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Emotion Generatiortand Emotion Regrr lat ion

Motinp B eyond ltadhional Dual-Process Accownts

Gal Sheppes and James J. Gross

From ciasical philosophers such os DrvidLlun)e to car ly psychologists such as Sig-mund Fr 'eud. rhe distrncr ion hetwecn pro-cesses that generate €motion and thosethat regulate emotion bas fcatured promi-nenrly. This cl ist incr ion has also dominatedmodern €motjon theory and research (e.g.,Gross, 1998a, 2001; Gross & Thompson,2007; I(oo1e,2009). However, an irlternativeview that describcs €motion and reguhiionas inseparably bound up with one

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bas cncrscd ir rct< rL lc,rr : k.s. , Crrnpos,Frankel, & Canrrs, 2004; i ( . rpp.rs, 20l l ;Mesquita & Fridja, 201 1 j Thonpson, 201 1 ).Recendy, we have attempted to recorcilethe,se contrasring v;ew! hy sugtesring tlrrrorrrerenr rneuref l (rr pcrspecn\er on emotion lead to prefercnces to make (or notm.ke) su.h x dislinction (C.oss & BarrcttJ2011; Gross, Sheppes, & Urry,2011a), rndwe have rried to define when the clistinctionis useful and when it is not (cross, Sheppes,& Urry, 20rrb).

In this chapter, we revisit this debare fromthe standpoint ofa dual process perspective.To th,t end, we begin by clearly definingemotion generation and emotion r€gula-tion, and by describing considerations rhatiusr i f l their set i ranon (Cro\\ . Sheppes,& U r r y . 2 0 1 r r , 2 0 r 1 b ) . W e r h e n d e s c r i b ea dual-process model that uses a classictramework according to which emotion gen-

eration is executed via associarivc proccssesand emotion reglrlarion vi:l reflective pro-cess€s (Gross & Thompson,2007; Sheppes& Cross, 2011,2012). , . \ l though this rnodelis b,:oadly consistenr with prior experimen-tal uorlc in rhe freld, rve argue rhrr emcrgrngevtdence cnJl lenges t ] I5 clJsstr cat€eo z. l -tion and sqggests the value of makins rl fur-tber division wirhin the emotion regulationconcept that inclu{es the operation of bothessocir t ive rnd ref lect ive proresses (e.g.,Berkmrn & Liel lermrn, 2009i Gyurrt( ,C r " s s , & E r k i n , 2 0 l 1 ; M r u ! s , B u n g e , &G r o s s , 2 n 0 7 ) .

DEFINITION OF TERMS

Emotions pla). a central parL in our livcs.The experience of fear rnay help us ro bemore vigiiant when we walk in a dar:k alleyat night, and surprise followed by happinessrnay facilitate our appreciarion when wemeet an scquaintance we did nor expect tosee. We can then experience sxdness \rhenthe .cqueintsnce shares w;rh us his recenrjob loss experience or switch to experiencinganser or even genuine disgust lchapm:rn,Kim, Susskind, & Anderson, 2009) if veperceive the reason for the job terminarionto be fundameltally unfair. Though clearlycentral in our lives, emotions are invoked in

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unique circumstances and are not experienced all of the time. Whlrr are the uniquecircumstances in which emotions are calledinto being?

Emotion Geneation

From an evolutionary perspective, emotionsare induced ro prepare the organism and toproduce responses thatwill be advantxgeousto d1e organism of to its relations (Damasio,1999). Specificalin emotions are generatedwhen an organism attends to a certain situ-ation that is given a v:rlenccd meaning, andthis evalurtion gives rise to I coordinatedset of €xperienlial, behavioral, and physi-olosicar .esponscs (Gfoss, 1998a, 1998b,2001,2002). Going back to the previousexample, if we attend ro rhe features of rhedark alley and appraise ir as porenrially dan-gefous, we experlence tear, tlut lnvolvesbehaviorol (0.g., facial expressive behav-iort Ekman, 1992) and physiological (e.g.,increxsed sympatheric ndivarioni Kreibig,2010)responses,

