1

Empedocles and his Ancient Readers on Desire and Pleasure

"A: What are Plato, Speusippus, and Menedemus up to? … What weighty thought, what line of argument are they now investigating? … B: I can tell you about these fellows for sure, since at the Panathenaea I saw a group of youngsters in the exercise-grounds of the Academy and heard them speaking, indescribable, astonishing! They were propounding definitions about nature and separating into categories the forms of life of animals, the nature of trees, and the classes of vegetables. And in particular, they were investigating to what genus one should assign the pumpkin … One of the boys said it was a round vegetable; another that it was a grass; another that it was a tree. When a Sicilian doctor heard this, he dismissed them contemptuously as talking nonsense."1

Introduction

Recent decades have witnessed concerted re-examination of the ancient

doxographical tradition.2 This paper contributes to this trend of scholarship. The paper

examines a set of Empedoclean doxographical passages in relation to a relevant set of

Empedoclean fragments.3 The doxographical material purports to give Empedocles'

views of desire, pleasure, and pain; the fragments include the concepts of desire,

pleasure, and pain.4

Beginning most saliently with Hermann Diels' Doxographi Graeci and Die

Fragmente der Vorsokratiker,5 scholars have studied doxographical material to elucidate

philosophers or schools whose work is fragmentary or lost.6 This approach to doxography

may be called "reconstructionist." Such reconstructionism is backward-looking.

Somewhat analogously to the stemmatic method of textual criticism, it attempts to work

through later accounts to a hypothetical archetype. Consequently, the interpreter's main

concern is the reliability of the doxographical material.

2

Much of the research on the Empedoclean doxography for this paper was

undertaken in a reconstructionist spirit. But one of the paper's central conclusions is that

the doxographers tend to oversimplify and mislead. Thus, according to a reconstructionist

agenda, the doxographical material largely lacks value. On the other hand, showing that

the material has these defects certainly is valuable, both upon behalf of reconstructionism

generally and otherwise.

In contrast to reconstructionism, doxographical material may be studied from the

perspective of reception. From the standpoint of the hypothetical archetype, receptionism

is forward-looking. Its interest is how and why later philosophers, commentators, and

doxographers proper interpret and report on their predecessors. Consequently,

receptionism does not discard unreliable doxographical material, for unreliable

interpretations are no less interpretations than reliable ones.

The opening paragraph of this paper speaks of examining Empedoclean

doxographical material "in relation to" Empedocles' fragments. The expression was

chosen to welcome reconstructionist and receptionist interests. Although their aims are

distinct, the work of reconstructionism and receptionism clearly overlaps; thus, the two

approaches can be complementary. Indeed, the paper's negative reconstructionist results

serve as positive points of departure for further examination along receptionist lines;

discovery that a doxographical passage is misleading prompts the question why.

To some extent, receptionism has been undertaken in the course of the discussion.

I say "to some extent" because the project of an adequate receptionist interpretation is

especially demanding.7 For example, envision a book-length study whose chapters were

devoted to Plato's interpretation and use of Empedocles, Aristotle's, Theophrastus', and so

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on. Such a study would facilitate a deep explanation of, say, any one of Aristotle's

Empedoclean opinions. Thus, from a receptionist perspective, the efforts of this paper to

explain the doxographical material should be viewed as preliminary.

Finally, we may distinguish a third approach to doxography, an approach that to

some extent combines reconstructionism and receptionism. Such an approach, which

might be called "dialogical," seeks to understand both the archetypal work, figure, or

school and its descendants. This is the main difference between the dialogical approach

and receptionism: the dialogical interpreter does not abandon the archetype, even though

the doxographical tradition is errant. The dialogical approach precisely seeks to clarify by

contrast the distinctiveness of the archetype and the descendants. This is akin to studying,

for instance, the ancient economy in order to understand the modern economy and vice

versa. This approach will be particularly fruitful when successors' interpretations of their

predecessors are inaccurate. But that seems to be the rule in antiquity.

In sum, this paper examines, from several perspectives, a set of Empedoclean

doxographical passages in relation to a relevant set of Empedoclean fragments. From a

reconstructionist perspective, the paper assesses the reliability of the doxographical

material. From a receptionist perspective, the paper attempts to clarify the history of the

doxographical material, specifically to identify significant contributions and to trace their

lines and characters of influence. From a dialogical perspective, the paper attempts to

clarify how the doxographical tradition diverges from the archetype and thus to elucidate

by contrast the archetype and its heirs.

The following discussion is organized into two parts, each including several

sections:

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PART ONE: THE DOXOGRAPHICAL MATERIAL

I. Post-Aëtian Doxographers on Empedocles on Desire and Pleasure

II. Aëtius' Conjunction of Empedocles' Views on Desire, Pleasure, and Pain

III. Theophrastus on Empedocles on Perception, Pleasure, and Pain

IV. Complications in Aëtius' and Theophrastus' Accounts

V. Aristotle and Plato on Empedocles on Homogeneous Elemental Attraction

VI. Speculation on Greek Sources for Empedocles on Appetite

VII. Ibn Lūqā and Pseudo-Plutarch's Placita 5.28

VIII. Aëtius' Empedoclean Opinions on Appetite as Botanical Appetite

IX. Aristotle's On Plants and Aëtius' Empedoclean Opinion on Botanical Appetite

X. Conclusion to the Doxographical Material

PART TWO: EMPEDOCLES' FRAGMENTS

I. Some Terminology and General Remarks

II. Empedocles' Fragments on the Motivations of the Roots

III. Empedocles' Fragments on the Motivations of Stuffs

IV. Empedocles' Fragments on Pleasure and Pain

V. Conclusion to Empedocles' Fragments

VI. Conclusion

The remainder of this introduction highlights the central claims and objectives of these

sections.

Section I of part one uses Pseudo-Plutarch 5.28 and Stobaeus 1.50.31 to

reconstruct the Empedoclean opinions on desire, pleasure, and pain from Aëtius' lost

Placita. Section II argues that Aëtius conjoined Empedoclean opinions on desire with

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Empedoclean opinions on pleasure and pain. The remainder of part one attempts to

reconstruct the two pre-Aëtian doxographical lineages of Empedocles' views of desire

and of pleasure and pain.

Sections III-IV focus on the pre-Aëtian doxographical lineage of Empedocles'

view of pleasure and pain. Section III argues that while Aëtius derives his Empedoclean

opinion on pleasure and pain from Theophrastus' On the Senses, Aëtius interprets

Empedocles' opinion on pleasure and pain differently from Theophrastus. Theophrastus

primarily construes Empedocles' conception of pleasure and pain in terms of the

structural conformity and non-conformity of perceptible effluences and perceptual pores;

Aëtius construes Empedocles' conception of pleasure and pain in terms of elemental

homogeneity and heterogeneity. I argue that Aëtius' transformation of Theophrastus' view

is due to Aëtius' combination of Empedoclean opinions on desire with those on pleasure

and pain. Section IV, essentially an appendix to section III, argues that Theophrastus' and

Aëtius' respective views are in fact more complex than section III suggests. Theophrastus

does discuss Empedocles' theory of perception in terms of elemental homogeneity and

heterogeneity, and elsewhere in the Placita Aëtius attributes to Empedocles the view that

perception occurs through the structural conformity of effluences and pores. Section IV

suggests a way of integrating these complexities.

Sections V-IX focus on the doxographical lineage of Empedocles' views of desire.

Section V argues that Aristotle, following Plato, attributes to Empedocles a cosmological

principle of elemental attraction according to which elementally homogeneous entities

are attracted one another. However, Aëtius' Empedoclean opinion on desire is specifically

of nutritional desire, that is, appetite, and this is not reducible to the cosmological

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principle. Consequently, section VI speculates on pre-Aëtian doxographical sources that

might have applied the cosmological principle in formulating Empedocles' view of

appetite. Aristotle himself, Theophrastus, Strato, and Meno are examined as possible

sources; and while no evidence points conclusively to one of these authors, all the

evidence points to the Peripatos.

The overarching objective of sections VII-IX is to suggest a more precise

identification of the pre-Aëtian source of Empedocles' opinion on appetite. Section VII

introduces a neglected source in the manuscript tradition of Pseudo-Plutarch's Placita,

Qust≥ā ibn Lūqā's Arabic translation. Ibn Lūqā's translation helps emend corruptions in the

Greek manuscripts of Pseudo-Plutarch 5.28. On the basis of the emendations and

consideration of the broader context of Pseudo-Plutarch 5.28, section VIII argues that the

Empedoclean opinion on appetite specifically derives from doxographical material on

appetite in plants. Subsequently, section IX uses Nicolaus of Damascus' adaptation of

Aristotle's On Plants to argue that Aëtius' Empedoclean opinion on botanical appetite

derives from Aristotle's lost botanical treatise. The conclusion in section IX thus confirms

the speculations in section VI that Aëtius' Empedoclean opinion on nutritional desire

derives from the Peripatos.

Part two of the paper compares the results from the doxographical tradition with

Empedoclean fragments in which the concepts of desire, pleasure, and pain occur.

Section I of part two introduces some convenient terminology and makes some general

remarks about Empedocles' conception of the cosmos and the place of desire, pleasure,

and pain within it. One fundamental difference between Empedocles and his Peripatetic

doxographers is that Empedocles attributes psychological states, including desire,

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pleasure, and pain, to the material elements of his cosmos, whereas for Aristotle such

psychological capacities only exist among organically complex beings. Another

fundamental difference is that Empedocles identifies Love and Strife, which are regarded

as independent entities, as the principal sources of motivation in other beings, whereas

Aristotle regards the psyche itself as the source of motivation.

Section II focuses on the motivations of Empedocles' roots and argues that the

roots have both positive and negative motivations, desires and aversions, to congregate

with both homogeneous and heterogeneous roots. Thus, the doxographical tradition

oversimplifies in attributing to Empedocles only the attraction of like for like. In addition

to the motivational influences of Love and Strife on the roots, several fragments suggest

that the roots have certain intrinsic kinetic tendencies and combinatorial dispositions.

Section II concludes with a discussion of these fragments and consideration of their

relation to the influences of Love and Strife.

Section III turns to the motivations of stuffs, that is, elementally complex entities,

and specifically focuses on fragments concerning appetite, albeit zoological rather than

botanical appetite. I argue that appetite is not for an elementally homogeneous entity, but

rather an elemental portion in which the stuff is deficient. The discussion includes an

account of the disjunctive and conjunctive roles of Strife and Love in the digestive

process.

