1NC

KThe 1AC’s ignorance of the role of criminality in their 1AC elides the discussion of the Prison Industrial Complex. Their focus on one localized signification of oppression elides the role of the prison in inaugurating and sustaining white supremacist violence—reject the teamRodríguez 07 - Professor and Chair of Ethnic Studies @ UC Riverside [Dr. Dylan Rodríguez, “American Globality and the US Prison Regime: State Violence and White Supremacy from Abu Ghraib to Stockton to Bagong Diwa,” Kritika Kultura 9 (2007): pg. 22-48

To consider the US prison as a global practice of dominance, we might begin with the now-indelible photo exhibition of captive brown men manipulated, expired, and rendered bare in the tombs of the US-commandeered Abu Ghraib prison: here, I am concerned less with the idiosyncrasies of the carceral spectacle (who did what, administrative responsibilities, tedium of military corruption and incompetence, etc.) than I am with its inscription of the where in which the worst of US prison/state violence incurs.

As the bodies of tortured prisoners in this somewhere else, that is, beyond and outside the formal national domain of

the United States, have become the h yper-visible and accessible raw material for a global critique of the US state—with Abu Ghraib often serving as the signifier for a generalized mobilization of sentiment against the American

occupation—the intimate and proximate bodies of those locally and intimately imprisoned

within the localities of the U nited States constantly threaten to disappear from the political and moral

registers of US civil society, its resident US Establishment Left, and perhaps most if not all elements of the global Establishment

Left, which includes NGOs, political parties, and¶ sectarian organizations. I contend in this essay that a new theoretical

framing is required to critically address (and correct) the artificial delineation of the statecraft of Abu Ghraib prison, and

other US formed and/or mediated carceral sites across the global landscape, as somehow unique and exceptional to places outside

the US proper. In other words, a genealogy and social theory of US state violence specific to the regime of

the prison needs to be delicately situated within the ensemble of institutional relations, political intercourses, and historical conjunctures that precede, produce, and sustain places like the Abu Ghraib prison, and can therefore only be adequately articulated as a genealogy and theory of the allegedly “domestic” US prison regime’s “globality” (I will clarify my use of this concept in the next part of this introduction).

Further, in offering this initial attempt at such a framing, I am suggesting a genealogy of US state violence that

can more sufficiently conceptualize the logical continuities and material articulations between a) the

ongoing projects of domestic warfare organic to the white supremacist US racial state, and b) the array of “global” (or extra-domestic) technologies of violence that form the premises of possibility for those social formations and

hegemonies integral to the contemporary moment of US global dominance. In this sense, I am amplifying the capacity

of the US prison to inaugurate technologies of power that exceed its nominal relegation to the domain of the

criminal juridical. Consider imprisonment, then, as a practice of social ordering and geopolitical power, rather than as a self-contained or foreclosed jurisprudential practice: therein, it is possible to

reconceptualize the significance of the Abu Ghraib spectacle as only one signification of a regime

of dominance that is neither (simply) local nor (erratically) exceptional , but is simultaneously mobilized, proliferating, and global .

The overarching concern animating this essay revolves around the peculiarity of US global dominance in the historical present: that is, given the geopolitical dispersals and dislocations, as well as the differently formed social relations generated by US hegemonies

across sites and historical contexts, what modalities of “rule” and statecraft give form and coherence to the (spatial-temporal) transitions, (institutional-discursive) rearticulations, and (apparent) novelties of “War on Terror” neoliberalism? Put differently, what technologies and institutionalities thread between forms of state and state-sanctioned dominance that are nominally autonomous of the US state, but are no less implicated in the global reach of US state formation?

The intent of this initial foray into a theoretical project that admittedly exceeds the strictures of a self-contained journal article is

primarily suggestive: on the one hand, I wish to examine how the institutional matrix and technological module of the US prison regime (a concept I will develop in the next section of the essay) is a programmatic (that is, strategic and structural rather than conspiratorial or fleeting) condensation of specific formations of racial and white supremacist state violence and is produced by the twinned, simultaneous logics of social ordering/disruption (e.g. the prison as both and at once the exemplar of effective “criminal justice” law-and-order and culprit in the mass-based familial and community disruption of criminalized populations).

On the other hand, I am interested in considering how the visceral and institutionally abstracted logic of bodily domination that

materially forms and reproduces the regime of the American prison is fundamental , not ancillary, to US state-mediated, state-influenced, and state-sanctioned methods of legitimated “local” state

violence across the global horizon . To put a finer edge on this latter point, it is worth noting that given the

plethora of scholarly and activist engagements with US global dominance that has emerged in recent times, and the subsequent theoretical nuance and critical care provided to treatments of (for example) US corporate capital, military/warmaking capacity, and mass culture, relatively little attention has been devoted to the constitutive role of the US prison in articulating the techniques, meanings, and pragmatic forms of state-building within post-1990s social formations, including those of the US’s ostensible peer states, as well as places wherein militarized occupation, postcolonial subjection, and proto-colonial relations overdetermine the ruling order. In place of considering the US prison as a dynamic, internally complex mobilization of state power

and punitive social ordering, such engagements tend to treat the prison as if it were, for the most part, a self-evident

outcome or exterior symptom of domination rather than a central, interior facet of how domination is itself conceptualized and produced.

In this meditation I am concerned with the integral role of the US prison regime in the material/cultural production of “American globality.” In using this phrase I am suggesting a process and module of state power that works, moves, and deploys in ways distinct from (though fundamentally in concert with) American (global) “hegemony,” and inaugurates a geography of biopolitical power more focused than common scholarly cartographies of

American “empire.” For my purposes, American globality refers to the postmodern production of US state and state-sanctioned technologies of human and ecological domination —most frequently formed

through overlapping and interacting regimes of profound bodily violence, including genocidal and protogenocidal

violence, warmaking , racist and white supremacist state violence, and mass -scaled

imprisonment — and the capacity of these forms of domination to be mobilized across political

geographies all over the world, including by governments and states that are nominally autonomous of the United States. American globality is simultaneously a vernacular of institutional power, an active and accessible iteration of violent human domination as the cohering of sociality (and civil society) writ large, and a grammar of pragmatic immediacy (in fact, urgency) that orders and influences statecraft across various geographies of jurisdiction and influence.

It is in this sense of globality as (common) vernacular, (dynamic, present tense) iteration, and (disciplining) grammar that the current formation of global order is constituted (obviously) by the direct interventions of the US state and (not as obviously) by the lexicon (as in the principles governing the organization of a vocabulary) of US statecraft. American globality infers how the US state conceptualizes its own power, as well as how these conceptualizations of power and American state formation become immediately

useful to—and frequently, structurally and politically overbearing on—other state formations and hegemonies. The prison

regime, in other words, is indisputably organic to the lexicon of the US state, and is thus productive of American

globality , not a by-product or reified outcome of it. In the remainder of this essay, I raise the possibility that

the US conceptualization of the prison as a peculiar mobilization of power and domination is , in

the historical present, central to how states , governments, and social orderings all over the world are formulating their own responses to the political , ecological, and social crises of neoliberalism, warfare, and global white supremacy. Pg. 22-25

1NC TMarihuna is a high THC drug. Hemp is not Martin 12 [Alexander Martin, “Cannabis vs. Marijuana vs. Hemp,” Weedist, July 12, 2012, pg. http://tinyurl.com/qfvxyhx

For many growing up in the United States, there has always been confusion on the

meaning of the words cannabis, marijuana   and hemp . A major source for this

confusion is the US government, who has lumped hemp in with marijuana since the 1950′s to cast its

prohibition net wider. The three words are interrelated, but different. In June, I covered the major compounds in cannabis, such as THC and CBD, and how it impacts your high.

Below are summary-level descriptions to help differentiate these three terms:

Cannabis: Cannabis is scientific term that refers to the genus of the flowering plant we all know and love. It is the common glue across the three words, as marijuana and hemp both come from the cannabis plant. There are three generally accepted varieties of cannabis, Cannabis sativa, Cannabis indica, and Cannabis ruderalis.

Marijuana: Marijuana is a variation of the Mexican Spanish word   marihuana ,

which entered into English usage in the late 19th century. Many suggest that this term was heavily pushed by US prohibitionists in the 1930s to make it sound foreign and demonic in their quest to ban the

cannabis plant. Marijuana really refers to cultivating the cannabis plant for

drug production , whether for recreational or medicinal use. Both marijuana and

hemp contain the cannabinoids THC and CBD, however marijuana contains much higher concentrations of the psychoactive THC which produces the ‘head’ high. Marijuana can approach 25% THC, whereas industrial hemp ranges in the 0.3%-1.0% range.

Hemp: Hemp is an Old English term that refers to low THC strains of the Cannabis sativa plant. Hemp is used for many industrial purposes , such as   fuel, paper, food (highly nutritious seeds and oil), textiles, body care products, detergents, plastics, paints, varnishes and other building materials. In short, a miracle plant that

humanity has counted on for 10,000 years.  Industrial hemp with its low THC, is not

a recreational or medicinal drug , nor can it effectively be used as one.

Hemp is grown differently from marijuana and hemp can grow in a wider variety of climates. Under federal law, Hemp is also illegal to grow in the United States (without a DEA permit, which you won’t be able to obtain) as prohibitionists have equated it to marijuana. This ban on industrial hemp is a crime against our citizens and our economy. Last month, US Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR) sponsored an industrial hemp farming amendment (S.A.2220) to the 2012 Farm Bill (S.3240), read more at National Cannabis Coalition on how to help support federally legalizing the growth of industrial hemp.

Hemp should not be a part of debates about marijuana. Blurring the distinction creates a completely incoherent discussion and it massively expands AFF ground – They get access to hemp advantages and add ons

1NC DA 1GOP will win the senateSILVER 9/15/14 Guru of all things election [Nate Silver, Senate Update: Democrats Draw Almost Even. Is It The Money? http://fivethirtyeight.com/datalab/senate-update-democrats-draw-almost-even-is-it-the-money/]

When we officially launched our forecast model two weeks ago, it had Republicans with a 64 percent chance of taking over the

Senate after this fall’s elections. Now Republican chances are about 55 percent instead. We’ve never quite settled on the semantics of when to call an election a “tossup.” A sports bettor or poker player

would grimace and probably take a 55-45 edge. But this Senate race is pretty darned close.

What’s happened? The chart below lists the change in our forecast in each state between Sept. 3 (when our model launched) and our current (Sept. 15) update.

As you can see, there hasn’t been an across-the-board shift. Republicans’ odds have improved in several important races since the launch of our model. Democrats’ odds have improved in several others. But

the two states with the largest shifts have been Colorado and North Carolina — in both cases, the

movement has been in Democrats’ direction. That accounts for most of the difference in the forecast.

It might help to break the states down into several groups:

Republican defenses (Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky). These are the three Republican-held seats where Democrats have some chance for a pickup. Democrats got good news in Kansas two weeks ago when their own candidate, Chad Taylor, ceased his campaign in the state — improving the odds for the center-left independent candidate, Greg Orman. Orman, however, is a slight underdog against the Republican incumbent Pat Roberts, and Orman isn’t certain to caucus with

Democrats if he wins. Meanwhile, Democrats’ odds have declined somewhat in Georgia and Kentucky. Taken as a group then, these states have not produced much change in the overall forecast.

Republican path of least resistance states (Alaska, Arkansas, Louisiana, Montana, South Dakota, West Virginia).

These are the six Democratic -held seats in deeply red states . If the GOP wins each one — while

holding all their own seats — they’ll win the Senate . Republicans remain favored in each of these six races , and their odds haven’t changed much since we launched our forecast. (They’re doing a tiny bit better in Alaska and a tiny bit worse in Louisiana, but these changes cancel out.)

Highly competitive purple states (Colorado, Iowa, Michigan, New Hampshire, North Carolina). These are the five competitive Senate races — all seats are currently held by Democrats — in states generally considered

presidential swing states. It’s here where Democrats have gained ground. There have been numerous recent polls in North Carolina, including two released on Monday, showing Democratic Sen. Kay Hagan ahead. Her odds of holding her seat have improved to 68 percent from 46 percent when the model launched. Colorado has followed a similar path, with Democratic Sen. Mark Udall’s chances of keeping his seat improving to 69 percent from 47 percent. Democrats have also made smaller gains in Iowa and Michigan. New Hampshire has been an exception. The model isn’t buying that the race is tied, as a CNN poll implied Monday, but it does have Democratic Sen. Jeanne Shaheen’s chances falling from 81 percent to 75 percent.

Republican reaches (Illinois, Minnesota, New Jersey, Virginia). These states are only on the fringe of being

competitive and haven’t received much attention from the news media or from pollsters. But each has been polled at least twice

since our model launched. Those polls haven’t shown Democrats gaining or losing any ground — but they have confirmed

Democrats are ahead, often by double-digit margins. Our model shows more confidence as the volume of polling increases, so these polls have also slightly helped Democrats.

Most of the Democrats’ gains, however, have come from the purple states. What’s perplexing is that this has happened right as

Democrats’ position on the generic congressional ballot — probably the best indicator of the

national mood — has deteriorated . Historically, the generic ballot and state-by-state Senate polls — while not perfectly correlated — have moved in tandem more often than not. On average since 1990, a one-percentage-point change in the generic ballot has translated to a half-point change (in the same party’s direction) in the average Senate race.

Might Democrats be benefiting from strong voter outreach in these states — perhaps the residue of President Obama’s “ground game” in 2012? You could make that case in North Carolina, where two polls released on Monday showed a smaller gap between registered and likely voters than most other states that have been polled this year. But this story isn’t so consistent. By contrast, CNN’s poll of New Hampshire on Monday had a conspicuously large turnout gap. And in 2010, presidential swing states showed an especially large turnout drop-off for Democrats.

Money could be a more important factor. Consider the states with the largest polling movement: In North Carolina, Hagan had $8.7 million in cash on hand as of June 30 as compared with just $1.5 million for her Republican opponent, Thom Tillis. In Colorado, Udall had $5.7 million as compared with $3.4 million for Republican Cory Gardner.

These totals do not account for outside spending. But in stark contrast to 2010, liberal and Democratic “super PACs” have spent slightly more money so far than conservative and Republican ones, according to the the Center for Responsive Politics. (One caveat for Democrats is that when money is spent on advertising, it can sometimes have short-lived effects.)

Whatever the reason, the GOP’s path to a Senate majority is less robust than before. They still look

pretty good in the “path of least resistance” states. But while West Virginia, Montana and South Dakota are

extremely likely pickups, Alaska, Arkansas and Louisiana are not sure things. Meanwhile, Republicans have fewer top-tier backup options, as states like North Carolina and Colorado have trended away from them. Republicans may need to decide whether to consolidate their resources. It won’t help them if they lose each of Colorado, Iowa, New Hampshire and North Carolina by a couple of percentage points — and in the process blow a state like Arkansas.

GOP majority gets TPA passedJOSEPH 14—Nonprolif expert on the National Security Council, former White House national security staffer [Jofi Joseph, Why a GOP takeover of the US Senate will not cause political deadlock, http://globalriskinsights.com/2014/05/17/why-a-gop-takeover-of-the-us-senate-will-not-cause-political-deadlock/]

Republican control of the Senate, which would make Senator Mitch McConnell the new Majority Leader, may have practical policy impacts, some of which will be of great interest to global investors.

Although the U.S. midterm elections remain six months away, oddsmakers are increasingly predicting the Grand

Old Party (GOP) will assume majority control over the Senate and thus put all of Congress under Republican control.

Today, there are 53 Democratic Senators, along with two Independent members who caucus with the Democrats, giving Majority

Leader Harry Reid a comfortable 55-45 margin of control. However, Republicans only need to flip six seats this

November to retake the majority. With some analysts predicting that Republicans are competitive in as many as ten Democratic-held seats this fall, a GOP takeover is increasingly likely.

Broadly speaking, a Republican takeover of the Senate could break the policy deadlock between the

Obama Administration and Congress, which has defined the U.S. political system since 2011. Ironically, once Republicans assume full control of the Congress, their leadership will come under greater pressure to demonstrate concrete results – they will no longer be able to get by through simply blaming Reid and Obama.

At the same time, as President Obama enters the lame duck stretch of his presidency, he and his senior staff will be

increasingly focused on specific policy accomplishments that can add to his historical legacy . These parallel sets of conditions will create unique incentives for both sides to put aside some of their ideological

rigidity and devise compromises in pursuit of shared victories.

What might constitute some common ground for an Obama White House and a GOP-controlled Congress?

First , look to international trade as a potential venue for a breakthrough. The White House has been stymied in its efforts to rejuvenate global free trade talks as Congress has refused White House

requests to provide fast track authority for parallel sets of negotiations – the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership

(TTIP) talks with the European Union and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TTP) talks with Asian partners.

The primary source of Congressional opposition lies in the Senate Democratic caucus , where

Majority Leader Reid is unwilling to subject some of his more vulnerable Members to tough votes that cross labor constituencies. With a Senate under GOP control , the prospects for the granting of free-

trade authority, and the likely boost that will provide to both sets of talks, immediately brighten s . The Republican Party, especially its internationalist wing, remains a strong supporter of free trade and would find common cause with the White House there.

Plan increases turnout – means Dems keep the senateAPPELBAUM 14 BA – University of Vermont. Political Writer and Current Events expert at Suffolk Resolves [Josh Appelbuam, Let’s Weed out Republicans in 2014, http://suffolkresolves.com/2014/03/04/lets-weed-out-republicans-in-2014/]

If Obama is to be remembered as one of the great Presidents in history, the rest of his term must be marked by action, not

gridlock. He needs a congress that will work with him to pass big, legislative initiatives that improve our country.

To accomplish this goal, the Democrats must win back the House and defend the Senate in the 2014 Midterm Elections. If they fail to do so, Obama’s final two years will be spent as a lame duck whose only remaining power lies in his veto pen.

So how can Democrats win big in 2014?

It’s simple: run on pot.

IT’S ALL ABOUT TURNOUT

A recent CNN poll showed that a majority of Americans (55%) support legalizing marijuana , which is a staggering number when you consider that just 34% supported it in 2002. However, when you look deeper into the numbers, it tells a different story.

Just 39% of people age 65+ support legalization, and among people age 50-64 the approval rises only slightly to 50%.

However, among 18-34 year olds, it’s wildly popular : over 66% support full legalization.

This is great news for the Democratic Party , which has struggled in recent years to turn out

voters during Midterm Elections, and continued this trend in 2010. In 2008, voters age 18-29 made up 18% of the

electorate. In the 2010 midterms, young people accounted for a paltry 11% of the vote.

In 2014, much of the debate will be centered on Obamacare. Unfortunately for Democrats, this isn’t a motivating factor for young people to head to the polls. It doesn’t excite them. They feel invincible and don’t think they need health insurance. It’s too abstract.

Marijuana is different. I t’s beloved by young people: a symbol of equal parts independence and rebellion. Unlike health care, which can feel overwhelming and complicated, marijuana is a tangible issue that young people can relate to. It’s

simple and straightforward. By pushing legalized marijuana nationally , Democrats can provide much-needed motivation for young people to turn out and vote for them. Simply put, paying $100 per month for Health Care that you may not even need doesn’t excite young voters, but being able to walk down the street to a pot shop and pay $40 for an 8th of legal marijuana does.

Best of all, this isn’t just a theory — the numbers back it up. Election data from the pro-marijuana group Just Say Now showed that in 2008 the youth vote (18-29) stood at 14% in the state of Colorado. In 2012, when a marijuana initiative was on the ballot, that number rose to 20%.

In the state of Washington the increase was even more pronounced. In 2008, the youth vote was 10%. With pot on the ballot in 2012 it soared to 22%.

If you put it on the ballot, young people will vote for it.

THE PATH TO VICTORY

Heading into the 2014 Midterm Elections, Democrats control the Senate 55-45. There are 36 open seats, 21

of which are held by Democrats, 15 by Republicans. Democrats can afford to lose up to four seats and still remain in control.

It’s a different story in the House, where Democrats are in the minority 201-234. With every seat open — since Representatives are elected every two years — Democrats must flip 17 seats in order to regain the majority.

