learners are capable of learning explicit rules. Krashen (1982) argues that most learners will only be able to learn rules that are formally simple and functionally transparent. However, he may have seriously underestimated the amount of explicit knowledge that learners are capable of internalizing. Good language learners (see Naiman et al. 1978, Pickett 1978) seem to pay conscious attention to grammar and to learn a large number of rules. Although Green and Hecht (1992) found that the learners they studied could produce a correct rule in less than half the cases (46 per cent), they showed that the more cognitively sophisticated learners in their study (i.e. pupils at a German Gymnasium and university students) achieved higher levels (55 per cent and 85 per cent respectively). Bialystok (1994: 556) argues that much of the information found in 'language-specific details' 'is learnt as discrete, statable knowledge, especially by adult second language learners'. Learners' explicit rules are not always very exact, however. Seliger (1979) found that the learners he studied demonstrated vague and sometimes plain inaccurate knowledge of the rule for using 'alan'. Sorace (1985), however, showed that although learners began with anomalous explicit knowledge they increasingly refined it over time. Green and Hecht (1992), in contrast to Seliger, found that their learners were almost always able to correct errors successfully if they had stated the rule correctly.

Learning implicit knowledge

In accordance with Schmidt's discussion of consciousness, implicit language learning can be characterized as incidental, involving some degree of attention to linguistic forms in the input (although the extent to which this attention is conscious remains controversial) but not involving any depth of awareness regarding the abstract system underlying the forms which have been attended to and internalized.

Lexical items and formulaic expressions can be learnt explicitly-by memorizing items from a phrase book, for example. In many cases, however, words and formulas are learnt incidentally from exposure to input in which they occur frequently and are salient. In classrooms, where the L2 is the medium of instruction, fixed expressions associated with the routines of classroom management appear to be readily internalized, perhaps because they are not only frequent but also help the learners to perform communicative functions that are important to them when they have little 'creative' proficiency in the L2 (see Chapter 7).

There are conflicting views about how implicit knowledge of L2 rules is developed. According to both the Input Hypothesis (Krashen 1985) and the early version of Long's Interactional Hypothesis (see Long 1983b), new rules are internalized subconsciously when learners comprehend input. However, this view has been challenged. Frerch and Kasper (1986), Sharwood Smith (1986), White (1987) and Gass (1988) all point out that comprehension can take place without any linguistic processing. Top-down processing of input draws on existing linguistic knowledge and contextual information, and so


obviates the need to pay much attention to new linguistic items. Comprehension that results from a semantic analysis of the input, where the relationships between the elements that make up the text are inferenced using contextual clues and world knowledge is unlikely to add anything to the learner's implicit knowledge. For this to happen some kind of structural analysis of the input is required. As Gass (1988: 205) comments:

What is comprehended can either feed into the intake component or, alternatively, it may not be used by the learner for anything beyond immediate communication.

As White (1987) has argued, input is more likely to become intake, if it is initially incomprehensible and~pe learner has to pay careful attention to the actual forms of language to make it comprehensible.

I would like to suggest that input can become implicit knowledge when the learner carries out the following operations:

1 Noticing (i.e. paying attention to specific linguistic features in the input). 2 Comparing (i.e. comparing the noticed features with the features the learner

typically produces in output). 3 Integrating (i.e. constructing new hypotheses in order to incorporate the

noticed features into the interlanguage system). In accordance with current theories of L2 acquisition (Chaudron 1985, Gass 1988, VanPatten 1987), the process by which input becomes implicit knowledge is seen to involve two principal stages; one where input becomes intake, which involves the operation of noticing, and one where intake becomes part of the learner's interlanguage system. Intake occurs when learners take features into their short- or medium-term memories, whereas interlanguage change occurs only when they become part of long-term memory (see Figure 4.3).

