emerging cleavages in new democracies: the case of lithuania

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Emerging cleavages in newdemocracies: The case ofLithuaniaMindaugas Jurkynas aa Institute of International Relations and PoliticalScience at Vilnius UniversityPublished online: 08 Mar 2007.

To cite this article: Mindaugas Jurkynas (2004) Emerging cleavages in newdemocracies: The case of Lithuania, Journal of Baltic Studies, 35:3, 278-296, DOI:10.1080/01629770400000111

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Emerging Cleavages in N e w Democracies: The Case of Lithuania

Mindaugas Jurkynas, Vilnius University

Abstract. Electoral behavior in new democracies has received significant attention, but patterns of party system development in post-communist countries still raise questions about politicization of societal conflicts and their relevance for the configuration of parties. The article discusses political manifestation of emerging cleavages. First, the study conceptualizes the notion of cleavage. The analysis then identifies the main divisive issues and their effect upon the party system. The social structure and electoral behavior helps to identify emerging cleavages. The article concludes that the formation of cleavages has not stabilized yet, and that to date, societal conflicts only have partial influence on the party system in Lithuania.

T he fall of communism across Eastern and Central Europe and the demise of the Soviet Union launched the transformation of post-

communist societies to democracy, market economy and nation-state re- building. Unstable economies, lack of political traditions and emerging social stratification had repercussions on politics in the new democracies. The post-communist societies were characterized by volatile voting patterns, unstable party systems and emotional politics. However, the Lithuanian party system did retain a rather stable set-up throughout the politically and economically tumultuous 1990s. The period of 1990-2000 revealed moderate fragmentation of the party system and a shift from centrifugal to centripetal competition. A change occurred in the 2000 elections, as new parties entered the political arena squeezing out some old-timers. The municipal elections of 2002 and the election of members into the European Parliament in June 2004 indicated that new parties threatened a substantial alteration of the political landscape. According to Gordon Smith (1989), the results of three successive parliamentary elections can clarify the significance of party system change. A number of elections in Lithuania allow us to draw inferences about Lithuanian electoral behavior and the formation of cleavages. ~ To put it briefly, the development of the party landscape in Lithuania consists of several phases. Initially, during 1990-2000 the Lithuanian, political landscape was characterized as a two-party system. High polarization and centrifugal competition were inherent in 1990-1997, followed subsequently by moderate pluralism and centripetal tendencies. Currently, five political

JBS, VOL XXXV, NO 3 (FALL 2004) 278

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EMERGING CLEAVAGES IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 279

organizations constitute the core of the party system: the Social Democrats, Social Liberals, Liberals, Conservatives and Liberal Democrats. z However, the success of the Labor Party and the Peasants' Union and New Democracy in the European Parliamentary election of 2004 is an indication of the reshuffling of party allegiances. Hence, a relevant question is what is the relationship between the party system and emerging cleavages. The article establishes the extent to which social stratification in a pre-cleavage society affected voting patterns. Politicization of issue divides in Central and Eastern Europe (Berglund et al 1998, 2004) and in Lithuania (Zeruolis 1998, Jurkynas 2001, Degutis 2001, Duvold and Jurkynas 2004) was discussed, however, empirical data from the last elections bring new developments to light, requiring further analysis.

With the presidential election of 1997 the prevalent communist/anti- communist 3 conflict dimension in Lithuanian politics gradually faded away. Municipal and parliamentary (Seimas) elections of 2000 confirmed the transformation of the political conflict from a value-laden to a socio- economic one. Electoral strategies of the political elite predetermined which societal conflicts were relevant for the election in the 1990s, as politicians would enter into conflicts that did not always mirror societal conflicts. Moreover, value-laden conflict hindered the politicization of cleavages. By the end of the 1990s, the political actors representing the old conflict lost a number of votes and the capability to shape politics independently from societal processes. Voting along socio-economic lines weakened the bipolarity and the value-laden conflict. Center-right parties emerged, emphasizing socio-economic agendas and neglecting 'ghosts of the past' (Jurkynas 2003). The emerging coalition-based and merger- oriented practices among parties also tended to reduce polarization. The socio-economic dimension of political conflict can help an electorate identify voting preferences, whereas the old political conflict obstructed cleavage-based politics. The decline of the transitional value-laden cleavage demonstrates emerging pragmatic interests in politics in which politicization of cleavages could gain momentum. On the other hand, if political conflict diverges from socio-economic issues, then class voting will turn into fata morgana.