In Figufe 32.1, we present in schernaticfo(m the situation-attention-n€aning-response sequence that cons tutes an emo-tional response, We use a rather abstractdefinition here, which we call the "nrodalmodeT" of emorion, beceuse emotions formsuch a helerogeneous category, wlth diflcr-ent types, int€nsiries, and durations, dr.r ir isdllficuh to make genelaliz^tions that applyto all cases. Desphe flrndamenral differencesbetween emotioos, we wish to emphasizethree common features for differeni emo-tional episodes.

l'irst, emotions arise when a situation isconstfued :rs being relevant toof an individual's pcrsonal strivings or activesoals (Schcrc,, Schorr, & Johrsld,c, 2001).Some of these gorls may be biologically

Situation Aiiention Appraisal Response

based (e.g., avoiding physical harm). Othersmay be cultural ly de, ivcd (e.s. , protect insfrmi l ia l d,sn,ry). some of tbese gnals nraybe social (e.g., helping an older adult crossthe streeo. Orhers may be self-focused (e.g.,wantrng to meet one's own expecratiois).Because many goxls arc usually active at anyone time, e most dominant goal dictateswhich, if an1 emotion rvill be activated andto what degree. Whatever the details of theemotion generating goals that are active ata particular point in time, and whatever thedetails of the situation the individual faces,ir is Lritinrately the situational meaning inrelntion to a goal that gives rise ro an emotion. As eith€f the goal or the individual'scomtrual of thc situation chLrnges, so will

A second common feature is that emo-tions are mulrifaceted, embodied phenom-ena that involve loosely coupled chnnges indre donrains ofsubjective experience, behav-ior, and peripheral physiology (Mauss, Lev-enson, McCrl ter, \ f i lhelm, & Gross,2005).The experiential component of enrorion:which is also defined as feeling, is a privateslate or an intemal representat ion of thech^nges invoked by the emorional Lr lblding(Damasio, 1999). The behavioral compo'nent of emotion includcs chrnges itr activityin m,,sdcs of the f . .e rnd Lrody, end in rvhatone srys, as well as nrore general chnnpies inbasic motivational states, such as the likeli-hood of approaching or wirhdrawing t'rorrsolncthing in rheenvironmen! (Fr i jda, 1986).'l he peripheral physiological component otemotion includes the autonomic and neuro-endocrine responses thar purarively providemetabolic support for anticipated ancl actualbehrvioral responses (Levenson, 1999).

A third common feature is that emotionsphy out in lvays thar aie sensitive to drc particular details of a given inrernal or exter-nal environment. This means thar, undersome circumstances, emotions can take fullcontfol (Frijda, 1986). For example, walk-ing around the streets of Paris, a person'sdorninant goal mav be sightseeing. But ii astranser pulls e Lnife .nd asks fot all of theperson's money, his or her dominant goalquickly becomes sLrrvival, and fear takesover. In this case, the emotion relared goalGurvival) has overriddcn the non emotion,relared goal (sightseeing). However, emo-tions do not always trump other goal driven

I_IGURE 12.r. A schcmatic of rhe enotiongenerarlve proccss. Irom cfols and Thomp-son (2007). Copyright by The cuilford Press.Reprintcd by permission.

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processes (i.e., processes related to meeringactive goalsj e.g., sighrseeing in the previousexample that is unfelared to the emotion-genefating goals), This means that emo-tions can be and often are adilrsred to suirour needs in a given situation. Tt is rhis rhirdcommon leature of emotion rhat permits usro fegl ate our emotrons,

Emotion RegulationEmation rcgulation re{efs ro rhe Drocessesthat influence rvhich emotions ive have,when we have them, and how we experienceor express these emotions (cross, 1993a).Recent ly, wr highirghted that emorion ts-ulrr ion should be det ined by the r . t i r rr i , rof r gn-r l ro modify the emotinn gcncr-r t iveprocess, and in\dlvcs thc motiv ired rccruiFmenl of one or more processes to influenceemoiion generat ion (Gross et al . ,2011a).'Whether

we cotsult our own experiences orthe empirical lirerature, il is cle;f rhat emo-t iors nlay be regulated in many di f ferentways (Cross, Richards, & John,2006).