Operations

noticing comparing integrating I I I I I I I I I I I I I I , , ,

INPUT .. Short/~ Long-term OUTPUT medium-term memory: memory: DEVELOPING INTAKE IL SYSTEM

Figure 4.3: The process of learning implicit knowledge


Noticing As we have already noted, Schmidt views the process of noticing as necessarily a conscious one. Noticing is not the same as perceiving. A reader, for instance, will generally be aware of the message content of the text (i.e. will notice it), but may also perceive other aspects of the text such as unusual linguistic features or the size of the print. Schmidt defines noticing operationally as 'availability for verbal report'. He claims that for a feature in the input to become intake the learner must notice it, a view that is disputed.

A number of factors may induce a learner to notice something in the input:

1 Task demands (i.e. the instructional task causes the learner to heed specific features because these are important for completion of the task). The most obvious way in which this occurs is during code-oriented instruction, when specific features are made intentionally prominent, but communicative tasks can also result in the learner attending to specific features that are significant for achieving a solution to a problem.

2 Frequency (i.e.linguistic features which occur repeatedly in the classroom input). Features may become frequent either as a result of form-focused instruction or through teacher talk.

3 Unusual features (i.e. features that surprise the learner because they do not conform to expectations). An unusual feature works in much the same way as a deviant feature in a literary text, the purpose of which is to draw attention to the code (see Widdowson 1975). Not all unusual features are noticed, however. The process of obliterative assumption (Ausubel1971) induces learners to interpret input in terms of their existing knowledge, and in such cases, unusual features will be screened out.

4 Salience (i.e. certain features may be more salient than others as a result of their phonological form or their position in utterances). Wode (1981), for instance, has argued that free morphemes are more salient than bound morphemes, while many of the operating principles identified by Slobin (1973 )-for example, 'Pay attention to the ends of words'-also account for why some features are more salient than others.

5 Interactional modification during the negotiation of meaning (i.e. attempts to deal with communication problems) may result in the learner notidng particular features in the input that might otherwise be ignored-see earlier section on input).

6 Existing linguistic knowledge (i.e. the learner's current stage of development may make it easier to notice some features than others).

Although there are strong grounds for believing that these are some of the major factors that cause learners to notice features in the input, we still know very little about what induces a learner to heed specific information on a particular occasion. The presence of one of more of the above conditions does not guarantee noticing; it merely makes it more likely.


Noticing also helps to explain how simplified input facilitates acquisition. According to Krashen (1981, 1985) simplified input is facilitative because it helps to make input comprehensible, but Gregg (1984) and White (1987) have argued that it is of little use where acquisition is concerned because it results in impoverished data. However, simplified input may be effective in drawing the learner's attention to features that would otherwise be ignored-either by temporarily increasing the frequency of specific forms or by constructing messages in such a way that specific forms become prominent in the input. In other words, the importance of simplified input may rest not in its contribution to the comprehensibility of messages, but rather in its ability to induce learners to pay attention to features which they are developmentally ready to acquire.

Comparing5

New items and rules only become part of the developing interlanguage system if learners can establish how they differ from their existing interlanguage representation. A diary study by Schmidt and Frota (1986) illuminates how this process of comparison operates. They examined to what extent a learner's reported understanding of the grammar of the L2 matched his production, finding a close correlation between the two. Thus, features that the learner noticed in the input and recorded in his diary tended to show up shortly afterwards in his output. The processes of noticing-the-gap are neatly illustrated in this extract from the learner's journal: .

I often say dois anos ante for 'two years ago'. I think it should be an os atras. I have been hearing it that way in conversation, I think ... (later the same day). I asked M which is correct and he says both are OK, but I am suspicious. Check with S tomorrow. (ibid.: 312)

Schmidt and Frota argue that noticing-the-gap is a conscious process, but this is controversial. Krashen's (1982) point that there are simply too many linguistic facts for all them to be acquired consciously is a compelling argument in this respect. Schmidt and Frota admit that there were some features that were not mentioned in the diary but did appear in the learner's production. It is possible, of course, that these features were still noticed.

In some cases, the comparison between the learner's output and the target language input is conducted overtly as part of the ongoing interaction, as in this example:

Learner: No go disco this Saturday. Teacher: Oh, so you're not going to the disco this Saturday?