According to a recent Reason.com article, thirteen states could be voting to legalize marijuana in 2014, while sixteen others could be voting to allow medical marijuana.

Three of the most likely states to have recreational pot on the ballot just so happen to have incumbent Democrat Senators up for re-election. This includes Alaska (Begich), Oregon (Merkley) and New Mexico (Udall).

A fourth Senator up for re-election, Mark Udall of Colorado, will be running on the backdrop of his state’s wildly successful legal marijuana launch. A recent report from the state’s Joint Budget Committee showed that in the first 18 months Colorado expects to generate $610 million in marijuana retail sales and take in $184 million in tax revenue.

Aside from full out legalization, the medical marijuana push may be more important to Democrats because many of the states that could have ballot initiatives are traditionally Republican.

This presents a golden opportunity to flip House seats in states like Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Tennessee, Kansas, Nebraska, Arkansas and Wyoming, all of whom may have medical marijuana on the ballot in 2014.

THE TIME IS NOW

When engaging in a fiscal debate, our two political parties get hung up on pledges. Republicans refuse to increase taxes while Democrats refuse to make cuts to entitlements. As a result, methods of addressing our debt and improving our economy are almost impossible to find in Washington.

Legalizing marijuana is the perfect bipartisan solution: it doesn’t raise taxes or cut Social Security. It allows us to bring in much-needed revenue that we can use to invest in education and infrastructure without violating either party’s economic pledge.

It’s time for the Democrats to step up and make pot legalization a central issue in the Midterm

Elections. They can look to Colorado and tout its success, and in doing so they’ll motivate young people to reject apathy and turn out at the polls for them.

As crazy as it sounds, pot legalization just might be the issue that propels the Democrats to victory in 2014, ensuring that the final two years of Obama’s presidency will be marked by action and achievements, not gridlock.

All the Democrats need to do is find the courage to inhale.

TPA prevents backsliding to protectionismEconomist 2/22/14 [The Economist 2-22, “How to make the world $600 billion poorer,” 2/22/14 (Print Edition), http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21596934-barack-obamas-unwillingness-fight-free-trade-expensive-mistake-how-make-world]

IN JULY 2008 Barack Obama, then a candidate for the presidency, declared before an adoring crowd in Berlin that “true partnership

and true progress [require] constant work and sustained sacrifice.” So it is with free trade. If not championed by

leaders who understand its broad benefits, it will constantly be eroded by narrow economic nationalism .

Mr Obama now appears to be surrendering to protectionists within his own party. If he cannot drag Democrats back

to their senses , the world will lose its best opportunity in two decades for a burst of

liberalisation. It will also be a signal that America is giving up its role as defender of an open

global economy in the same way that Mr Obama has retreated in foreign policy.

Mr Obama did little to promote free trade during his first term, but has seemed bolder in his second. He launched America

into ambitious new deals with large Pacific economies and the European Union , breathing

new life into global trade talks . Momentum built up; the “constant work and sacrifice” paid dividends. Members of the

World Trade Organisation agreed on a package of trade reforms in December—the first truly multilateral deal in the organisation’s

20-year history. Diplomats credit the White House’s new resolve for helping to bring stubborn parties to the table. Progress suddenly seemed possible in other areas, such as liberalising trade in services and information technology, and reducing barriers to the exchange of

“environmental goods and services”, which would make it cheaper to curb carbon emissions .

First, shoot yourself in the foot. Then repeat…

The hitch is that Congress must approve trade agreements . Previous presidents had the advantage of “ fast-track ” trade promotion authority, which let them present deals to Congress for a simple yes or no vote. Without it,

lawmakers can wreck carefully negotiated deals with toxic amendments. No country would engage in serious talks

with America under such circumstances. Fast-track is therefore essential—and elusive. Congress last granted it in 2002; it

expired in 2007. The Obama administration blithely asserted that Congress would renew it, but many lawmakers, primarily Democrats, have signed letters opposing it. Harry Reid, the Senate majority leader, has all but ruled out a vote this year. And on February 14th Joe Biden, the vice-president, told a gathering of Democratic leaders that he understood their opposition. The White House appears to have given up with scarcely a fight. A fast-track vote before November’s mid-term elections seems unlikely (see article).

Why panic about this? Tactically, it could just be another piece of Washington politicking: some optimists claim that Congress will return after the mid-terms ready to back fast-track, providing Mr Obama allows some boilerplate language in the bill chiding China for allegedly manipulating its currency. Others wonder whether the trade deals are

really so vital. Indeed, the idea that they will not do much to help the economy is one excuse for Democrats undermining their president.

In fact, the deals on the table are big. Reasonable estimates say that the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) could boost the world’s annual output by $600 billion—equivalent to adding another Saudi Arabia. Some $200 billion of that would accrue to America. And the actual gains could be even larger. The agreements would clear the way for freer trade in services, which account for most of rich countries’ GDP but only a small share of trade. Opening up trade in services could help reduce the cost of everything from shipping to banking, education and health care. Exposing professional occupations to the same global competition that factory workers have faced for decades could even strike a blow against the income inequality that Mr Obama so often decries.

Tactically, even a short delay could prove fatal to both deals . Pacific negotiations have been extended while

America and Japan hammer out compromises on agriculture. Why should Japanese politicians risk infuriating their farmers when any agreement can be torn up on Capitol Hill? The deal with the EU was meant to be done swiftly—perhaps in as little as two years—to

keep politics from mucking it up. Europe’s leaders will now doubt America’s commitment , given how feebly Mr Obama has fought for fast-track. Trade sceptics, such as French farmers, are drooling. Angela Merkel, Germany’s chancellor, who is already furious about American spying, may decide that a trade deal is not worth battling for.

The greatest risk of all is that the political momentum in America , having swung against free

trade, will be hard to reverse . Some Tea Party Republicans oppose fast-track because they are loth to grant Mr Obama

the authority to do anything. Democrats, keen to brand themselves as the anti-inequality party, may find economic nationalism an easy sell on the campaign stump: and, once pledged to that cause in November, candidates will not vote for the opposite in Congress.

And for this Mr Obama deserves some blame. He is far more ardent in bemoaning inequality than in explaining why an American retreat from the world would be the wrong way to address it. He seldom mentions, for example, that cheap imports help the poor by cutting their shopping bills, and so reduce inequality of consumption.

It’s not a zero-sum world

There is nothing inevitable about globalisation . Governments have put up barriers before—

with disastrous consequences during the 1930s —and could do so again. So it is alarming when America, the mainstay of an open global economy, gives off isolationist signals. Only recently Congress childishly refused to honour an agreed-upon increase in America’s financial commitment to the International Monetary Fund. The Federal Reserve is pushing forward with new banking regulations that could penalise foreign banks and further Balkanise global finance (see article). Mr Obama continues to delay approval of a critical oil pipeline from Canada, and is slow to grant permits to export American natural gas.

“ America cannot turn inward ,” the Obama of 2008 said in Berlin. The Obama of 2014 is now responding: “Yes we can.”

Flips the aff & global warPanzer 7—Michael J. Panzner, Faculty Member specializing in Equities, Trading, Global Capital Markets and Technical Analysis at the New York Institute of Finance, 25-year veteran of the global stock, bond, and currency markets who has worked in New York and London for HSBC, Soros Funds, ABN Amro, Dresdner Bank, and J.P. Morgan Chase, 2007 (“Geopolitics,” Financial Armageddon: Protecting Your Future from Four Impending Catastrophes, Published by Kaplan Publishing, ISBN 141959608X, p. 136-138)

Continuing calls for curbs on the flow of finance and trade will inspire the U nited States and other nations to spew forth protectionist legislation like the notorious Smoot-Hawley bill. Introduced at the

start of the Great Depression, it triggered a series of tit-for-tat economic responses, which many commentators believe helped turn a serious economic downturn into a prolonged and devastating global disaster. But if history is any guide, those lessons will have been long forgotten during the next collapse. Eventually, fed by a mood of desperation and growing public anger, restrictions on trade, finance, investment, and immigration will almost certainly intensify. [end page 136] Authorities and ordinary citizens will likely scrutinize the cross-border movement of Americans and outsiders alike, and lawmakers may even call for a general crackdown on nonessential travel. Meanwhile, many nations will make transporting or sending funds to other countries exceedingly difficult. As desperate officials try to limit the fallout from decades of ill-conceived, corrupt, and reckless policies, they will introduce controls on foreign exchange. Foreign individuals and companies seeking to acquire certain American infrastructure assets, or trying to buy property and other assets on the cheap thanks to a rapidly depreciating dollar, will be stymied by limits on investment by noncitizens. Those efforts will cause spasms to ripple across economies and markets, disrupting global payment, settlement, and clearing mechanisms. All of this will, of course, continue to undermine business confidence and consumer spending. In a world of lockouts and lockdowns, any link that transmits systemic financial pressures across markets through arbitrage or portfolio-based risk management, or that allows diseases to be easily spread from one country to the next by tourists and wildlife, or that otherwise facilitates unwelcome exchanges of any kind will be viewed with suspicion and dealt with accordingly.

The rise in isolationism and protectionism will bring about ever more heated arguments and dangerous confrontations over shared sources of oil, gas, and other key commodities as well as factors of production that must, out of necessity, be acquired from less-than-friendly nations. Whether involving raw materials used in strategic industries or basic necessities such as food, water, and energy, efforts to secure adequate supplies will take increasing precedence in a world where demand seems constantly out of kilter with

supply. Disputes over the misuse , overuse, and pollution of the environment and natural resources will become more commonplace . Around the world, such tensions will give rise to full-scale military encounters , often with minimal provocation. In some instances, economic conditions will serve as a convenient pretext for conflicts that stem from cultural and religious [end page 137] differences. Alternatively,

nations may look to divert attention away from domestic problems by channeling frustration and populist sentiment toward other countries and cultures. Enabled by cheap technology and the waning threat of American retribution, terrorist groups will likely boost the frequency and scale of their horrifying attacks, bringing the threat of random violence to a whole new level.Turbulent conditions will encourage aggressive saber rattling and interdictions by rogue nations running amok. Age-old clashes will also take on a new, more heated sense of urgency . China will likely assume a n increasingly belligerent posture toward Taiwan,

while Iran may embark on overt colonization of its neighbors in the Mideast . Israel , for its

part, may look to draw a dwindling list of allies from around the world into a growing number of conflicts . Some observers, like John Mearsheimer, a political scientist at the University of Chicago, have even speculated that an “intense confrontation” between the United States and China is “inevitable” at some point.

More than a few disputes will turn out to be almost wholly ideological. Growing cultural and religious differences will be transformed from wars of words to battles soaked in blood. Long-simmering resentments could also degenerate quickly , spurring the basest of human instincts and triggering genocidal acts . Terrorists employing biological or nuclear weapons will vie with conventional forces using jets, cruise missiles, and bunker-busting bombs to cause widespread destruction. Many will interpret stepped-up conflicts between

Muslims and Western societies as the beginnings of a new world war .

As events unfold, unsettling geopolitical tensions and the continuing economic collapse will weigh heavily on the familiar routines of everyday life, forcing many Americans to wonder when, or if, it will ever end.

1NC DA 2Defense and other manufacturers are reshoring. Regulatory uncertainty and higher labor costs will put a halt to the trend Wingard & Connerty 14 - Managing director in L.E.K. Consulting’s Boston office & Managing director in L.E.K. Consulting’s Chicago office [Carol Wingard & Michael Connerty, “The Rebirth of U.S. Manufacturing: Myth or Reality?,” Harvard Business Review| 8:00 AM June 4, 2014, pg. http://blogs.hbr.org/2014/06/the-rebirth-of-u-s-manufacturing-myth-or-reality/

In the past, a key driver for companies to move their manufacturing

out of the U.S. was to save money on labor . The difference in labor costs is still

significant, but it has narrowed as wages have risen elsewhere. The strengthening of China’s

currency has further eroded this cost advantage, and U.S. manufacturers have also closed

the gap somewhat by enhancing their productivity and their use of automation.

According to the global business director at a welding-equipment manufacturer, fierce overseas competition “has forced the evolution of the industrial base in the U.S., where many industrial manufacturers have become lean [and] automated to survive.” So our study suggests that labor costs are no longer the dominant factor in determining where companies base their manufacturing.

In the future, many commoditized products will continue to be made offshore. In the U.S., we expect

a growing emphasis on more sophisticated manufacturing , including the

use of 3-D printing to accelerate product development. This cutting-edge technology holds particular promise for the type of complex, low-volume products

developed in industries such as aerospace and defense .

What could deter manufacturers from investing in U.S.-based manufacturing? Our survey respondents suggest that high corporate taxes and

regulatory uncertainty are the two biggest factors hindering U.S.

manufacturing from growing faster. Manufacturers in lower-cost countries such as China are also raising their game, not least by improving their own use of automation.

In general, we don’t expect many companies to close their existing facilities in China and to reshore them

in the U.S. But we do expect many companies to locate new manufacturing

facilities in the U.S., particularly in sectors such as aerospace and

defense , industrial manufacturing , oil and gas, and the automotive

industry. The bottom line is that companies will locate close to where their growth is originating. This doesn’t amount to a renaissance or a new dawn. But after decades of decline, it’s a welcome advance.

Legalization drives up labor costs and discourage new businessesHirschfeld 98 - Professor of Law @ University of Detroit Mercy School of Law [Laura L. Hirschfeld, “Legal Drugs? Not Without Legal Reform: The Impact of Drug Legalization on Employers Under Current Theories of Enterprise Liability,” Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy, 7 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 757, 776 (1998)

As a people, we have an obligation to consider all possible resolutions to the problem of drug abuse-including schemes which explicitly tolerate some drug use, such as decriminalization or legalization. Perhaps we would be better served by a system that treats addiction as a health problem rather than a law enforcement problem, that eliminates the deadly chaos of the black market and that devotes its resources to education, treatment and rehabilitation. But who will foot the bill for all of these societal improvements? Legalization advocates maintain that all of this will be paid for with cost savings from reduced interdiction

and misuse of judicial resources. Perhaps, but legalization of drugs would not occur

in a vacuum. In fact, any economic rationale for legalizing drugs is inaccurate without considering the financial impact to the private sector.

An unspoken (and perhaps unidentified) effect o f any drug legalization system is to transfer a significant portion of these social costs to the private sector employers in the form of larger and more frequent judgments

rendered and fines imposed for the torts and crimes committed by

employees under the influence of drugs, and of productivity costs of treatment and rehabilitation efforts required under the Americans with

Disabilities Act ( ADA ). The unquantifiable costs associated with retraining new

workers to replace those addicted to drugs, along with lost profitability

associated with the possible inability to fire addicted and unproductive employees, should also be considered.

Our approach to the problem of drug abuse must be carefully thought out. It must be consistent with the political philosophy and principles upon which this country was founded-liberty, democracy, private ownership of property and a free market. Legalization of drugs is a libertarian position, but the current structure of our enterprise liability law has a distinctly socialist tone. We cannot use libertarian philosophy to justify gratifying our basest urges and socialist philosophy to justify asking others to pay for it. It is just this sort of philosophical schizophrenia that produces the inconsistent and utterly irreconcilable jurisprudence that we have seen recently in the area of respondeat superior.

There may be no imminent risk of drugs being legalized. But the mere prospect should bring into sharp focus the fact that our enterprise liability law has already strayed too far from its origins. The current legal climate seeks to make private employers insurers against any and all bad things that happen to people. This is contrary to the basic social and political philosophies of the United States. The problem needs to be redressed, even in the absence of legalized drugs.

Employers should not be the only ones concerned about drug legalization without tort reform. As has been shown in the past, corporations will not just

blithely absorb these increased costs ; they will be passed on to the American consumer . Before we decide to accept such costs, we must know what they

are: personally invasive employment policies , dramatically reduced

employment opportunities for those with a past criminal record or

history of substance use or abuse, reduced productivity , expenses of defending

protracted lawsuits, skyrocketing and unpredictable financial losses and

inevitably inflated insurance costs , a greater number of goods and

services whose costs will be beyond the means of an even greater segment of

the population, bankruptcy of enterprises that will no longer be able

to afford the losses and/or insurance associated with employee torts

or crimes, and lost opportunities of innumerable ventures that will never

come into existence for fear of overwhelming financial liability for

unpredictable, uninsurable and uncontrollable employee behavior . It is difficult to agree to pay a price when one does not know what it is. And these costs are incalculable. Pg. 840-841.

Defense industrial base is key to US readiness Adams 13 - Brigadier General for the U.S. Army [John Adams (Deputy Director for European Policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Ph.D. candidate in Political Science at the University of Arizona and holds Masters Degrees in International Relations (Boston University) and Strategic Studies (US Army War College), Remaking American Security: Supply Chain Vulnerabilities & National Security Risk Across the US Industrial Base, Report prepared for Alliance for American Manufacturing by Guardian Six Consulting LLC. (2013)

With the closing of factories across the United States and the mass exodus of U.S.

manufacturing jobs to China and other nations over the past 30 years, the U nited States’

critically important defense indus trial base has deteriorated

dramatically. As a result, the U nited S tates now relies heavily on imports to

keep our armed forces equipped and ready. Compounding this rising reliance on foreign suppliers, the United States also depends increasingly on foreign financing arrangements.

In addition, the United States is not mining enough of the critical metals and other raw materials needed to produce important weapons systems and military supplies. These products include the night-vision devices (made with a rare earth element) that enabled Navy SEALs to hunt down Osama bin Laden.

Consequently, the health of the U nited States’ defense industrial base —and our

national security—is in jeopardy . We are vulnerable to major disruptions in

foreign supplies that could make it impossible for U.S. warriors,

warships , tanks, aircraft, and missiles to operate effectively. Such supply disruptions could be caused by many factors, including:

Poor manufacturing practices in offshore factories that produce problem-

plagued products. Shoddy manufacturing could be inad vertent , could be part of a

deliberate attempt to cut costs and boost profits, or could be intentionally designed to damage U.S. capabili ties . Motivated by expected gains in cost, innovation, and efficiency, the

Department of Defense (DoD) began a decided shift from parts made to military specifications

(Mil-Spec) to commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) parts and equipment two decades ago. However,

COTS parts often lack the quality control and traceability necessary to ensure that parts used in the defense supply chain meet the rigorous standards we expect of equipment vital to our

national security. Faulty and counterfeit COTS parts are already taking a

toll on readiness in several defense sectors .

Natural disasters, domestic unrest, or changes in government that could cut or halt production and exports at foreign factories and mines.

Foreign producers that sharply raise prices or reduce or stop sales to the United States. These changes could be caused by political or military disputes with the United

States, by the desire of foreign nations to sell to other countries, by the need to attract foreign investment and production, or by foreign nations wanting to keep more of the raw materials, parts, and finished goods they produce for their own use. Pg. ii

US readiness deters Russian small-scale aggression that accumulates and risks of escalation Olson 14 – Reporter for Stars and Stripes [Wyatt Olson, “Military’s reduced readiness seen as emboldening China, Russia,” Stars and Stripes, Published: May 20, 2014, pg. http://tinyurl.com/n6vq7zr

“The U.S. certainly retains an ability to project an awful lot of air and sea power for more limited contingencies — and do so very quickly,” said Anthony

Cordesman, a defense expert at the bipartisan Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

And even if U.S. forces did become embroiled in Pacific confrontations such as those unfolding in Vietnam and the Philippines, they aren’t the kind of interventions that demand huge follow-up forces, he said.

Cordesman cautioned against equating these kinds of skirmishes with a potential outbreak of hostilities on the Korean peninsula because the U.S. is prepared and willing to match escalation there, he said.

“You’re not going to go to general war over an [exclusive economic zone] or a reef somewhere in the Pacific,” he said.

Still, Cordesman admitted, irrational behavior and miscalculations

by adversaries can quickly lead to escalation and “the need for putting many more follow-on forces in the field over time.”

Some experts say that flagging readiness — real or perceived — actually invites

escalation by weakening America’s “deterrent effect” as China and

Russia continue beefing up their Pacific forces .