One important poinr of diflerence acrossemotion regulaljon episodes is whether thecnrori(nl fegularory goal is acrivared in theindivic lualwho is having (or is l ikely to have)an emotion episode or in someone elsc. Anexample of the first lype of emotion regula-tion episode-which we tefet to as intlinsicemotio/t ftgulation-is \Nhen someone triesnot to dlink about somerhing rhar is upserting..,\n cxamplc of the second typc of euro-tion regulation episode-which rve refer toas extrinsi. emotion reg lation-is when afriend calms us down 6y putting an upset-ting situation in perspective. \0hile extrin-sic emotion regulation remains imporrant inadulthood, it is perhaps rhe mosr doninantform ofemotion regulation in infancy whereparents have a crucial role in helping infantsto develop an ability ro regulare rheir emo-t ions (Macklem,200B).

A second poinr of difference across emo-tion regulation episodcs is whether themoti \ rr jon ro cngrge in emonon regulrr ionis iclorrr lrhe go,rl tn reel l*< negative ormofe posrtlve ln rhe near,term) or irstlr-npri4i fto achieve oner lonq rerm qolls)(T.tmrr, 2009). ln some !a,es thise t"oi lpeso1 goals are congruenr, for er.ample, whena person tries to decrease feaf and anxietybecause it makes him or her jittery in rhe

m o m e n r . r n d . r r r h e , r ' n F r i n r e c r n h u r r n i sor her long n rn her h h. Ar orher r ime, r he.egorl ' can compete. for c: .ample. when one$ r nt , tJ Jroid r . e l r . r drerded , i r . al iun x,order ro fcel n l je ' rn rhr .hor r run rht in thrlong run petpeoates the situation.

Finllly, emotions can be down-resulated\rh.n rhe tor l i , r^ dec.eJ,e,he mJgn,rUd(of oufatlon ol a certarn emoflon response,ur up-regulated when the e^rl i\ ro rn. re. {the magnitlrde or duration of an emotionalre'pnn'e. Whi le rhe obvou. exrmple, ordo!vn-reg!lation involve decreasing nega-tive emotions, and the obvious examDlesof up'regulation involvc increasing pos;-tive emotions, there are many instanccs inwhich one's instrumcntalgoals lre ro do\r,rregulate positive emorions or up-rcgulalenegative emorions (Tamir,2009). For exam-ple, a person on a dier might rry to reducehis or her ioy when earing high, calorie food,or ̂ pefson who wishes to avoid cefrain dan-gers might,prefer ro tp regul.rre-hrs_or herrear rcvers l rr ln ' r sa i .oro, 2rrL,y), lhouqh.r l l o l rhcse types of cnrot ion reguhrion xlecleady impoftant, we focus in this chapteron down'regulation of negative cnrotions,because i t is one of the most comnron andimportant types of regulation.

D i sti nEu ish i n I Em ot i o n G en e rctionfrcm Emotion RegulationThe dil'ference between emotion genera-tior ard cnrorion regulnrion is a disrincrionbetween the processes that genefate an emo-tion in a particulaf sirlrationr and rhe pro-cesses tha! are engaged to fiodify these emo-tion generarive processes.

Recently, rve have argued rhat allhoughbodr emotion generarion and emorion res-ulation involve goals, a process is enorionregulatory if, and only if, it is instantiated inpuLsuit of . r 3or lro inf luenre-Jn ongurnS oriuiure emorron ((rross et ar. , l01lcl . lh(re-tore, the target of an emorion regulationgoal is ahvays the emotion-generarive pro-cess. This is in contrast ro rhe goals thar gen-er.te emotionJ n.mely, rhose that are insrantiated in pufslrit of a particular outcome.'Iherefore,

the target of an emotion genera-tion soai can be either the internal or theexternal environment. As we explain below,it is often difficult to discern when a goalto reguLate emotion has been activated, and

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emotion generation and emotion reglrlationoft€n (but not ahvays)co-occur. I-Iowever, itis the targeting ofan ongoing or future emo-tion generative process for change that constitutes emotion regulation.