This may be one reason why interaction helps to facilitate language acquisition; it helps the learner to undertake the necessary comparison between output and input. However, for acquisition to take place, the learner must make a mental comparison. A comparison made interactionallY as in the


above example mayor may not lead to an internal comparison. Also, the comparison must be a focused one. It is unlikely that learners will be able to attend to all the differences between their own and the teacher's utterances in examples such as the one above.

Integrating Learners must also be able to use the information available to them from noticing and comparing to modify their interlanguage systems. In the case of item learning this may occur relatively easily, but where system learning is concerned restructuring is more problematic. Gass (1988) proposes that the modification of interlanguage rules can take two forms; either learners revise hypotheses and, therefore, develop their implicit L2 grammar or they place features in storage until some subsequent time when they can fully incorporate them into their interlanguage systems. These stored features may become part of the explicit L2 grammar.

The extent to which consciousness is present when learners incorporate intake into the interlanguage system is uncertain. Studies in cognitive psychology (e.g. Lewicki et al. 1988, Cleeremans 1993) indicate that some learners are able to internalize quite complex information without demonstrating any awareness of what they have learnt. Studies by Reber (see Reber 1976) involving artificial grammars and Robinson's (1996) studyoftwo grammatical rules in English also demonstrate that subjects may be able to learn the rules underlying quite complex strings without consciously thinking about them. 6 However, other researchers (e.g. Dulany et al. 1984) have argued that rule-learning cannot take place implicitly and DeKeyser (1995), in a review of the available research, concludes that there was 'very little evidence for implicit learning of abstract patterns' (ibid.: 83). This remains a controversial issue.

The L2 studies which show that the acquisition of rules follows a fairly well-defined sequence suggest that hypothesis formation and revision are constrained by the learner's existing knowledge of the L2 (see earlier discussion of implicit knowledge). Thus intake does not automatically become part of interlanguage; incorporation of rules occurs only when the learner is ready. Integration of new material will be easier if it does not involve any restructuring of the existing system (i.e. it can simply be added to the system). Such is probably the case with individual items such as words and formulaic chunks,? which, as we have seen, constitute an important part of implicit knowledge, and perhaps also with simple rules like the copula. Knowledge that cannot be accommodated in the interlanguage system may be lost or may be shunted into an alternative store as explicit knowledge.

As we saw in Chapter 2, there are also arguments and some evidence to show that hypothesis formation is not entirely dependent on input and intake; learners seem to be able to go beyond the information available to them in the


input. Zobl (1983) has argued that learners must be equipped with a 'projection device' that causes acquisition of one feature to trigger acquisition of other features. Further evidence of learners' ability to go beyond the input can be found in overgeneralization errors (e.g. 'eated').

The relationship between explicit and implicit knowledge Of crucial importance for any theory of instructed second language acquisition is the relationship between explicit and implicit knowledge systems. In Krashen's (1981) non-interface model, the two types of knowledge are seen as totally unrelated, and explicit knowledge is considered unimportant for interlanguage development. In the weak interface model being proposed here, however, explicit knowledge is seen as playing an important role in developing implicit knowledge, as shown in Figure 4.4.

form-focused instruction

J, r---------------------------"I----------- ex~licit I I ! . ! knrf~F:J INPUT-~ noticing ...... INTAKE----.. comparing--"IMPLICIT .. OUTPUT

t t KNOWLEDGE (ILrSTEM)

Figure 4.4: The role of explicit knowledge in L2 acquisition

First, explicit knowledge can help the learner to notice features in the input that would otherwise be ignored. For example, if learners learn the formal rule for third-person -s, they may be less likely to overlook the presence of this feature in the input. This feature is communicatively redundant and so may be missed when learners process input entirely for meaning. Access to explicit knowledge may encourage the learner to notice it even though it is not necessary for communication, as suggested by Fotos's (1994) research (see Chapter 3). The argument is, therefore, twofold; learners will be more inclined to engage in grammatical processing if they possess explicit knowledge and will be better equipped to do so.

Second, explicit knowledge may facilitate the process of noticing-the-gap. Thus learners are better able to compare what they have noticed in the input with output derived from their current interlanguage grammars if they are equipped with explicit knowledge. Explicit knowledge may sensitize the


language processor so that it takes account of data available in the input and is more able to undertake an adequate analysis.