In congressional testimony, top-ranking military chiefs have already warned that readiness is deteriorating, partly because of cuts from last year’s sequester at a time the military is struggling to refit and retrain after a decade of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Gen. Curtis Scaparrotti, commander of U.S. forces in South Korea, testified before a Senate subcommittee in March that he was concerned about the readiness of “follow-on forces” that would be required should the peninsula enter crisis.

Marine Corps Commandant Gen. John Amos told the same committee last fall that budget cuts leave “fewer forces, arriving less-trained, arriving later in the fight.”

Reduced readiness cuts two ways , said Todd Harrison, a defense expert

with the nonpartisan Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in Washington, D.C.

“I think this reduction in readiness that we’re looking at will reduce our confidence in the ability of our military to intervene successfully if called upon ,”

he said. “That may weaken the deterrent effect on potential adversaries ,

but it could also create a situation where we self-deter . ”

Dakota Wood, a defense expert at the conservative Heritage Foundation in Washington, D.C., said that

America’s current budget and readiness woes do not go unnoticed by China and Russia.

“There’s this deterrent value in being strongly forward, being strongly postured and having the perception that not only are your forces ready for action, but that the government in the U.S. is willing to press that case if it comes to it.

“When it comes to China, we are seeing increasing aggressiveness in

trying to push forward their territorial claims in the East and S outh

C hina S eas .

“China is likely viewing this as a window of opportunity to aggressively press its claims in these waters, and the U.S. is not well postured to come to the assistance of friends and allies in the region.”

Wood described this “pattern of conduct” as “ taking small bites of

an apple ,” which over time will consume it.

“So each one of these little actions is below the threshold that would invite a large-scale conventional military response,” he said. “But they’re willing and able to take these small bites because they know the U.S., by this series of incidents, is unwilling to press the case.”

Terrence K. Kelly director of the Strategy and Resources Program at the

RAND Corporation, said that individual skirmishes such as these might

seem insignificant. But over time countries such as China and Russia can

achieve their goals by “ nibbling away ” with “subresponse-level”

aggression, Kelly said.

“It’s probably calculated to slowly over time achieve an effect that won’t elicit a military response from the U.S. or its allies,” he said.

Cordesman said, however, that even a modest U.S. intervention could lead to

unintended escalation .

“The problem is that the United States responding — even if it solves one small , short-term problem — may lead to the other side responding in ways that again

produce a steady pattern of escalation ,” Cordesman said.

Nibbling away at Ukraine results in a massive Russia-NATO war Schindler 14 - Professor of national security affairs @ Naval War College [John R. Schindler (Former National Security Agency counterintelligence officer), “How to Win Cold War 2.0,” Politico.com, March 25, 2014, pg. http://tinyurl.com/ps85rcy

Since the annexation of Crimea, Russia n intelligence has reportedly been

employing its playbook in eastern and southern Ukraine , using spies

and operatives to stir up trouble among ethnic Russians and lay the groundwork for a future invasion by “self-defense militias” backed by Russian troops. It’s not yet clear that these techniques will

get Putin what he wants, but there is always the option of overt invasion by

the Russian military , which must be judged a serious possibility .

If Russia goes down that road, the stoic passivity we have witnessed by besieged

Ukrainian troops in Crimea will end and Moscow will have a major war on its hands—indeed the biggest European conflict since 1945 .

Moves by the Russian military into central Ukraine would generate stiff

resistance that could last years , particularly since the brutal Stalinist methods of mass

repression that were needed to pacify Ukraine in the late 1940s are off the table for even Putin in 2014. In

the unlikely event that Russian forces move into western Ukraine, past Kyiv and toward Poland, it

would be difficult to see how NATO could avoid becoming involved.

That said, it’s evident that Moscow prefers easy conquest and would likely avoid any moves that could

trigger a genuine war with NATO. Putin has become a gambler but not yet a fool.

However, his nationalist attack on the post-Cold War European order is bound to evoke memories of Adolf Hitler in the late 1930s. Like Hitler, Putin has reestablished the pride of a defeated people, brought them out of economic disaster, rebuilt the military and revitalized ethno-nationalism while humiliating the hated victors of the last war. This

is a heady brew , so Putin’s current high popularity numbers among average Russians ought not

surprise, but the Kremlin’s vision of a Russian Lebensraum transcending current

borders ought to alarm to anyone invested in European peace and stability.

Whether or not Putin invades mainland Ukraine, NATO must understand that the

Kremlin has decided to begin a new Cold War by attacking the settlement of the

last one. Further Western denial—like we saw after the invasion of Georgia—w ill only encourage more Russian adventurism, with all the attendant risks of wider conflict and major war. While the George W. Bush administration bears its share of the blame here, there is no denying that the Obama White House has repeatedly fumbled the ball with Russia. The famed “reset” was a fine idea if Dmitry Medvedev were actually running Russia, which he certainly was not. Moreover, this White House’s mishandling of Syria, essentially outsourcing U.S. policy to Moscow, only encouraged more hardball from Putin, as was predictable to those who understand this Kremlin.

* Lebensraum is a German term calling for territorial expansionism – breathing room for tyrants.

1NC CPThe fifty states and the District of Columbia should eliminate their prohibitions on and establish regulation for the possession, cultivation and sale of cannabis sativa.The United States Attorney General, the fifty states and the District of Columbia should enter into and implement contractual cooperation agreements that bind the states and the District of Columbia to enforcement against illegal production and sales in return for federal acquiescence to state cannabis sativa initiatives. The United States federal government should not legalize cannabis sativa.Written agreement provides certainty to states and industry participants that the federal government will acquiesce to state laws Kleiman 13 - Professor of Public Policy @ UCLA [Mark A.R. Kleiman, “Cooperative Enforcement Agreements and Policy Waivers: New Options for Federal Accommodation to State-Level Cannabis Legalization,” Journal of Drug Policy Analysis, 2013; 6(1): pg. 41–49

Formalizing administrative discretion: cooperative enforcement agreements

The vast bulk of drug law enforcement is carried out by state and local, rather

than federal, authorities . That is especially true for cannabis , where the federal

effort is concentrated on relatively high-level dealing and the federal government makes fewer than 10% of the arrests for growing or selling and an even smaller fraction of arrests for mere possession .

Accordingly, the CSA 2 provides that:

The A ttorney G eneral shall cooperate with local, State, and Federal agencies concerning traffic in

controlled substances and in suppressing the abuse of controlled substances. To this end, he is authorized to …

notwithstanding any other provision of law, enter into contractual agreements with State and local law enforcement agencies to provide for cooperative enforcement and regulatory activities under this chapter. [emphasis added]

Note the mix of mandatory and permissive language. The Attorney General is commanded to cooperate and

authorized to enter into contractual cooperation agreements “notwithstanding any other provision of law.” Whether this authority could extend to an agreement not to enforce the federal law under specified circumstances remains an open question. But there is a completely straightforward argument to be made that such agreements could advance the cause of “suppressing the abuse of controlled substances”; if Colorado or Washington were to cease the enforcement of the laws against unlicensed cannabis production and against sale for shipment out of state, the federal government would find it difficult – perhaps impossible – to close the resulting gap and prevent an

explosion of exports, perhaps leading to a national collapse in cannabis prices.3 Thus, a cooperative agreement binding the state and its localities to vigorous enforcement against

exports in return for federal acquiescence in intra-state sales regulated and taxed under

state law would plausibly advance the purposes of the Act better than any alternative available to the Attorney General .

A less explicit form of such an agreement might list joint enforcement priorities in order, leaving state-legal

activities off the list or placing them at its end. Either version of the written-agreement

approach would have substantial advantages , in terms of certainty for

state officials and industry participants , over semi-formalized

administrative discretion . It might also do more to encourage vigorous state efforts to suppress production and sale for sales out of state than could be accomplished with a nod and a wink.

To the immediate objection that the Executive Branch – charged by the Constitution with the “faithful execution” of the laws – has no authority to acquiesce in the violation of some of those laws, there is an equally immediate rejoinder; those laws are now being violated and will continue to be violated, in ways the Executive is practically powerless to prevent in any case and still more powerless without the active

engagement of state and local enforcement agencies. If “the abuse of controlled substances” can be more effectively suppressed with cooperative agreements than without them, then the mandate to cooperate for the purposes of the Act might be

best carried out by explicitly agreeing not to do what the federal

government cannot in fact do with or without such an agreement .

States cannot legalize marijuana. Legalize means Congress Kamin 13 – Professor and Director of the Constitutional Rights and Remedies Program @ University of Denver [Sam Kamin, “Medical Marijuana in Colorado and the Future of Marijuana Regulation in the United States,” McGeorge Law Review, (2012) pg. 147-167

Barring an unlikely policy change by Congress , therefore, every sale of marijuana in every state with a medical marijuana provision on the books will continue to constitute a serious federal crime . While states can choose not to enforce their own criminal laws against those providing or using marijuana for medical purposes and

can choose not to enforce any federal law with which they disagree, they

cannot legalize marijuana outright. No matter how beneficently a state views

the medical use of marijuana, its use (as well as its cultivation and provision ) remains illegal in the eyes of the federal government .

What is more, it is now clear that compliance with a state medical marijuana provision is not a defense in a federal prosecution under the CSA. Even in those states that have made marijuana possession by certain persons for certain purposes legal, the fed eral government retains the power to enforce federal drug laws against those very persons .24 This position was clarified in

2001 when the United States Supreme Court held that there is no medical necessity

exception implied in the CSA and that a defendant in a federal prosecution is essentially barred from even raising medicinal use or compassionate motives as a defense.25 Pg. 153

Mexico

No I/L—CartelsBeckley ev—cites a RAND study—marihuana is only 15-20% of cartel revenuesCarpenterfrom a former DEA official, is that marijuana accounts for approximately 55 percent of total revenues. Other experts dispute that figure. Edgardo Buscaglia, who was a research scholar at the conservative Hoover Institution until 2008, provides the low-end estimate, contending that the drug amounts to “less than 10 percent” of total revenues. Officials in both the U.S. and Mexican governments contend that it’s more like 20 to 30 percent

Cartels are adaptable—they’ll survive with other revenue streamsZaiac 14 (Nick, public policy researcher for PanAm Post, Marijuana Legalization Won’t Crowd Out Cartels, May 21, 2014, http://dailycaller.com/2014/05/21/marijuana-legalization-wont-crowd-out-cartels/)

Everyone agrees that drug cartels are terrible, violent organizations, which is probably why a recent Washington Post article

describing a collapse in Mexican wholesale marijuana prices after 2012 has garnered so much attention. Advocates of cannabis legalization in the U.S. were quick to jump on the story as a victory over the cartels since Mexico decriminalized the drug in 2009. These advocates have long claimed that legalization would lead to a weakening of Mexico’s cartels and, with it, their stranglehold on the country.

Unfortunately, this may be wishful thinking, as there are doubts about how much cannabis legalization can really hurt the cartels. “Farmers in the storied ‘Golden Triangle’ region of Mexico’s Sinaloa state … say they are no longer planting the crop,” the heavily quoted Washington Post article reports about marijuana

farming. “Its wholesale price has collapsed in the past five years, from $100 per kilogram to less than $25.” While a reader can easily misconstrue this quote as saying that less pot is being produced, thereby weakening the cartels, the article then goes on to describe how the farmers are instead planting opium poppies, which will supply the US heroin trade instead. Indeed, recent months have seen a surge in reports of cartels moving into new forms of illegal activities . A few weeks ago, Mexican authorities in seized 68,000 tons of cartel-mined iron ore while en route to China. Last year, the Zetas cartel was revealed to have been involved in massive illegal coal mining operations. Around the same time, the Knights Templar cartel’s vast involvement in the avocado trade was exposed. And then came the revelation that the “lime crisis” every margarita-lover in the nation is freaking out about is, at least in part, being fueled by cartel involvement in the fruit’s trade. Cartels’ movement into normally legal markets seems shocking to many, but the ideas are far from new. As far back as 1995, noted social scientists Diego Gambetta and Peter Reuter wrote about how cartels will seek out opportunity for profit any way they can, citing Cosa Nostra’s involvement in price fixing the concrete industry. Cartels act as catalysts of illicit entrepreneurship, giving individuals the ability to enter the darker side of legal markets. The lime trade is an excellent example. Exporting limes to the U.S. is

a good, common, and legal trade. The Knights Templar thereby expropriated some lime farms while using their clout to regulate competition out of existence. Cartels have proven extremely adaptable to outside pressure. When some government action can prove successful in the short-term, like

the Coast Guard shutting down the Caribbean cocaine trade, the cartels will adapt . In the Caribbean case, it meant shifting

supply routes overland via Mexico. When crackdowns occur in particular industries, the cartel will shift

away from it . A notable example of this was the U.S.-based mafia’s avoidance of the heroin trade in the 1950s, ceding the

trade to the Sicilian mob. The penalties for trafficking heroin were so stiff that they posed systemic risk to the mafia, and thus they

avoided an otherwise lucrative market. As such, cartels are becoming diversified networks of businesses, not simply reliant on the traditional drug trade for revenue . Back in 2011, Sylvia Longmire noted that this diversification would insulate cartels from economic and political shocks of legalization, just like having a diverse portfolio of stocks

insulates investors from some risk. No matter how low prices for some particular drug fall, the cartels will likely just shift to new activities. Thus, Mexican farmers’ move to opium production was all too predictable. At the same time, any time a cartel is forced to exit a trade, especially one with previously-high margins,

it generally come out weaker than before. Put simply, legalizing cannabis in the U.S. will hurt the cartels, but it is unlikely that it will kill the cartels by any means.

Valdez ev is from 2009 and a contributor to The Arizona Republic—unqualled to discuss cartels

Drug violence decliningBargent 13

James, Independent journalism from Colombia and Latin America, “Mexico Drug War Violence Slowing: Report”, Febraury 7th, 2013, http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/mexico-drug-war-violence-slowing-report

A new report analyzing the data behind Mexico’s drug war shows in 2012 organized crime

related killings declined or leveled off while becoming increasingly concentrated in key strategic areas. The

report , compiled by the San Diego University’s Trans-Border Institute, analyzed a range of

data sources -- both official and independent -- to build a comprehensive picture of the

shifting violence patterns in Mexico. ¶ The most significant trend identified was the slowing

rate of drug war killings. While the conclusions of different data sets varied widely, they agreed that in 2012 the

substantial year on year increases Mexico has seen since 2007 came to an end .¶ According to

data collated by Mexican newspaper Reforma, organized crime related murders dropped by

over 21 percent , falling to 8,989 from 12,284. Projections for the government’s as yet unreleased figures show a 28% drop . However, figures from another media source, Milenio, showed an increase in its crime related murder tallies but by less than 1 percent – far lower than in previous years.¶ The report also highlights how Mexico’s drug war violence is increasingly concentrated. Between 2007 and 2011, the number of municipalities that recorded no murders dropped by

28 percent, while the number of municipalities with 25 or more annual homicides grew from 50 to 240. However, in 2012, (for which, the report points out, the data set is incomplete) the number of municipalities free from violence increased 16% while the number with more than 25 homicides decreased more

than 25% to 178. ¶ Over half the organized crime linked murders nationwide came from just five states; Sinaloa, Chihuaha,

Nuevo Leon, Guerrero and Coahuila (although the order depends of the data set). 2012 also saw Acapulco assume the mantle of Mexico’s most violent city, even though the murder rate leveled off, while the cities of Monterrey, Torreon, and Nuevo Laredo

posted the largest increases in crime related killings.¶ InSight Crime¶ While the authorities will probably lay claim to the slowdown in drug violence, it is likely a more influential factor has been changing dynamics in the Mexican underworld, as reflected by the shifting geographical patterns.¶

AT: State Collapse (Mexico)Pedigo—undergradThis monopoly(on violence) cannot be fully achieved through policies that aim to stop the flow of drugs or reduce short term violence ; these are merely symptoms of cartel power.

Mexico won’t collapse now - stability increasing, economy is growing and corruption is decreasingBarone 13 (Michael, political analyst, coauthor of annual Almanac of American Politics and senior policy analyst for the Washingon Examiner, “Mexico becomes a stable, politically diverse neighbor,” American Enterprise Institute, http://www.aei.org/article/politics-and-public-opinion/mexico-becomes-a-stable-politically-diverse-neighbor/ 4/6/14

We Americans are lucky, though we seldom reflect on it, that we have good neighbors. In East Asia, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines face challenges from China over islands they have long claimed in the East China Sea. In Europe, Germany and other prosperous nations face demands for subsidies from debt-ridden nations to avoid the collapse of the euro. When Southern Europeans look across the Mediterranean, they see Muslim nations facing post-Arab Spring upheaval and disorder. The United States has land borders with just two nations, Canada (more on that another day) and Mexico, where Barack Obama is headed next month. They're both good neighbors. I realize that most of the

recent news on Mexico has been about violent drug wars. You get 500,000 hits when you Google " Mexico failed

state ." But that's a misleading picture . The war on drug lords waged by President Felipe

Calderon from 2006 to 2012 has had considerable success and has been de-emphasized by his successor, Enrique

Pena Nieto. The focus on the drug war ignores Mexico's progress over the last 25 years as an electoral democracy. For 71 years, it had one-party rule of the PRI, or Party of the Institutional Revolution. Under PRI rule, a president

selected by his predecessor selected his successor. But under PRI Presidents Carlos Salinas (1988-94) and Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000), Mexico established a clean election system under which the opposition conservative PAN and leftist PRD parties won state and legislative offices. This was capped when PAN candidate Vicente Fox was elected president in July 2000. When Zedillo came on television and said, "I recognize that Vicente Fox is the next president of Mexico," thousands of Fox supporters gathered around Mexico City's Angel of Independence and stomped so strongly in unison that the Earth shook. Fox and his PAN successor, Calderon, had some significant policy successes. But they were frustrated in getting changes in the energy sector, in which the state-owned monopoly Pemex has lagged

behind, and in education, where teacher jobs are handed down from parent to child. The reason is that since 2000, none of Mexico's three parties has had a majority in Congress. That's one result of genuine political competition, in which voters have imposed rotation in office in governorships and legislative seats. But it also meant that the PAN presidents could not get reforms through Congress if they were opposed by the PRI and the PRD. Things have been different since the 2012 presidential election. PRI candidate Enrique Pena Nieto seemed a depressingly conventional politician, who as governor of the state of Mexico (which surrounds central Mexico City) won publicity for dating a telenovela star. Pena won the July election handily and on taking office in December called for major reforms. He issued a 34-page Pact for Mexico, which proposed greater competition for Pemex in the energy sector, plus education and judicial reforms. Remarkably, it was endorsed by PAN and PRD as well as the PRI. Pemex has been a sacred cow in Mexico since the 1930s when President Lazaro Cardenas seized foreign oil operations and created the state-owned monopoly. The Pemex union was a pillar of the PRI establishment. Now a PRI president was proposing to reform it, and his move was endorsed by a PRI party convention in March. Pena also acted on education. In February, Congress passed a law establishing a transparent system for teacher hiring and evaluation. The next day, the government arrested the head of the teachers union and charged her with spending $156 million of union funds on luxury goods. And Pena has moved to

deregulate telecommunications, which threatens the position of telecom billionaire Carlos Slim. There is other heartening news from south of our border. Mexico's economy is moving ahead with 5 percent growth. Since the NAFTA treaty went into effect in the 1990s, it seemed that Mexico's economy was tethered to ours, leaving it unable to close the gap with the United

States. Now as our economy slogs along slowly, Mexico is moving toward catching up. It is, as former

Foreign Minister Jorge Castaneda has proclaimed, a majority middle-class country now. It is also a country from which, according

to the Pew Hispanic Center, there has been no net migration to the United States since 2007. All this vindicates our previous four presidents, who pressed for closer ties with Mexico. But most of the credit belongs to the leaders and people of Mexico. Good neighbors.

