emergence of cooperation through coevolving time scale in spatial prisoner’s dilemma
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Emergence of cooperation through coevolving time scale in spatial prisoner’s dilemma. Zhihai Rong ( 荣智海 ) [email protected] Donghua University 2010.08@The 4th China-Europe Summer School on Complexity Science, Shanghai. Acknowledgements . Dr. Zhi-Xi Wu Dr. Wen-Xu Wang Dr. Petter Holme - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
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Donghua UniversityDonghua University
Emergence of cooperation through coevolving time scale in spatial prisoner’s dilemma
Zhihai Rong ( 荣智海 )[email protected] Donghua University
2010.08@The 4th China-Europe Summer School on Complexity Science, Shanghai
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Acknowledgements
Dr. Zhi-Xi Wu
Dr. Wen-Xu Wang
Dr. Petter Holme
Zhi-Xi Wu, Zhihai Rong & Petter Holme, Phys.Rev.E,036106,2010
Zhihai Rong, Zhi-Xi Wu & Wen-Xu Wang, Phys.Rev.E,026101, 2010
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阿豺折箭 戮力一心
阿豺有子二十人。阿豺谓曰:“汝等各奉吾一支箭。”折之地下。俄而命母弟慕利延曰:“汝取一支箭折之。”慕利延折之。又曰:“汝取十九支箭折之。”延不能折。阿豺曰:“汝曹知否?单者易折,众则难摧,戮力一心,然后社稷可固!”
——《魏书•吐谷浑传 》
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Cooperation: the basis of human societies
Robert Boyd and Sarah Mathew, A Narrow Road to Cooperation, SCIENCE,2007
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Prisoner’s dilemma ( 囚徒困境 ,PD)
Cooperator: help others at a cost to themselves.Defector: receive the benefits without providing help.
Whatever opponent does, player does better by defecting…
C DC (-2,-
2)(-5,-1)
D (-1,-5)
(-3,-3)
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Some rules for evolutions cooperation
Nowak MA (2006). Five rules for the evolution of cooperation. Science
Kin selection: relativeHamilton, J. Theor. Biol.7 (1964)
Direct reciprocity: unrelated individuals Tit for tat(TFT): nice, punishing, forgiving, but for
noise… Axelrod & Hamilton, Science 211, (1981)
Win stay, lost shift(WSLS) Nowak, Sigmund, Nature 364, (1993)
Indirect reciprocity: reputationNowak, Sigmund, Nature 437 (2005).
Network reciprocity
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Spatial Game Theory M. Nowak and R. May, Evolutionary games and spatial chaos,Nature
1992
Each player x occupying a site on a network
playing game with neighbors and obtaining payoff: Px(t)
updating rule( replicator dynamics): select a neighbor and learn its behavior with probability ~ f(Py(t)-Px(t))
player2
player1
C D
C 1 0
D 0
:1 2
: the temptation to defection
b
PD b
b
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Evolutionary games on graphs G. Szabo&G. Fath, Evolutionary games on graphs, Phys. Rep. 446, 2007
Cooperator frequency fc
Game Rule
Selection ruleBest take overRandomPreferential …
PD,SG,SH,UG,PGG, Rock-paper-scissors…
Evolutionary Rule Structure & property
Replacement rulereplicator dynamics W(xy) =f(Py-Px)Fermi dynamics: W(xy)=(1+exp(x-y/κ))-1
Win stay, lost shiftMemory …
Lattice, random graph, small-world, scale-free…<k>, γ, rk , CC, community
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Diversity of lifetime (time scale)C.Roca, J.Cuesta, A.Sánchez (2006),Physical review letters, vol.97, pp.158701.
Z.X.Wu, Z.H.Rong, P.Holme (2009), Physical Review E, vol.80, pp.36106.
The interaction time scale — how frequently the individuals interact with each other
The selection time scale — how frequently they modifies their strategies
The selection time scale is slower than the interaction time scale, the player has a finite lifetime.
Individuals local on a square lattice.The fitness of i at t-th generation: fi(t)=afi(t-1)+(1-a)gi ,
where -- gi is the payoff of i -- a characterizes the maternal effects.With probability pi, an individual i is selected to update
its strategy:
where κ characterizes the rationality of individuals, and is set as 0.01.
1/pi is the lifetime of i’s current strategy, f(0)=1.
1( )
1 exp[( ) / ]i ji j
W s sf f
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Some key quantities to characterize the cooperative behaviors
Frequency of cooperators: fc
The extinction threshold of defectors/cooperators:bc1 and bc2
player2
player1
C D
C 1 0
D 0
:1 2
b
PD b
AllD
AllC
C & Dcoexist
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DHUDHU Donghua UniversityDonghua UniversityMonomorphic time scale
a↗fc ↗ Optimal fc occurs at p=0.1 for a=0.9p1, C is frequently exploited by D.