Finally, section IV argues that, contrary to Theophrastus' suggestion, Empedocles

is not interested in pleasure and pain as mere sensations. Rather, so far as related

concepts occur within the fragments, Empedocles is concerned with the emotions of joy

and suffering. Furthermore, Love and Strife are responsible for joy and suffering

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respectively, which means that, contrary to the doxographical tradition, Love is

responsible for pleasure insofar as Love conjoins heterogeneous entities.

PART ONE: THE DOXOGRAPHICAL MATERIAL

I. Post-Aëtian Doxographers on Empedocles on Desire and Pleasure

The doxographical material that purports to give Empedocles' views of desire,

pleasure, and pain is divisible into two sets, post-Aëtian and pre-Aëtian. The post-Aëtian

material comes from Stobaeus' Anthology and Pseudo-Plutarch's Placita.

Stobaeus' Anthology, book 1, chapter 50, is professedly devoted to opinions

concerning perception, the objects of perception, and whether perceptions are true.

Sections 28-33 of chapter 50 concern pleasure and pain. Section 31 attributes the

following opinion to Empedocles:

"Empedocles says that like things derive pleasures from like things and that (they

aim) at a refilling in accordance with the deficiency. Consequently, desire is for

that which is like because of that which is lacking. And pains occur because of

opposites. For things that differ are hostile to one another both in accordance with

the combination and the blending of elements."8

A similar passage occurs in Pseudo-Plutarch's Placita, book 5, chapter 28. This chapter

contains or rather once contained opinions pertaining to the question "Whence in animals

are desires and pleasures derived?"9 One opinion, Empedocles', has survived in the Greek

tradition:

"Empedocles holds that desires occur in animals according to their deficiencies in

those elements that complete each one. And pleasures come from what is

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congenial according to the blends of related and like (elements), while

disturbances and <pains from what is uncongenial>."10

The Greek text on which this translation is based contains problems, which I will discuss

in section VII of this part of the paper. Presently, this rendition, based on Diels'

Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, should suffice.

Clearly, the contents of Stobaeus 1.50.31 and Pseudo-Plutarch 5.28 are similar; in

fact they derive from a common source. Following Diels, this common source is

conventionally identified as Aëtius' lost Placita. Pseudo-Plutarch's Placita is an epitome

of Aëtius' Placita, and Aëtius' Placita is a major source for the material assembled in

Stobaeus' Anthology. Drawing on the contents of Stobaeus 1.50.31 and Pseudo-Plutrach

5.28, and without the benefit of perspective from the pre-Aëtian doxographical tradition

or consideration of Stobaeus' Anthology or Pseudo-Plutarch's Placita and their textual

traditions, a first attempt to reconstruct Empedocles' opinions concerning desire, pleasure,

and pain from Aëtius' lost Placita might run as follows:

(A1) Desire arises through lack of a certain element and is directed at the element

that is lacking.

(A2) Pleasure arises through mixing of like elements.

(A3) Pain arises through mixing of opposite elements

(A1-3) might be conjoined and elaborated into the following account. Subjects of

desire, pleasure, and pain are composed of a set of elements. The diminution in one of the

elements evokes desire in that subject. The subject desires the kind of element whose

quantity is diminished. Pleasure arises as the subject regains the elemental kind in which

it is deficient. Precisely, pleasure arises because the portion of the regained element

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mixes with the diminished portion of the same kind of element. On the other hand, if a

deficient subject obtains an elemental portion that is opposite in kind to the element in

which it is deficient, pain arises. Precisely, pain arises because the portion of the acquired

element mixes with the diminished portion of the opposite kind of element.

This interpretation of Aëtius' Empedoclean opinions on desire, pleasure, and pain

is not intended to be accurate, only plausible on the mere basis of Stobaeus 1.50.31 and

Pseudo-Plutarch 5.28, without the perspective of the pre-Aëtian doxographical tradition

or further consideration of Stobaeus and Pseudo-Plutarch. In fact, Aëtius' opinions are

confused and oversimplified. This can be shown by directly comparing (A1-3) with

Empedoclean fragments pertaining to desire, pleasure, and pain. I will discuss those

fragments in part two. But there is good reason to believe that Aëtius' Empedoclean

opinions on desire, pleasure, and pain were not directly based on an interpretation of

Empedocles' poem On Nature, even though Aëtius must have had access to the poem. In

other words, Aëtius' Empedoclean opinions on desire, pleasure, and pain, derive from

earlier doxographers.

Over three hundred references to Empedocles occur among extant Greek literature

between the time of Empedocles himself, 5th c. BCE, and Aëtius, 1st c. CE.11 Additionally,

we know that many authors whose works are now lost discussed Empedocles. For

example, Diogenes Laertius mentions or cites references to Empedocles from eighteen

authors who had written by the 1st c. CE: Aristotle, Theophrastus, Heraclides of Pontus,

Hippobotus, Heraclides of Lembos, Timaeus, Hermarchus, Hermippus, Apollodorus,

Satyrus, Favorinus, Neanthes, Alcidamas, Hieronymus, Xanthus, Diodorus of Ephesus,

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and Demetrius of Troezen.12 Most of these authors' works are lost or extremely

fragmentary.

Among extant literature and presumably much that was written by lost authors

such as those whom Diogenes lists, references to and discussions of Empedocles lack

philosophical content. For instance, several references to Empedocles occur among the

fragments of Timaeus' Histories, but these are biographical and political. Among

references that have philosophical content, most occur in Aristotle's corpus (134

references). The second most, but much fewer, occur in Theophrastus' works (14

references). Apropos of (A1-3) in particular, Aristotle and Theophrastus are the only

extant pre-Aëtian authors to speak of Empedoclean doctrines concerning desire, pleasure,

and pain. This encourages the view that ultimately (A1-3) depend no other sources.

Indeed, I will suggest that (A1-3) ultimately derive from the early Peripatetic

doxographical tradition. I will also suggest that Plato influenced an aspect of the

Peripatetic doxographical tradition on Empedocles.

II. Aëtius' Conjunction of Empedocles' Views on Desire, Pleasure, and Pain

Before turning to the pre-Aëtian doxographical material, I want to clarify Aëtius'

Empedoclean opinions further. I want to suggest that Aëtius himself conjoined

Empedoclean doxographical material on desire, on the one hand, and pleasure and pain,

on the other.

In 1.50.28-33 Stobaeus transmits views on pleasure and pain of several other

individuals and schools: Epicurus, the Peripatetics, Chrysippus, Anaxagoras, and

"others." While sections 28-33 all concern pleasure and pain, sections 28-30 in particular

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form a coherent subset. Section 28 attributes to Epicurus the view that pleasures and

pains are perceptual; section 29 attributes to the Peripatetics the contrary view that they

are cognitive; and section 30 attributes to Chrysippus an intermediate position according

to which generic pleasure is cognized, while specific pleasure is perceived. Thus, sections

28-30 can be viewed as responding to the question whether pleasure and pain are

perceived or cognized. Diels, perhaps rightly, situates 1.50.28-30, along with a number of

other sections in Stobaeus, within Aëtius' Placita book 4, chapter 9, under the rubric

"Whether perceptions are true."13 At least, the question whether pleasure and pain are

perceived or cognized is clearly relevant to the question whether perceptions are true. For

example, at 1.50.17 Stobaeus attributes to Pythagoras, Empedocles, Xenophanes,

Parmenides, Zeno, Melissos, Anaxagoras, Democritus, Metrodorus, Protagoras, and Plato

the view that perceptions are false. Thus, if pleasure and pain are perceived, rather than

cognized, they are false.

Granted this, Stobaeus' Empedoclean opinion at 1.50.31 is remarkable not only in

that it says nothing about the relation between pleasure or pain and perception

(ai[sqhsi"), but in that it relates a conception of pleasure and pain to desire. None of the

other doctrines in 1.50.28-33 has anything to say about desire. In fact, there is only one

other section in all of 1.50 that contains a doctrine on desire; at 1.50.25 Stobaeus reports

that according to Parmenides and Empedocles desire arises from a lack of nourishment.

Diels also situates this section in Aëtius 4.9 under the rubric "Whether perceptions are

true" and, precisely, immediately before the contents of Stobaeus 1.50.31, that is, before

the Empedoclean opinion about desire, pain, and pleasure. This is very odd, especially

since Photius informs us that chapter 46 of book 1 of Stobaeus' Anthology, which

13

unfortunately does not survive, was devoted to the subject of nourishment and desire in

animals (peri; trofh'" kai; ojrevxew" tw'n zw/vwn).14 As we have seen, Pseudo-Plutarch's

report at 5.28 explicitly concerns desires in animals (ta;" ojrevxei" … toi'" zwv/oi").

Moreover, the immediately preceding section, 5.27, concerns nourishment and growth

(peri; trofh'" kai; aujxhvsew"). In it, Pseudo-Plutarch reports: "Empedocles holds that

animals are nourished through the settling of what is appropriate."15 Consequently, Diels

should have situated Stobaeus 1.50.25, the Empedoclean and Parmenidean opinion on

desire and nourishment, in Aëtius 5.27, which is devoted to the subject of nourishment

and growth. Furthermore, Diels situates Pseudo-Plutarch 5.28 in Aëtius 5.28 under the

rubric "Whence desires and pleasures are derived." But surely some of the content of

Stobaeus 1.50.31 belongs here as well.

Now since the contents of Pseudo-Plutarch 5.28 and Stobaeus 1.50.31 are similar,

we must conclude that Aëtius himself, if not a late source of his, is responsible for

conjoining the Empedoclean view of pleasure and pain, on the one hand, with that of

desire, on the other. Moreover, we should assume that the location of this opinion in

Pseudo-Plutarch's Placita is more accurate relative to Aëtius' Placita than its location in

Stobaeus' Anthology. That is to say, the contents of Pseudo-Plutarch 5.28 did not appear

in Aëtius 4.9 under the rubric "Whether perceptions are true" but in Aëtius 5.28 under the

rubric "Whence desires and pleasures are derived."16

As we will see, the possibility that Aëtius himself conjoined Empedoclean views

on desire and on pleasure and pain is strengthened by the fact that the pre-Aëtian

doxographical material on the topics of desire, on the one hand, and of pleasure and pain,

on the other, derive from distinct sources. The material on pleasure and pain derives from

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Theophrastus' On the Senses. The material on desire does not; indeed, its pedigree is

much more obscure. I'll begin with the material in Theophrastus' On the Senses.