Zero risk of Mexican state collapse – consensus of credible expertsDaudelin, 12—Jean, Professor @ Carleton, teaches on development and conflict. He is a specialist of Latin America, particularly Brazil, Central America and Colombia, where he has researched religious movements, indigenous politics, urban violence, economic integration, and regional politics. His current research focuses on property rights and conflict, on Brazilian foreign policy and international relations in the Americas, and on crime and violence in Latin America, “The State And Security in Mexico” http://books.google.com/books?id=o-Tu81Bq6s4C&pg=PA127&lpg=PA127&dq=mexico+state+collapse&source=bl&ots=Yhx_8YtFb4&sig=pa7WFUmTZL9ABazqwXvl8euUKw&hl=en&sa=X&ei=46UHVNGWOIfxgwSRlYDACg&ved=0CB8Q6AEwATgU#v=onepage&q=mexico%20state%20collapse&f=false

A careful look at the evidence and the fact that the U.S. seems to be disengaging from what has ultimately been a

limited involvement in the region's drug and organized-crime scene suggests that, from whichever angle one looks at the problem, the latter does not represent a very significant threat to U.S. security . In that context, a sizable increase in Canada's involvement can hardly be justified by the dangers the problem represents to its main ally.

The prospects of narco-traffickers provoking a state collapse in Mexico are essentially

nonexistent , notwithstanding alarmist declarations by some U.S. public officials. 14 No

reputable expert on the country has supported that view .54 Such prospects for Guatemala, Honduras, or even El Salvador are much less far-fetched, however, which is why an effort is currently being made by the World Bank, the European Union, the U.S., and Canada to bolster the region's governments* individual and collective capacity to confront the organized-crime challenge." It is difficult to argue, however, that the emergence of a narco-state or some kind of state collapse in Central America and the Caribbean would represent a significant threat for Canada itself. These regions—Central America and Haiti in particular—have long been plagued by corruption, violence, and instability and have previously-seen long episodes of civil war without any ripple effect on Canada. Were such developments to occur, they would create, relative to North America, the situation that currently exists in the urban peripheries of large Latin American countries, such as Colombia or Brazil, whose stability and economic prospects are not significantly impacted by the anarchy and violence that prevail in small "uncontrolled territories."

1NC Oil ShocksMoran—I/L to oil shocks about Calderon losing being the CIA’s nightmare—CALDERON LOST “ What if Calderon loses?”

No economic collapse from shocks – most comprehensive data.Khadduri, 8/23/2011 (Walid – former Middle East Economic Survey Editor-in-Chief, The impact of rising oil prices on the economies of importing nations, Al Arabiya News, p. http://english.alarabiya.net/views/2011/08/23/163590.html)

What is the impact of oil price shocks on the economies of importing nations? At first glance, there appears to

be large-scale and extremely adverse repercussions for rising oil prices. However, a study published this month by researchers in the IMF Working Paper group suggests a different picture altogether (it is worth mentioning that the IMF has not endorsed its findings.) The study (Tobias N. Rasmussen & Agustin Roitman, "Oil Shocks in a Global Perspective:

Are They Really That Bad?", IMF Working Paper, August 2011) mentions that “Using a comprehensive global

dataset […] we find that the impact of higher oil prices on oil-importing economies is generally small :

a 25 percent increase in oil prices typically causes GDP to fall by about half of one percent or

less.” The study elaborates on this by stating that this impact differs from one country to another, depending on the size of oil-

imports, as “oil price shocks are not always costly for oil-importing countries: although higher oil prices increase the

import bill, there are partly offsetting increases in external receipts [represented in new and additional

expenditures borne by both oil-exporting and oil-importing countries]”. In other words, the more oil prices increase , benefiting exporting countries, the more these new revenues are recycled , for example through the growth in demand for new services, labor, and commodity imports . The researchers argue that the series of oil price

rallies (in 1983, 1996, 2005, and 2009) have played an important role in recessions in the United States. However, Rasmussen

and Roitman state at the same time that significant changes in the U.S. economy in the previous period

(the appearance of combined elements, such as improvements in monetary policy, the institution of a labor

market more flexible than before and a relatively smaller usage of oil in the U.S. economy) has greatly

mitigated the negative effects of oil prices on the U.S. economy. A 10 percent rise in oil prices

before 1984, for instance, used to lower the U.S. GDP by about 0.7 percent over two to three years, while

this figure started shrinking to no more than 0.25 percent after 1984, owing to these accumulated economic

changes. This means that while oil price shocks continue to adversely impact the U.S. economy, the latter has managed,

as a result of the changes that transpired following the first shock in the seventies, to overcome these shocks , and

subsequently, the impact of oil price shocks has become extremely limited compared to previous periods.

1NC EconNo impact to economic decline – prefer new dataDrezner 14 Daniel, IR prof at Tufts, The System Worked: Global Economic Governance during the Great Recession, World Politics, Volume 66. Number 1, January 2014, pp. 123-164

The final significant outcome addresses a dog that hasn't barked: the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border conflict

and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.42 They voiced genuine

concern that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict—whether through greater internal

repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict . Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fueled impressions of a

surge in global public disorder. The aggregate data suggest otherwise , however . The Institute for Economics and

Peace has concluded that "the average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007 ."43 Interstate violence in particular has declined since the start of the financial crisis, as have military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm that the Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict , as Lotta Themner and Peter Wallensteen

conclude: "[T]he pattern is one of relative stability when we consider the trend for the past five years."44 The secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed. Rogers Brubaker observes

that "the crisis has not to date generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion that might have been expected."43

1NC HegUS decline will not spark wars.MacDonald & Parent 11—Professor of Political Science at Williams College & Professor of Political Science at University of Miami [Paul K. MacDonald & Joseph M. Parent, “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Spring 2011), pp. 7–44]

Our findings are directly relevant to what appears to be an impending great power transition between China and the United States. Estimates of economic performance vary, but most observers expect Chinese GDP to surpass U.S. GDP sometime in the next decade or two. 91 This prospect has generated considerable concern. Many scholars foresee major conflict during a Sino-U.S. ordinal transition. Echoing Gilpin and Copeland, John Mearsheimer sees the crux of the issue as irreconcilable goals: China wants to be America’s superior and the United States wants no peer competitors. In his words, “[N]o amount of goodwill can ameliorate the intense security competition that sets in when an aspiring hegemon appears in Eurasia.” 92

Contrary to these predictions, our analysis suggests some grounds for optimism. Based on the historical track record of great powers facing acute relative decline, the United States should be able to retrench in the coming decades. In the next few years, the United States is ripe to overhaul its military, shift burdens to its allies, and work to decrease costly international commitments . It is likely to initiate and become embroiled in fewer militarized disputes than the average great power and to settle these disputes more

amicably. Some might view this prospect with apprehension, fearing the steady erosion of U.S. credibility. Yet our analysis suggests that retrenchment need not signal weakness . Holding on to exposed and expensive commitments simply for the sake of one’s reputation is a greater geopolitical gamble than withdrawing to cheaper, more defensible frontiers.

Some observers might dispute our conclusions, arguing that hegemonic transitions are more conflict prone than other moments of acute relative decline. We counter that there are deductive and empirical reasons to doubt this argument. Theoretically, hegemonic powers should actually find it easier to manage acute relative decline. Fallen hegemons still have formidable capability , which threatens grave harm to any state that tries to cross them . Further, they are no longer the top target for balancing coalitions, and recovering hegemons may be influential because they can play a pivotal role in alliance formation . In addition, hegemonic powers, almost by definition, possess more extensive overseas commitments; they should be able to more readily identify and eliminate extraneous burdens without exposing vulnerabilities or exciting domestic populations.

We believe the empirical record supports these conclusions . In particular, periods of hegemonic transition do not appear more conflict prone than those of acute decline . The last reversal at the pinnacle of power was the AngloAmerican transition, which took place around 1872 and was resolved without armed confrontation. The tenor of that transition may have been influenced by a number of factors: both states were democratic maritime empires, the United States was slowly emerging from the Civil War, and Great Britain could likely coast on a large lead in domestic capital stock. Although China and the United States differ in regime type, similar factors may work to cushion the impending Sino-American transition. Both are large, relatively secure continental great powers, a fact that mitigates potential geopolitical competition. 93 China faces a variety of domestic political challenges, including strains among rival regions, which may complicate its ability to sustain its economic performance or engage in foreign policy adventurism. 94

Most important, the United States is not in free fall. Extrapolating the data into the future, we anticipate the United States will experience a “moderate” decline, losing from 2 to 4 percent of its share of great power GDP in the five years after being surpassed by China sometime in the next decade or two. 95 Given the relatively gradual rate of U.S. decline relative to China, the incentives for either side to run risks by courting conflict are minimal. The United States would still possess upwards of a third of the share of great

power GDP, and would have little to gain from provoking a crisis over a peripheral issue. Conversely, China has few incentives to exploit U.S. weakness. 96 Given the importance of the U.S. market to the Chinese economy, in addition to the critical role played by the dollar as a global reserve currency, it is unclear how Beijing could hope to consolidate or expand its increasingly advantageous position through direct confrontation. In short, the United States should be able to reduce its foreign policy commitments in East Asia in the coming decades without inviting Chinese expansionism. Indeed, there is evidence that a policy of retrenchment could reap potential benefits. The drawdown and repositioning of U.S. troops in South Korea, for example, rather than fostering instability, has resulted in an improvement in the occasionally strained relationship between Washington and Seoul. 97 U.S. moderation on Taiwan, rather than encouraging hard-liners in Beijing, resulted in an improvement in cross-strait relations and reassured U.S. allies that Washington would not inadvertently drag them into a Sino-U.S. conflict. 98 Moreover, Washington’s support for the development of multilateral security institutions, rather than harming bilateral alliances, could work to enhance U.S. prestige while

embedding China within a more transparent regional order. 99 A policy of gradual retrenchment need not undermine the credibility of U.S. alliance commitments or unleash destabilizing regional security dilemmas . Indeed, even if Beijing harbored revisionist intent, it is unclear that China will have the force projection capabilities necessary to take and hold additional territory. 100 By incrementally shifting burdens to regional allies and multilateral institutions, the U nited States

can strengthen the credibility of its core commitments while accommodating the interests of a rising China . Not least among the benefits of retrenchment is that it helps alleviate an unsustainable financial position. Immense forward deployments will only exacerbate U.S. grand strategic problems and risk unnecessary clashes. 101

Ikenberry votes negIkenberry 11—PhD, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs [May/June issue of Foreign Affairs, G. John, “The Future of the Liberal World Order,” http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67730/g-john-ikenberry/the-future-of-the-liberal-world-order?page=show]

The liberal international order is not just a collection of liberal democratic states but an international mutual-aid society -- a sort of global political club that provides members with tools for economic and

political advancement. Participants in the order gain trading opportunities , dispute-resolution mechanisms , frameworks for collective action, regulatory agreements, allied security guarantees, and resources in times of crisis . And just as there are a variety of reasons why rising states will embrace the liberal

international order, there are powerful obstacles to opponents who would seek to overturn it . To

begin with, rising states have deep interests in an open and rule-based system. Openness gives them access to other societies -- for trade, investment, and knowledge sharing. Without the unrestricted investment from the United States and Europe of the past several decades, for instance, China and the other rising states would be on a much slower developmental path. As these countries grow, they will encounter protectionist and discriminatory reactions from slower-growing countries threatened with the loss of jobs and markets. As a result,

the rising states will find the rules and institutions that uphold nondiscrimination and equal access to be critical. The World Trade Organization -- the most formal and developed institution of the liberal

international order -- enshrines these rules and norms, and rising states have been eager to join the WTO and gain the rights and protections it affords. China is already deeply enmeshed in the global trading system, with a

remarkable 40 percent of its GNP composed of exports -- 25 percent of which go to the United States. China could be drawn further into the liberal order through its desire to have the yuan become an international currency rivaling the U.S. dollar . Aside from conferring prestige, this feat could also stabilize China's exchange rate and grant Chinese leaders autonomy in setting macroeconomic policy. But if China wants to make the yuan a global currency, it will need to loosen its currency controls and strengthen its domestic financial rules and

institutions. As Barry Eichengreen and other economic historians have noted, the U.S. dollar assumed its international role after World War II not only because the U.S. economy was large but also because the United States had highly developed financial markets and domestic institutions --

economic and political -- that were stable, open, and grounded in the rule of law. China will feel pressures to establish these same institutional preconditions if it wants the benefits of a global currency. Internationalist -oriented elites in Brazil, China, India, and elsewhere are growing in influence within their societies, creating a n expanding global constituency for an open and rule-based international order . These elites were not party to the grand bargains that lay behind the founding of the liberal order in the early postwar decades, and they are seeking to renegotiate their countries' positions within the

system. But they are nonetheless embracing the rules and institutions of the old order. They want the protections and rights that come from the international order's Westphalian defense of sovereignty . They care about great-power authority. They want the protections and rights relating to trade and investment. And they want to use the rules and institutions of liberal internationalism as platforms to project their influence and acquire legitimacy at home and abroad. The UN Security Council, the G-20, the governing bodies of the Bretton Woods institutions -- these are all stages on which rising non-Western states can acquire great-power authority and exercise global leadership.

1NC No China WarChina will not risk war—economics and diplomacyFravel 12—Associate Professor of Political Science and member of the Security Studies Program at MIT. Taylor is a graduate of Middlebury College and Stanford University, where he received his PhD. He has been a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University, a Predoctoral Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, a Fellow with the Princeton-Harvard China and the World Program and a Visiting Scholar at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences(M. Taylor, “All Quiet in the South China Sea,” March 22nd, 2012, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137346/m-taylor-fravel/all-quiet-in-the-south-china-sea)

Little noticed, however, has been China's recent adoption of a new -- and much more moderate --

approach. The primary goals of the friendlier policy are to restore China's tarnished image in East Asia and to reduce the rationale for a more active U.S. role there.

Beijing is also unlikely to be more assertive if that sustains Southeast Asian countries' desires to further deepen ties with the U nited S tates.

The first sign of China's new approach came last June, when Hanoi dispatched a special envoy to Beijing for talks about the

countries' various maritime disputes. The visit paved the way for an agreement in July 2011 between China and the ten members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to finally implement a declaration of a code of conduct they had originally drafted in 2002 after a series of incidents in the South China Sea. In that declaration, they agreed to "exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes."

Since the summer, senior Chinese officials, especially top political leaders such as President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen

Jiabao, have repeatedly reaffirmed the late Deng Xiaoping's guidelines for dealing with China's

maritime conflicts to focus on economic cooperation while delaying the final resolution of the underlying claims. In August 2011, for example, Hu echoed Deng's approach by stating that "the countries concerned may put aside the disputes and actively explore forms of common development in the relevant sea areas."

Authoritative Chinese -language media , too, has begun to underscore the importance of cooperation . Since August, the international department of People's Daily (under the pen name Zhong Sheng) has published several columns stressing the need to be less confrontational in the South China Sea. In January 2012, for example, Zhong Sheng discussed the importance of "pragmatic cooperation" to achieve "concrete results." Since the People's Daily is the official paper of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, such articles should be interpreted as the party's attempts to explain its new policy to domestic readers, especially those working lower down in party and state bureaucracies.

In terms of actually setting aside disputes, China has made progress. In addition to the July consensus with ASEAN, in October China reached an agreement with Vietnam on "basic principles guiding the settlement of maritime issues." The accord stressed following international law, especially the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Since then, China and Vietnam have begun to implement the agreement by establishing a working group to demarcate and develop the southern portion of the Gulf of Tonkin near the disputed Paracel Islands.

China has also initiated or participated in several working-level meetings to address regional concerns about Beijing's assertiveness . Just before the East Asian Summit last November, China announced that it would establish a three billion yuan ($476 million) fund for China-ASEAN maritime cooperation on scientific research, environmental

protection, freedom of navigation, search and rescue, and combating transnational crimes at sea. The following month, China convened several workshops on oceanography and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, and in January it hosted a meeting with senior ASEAN officials to discuss implementing the 2002 code of conduct declaration. The breadth of proposed cooperative activities indicates that China's new approach is probably more than just a mere stalling tactic.

Beyond China's new efforts to demonstrate that it is ready to pursue a more cooperative approach, the country has also halted many of the more assertive behaviors that had attracted attention between 2009 and 2011. For example, patrol ships from the Bureau of Fisheries

Administration have rarely detained and held any Vietnamese fishermen since 2010. (Between 2005 and 2010, China detained 63 fishing boats and their crews, many of which were not released until a hefty fine was paid.) And Vietnamese and Philippine vessels have been able to conduct hydrocarbon exploration without interference from China. (Just last May, Chinese

patrol ships cut the towed sonar cable of a Vietnamese ship to prevent it from completing a seismic survey.) More generally, China has not obstructed any recent exploration-related activities, such as Exxon's drilling in October of an

exploratory well in waters claimed by both Vietnam and China. Given that China retains the capability to interfere with such activities, its failure to do so suggests a conscious choice to be a friendlier neighbor.

The question, of course, is why did the Chinese shift to a more moderate approach? More than anything, Beijing has come to realize that its assertiveness was harming its broader foreign policy interests. One principle of China's current grand strategy is to maintain

good ties with great powers, its immediate neighbors, and the developing world. Through its actions in the South China Sea, China had undermined this principle and tarnished the cordial image in Southeast Asia that it had worked to cultivate in the preceding decade. It had created a shared interest among countries there in countering China -- and an incentive for them to seek support from Washington. In so doing, China's actions provided a strong rationale for greater U.S. involvement in the region and inserted the South China Sea disputes into the U.S.-Chinese relationship.

By last summer, China had simply recognized that it had overreached . Now, Beijing wants to project a more benign image in the region to prevent the formation of a group of Asian states allied against China, reduce Southeast Asian states' desire to further improve ties with the United States, and weaken the rationale for a greater U.S. role in these disputes and in the region.

So far, Beijing's new approach seems to be working, especially with Vietnam. China and Vietnam have deepened their political relationship through frequent high-level exchanges. Visits by the Vietnamese Communist Party general secretary, Nguyen Phu Trong, to Beijing in October 2011 and by the Chinese heir apparent, Xi Jinping, to Hanoi in December 2011 were designed to soothe spirits and protect the broader bilateral relationship from the unresolved disputes over territory in the South China Sea. In October, the two also agreed to a five-year plan to increase their bilateral trade to $60 billion by 2015. And just last month, foreign ministers from both countries agreed to set up working groups on functional issues such as maritime search and rescue and establish a hotline between the two foreign ministries, in addition to starting talks over the demarcation of the Gulf of Tonkin.

Even if it is smooth sailing now, there could be choppy waters ahead. Months of poor weather have held back fishermen and oil companies throughout the South China Sea. But when fishing and hydrocarbon exploration activities resume in the spring, incidents could increase. In addition, China's new approach has raised expectations that it must now meet -- for example, by negotiating a binding code of conduct to replace the 2002 declaration and continuing to refrain from unilateral actions.

Nevertheless, because the new approach reflects a strategic logic, it might endure, signaling a more significant Chinese foreign policy shift. As the 18th Party Congress draws near, Chinese leaders want a stable external environment, lest an international crisis upset the arrangements for this year's leadership turnover. And even after new party heads are selected, they will likely try to avoid international crises while consolidating their power and focusing on China's domestic challenges.

China's more moderate approach in the South China Sea provides further evidence that China

will seek to avoid the type of confrontational policies that it had adopted toward the United States in 2010.

When coupled with Xi's visit to Washington last month, it also suggests that the United States need not fear Beijing's reaction to its

strategic pivot to Asia, which entails enhancing U.S. security relationships throughout the region. Instead, China is more likely to rely on conventional diplomatic and economic tools of statecraft than attempt a

direct military response . Beijing is also unlikely to be more assertive if that sustains Southeast Asian countries' desires to further deepen ties with the United States. Whether the new approach sticks

in the long run, it at least demonstrates that China, when it wants to, can recalibrate its foreign

policy. That is good news for stability in the region .