Explicit knowledge, then, can contribute indirectly to interlanguage development. It can be viewed metaphorically as a kind of 'acquisition facilitator' (Seliger 1979) or as providing hooks on which to hang subsequent implicit knowledge (Lightbown 1985b). A corollary of this position is that formal instruction directed at explicit knowledge may have a delayed rather than an immediate impact on the learners' interlanguage. There is, of course, no certainty that learners will use their explicit knowledge to facilitate noticing and comparing (hence the dotted lines in Figure 4.4).

Explicit knowledge can also convert directly into implicit knowledge if the itemlrule is not developmental or, if it is developmental, when the learner is psycholinguistically ready to accommodate it-as has been discussed earlier.

Explicit knowledge may be especially important for the adult learner. Schmidt (1990) advances the argument that whereas children may be able to notice linguistic features in the input as a result of peripheral attention (i.e. while focused on the message), adults may need to engage in more focal, controlled noticing. If this is so, then explicit knowledge may be necessary to help adults both observe and process certain linguistic properties. It is likely, however, that implicit knowledge is utilized in the processes of noticing and comparing (as shown in Figure 4.4), even with adults.

Explicit knowledge is no substitute for implicit knowledge. Ultimately, success in L2learning depends on implicit knowledge. To support this claim we might again turn to the study by Green and Hecht (1992) mentioned earlier. Although, this study showed that learners who knew a rule explicitly were able to correct errors successfully, it also showed that in more than 50 per cent of the cases tested they were able to give the desired correction when they could not state the rule.

An implication in the position being advanced here is that acquisition will proceed more rapidly if learners have well-developed explicit knowledge and access to communicative input. Studies by Spada (1986, 1987) and by Montgomery and Eisenstein (1985) support such a claim. The synergistic effect (DeKeyser 1995) created by implicit and explicit learning working together outweighs the effect of either kind of learning working separately.

Automatizing L2 knowledge The theory of second language acqUlsltlOn distinguishes between explicit/implicit knowledge on the one hand and controlled/automatic processes on the other. Having considered the former in some detail, we will turn our attention briefly to the latter.

The principle means by which both explicit and implicit knowledge become automatic is practice. However, the kind of practice needed to automatize the two types of knowledge is different. In the case of implicit knowledge, practice


that requires learners to make use of interlanguage knowledge under real operating conditions is needed. Johnson (1988: 93) discusses the eradication of mistakes (i.e. learners' failure to perform their competence) in terms of the literature on skill acquisition and argues that 'learners need to see for themselves what has gone wrong, in the operating conditions under which they went wrong'. He suggests that the kind of practice that is most likely to lead to increased accuracy will involve the stages of corrective action and retrial. He argues that the former is best executed not by means of formal explanation but by 'confronting the learner with the mismatch between flawed and model performance' (ibid.: 93) and that the latter entails opportunities for performing the skill in free practice (i.e. practice that corresponds to the type of language use that the learner is trying to master). One way in which this takes place is when learners receive requests to clarify utterances that contain linguistic errors (Pica et al. 1989). In Chapter 8 we will examine a small-scale study that has investigated the impact of pushing learners to reformulate their utterances on interlanguage development. It is possible, however, that learners will need continual access to free practice of this kind to ensure that automaticity is maintained over time. As we saw in Chapter 2, long-term gains in accuracy may require continued exposure and opportunity to use newly acquired structures in classroom communication.

The automatization of explicit knowledge can be achieved through more traditional controlled grammar practice activities. Many pedagogic accounts of practice assume that it will re~mlt in implicit knowledge (see Dr 1988). It is seen as a device that leads the learner from explicit to implicit knowledge. The theory of instructed second language acquisition proposed here does not rule out such a possibility if the learner is developmentally ready to acquire the targeted feature. However, it suggests that practice will not always be successful this way and, from a pedagogic stance, the difficulty in predicting when it will be successful detracts from the utility of practice (Ellis 1988a). Practice does have an important role, however-that of automatizing existing explicit knowledge.