P0, Ds around the boundary have enough time to obtain a fitness high enough to beat Cs.
Coherence resonance M. Perc, New J. Phys. 2006,M. Perc & M. Marhl,New J. Phys. 2006 J. Ren, W.-X. Wang, & F. Qi, Phys. Rev. E 75,2007
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DHUDHU Donghua UniversityDonghua UniversityPolymorphic time scaleThe leaders are the individual with low p the followers are the individual with high p.v% of individuals’ p are 0.1, and others’ p are 0.9.
v=0.5, a=0.9, b=1.1, fc ≈0.712
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Coevolving time scaleZ.H.Rong, Z.X. Wu, W.X.Wang, Emergence of cooperation through coevolving time
scale in spatial prisoner's dilemma, submitted to Physical Review E , 82, 026101 , 2010
“win-slower, lose-faster” rule: i updates its strategy by comparing with neighbor j with a
different strategy with probability
If i successfully resists the invasion of j, the winner i is rewarded by owing longer lifetime: pi=pi-β, where β is reward factor
If i accepts j's strategy, the loser i has to shorten its lifetime: pi=pi+α, where α is punishment factor
0.1 ≤ pi≤1.0, initially pi=1.0, κ=0.01
What kind of social norm parameters (α,β) can promote the mergence of cooperation?
1( )
1 exp[( ) / ]i ji j
W s sf f
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a
High time scale C(p>0.5) High time scale D(p>0.5)Low time scale C (p≤0.5) Low time scale D(p ≤0.5)
(α, β)=(0.0,0.1) (α, β)=(0.2,0.1)
(α, β)=(0.9,0.1)Long-term C cluster
(α, β)=(0.9,0.05)short-term C cluster
(α, β)=(0.9,0.9)Long-term D cluster
The extinction threshold of cooperators, rD
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α=0, increasing β(reward)
Initially p=1, pmin=0.1
High time scale C High time scale D
Low time scale C Low time scale D
t=100 t=50000
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a
High time scale C High time scale DLow time scale C Low time scale D
(α, β)=(0.0,0.1) (α, β)=(0.2,0.1)
(α, β)=(0.9,0.1)
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β =0.1, increasing α(punishment)
(α,β)=(0.1,0.1)
(α,β)=(0.9,0.1)
α↗, fc↗Feedback mechanism for
C/D:Winner Cfc↗fintess↗
Winner Dfc↘fintess↘α↗, their losing D neighbors
have greater chance to becoming C, hence cooperation is promoted.
b=1.05
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a
High time scale C High time scale DLow time scale C Low time scale D
(α, β)=(0.0,0.1) (α, β)=(0.2,0.1)
(α, β)=(0.9,0.1)
(α, β)=(0.9,0.05)
(α, β)=(0.9,0.9)
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(α,β)=(0.9,0.1)
α =0.9, increasing β(reward) (α,β)=(0.9,0.9)
(α,β)=(0.9,0.05)
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Coevolution of Teaching activity
A. Szolnoki and M. Perc, New J. Phys. 10 (2008) 043036A. Szolnoki,et al.,Phys.Rev.E 80(2009) 021901
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The player x will adopt the randomly selected neighbor y’s strategy with:
wx characterizes the strength of influence (teaching activity) of x. The leader with wx 1.
Each successful strategy adoption process is accompanied by an increase in the donor’s teaching activity:
If y succeeds in enforcing its strategy on x, wywy+Δw.A highly inhomogeneous distribution of influence may emerge.
1( )
1 exp[( ) / ]x y yx y
W s s wP P
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Multiplicative “win-slower, lose-faster”
“win-slower, lose-faster” rule: i updates its strategy by comparing with neighbor j
with a different strategy:If i successfully resists the invasion of j, the winner i is rewarded by owing longer lifetime: pi=max(pi/β, pmin)
If i accepts j's strategy, the loser i has to shorten its lifetime: pi=min(pi*α,pmax)
pmin=0.1 and pmax=1.0
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The extinction threshold of cooperators, rD
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The extinction threshold of cooperationFor loser:α↗
For winner: βmidThe additive-increase /multiplicative-decrease (AIMD) algorithm in the TCP congestion control on the Internet
Jacobson, Proc. ACM SIGCOMM' 88 The extinction threshold of cooperators, rD
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Conclusions
The selection time scale is slower than the interaction time scale.
Both the fixed and the coevolving time scale.
“win-slower, lose-faster” rule
The potential application in the design of consensus protocol in multi-agent systems.
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THANKS!Discussing
Rong Zhihai ( 荣智海 ) : [email protected]
Department of Automation, DHU