The political society in Lithuania was pre-cleavage in the beginning of the 1990s. Market relations were not on the agenda during Soviet times and social conflicts had been frozen for fifty years with a pseudo-egalitarian profile. 4 During the fifty years of the Soviet era state and nation building were closed and all patterns of democratization ceased. The communist regime eradicated most of the inter-war political traditions. The society changed by means of Soviet repressions, deportations, emigration,

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280 MINDAUGASJURKYNAS

collectivization, modernization and finally generational change. In the beginning of the 1990s Lithuanian society was much like tabula rasa

(Shabad and Slomczynski 1999), as economic, societal and political processes were just beginning to emerge. Likewise, organizational linkages with the inter-war period were either weak or non-existent. 5 Political parties in new democracies appeared prior to, or simultaneously with, social stratification. 6 Hence the role of political entrepreneurship in the post-communist context is relevant, as party competition in Central and Eastern Europe is largely driven and shaped by the parties themselves (Sitter 2001). The post-communist transition to democracy presupposed a re-surfacing of political parties as cornerstones of a democratic regime.

Arend Lijphart claims that seven different issue dimensions can be identified in democratic societies: socio-economic, religious, cultural- ethnic, urban-rural, regime support, foreign policy, and post materialist issues (Lijphart 1984, 79). They correspond with Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan's (1967) model of cleavages as bases for party origins and separation. According to their classical dictum, national and industrial revolutions have generated state/church, center/periphery, agriculture/industry and capital/labor conflict lines 7 in West European societies. Parties absorbed these splits, providing the basis for party systems throughout Western Europe (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). It would be methodologically misleading to automatically apply this theorizing to post- communist Europe's homogenized 'flattened societies '8 which were affected by the triple transition: nation/state re-building, de-communization and marketization. The post-communist transition in Lithuania witnessed three main conflicts in the left/right dimension: center/periphery 9 (or USSR/Lithuania) (1988-90), ideological value-laden ~° (1990-1997) and the emerging socio-economic (1997-2004) (Jurkynas 2003). The object of this analysis is the link between social conflicts and the party system, since emerging societal conflicts transfer into voting behavior and affect politics. Voting patterns in Lithuania have so far revealed volatile voting against ruling parties rather than along social and economic preferences. Against this backdrop, formation of cleavages is still very open. This study will ascertain the relevant cleavages and to what extent they tend to influence voting patterns and party system. The first part will conceptualize application of cleavage-based theories in the post-communist milieu and outline the emerging cleavages in Lithuania.

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Conceptualizing Cleavages

Western and new democracies do seem to have one thing in common: the crisis of established parties. In the West, the domination of the self- interested political class and the development of the welfare state, have led to the erosion of cleavages and weakened the legitimacy of political organizations (Mair 2003, 6; Ekman et al 2004, 598). In post-communist countries legitimacy of parties is not high, even in semi-cleavage societies and politics. Cleavage is a political division among citizens rooted in the social structure and affecting electoral preferences. Cleavages can trigger political disagreements and become bases for partisan divisions. New parties do not necessarily reflect emerging cleavages, but cleavages need an agent, often a political organization, to become politically salient. A social conflict or issue divide is politicized when parties translate it into politics. In the pre-cleavage post-communist societies there is a difference between 'cleavage' and 'issue divide'. A cleavage must be a permanent and non-contingent societal conflict translated by political agents. If the politicization of social conflicts is short-lived, it is an issue divide or division. A cleavage dwindles away when parties representing the divide fall out of the ranks of relevant decision-makers and electoral preferences become restructured around other political agents representing other societal conflicts. One party can institutionalize one or more social divisions. Moreover, divides are not necessarily bipolar. A party representing an issue divide does not necessarily have to have an adversary (Hell6n et al 1998, 372). For example, if there is a party embracing just rural interests, it represents the whole rural/urban division. If a majority of elected parties support one side of a cleavage, it loses its mobilizing effect due to consensus on an issue. There are two ways to ascertain the relevance of cleavage politicization: macro-data from elections and questionnaires and opinion polls. This study focuses on the first method.

Political sociologists Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan (1967) established preconditions for the emergence of party systems in Western Europe. Only the parties reflecting structural divisions in the society were able to reproduce themselves electorally and institutionally, by giving a birth to modern party systems. The authors noted the political ability of parties to engineer cleavages that do not translate themselves into party oppositions. Cleavages partly depend on organizational and electoral strategies of parties (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, 26-27). Giovanni Sartori (1969) developed the idea further by turning the causal logic of the Lipset and Rokkan model upside-down. According to him, parties give visibility and identity for social divisions rather than social divisions inducing the

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282 MINDAUGAS JURKYNAS

development of parties. Politics in such circumstances can be conducted independently from social structures. Parties are able to politically vivify a cleavage that can be dying socially. Geoffrey Evans and Stephen Whitefield (2000) aptly summarized the relevance of cleavages. A 'bottom-up' approach stresses the relevance of sociological factors in explaining the nature of political divisions. The 'top-down' insight, in contrast, underlines the role of elites or institutional factors in shaping social divisions (Evans and Whitefield 2000). In the beginning of the transition period of 'flattened societies', namely in the early 1990s, parties were particularly active in engineering political problems independently of societal divisions. Early democratization does not necessarily generate clear-cut divisions along functional lines (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, 12).