III. Theophrastus on Empedocles on Perception, Pleasure, and Pain

Aëtius' Empedoclean opinions concerning pleasure and pain, but not desire,

derive from Theophrastus' On the Senses. In On the Senses Theophrastus categorizes

Empedocles' views of perception under the division of those who explain perception

according to the principle of likeness. Regarding pleasure and pain, Theophrastus reports:

"(Empedocles says) that we experience pleasure (h{desqai) through things that are

alike (toi'" oJmoivoi") in accordance with both their parts and blending (kata; te

<ta;>17 moriva kai; th;n kra'sin), while we experience pain (lupei'sqai) through

things that are opposite (toi'" ejnantivoi")."18

And again:

"(Empedocles says that we) experience pleasure (h{desqai) through things that

are alike (toi'" oJmoivoi"), and pain (lupei'sqai) through things that are opposite

(toi'" ejnantivoi") … Moreover … kindred things (suggenh') above all produce

pleasure through contact, as he says …"19

Theophrastus hereby appears to supply later doxographers with the view that Empedocles

held that pleasure arises through the blending of like elements, while pain arises through

the blending of opposite elements.20 Yet whereas Aëtius and his followers speak of

pleasure and pain as the blending of like and opposite elements, this is actually not the

meaning of the Theophrastean passages cited. In his discussion of Empedocles' account

of perception in On the Senses, Theophrastus primarily— I emphasize "primarily," not

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"only"21— treats likeness and opposition in terms of structural conformity or non-

conformity between perceptible effluences and perceptual pores.22 Theophrastus begins

his account of Empedocles' theory of perception as follows:

"Empedocles has a common method of treating all the senses. He says that

perception occurs because (the effluences) fit into (ejnarmovttein) the pores of the

particular perceptual faculty."23

Subsequently, he claims:

"For it is clear that what fits in (ejnarmovttei), as he puts it, is what is alike (to;

o{moion)."24

Thus, Theophrastus interprets structural conformity (aJrmoniva) between perceptible

effluences and perceptual pores as likeness (oJmoiovth").

We can understand Theophrastus' subsequent criticism of Empedocles

accordingly:

"(Empedocles') explanation of pleasure and pain is inconsistent, for he ascribes

pleasure to the action of like things, while pain he derives from opposites …

Pleasure and pain are thus regarded … as perceptions or as occurring with

perception; consequently, the perceptual process does not in every case arise from

likeness."25

Theophrastus claims that Empedocles is inconsistent because he presents a general

account of perception in terms of the structural conformity of effluences and pores, yet he

also explains the distinction between pleasure and pain in terms of likeness and

opposition. Consequently, in the case of pain, the perception of pain must be explained

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according to the structural conformity of effluences and pores, but the perception of pain

must be explained according to the structural non-conformity of effluences and pores.26

Evidently, between Theophrastus and Aëtius a significant transformation in the

reporting of Empedocles' opinions concerning pleasure and pain occurred. In light of the

disparity between Theophrastus and Aëtius, it is especially noteworthy that Aëtius' report

on Empedocles' view of pleasure and pain is conjoined with an account of Empedocles'

view of desire, whereas Theophrastus' On the Senses makes no mention of Empedocles'

view of desire. Stobaeus transmits Aëtius' claim that according to Empedocles desire is

for that which is like because of a deficit. As suggested in section I, this means that desire

is directed toward a kind of element in which the elementally homogeneous subject of

desire is deficient. For convenience, I will hereafter speak of elemental likeness as

elemental "homogeneity." Consequently, Aëtius' conjunction of Empedocles' view of

pleasure and pain with his view of desire plays an important role in Aëtius' opinion that

the likeness involved in pleasure is elemental homogeneity, rather than Theophrastus'

view, structural conformity of effluences and pores.27

IV. Complications in Aëtius' and Theophrastus' Accounts

While Aëtius' and Theophrastus' accounts of Empedocles' conception of pleasure

and pain diverge according to their distinct conception of likeness, elemental

homogeneity and structural conformity respectively, their accounts are actually more

complicated than the preceding section indicates. Here, I discuss two complications with

Theophrastus' and Aëtius' accounts respectively.

17

In discussing Theophrastus' account of Empedocles' theory of perception, I said

that likeness and opposition are "primarily," but not only, treated in terms of structural

conformity or non-conformity between perceptible effluences and perceptual pores.

Theophrastus' treatment of likeness in Empedocles' psychology is complex. Theophrastus

also suggests that Empedocles' psychological theory, including the experiences of

pleasure and pain, involves likeness understood as elemental homogeneity. In section 10

of On the Senses Theophrastus reports that Empedocles conceives of knowledge in terms

of likeness:

"(i) (Empedocles) also speaks of knowledge (fronhvsew") and ignorance in the

same way (as he speaks of perception).28 For he says that knowing is due to like

things (toi'" oJmoivoi") and being ignorant is due to unlike things (ajnomoivoi"), for

in his view knowledge is the same as or close to perception. (ii) For after he

enumerates how each (element) recognizes each [Theophrastus is here alluding to

B109], (iii) he concludes by adding that from these (elements) 'all things having

been fittingly conjoined (pavnta pephvgasin aJrmosqevnta),29 and by means of

these they have knowledge and experience pleasure and pain (h{dontæ hjdæ

ajniw'ntai30).' [= B107] (iv) Therefore, it is principally by means of the blood that

we know, for in the blood the elements (stoicei'a) are blended more fully than in

our (other) parts."31

After making the general point in (i) that Empedocles was committed to the view that

knowledge, as well as perception, is based on likeness, Theophrastus alludes in (ii) to the

following verses of Empedocles' poem (B109):

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"For it is with earth that we see earth; with water, water; with air, divine air; with

fire, destructive fire; with love, love; and with grim strife, strife."

In (iii) Theophrastus cites fragment B107. But since Theophrastus introduces B107 with

the words "he concluded by adding" (ejpi; tevlei prosevqhken), and this follows the

allusion to B109, Henricus Stein, followed by other commentators, proposes appending

B107 to B109, viz.:32

"For it is with earth that we recognize (ojpwvpamen) earth; with water, water; with

air, divine air; with fire, destructive fire; with love, love; and with grim strife,

strife. … all things having been fittingly conjoined, and by means of these

(touvtoi") they have knowledge and experience pleasure (h{dontæ) and pain

(ajniw'ntai).'"

Granted this relation between B109 and B107, we can infer that Theophrastus

interprets Empedocles' view of cognition as follows. Blood is responsible for cognition

because the material elements, air, water, fire, and earth, that enter the blood through the

perceptual pores are recognized by homogeneous elements that constitute the blood.

Blood also recognizes Love and Strife— Theophrastus appears to believe Empedocles is

claiming— insofar as Love and Strife inhere in the blood as well. Finally, Theophrastus'

interpretation implies that Empedocles understands pleasure and pain like cognition, and

this suggests that pleasure and pain arise through the conjunction of homogeneous

elements. Consequently, Theophrastus' interpretation of pain in B107 is inconsistent with

the view, which he also attributes to Empedocles, that pain arises through the blending of

opposites, for in that case opposition implies structural non-conformity. Furthermore, it is

19

unclear how pain and pleasure can be understood analogously to cognition since pain and

pleasure are not material elements that can contact one another.33

Theophrastus' interpretation of B109 and B107 must be confused. I agree with

David Sedley that Theophrastus' identification of structural conformity with likeness and

his conflation of the likeness of structural conformity and the likeness of elemental

homogeneity is a function of Theophrastus' "Aristotelianism," that is, Theophrastus'

"(imprisonment in) an over-schematized doxographical view, according to which

Empedocles has got to come out as a like-by-like theorist."34

Theophrastus' view that Empedocles was committed to a theory of cognition

based on likeness does derive from Aristotle. In On the Soul, Aristotle writes: "All those

… who looked to the fact that what has soul knows or perceives what exists, identify soul

with the principle or principles of nature … Thus, Empedocles declares that soul is

formed out of all his elements, each one itself being a soul; his words are …"35 Aristotle

now cites B109. Again, in Metaphysics G, Aristotle cites B109 within the context of a

series of criticisms of Empedocles. Aristotle claims that if, as Empedocles maintains,

knowledge is of like by like, then god would be less intelligent than others: since strife

does not inhere in god, god would fail to recognize and so lack knowledge of strife.36

In short, Theophrastus' account of Empedocles' view of knowledge and at least

some forms of perception, namely pleasure and pain, includes both conceptions of

likeness, structural conformity and elemental homogeneity; and in the latter case,

Theophrastus follows Aristotle.

Let us now turn to a corresponding complication in Aëtius' account. Although

Aëtius' conjunction of Empedocles' views of desire and of pleasure and pain suggests that

20

the likeness involved in pleasure is elemental homogeneity, Aëtius also elsewhere reports

that for Empedocles perception involves the structural conformity of effluences and

pores. The evidence for this comes from Pseudo-Plutarch 4.9:

"Empedocles and Heraclides claim that the particular perceptions (that is,

perceptions of the particular senses) occur when there is commensuration (ta;"

summetriva") with the pores, when each proper object of perception fits in with

the (appropriate) faculty of perception."37

It is questionable whether this passage can be reconciled with the passage in Pseudo-

Plutarch 5.28. Here is one possibility. In contrast to seeing, hearing, and the functions of

the other specific sensory modalities, experiencing pleasure and pain are common to all

the senses. Thus, while pleasure and pain occur through elemental homogeneity,

perception by means of specific sensory modalities occurs through structural conformity

of effluences and pores. Thus, for example, the pain experienced in touching a burning

coal may be explained, as a form of tactile perception, as involving structural conformity

of pores and effluences, and, hedonically, as involving heterogeneous elements. This

interpretation is also compatible with Theophrastus' claim that for Empedocles pleasure

and pain either are perceptions or "accompany perception" (metæ aijsqhvsew").

Finally, one may ask whether this charitable interpretation of Aëtius is accurate.