In this respect, the theory emphasizes the need to suit the type of practice to the type of knowledge (explicit or implicit) that is the goal of the instruction. Automatization is of crucial importance in L2 acquisition, not only because it leads to improved L2 performance, but also because it enables the learner to release attention and effort for the controlled processing of new L2 forms (VanPatten 1987).

The role of other knowledge It is hypothesized that other knowledge in the form of the learner's knowledge of the world and the learner's L 1 contribute to instructed L2 acquisition in much the same way as they contribute to naturalistic L2 acquisition.


World knowledge One way of characterizing world knowledge is as a set of content schema, a term derived from Bartlett (1932), who showed that people's interpretations of a text tended to reflect their own, preformed interests and tendencies. Ausubel (1971) advanced the theory that already-known ideas tend to subsume or anchor new information, resulting in the process of obliterative subsumption, to which we referred briefly earlier (see page 120). Rumelhart (1980) and Schank and Abelson (1977) have further developed schema theory to account for narrative memory and the reading process.

Learners use content schema to help them interpret messages; that is, they use them to fill in gaps in linguistic processing of input by inferencing probable meanings. This involves top-down processing. It is clear, therefore, that content schema playa major role in language use, but it is less clear if or how they contribute to the acquisition of new linguistic knowledge. They playa potential role in the acquisition of new vocabulary and formulas by enabling the learner to discover the meaning and contextual uses of these items through inferencing. They may also help the learner discover the meaning of grammatical features in the same way. Content schema, therefore, may contribute substantially to the early stages of language acquisition, by helping learners get a foothold on the mountainous task that faces them. Also, skilful use of content schema in inferencing may help the learner develop effective strategic competence, thus enabling them to become fluent communicators. However, as was argued earlier, learners who continue to rely extensively on top-down processing may be prevented from undertaking the noticing and comparing that are necessary for acquisition. Such learners may become effective communicators but fail to develop advanced levels of explicit or implicit grammatical knowledge. One possible solution is to sensitize learners to the need for structural as well as semantic processing by equipping them with explicit knowledge through form-focused instruction.

The learner's L 1 The dismissal of a significant role for the learner's L1 in L2 learning, which occurred when behaviourist models of language learning were rejected, has more recently given way to acceptance of transfer as a major factor. This acceptance has occurred as cognitive models of learning have gained prominence. Schachter (1983), for instance, has located transfer clearly within a hypothesis-testing model of L2 acquisition.

Explicit knowledge of L2 rules may serve to inhibit negative transfer in implicit knowledge. Interestingly, however, there is disagreement over whether negative transfer will be more evident in instructed learning (which can be considered to favour explicit knowledge) or in naturalistic learning (which favours implicit knowledge). Marton (1981) suggests that negative transfer will be more evident in instructed than in naturalistic learning but


Odlin (1989: 147) claims the reverse is more likely. Odlin proposes that ... in unfocused contexts (such as naturalistic settings), the constraints {)n negative transfer will be weak, as there is generally less concern about heeding target language norms.

On balance, the evidence seems to favour Odlin. In addition to the studies he cites (Sey 1973 and Singler 1988), which indicate thatlearners with considerable formal education manifest less cross-linguistic influence than those with little, there is Pica's (1985) study of naturalistic, instructed, and mixed groups of learners which shows that pidgin-like forms which mirror Ll forms are more prevalent in the first than in the other two groups (see page 61). It seems reasonable to assume that explicit knowledge enables instructed learners to overcome at least some negative transfer effects, possibly by sensitizing them to the differences between the target and native language forms.

The bulk of recent work on transfer has been concerned with identifying when it occurs and when it does not. As Kellerman (1983: 129) comments:

... it is rapidly becoming an article of faith that transfer is not an all-or-nothing affair but a process that needs to be constrained in various ways. It is only by attempting to investigate the nature of these constraints that we will be able to explain ... why 'now you see it, now you don't'.