According to Stefano Bartolini and Peter Mair (1990), a cleavage consists of three parts:

1. Empirically, it has to be definable in terms of social structure; 2. Normatively, it is a system of values giving a sense of common

identity to a social group; 3. Behaviorally, a cleavage manifests itself as an interaction between

political actors. This study takes into consideration the empirical and behavioral

aspects for two reasons: first, data on identities of social groups is barely available; second, the focus lies upon the connection between social structures and politics. Societal divisions or issue divides, which lie upon socio-economic interests, tend to last longer than those not entrenched in social structures. Electoral support is a useful tool to ascertain the level of politicization of societal conflicts. Only parties with 4-5% of electoral support or relevant party factions are considered to represent issue divides, since such parties represent coalition or blackmail potential.

Tracing the Emergence of lssue Divides

Societal cleavages need time to develop in homogenized and socially amorphous post-communist societies. The primacy of politics over interest crystallization prompts a focus on cleavages manifested through representation via electoral support. A theoretical landscape of emerging cleavages in post-communist countries (Hell6n et al 1998, 371) suits the Lithuanian case well. Cleavages from inter-war Lithuania hardly exist, due to the aforementioned transformation of Lithuanian society during the Soviet regime. Although parties bear traditional names, ideological behavior in power or opposition was frequently inconsistent. Many parties in the beginning of the 1990s possessed a 'catch-all' character due to organizational, networking and ideological weaknesses. Taking this context

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as a starting point, this study follows a line of historical, transitional and contemporary cleavages (Ekman et al 2004, 602). Transitional cleavages in new democracies represent a conflict between the Soviet apparatus and the Sajadis, historical ones embrace ethnic, religious, urban/rural, labor/capital, communist/social democrat and contemporary ones deal with conflicts of national/cosmopolitan, protectionist/free-market, generational and winners/ losers of transition. The Lithuanian case reveals both transitional and historical divides.

Transitional Issue Divide

The issue dimension of the Lithuanian Soviet apparatus vs. Sajadis ~ and later between their successors, the Labor Democratic Party (LDDP) and the Conservatives (TSLK), respectively, was the dominating political conflict which polarized society during 1990-1997 (Jurkynas 2003). Sqjadis coined the basics of the value-laden conflict, by launching zealous anti-communist and anti-Russian rhetoric during and between every election. The pre-cleavage society followed the conflict generated by policy-makers, as indicated by the voting patterns. The TSLK still tends to exploit anti-Russian and pro-Western values. The conservative constituency supported the party with an average of 19.8% of votes cast between 1992-2004. Electoral defeat of the TSLK in 2000 and low ratings immediately after forced~the party to transform anti-communist stances and replace the leadership in 2003. Other parties subscribing to the old political conflict, namely the LDDP and the Christian Democrats, suffered a substantial loss of popularity. The Christian Democrats did not recover after the blow in the parliamentary elections of 2002, and obtained only 2.75% of the votes cast in the election to the European Parliament in 2004. The LDDP merged with LSDP, nevertheless, their popularity dropped from 31.1% to 14.4% in 2002-2004. The loss of electoral support for the aforementioned political organizations contributed to the decline of the value-laden and anti-communist political conflict (Duvold and Jurkynas 2004). The Conservatives could no longer embrace out-of-date tactics. The Conservative constituency which emphasized the negative evaluation of the Soviet past lost substantial numbers of supporters between 1996 and 2000 (Degutis 2001).

Rural~Urban Conflict

Another social conflict lies along the urban/rural dimension. Before World War Two, there had been political parties such as the Farmers' Union and Peasant People's Party, which represented rural interests in Lithuania (Zeruolis 1998, 124). Currently, the societal conflict overlaps

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with a protectionist/free-market division (Hellbn et al 1998). The transition to market economy has brought about the emergence of a landowning class. Although Lithuania has traditionally been regarded as an agricultural society, the number employed in the agricultural sector has been shrinking: from 19% in 2001 to a still socially sensitive 17% in the middle of2002J 2 However, the GDP share of agricultural production has dropped nearly four times since 1994 (see Figure 1). This social structure provides a basis for a rural cleavage to be exploited by political parties.