The main difficulty is that it requires us to maintain that Aëtius either deliberately

improved upon Theophrastus, perhaps in defense of a more coherent account of

Empedocles, or that he improved upon Theophrastus rather accidentally.38 If the

argument in section II is sound, that Aëtius himself conjoined Empedoclean opinions on

desire and on pleasure and pain, then this provides some support for the claim that Aëtius

21

was a rather active constructor of opinions. That, in turn, supports the view that Aëtius'

improvement on Theophrastus was intentional. But corroborating this suggestion would

require comparison of other Aëtian opinions with those of his predecessors.

V. Aristotle and Plato on Empedocles on Homogeneous Elemental Attraction

I turn now from the pre-Aëtian doxographical material on Empedocles on

pleasure and pain to the pre-Aëtian doxographical material on Empedocles on desire.

Aëtius' Empedoclean opinion on desire specifically concerns nutritional desire, that is,

appetite. Granted this, it is difficult to identify a pre-Aëtian source for this Empedoclean

opinion. Among our Greek sources, we have material on Empedocles' views on desire, on

botanical nourishment, even a bit on digestion. The pseudo-Aristotelian On Plants

attributes to Empedocles the view that plants are moved by desire (ejpiqumiva/

kinei'sqai),39 and this implies nutritional desire; however, no explanation of this appetite

is given. Moreover, nothing from the Greek tradition of the doxographical material on

these other topics, desire, botanical nourishment, or digestion, can straightforwardly be

constructed into the doctrine on appetite. There is a lacuna here. Arabic sources will

ultimately help illuminate the Greek tradition and fill, or at least partially fill, this lacuna.

But, for expository and heuristic reasons, it will be valuable to begin by focusing

exclusively on the Greek tradition.

First, consider the following analysis of Aëtius' Empedoclean opinion on appetite.

Aëtius' Empedoclean opinion on appetite concerns the physiology of nutrition, precisely

the view that appetite arises through nutritional deficiency and is directed toward that

which is like its subject, where likeness implies elemental homogeneity. This nutritional

22

principle is analyzable into two components. One is nutritional deficiency as the cause of

desire; the other is the homogeneity of the object and subject of desire. The first

component may be particular to nutritional processes. The second component is a species

of what I will call "the cosmological principle of homogeneous elemental attraction." The

cosmological principle of homogeneous elemental attraction is the view that

homogeneous elements are attracted to one another.

I will begin my examination of the pre-Aëtian doxographical tradition on

Empedocles' views on desire by focusing on the principle of homogeneous elemental

attraction. The Empedoclean principle of homogeneous elemental attraction occurs

explicitly in Aristotle and implicitly in Plato. Aristotle refers to Empedocles' principle

twice, both times in ethical works. In book 8 of Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle writes:

"Some hold that friendship is a kind of likeness (oJmoiovthta) and that like men are

friends. Hence the sayings 'like to like' and 'birds of a feather flock together' …

Others say 'two of a trade never agree.' … Euripides says that 'parched earth loves

the rain, and stately heaven when filled with rain loves to fall to earth'; and

Heraclitus says that 'it is what opposes that helps' and 'from different tones comes

the fairest tune' and 'all things are produced through strife.' But others, and

especially Empedocles, say the opposite of this, that like desires like (to; o{moion

tou' oJmoivou ejfivesqai)."40

Aristotle's diairesis of opinions concerning friendship according to the principles of

likeness and opposition derives from Plato's Lysis. At Lysis 213e3-216b6 Socrates

explores with Lysis the views that friendship is based on the attraction of like things and

the attraction of opposites. Regarding the attraction of like things, Socrates cites the

23

following verse from Homer's Odyssey: aijeiv toi to;n oJmoi'on a[gei qeo;" wJ" to;n

oJmoi'on.41 He continues:

"And haven't you come across the writings of the very wise, which say the

same thing, that of necessity like is a friend of like (to; o{moion tw/' oJmoivw/

ajnavgkh ajei; fivlon ei\nai), for it is these men who discuss and write about nature

and the whole (tou' o{lou)."42

Socrates' reference to the very wise who write about nature and the whole seems to refer

particularly to Empedocles, for Empedocles uses the phrase "to; o{lon" to refer to the

cosmos in fragment B2.6.

Socrates subsequently describes the contrary view based on the attraction of

opposites:

"Dry desires wet, cold desires hot, bitter sweet, sharp blunt, empty full, and so on

according to the same principle. For the opposite … is nourishment for its

opposite; whereas like does not enjoy (ajpolau'sai) like."43

Clearly, in Nicomachean Ethics 8 Aristotle adopts Plato's division in Lysis of conceptions

of friendship and also desire according to likeness and opposition.

Granted this, it is unclear how we get from Aristotle's Empedoclean cosmological

principle of elemental attraction to the nutritional principle in Aëtius. Between Aristotle

and Aëtius there is no extant reference to Empedocles as a proponent of the cosmological

principle. Presumably, either Aristotle's view influenced others who wrote on

Empedocles on nutritional desire and thereby informed Aëtius, or some lost Aristotelian

work itself discussed Empedocles on nutritional desire.

24

VI. Speculation on Greek Sources for Empedocles on Appetite

Here, I entertain several possible sources for Aëtius' Empedoclean opinion on

appetite, three relating to the Peripatetic tradition and a fourth relating to the medical

doxographical tradition. The Peripatetic and medical traditions actually overlap since the

Peripatetics were also involved in medical doxography. However, for expository reasons

it is convenient to segregate the traditions.

Our first guess might be that Aëtius' Empedoclean opinion on appetite derives

from Theophrastus. As we noted above, however, it clearly does not derive from

Theophrastus' On the Senses since Theophrastus' On the Senses contains no account of

Empedocles' view of desire. Alternatively, Theophrastus' Physical Opinions might have

contained a discussion of nutrition, including appetite. However, there is no explicit

evidence that it did. Indeed, nothing in Theophrastus' surviving works or fragments

concerns Empedocles and desire.44 Moreover, none of the works attributed to

Theophrastus by ancient authors or in Diogenes Laertius' catalogue of Theophrastus'

works is a reasonable candidate for the source of Aëtius' Empedoclean opinion on

appetite.45 Since it is widely believed that Theophrastus' Physical Opinions is a major

source for Aëtius' Placita, we still should not exclude the possibility that Aëtius'

Empedoclean opinion on desire derives from Theophrastus. Nonetheless, we need to

consider alternatives.

Aristotle offers another avenue. In book 2 of On the Soul Aristotle briefly

discusses nutrition (415a22-416b31). Therein Aristotle criticizes Empedocles' view of

nutrition and growth in plants (415b27-416a18). Aristotle's criticism says nothing about

Empedocles' view of desire or nutritional desire in plants or animals. Yet Aristotle

25

concludes his treatment of nutrition in On the Soul by saying: "We have now given an

outline of the nature of nourishment; further details must be given in the appropriate

place."46 This reference to an appropriate place for a detailed discussion of nutrition is

puzzling. Elsewhere in Aristotle's corpus, there are references to a discussion of nutrition

that already has occurred (backward references) and that will occur (forward

references),47 but there is no independent treatise dedicated to the subject. Moreover,

none of the ancient catalogues of Aristotle's writings lists such a work. Of course, the

references to a discussion of nutrition need not refer to an independent treatise; they

could refer to discussions of nutrition within other works, in particular On the Generation

of Animals.48 However, although nutrition is sporadically discussed in the corpus, nothing

qualifies as a sustained, detailed examination of the topic.

Pierre Louis has attempted to explain Aristotle's backward and forward references

to discussions of nourishment by arguing that Aristotle composed one treatise on the

subject early in his career, then planned to supplant the treatise with another that he

ultimately never wrote, and the original treatise was lost before Aristotle's corpus was

compiled and edited.49 An alternative explanation is that the references to discussions of

nourishment in Aristotle, whether made by Aristotle or editors of Aristotle, are to works

composed by other members of the Peripatos. James Lennox offers this suggestion in

remarks on PA650b10,50 citing Aristotle's references to discussions of plants, which may

well refer to Theophrastus' works.51

Further, albeit limited support for Lennox's idea derives from Diogenes Laertius.

Diogenes' catalogue of Strato's writings includes a treatise in one book entitled On

Nourishment and Growth.52 This is the only Peripatetic work on the subject we know of.

26

Perhaps some of the Aristotelian references to discussions of nourishment refer to this

work. Unfortunately, no other reference to Strato's treatise survives.53 Consequently, even

granting that Aristotle's references to discussions of nourishment refer to Strato's work,

the idea that Aëtius derived his claim about Empedocles on nutritional desire from Strato,

and perhaps also used Strato for his opinions on nourishment and growth, must remain

speculative.

Another possibility is that Aëtius' opinions on nutrition and nutritional desire

derive from the medical doxographical tradition. There is some general and some specific

support for this suggestion. Generally, most opinions attributed to doctors in Aëtius'

Placita occur toward the end of book 5, where the Empedoclean opinions on nourishment

and growth and on nutritional desire occur.54 Furthermore, in some cases nutritional

desire was discussed within discussions of nutrition in medical literature. Perhaps the

most telling example is also the earliest. In chapter 39 of the Hippocratic Diseases IV,

which may be dated to c. 420 BC,55 we find a conception of nutritional desire and even

pleasure that resembles the views Aëtius attributes to Empedocles. The Hippocratic

author, probably Hippocrates' son-in-law Polybus, relates desire and pleasure to his

conception of physical health as equilibrium of the humors:

"Now if we are in need (ejndehvsetai) of food or drink, then in this case the body

too will draw from the sources (that store the various humors) until the humors

are reduced below what is fitting (e[lasson tou' kairou'). At that point a man has

the desire (iJmeivretai) to eat or drink something of a nature to fill up (ejpiplhvsei)

that portion (moivrhn) and make it equal (ijswvsi) to the others. This is why, even

after we have eaten or drunk a large amount, we sometimes still desire

27

(iJmeirovmeqa) a food or drink and will eat nothing else with pleasure (hJdevw"),

except the particular thing that we desire (iJmeirovmeqa). But when we have eaten

and the humor in the sources and in the body is equalized (ijswqh/') as far as

possible, then the desire (i{mero") ceases."56

In his commentary, Iain Lonie suggests that "the author is simply giving his own

physiological form to a theory of pleasure and pain (which) so far as we know … was

first expressed by Empedocles."57 However, in support of the association of the

Hippocratic claims with Empedocles, Lonie cites Aëtius' opinion at 5.28. Obviously, it

would be question-begging for us to endorse Lonie's claim. Consequently, we should say

that the Hippocratic passage contains significant correspondences with Aëtius' opinion at

5.28. Thus, I appeal to these correspondences only in support of the speculation that

Aëtius' discussion of nutritional desire may derive from a medical doxographical

tradition.58

In considering the medical doxographical tradition upon which Aëtius might have

depended, a good first guess is Meno's Medical Collection (ijatrikh; sunagwghv).59 An

immediate objection is that most of the doctors to whom Aëtius attributes opinions are

contemporaneous with or postdate Meno's collection,60 and this might tell against Aëtius'

use of Meno's collection more generally. However, the authorities whose opinions on

nourishment and growth and on desire and pleasure Aëtius cites, namely Parmenides,

Empedocles, and Anaxagoras, are all Presocratic. Thus, the speculation that Aëtius used

Meno for these opinions remains viable.61

In sum, on the basis of the Greek tradition of the doxographical material alone, we

can do no better than speculate on Aëtius' source for the Empedoclean opinion on

28

appetite. Yet with respect to both the medical and non-medical doxographical tradition

the evidence points toward the Peripatos.