Federalism

1NC CoreNo spillover—solving marihuana won’t mean auto cooperation on water shortages and the environment—the reasons for disputes over the clean water act are different, and relate to business and interstate commerce

Malloy—As the U.S. struggles to clean up its waters , it would be wise to analyze whether the CWA’s structure and implementation measure up to its sustainability goals

There’s no INTERNAL LINK between fixing the Clean water act and fixing the Colorado river aquifer

1NC BlackoutsNew developments sure up grid stabilityKemp 12 -- Reuters market analyst (John, 4/5/12, "COLUMN-Phasors and blackouts on the U.S. power grid: John Kemp," http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/05/column-smart-grid-idUSL6E8F59W120120405)

The hoped-for solution to grid instability is something called the North American SynchroPhasor Initiative (NASPI), which

sounds like something out of Star Trek but is in fact a collaboration between the federal government and industry to improve grid monitoring and control by using modern communications

technology. More than 500 phasor monitoring units have so far been installed across the

transmission network to take precise measurements of frequency, voltage and other aspects

of power quality on the grid up to 30 times per second (compared with once every four seconds using

conventional technology). Units are synchronised using GPS to enable users to build up a comprehensive real-time picture of how power is flowing across the grid (www.naspi.org/Home.aspx and). It is a scaled-up version of the monitoring system developed by the University of Tennessee's Power Information Technology Laboratory using inexpensive frequency monitors that plug into ordinary wall sockets. Tennessee's FNET project provides highly

aggregated data to the public via its website. The systems being developed under NASPI provide a much finer level of detail that will reveal congestion and disturbances on individual transmission

lines and particular zones so that grid managers can act quickly to restore balance or

isolate failures ()

-- Blackouts won’t hurt the economyGaylord 3 (Becky, “Blackout Blues Hit Local Industries”, The Plain Dealer, 8-16,

http://www.cleveland.com/blackout/index.ssf?/blackout/more/1061038185297290.html)

The biggest blackout in U.S. history will pinch the nation’s economy only modestly , but for some Northeast Ohio manufacturers, the setbacks may linger for weeks. The $10 trillion U.S. economy is so resilient that the power outage’s impact shouldn’t shave significant growth from third- quarter output, economists predicted. Federal tax refunds and consumer spending have fueled recent growth, and much of the productivity disrupted by the brief blackout can be made up through overtime and other measures , said Stuart Hoffman, chief economist at PNC Bank in Pittsburgh. But the outages walloped some industries crucial to this region, such as steel and automotive. “For the individual companies that have problems, they are colossal,” said Ken Mayland, president of ClearView Economics in Pepper Pike.

Alt causes – aging equipment, growth, cyber threatsLoder 2/28/08 – staff writer [Asjylyn, “Still in dark over blackout,” St. Petersburg Times, 2/28/08, Business p. 1D]

Floridians have power, but not answers to how a small equipment malfunction in South Florida triggered a massive blackout that left millions of people as far away as the Tampa Bay area in the dark Tuesday afternoon. Florida Power & Light, Florida's largest provider of electricity and the source of the malfunction, said it might not have answers for weeks. "We're still in the middle of

a major investigation to figure out why what happened happened," said Sarah Marmion, spokeswoman for the Juno Beach utility. Florida's outage spurred new concerns about the vulnerability of the electric grid. The state's utilities sought to

reassure customers that all was well. But experts from around the country pointed out the system's fragility due to aging equipment, breakneck growth and ever-evolving cyber threats. "The grid has vulnerabilities that are both blessings

and curses," said Eric Byres, chief technology officer for Byres Security, a Canadian firm that focuses on cyber-security for critical infrastructure. "The grid is the most complicated machine that man has ever made. " The power network has two basic problems, he

said. It's highly interconnected, so power can move throughout the system and customers aren't solely dependent on one power plant. But that also means that an isolated problem can quickly amplify. "The other problem with the grid is that it's old. It uses technology built largely 25 to 30 years ago," Byres said.

1NC AGWe are resilient to ag shocksLedbetter 8 (James, Deputy Managing Editor – CNN Money and Editor – Dispatches, “How Bad Could It Get?”, Slate Magazine, 5-2, Lexis)

But no one would dispute that the American economy is more dynamic and resilient than it was in the '30s. The overwhelming majority of workers in those days toiled in either manufacturing or agriculture, sectors that are especially vulnerable to bust cycles. The employment market has diversified, workers have better skills, and global trade is much more important. So, if this recession leads to increases in unemployment-as it almost certainly will-not all job sectors will be uniformly hit. (Even in the severe '81-'82 recession, only 72 percent of U.S. industries experienced declining employment, compared with 100 percent during the Depression.) Wages may well flatten or shrink-as they've been doing for years-but it's difficult to find a credible scenario in which U.S. unemployment is going to hit 10 percent in the next 18 months.

1NC Algae1. Dead zones are inevitable and naturally occurringLewis, 07 – senior fellow at the Competitive Enterprise Institute (Marlo, “XII. Algae, Ticks, Mosquitoes, and Germs,” http://cei.org/pdf/ait/chXII.pdf)

Comment: A global warming link to toxic algae blooms is plausible, because algae- forming bacteria only produce blooms in warm water. But global warming is at most an aggravating factor. Mass fish kills associated with red tide algae blooms have been reported in Florida for hundreds of years. Indeed, reports the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission, “There is evidence that red tides have always existed in Florida’s waters . Scientists who study red tides globally consider Florida red tides to be unique because they are natural events which existed long before Florida was settled .”1 Similarly, dead zones are naturally occurring phenomena in the Baltic Sea, which has had algae blooms since the last ice age, as shown by sediment cores.2 In both the Baltic Sea and the Florida coast, sea surface temperatures in late summer are naturally high enough to support algae blooms , with or without global warming .

2. Alt cause – sewage and global dead zonesTELEGRAM & GAZETTE, 08 (“Dead in the water; Hypoxia zones threaten ecosystems, fisheries,” 8/19, lexis)

The largest known dead zone, about the size of Massachusetts, is off the Gulf Coast where the Mississippi River empties much of America's agricultural runoff into the ocean. But a recent survey by the Virginia Institute of Marine Science identified more than 400 such zones, from the fiords of Norway to the bays of New Zealand .

The chief causes are sewage and river-borne runoff of nitrogen fertilizers . Algae and bacteria thrive on those nutrients, depriving crustaceans, fish and other marine life of the oxygen needed for survival.

Resilience solves the impactVelasquez-Manoff, 08 (Moises, Christian Science Monitor, 6/25, “Some Coastal Woes Begin Far Inland”, http://www.alternet.org/water/89393/some_coastal_woes_begin_far_inland/?page=entire)

Others think the dead zone's potential impact on fisheries is being oversold. How oxygen- depleted waters affect an ecosystem depends on the ecosystem itself, says James Cowan, a fisheries oceanographer at Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge.

In Chesapeake Bay, for example, originally dominated by bottom-dwelling organisms like oysters, increased nutrient influx has restructured the food web. Low-oxygen waters can occupy up to 40 percent of the Chesapeake in summer, suffocating crabs, fish, and worms. Centuries of

harvesting oysters, which once filtered excess nutrients from the water and so defended the bay against hypoxia, may have sent the ecosystem past a tipping point. Few oysters remain.

But at the mouth of the Mississippi, the ecosystem is already adapted to a harsh environment that includes large pulses of sediment and fresh water. Midwater organisms accustomed to these conditions dominate the ecosystem. The greater threat here, Dr. Cowan says, is loss of coastal wetlands that serve as fish nurseries. "For my money, that's the bigger concern," he says.

1NC Environmental DegradationNo bio-d impact – the environment is super resilientKareiva et al 12 – Chief Scientist and Vice President, The Nature Conservancy (Peter, Michelle Marvier --professor and department chair of Environment Studies and Sciences at Santa Clara University, Robert Lalasz -- director of science communications for The Nature Conservancy, Winter, “Conservation in the Anthropocene,” http://thebreakthrough.org/index.php/journal/past-issues/issue-2/conservation-in-the-anthropocene/)

2. As conservation became a global enterprise in the 1970s and 1980s, the movement's justification for saving nature shifted from spiritual and aesthetic values to focus on biodiversity. Nature was described as primeval, fragile, and at risk of collapse from too much human use and abuse. And indeed, there are consequences when humans convert landscapes for mining, logging, intensive agriculture, and urban development and when key species or

ecosystems are lost.¶ But ecologists and conservationists have grossly overstated the fragility of nature , frequently arguing that once an ecosystem is altered, it is gone forever. Some ecologists suggest that if a single species is lost, a whole ecosystem will be in danger of collapse , and that if too much biodiversity is lost, spaceship Earth will start to come apart. Everything, from the expansion of agriculture to rainforest destruction to changing waterways, has been painted as a threat to the delicate inner-workings of our planetary ecosystem. ¶ The fragility trope dates back, at least,

to Rachel Carson, who wrote plaintively in Silent Spring of the delicate web of life and warned that perturbing the intricate balance of nature could have disastrous consequences.22 Al Gore made a similar argument in his 1992 book, Earth in the Balance.23 And the 2005 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment warned darkly that, while the expansion of agriculture and other forms of development have been overwhelmingly positive for the world's poor,

ecosystem degradation was simultaneously putting systems in jeopardy of collapse.24¶ The trouble for conservation is that the data simply do not support the idea of a fragile nature at risk of collapse . Ecologists now know that

the disappearance of one species does not necessarily lead to the extinction of any others, much less all others in the same ecosystem . In many circumstances, the demise of formerly abundant

species can be inconsequential to ecosystem function. The American chestnut , once a dominant tree in eastern North America, has been extinguished by a foreign disease, yet the forest ecosystem is surprisingly unaffected. The passenger pigeon, once so abundant that its flocks

darkened the sky, went extinct, along with countless other species from the Steller's sea cow to the

dodo, with no catastrophic or even measurable effects . ¶ These stories of resilience are not

isolated examples -- a thorough review of the scientific literature identified 240 studies of ecosystems following major disturbances such as deforestation, mining, oil spills , and other types of pollution. The abundance of plant and animal species as well as other measures of ecosystem function recovered, at least partially, in 173 (72 percent) of these studies.25¶ While global forest cover is continuing to decline, it is rising in the Northern Hemisphere, where "nature" is returning to former agricultural lands.26 Something similar is likely to occur in the Southern Hemisphere, after poor

countries achieve a similar level of economic development. A 2010 report concluded that rainforests that have grown back over abandoned agricultural land had 40 to 70 percent of the species of the original

forests.27 Even Indonesian orangutans, which were widely thought to be able to survive only in pristine forests, have been found

in surprising numbers in oil palm plantations and degraded lands.28¶ Nature is so resilient that it can recover

rapidly from even the most powerful human disturbances. Around the Chernobyl nuclear facility, which melted down in 1986, wildlife is thriving , despite the high levels of radiation .29 In the Bikini Atoll, the site of multiple nuclear bomb tests, including the 1954 hydrogen bomb test that boiled the

water in the area, the number of coral species has actually increased relative to before the explosions.30 More recently, the massive 2010 oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico was degraded and consumed by bacteria at a remarkably fast rate .31¶ Today, coyotes roam downtown Chicago, and

peregrine falcons astonish San Franciscans as they sweep down skyscraper canyons to pick off pigeons for their next meal. As we destroy habitats, we create new ones: in the southwestern United States a rare and federally listed salamander species seems specialized to live in cattle tanks -- to date, it has been found in no other habitat.32 Books have been written about the collapse of cod in the Georges Bank, yet recent trawl data show the biomass of cod has recovered to precollapse levels.33 It's doubtful that books will be written about this cod recovery since it does not play well to an audience somehow addicted to stories of collapse and environmental apocalypse. ¶ Even that classic symbol of fragility -- the polar bear, seemingly stranded on a melting ice

block -- may have a good chance of surviving global warming if the changing environment continues to increase the populations and northern ranges of harbor seals and harp seals.

Polar bears evolved from brown bears 200,000 years ago during a cooling period in Earth's history, developing a highly specialized carnivorous diet focused on seals. Thus, the fate of polar bears depends on two opposing

trends -- the decline of sea ice and the potential increase of energy-rich prey. The history of life on Earth is of species evolving to take advantage of new environments only to be at risk when the environment changes again. ¶ The wilderness ideal presupposes that there are parts of the world untouched by humankind, but today it is impossible to find a place on Earth that is unmarked by human activity. The truth is humans have been impacting their natural environment for centuries. The wilderness so beloved by conservationists -- places "untrammeled by man"34 -- never existed, at least not in the last thousand years, and arguably even longer.

2NC

2NC PDCPAnd, states can’t legalize a federal felony. Kleiman says so. Kleiman 10 - Professor of public policy @ UCLA [Mark A.R. Kleiman, “California can't legalize marijuana,” Los Angeles Times, July 16, 2010|pg. http://tinyurl.com/399wzwr

There's one problem with legalizing , taxing and regulating cannabis at the state level: It can't be done .

The federal C ontrolled S ubstances A ct ma kes it a felony to grow or sell cannabis. California

can repeal its own marijuana laws, leaving enforcement to the feds. But it can't legalize a federal felony .

Therefore, any grower or seller paying California taxes on marijuana sales or filing pot-related California regulatory paperwork would be confessing, in writing, to multiple federal crimes. And that won't happen.

He is the hemperor of marijuana policy Morrison 13 [Patt Morrison, “Mark Kleiman, pot's go-to Guy,” Los Angeles Times, December 04, 2013|pg. http://tinyurl.com/lw7u7kl

The UCLA professor of public policy has become an expert on the issues that crop up when states make

marijuana legit.

Come New Year's Day, in Washington state and Colorado, marijuana will be legit, courtesy of two ballot initiatives. How do you create a legal business out of an illegal one? After 13 years of Prohibition, the country at least had an earlier legal liquor market to

refer to. That's where Mark Kleiman comes in, the go-to expert on these matters . A UCLA professor of public policy and author and coauthor of books like "Marijuana Legalization," he's heard all the

jokes about " hemperor " and " your serene high-ness . " He was consulted by Washington state's liquor control board , which has to come up with the nuts and bolts for the new law and which asked him for, well, the straight dope.

Only the federal government can legalize. State action violates Article IV of the Constitution Valente 13 – Executive Director of the Partnership for a Drug-Free New Jersey [Angelo M. Valente, “Marijuana Legalization: Now What?,” Partnership for a Drug Free New Jersey, Posted 9/4/2013, pg. http://tinyurl.com/mccvw9k

Marijuana is a schedule I classification drug under the Controlled Substances Act in the United States, meaning that it

has a high potential for abuse and there is no ACCEPTED medical precedent for it. Therefore, it is illegal to possess or sell in the United

States. This is federal law . According to Article IV, Clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States, better

known as the Supremacy Clause, “This Constitution, and the Laws of the U nited States…shall be the supreme law of the land ; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.” In other words, Washington can pass the Undiscovered Species

Protection Act, which makes it illegal to harass Bigfoot or any other undiscovered species but it can’t legalize marijuana

because it is against federal law and the law of the U nited S tates supersedes that of the state.

Only Congress can legalize. Liberty is a DA to their counter-interpretation Fitton 13 - President of Judicial Watch [Tom Fitton, “Judicial Watch Brief Challenges Legality of AZ,” Medical Marijuana Act, Breit Bart, 1 Apr 2013, pg. http://tinyurl.com/n9ufc3e

This is a clear cut case where federal law trumps state law , regardless of how many voters may wish it

weren’t so. Medical marijuana special interest groups have invested heavily in shaping public perception on this issue, but we

cannot allow the rule of law to be subject to the shifting whims of the electorate .

If marijuana is to be “legalized ,” the U.S. Constitution requires that it be done by an act of

Congress . In the meantime, a state simply can’t legalize something that is a felony under federal

law. Conflicting marijuana laws create not just uncertainty in the law, but undermine the rule

of law that protects our liberty.

AT: Links to NBTucker 11 - JD from Indiana University School of Law [Lindsey M. Tucker, “High Stakes: how to Define "Disability" in Medical Marijuana States in Light of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Canadian Law, and the Impact of Employers,” Indiana International & Comparative Law Review, 21 Ind. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 359 (2011)

Although many state medical marijuana laws expressly prohibit requirements that employers accommodate an employee's use of marijuana at work, some argue that an employer's duty to accommodate should extend to an employee's off-the-clock use. n213 However, the effects of marijuana [*381] do not magically wear off once an employee clocks in. n214 Marijuana has short-term and long-term effects. n215 Prolonged exposure can result in respiratory illnesses, decreased cognitive ability, and up to six months of memory defects after the last usage. n216

Another legitimate concern involves the extent of unknown liability employers face because of the actions of employees under the influence of marijuana . n217 Employers are rarely held liable for an employee under the influence of alcohol or drugs when driving, operating heavy machinery, or engaging in other safety-sensitive tasks. n218

However, courts have expanded the scope of employment, hold ing employers liable in order to

compensate victims for wrongful acts of employees that are "bizarre and unforeseeable acts, or brutal,

violent, and sexual crimes." n219 "Forcing the employers to retain current drug users would close off

one of the few methods that modern employers have left to insulate themselves from

unlimited liability. " n220 Employment decisions are business decisions. Thus, employers must retain the ability to make the decision that will foster and promote the overall health of their businesses. n221

2NC SolvencyThis is their solvency argChemerinsky, et al, 14 [Erwin Chemerinsky echemerinsky@law.uci.edu University of California, Irvine ~ School of Law Jolene Forman jforman@aclunc.org American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California Criminal Justice and Drug Policy Fellow Allen Hopper ahopper@aclunc.org American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California Criminal Justice and Drug Policy Director Sam Kamin skamin@law.du.edu University of Denver ~ Sturm College of Law Professor and Director, Constitutional Rights and Remedies ProgramLegal Studies Research Paper Series No. 2014-25 Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana Regulation, p. ssrn]

The struggle over marijuana regulation is one of the most important federalism conflicts in a generation. Unprecedented public support for legalizing marijuana has emboldened Brandeisian experimentation across the country – since 1996 twenty states have legalized marijuana for medical purposes2 and, in November 2013, Colorado and Washington state went even further, legalizing marijuana for adult recreational use.3 And, while the Obama administration has thus far utilized its enforcement discretion to allow those state policy experiments to play out, marijuana remains a prohibited substance under federal law. The ongoing clash over marijuana laws raises questions of tension and cooperation between state and federal governments, and forces policy-makers and courts to address the preemptive power of federal drug laws. Divergent federal and state laws also create debilitating instability and uncertainty on the ground in those states pioneering new approaches to marijuana control. In the fall of 2013, the federal Department of Justice (“DOJ”) announced it will not prioritize enforcement of federal marijuana laws in states with their own robust marijuana regulations, specifying eight federal enforcement priorities to help guide state lawmaking.4 This announcement has been widely interpreted to signal that the federal government will not enforce its stricter marijuana laws against those complying with the new Washington and Colorado laws so long as the new state regulatory regimes effectively prevent the harms the DOJ has identified as federal priorities. Yet even if the federal government voluntarily refrains from enforcing its drug laws against those complying with robust state regulatory regimes, the ancillary consequences flowing from the continuing federal prohibition remain profound. We suggest an incremental and effective solution that would allow willing states to experiment with novel regulatory approaches

while leaving the federal prohibition intact for the remaining states. The federal government should adopt a

cooperative federalism approach that allows states meeting specified federal criteria –

criteria along the lines that the DOJ has already set forth – to opt out of the federal Controlled

Substances Act (“CSA”) provisions relating to marijuana. State law satisfying these federal

guidelines would exclusively govern marijuana activities within those states opting out of the

CSA while in those states content with the CSA’s terms nothing would change . Our article proceeds

as follows. We begin in Part II with a brief overview of the history of marijuana regulation from the 1930s to the present, explaining how the current tension over the appropriate roles of the state and federal government arose. We then catalog in Part III many of the problems flowing from the clash between federal and state laws, demonstrating that in spite of the DOJ’s announced enforcement leniency, the continuing federal prohibition significantly hampers the new state laws. Banks, attorneys, insurance companies, potential investors, and numerous others – justifiably concerned about breaking federal law – are reluctant to provide investment capital, legal advice, or numerous other basic professional services necessary for businesses to function and navigate complex state and local regulations. Federal tax rules treat these marijuana business activities like any other federal drug crime, which enormously increases tax liability by disallowing deductions for common business expenses. And those engaging in marijuana activity entirely legal under state law – whether recreational or medical – still risk losing their jobs, parental rights, and many government benefits. Although President Obama has said state policy experiments in Washington and Colorado are “important” and should go forward,5 the continuing federal prohibition of marijuana substantially undermines these new state laws. In Part IV we turn to a discussion of federal preemption law as it applies to the CSA. explain why, even if it wished to do so, the DOJ could not simply shut down all state marijuana legalization efforts using the federal government’s preemption power under the Supremacy Clause. We explain that while the courts have yet to establish the precise contours of federal preemption doctrine in this context, the preemptive reach of the CSA is relatively modest. Recognition of this legal reality likely played a significant role in the recent DOJ decision 6 not to bring preemption challenges against the Colorado and Washington State ballot initiatives.