25

20

15 %

10

23.1 21. l j , , , , ~ £ ~

. . . . . . . . ~ . . 1 ~ . 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

;io o, iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii iii I 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

Jan-Jun

year

Figure 1. GDP Share of the Agricultural Sector in Lithuania 1994-2002 Source: Statistical Office of Lithuania

The first party to have distinctly manifested itself as defenders of rural interests was the Lithuanian Peasants' Party (LVP). It emerged in the mid- 1990s and recorded 6.7% of votes cast onn average between 1995-2004. The party stands for protectionism for Lithuanian agricultural products. This is not surprising, since farmers have always been most skeptical about market-driven logic. The most recent election in 2004 confirmed electoral support of 7.4% votes cast for the LVP. This result is sufficient for the party to acquire coalition potential in the parliament. The party, however, did not become a Scandinavian-style 'Center' party. The Peasants' Party merged with New Democracy (formerly the Women's Party) in 2002, for reasons unrelated to ideological affinities. The LVP was the most visible party to have institutionalized the rural conflict, but the electoral success of the party was mostly visible in local elections. The LVP's performance in the general elections has been a disappointment with an average of 2.9% of the votes cast. Other parties such as the LSDP, NSSL, LKDP, TSLK and

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the newly established Labor Party (DP) attract a substantial amount of the rural constituency. Furthermore, the rural/urban issue divide has been represented by the Liberal Union (LLS). The party attracted a number of votes after Rolandas Paksas left the Conservative Party and became the leader of the Liberals, who had acquired parliamentary relevance after the municipal and parliamentary elections in 2000. The LLS attracted an average of 7.6% of votes cast between 1992-2004,~3 although support after the breakthrough in 2000 increased to an average of l 2.9%.~4

A divide of winners/losers of the transition or, say, a center/periphery cleavage, in a way overlaps with the urban/rural divide and manifests itself politically to some extent. Vilnius, Klaipeda and Kaunas attract over 80% of foreign direct investment and produce over 60% of Lithuania's GDP. Unemployment rates in those cities are far below the national average. It is therefore no wonder that the LLS rallies its constituency in urban areas. The course of modernization has produced a stratum of young, educated, and well-off people who are unconnected to the nomenklatura privatization. Their voting preferences tend to favor liberal-minded parties of the right. Voting results in the presidential election of 2002 also followed this pattern. President Adamkus drew his support in both presidential elections of 2002 and 2004 largely in urban areas, especially in large cities. On the other hand, the 'losers' of the market reforms -- the unemployed, low-salary employees, and the rural population -- express their negative political attitudes towards the political elite. Some of them vote for leftist parties and some do not vote at all. Yet, support for Paksas in the provinces was clearly convincing (Prezidento rinkimai 2003). Thus, the urban/rural issue division is exploited most by the LVP and LLS. The clear social structure and electoral behavior serve to illustrate the emerging cleavage.

Post-Communist~Social Democratic Divide

A historical communist/social democratic divide echoed in Lithuanian politics too. Structurally, in the society there were voters supporting both parties, after the reestablishment of the independence, although the pre- cleavage electorate focused mainly on value-laden politics and personalities in politics. The contraposition of the ex-Communist LDDP and the Social Democratic (LSDP) parties was clearly evident from the early 1990s. The LSDP regarded the LDDP as a nomenklatura party, due to shady privatization and did not recognize the LDDP as the real social democratic party. The LSDP even blocked their membership in the Socialist International. However, after successful cooperation in the local and general elections of 2000, the LDDP and LSDP merged in 2001. Social

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Democrat/Communist bickering vanished and a strong propensity for social democratic voting remained. The two leftist parties were the most popular in 1992-2004, receiving, on average 24.1 % of the votes cast (see Figure 2). Voters favorable to the Soviet past comprised a part of the LDDP and LSDP electorate in 1996. Skilled workers, the unemployed, and non-Lithuanians tended to favor the LSDP (Degutis, 2001). The voting patterns over the past decade have followed the value-laden conflict with only the votes cast for the LSDP before 2000 having a different meaning. All in all, the presence of the LSDP has served to institutionalize the emerging laborlcapital conflict.

1992 1995 1996 1997 2000* 200V 2002"' 2004

year

+Total

+ LDDP

-c+ LSDP I

Figure 2. Votes Cast for the LDDP and the LSDP, 1992-2004 * Local elections. ** Seimas elections. *** The merger of the LDDP and the LSDP into the LSDP.

boes Religion Matter in Politics?