VII. Ibn Lūqā and Pseudo-Plutarch's Placita 5.28

Fortunately, our quest for the source of Aëtius' Empedoclean opinion on appetite

needn't end in speculative obscurity. Arabic sources illuminate the Greek doxographical

tradition. We will approach these by way of Pseudo-Plutarch's Placita 5.28. In section I, I

mentioned that in Pseudo-Plutarch's Placita 5.28, which is devoted to the question

"Whence in animals are desires and pleasures derived?" only one opinion, Empedocles',

has survived in the Greek tradition. I presented an English translation of the opinion

based on Diels' presentation of the Greek in Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (hereafter

Fragmente). The first part of the opinion, on Empedocles on desire, is unproblematic:

"Empedocles (says that) desires occur in animals according to their deficiencies in those

elements that complete each one." I rendered the second part, on pleasure and pain, as:

"And pleasures come from what is congenial according to the blends of related and like

(elements), while disturbances and <pains from what is uncongenial>." This rendition is

based on the following Greek of Diels' Fragmente:

(D) "ta;" de; hJdona;" ejx oijkeivou kata; ta;" tw'n suggenw'n kai; oJmoivwn kravsei",

ta;" de; ojclhvsei" kai; ta;" <ajlghdovna" ejx ajnoikeivou>."

As Diels indicates, the Greek manuscripts break off after "kai; ta;"." However, Diels'

presentation in Fragmente is misleading because problems in the Greek manuscripts

begin immediately after "ta;" de; hJdona;"." The Greek manuscripts actually read:

(E) "ta;" de; hJdona;" ejx uJgrou' kai; ta;" tw'n kinduvnwn kai; oJmoivwn kinhvsei", ta;"

29

de; ojclhvsei" kai; ta;"."62

In Doxographi Graeci, published over twenty years before Fragmente, Diels inserts a

crux after "ta;" de; hJdona;" ejx" and claims: "corrupta archetypo oblitterato vix restitui

possunt."63 Diels then offers the emendation and supplementation of (E) that yields (D).

When Diels published Fragmente in 1903, he reproduced his rendition of Pseudo-

Plutarch's opinion from Doxographi Graeci, but failed to acknowledge that the

corruption of the text begins immediately after "ta;" de; hJdona;" ejx." Thus, Fragmente

gives the false impression that "oijkeivou kata; ta;" tw'n suggenw'n kai; oJmoivwn

kravsei"" conforms to the manuscript tradition.

It would be misleading to say that most scholars have agreed with Diels'

assessment that (E) is corrupt and that they have followed Diels' reconstruction— but

only because (E) or (D) is not treated in most works on Empedocles.64

Among those who do treat (E) or (D), Bollack is exceptional. Bollack acknowledges that

(E) is incomplete, but he maintains that it is not otherwise corrupt. Thus, Bollack

criticizes Diels: "La phrase [(E)] n'est malheureusement pas achevée dans les

manuscripts. On a platement corrigé ce précieux témoignage …"65 Bollack retains the

text of (E) and suggests adding a phrase such as "ejk purov"" after "ta;" de; ojclhvsei"" to

correspond to the function of "ejx uJgrou'" in the first clause;66 viz.:

"ta;" de; hJdona;" ejx uJgrou' kai; ta;" tw'n kinduvnwn kai; oJmoivwn kinhvsei", ta;"

de; ojclhvsei" <ejk puro;"> kai; ta;" …"

Bollack translates:

30

"Quant aux plaisirs, ils se produisent à partir de l'humide, de même que les

transports qu'on éprouve dans les situations périlleuses et pour des causes du

même genre, quant aux tristesses et aux …"67

Bollack's approach is attractive because it leaves the text intact and attributes a

prima facie plausible conception of pleasure to Empedocles. Bollack explains:

"ejx uJgrou': de l'eau ou du froid. Ce froid règne dans l'état précédant le plaisir (cf.

ejx). Le corps demande alors un supplément de chaleur: le 'même' qu'il n'a pas …

(Quant aux 'situations périlleuses') il s'agit sans doute de l'exaltation guerrière

surmontant un sentiment de crainte: l'échauffement, pareil à celui du plaisir,

succède alors au froid. Les sentiments belliqueux sont assimilés à des plaisirs

dans cette classification homérique."68

Thus, Bollack suggests that (E) is valuable because it reveals that Empedocles' poem

contained "une étude des passions (et des apathies)."69 In other words, the report refers

not simply to sensations of pleasure and pain, but to emotions of joy and grief. Regarding

the concept of grief specifically, Bollack emphasizes that the word in (E) is "ojclhvsei","

not "ajlghdovne"" or "luvpai."

In support of his interpretation, Bollack appeals to Empedocles' fragment B21.3-

5: "the sun, bright to look on and hot in every respect, and the immortals which are

drenched in heat and shining light, and rain, in all things dark and cold." But this is feeble

support. The relation between the content of B21.3-5 and Bollack's interpretation of (E) is

obscure. Bollack might have found stronger support for his interpretation of (E) in DK31

A85:

31

"Empedocles says that sleep occurs by a moderate cooling of the heat in the

blood, and death by a total cooling … Empedocles says that death is a separation

of the fiery from things whose combination was compounded for man … And

sleep occurs by a separation of the fiery."70

This testimony, at least, associates vitality with heat and its opposite with cold. Given

this, Bollack might find support for the view that Empedocles associated vitality with

pleasure and morbidity with pain.

But while Bollack's effort to preserve the manuscript reading is admirable, on

grounds of both grammar and content his interpretation cannot be accepted. On Bollack's

interpretation, "ta;" de; hJdona;" ejx uJgrou'" is an independent clause. Some verb must

therefore be understood, for example "givnesqai"; viz. "ta;" hJdona;" ejx uJgrou'

givnesqai." The phrase "ejx uJgrou'" is familiar enough among the doxographical literature;

it occurs elsewhere in the Placita and in Stobaeus as well as in Diogenes Laertius and

Hippolytus. In all cases it appears to have an Aristotelian pedigree.71 Pseudo-Plutarch

reports that Thales maintains that all things have their origin "ejx uJgrou'."72 Similarly,

Hippolytus reports of Hippo of Rhegium that soul comes into being "ejx uJgrou'." The

phrase "ejx ujgrou'" is used in these cases to describe water or moisture as the source from

which all things or soul are derived. But this is clearly not the sense in which on Bollack's

interpretation the phrase is used in the clause "ta;" hJdona;" ejx uJgrou' (givnesqai)."

Rather, on Bollack's interpretation— and despite Bollack's own translation "à partir de"—

Empedocles is said to hold that pleasures arise out of water, in the sense that pleasures

follow the replacement of the cold of water by the heat of fire. Surely, this is an

extraordinary amount of information to pack into the phrase "ejx uJgrou'."

32

On top of all this work to make sense of "ejx uJgrou'," it is jarring to have to take

"ta;" tw'n kinduvnwn kai; oJmoivwn kinhvsei"" as an accusative of respect syntactically

parallel to "ejx uJgrou'." Furthermore, "kinhvsei"" is an exceedingly vague word for the

idea that Bollack reads in the text. By "movements of dangers and the like" we are

supposed to understand "actions in which dangers and the like are overcome." But can

"kivnhsi"" possibly be used with the genitive of separation to convey Bollack's idea? A

search on TLG reveals that in fact there is no other instance of the phrase "hJ tou'

kinduvnou kivnhsi"" in extant Greek literature through the sixth century CE.73

Consequently, either we force an extraordinary interpretation out of a syntactically

strained text or we admit that the text is corrupt. I maintain with Diels that the text is

corrupt.

In viewing (E) as corrupt, Diels agreed with his predecessors Gottlob Schneider

and Simon Karsten. In a comment on his edition of Theophrastus' works, published in

1818-21, Schneider writes of (E): "ubi verba disiecta et defecta sensu ex hoc loco

restituere aliquatenus licebit: ta;" de; hJdona;" dia; ta;" tw'n oJmoivwn kinhvsei", ta;" dæ

ojclhvsei" dia; ta;" tw'n ejnantivwn."74 In his Philosophorum Graecorum Reliquiae,

published in 1838,75 Karsten cites the lines from Pseudo-Plutarch's Placita up to "ta;" de;

hJdona;"" and writes: "sed quae sequuntur, ut prorsus corrupta, omitto …" Then in a

subsequent footnote, Karsten offers his own tentative emendation and supplement: "ta;"

de; hJdona;" ejxergavzesqai kata; ta;" tw'n oijkeivwn kai; oJmoivwn kinhvsei", ta;" dæ

ojclhvsei" kai; ta;" ajlghdovna" toi'" ejnantivoi"."76 In short, Diels' rendition of (E) as

(D) does not report the gospel truth, only an interpretation of it.77 This misleading

impression can easily be rectified by re-editing to indicate that Diels emended and

33

supplemented the text from "ta;" de; hJdona;" ejx." But still, it is questionable how (E)

should be reconstructed.

In justifying his rendition of (E) over those of Schneider and Karsten, Diels, in

Doxographi Graeci, writes: "propius a traditis abessent haec: …"78 and he refers to the

passage from Stobaeus 1.50.31:

" jEmpedoklh'" ta;" hJdona;" givnesqai toi'" me;n oJmoivoi" tw'n oJmoivwn, kata; de;

to; ejllei'pon pro;" th;n ajnaplhvrwsin, w{ste tw/' ejlleivponti hJ o[rexi" tou'

oJmoivou. ta;" dæ ajlghdovna" toi'" ejnantivoi": [h]] ajllotriou'sqai ga;r pro;"

a[lla o{sa diafevrei katav te th;n suvgkrisin kai; th;n tw'n stoiceivwn

kra'sin."