Grabarksy is about exemptions not legalizationGrabarsky, 13 [Todd, associate in O'Melveny's Los Angeles office and a member of the Litigation Department. Professional Activities Law Clerk, Honorable Edward J. Davila, US District Court, Northern District of California Author, “CONFLICTING FEDERAL AND STATE MEDICAL MARIJUANA POLICIES: A THREAT TO COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM”, 116 W. Va. L. Rev. 1]

When it comes to enforcement of the CSA the federal government has extremely limited resources. As noted, federal law enforcement only accounts for approximately one percent of all drug-related arrests in this country. Therefore, as the Ogden Memo indicated, the federal executive must choose to allocate its resources with the understanding that it simply will not be able to arrest and prosecute all offenders of federal drug laws. The federal government has already conceded this: In both the Ogden and Cole Memos the Department of Justice acknowledged that its “investigative and prosecutorial resources” are “limited” and it must therefore pick and choose which types of federal offenders are worth its resources. The federal government, in essence, relies on the states to assist in the execution of the CSA. Because of this, instead of attempting to subvert the state medical marijuana schemes, the federal government should be engaging in a more “cooperative federalism” system by working with the states to prioritize federal enforcement resources in a manner consistent with state policy and regulations. In order to achieve this balance between the state and federal enforcement policies and to restore cooperative federalism, the federal government needs to adopt an enforcement policy with regards to medical marijuana that complies with the state laws and regulations. Calling for the federal executive may prove to be futile, considering that in prosecuting those who violate the CSA by cultivating, possessing or distributing marijuana for medical purposes—even in compliance with state laws and regulations—federal law enforcement agents are acting wholly within the scope of their duties and obligation to enforce and uphold the federal CSA. After elaborating on the improbability of executive self-restraint in Part V.A, Part V.B will propose that Congress acts to re-achieve the balance of cooperative federalism in the realm of nationwide drug enforcement. In order to do this, Congress needs to exempt the applicability of the CSA’s proscription of medical marijuana to those acting in compliance with state laws and regulations like those in California. A. The Futility of Internal Executive Restraint The Ogden Memo–Cole Memo shift is a poignant illustration of the problems of assigning the task of preservation of cooperative federalism—or federalism in general for that matter—to the Executive Branch of the federal government. Seemingly on a whim, the Department of Justice and various United States Attorneys can focus and re-focus efforts on medical marijuana distributors acting in full compliance with state laws. The federal executive policy can be characterized as spottily inconsistent at best and whimsical at worst. In addition to the recent crackdowns in California, federal medical marijuana enforcement policy in Colorado is illustrative of the uncertainty. In a December 2011 questioning by the House Judiciary Committee to Attorney General Eric Holder, Representative Jared Polis of Colorado asked Holder the following series of questions: Polis: I wanted to see if I can get your assurance that our definition of “caregiver” in our state’s constitution will be given some deference in the Attorney General’s office. Holder: What we said in the [Ogden] Memo we still intend, which is that given the limited resources that we have, and if there are states that have medical marijuana provisions . . . if in fact people are not using the policy decision that we have made to use marijuana in a way that is not consistent with the state statute we will not use our limited resources in that way. Polis: [Referring to the recent crackdown in California] I’d like to ask whether our thoughtful state regulations . . . provide any additional protection to Colorado from federalism intervention. Holder: Our thought was where a state has taken a position, as in passed a law, and people are acting in conformity with the law—not abusing the law, but acting in conformity with it—and again given our limited resources that would not be an enforcement priority for the justice department. . . . Polis: Is there any intention of the DOJ to prosecute bankers for doing business with licensed and regulated medical marijuana providers in the states? Holder: Again consistent with the notion on how we use our limited resources, again, if the bankers, the people seeking to make the deposits are acting in conformity with state law would not be a priority for the Justice Department. Within three months after this direct assurance by the executive head of the Justice Department that entities acting in compliance with state law would not be a federal law enforcement priority, a Colorado-based United States Attorney announced that there exists no “safe harbor” for medical marijuana dispensaries acting in compliance with state law because their activities nonetheless remain illegal under federal law. While the issue being address concerned dispensaries located within 1,000 feet of schools, the U.S. Attorney’s office stated that it is “not possible to answer whether a shop in compliance with state rules and regulations and not located near a school would still face any trouble.” At best, the shift from the Holder questioning to the latest Colorado U.S. Attorney letter can be viewed as confusion or uncertainty among the federal executive law enforcement; at worst it can be viewed as a blatant attempt to subvert state medical marijuana laws. At worst, it can be seen as an attempt by the federal government to undermine popular state policies. However, notwithstanding specific policy-based law enforcement decisions made by the Obama administration, it still remains the duty of the federal executive branch to uphold federal law. Ultimately, the CSA remains the law of the land; and the executive branch has the constitutional duty to uphold that law. As such, that same governmental branch simply cannot be left to its own devices to preserve federalism and resolve the threat to cooperative federalism posed by the federal-state dichotomy in medical marijuana laws. The experience of the federal executive’s inconsistent policy in Colorado, California, and other states with medical marijuana exemptions is a testament to that. B. A Congressional Exemption for Medical Marijuana in Compliance with State Law Because

it appears that the federal executive could not viably preserve the federalism balance, this Article turns to Congress. This Article proposes that Congress Act to reconcile the state-

federal conflict of laws regarding medical marijuana by creating an exemption from the CSA

for medical marijuana usage and distribution in compliance with approved state laws and regulatory scheme. At the most, Congress could amend the CSA to expressly provide the exemption, or at least pass an act prohibiting the Executive from enforcing the CSA’s medical marijuana proscription in states that permit it. Such an exemption would allow states to proceed with their medical marijuana programs while at the same time keeping the drug illegal at the federal level. The result would be

that medical marijuana would be presumptively prohibited nationwide, except in states that take affirmative legislative and administrative steps (as some have already done) to legalize it. It is extremely important to note that this proposal does not call for a federal exemption to the CSA for medical marijuana. On one hand, in states like California that elect to legalize medical marijuana, the proposed exemption would allow those states’ legislation and regulation to operate unimpeded by federal disruption. This will also allow these states to work with the federal authorities in focusing on the state-federal unity of interests in drug enforcement; for example California state agents will still be able and encouraged to work with their federal counterparts to curb the distribution and possession of drugs that remain illegal on both the federal and California law books. On the other hand, in states that wish to keep medical marijuana prohibited, state authorities will continue to cooperate with the federal government to execute the CSA and its state law counter. The reason why this compromise is necessary stems from the so-called “laboratories of experimentation” notion of federalism that a one-size-fits-all fix is not a viable or practicable solution to address an issue that affects over 300 million people with hundreds if not thousands of diverse values, principles, and beliefs. As mentioned supra, this Article does not purport to opine on the policy values of the legalization of medical marijuana. Rather, this Article argues that if the people or legislature of a state decide on a social issue like medical marijuana, then the federal should give some deference to those decisions. When it comes to social issues, the state lawmaking process—especially in states that pass laws through popular referendum—is arguably better at achieving the will of the people than is the federal government. State governments are more localized, and thus more apt at deciding how to specifically address a problem that is affective its citizens. The very existence of federalism acknowledges that one solution in one state might not be best for another state let alone the rest of the country. A potential hurdle to this proposal would be the argument that this would create a federal scheme that would have different consequences in different states. For example, a medical marijuana dispensary in California would not be subject to federal prosecution as would its counterpart (if such a thing exists) in, say, New York. This would, it can be argued, undermine the notion that federal laws are to be uniformly applied across the several states. However, such a Congressional exemption to federal law where states adopt relevant programs of their own design has been constitutionally implemented has been seen before, namely in the realm of social security. In Charles C. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, the U.S. Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo, upheld a federal tax and spending unemployment compensation program to be applied across the nation as part of the Social Security Act. Built into the federal program was an exception for states that adopted unemployment compensation programs of their own: employers in these states would receive a ninety percent federal tax credit; employers in states without such comparable programs would not. In upholding the state-specific exemption program as constitutional, Justice Cardozo mused on the importance of having local solutions to local problems. The state-by-state exemption to the Social Security Act—an early example of cooperative federalism, perhaps—showed that “Congress believed that the general welfare would better be promoted by relief through local units than by the system then in vogue . . . .” If a state—Alabama, as was the case in Steward Machine Co.—created an unemployment tax and spending scheme that was better tailored to fit the needs of its citizens, then Congress could very well have that program take the place of the broader federal one. The cooperative federalism principles from the Steward Machine Co. opinion are easily applicable to the medical marijuana conflict and the state-specific Congressional exemption to the CSA that this Article proposes. Generally, just like the Social Security Act, the CSA was meant to be a cooperative effort between the federal government and the states. If various states wish to experiment in unique ways to solve the problem of drugs yet fit the specific needs of their citizens, then Congress indeed can and should defer to those states, just like Congress did with the unemployment tax exemptions at issue in Steward Machine Co. Such an exemption to the CSA will allow states to work with the federal government yet promote the general welfare through “local units.” Such a proposal may already be gaining traction among circles of the federal legislature, especially in the aftermath of the 2012 election. Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont and Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee has announced that he will hold a hearing on how to reconcile the CSA with the various state medical and recreational marijuana allowances early in the term of the 113th Congress. Among the avenues Senator Leahy has already suggested is the following, which essentially mirrors this Article’s federal exception proposal: “One option would be to amend the Federal Controlled Substances Act to allow possession of up to one ounce of marijuana, at least in jurisdictions where it is legal under state law.” In addition, Congresswoman Diana DeGette of Colorado has introduced a bipartisan bill which hints at a similar exemption. The proposed Respect States’ and Citizens’ Rights Act of 2012 would amend the CSA to “provide that federal law shall not preempt State law.” While this bill would not affirmatively carve out an exception to the CSA in states that have allowances for medical and recreational marijuana usage, it would definitively resolve a lingering preemption question. Interestingly, the bipartisan bill has received support and sponsorship from Congressman Mike Coffman who was a staunch opponent of Amendment 64. “I strongly oppose the legalization of marijuana, but I also have an obligation to respect the will of the voters given the passage of this initiative, and so I feel obligated to support this legislation.” This line of reasoning is one happily endorsed by this Article, which, as Rep. Coffman appears to do, does not place a policy-judgment on state marijuana laws when analyzing the federalism concerns and quandaries they raise, and offering solutions as to how to reconcile the federal-state conflict. CONCLUSION: THE VIABILITY OF A STATE-SPECIFIC FEDERAL EXEMPTION The idea of an exemption from enforcement of the CSA in states that allow for the limited usage of medical marijuana may not be so far-fetched. The expansion of state-by-state medical marijuana exemptions—about one-third of the states have legalized medical marijuana — supports the notion that the national tide on the issue is shifting. Additionally, since the passage of the CSA in the 1970s, popular support for medical marijuana exemptions has grown considerably: in several national polls, a strong majority of respondents support the legalization of marijuana for medical purposes. Furthermore, it should be noted that in 2010 the District of Columbia Council approved a measure that that would allow patients to receive medical marijuana from state-regulated dispensaries. After being signed into law by the District’s mayor, Congress did not exercise its power to block the law from taking effect as it had done after a similar measure was passed via referendum by sixty-nine percent of the voters in 1998. On January 1, 2011, the District’s medical marijuana law went into effect. Since then, the District’s Health Department has selected and approved locations for the medical marijuana dispensaries. From a cynical standpoint, the legality of medical marijuana in the seat of the federal government can be viewed as hypocritical: that Congress and the various executive law enforcement agencies that continue to assert the illegality of the medical marijuana are turning a blind eye to its usage in its backyard. However, this Article takes that position that the District’s medical marijuana law illustrates a changing of the mindset of Congress to one of cooperative federalism for drug regulation. Congress’ implicit approval of the District’s law—indeed, Congress had full authority to legitimately block it, like it did in 1998—evinces a recognition that a uniform drug policy that applies to each and every semi-autonomous subdivision of the United States may not be what’s best for the “general welfare.” Hopefully, for indeed, Congress had full authority to legitimately block it, like it did in 1998—evinces a recognition that a uniform drug policy that applies to each and every semi-autonomous subdivision of the United States may not be what’s best for the “general welfare.” Hopefully, for the sake of cooperative federalism, the next step will be for Congress to officially make this recognition and enact an exemption to the federal ban on medical marijuana in states where its usage is legal and regulated.

DA

2NC OverviewOffshoring undermines long-term research. Institutional memory, know how and US leadership is at risk Adams 13 - Brigadier General for the U.S. Army [John Adams (Deputy Director for European Policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Ph.D. candidate in Political Science at the University of Arizona and holds Masters Degrees in International Relations (Boston University) and Strategic Studies (US Army War College), Remaking American Security: Supply Chain Vulnerabilities & National Security Risk Across the US Industrial Base, Report prepared for Alliance for American Manufacturing by Guardian Six Consulting LLC. (2013)

Increasingly, manufacturing and innovation take place in geographic clusters, bringing together producers, suppliers, customers, scientists, workers, and funding.20 The virtue of the cluster dynamic is that groups of suppliers, clients, and

producers work closely together and interact frequently, thereby strengthening innovation and improving quality. Widespread

offshoring means that regional innovation clusters emerge outside the U nited S t ates, depriv ing U.S. corporations, scientists, investors, and workers access to competitive knowl edge networks.21

As production goes overseas, the United States not only loses immediate access to products

necessary for defense, but also risks losing institutional memory and know-how . Patents for

emerging technologies move offshore as well. The U.S. Geological Survey warns that “[l]arge reductions in American high-skilled production and sci ence and engineering workforces leads to loss of technological know-how critical to U.S. leadership in critical technologies.”22

Such trends endanger the U nited S tates’ capacity to make the products nec essary for the country to mobilize its defense industrial base in a future conflict . Leveraging superiority in the application of advanced materials and sophisticated electronics, communications, and

satellite technologies will win future conflicts . pg. 9

LinkEmployers rightfully afraid. They will respond to the threat of legalization Tucker 11 - JD from Indiana University School of Law [Lindsey M. Tucker, “High Stakes: how to Define "Disability" in Medical Marijuana States in Light of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Canadian Law, and the Impact of Employers,” Indiana International & Comparative Law Review, 21 Ind. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 359 (2011)

A. Drug-Free Workplaces: Public Policy

There is a range of public policy reasons behind supporting drug-free workplaces, including the loss of government funding for projects, the correlation between a worker's impairment and absence and efficiency rates,

employer liability due to acts of an impaired worker , and fiscal consequences suffered by the employer , employer's shareholders , employees, and customers . n191 Employers adopt drug-free workplace policies to "improve work safety, to ensure quality production for customers, and to

enhance [their] reputation in the community by showing that [they have] taken a visible stand against chemical abuse and the associated detrimental effects." n192

Employers contracting with the federal government endanger profits and future contract opportunities if they fail to maintain

workplaces that are not drug- free. n193 Federal law requires employers to notify employees that the use of

controlled substances, which includes marijuana, is prohibited. n194 The federal government can terminate a

particular grant and even impose five years of ineligibility from receiving future grants if an employer does not maintain a drug- free workplace . n195

Employers not only stand to lose lucrative relationships at the federal level but also with states that invoke laws that criminalize the use of medical marijuana. n196 For example, California requires all employers who receive state funding, regardless of the dollar amount of the contract or grant, to comply with California's Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1990. n197 In exchange for the continuation of state grants, the Act requires an employer to: i) provide annual certification that controlled substances, including marijuana, are prohibited; ii) implement drug-free awareness programs that educate employees on the dangers of using drugs, educate employees on the consequences associated with drug use, and provide employees with access to drug counseling; and iii) make an employee's compliance with the [*379] program a condition of employment. n198 The importance of such programs is reiterated through the associated penalties, which include delay of payment, contract or grant termination, a combination of both delay and termination,

or ultimately debarment. n199 These federal and state laws are not simply lip service; an employer's falsification of compliance can end in suspension or termination of the contract or grant and an employer's ultimate disbarment in the grant program. n200

An employer's concern with maintaining a drug-free workplace goes beyond compliance with federal and

state laws to encompass fears of the effect that marijuana has on an employee's performance .

n201

[Safety hazards are a reason to] be concerned from an occupational hazard standpoint . . . . [The employee using medical marijuana] could drop or mishandle or lose control of [merchandise or equipment] because of their impaired mind-altered judgment. The job would really need to require no judgment of any kind. No coordination, no technical judgment or no thinking skills in order to argue [medical marijuana] would be safe in the workplace. n202

Studies show a n invasive range of effects marijuana has on a person, even when used as medication,

which support "[ e]mployer fears of employee absenteeism, shiftlessness, or malfeasance while under the influence of marijuana . " n203

Case

Impact DefesnsePrefer our evidence because our studies are the most comprehensive.Khadduri, 823/2011 (Walid – former Middle East Economic Survey Editor-in-Chief, The impact of rising oil prices on the economies of importing nations, Al Arabiya News, p. http://english.alarabiya.net/views/2011/08/23/163590.html)

The significance of this study lies in its investigation of the impact of rising oil prices worldwide ,

especially in developing countries, in contrast with the limited focus on the U nited S tates or the Western

industrialized countries in other similar available literature . Thus, the researchers draft a

comprehensive global portrait of the intertwined relationship between crude oil prices on the

one hand, and economic production and international trade on the other. They thus conclude that “the results

show that these correlations have, across the world, usually been positive . High oil prices have generally coincided with good times for the world economy, especially in recent years.”

Stabiltiy NowNieto reforms are improving stabilityPerez, 14 (Santiago, "Mexico's President Says Drug Violence Has Been Contained, Isolated", online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304675504579391553263022472)

MEXICO CITY—The wave of drug-related violence that swept through Mexico in recent years has been

contained and isolated , and further improvement could allow the government to pull back the armed forces from the

fray, President Enrique Peña Nieto said late Monday. "I can´t say that this would happen over the short term, based on the decline of

crime rates, but what´s desirable over the medium term is that at some point the army goes back to the barracks, and that the Mexican State could have civilian authorities that are much more reliable ," the Mexican leader said in

an interview at the presidential compound in Mexico City. Since taking office in late 2012, Mr. Peña Nieto shifted the focus of his government to a package of ambitious economic reforms and away from the fight against organized crime that dominated the six-year term of his predecessor Felipe Calderon, when some 60,000 people died in drug-related killing.

There has been good news. The overall murder rate in Mexico fell about 16% last year compared with the previous year. But kidnapping and extortions rose. And in the western state of Michoacan, where the army had pulled back somewhat, the brutal Knights Templar cartel gained strength, Mr. Peña Nieto was forced to call an unprecedented deployment of

federal forces. "There has been a decline in homicides and theft, but sadly, we have to acknowledge that extortion and kidnapping grew in some states," Mr. Peña Nieto said. This is primarily the result of the government´s

effort to dismantle some drug gangs, forcing kingpins to resort to other illegal activities, he added. Mr. Peña Nieto said the federal government and local authorities have focused on specific areas or regions that were deeply affected by crime and lawlessness , improving security in cities such as Monterrey or Ciudad Juárez, which "just a few months ago were in critical condition."

Economic growth creates Mexican stabilityCorchado, 14 (Alfredo, "20 years after NAFTA, Mexico has transformed", www.dallasnews.com/news/local-news/20140101-20-years-after-nafta-mexico-has-transformed.ece)

LA VALLA, Mexico — Leodegarco Ramírez Ramírez smiles as he stands in a spot symbolizing the rise of a new Mexico, an area of cornfields that are slowly being replaced by manufacturing plants where his sons and nephews make airplanes and automobiles.