The religious cleavage was salient in the inter-war period due to Catholic character of the population and the political and societal influence of the Catholic Church. The Chridian Democratic Party was one of the most important political organizations during the fledgling democratic regime until the authoritarian coup of Antanas Smetona in 1926. The Soviet regime drastically reduced the influence of the Church, with secularism and atheism becoming the norm in the Communist years. The effect of marketization on the religious issue divide is of lesser importance for political salience, since religious values have less to do with positions

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in the market. Despite the Soviet regime, the Catholic Church continued its activities underground. According to the census of 2001, 79% of Lithuanians considered themselves as Catholics providing a favorable social structure for political mobilization. The religious issue was politically manifested via the Christian Democratic Party (LKDP) and the Lithuanian Christian Democratic Union (LKDS). ~5 The opposition of the Catholic Church to the Soviet regime and its active role in the national movement enabled the LKDP to appeal to voters for independence with a religious flavor and the election of t992 rendered the LKDP 12.6% of electoral backing. However, soon after, the party's campaign with the Conservatives about the dangers of communist and Russian influences began shaping the value-laden political conflict. The withering of the old political conflict took the wind out of the LKDP's sails. The party failed to pass the 5% threshold in the multi-member constituency in the general election of 2000 and political support for the Christian Democrats faded away soon afterwards. The party attracted just 2.75% of support. The total support for parties appealing only on the basis of Christian values in the European parliamentary election of 2004 was 5.3%. In the period 1992- 2004 the Christian democratic parties obtained an average of 10.1% of votes cast. However, this does not mean that there is a permanent cleavage. The value-laden conflict overshadowed the real representation of the religious stratum. The typical voters of the party in 1996-2000 were rural pensioners with primary education (Degutis 2001). The change of the left/right dimension from value-laden to socio-economic provided opportunities for the Christian Democrats to link their electoral strategies with religious interests in politics that is still open for the electoral test in the future. During internal squabbles in the Christian Democratic Party, the Conservative Party appears to have taken over the initiative on moral issues by having established a Christian democratic faction in the party in September 2003.16 The Homeland Union also stresses Christian values in new party policies and culls support from religious voters. Moral issues have become one of the Conservative appeals that could drain electoral support from the Christian Democrats in the future.

Ethnic Politicization on the Rise?

Ethnic cleavage is the most significant issue in divided societies, or in countries where national minorities are politically represented. However, political issues concerning ethnic minorities in Lithuania have never stirred concern to the same extent as in Estonia and Latvia. The ethnic composition of Lithuanian society (see Figure 3), broad citizenship

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opportunities and a favorable legal framework preconditioned the absence of the politicization of the ethnic issue (Jurkynas, 1997).

1989 ~ 9 . 4

2001 01•72 6"7

6.3

1.2

0 20 40 60 80

%

m Lithuanians 1!3 Poles I~ Russians [] Belarussians • Ukrainians

Figure 3. Ethnic Composition in Lithuania, 1989-200117 Source: Statistical Office of Lithuania.

The leftist parties are still favored in general elections among a constituency of national minorities (Zeruolis 1998, Degutis 2001) but wider support was low in 1992-2004. None of the ethnic parties received more than 3% of votes cast in general elections. In local elections the ethnic parties attract more support. The Electoral Action of Lithuanian Poles (LLRA) has controlled municipal councils in Vilnius and Sal~ininkai districts since 1997. The party landscape of national minorities is quite fragmented. The LLRA and the Party of Lithuanian Poles represented the Polish minority. In a similar vein, the Union of Lithuanian Russians and the Political Party 'Russian Alliance' stood for the local Russians. Only the LLRA remains influential on a local level with roughly 3% of all mandates in the local councils since 1997. The other parties claiming to represent ethnic groups were fragmented and their results hovered below 1% of mandates. This picture changed somewhat with the elections to the European Parliament in which the ethnic-based parties participated under a joint list and received 5.7% of votes cast. Moreover, politicians of pro- Western and rightist orientation are never supported in South-Eastern Lithuania where a majority of national minorities live. The last presidential election of 2004 confirmed this pattern, with Kazimiera Prunksien~

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receiving overwhelming support in the region. It is a moot question whether ethnic parties will maintain political unity in the future and politicize an ethnic issue divide. If they manage to do so, it is likely to become a cleavage.