Granting Diels that Aëtius is the common source of Stobaeus and Pseudo-Plutarch, if

Stobaeus is to be the basis of a reconstruction of (E), presumably we should adhere even

more closely to Stobaeus. For example, we might reconstruct (E) as:

(S) "ta;" de; hJdona;" givnesqai kata; ta;" tw'n oJmoivwn sugkrivsei" kai; kravsei",

ta;" de; ojclhvsei" kata; ta;" tw'n ejnantivwn (sugkrivsei" kai; kravsei")."

But further light is thrown on the reconstruction of (E) from another piece of evidence,

unavailable to Diels and unknown to more recent editors of Empedocles.79 In his book-

list al-Fihrist, composed in 978, ibn an-Nadīm, a bookseller from Baghdad, mentions

Qust≥ā ibn Lūqā as a translator of Pseudo-Plutarch's Placita. Ibn Lūqā was a 9th c. (d. 912)

Christian doctor, philosopher, and astronomer originally from Baalbekk in Syria, with

command of Arabic and Greek. During his stay in Baghdad, he translated into Arabic

Greek texts he had acquired in Asia Minor.80 Copies of ibn Lūqā's Arabic translation of

Pseudo-Plutarch's Placita only came to light in the thirties, forties, and fifties of the

34

twentieth century.81 In 1980 Hans Daiber published an edition of ibn Lūqā's Placita with

facing German translation.

Our earliest Greek manuscripts for Pseudo-Plutarch's Placita are centuries later

than the text ibn Lūqā used: A Par. 1671 a. 1296; E Par. 1672 paulo post a. 1302; F Par.

1957 s. XI; and M Mosqu. 501 s. XII. In their discussion of the tradition of Pseudo-

Plutarch's Placita, Jaap Mansfeld and David Runia conclude that the source of ibn Lūqā's

translation "cannot be reduced to any other of our texts, whether in direct or indirect

tradition …"82 Indeed, ibn Lūqā's source diverges from the rest of the Greek manuscript

tradition in numerous noteworthy ways.83

Regarding Placita 5.28 and specifically (E), ibn Lūqā's text reads:

"ammā l-ladhdhātu fa-innahā mina l-rut≥ūbati min h≥arakāti l-tarbiyati l-

mutashābihati fī l-jins, wa-ammā l-adhā fa-min qibali l-ashyā'i l-mukhālifati fī l-

lamsi wa-l-mulāqāti."

"As for pleasures, they come from moisture due to movements of growth that are

similar in genus. As for pain, it arises due to opposite things coming into contact

and mixing."84

In contrast to the Greek manuscript tradition, in the Arabic translation the second clause,

on pain, is complete. Moreover, the Arabic corresponds almost exactly with our

reconstruction (S) based on Stobaeus: "ta;" de; ojclhvsei" kata; ta;" tw'n ejnantivwn

sugkrivsei" kai; kravsei"."85

The first clause, however, is more problematic. First, it contains a grammatical

ambiguity. The Arabic word for "similar," "mutashābihati," can modify either the word

for "movements," "h≥arakāti," or the word for "growth," "l-tarbiyati." This is the case even

35

though "h≥arakāti" is plural and "l-tarbiyati" is singular. My translation preserves this

ambiguity. Second, the Arabic version conforms with the Greek manuscript tradition's

readings of "ejx uJgrou'" and "kinhvsei"." Third, the Arabic version contains nothing

corresponding to "tw'n kinduvnwn" in the Greek manuscript tradition. Rather, the Arabic

version has "l-tarbiyati" (corresponding to the Greek "th'" aujxhvsew""), which has no

equivalent in the Greek manuscript tradition. Fourth, the Greek manuscript tradition's

"oJmoivwn" does not agree with the Arabic "mutashābihati" because, as we have said,

"mutashābihati" modifies either "h≥arakāti" or "l-tarbiyati"; however, "oJmoivwn" and

"kinhvsei"" are in two different cases, and "oJmoivwn" does not agree with "th'" aujxhvsew""

in number. Fifth, the Greek also has two conjunctions "kai; … kai; …" which correspond

to nothing in the Arabic version. In light of these five points, the Greek manuscript from

which ibn Lūqā worked must have looked very close to the following:

(A) "ta;" de; hJdona;" ejx uJgrou' kata; ta;" th'" aujxhvsew" tw'n oJmoivwn kinhvsei",

ta;" de; ojclhvsei" kata; ta;" tw'n ejnantivwn sugkrivsei" kai; kravsei"."86

Let us now compare the problematic sections in the first clauses of (E), (S), and

(A): ta;" de; hJdona;"

(E1) "ejx uJgrou' kai; ta;" tw'n kinduvnwn kai; oJmoivwn kinhvsei","

(S1) "givnesqai kata; ta;" tw'n oJmoivwn sugkrivsei" kai; kravsei","

(A1) "ejx uJgrou' kata; ta;" th'" aujxhvsew" tw'n oJmoivwn kinhvsei","

Comparison suggests the following points. First, "givnesqai" should be left implicit.

Second, "kata;," rather than the first "kai;" in (E1), is correct. Third, "tw'n kinduvnwn" in

(E1) is corrupt. I suggest "sugkrivsei"" instead. Fourth, the presence of "th'" aujxhvsew""

in (A1) may be conceptually relevant to the remaining content— certainly more than

36

"tw'n kinduvnwn"— but its role in (A1) is still unclear. Fifth, "kinhvsei"" may be a

corruption of "kravsei"" or vice versa. Sixth, (A1) corroborates the presence of "ejx

uJgrou'" in (E1), but "ejx uJgrou'" remains puzzling.

Evidently, these considerations alone do not clarify how we should reconstruct the

archetype of the Empedoclean opinion on pleasure in Pseudo-Plutarch's Placita 5.28. But

further help comes from considering the broader context of Placita 5.28 and ibn Lūqā's

translation of material in that broader context.

VIII. Aëtius' Empedoclean Opinion on Appetite as Botanical Appetite

Recall how Pseudo-Plutarch's report at 5.28 begins:

"Empedocles says desires occur toi'" zw/voi" according to their deficiencies in

those elements that complete each one."

Compare this with Stobaeus:

"Empedocles says that like things … (aim at) a refilling in accordance with the

deficiency. Consequently, desire is for that which is like because of that which is

lacking."

One difference between Pseudo-Plutarch's and Stobaeus' formulations is that Pseudo-

Plutarch speaks of desires occurring "toi'" zw/voi"," whereas Stobaeus does not identify

the subjects of desire; Stobaeus merely speaks of like things (toi'" oJmoivoi").

This raises the question whether Aëtius' opinion referred specifically to zw/'a or rather to a

broader set of entities. In particular, to this point I have translated "toi'" zw/voi"" as

"animals,"87 but is this what "ta; zw/'a" means here? Could "ta; zw/'a" be used here more

broadly to mean "living things"?

37

The Peripatetic treatise On Plants reports: "Anaxagoras and Empedocles say that

plants are moved by desire (ejpiqumiva) and that they also experience perception and feel

pain (lupei'sqai) and pleasure (h{desqai)."88 Indeed, the Peripatetic author reports:

"Anaxagoras and Democritus and Empedocles have said that plants possess mind (nou'")

and understanding (gnw'si")."89 Compare these testimonies with Timaeus' position in

Plato's eponymous dialogue.90 Timaeus rejects the attribution to plants of belief (dovxa),

reasoning (logismov"), and mind (nou'"), but he too maintains that plants partake of

"pleasant and painful perceptions" as well as desires (ejpiqumivai).91 Furthermore, Timaeus

deliberately refers to plants as "zw/'a" on the ground that anything that "partakes of life

(tou' zh'n) is entitled to be called a 'zw/'on.'"92

Plato's conception of plants as zw/'a follows a number of other Presocratics.93 In

contrast, in On the Soul Aristotle argues, against his predecessors, that plants lack the

capacity for perception, let alone cognition.94 Thus, as we move from the Presocratics to

Aristotle, the set of entities that count as zw/'a shrinks and the psychological functions

attributed to plants are reduced. If, then, Aëtius' opinions are based on Peripatetic

sources, if those sources follow Aristotle in denying perception and so on to plants, and

finally if Pseudo-Plutarch's identification of the subjects of desire with animals correctly

represents Aëtius' opinion, then we can conclude that Aëtius' opinion expressly

concerned desire in animals and not plants. Indeed, this conclusion seems to be

confirmed by the contents of Aëtius' Placita 5.26, which fall under the rubric "How

plants grow and whether they are animals (pw'" hjuxhvqh ta' futa; kai; eij zw/'a)."95 The

fact that Aëtius poses the question in this way indicates that he takes "zw/'on" to mean

"animal."

38

Yet in the case of Empedocles' opinions on desire and plants in zw'/a at Placita

5.28, the question remains complicated. Pseudo-Plutarch's chapter 5.26, devoted to the

questions how plants grow and whether they are zw/'a, begins with the claim that Plato and

Thales regard plants as e[myuca zw/'a, whereas although Aristotle regards plants as

e[myuca, he denies that they are zw/'a. Pseudo-Plutarch, then, proceeds to give a lengthy

account of Empedoclean opinions, beginning with the claim: "Empedocles says that trees

were the first zw/'a to grow up from the earth."96 This at least permits the interpretation

that the Empedoclean opinion on desire and pleasure at 5.28 includes plants. In fact, I

want to argue for the stronger claim that Aëtius' Empedoclean opinion at 5.28 specifically

concerns desire and pleasure in plants and that Aëtius derived the opinion from

doxographical material on plants— regardless of whether Aëtius employs the opinion

within a chapter on the question of the source of desire and pleasure in animals.