In most everyday situations, the emotiontrajectory that we observe is rhe result oI acomplex interplay between emotion gcnera-tive and emotion regulatory processes. Thechallense is to deteruine-lbr arry givencase-whetl,er a goal to nodify an emotionhas been activated, leading to the recruit-ment of regulatory processes and (ofren)to the altcration of the emotion responsetrajectory. \ve find ir useflrl to im.gine aconrinuum of possibilities, ranging from.xses where there are clear rnd cohpellinggrounds for inferring thar emorion regu'lation processes afe operntive to those inwhich there is little ground fof thinking tharemotion regulalion processes are operative.

At one end of this continuum, thcfe a,:eclear sign6 that a stable, dominant emotionregDT.rr inn sn.r l hnc heen.cr ivrred, leadingto the recrurtment ot resulator) pfocessesand to the alteralion of the emorion rcsponsetrajectory.In these siruarions, ir se€ms usefult,) posrulale rwo scpArxble facrors tha! gov-etn the lvay rhc incl iv idlal is responding indrat part icular s i !uat ion: emotion genernt ionand emotion regulation. At the other end ofthe continuLrm, there is no clcar indicationrhnt a stable. dominant emotion regulationgoal has been aclivated or that the ;morionresponse trajcctory has bccn altcrcd (c.g., thcindividurl behaves in a wey that is similarto his or he( behavior whcn freely express,ing a certain emotion). In this c:rse, it seemsmost parsimonious to invoke only emotiongenerative (rnd not emotion regulatory)pro-

Perh.ps most interesting are ccses in which(l) there afc clear indications that an emo-tion rcgulation goal has been activated, yetwe cannot detect any change in the emotionffajecrory, or (2)ther€ is no clearsign rharanemotion regulation goal has been activated,yet lhe emotion traiectory is alrered. In theformer case, we misht invoke ineffective (orfailed) emotion regulation. In rhe larter case,if there is no indication that an emotion reg-ulation goal has been activated, and no evidencc for rhc recruirmenr ofemorion regula-tory processes! the individual's response maybest be explained more simpln in terms of

emotion generative (and not emotion regulatory) processes. These "intermediate" cas€smay be more the norm than the exceptionas one moves arvay from controlled labora-tory studies tolvard evcryday social interactions, where most oi our emorions play ontland where the interdigitation of emotiongeneration and emotion regulation may bemost pronounced (Campos, \{talle, Dahl, &Mrin,2011).

\(bcrever we are on this hypotheticalcon-tinuum, invoking emotion regulatory pro-cesses reqrires ictivation of an emotion reg-ulatory goal, and in many cases results in anobserved emotion trajectory that is diffcrenrfrom the (hypothetical) emotion trljecroryth.r would h.rve uniolded in the abscrcc ofemotion regulation. This highlights the factthat statements about enotion regulation-like odrer psychological constructs-areinherently probabilistic.

A DUAL,PROCESS ACCOUNTOF EMOTION GENERATIONAND EMOTION REGULATION

Distinctions between emotion generationand emotion regulation are important, butwhxt is essenrial is definine rhe Drocessesu nclerlying each. Considcr thie prociss modelofemotion regulation (for fevielvs, se€ Cross,19934, 2001, 2002; Gross & Thompson,2007). According to this model, rhe analy-sis of enotion rcgulation processcs ilvolvesconsidering which parts ofthe emorion gen,erative process are pfimary targets of nnactive goal to influence emotion. To e!am-ine this dimension of variation, rve take theemotion generation model depicred in Figure32.1 as a starting poinr. Emotion regulatoryacts.re seen as haviDg thei primary inpacton different stages of the emotion gcneraliveprocess (Gross,2001). ID Figure 32.2, wehighlight five points in the emotion genera-tive process at which inclividuals car reguiate their emotions, corresponding to {ivefamilies of emotion regulation processes:situation sele.rion, sitretion modification,atlentional deployment, cognitive change,and response modularion.