Postmaterialism is not on the Agenda

With the pioneering research of Ronald Ingelhart (1977), postmaterialist issues entered the academic discourse. A decent level of socio-economic development in western societies opened the way for concerns about 'quality of life'. Again, Western experiences are not always easily transferable to Eastern and Central Europe, due to substantially lower living standards: Lithuanian per capita GDP was only 42% of the EU average in 2003. interestingly though, the first organizations to challenge the Soviet regime had a clearly ecological basis. Environmental movements were among the first to openly criticize the Soviet regime. The Greens questioned the legitimacy of the Soviet regime using environmental rhetoric, especially after the Chernobyl catastrophe in Ukraine. The Greens and the Women's party (LMP) rather artificially represented a postmaterialist issue. The emergence of the Greens in the late 1980s was linked with opposition to the Soviet industrial sector. Demonstrations with environmental demands expressed political discontent with Soviet politics. The Greens acquired 3% of seats in the parliament after the constitutive election of 1990. In the parliamentary election of 1992, the Greens failed to attract electoral support ,and vanished from the political arena. The early post-communist ecological movement was anti-Soviet rather than postmaterialist. The support of Sqj~dis was probably the most decisive factor yielding 4 seats for the Greens in the Supreme Council/Constitutive Assembly. The transitional economy and society focused mostly on material issues, as low living standards did not make postmaterialist values politically important. On the other hand, ecological ideas from the Soviet period existed, however their political institutionalization did not go far, as the independence issue vanished. Actually, postmaterialism has never been on the political agenda, as it was first obscured by the reestablishment of statehood and then by the value-laden conflict. High electoral volatility, the success of new parties and low voter turnout demonstrate the openness of the electoral market, where, the Greens might reconsider their political careers. The other party that might have theoretically represented postmaterialism was the Women's Party established in 1995.18 The electoral results of the LMP were unimpressive. The party has never managed to gain any seats via party lists in general elections. Credit for party support lies with the popularity of its leader Kazimiera Prunskiene

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rather than postmaterialist values. Though Prunskiene lost the presidential election of 2004, she received over 47% of votes cast. This gives her a fair chance to lead the party straight to the parliament in the forthcoming general election of 2004. So far, the recent merger of the LMP and LVP does not come even close to 'rural postmaterialism'. Inadequate living standards and other more important political issues have overshadowed postmaterialist thinking in politics, as witnessed by low electoral support for the Green and Women's parties.

Political Personalities and Issue Divides

Politicians became the first objects of political identification among the electorate after the fall of the Iron Curtain. Society was socially homogenized and amorphous, and parties were not developed organizationally. The leaders of Saj~dis and the reformed LKP, Landsbergis and Brazauskas, respectively, were the first to have political charisma. Underdevelopment of post-communist parties preconditioned personal ambitions, a large number of party splinters and factions in the Seimas, and a 'political tourism' among parties. The largest parties produced a number of splinter parties: the LDDP lost the Socialists, the LSDP -- Social Democracy-2000; the Conservatives -- the Homeland People's Party ~9 and the Moderate Conservative Union; the LKDP -- the Modem Christian Democrats; and the Liberals -- the LDP. New parties throughout the 1990s also centered around famous politicians. The NSSL should be grateful to Artfiras Paulauskas 2°, as his personal charisma after having lost the presidential election of 1997 led to the creation of the party and its successful results in 2000. The arrival of Paksas 2~ to the Liberals was marked with rising ratings and the LLS became the second largest parliamentary party in 2000. After the split from the LLS, Paksas attracted 8% for his new party, the Liberal Democrats. In a similar vein, the comeback of Brazauskas from political retirement saved the LSDP and LDDP in the general elections of 2000 by yielding over 31% of votes and control of the govemment. Again,. the unpopularity of the leader of the TSLK, Landsbergis, contributed to a heavy loss of the Conservatives in parliamemary elections of 2000. Finally, the personal charisma of the Lithuanian Russian Viktor Uspaskich and the almost routine disillusionment with old parties elevated the Labor Party (DP) to political heights. The DP received 30.2% of the votes cast in the European parliamentary elections of 2004, even though the party has yet to gain office.

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Two institutional factors reinforced the importance of personalities: the electoral system and the office of president. Single-member constituencies reward politicians with larger room for maneuver vis-a-vis their parties. A politician elected in such a constituency holds a stronger position in the party. He has a direct contact to voters that increases opportunities for improving personal political performance despite party politics. On the other hand, parties, according to opinion polls, have been regarded as the most distrusted institution over the last ten years. There are legions of examples in Lithuanian politics, when certain personalities have been repeatedly elected to the parliament in single-member constituencies despite party performance. Party loyalty and party membership rates are low. By 1999, membership ratios in Lithuanian parties were about five percent (Krupavi6ius and Zvaliauskas 2003), far below West European standards. The 'presidential factor' is another feature that reinforces the role of personalities in politics. The president is elected directly by popular mandate and has certain powers in domestic politics. Many parties view the presidential election as an opportunity for advertising their respective parties and keeping them in the focus of the electorate, who tend to vote for candidates regardless of party loyalties. The presidential election of 2002 revealed that a large section of the electorate did not respond to the major parties appeal to vote for the Lithuanian-American Valdas Adamkus in the run-off. 22 It appears that the role of the presidency will diminish somewhat as the political game becomes increasingly routinized and institutionalized (Duvold and Jurkynas 2004). However, the electoral attachment to personalities and voter volatility continues to obscure the crystallization of cleavages.

Cleavages of Tomorrow?