The constraints that have been identified include the learner's stage of development, the degree of similarity between the target and native language rule, conformity to universal operating principles, language-specific tendencies in the target language, the degree of markedness of the Ll rule and the target language rule it is seeking to replace, and the perceived magnitude of the distance between the two languages. There is every reason to suppose that these constraints will operate in tutored as well as untutored learning contexts.

In line with current thinking on transfer, the learner's L 1 should be seen as constituting a positive resource rather than as an inhibiting factor. Transfer is not something that has to be overcome but part of the process of constructing implicit knowledge.

L2 performance The reception processes involved in comprehending input have already been considered. Although there is general agreement that listening involves both linguistic, bottom-up processing and semantic, top-down processing, there is, in fact, no well-established model of how these interact-to quote Dunkel (1991: 434): 'there seems to be very little genuine agreement about what listening entails, and how it operates'. The model of most relevance to the theory of instructed L2 acquisition advanced in this chapter is that of Frerch and Kasper (1986). They view comprehension as the integration of three types of information-verbal and non-verbal input, the listener's existing knowledge (linguistic and world) and contextual information. Comprehension


involves a matching process that is both input-driven (i.e. bottom-up) and knowledge driven (i.e. top-down), the extent to which it is one or the other depending on the nature of the comprehension task. When gaps appear between the input and the recipient's knowledge, inferencing procedures are used in an attempt to bridge them and input is further sampled and processed. Fxrch and Kasper (1986) emphasize that comprehension is typically partial and that understanding involves arriving at a 'reasonable interpretation'.

What these models emphasize is the relative interdependence of comprehension and learning. In other words, contrary to the claims of the Input Hypothesis, comprehending input does not in itself contribute to acquisition. As Fxrch and Kasper emphasize learning only occurs when there is a gap in knowledge that leads to mis- or non-understanding. Learning becomes possible when the learner admits responsibility for the problem and so is forced to play close attention to the input. It follows then that it is not comprehension per se that aids learning, but, as was suggested earlier, lack of comprehension. Efficient decoding may obviate the need for close attention to linguistic form; a learner may become proficient at reading or listening without developing high levels of grammatical proficiency in the L2 (see Ellis 1993a).

L2 production may be dependent entirely on the learner's own linguistic and non-linguistic resources or it may be interactionally accomplished. In the case of the former, learners will have to balance the need for communicative efficiency with the need to conform to target language norms (Clyne 1985). Communicative efficiency can best be achieved by relying on automated implicit knowledge (Type D in Figure 4.1). The use of formulas and what I have called 'semantic simplification' (the omission of key constituents from an utterance, which an interlocutor can infer from context-see Ellis 1994) contribute to fluent and successful communication, particularly in the early stages of L2 acquisition. The attempt to conform to target language norms is evident when learners try to maximize their competence by means of monitoring. Krashen (1977) proposes that output is initially generated by means of acquired (i.e. implicit) knowledge and is then edited or monitored under certain conditions. Krashen's view of monitoring is somewhat limited (see Morrison and Low 1983, for a detailed account of different types of monitoring). In particular, he sees it as restricted to learnt (i.e. explicit) knowledge. However, learners can also monitor by means of controlled implicit knowledge, a point that Krashen (1985) seems to acknowledge later when he talks about monitoring by feel. Also, although monitoring constitutes an additional processing operation, it need not interfere greatly with communicative efficiency, as learners with access to well-automated explicit knowledge may be able to edit their output without adversely affecting their fluency. There is likely to be considerable individual variation in the extent to which different learners emphasize communicative efficiency or target language norms in their production (Meisel, Clahsen, and Pienemann 1981).

Learners also make use of the scaffolding provided by their interlocutors to help them produce utterances (see Chapter 2). Interactionally-aided output


appears to figure extensively in early L2 acquisition. In the classroom, there may be limited opportunities for such output, but Fa:rch (1985) has shown that they are not entirely missing.