Sit'tation selectian .efers to eflorts indi-viduals make to influ€nce the situations theyencounterJ wltn a vrew toward lncreastng(or decreasing) the likelihood thar certain

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Cognitive ResponseChange Modulatiof

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FIGURE r?.2. Ap.oce$ modcl of cdoriontion strategics. Irom Cross and Thompsor

cmotions will arise. SituaNion modificatianrefers ro attempts to change lhe exrernal fer-tures of a siluation in a way tha! will afterone's emotional response to that situarion.Moving from eflorts to regulate d1e externalfernrres of an emotionnl situarion to requ-Iations elforts that influence internal repie-sentations (i.e., the "blac|< box" ), aNtentianaltlepbyment rclels to directing artention insuch a way tha[ rhe emorion*rcsponse tta-jecfory is altered. Cognitiue .hakgc rclers toaltering a sitlrariou's medning in n way thatinfluences the emotions rhat situation willproduce. Finally, /aspo, se madulatioft rcfercro targering fie experiential, behavioroland/or physiological components of an activaredemorion rcsponsc fo( changc.

Y/ithin this broad framervork, of course,it is possible to drill down and anxlyze morespecific processes of each of the straregiesthat make up each family of regulatory yo-c€sses. For €x.mpleJ we fecently consideredin greater detail the underlying mechanismsinvolved in attentional deployment andcognitive change (Sheppes, 2014; Sheppes& Gross,2011! Sheppes & Levin,2013jSheppes, Scheibe, Suri, & cross, 2011;Sheppes er a1., in press). According ro ourperspective, emotion regulatory srrategiescan modify thecogiritive processing oI emo-trorar lnformalon at two malor stages.

Incoming emotional information can beregulated at an early processing stage viaa filtering rnechanism lhat blocks it fromcapturing s€lecrive arrenrion. Such eadyolsengagemenr rrom cognr ve ptocesslng()1 emotional infofmation does not permit

reguhtion that hishlishts fiyc familica of cmorion rcgula'(2007). Coo'ri8hr by The Guilturd Press. Rcprintcd by

elaborative processing that m:ry be inrpor-tanr for fully evaluating the siluarjon andpfeparing :rn rdaptive response (Bradley,Codispot i , Cuthberr, & Lang,2001; \v i l -son & Cilbert, 2003). Flowever, early dis-engagement, before emotionsl informationgarhers torce) can successiLrlly modulate lorvand high crnotional intensity infornlation.A classic early disengngeffent fegulatjonstntegy is distlactio n, w h ic h involves disen'gaging from negativc emotion by producingneutral rholrghls, using an early fiher tharblocks enotional inlormation befofe it isrePresented in wo(king memory fof furtherevaluarive processing (see Figure 32.3a).

Incoming emotional information thatpasses the errll filtcr crrr sLill be regulatcdrt .r late stage via r second liltering rnecha-nrsm tnat opefates at the semantrc merntnglevel and determnres rhe fin:rl output of thesystem. Engagement with emotional pro-cessirg allows elaborated cognitive process,ing of emotional information, but bccauseemotional infornation gathcrs forcc priorto irs late nodulation, it is less effective atmodulating high inteisity emotional infor,mation. A classic ln.e engagemenr straregyis reappktisdl, which involves engaging withnegative emotion b,v allowing emotionalinformation to be represented in work,ing memory and provided with elaboratedmeaning before it is reinterpreted via a latef i l ter (see Figure 32.3b).

X(hile the process model and its elabo-rations layor a separarion between emotion generntion proc€sses and emotionregulation processesj an important ques-

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FIGURE 12.1. Illustratiors of the unde.lling operation of distraction and reappraisal. The thickncssofthc Lincs representing the carly'sclcction and late-sclcctionfiLters reflectsthe abilityolthcse filters toblock emotional proccssing. h disengagcmcnt distraction, which is showfl in Pifel ,, in.oning cdo-rional iDformarion (rcprcscrrcd by ihe afow for Stimulus 1, 51) is filtcrcd our ar an earty attenrionalsclection ph^se. A ncutr:l1srroah of infofm.uion {represesred by lrrow 52) rhdr corresponds ro lheneutrdl rhoughts pxoduced i| disfacrion nrd rhar is semanricrlty independenr ffom thc origin.l eno-rionrl nfortudrion doninnrcs rhc ftral .espo,,sc. lu cnsrsctr,ed reappraisal, which is shown in panol,, incoming emorional informdlion (represcrrcd bv rlrow 51)passcs lhc c:rrlyfihe!, is arrended, undcL-goes senanljc analysis, and is providcd wirh ehborarivo mcaning prior ro modulatior vja a neurr^lrcirterpretdtion lfcprcscnrcd by atrow SL'), whjch is sendnrically dcpcndert on rhe orisinat cmorjonalinformrrion. tsligh-nTensiry cDotional inloararion (rcprcscr:ted by the dashcct arLow) p:rsses throughrhe lare-sclcction fihcr,r'rd affccrs rho fiml Lesponse. Adaptcd lrom Sheppes, Schi:ibc, Suri, rnd cross