Post-communist societies are marked by the interplay of social and political factors, z3 In the beginning of the 1990s, political actors were quite successful at raising political problems, as the electorate did not have political experience and did not vote rationally along social and economic interests. 24 In the course of marketization and growing political experience, societal factors began to manifest themselves in politics. Arguably, some issue divides have surfaced via political parties and some are still either latent or overshadowed by other emerging cleavages. A low level of trust in parties and parliament, and disillusionment with democracy for not bringing a decent living standard have led to low voter turnouts since 1992. The electoral market is open. It should not come as a surprise that there is much leeway for political exploitation of emerging issue di~'isions in society.

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The success o f Paksas and the fact that a TV comedian came fourth in

the presidential election o f 2002 revealed an underrepresented societal

dissatisfaction. Adamkus won the presidential election o f 2004 with just 52% o f electoral backing against Prunskiene who attracted Paksas '

supporters. Only a slim major i ty o f voters turned their backs on the support o f the impeached president and his prot6g6. However , continuing high levels o f support for the Labor Party and pro-Paksas polit icians signals

serious discontent among the losers o f the transition in the countryside, provinces and South-Eastern Lithuania. Dissatisfaction with the current state o f political, economic, and social affairs leaves the electoral market open for new parties with populis t appeal, such as the Liberal Democrats

and the Labor Party. Both are new in the political sys tem and both appeal for support f rom the dissatisfied.

Table 1. Electoral Support for Major Parties 1992-2004, % of Valid Votes Cast 1992 1995 1996 1997 2000 2000 2002

Seimas Local Seimas Local Local Seimas Local LDDP 44.0 16.9 9.5 14.9 11.1 31.15 See 6 LSDP 6.1 4.8 6.6 9.2 6.6 See 5 17.16 TSLK 1 21.2 28.8 29.8 33.2 12.7 8.6 11.2 LKDP 12.62 16.6 9.9 12.1 6.3 3.1 6.47 LKDS 3.63 N/A 3.2 0.34* See 4 3.8 LVP 7.0 1.7 5.6 13.44 4.1 8.08 LCS 2.5 5.0 8.2 9.1 11.1 2.9 8.79 LLS t° 1,5 2.7 1.8 3.6 10.6 17.3 12.69 NSSL - 17.3 19.6 7.5 LDP - 7.9 DP

2004 EuroParl.

14.4 12.6 2.8

7.4

11.2 4.9 6.8

30.2 * percentage of seats at local municipalities Source: Central Electoral Commission of Lithuania i TSLK has institutionalized Sajadis into a political party in 1993. 2 LKDP led coalition. 3 LKDS led coalition. 4 Coalition of the LKDS and LVP. 5 Coalition of the LDDP, LSDP, ND and LRS. 6 Merger of the LDDP and LSDP. 7 Merger of the LKDP and LKDS into the LKD.

Merger of the LVP and ND from 2002. 9 The LLS-~ t~e LCS and MKDS have merged into the LiCS in May 2003. l0 LiCS since 2003.

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Issues of integration have not yet stirred political conflicts. Euro- Atlantic integration is a consensus issue among the political elite and population at large, confirmed by 91% 'yes' vote in the referendum of 2003 on Lithuanian membership of the EU. Two factors caused this favorable attitude towards the EU: a geopolitical rationale for participating in joint European decision-making and hence a distancing from Russian influence; and economic calculations aimed at reaching a higher level of affluence. On the other hand, the nature of EU membership will undoubtedly affect domestic politics and thence fall into political conflict. Due to the open electoral market and socio-economic grievances of EU- adjustment, EU-generated conflicts could be absorbed and represented by political parties. EU membership may also give birth to a certain nationalist backlash in a country that has so recently surfaced from the Soviet domination. Issues of self-determination in a supra-national EU context might still be politically sensitive, as according to the New Europe Barometers from 2001, forty-four per cent of Lithuanians identify primarily with the nation-state (Duvold and Jurkynas 2004).

Conclusions

This study identified empirical and behavioral aspects for the emergence of cleavages and their effect on party system. According to empirical aspect of cleavage, the study found the following social strata available for political management into cleavages in 1990-2004: anti- communist, rural, urban, religious leftist and ethnic. However, the link between social structure and voting behavior has yet to be stabilized. The analysis identified four politically salient issue divides that have transferred into politics during the period examined: transitional, religious, labor/capital and urban/rural. These issue divides still need continuous political institutionalization in order to become cleavages. Transitional issue divide transformed from contents of the left/right dimension to pro- Western and anti-Russian appeal represented by the Conservatives, since societal interests finally put an end to old politics with the general elections of 2000. The religious issue dimension was politicized with an anti- communist emphasis in the 1990s. However, the issue becomes, again, a part of the appeal to the Conservative constituency, as the Christian democratic parties lost electoral support after the general election of 2000. Leftist labor interests crystallized after the two leftist parties merged, to become the Social Democrats. The Liberals and Peasants politicized the urban/rural and protectionist/free market conflict to a large degree. The ethnic conflict played a minor role, as the constituency was split among different parties and did not affect politics at large. Nevertheless, it could

