8/13/2019 Eminent and Tax

1/3

City of Manila v Chinese CommunityFACTS: Plaintiff sought to expropriate a part of a private cemetery devoted for public use to make an extension of Rizal Avenue.Defendants contend that expropriation is not necessary because it will disturb the remains of the dead. Moreover, adjoiningand adjacent lots were offered to the city free of charge for the planned public improvement.ISSUE: Whether or not a private property devoted for public use can still be expropriated.HELD: Yes, private property devoted for public use is still subject to expropriation, provided this is done directly by the nationallegislature or under a specific grant of authority to the delegate. In addition, there must be a necessity for the expropriation. Inthe case at bar, evidence shows that there is no proof of the need of converting the cemetery.

Republic v CastellviFACTS: After the owner of a parcel of land that has been rented and occupied by the government in 1947 refused to extend thelease, the latter commenced expropriation proceedings in 1959. During the assessment of just compensation, the governmentargued that it had taken the property when the contract of lease commenced and not when the proceedings begun. The ownermaintains that the disputed land was not taken when the government commenced to occupy the said land as lessee becausethe essential elements of the taking of property under the power of eminent domain, namely (1) entrance and occupation bycondemnor upon the private property for more than a momentary period, and (2) devoting i t to a public use in such a way as tooust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property, are not present.ISSUE: Whether or not the taking of property has taken place when the condemnor has entered and occupied the property aslesse.HELD: No, the property was deemed taken only when the expropriation proceedings commenced in 1959.The essential elements of the taking are: (1) Expropriator must enter a private property, (2) for more than a momentary period,(3) and under warrant of legal authority, (4) devoting it to public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or injuriouslyaffecting it in such a way as (5) substantially to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.In the case at bar, these elements were not present when the government entered and occupied the property under a contractof lease. Phil. Press Institute v COMELECFacts:

In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, PPI, a non-stock,non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine publishers, asks us to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government, andany of its agencies, against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. Petitioner also contendsthat the 22 March 1995 letter directives of Comelec requiring publishers to give free "Comelec Space" and at the same timeprocess raw data to make it camera-ready, constitute impositions of involuntary servitude, contrary to the provisions of Section18 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Finally, PPI argues that Section 8 of Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is violative of theconstitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech, of the press and of expression.

On the other hand, The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment on behalf of respondent Comelec alleging that ComelecResolution No. 2772 does not impose upon the publishers any obligation to provide free print space in the newspapers as itdoes not provide any criminal or administrative sanction for non-compliance with that Resolution. According to the SolicitorGeneral, the questioned Resolution merely established guidelines to be followed in connection with the procurement of"Comelec space," the procedure for and mode of allocation of such space to candidates and the conditions or requirements forthe candidate's utilization of the "Comelec space" procured. At the same time, however, the Solicitor General argues that evenif the questioned Resolution and its implementing letter directives are viewed as mandatory, the same would nevertheless bevalid as an exercise of the police power of the State. The Solicitor General also maintains that Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772is a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the Comelec over the communication and informationoperations of print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election.

Issue:

Whether or not Resolution No. 2772 issued by respondent Commission on Elections is valid.

Held:

WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is GRANTED in part and Section 2 of Resolution No.2772 in its present form and the related letter-directives dated 22 March 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE as null and void, and theTemporary Restraining Order is hereby MADE PERMANENT. The Petition is DISMISSED in part, to the extent it relates to Section8 of Resolution No. 2772. No pronouncement as to costs.

8/13/2019 Eminent and Tax

2/3

Ratio Decidendi:

1. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, in its present form and as interpreted by Comelec in its 22 March 1995 letter directives,purports to require print media enterprises to "donate" free print space to Comelec. As such, Section 2 suffers from a fatalconstitutional vice and must be set aside and nullified.

2. To the extent it pertains to Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition must be dismissed forlack of an actual, justiciable case or controversy.

Abra Valley College vs. AquinoGR L-39086, 15 June 1988Second Division, Paras (J): 4 concurFacts: Abra Valley College rents out the ground floor of its college building to Northern Marketing Corporation while the secondfloor thereof is used by the Director of the College for residential purposes. The municipal and provincial treasurers servedupon the College a notice of seizure and later a notice of sale d ue to the alleged failure of the College to pay real estatetaxes and penalties thereon. The school filed suit to annul said notices, claiming that it is tax-exempt.

Issue: Whether the College is exempt from taxes.

Held: While the Court allows a more liberal and non- restrictive interpretation of the phrase exclusively used for educationalpurposes, reasonable emphasis has always been made that exemption extends to facilities which are incidental to andreasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the main purposes. While the second floors use, as residence of the director,is incidental to education; the lease of the first floor cannot by any stretch of imagination be considered incidental to thepurposes of education. The test of exemption from taxation is the use of the property for purposes mentioned in theConstititution.

Lladoc vs CIR Facts:Sometime in 1957, M.B. Estate Inc., of Bacolod City,donated 10,000.00 pesos in cash to Fr. Crispin Ruiz, theparish priest ofVictorias, Negros Occidental, and predecessorof Fr. Lladoc, for the construction of a new Catholic church inthe locality. Thedonated amount was spent for such purpose.On March 3, 1958, the donor M.B. Estate filed the donor'sgifttax return. Under date of April 29, 1960. Commissioner of InternalRevenue issued anassessmentfor the donee'sgift tax against the Catholic Parish of Victorias of which petitioner wasthe parishpriest.Issue:Whether or not the imposition of gift tax despite thefact the Fr. Lladoc was not the Parish priest at the time of donation,Catholic Parish priest of Victorias did not have juridical personality as the constitutional exemption forreligious purpose is valid. Held :Yes, imposition of the gift tax was valid, under Section22(3) Article VI of the Constitution contemplates exemptiononly frompayment of taxes assessed on such properties asProperty taxescontra distinguished from Excise taxes Theimposition of the gifttax on the property used for religiouspurpose is not a violation of the Constitution. A gift tax is nota property by way of gift intervivos.The head of the Diocese and not the parish priest is the realparty in interest in the imposition of the donee's tax on thepropertydonated to the church for religious purposeLUNG CENTER VS. QUEZON CITYGR 144104 June29, 2004En Banc, Callejo J: Facts:The lung center is a charitable institution within the context of 1973 and 1987 constitutions. The elements considered indetermining a charitable institution are: the statue creating the enterprise; its corporate purposes; constitution and by-laws,methods of administration, nature of actual work performed, character of the services rendered, indefiniteness of thebeneficiaries, and the use occupation of properties. As a gen. principle, a charitable institution doe not lose its character as suchand its exemption form taxes simply because it derives income from paying patients, or receives subsidies from government;and no money insures to the private benefit of the persons managing or operating the institution.Issue:Whether or not the real properties of the lung center are exempt from real property taxes.Ruling.

8/13/2019 Eminent and Tax

3/3

Partly No. Those portions of its real property that are leased to private entities are not exempt from actually, direct andexclusively used for charitable purpose. Under PD 1823, the lung center does not enjoy any property tax exemption privilegesfor its real properties as well as the building constructed thereon.The property tax exemption under Sec. 28(3), Art. Vi of the property taxes only. This provision was implanted by Sec.243 (b) ofRA 7160.which provides that in order to be entitled to the exemption, the lung center must be able to prove that: it is acharitable institution and; its real properties are actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purpose. Accordingly, theportions occupied by the hospital used for its patients are exempt from real property taxes while those leased to privateentities are not exempt from such taxes.