/a (2011). Cop)righr by rhe As$.ilrion for Psychological Scicnce. Adaprcd wirh pcrmission flom Sagc

tion is how best to captur:e thc relarion-ships between drese two sets of processes.In neighboring fields such ns rhar oI sell-regulntion (which includes emotion regula-r ion. xs weLl cs the regulr t i "n o[ tLoughrs,dr ives. hel iefs. bchavrors,.nd gocls), c l ,ssicdual-pr'ocess accounts have been proposed(e.9., tor reviews, see Hofmannr Friese, &Strack, 2009i Strack & DeLrtsch, 2004). Fo{exanrple, some models have highlighted rhlrtdeliberate self-control is initiated when aconflict is.identilied betwen entrrl goalsano opposrng assocrarrve tempt.nons (e.g.rFujita & Carnevale, 2012; Myrseth & Fisl.r-bich, 2009). In these cases deliberate sel{-control is activat€d to resolve rhe conflict inaccord lvith gorl pursuit. Borrowing lromthese models, emotion generarion has oftenbeen considered to involve an associativemode tMt involves lower-order mental oper-ations that afe achieved through relativelyfast auromaric and effortless pfocesses, andernolion rcgulation has ofren been viewedas n reflective mode that involves higher,

order mentnl operalions rhat are achievedvia relatively slow, deliberate, and eflbrtful

While the process model rnd its elabora-tions do nor cxplicitly limit emotior gen-eration to xn associative mode and emorionfegulntion to a reflecrive mode, rhe mostcommon interpreration of thjs model andrelatfd findings across multiple levels ofan.lysis is congfuent with this view (rcviewsof selfreport studies: Aldao, Nolen-H.eksenr. & Schweizer. l0t0i eodnrrLveand physrologicr l srudres: Webb, Mi les, &Sheeran, 2012; electrophysiological studies:Hajcak, MacNamara, E< Olvert ,2010i neuroimaging studies: Berkmnn & Liberman,2009; Ochsner & cross,2005,2008). IDthese studies a clear demonstration of thidual-proces nanrre is rlso observed ln theexperimenrrl manipulation in which participants are requi(ed to generate emotionalresponses in a relatively effortless rvay (e.g.,\ iewing picrures). xnd mosr manipuhI|onsoi emotion rcgulauon hrve inrolved ;rst

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ing participants to deliberately insrantiateeffortful strategies whose aim is to modifythe natural emotional responses.

ELABORATING ONTHE DUAL-PROCESS ACCOUNT

Vhile the classic duafprocess account ofliuknrg enroLiuu sereratio! with an associative mode and €motion regulation with areflective mode has been fruitful, in recenryerrs it has become quite clear lhat enorionregulatory pfocesses crn also be initiaredrelatively automatically via fasr, associarivemodes of operation (Gylrrak et al., 2011;I(oole, & Rothcrmund,2011; M.uss ct al . ,2007).

As we have empbasized, our definition ofwhat constitutes emotion reguladon doesnot specify the nature of the underlying pro-cesses (associariveof reflecrive). In6iead, ourdefinition holds thnt a pfocess is emotionregrrl,rtory if (and only if) it is instantiaredin pursuir of a goal to influence an ongo,ing or tuture emotion (Cross et a| . ,2011).In the following, we examine rhe nnture ofrecen( cvidence fof the existence oF nssocia-tive enotion reglrlalion processes, using d1eAfofemenlioned continuum of possibilitiesthat classifies whcrher emotion rcgulalionprocesses can be assumed to be an indepen-dent entity fiat is separate from emotiongenefatior processes.