Output may also contribute to acquisition. As suggested by Swain (1985), pushed output (i.e. output that is precise and sociolinguistically acceptable) may be necessary for learners to achieve higher levels of linguistic and sociolinguistic competence. Swain (1995) suggests that pushed output aids acquisition in three principal ways. First, it promotes noticing-the-gap. Through trying to produce the target language, learners discover that there is a gap between what they want to say and what they are able to say. Second, output serves as means of hypothesis testing. Swain suggests that learners may tryout rules and, if their output elicits feedback indicating the rules are incorrect or inappropriate, they utilize this feedback to modify the rules. Third, learners have been observed to reflect sometimes on their output and, as a result develop a meta lingual understanding of how it is problematic. In this way, output can also contribute to the development of explicit knowledge. Swain argues that this process of reflection is stimulated when learners engage in collaborative tasks that lead to talk about linguistic form in the context of meaning-focused activity. In these three ways, pushed output can both help to create new linguistic knowledge and also to increase the accuracy with which existing knowledge is used. However, as we saw in Chapter 2 opportunities for pushed output may be rare, even in classrooms that can be presumed to favour real communication (i.e. immersion classrooms in Canada). It may be necessary, therefore, to contrive opportunities for learner production that encourages noticing-the-gap, hypothesis testing and reflection.

Output can also help in another way. The language learners produce constitutes a kind of auto-input (Schmidt and Frota 1986). As Sharwood Smith (1981) has pointed out this means that utterances that have been constructed with the help of explicit knowledge can provide feedback into the system responsible for processing implicit knowledge. It also means, however, that learners are exposed to their own errors, a fact that may account for why some errors are so persistent and why learners often feel that their errors are not really errors. Auto-input, therefore, has the potential to both facilitate and impede acquisition.

Summary The theory described in the previous sections has been constructed to explain how input derived from different types of instruction contributes to L2 acquisition in a classroom setting. The central premise of the model is that knowledge can be distinguished according to whether it is explicit or implicit. This summary takes the form a series of claims regarding these two types of knowledge.


Explicit knowledge 1 Explicit knowledge consists of analysed L2 features, which the learner is

aware of and may be able to articulate. 2 Explicit knowledge is available for use in both controlled and automatic

processing. 3 Explicit knowledge can be developed as a result of memorizing descriptions

of L2 features or of engaging in problem-solving activities. 4 Learners may make use of explicit L1 knowledge when learning explicit L2

rules. 5 Learners may also develop explicit L2 knowledge as a result of reflecting on

their own output, in particular when they perceive this as problematic in someway.

6 Explicit knowledge may convert directly into implicit knowledge if the learner has reached a stage of development that permits this.

7 Explicit knowledge may also contribute to the acquisition of implicit knowledge indirectly in two ways: by helping the learner to notice features in the input and by helping learners to carry out a comparison between input and their own current interlanguage and in so doing to notice the gap.

8 Explicit knowledge can be used to edit utterances (conscious monitoring).

Implicit knowledge 1 Implicit L2 knowledge consists of items (e.g. lexical items and formulaic

chunks) and rules or generalizations. 2 Implicit knowledge is available for use in both controlled and automatic

processing, but is particularly suited to the latter. 3 Implicit knowledge results from incidental learning when learners attend to

and detect forms in the input. Learners are not aware or have only a low level of awareness of their implicit knowledge.

4 Implicit learning involves intake and interlanguage revision. Intake occurs when the learner (a) notices a new feature in the input and places it in short-term memory. Interlanguage revision occurs when the learner (b) notices a gap between the feature and the current interlanguage and (c) accommodates the L2 system to the new feature. The extent to which consciousness is involved in (a) and (b) remains a matter of controversy. It is likely that (c) is a largely subconscious process.

5 Integration is easier in item learning than in system (rule) learning. 6 Implicit knowledge of some grammatical rules is acquired gradually and

sequentially, reflecting psycholinguistic constraints that govern their integration.

7 Learners are likely to notice and, therefore, intake features that are communicatively significant, frequent, unusual, perceptively salient, similar to their L1, or unmarked. Noticing and intake may also be promoted by developmental readiness.


8 Simplified or interactionally modified input can result in some features becoming more frequent or salient in the input and therefore more noticeable.

9 Learners may be able to go beyond the data provided by the input by projecting their knowledge of marked features to associated unmarked features.