Ramirez and his countrymen are part of a transformation as Mexico moves from a commodity, crisis-prone, agriculture-dominated economy to a more broad-based one with manufacturing plants that produce

everything from aerospace and auto parts to refrigerators. “I tell my sons things are looking up for Mexico,” he said. “We’ll go to the United States more out of curiosity than necessity.” There is debate over how much of the change is due to the North American Free Trade Agreement. This week marks the 20th anniversary since the accord took effect for the United States, Mexico

and Canada. “Mexico has a world-class manufacturing sector, and NAFTA has certainly helped bring this industry up to the highest global standards,” said Pia Orrenius, an economist and migration specialist at the Federal

Reserve Bank of Dallas. “Would this have happened without NAFTA? Maybe, but it probably would have taken longer. … Overall, I think Mexicans see a brighter future for their nation than they did 20 years ago .”

Violence is deescalating – Neito’s strategy and major drug lord capturesZabludovsky, 14 (Karla, "Murders in Mexico Down From Height of the Drug War, But Violence Persists", www.newsweek.com/murders-mexico-down-height-drug-war-violence-persists-260990)

Aware of the war weariness felt among many in Mexico, Pena Nieto ran on the promise that , if elected, his government would shift the focus from capturing drug kingpins, like Calderon had, to making daily life for ordinary Mexicans safer. "With this new strategy, I commit myself to significantly lowering the homicide rate, the number of kidnappings in the country, the extortions and the human trafficking," wrote Pena Nieto in a newspaper editorial during his presidential campaign. Since taking office in December 2012, Pena Nieto has largely eliminated talk of security from his agenda except when large outbreaks of violence have forced him otherwise, focusing instead on the economy and

his legislative reforms, including sweeping overhauls to education and energy. And while the country appears to be less violent now than during Calderon’s war on drugs, the climate of press freedom, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists, remains “perilous.” In large swaths of the country, media outlets have quelled security reporting, essentially creating information black holes. “By virtue of there not being any security guarantees for the full exercise of journalism, the editorial board of the Zocalo newspapers, starting today, has decided to abstain from publishing any information related to organized crime,” said a

2013 editorial in a local paper in Coahuila. Still, several drug lords have been captured during Pena Nieto’s time in office , including the most-wanted and mythical Joaquin Guzman Loera, known as “El Chapo Guzman .”

Pedigo wrote the paper when he was a fucking undergrad – says the plan is not sufficient. Pedigo, 12 [David, “The Drug War and State Failure in Mexico” The Johns Hopkins University - Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) Beloit College Universidad San Fransisco de Quito Cumbayá The Drug War and State Failure in Mexico David Pedigo Beloit College]

State failure is indeed an imminent threat in Mexico, but it is not inevitable. Even the failed cities that have begun to characterize its border region are not unavoidable realities. It is necessary, however, for policies to have the appropriate goals in mind, as well as a clear understanding of how those goals can be realistically accomplished, before the current situation can be reversed. This goal must be to reduce the power of cartels so that the Mexican state can gain a monopoly on the use of legitimate force throughout its

territory. This monopoly cannot be fully achieved through policies that aim to stop the

flow of drugs or reduce short term violence; these are merely symptoms of cartel

power . While statistics such as homicide rates and levels of drug trafficking are certainly indicative of cartel activity, they are

not necessarily accurate indicators of cartel power. Indeed, over the short term, spikes of violence may even signify the desperate attempts of cartels to assert their power when it is being threatened. While it may be more difficult to measure, a more relevant indicator of cartel power may be the frequency with which state actors such as mayors, police chiefs, governors, etc. are forced out of their post or bribed by cartels. Bribery is never likely to stop outright, but it is not overly ambitious to aim to create a Mexico where cartels can no longer influence high ranking public officials by violence and intimidation. Higher arrests and conviction rates would also be indicative of the state’s regained monopoly on the use of force. To put this in perspective, while the arrest rate in the United States is in the 90th percentile and the conviction rate is over 50 percent,102 the arrest rate in Mexico is 22 percent and the conviction rate is 1.5 percent.103 Mexico should by no means be expected to match these rates of its much more developed neighbor to the north, but this comparison shows that a dramatic increase is certainly needed. This is no small task, and Mexico

cannot do it alone; it will require substantial assistance from the United States. This means more

than financial assistance; the United States must own up to its role in the drug war through

implementing effective policies. U.S. intelligence networks in the DEA and other law

enforcement bodies are much better established than their Mexican counterparts, and these

networks will continue to be useful in the pursuit of cartel members in the future. However,

nothing would more significantly impact the drug war in Mexico than the full legalization in the United States of at least some drugs. As mentioned earlier, it would completely change the dynamics of the drug trade and weaken the cartels in a way that perhaps nothing else could. It should also be noted that while cartel power is the principle threat to the Mexican state, reducing this power will not solve all of Mexico’s ills, and crime and violence will most likely persist even after cartels are weakened. In Jamaica, for example, local gang bosses, or “dons” have continued to draw influence from urban communities and engage in turf battles even after the shift of major drug flows to the Central American corridor. The dons in Jamaica are able to maintain their power networks because of a lack of alternative economic opportunities to crime.104 Undermining the power of drug cartels in Mexico may help to avoid state failure, but the persistence of crime itself is an economic problem at heart. However, this is an entirely separate issue.

Crippling the cartels in Mexico may also cause the drug trade to relocate once more, just as it did after Plan Colombia. In fact, this has already begun to happen in Central America, which is now seeing increased levels of violence, with Honduras and El Salvador exhibiting the highest national homicide rates in the world (more than 60 murders a year per every 100,000 people). 105 Unfortunately, given the history of the drug trade, this may simply be an unavoidable consequence. From the U.S. perspective, this at least means relocating the violence away from the border, but once again, this is a separate issue entirely. The cartels of Mexico have created an incredibly complex and dangerous system that undermines the rule of law, robs the Mexican state of its monopoly on the use of force, and threatens to turn Mexico into a failed state. Destroying this power structure will be equally complex. It will take years, cost billions of dollars and thousands of lives, and may ultimately be an incomplete victory. Just as the drug trade will never be completely stopped, drug traffickers will never completely lose power. Though it may seem to be a thankless struggle, doing nothing may create a failed state in Mexico, which, as Mearsheimer and David have both observed, would have catastrophic results for both the United States and Mexico.

Black MarketsMexican cartels have a diversified portfolio Sabet 13 – Director of the Drug Policy Institute and Assistant Professor in the Division of Addiction Medicine @ University of Florida [Dr. Kevin A. Sabet (Former Senior Policy Advisor in the Obama Administration's Office of National Drug Control Policy), “Article: A New Direction? Yes. Legalization? No. Drawing on Evidence to Determine Where to Go in Drug Policy,” Oregon Law Review, 91 Or. L. Rev. 1153, 2013

Where do the cartels derive most of their income if not from marijuana trafficking? They traffic cocaine, heroin, and meth amphetamine into the U nited States. They smuggle migrants across the border and when migrants refuse to cooperate in cartel activities, they are often murdered, sometimes in mass killings, dozens at

a time. These crime syndicates profit from extortion and kidnapping. They traffic in weapons and ammunition. In short, like the Mafia during alcohol Prohibition, the Mexican cartels have "diversified their portfolio" and spread their tentacles into a wide range of vices , and these activities have further escalated levels of violence as the various cartels compete to control turf. n31

Legalization will not eliminate the Mexican drug cartel Sabet 13 – Director of the Drug Policy Institute and Assistant Professor in the Division of Addiction Medicine @ University of Florida [Dr. Kevin A. Sabet (Former Senior Policy Advisor in the Obama Administration's Office of National Drug Control Policy), “Article: A New Direction? Yes. Legalization? No. Drawing on Evidence to Determine Where to Go in Drug Policy,” Oregon Law Review, 91 Or. L. Rev. 1153, 2013

As the RAND research team scrutinized this argument, they discovered that marijuana exports are an

important but not dominant source of revenue for Mexican drug cartels . RAND estimated that " 15- 26 percent is a more credible range of the share of drug export revenues attributable to marijuana" at that time. n28 That works out to around $ 1.5 billion in cartel revenues coming from moving marijuana across the U.S. border for sale to wholesalers. By contrast, cocaine, heroin, and meth amphetamine trafficking into the United States brought the cartels over $ 4 billion a year in revenues (combined total, [*1160] not per drug). n29 Consistent with this finding, the Mexican Institute of Competitiveness

(IMCO), found that Mexican drug cartels could see their revenue drop between twenty and thirty-three percent. The lead author

wrote later that he thought "that could be reasonably termed both significant and substantial ... [however] ... marijuana legalization would transform the Mexican drug trafficking organizations (in interesting and, as of yet,

unpredictable ways), but it would certainly not eliminate them (not by itself, in any case)." n30

The effect is limited. Cannabis accounts 1/5th of the drug export revenue Hawken et al. 13 – Professor of public policy @ Pepperdine University [Angela Hawken, Jonathan Caulkins (Professor of Operations Research and Public Policy @ Carnegie Mellon University), Dr. Beau Kilmer (Co-Director of the RAND Drug Policy Research Center) & Dr. Mark Kleiman (Professor of Public Policy @ UCLA), “Quasi-legal cannabis in Colorado and Washington: local and national implications,” Addiction, Volume 108, Issue 5, May 2013, pages 837–838

Will cannabis legalization in Washington state and Colorado dent the profits of international drug-trafficking organizations (DTOs)? Certainly not if the legally produced cannabis stays in Colorado and Washington state; those states account for just a few percent of

the overall US market. Even if , over time, cannabis from Colorado and/or Washington state were to drive Mexican imports out of the national market —an outcome that cannot be ruled out given the relatively small costs

of interstate smuggling—the effect on DTO revenues would be appreciable, but still limited. Cannabis

accounts for approximately one-fifth to one-third of the Mexican DTOs' drug-export revenues [8, 9], and they have other income streams as well, including extortion, kidnapping and theft of public property.

Drug cartels will just enter the market. Vitiello 10 - Professor of law @ Pacific's McGeorge School of Law [Michael Vitiello, “Why the Initiative Process Is the Wrong Way to Go: Lessons We Should Have Learned from Proposition 215,” McGeorge Law Review, 43 McGeorge L. Rev. 63 (2010)

Another problem with an open market is that some suppliers may circumvent the applicable taxing scheme. For example, some proponents of legalization have argued that legalizing marijuana may impair Mexican drug

cartels. n241 Open markets would reduce the risk of criminal prosecution; but given that members

of drug cartels have been willing to violate the law , one wonders if they will enter the legal

market or will try to circumvent paying taxes . That in turn raises an important law enforcement question: if

marijuana is legalized, what penalties are available for sellers who do not pay marijuana taxes? n242 Proponents of legalization have overstated the savings that we will likely realize by legalizing marijuana. n243

If the criminal justice system ceases to prosecute marijuana offenses, participants in the

marijuana trade will have little incentive to pay marijuana taxes . In most legalization scenarios, we face a hard choice between reducing criminal justice cases and raising tax revenue . Raising tax revenue [*89] requires a significant threat of criminal prosecution for the failure to pay marijuana taxes. n244

Federalism

Internal Link

Federal illegality is a non-issue Kamin 12 - Professor of Law and Director of the Constitutional Rights & Remedies Program, University of Denver [Sam Kamin,

“Keynote: Marijuana at the Crossroads,” Denver University Law Review, Volume 89 Issue 4 (2012)

Thus, the state has permitted (or at least tacitly endorsed) that which the federal government has officially prohibited— the possession of mari-juana .8 This development is both contradictory and

unproblematic from a federalism perspective . That is, it is a matter of black letter constitutional law that the federal government cannot commandeer state governments into helping federal officials enforce the CSA’s continuing marijuana prohibition.9 And the federal government , although free to

prohibit mari-juana under its Commerce Clause power,10 cannot force the states to pro-hibit particular

conduct that they do not wish to prohibit. Thus, there is nothing inherently illegitimate or

inappropriate about the states choosing to decriminalize or even permit conduct that violates federal law.11 pg. 979

No Internal LinkEffective cooperative federalism solves US water conservation efforts—the impact is water shortages and algae bloomsBonnie A. Malloy 2012, University of Houston Law Center, “TESTING COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM: WATER QUALITY STANDARDS UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT http://goo.gl/VR7Nnx

“A nation that fails to plan intelligently for the development and protection of its precious

waters will be condemned to wither because of its shortsightedness.” 1 Over forty years after

this prophetic statement by Lyndon B. Johnson , many countries are experiencing severe

water quality problems, including the U.S . 2 The Clean Water Act (“CWA”), which aims to restore and maintain the integrity of the nation’s waters, 3 is the main regulatory structure for protecting water quality in the U.S. and may require modification. Although not in express terms, the CWA’s objective embraces the sustainability principle by seeking to preserve clean water for future generations and rejects the myopic mentality warned of by President

Johnson. To accomplish this goal, the CWA utilizes a cooperative federalism structure to ensure all

waters receive prompt protection

ResiliantFederalism is resilient Rodriguez 14 - Professor of Law @ Yale Law School [Christina M. Rodriguez, “Negotiating Conflict Through Federalism: Institutional and Popular Perspectives,” Yale Law Journal, Vol. 124, (2014) p. 2094

Though pursuit of their interests by each player may often lead to conflict, particularly over which institutions should control any

given policy domain, I argue that the value of the system common to all of its participants is the framework it

creates for the ongoing negotiation of disagreements large and small —a value that requires regular

attention by all participants to the integrity of federalism’s institutions. It is in this sense that I think federalism constitutes a framework for national integration , in the spirit of this Feature. It creates a multiplicity of institutions with lawmaking power through which to develop national consensus, while establishing a system of government that allows for meaningful expressions of disagreement when consensus fractures or proves¶ elusive —a value that transcends perspective.

In what follows, I attempt to establish these conclusions by considering how the negotiations required by federalism have structured our national debates over a number of pressing social welfare issues, including immigration,

marriage equality, drug policy , education and health care reform, and law enforcement. I focus on how these debates

play out in what I call the discretionary spaces of federalism , which consist of the policy conversations¶ and bureaucratic negotiations that actors within the system must have to figure¶ out how to interact with one another both vertically and horizontally . Indeed, within existing

legal constraints, state and local actors will have considerable room to maneuver , and the federal government considerable discretion to¶ refrain from taking preemptive action . 2 I highlight questions of administration and enforcement, because it is in these domains that the system’s actors construct one another’s powers and

interests on an ongoing basis, based on the value they seek to derive from the system. In these discretionary spaces,

“ winners” must sometimes emerge from discrete conflicts, whether through judicial resolution or political

concession, and the parameters set by courts and Congress obviously define the terrain of negotiation. But the intergovernmental relationships and overlapping political communities

the system creates are neither locked in zero-sum competition nor bound by fixed rules of

engagement , precisely what makes federalism productive regardless of perspective . pg. 2097-2098

1NR

AT: WangGOP keeps the Senate – almost every model agrees – Wang is an outlier. [other formulas are also ‘polls only’SILVER 9 – 19 – 14 Election Guru [Nate Silver, Senate Update: Democrats Add By Subtraction In Kansas, http://fivethirtyeight.com/datalab/senate-update-democrats-add-by-subtraction-in-kansas/]

Overall, the FiveThirtyEight forecast has Republicans with a 55 percent chance of winning the Senate , down slightly from 57 percent before the Kansas ruling. (There were also a couple of new polls out

on Friday, but they were in line with our previous projections in those states; the change in Kansas is what accounts for the slight boost to Democrats.)

As has usually been the case, the FiveThirtyEight model’s forecast is similar to that of other systems, whether they use polls only or polls along with other factors:

The Daily Kos Poll Explorer model, developed by Drew Linzer, uses polls only and gives Republicans a 54 percent chance of a Senate takeover.

The HuffPost Pollster model is also “ polls only ” and puts the GOP’s chances at 56 percent.

The Washington Post’ s Election Lab model , which includes fundamentals, has Republicans’ chances at 62 percen t.

The New York Times’ “Leo” model, which uses polls and fundamentals, has the GOP’s chances at 58 percent.

Sam Wang’s “Princeton Election Consortium” model is the outlier , suggesting Democrats would have a 93 percent

chance of keeping the Senate in an election held today and a 70 percent chance in November. (I’ve raised a few questions about Wang’s methodology.)

Stats experts vote for Nate over WangGELMAN 9 – 19 – 14 Professor of statistics and political science at Columbia [Andrew Gelman, Election forecasting: Nate Silver vs. Sam Wang, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/09/19/election-forecasting-nate-silver-vs-sam-wang/]

Paul Alper pointed me to an explanation by Nate Silver of his election forecasting methodology, where Nate writes:

I don’t like to call out other forecasters by name unless I have something positive to say about them — and we think most of the other models out there are pretty great. But one is in so much perceived disagreement with FiveThirtyEight’s that

it requires some attention. That’s the model put together by Sam Wang, an associate professor of molecular biology at Princeton.

That model is wrong — not necessarily because it shows Democrats ahead (ours barely shows any Republican advantage), but because it substantially underestimates the uncertainty associated with polling averages and thereby

overestimates the win probabilities for candidates with small leads in the polls. This is because instead of estimating the uncertainty empirically — that is, by looking at how accurate polls or polling averages have been in the past — Wang makes several assumptions about how polls behave that don’t check out against the data.

Alper asks what I think of all this. I basically agree with Nate—if Sam Wang really gave Sharon Angle a 99.997% chance of being elected to the Senate in 2010 then, yeah, that’s pretty good evidence that Sam was overconfident.

I actually discussed some of this in a post back in 2010 with the horribly academic title, “Some thoughts on election forecasting,”

in which I questioned Sam’s naive statement, “Pollsters sample voters with no average bias. Their errors are small enough that in large numbers, their accuracy approaches perfect sampling of real voting.” As I wrote at the time:

This is a bit simplistic , no? Nonresponse rates are huge and pollsters make all sorts of adjustments. In non-volatile settings such as a national general election, hey can do a pretty good job with all these adjustments, but it’s hardly a simple case of unbiased sampling.

So, given all this, it makes sense to me that Sam’s probabilistic forecasts would be over-certain .

In addition, I disagreed with Sam’s opposition to “fancy modeling” and “assumption-laden models.” OK, “fancy” sounds bad—it sounds like the kind of thing that Marie Antoinette might do, right? But as I wrote back in 2010:

Assumptions are a bad thing, right? Well, no, I don’t think so. Bad assumptions are a bad thing. Good assumptions are just fine. Similarly for fancy modeling. I don’t see why a model should get credit for not including a factor that might be important.

And I followed up with my favorite Radford Neal quote.

So, yeah, I’m with Nate on this one. His model is complicated because life is complicated, and he’s trying to do the best he can.

That said, I have some sympathy for Sam, who’s a biologist who does election forecasting in his spare time. And it’s interesting to see that a very simple model, set up by a non-expert as a little side project, can come within shouting distance of something that took much more effort and has much more sophistication.

Nate’s model is not perfect either (in particular, last time I looked, the geographic correlations in the uncertainties didn’t

seem quite right) but as Al Smith might have said had he been a statistician, the solution to the problems of statistical modeling is more modeling (if it seems worth the effort).

In short, I’m going with Nate (although maybe not to so many significant digits), but I think Sam is doing a useful service by

providing a sort of baseline.

Let me conclude by emphasizing, as Nate himself says, that Nate’s forecast is only one of many similar efforts. As our own John Sides explains, we’re all using the same information, one way or another, to forecast. As a statistician, my intention here is to express

agreement with John and Nate that, in election forecasting, we want to use our substantive understanding to construct a reasonable model, rather than to attempt some sort of mechanical procedure based on the polls alone.