Aëtius' Placita 5.27 concerns nourishment and growth; the rubric at Pseudo-

Plutarch 5.27 is "Peri; trofh'" kai; aujxhvsew"."97 Observe that this rubric does not

specify the subjects of growth and nourishment. In the Greek manuscript tradition of

Pseudo-Plutarch's Placita, 5.27 contains an Empedoclean opinion on nourishment and

growth and then begins with one from Anaxagoras, " jAnaxagovra" trevfesqai me;n." At

this point the manuscript breaks off. The passage runs as follows:

"(i) Empedocles (says that) ta; zw/'a are nourished through the settling down98 of

that which is akin (tou' oijkeivou) and that they grow through the presence of heat;

they diminish and perish (meiou'sqai kai; fqivnein) through the lack of each one

(e[kleiyin eJkatevrwn). (ii) But humans of today in comparison to the first humans

have the form of newborns. (iii) Anaxagoras (says that) … are nourished …"99

39

Ibn Lūqā's text differs from that of the Greek manuscript tradition in several respects.

First, ibn Lūqā begins with the Anaxagorean opinion (iii) and completes it:

"Anaxagoras believed that animals (ayawānāt) are nourished from moisture (bi-'r-

ruūbati) which each of their organs draws in during feeding and nourishing. They

grow when they acquire a lot of nourishment, but become weak and infirm when

they lose a lot."100

Second, in ibn Lūqā's text the line about humans of today being like newborns in

comparison to the first humans (ii) occurs immediately following the preceding quotation

and thus is attributed to Anaxagoras, not Empedocles.101 Third, ibn Lūqā's rendition of the

Empedoclean opinion (i) is, otherwise, identical to that of the Greek tradition, with the

exception of one word. The Arabic has " bi-'r-ruūbati," which corresponds to the Greek

"uJgrou'," rather than an Arabic word corresponding to "tou' oijkeivou." Thus, ibn Lūqā's

version translates:

"Empedocles (says that) ta; zw/'a are nourished through the settling down of

moisture (tou' uJgrou') and that they grow through the presence of heat; they

diminish and perish (meiou'sqai kai; fqivnein) through the lack of each one

(eJkatevrwn)."102

The phrase "each one" (eJkatevrwn) can now be seen to refer to moisture and heat

respectively. On this reading, moisture is responsible for nourishment in the sense of

increase of bulk, while heat is responsible for vertical growth. The phrase "each one"—

that is, moisture and heat (rather than that which is akin and heat)— further confirms that

"uJgrou'" is the correct reading.

40

As we have seen, Pseudo-Plutarch 5.26 concerns the generation of plants and

whether they are animals. A long Empedoclean opinion on this subject includes the

following claims:

"… Trees grow by being raised out by the heat in the earth … Fruits are excesses

of water and fire in the plants. Those (plants) that are deficient in moisture

because it is evaporated by heat in summer drop their leaves … Differences in

flavors come from variations in the earth and seasons and from the plants drawing

in different homoiomeries from their source of nourishment …"

Considering these claims in conjunction with the opinion at 5.27 we can infer that plants

grow vertically through the absorption of heat, derived from fire, and that they are

nourished by moisture, derived from water. These inferences conform with ibn Lūqā's

presentation of the Empedoclean opinions in 5.27 that "ta; zw/'a are nourished through the

settling down of moisture (tou' uJgrou')103 and that they grow through the presence of

heat." This conclusion, in turn, supports the conclusion that the Empedoclean opinion on

nourishment and growth at 5.27 pertains to plants.104

Consequently, I suggest that we can make the following sense of the opinion at

5.28. First, in view of the comparison of (E1), (S1), and (A1) from the preceding section,

now considered in conjunction with our discussion of the broader context of Pseudo-

Plutarch in the Greek and Arabic traditions, we should render the clause pertaining to

pleasure at 5.28 as:

"ta;" de; hJdona;" ejx uJgrou' kata; ta;" th'" aujxhvsew" kinhvsei" kai; tw'n

oJmoivwn sugkrivsei"."

41

"Pleasures come from moisture in accordance with movements of growth and the

blending of like elements."

Consequently, the first two clauses of the Empedoclean opinion at Pseudo-Plutarch 5.28

should be rendered:

"Empedocles holds that desires occur in animals according to their deficiencies

(ejlleivyei") in those elements that complete each one. And pleasures come from

moisture in accordance with movements of growth and the blending of like

elements …"105

The phrase "ejx uJgrou'" can now be understood as referring to the moisture that nourishes

plants. As 5.27 states, plants "diminish and perish (meiou'sqai kai; fqivnein) through the

lack (e[kleiyin) of each one (eJkatevrwn, again, heat and moisture)." Thus, pleasure is

conceived as a function of replenishing a lack of moisture. Moreover, the replenishment

of moisture, which pleasure accompanies, occurs (in some unspecified way) in

accordance with the process of growth. Perhaps this can be taken to mean that when

plants absorb moisture, they do not merely increase in bulk, but that their increase in bulk

conforms to their vertical growth.

Let us now consider the rendition of the last clause of 5.28 on pain. Ibn Lūqā's

Greek text probably read: "ta;" de; ojclhvsei" kata; ta;" tw'n ejnantivwn sugkrivsei"

kai; kravsei"." This is similar to the final clause at Stobaeus 1.50.31: "(ta;" dæ ajlghdovna"

toi'" ejnantivoi": [h]] ajllotriou'sqai ga;r pro;" a[lla o{sa diafevrei) katav te th;n

suvgkrisin kai; th;n tw'n stoiceivwn kra'sin." Thus, Pseudo-Plutarch's Empedoclean

opinion on pain might be rendered in English as: "pains come from the blending and

mixing of opposite elements." But if this is approximately correct, it is also problematic

42

in light of our preceding conclusion regarding the opinion on pleasure; for if pleasure

arises not only from the blending of like elements, but from moisture in accordance with

movements of growth, then one would expect some correlative point about pain; for

example, pain arises from the blending of opposite elements, but also from lack of

moisture or movements antithetical to growth. One explanation of this problem is that

Pseudo-Plutarch's Empedoclean opinion on pain is abbreviated. Indeed, Pseudo-Plutarch

generally abbreviates Aëtius. If so, however, then Stobaeus' report must also be

abbreviated. This is, at least, consistent with Mansfeld and Runia's general conclusions

regarding Stobaeus' method of excerpting.106 But since Stobaeus' and ibn Lūqā's

formulations of the Empedoclean opinion on pain are nearly identical, there should be a

more reasonable explanation for why the opinion on pain does not precisely correlate

with the opinion on pleasure.

A second explanation derives from the view, defended in section II, that Aëtius

himself was responsible for combining Empedoclean opinions on desire, on the one hand,

and pleasure and pain, on the other. In doing so, Aëtius seems to have been under the

influence of a familiar conception of pleasure related to desire-satisfaction. As we have

seen, the Empedoclean opinion identifies desire as arising from a lack and pleasure as

accompanying the remedy of the lack. The desire-satisfaction conception of pleasure is

relatively easy to square with a conception of pleasure based on the blending of like

elements since the remedying of a lack can be understood as supplying a deficient

elemental portion with a replenishing homogeneous elemental portion. But the desire-

satisfaction conception of pleasure squares less easily with a correlative conception of

pain based on the blending of opposite elements. In this case, pain is understood to arise

43

when, following desire, an elemental supply of one kind mixes with a deficient elemental

portion of a heterogeneous kind. However, this conception does not explain the pain of

lack itself, assuming, as the desire-satisfaction model typically does, that pain arises

precisely from a lack. Consequently, the failure of precise correlation between Pseudo-

Plutarch's, and thus Aëtius', Empedoclean opinions on pleasure and on pain, may reflect

an inherent difficulty in Aëtius' combination of opinions on desire, on the one hand, and

on pleasure and pain, on the other.

We now have good reason to believe that the Empedoclean opinion on desire at

Aëtius' Placita 5.28 concerns botanical appetite, regardless of whether the opinion was

put to use to explain appetite in animals as well as plants. However, we still have not

identified the source of this Empedoclean opinion. The main purpose of this section has

been to show that the Empedoclean opinion on desire essentially concerns botanical

desire and to emphasize the role of the Arabic tradition in illuminating this point. In the

follow section IX, I suggest the identity of the source of Aëtius' Empedoclean opinion on

desire. Before we turn to that discussion, however, one outstanding issue concerning

Pseudo-Plutarch's Placita 5.27 deserves consideration.

Recall (ii) from Pseudo-Plutarch's Placita 5.27: "But humans of today in

comparison to the first humans have the form of newborns." We have noted that in the

Greek tradition, (ii) follows the Empedoclean opinion on nourishment and growth (i);

however, in ibn Lūqā's translation (ii) follows the Anaxagorean opinion on nourishment

and growth (iii). Two questions, thus, present themselves. First, to whom does (ii)

belong?107 And second, doesn't the fact that (ii) concerns humans complicate, if not

44

undermine, the argument that the Empedoclean opinion (i) at Placita 5.27 concerns

botanical nourishment and growth?

The contents of (ii) are not consistent with any of the testimonies or fragments of

Empedocles or Anaxagoras.108 Thus, it seems likely that (ii) belongs to another

philosopher and that indeed it is misplaced in both the Greek and Arabic traditions. The

most likely candidate for proponent of (ii) is Anaximander, for testimonies attribute to

him the opinion that the first humans emerged fully-formed from fish or fish-like

creatures;109 accordingly, in comparison to the first humans, humans of today would look

like newborns. At Pseudo-Plutarch's Placita 5.19, whose rubric is "Concerning the

generation of animals, how animals were generated and whether they are destructible,"

the Anaximandrean testimony is described of the first land animals (zw'/a), not humans

specifically; however, in Censorinus and Plutarch, it is described of humans.110 Since,

most likely, (ii) is not an opinion of Empedocles or Anaxagoras and does not belong at

Placita 5.27, it should not further complicate our argument that the Empedoclean opinion

on nourishment and growth at 5.27, that is (i), concerns plants. Consequently, I now turn

to the source of Aëtius' Empedoclean opinions on botany.