As dcscribcd carlier, at one cnd of the con-tinuunr, th€re are clear signs rhar a stablerdominant emotion reguletion goal has beenact ivrred. le.rding ro rhe recruirmenr ol regl ,rrory processes rnd to the alrernt ion of rheemot;on response trajectory. An example ofsuch a case is nicely illustrated in findings byx i l l iems, B.rgh, Noc€ra, and cmy (2009),who have shown that unconsciously primingthe goal to reappraise fesuhed in aftenuarionof experienr ix l and physiologir : l srgnrruresoi anxjely. Sinr i lar lJ, Inf luent|al qrudres onimplementation intentions have shown thatforming r s imple r f-rhen rtgr larury rulereduced behavLorr l . rnd early cr,r t icr l <igntof fear and disgust reactions (Gallo, Keil,McCulloch, Rockstroh, & Gollwitzer, 2011)and modulated emotion generative attenriolal and inrerprerarion biases of threatin socially anxioLrs individuals (e.g., Webb,

Ononaiye, Sheeran, Reidy, & Lavda, 2010).In each ol these cases, it is evidenr ffom thep.lttem of outcomes that an associative emo-tion reguiatory process has been engaged.

There also can be cases at the other endo[ the .ontintrtrm, where rhere is no clcarindication that an associative emotion regFlation goal was activated or that fie emotionresponse trajectory was altered. As statedearlier, rhese cases frvor a parsimoniousview that only includes the manifestarion ofen1otion generative processes.

The challenge lies in the rniddle of thecontinrunr, where ihere are clear indicationsthit an emotion regulation goal was acti-vated, yet we cannot det€ct any change inthc cmotbn traj€ctory. Such siruarions Brisein rhe context of srudies that have mnnipu-lateJ gnals (e.g.. v ic rrnconst iorrs pr irning orvia the form.r ion nf implemenrrt ion inten-tions) and observed that fiey werc operative(e.9., via maniplrldtion checks), ye! Iailed roachieve a changc in emorion generation pro-ccsscs. lt is :|lso intefcsting to consider caseswhere drere is no clear sign that an err,orionfegulntion goal lvas activared, yer rhe cmo-tion trajectofy was alrered. Two such casesthat fit ftis category Are cnotionnl con-f l icr adap*rt ion (e.g., Egner, Etkin, Gale, &FI iLsch,2008i 8tkin, Egner, Peraza, Kandel)& I- l i rsch, 2006) and affect label ing ( tsTnrir i ,Bookheimer, & Mazziotta, 2000; Lieber-man er al., 2007; Liebernan, Flari ) Jarcho,Eisenberger, & Bookheimer,2005)i we turnn(r!v !o thcsc rwo cascs.

Emotional cotrfli.t ada ptation le.g., Egnerer a1.,2008i Etkin et al . , 2006) is an emo-tional varianr of dre classic Stroop task. Inthis rask, participants areinstructedro namean emotional expression (e.g., of a face dis,playing fear) while inhibiting rhe automalicrea.ling of a supcrimposcd emorional word(e.g., the word sad written on rhe foreheadof a face displaying fear). As in the classicStroop task, there afe congruent and incongruent trial types. Imporrantly, the emotional confLid adaptation effect is observedwhen the response for an incongruent trialis f rster i f i r rs preceded by rn incongruenrtr i r l thrn i f i r is preceded b1 r congruentrrial- Relared functional neuroimaging data\uggesr rn inteLplay berween brain regronsrssociated $ Lrh reglr l ihon ie.g.. rhe anrrf lorcingulate cortex and medial prefronral cor-

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tex) and brain regions associated with emo-tional reactivity regions (e.g., the amygdala).The interpretarion oI this elfect is that per-forming an incongruent trial activates emo-tional control that implicirly persisrs inro thenext t f ia l . In thisc.se, i r is hard to determinewhether a clear regulatory goal was formed(because parricipanrs fty to inhibit rhe read-ing ol a word), blrt it is clenr that fegularoryProcesses werc recrurred.