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become a politically relevant issue divide on the parliamentary level if ethnic parties manage to unite and mobilize electoral support in the long run. Postmaterialist issues are not on the political agenda yet due to relative lack of affluence. The formation of issue divides and their transformation into cleavages has not yet concluded because of the open electoral market and recent decline of the value-laden left/right dimension. Electoral strategies of the political elite predetermined which societal conflicts were relevant for the election in the 1990s. Politicians generated and shaped political issues, which did not reflect social conflicts until the general elections of 2000. The loss of votes for parties representing the old value- laden and anti-communist division weakened their ability to mastermind politics independently from societal processes. The value-laden conflict obstructed politics based on cleavages or issue divides. The transitional issue divide faded in favor of the emerging socio-economic political conflict (the left/right dimension), paving the way for class voting. However, high electoral volatility was indicative of erratic voting preferences. Given the backdrop of pre-cleavage society and personalization of politics, it is not surprising that none of the ruling parties has ever been re-elected for two successive terms. Political personalities continue to hamper attachments of issue dimensions.

Conflicts between winners and losers of post-communist transformation emerges as the next issue, manifested in the presidential elections of 2002 and 2004 and the elections to the European Parliament of 2004. The Labor Party seems to skim off the cream of socio-economically disadvantaged and anti-establishment votes. EU-related issues can be up for grabs in the future. It is an open question whether the old parties manage to absorb new issues, or the issues wilt give birth to new political organizations. The politicization of issue divides is a relatively new political phenomenon. After the general election of 2000 the value-laden conflict completely lost its mobilizing power for the party system due to emergence of new parties. However, this was only partly due to social conflicts, as political personalities and high voter volatility gave rise to new parties, which began a gradual process of institutionalizing social conflicts. Cleavage based politics is still to come. Volatile voting, low voter turnouts (48-52% in the last presidential and European parliamentary elections), fledgling issue divides and the rapidly changing party landscape have so far displayed only a partial effect of societal conflicts on the party system. The Lithuanian party system remains moderately fragmented with five relevant parliamentary parties. The forthcoming general election in autumn 2004 will contain fragmentation of the party system within the range of 5-7 parties. The societal structure is not changing as fast and as radically as

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p a r t y p r e f e r ences , zs The open e lec to ra l m a r k e t is a p e r f e c t p l ace for

add i t i ona l soc ie ta l con f l i c t s and t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f cu r r en t ones , w h i c h

a p p e a r to be i ssue d i v i d e s ra the r than c l eavages . The i r f o r m a t i o n is stil l far

r e m o v e d f rom p e r m a n e n t po l i t i c a l d iv i s ions . The e l ec t ion for the E u r o p e a n

P a r l i a m e n t o f 2004 s i g n a l e d a c h a n g e o f the p a r t y sy s t e m, in w h i c h

e m e r g i n g soc ia l conf l i c t s f o r m a par t o f the e lec to ra l ba s i s for ex i s t ing and

n e w par t ies .

Abbreviations

DP -- Labor Party (Darbo parto'a ) LCS -- Lithuanian Center Union (Lietuvos centro sajunga) LiCS -- Liberal and Center Union (Lietuvos liberahl ir centro sajunga) LKDS -- Lithuanian Christian Democratic Union (Krik~6ionitt demokrat~ sqjunga) LDDP -- Lithuanian Labor Democratic Party (Lietuvos demokratind darbo partija) LDP -- Liberal democrat party (Liberaht demokrattt partu'a ) LKDP -- Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party (Lietuvos krik~(ioni~ demokrat~ partija) LLP -- Lithuanian Labor Party, (Lietuvos darbo parto'a) LLRA -- Electoral Action of Lithuanian Poles (Lietuvos lenktl rinkim~l akco'a) LLS -- Lithuanian Liberal Union (Lietuvos liberal~ sajunga) LMP -- Lithuanian Women's Party (Lietuvos moter~ partu'a ) LRS -- Union of Lithuanian Russians (Lietuvos rus~t sajunga) LSDP -- Lithuanian Social Democratic Party (Lietuvos socialdemokrat~ parto'a ) LVP -- Lithuanian Peasants' Party (Lietuvos valstie(itt pat'to'a ) ND -- New Democracy (Naujoji demokratija) NSSL -- New Union/Socialliberals (Naujoji sajunga/Socialliberalai) TSLK -- Homeland Union (Lithuanian Conservatives) (Tevyn~s Sajunga [Lietuvos konservatoriai])

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emerging cleavages in new democracies: the case of lithuania

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