10 Learners utilize both world knowledge and L1 knowledge in acquiring implicit knowledge.

11 The process of comprehending input is distinct from the process of acquiring implicit knowledge; noticing and intake only occur when learners are engaged in bottom-up processing and integration requires them to recognize a gap in the interlanguage system.

12 Learners' output also contributes to the acquisition of implicit L2 knowledge when the learner is pushed to conform to target language norms and (b) output becomes auto-input.

13 Opportunities for participating in language use under real operating conditions may be needed to automatize implicit knowledge.

14 Learners can edit their output using implicit knowledge. This is known as monitoring by feel.

As in all theories, these claims constitute hypotheses that require careful testing.

Conclusion The theory helps to explain two puzzles in L2 acquisition studies. The first is the paradox of formal instruction; formal instruction results in faster and more successful language learning (see Chapter 2) and yet learners often fail to learn what they have been taught. This can be explained by positing that formal instruction contributes primarily to explicit knowledge which can facilitate later development of implicit knowledge. In other words, it will often have a delayed rather than an immediate effect.

The second puzzle is the fluency-accuracy puzzle; learners appear able to develop fluency in the use of the L2 while fossilizing linguistically. Learners who concentrate on automatizing their existing knowledge may do so at the expense of internalizing new knowledge. This is because the psycholinguistic processes involved in using L2 knowledge are distinct from those involved in acquiring new knowledge. To acquire, the learner must attend to the input, and perhaps also, make efforts to monitor output, but doing so may interfere with fluent reception and production. Learners may be faced with the choice of processing to achieve communicative efficiency or to acquire. Individual learners will respond differently to this choice.

The theory affords a number of pedagogic proposals. A number of these are explored in Chapters 5 and 6.


Notes 1 A recent study by Mackey (1996) does provide some support for the claim

that interaction facilitates the acquisition of grammar. She found that a group of learners who experienced interactionally modified input in performing tasks that required them to ask various types of questions manifested the ability to produce developmentally more advanced questions in a delayed but not an immediate post test. This study also lends support to a later claim, namely that form-focused instruction may sometimes have a delayed rather than an immediate effect.

2 Evidence for implicit knowledge of items is to be found in the fact that language users frequently use particular formulaic expressions to perform particular language functions without any awareness of so doing (Wolfson 1989).

3 It is customary to speak of linguistic knowledge (in particular grammatical knowledge) in terms of rules. However, recently an alternative explanation known as parallel distributed processing has been developed (see Rumelhart et al. 1986, Gasser 1990). This views learning as the establishment and strengthening of a network of connections in response to exemplars encountered in the input. There are no rules; knowledge exists as connection strengths spread throughout the system. In this chapter the term 'rules' is used to describe that aspect of linguistic knowledge that is not formulaic-in accordance with custom. The manner in which implicit knowledge is represented in the learner's mind is clearly of considerable importance. However, the main hypotheses of the theory of instructed L2 acquisition discussed in this chapter are not incompatible with a view of knowledge as associational strengths.

4 See also Robinson (1995) for a review of cognitive models of the role of attention in information processing. Robinson discusses three uses of the term 'attention'; to refer to (1) the processes involved in selecting the information to be processed and stored in memory (2) our capacity for information processing and (3) the mental effort involved.

5 In an earlier version of this theory (Ellis 1994), I characterized the function of comparing as that of facilitating intake. That is, intake was the result of noticing and comparing. On further thought, I now consider comparing as facilitating the representation of the new knowledge in the learner's interlanguage (IL) system. That is, it works on information that has been taken in. However, comparing does not guarantee that the new information will be integrated into the IL system; it merely makes it possible.

6 One of the problems with studies such as those carried out by Reber and Robinson is that we cannot be sure that the learners who were instructed to just memorize target sentences did not, in fact, attempt to consciously identify regularities in them.


7 The argument here is that item learning poses less of an integration problem than system learning. However, I do not wish to claim that the learning of formulas and lexical items only involves item learning. Clearly, lexical acquisition ultimately involves integrating items into a semantic network. I would suggest, however, that items may be initially (and incompletely) learnt in an unintegrated fashion.