In a sinilar vein, d//sct labeling lLieberman er al . ,2005,2007) refers ro a crearivetask context in which the consequerce ofprocessing affective features with wordsrecruiis an emotional regulation circuitrythat is different lrom processing affectiveaspects in pe.ccprual or cxpcricntial ways.Specificallg in this task, participants arepfesented with a rarget picrure (e.9., anangry lace) and asked to choose eirher amatchrng wofd (choosing rhe .Jr'oft ang!ol'er fhe word sd,t) or a matching perceptualface (choosing an angry Ince over a sad face)fh.t appeax belorv the target face. In thiscontextl effotional modularion h obsefvedvin the recnritment of conlrol-relared brain(egions, without patr ic ipanrs' aw3renesg ofsuch xn cf fecr (Lieherman, Lnnqnl( i , fahrh-nia, & CLockett ,201l) . l ler:e, too, i t is norclear whether an emotion regulalory goalwas activaled, although there are clearmanilestations of emolional gencrarion andmodulation via dre recruirment of regula-rory Draro p(ocesses.

Thc cmcrging s!udy of associativc ertL.t!io rrreglrlation has increased in volune in recentyears and attr:acted a grea! deal of inrer€st.The grolving consensus is that all familiesof elnor ion regul:r t i^n qrrrregies rhrt consntute rhe process nrodeJ of emotion regulrnun(Gross, 1998a, see Figure 32.2 have associa-tive as well as delibercte forms (for rcviews,see Gross & Thompson, 2001Mauss er al . ,2001 Todd, Cunningham, Anderson, &Thompson, 2012). Neverrheless, and despitethe promising potential, seveml deiinidonalissues remain unclear ar pr€sent. One majofissue revolves around the core underlyinefeatures of the different lorms of rsso.i,itive emotion reglrlation. For example, whilesome forms of associative regulation, sucl.ras emotional conflict ad,rptadon and alfecrlabcling, appear ro be unconscious, studies on implementalion intentions rypicallyinvolve fofming conscious emotion regula-

tion if then rrles. At the same tim€, whileimplementation intentions and affect labefing require minimal cognitive effort ro oper-ate, emotionsl conflict adaptation engageseffortful cognitive control mechanisms,an.l even rtnconscious goal pursuit rppearsto utilize executive contuol resources for itsattainment (see Marien, Custers, Hassin, &Aarts,2012).

ln moving forward, the field of emotionregulation will need to find new lvays todefinc the differences between associariveand deliberate forms of emotion regnla-tion. One important venue involves clearerempirical evaluation of the two forms of reg-ulation. Currently, studies typicilly involveevaluating dclibcratc and associative pro-cesses using diflerent tasks (see Hofmann etal., 2009, for a review). \(/hile infonnitive,the use of different tasks makes it hard toseparate pfocess from measure. one promis-ing approach th:rt ovefcomes rhis obstacle isthe quadruple-process model that providesdistinct qunntitdtive estimates of associativeand deliberate processes in a single task (seeSherman et al . , 2008, for a review). Insightsabout associative And deliberare processesin the neighhoring f ie ld of sel f-regul:Lt ionhave r l rrrc ly been rr tr l ized (c.g., Govonrn &P.yne,2006j Stewart & Payne,2008; forfeviews, see Payne,200i l j Shernran et ai . ,2008). Therefore, their adoption in the fieldol emotion reguletion is urgently needed.

In this chapter, w€ hnve revisited a cen-Lral qucstior in affecrive science rhar relaresto whether emotion generarion Drocessescan be separated from emotion regulationpfocesses. According ro our perspective, acentral considention that jusrifies a separa-tion is whether one can assune rhar a goalto change the emotion genention trajecrorywas ictiv.lcd. Congruenr with dresc casesthat justify a separation, conceptual modelsnt emc,r ion regrlar ion hrve been proposed.Ihese models hare heen framed in .hssicdxal-proc€ss terms whereby emotion generaron rs execute.l vra assoclafivc processes andemotion regularion via feflecrive processes.In this chapter, we hive ch:llenged this classic categorization by discussing the condi-tions that iustify the existence of an addi,tional associative emotion regulation system(in addition ro the classic reliective emorionregulation system) rhat is separate from anassociative emodon generation syslem.

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Emotior Gefl*atian axd ljflatiok R*uldtion 497

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AUTHORS'NOTE

'lhis chapt€f dnws upon and updatcs previous

reviews by Gross (1998a,2001,2002); Grossand Thompson (2007); Gross et al. {2011a); andSheppes ard G.oss (2011,2012)-

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