AND—Wang’s forecast underestimates certainty of pollsLoGIURATO 9/17/14 Political reporter for Business Insider [Brett LoGiurato, Nate Silver Versus Princeton Professor: Who Has the Right Models? http://www.slate.com/blogs/business_insider/2014/09/17/nate_silver_writes_fivethirtyeight_post_criticizing_princeton_professor.html]

FiveThirtyEight's Nate Silver on Wednesday openly denounced a rival forecaster's model , writing a lengthy piece

describing Princeton University professor Sam Wang's forecast as "wrong."

Wang and Silver's forecasts have diverged significantly on their odds for party control of the Senate in November. Wang's model, which relies solely on available polls of races, gives Democrats an 80 percent chance of retaining control of the Senate. It

has been much more bullish for Democrats than other forecasters, including Silver. Silver's forecast, though,

has shifted noticeably in Democrats' favor over the past few days, and his model now gives Democrats a near-even chance of keeping the Senate.

In his post, Silver called out Wang's model for rely ing too heavily on polls he says have overestimated Democratic candidates' chances of winning :

I don’t like to call out other forecasters by name unless I have something positive to say about them—and we think most of the other models out there are pretty great. But one is in so much perceived disagreement with FiveThirtyEight’s that it requires some attention. That’s the model put together by Sam Wang, an associate professor of molecular biology at Princeton.

That model is wrong—not necessarily because it shows Democrats ahead (ours barely shows any Republican

advantage), but because it substantially underestimates the uncertainty associated with polling averages and thereby overestimates the win probabilities for candidates with small leads in the polls. This is because instead of estimating the uncertainty empirically—that is, by looking at how accurate polls or polling averages have been in the past—Wang makes several assumptions about how polls behave that don’t check out against the data.

Silver went on to list some examples in which Wang's model has been wrong—in the 2010 Nevada Senate race between Democratic Majority Leader Harry Reid and Republican Sharron Angle, and in control of the House in 2010. In both of these cases , Silver wrote, Wang's forecast heavily diverged from the actual result . Silver's forecast also got Nevada wrong, but he argued Wang's model put Reid's odds of winning around 30,000-to-1. Silver's own model had Reid at a 5-to-1 underdog.

Social Issues

Social issues- like the plan – mobilize turnoutBIGGERS 10 PhD., Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland [Daniel R. Biggers, When Ballot Issues Matter: Social Issue Ballot Measures and Their Impact on Turnout, Published online: 1 April 2010]

Why Social Issues?

While they are not the only type of issue that can mobilize turnout, social issues are uniquely

positioned to consistently do so. Such issues include abortion, the death penalty, euthanasia, stem cell research, drug legalization, same-sex marriage, homosexual rights, and obscenity. These issues relate to morality politics , which involves policies that attempt to regulate social norms o r generate a strong moral response from citizens (Mooney and

Lee 1995) by invoking notions of right and wrong (Haider-Markel and Kaufman 2006). These policies validate a particular set of moral values (Mooney 2001), and attitudes regarding them are based on core values rooted within an citizen’s system of beliefs (Tatalovich et al. 1994) and primary identity, especially religion, which for many serves as the basis of their most fundamental values (Tatalovich and Daynes 1998).4

In comparison to other ballot measures, those that address social issues are particularly well known. Nicholson (2003) finds that 80% or more of respondents were familiar with initiatives that dealt with social issues, as well as more likely to be aware of initiatives addressing morality or civil liberties and rights issues than other initiatives. Furthermore, social issues are consistently the most cited by respondents when asked about which issues are on the ballot (Donovan et al. 2005).

Many of these are “easy” issues (Carmines and Stimson 1980) in that they trigger a “gut response ” and do not require a heightened level of sophistication. Such issues are considered “easy” because they are often framed as morality based alternatives, such as the simplification of abortion into a choice of pro-life versus pro-choice (Layman 2001). As they tap core values that reflect deeply held beliefs (Carmines and Stimson 1980) and produce a highly emotional response from citizens (Layman 2001),

they are often seen as more meaningful to citizens than other, more complex issues (Mooney 2001),

and this technical simplicity may facilitate participation (Mooney 1999; Mooney and Lee 1995).

More importantly, social issue propositions tap into existing social cleavages, and they possess the ability to arise the

passions of those in both the traditionalist and modernist camps (Layman and Carsey 2002). Such issues heighten a sense of cultural embattlement and feelings of religious threat for many evangelicals (Campbell 2006), while some on the other side of the issue perceive the Christian right’s views as intolerant or extreme (Bolce and De Maio 1999).

The characteristics of these issues act to overcome key reasons as to why citizens do not

participate in politics. Individuals fail to vote because they cannot, do not want to, or are not asked (Verba et al. 1995).

The religious nature of social issues, however, means that churches can play an active role in developing the skills necessary to vote (Verba et al. 1995), and that individuals have sufficient information (drawn from their religious identify) to participate. This nature also facilitates mobilization on both sides of the issue (Barclay and Fisher 2003; Haider-Markel and Meier 1996; Roh and Haider-Markel 2003), which serves to maximize participation (Wilcox and Larson 2006), lower the costs of voting (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba et al. 1995), and may even partially reduce the socioeconomic bias in participation (Verba et al. 1995).

Turnout boost would mean the Dems keep the Senate.BALZ 14 Chief correspondent @ Washington Post [Dan Balz, “Democrats face turnout problem, dissatisfaction in ranks leading to midterms,” Washington Post, March 18, 2014, pg. http://tinyurl.com/ls5n8gn]

At the beginning of each midterm election cycle, Democrats vow to do a better job of get ting their voters to the polls. But when history (a president’s party generally loses seats in midterm elections) and the political winds are blowing in the wrong direction, they’ve fallen short .

That was the case in 2010, when Republicans made historic gains in the House just two years after Obama

and the Democrats celebrated his 2008 victory as a sign that the pendulum was swinging permanently in their direction.

After the government shutdown in October, Democrats told themselves that the Republicans were in such poor shape that the House could actually change hands with the 2014 contest. No one is suggesting that today, which may be one reason such longtime Democratic stalwarts as Reps. John D. Dingell (Mich.) and Henry A. Waxman (Calif.) have decided to retire. Republicans are favored to hold their House majority, and Democrats are looking mainly at holding down their losses.

The Senate is another story. Former Obama White House press secretary Robert Gibbs said Sunday on NBC’s

“Meet the Press” that Democrats should worry that the electorate in November will look more like it

did in 2010 than in 2012. If that’s the case, he said, the GOP could win control of the Senate . “If we lose the Senate, turn out the lights,” he said, “because the party’s over.”

Gibbs had uttered something similar about the possibility of big losses in 2010 and was slapped down by senior Democrats, including then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (Calif.).

Gibbs quipped Sunday that he still has “tire tracks” on his body from that experience. But his point is a serious one. Democrats must get their voters to the polls in November or risk losing control of the Senate , which would make life even more difficult for Obama during his final two years in office than it has been with Republicans in control of the House.

2nc/1nr Link Wall

AND – Two framing issues – FIRST – people excited about weed aren’t voting now – means only a risk of the linkMILLER 3 – 28 – 14 High Times Senior Reporter [Mark Miller, Survey: Marijuana Motivates Voters, http://www.hightimes.com/read/survey-marijuana-motivates-voters]

Democratic pollster Celinda Lake expressed optimism over those figures because Republican voters generally outnumber Democrats at the ballot in non-election years .

Lake interjected humor with her enthusiasm: "[This] is why you can imagine we're very excited about our

marijuana numbers in this poll, not only for personal consumption to get through this election, but in terms of

turnout ."

Still, the survey reported that 64 percent of Republicans said they were “extremely likely ” to vote in 2014, compared with 57 percent of Democrats. Thirty-six percent of younger voters , who tend to be Democrats, opined they’d be “extremely likely ” to vote.

Overall, 73 percent of voters support the legalization of medical marijuana, while 53 percent are in favor of decriminalizing personal possession.

Lake added: "What's really interesting and, I think, a totally unwritten story is that everyone talks about marriage equality hitting a

tipping point [of acceptance]. Marijuana is hitting the tipping point. It's really astounding about how fast it's moved.”

2NC/1NR—GOP Good (TPA)

GOP kills TPA—causes delaysInside US Trade 9/19—writes about trade?

(“Kind Says TPA Unlikely In 2014 If GOP Takes Senate; Wyden Defers To Reid On Schedule”, Inside US Trade Daily Report, ProQuest, dml)

Two key congressional Democrats on Tuesday (Sept. 17) separately highlighted two different hurdles to advancing Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) legislation during the lame-duck session of Congress: the strong likelihood that Republicans would not want to move on TPA if they take the Senate in the November

elections, and the uncertainty over whether Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV) would allow such a vote in the lame duck.

In an interview, House New Democrat Coalition Chairman Ron Kind (D-WI) stressed that a Republican takeover of the Senate in the Nov. 4 midterm election would likely kill any chances for a TPA bill to move in the lame duck. "I think if we get a flip of the Senate Nov. 4, the brakes get hit pretty fast around here and everything slips into the new Congress then ," he said.

Won’t spark gridlockJOSEPH 14—Nonprolif expert on the National Security Council, former White House national security staffer [Jofi Joseph, Why a GOP takeover of the US Senate will not cause political deadlock, http://globalriskinsights.com/2014/05/17/why-a-gop-takeover-of-the-us-senate-will-not-cause-political-deadlock/]

Either way, the common assumption that a GOP takeover of the Senate will only further entrench

political paralysis and gridlock in the United States is likely mistaken . If anything, it may encourage both sides to cooperate out of self-interest as both Democrats and Republicans will seek to demonstrate their accountability to voters for shared responsibility of power.

As President Obama looks out to the last two years of his presidency, a GOP Senate ironically may set the stage for a final burst of policy success.

AND – it’s the silver lining of a SenatePALMER 9 – 15 – 14 Politico Staff [Doug Palmer, http://www.politico.com/story/2014/09/2014-election-gop-senate-trade-110937.html]

There’s a silver lining for Barack Obama if Republicans take over the Senate : His ambitious global

trade agenda could actually take off . But there’s also a risk it could run into a brick wall if he ignores a big red flag raised

by Republicans.

Democrats who have stymied Obama’s push for “ fast track ” trade authority would be in the minority in both chambers, and Obama would find trade-friendly Republicans running the key committees that deal with trade policy.

Quick approval of that legislation , also known as trade promotion authority, would give a big boost to talks on two proposed free trade agreements in the Asia-Pacific and with the European Union. But in recent months, Republicans have warned Obama not to assume he has their unconditional support for the legislation.

Passage more likely under DemocratsPalmer 9/15—Politico

(Doug, “GOP Senate no slam dunk on trade for Obama”, http://www.politico.com/story/2014/09/2014-election-gop-senate-trade-110937.html#ixzz3DwpBDy5O”, dml)

But Hatch and other Republicans , including outgoing House Ways and Means Committee Chairman

Dave Camp, have warned Obama repeatedly in recent months that that’s a risky strategy.

Adding to Republican frustration is their conviction that Congress could have passed a fast-track

bill early this year if Obama had given Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) a stronger push to bring it to the floor.

Following months of negotiations, Hatch and Camp reached agreement with former Senate Finance Committee Max

Baucus, a Montana Democrat, on a major update of fast track that had the tacit, if not explicit, backing of the White House.

But in another move that raised questions about the seriousness of Obama’s efforts to win TPA, he plucked Baucus from the Senate by nominating him to be ambassador to China. That put Oregon Democrat Ron Wyden in charge of the Finance Committee . Since then, Wyden has held a number of trade hearings but has yet to produce his own fast-track bill.

If Democrats retain the Senate majority, Wyden will still have the power of the pen next year and

should be in a stronger position to move with elections out of the way. But if Republicans take

control, Hatch will take ove r as Finance Committee chairman, and Wyden’s influence over TPA

will be greatly diminished .

GOP senate means largest expansion of trade ever via fast-trackHATCH 14 Finance Committee Ranking Member – Senator [Orrin Hatch, Julia Lawless, Antonia Ferrier, Hatch Pushes for Senate Action on Bill to Help Boost Job-Creating Trade Pacts, http://www.finance.senate.gov/newsroom/ranking/release/?id=12ab52b7-8688-4e23-9055-0c34f7c55106]

Why is TPA so important?

I think some additional context is necessary here.

The administration is currently in the midst of negotiations on the Trans-Pacific Partnership, or TPP, an Asia-

Pacific trade agreement that is currently being negotiated between the United States and twelve other countries, including some of the world’s largest economies, such as Japan, Canada, and Mexico.

The Asia-Pacific region represents more than forty percent of the world’s trade . And, as a group, TPP countries represent the largest goods and services export market for the United States.

On the other side of the world, the U.S. is negotiating a bilateral trade agreement with the twenty-eight

countries of the E uropean U nion .

The United States and the EU generate over half of the world’s economic output .

Total goods trade alone between the U.S. and EU amounts to over one trillion dollars a year.

Investment flows represent another three-hundred billion dollars a year.

Together, these two trade agreements have the potential to greatly expand access for U.S. products into foreign markets around the world. Most importantly, they would help to grow our economy and create jobs here at home.

These two separate trade negotiations represent what is the most ambitious trade agenda in our nation’s recent history. While everyone knows that I’m a pretty outspoken critic of the Obama Administration, I believe they

deserve credit on this front.

But, if these negotiations are going to succeed , Congress must approve TPA . Because of the unique

structure of our government, our country needs TPA.

Our trading partners will not put their best deal on the table unless they know the United States can deliver on what we promise.

TPA empowers our trade negotiators to conclude agreements and provides a path for passage in Congress.

That is why every president since FDR has sought Trade Promotion Authority. No economically significant trade agreement has ever been negotiated by any administration and approved by Congress without it.

Put simply, if Congress does not renew TPA, the TPP negotiations and those with the E uropean U nion

will almost certainly fail . That is why it is so disconcerting to me to see how some of my colleagues across the aisle have

responded to President Obama’s call for TPA renewal.

TPA is one of the few issues where both parties can and should be able work together to achieve a common goal. I know that I,

along with my Republican colleagues, stand ready and willing to work with the administration to approve TPA a s s oon a s p ossible.

I believe the bipartisan bill Chairman Baucus and I recently introduced to renew TPA would receive strong bipartisan

support in the Senate if it were allowed to come up for a vote .

Indeed, I am confident that the vast majority of my colleagues would join me in supporting the bill.

The problem is, Republicans are not in the majority in the Senate . It is the Democrats that control the agenda. And, unfortunately, the President’s call to renew TPA does not appear to be a priority for them.

Trade LeadershipKey to global trade momentumRobert Zoellick, President, World Bank and former USTR, Payoff from the World Trade Agenda,

Peterson Institute for International Economics, 6/14/13, http://www.piie.com/publications/papers/transcript-20130614.pdf

Robert Zoellick: Yeah. Well, I guess I’ll expand on some of the remarks I made at the close. Well sometimes people like big bang

concepts; that it all gets done at once. My experience is that you try to get some wins, you kind of start to build momentum ; you show that it’s real, but you need to combine it with , particularly in

representing the United States, a broader strategy where you’re trying to go. You need to try to explain the types of

interconnections that I was describing today. So I hope that Mike or his counterparts, as they pursue the elements the president has set out, include a global agenda as well as the TTIP and the TPP and frankly look for bilateral steps that they can use. As I’ve said, the strategic economic dialogue with China could have some opportunities here. But

then they explain what they’re doing and explain to the world and frankly, this will require a little diplomacy, you could start to make some early moves that show that it’s real. So again, to give you sort of a historical

comparison, after the breakdown in Cancun, those of you that are the scholars of this will recall that—I kind of use the story of the FT, a letter to all of the WTO people and a trip around the world, as sort of a symbolic way of trying to reframe the issue.

So it’s a combination of substance and positioning, which you have to be in international politics. So the challenge is not just to get lost in the negotiating details, you have to know that, but you have to frame this. And then

what I would look for ways on the agenda where I could show that we’re getting something done. Now one possibility is the t rade p romotion a uthority. That would show a great sense of momentum. Now it’ll be messy and everybody will want to throw everything into it and so on and so forth.But that’s in some ways a signaling system and if you get it done, it show—and I believe you can get it done.

You’ve got more interest on this than a bipartisan fashion than the other items—that would show momentum. The points in this paper about the Bali meeting. People are skeptical but if the U nited S tates set out this strategy and then you started to get a couple of these things done in Bali, that would show that things can be done . What I’ve encountered is the world has lots of critics and analysts and naysayers and so and so forth, and that’s the way in which we have a live debate and they’re always going to be out there and most vocal and those who are a little bit wary of following, those that are a little cautious, those who don’t quite have the same political will, they’re going to step

back until they see something happening, but I think if you start to move some of these issues globally, you can start to get some other allies .

TPP Helps China Rlx TPP solves China relationsGordon 14—Professor emeritus @ University of New Hampshire [Bernard K. Gordon, “China Belongs in the Pacific Trade Pact, The Wall Street Journal, April 23, 2014, pg. http://tinyurl.com/qen68ch]

China signaled its interest last May when it s commerce ministry announced "a serious study of the TPP," and President Xi Jinping raised the issue with Mr. Obama at their June "Sunnylands" summit. At their Third Plenum in November, Communist Party leaders called for basic reforms to better connect China with the global economy, declaring that the "market will be decisive."

Meanwhile, Chinese officials have lost patience with the World Trade Organization. When its most recent meetings in December closed with little progress on key issues, such as food security and agriculture, China's commerce minister, Gao Hucheng, said Beijing was open to "other negotiations."

More recent comments reflect some urgency. In January a prominent Beijing economist, Yiping Huang, reported that "an increasing number of policy advisers are now urging the government to apply to join the TPP negotiations as early as possible." Justin Yifu Lin,

China's former World Bank senior v ice p resident, openly called for Beijing to participate in the TPP—and added the U.S. should welcome the idea.

Recent American developments support that view, including negotiations toward a China -U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty. Now in their 11th round, the negotiations accelerated soon after China agreed last July to

include more investment sectors including finance and other services, as well as manufacturing and agriculture. Prospects are good to finalize the treaty in 2015.

There's also growing American interest in a U.S.-China free-trade agreement—and China's membership in the TPP would have, in effect, similar results. Former AIG Chairman Maurice Greenberg has publicly urged talks toward a free-trade agreement. The China-United States Exchange Foundation, whose steering committee includes Henry Kissinger and Bill Gates, made a similar proposal last May.

On Nov. 20, National Security Adviser Susan Rice delivered a speech at Georgetown University just days after

China's Third Plenum. "Our foremost economic goal in the region is concluding negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership," she said. "We welcome any nation that is willing to live up to the high-standards of this agreement to join and share in the benefits of the TPP , and that includes China ."

No signal from the White House could be clearer. Ms. Rice has authoritatively dismissed the notion that the TPP aims to contain China . Her comments recognize that by committing to reforms to better integrate with the world economy, Beijing's plans link closely with America's TPP goals.

Chinese membership in the eventual partnership would pay big dividends for the United States. A forthcoming study by Peter A. Petri (Brandeis), Michael Plummer (Johns Hopkins) and Fan Zhai (Northwestern) of a proposed China-

U.S. Economic Partnership estimates that it would lead to a 13% increase in U.S. exports, particularly in services, agriculture and advanced manufacturing (aircraft engines, electronics, pharmaceuticals and the like). Within a decade the gains to the U.S. would be $170 billion a year, nearly a full percentage point of gross domestic product.

The TPP goes well beyond traditional trade issues of tariffs and markets. Its 29 chapters deal with state-owned enterprises, issues of intellectual property, government procurement, small and medium-size businesses, labor and more.

The TPP, in short, will set the rules of the global economy over the next several decades. It is crucial that the U.S. maintain its major role in setting those rules.

Bringing China into the TPP negotiations poses hurdles, among them the attitudes of some in Congress. The role of state-owned enterprises in China's economy under a free-trade agreement is one knotty issue. U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman and his deputies regard the TPP as a "single undertaking," but as in some of Japan's agricultural sectors a phased approach is likely to apply.

The movement toward a U.S.-China Investment Treaty does suggest that some TPP expectations could be met more quickly.

China and the U.S. are the world's two largest economies and both have a great deal at stake in the Pacific region. A Trans-Pacific Partnership that does not include both would represent a major lost opportunity.