IX. Aristotle' On Plants and Aëtius' Empedoclean Opinion on Botanical Appetite

A work On Plants in two books is listed in Diogenes Laertius' catalogue of

Aristotle's writings.111 Alexander says that the work was lost,112 thus lost, at least to

Alexander and his circle, by the late second century CE. Aristotle himself refers to such a

work nine times, sometimes obliquely, sometimes directly.113 Fragments from the work

45

compiled by Rose are negligible.114 However, as H. J. Drossart Lulofs has argued,

fragments from Aristotle's On Plants can be gleaned from the Aristotelian On Plants.115

The treatise On Plants in the Aristotelian corpus has an extraordinary pedigree; it

is a thirteenth century Greek translation, perhaps by Maximus Planudes,116 of a late

twelfth or early thirteenth century Latin translation, by Alfred of Sarashel,117 of an Arabic

translation made sometime before the ninth century, by Ish≥āq ibn H≥unayn,118 of a Syriac

translation of uncertain date or authorship, of a lost Greek original by the Peripatetic

Nicolaus of Damascus, who lived during the Augustan Age and thus composed the work

in the late first century BCE or early first century CE.119 Since the Syriac translation

survives only in fragments,120 the Arabic translation, as Drossaart Lulofs says, "ought to

be regarded as the central text on which all others depend."121 The Arabic translation

gives the following title: "The Treatise on Plants by Aristotle: An Adaptation of

Nicolaus." Indeed, as Drossaart Lulofs has argued, Nicolaus' work is an adaptation of

Aristotle's On Plants, which also heavily depends on Theophrastus' botanical works.122

For our purposes, the most significant passages of the Syriac-Arabic-Latin-Greek

work are the doxographical ones, which occur at the beginning of book 1. Nicolaus refers

to botanical opinions of Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Democritus, and Plato.123 While

Theophrastus occasionally cites the botanical opinions of Empedocles, Anaxagoras,

Democritus, and Plato in his own botanical works,124 none of the botanical opinions

attributed to these pre-Aristotelian theorists in Nicolaus' On Plants derives from

Theophrastus. This strongly suggests that this doxographical material from Nicolaus' On

Plants derives from Aristotle's On Plants. In particular, Nicolaus refers to the views of

Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Democritus, and Plato on the psychological capacities of

46

plants. We cited several of these above. In brief, Empedocles and Anaxagoras are said to

maintain that plants have perception and experience pleasure and pain.125 Empedocles,

Anaxagoras, and Democritus maintain that plants have reason and understanding.126

Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and Plato attribute desire to plants.127 And Anaxagoras

maintains that plants are animals.128 These opinions are then contrasted with the

Aristotelian view that plants do not have these higher psychological capacities. Thus, it

appears that one of the topics Aristotle discussed in On Plants was the range of

psychological capacities of plants, and it appears that, presumably early in book 1,

Aristotle discussed and criticized the views of his predecessors Empedocles, Anaxagoras,

Democritus, and Plato on the subject. This well conforms to Aristotle's doxographical

habits in his surviving works.

Finally, one doxographical passage in Nicolaus' On Plants, which I assume

derives from Aristotle's On Plants, is paralleled in Aëtius 5.26. The Empedoclean opinion

at Aëtius 5.26 begins: "Empedocles says that trees were the first zw/'a to grow up from the

earth, before the sun was unfolded around it and before night and day were separated."

The Arabic translation of Nicolaus' On Plants reports: "the statement of Empedocles is

excellent, namely that plants were generated when the world was incomplete."129

In sum, the evidence suggests that some of the doxographical material on botany

at Aëtius 5.26, the Empedoclean and Anaxagorean opinions on nourishment and growth

at 5.27 (both of which, as I have argued, concern plants), and also the Empedoclean

opinion on desire at 5.28 (which again, as I have argued, concerns botanical appetite)

derive from Aristotle's On Plants. This conclusion also nicely squares with our evidence

from Nicomachean Ethics concerning Empedocles' cosmological principle of elemental

47

attraction. If Aristotle's On Plants did discuss Empedocles' conception of botanical

appetite, then presumably Aristotle's account would have been informed by Aristotle's

view that Empedocles was committed to the cosmological principle.

X. Conclusion to the Doxographical Material

The following diagram represents the doxographical tradition on Empedocles on

desire, pleasure, and pain, according to the preceding results:

ibn Lūqā's Placita Pseudo-Plutarch's Placita Stobaeus' Anthology Nicolaus' On Plants Aëtius' Placita Aristotle's On Plants

Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics

Theophrastus' On the Senses

Plato's Lysis Aristotle's On the Soul/Metaphysics

Empedocles' On Nature

The diagram distinguishes two pre-Aëtian doxographical lineages, one pertaining

to Empedoclean opinions on desire, the other pertaining to Empedoclean opinions on

pleasure and pain.130 The doxographical lineage on desire begins with Plato's Lysis where

the cosmological principle of homogeneous elemental attraction is implicitly attributed to

Empedocles. This cosmological principle is also conceived as a principle of desire or

motivation; in other words, it is conceived as a psychological principle. In this respect

Plato is closer to Empedocles than Aristotle is. For instance, I have recently emphasized

48

that in Lysis "Plato develops the view that human filiva is one, albeit for us humans

especially important, instance of a much more general condition … filiva is analyzed as a

two-place relation whose participants (fivloi) may or may not be humans."131 For

example, Socrates considers one theory in which the wet desires the dry and the cold

desires the hot.132

In Nicomachean Ethics 8, Aristotle appropriates the cosmological principle of

elemental attraction from Lysis, also deploying it in an examination of friendship and also

within the Platonic framework of a dichotomy between conceptions of friendship based

on likeness and opposition. Aristotle explicitly attributes the principle to Empedocles. In

contrast to Plato, however, Aristotle himself would not have regarded the cosmological

principle as a principle of desire since Aristotle denies that entities more psychologically

basic than animals have desires.

Ibn Lūqā's Arabic translation of Pseudo-Plutarch's Placita helps illuminate the

view that Aëtius' Empedoclean opinion on desire more specifically concerns appetite in

plants. The Syriac-Arabic-Latin-Greek tradition of Nicolaus of Damascus' On Plants

supports the view that the source of Aëtius' Empedoclean opinion on botanical appetite is

book 1 of Aristotle's lost treatise On Plants. Given this, Aristotle's account of

Empedocles' conception of botanical appetite was presumably informed by Aristotle's

own conception of Empedocles' commitment to the cosmological principle of

homogeneous elemental attraction. Indeed, the cosmological principle is an analytic

component of the nutritional principle. The nutritional principle supplements the

cosmological principle with the interrelated concepts of deficiency and completion and

49

the interrelated concepts of subjective and objective complements within a physiological

system.

Strictly speaking, the doxographical lineage on Empedocles on pleasure and pain

begins with Theophrastus' On the Senses; however, Aristotle's On the Soul significantly

influences Theophrastus' treatment. In On the Soul Aristotle interprets Empedocles'

fragment B107 to imply that Empedocles was committed to a conception of knowledge

and perception involving the elemental homogeneity of subject and object. Since B107

speaks of knowledge as well as h{desqai and ajnia'sqai, Theophrastus applies Aristotle's

interpretation of B107 to these Greek concepts, concepts Theophrastus himself interprets,

within the context of his discussion of the physiology of perception, as sensations of

pleasure and pain.

This Theophrastean interpretation of Empedoclean opinions on pleasure and pain

is, however, only one of two in On the Senses and a minor one at that. Theophrastus

simultaneously maintains— still under the influence of Aristotle's schematization,

although perhaps on the basis of his own interpretation of Empedocles— that

Empedocles' conception of perception depends upon likeness. But here likeness is

understood as structural conformity between effluences and pores. Furthermore,

Theophrastus applies this interpretation to pleasure and pain so that pleasure is

understood to arise through the structural conformity of effluences and pores, while pain

arises through non-conformity. I doubt that Theophrastus regards these two

interpretations of pleasure and pain as compatible, especially since he criticizes as itself

inconsistent Empedocles' conception of pain based on structural non-conformity of

50

effluences and pores. Still, in what survives, Theophrastus does not explicitly address the

relation between the two interpretations.

Aëtius appropriates Theophrastus' conceptual framework for the interpretation of

Empedoclean opinions on pleasure and pain based on likeness and opposition. Yet Aëtius

understands likeness and opposition here as elemental homogeneity, not as structural

conformity or non-conformity of effluences and pores. Elsewhere in the Placita Aëtius

also appropriates Theophrastus' Empedoclean account of perception as structural

conformity between effluences and pores, but that account does not figure in Aëtius'

Empedoclean opinion on pleasure and pain.

Aëtius himself appears responsible for uniting the doxographical lineages on

Empedocles on desire or appetite and on pleasure and pain. One consequence of this

unification is precisely the exclusion of the Theophrastean conception of Empedoclean

pleasure as involving likeness understood as structural conformity of effluences and

pores. This seems to be due to Aëtius' understanding of Empedocles' conception of

pleasure according to a desire-satisfaction model and because the object and subject of

desire are elementally homogeneous. Thus, pleasure arises through the restoration of a

deficit, and that restoration involves the conjunction of homogeneous elements.

Two final points about the doxographical tradition. First, the diagram above is

based on knowledge and hypotheses that are limited by the paucity of extant texts. For

example, it has been thought that Theophrastus' On the Senses is a constituent of

Theophrastus' Physical Opinions; however, the jury remains out.133 If it were confirmed

that On the Senses is one of the books of the Physical Opinions and if Theophrastus'

Physical Opinions included sections on plants and their psychological capacities that

51

were indebted to Aristotle's On Plants, our account and the accompanying diagram would

change. More generally, the diagram should not be interpreted to suggest definitively that

there were no intermediate sources between Aëtius and Aristotle's On Plants, on the one

hand, and Theophrastus' On the Senses, on the other. For example, whether Aëtius

derived Aristotle's Empedoclean nutritional principle directly from Aristotle's On Plants

or from an intermediate source is unclear.

The second point concerns the role of diaireseis based on likeness and opposition

within the doxographical material. One such diairesis is explicit in the cosmological

principle in Plato and Aristotle. Who knows whether some such diairesis informed

Aristotle's discussion of appetite in On Plants? Another such diairesis is explicit in

Theophrastus' doxography of theories of perception and knowledge. While Theophrastus'

account of Empedocles' conception of cognition and perception is, in this respect,

specifically indebted to Aristotle, no passage in the Aristotelian corpus confirms that

Aristotle himself is responsible for initiating such a diairesis in doxography on perception

and cognition generally. Likewise, no such evidence derives from Plato's dialogues.

Nonetheless, Plato's formative role in what may be called diairetic doxography should be

appreciated. This role is confirmed by the diairesis in Lysis itself and the fact that Plato is

responsible for the introduction of the diairetic method in dialectic generally.134

PART TWO: EMPEDOCLES' FRAGMENTS

I. Some Terminology and General Remarks

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I begin the discussion of those Empedoclean fragments in which the concepts of

desire, pleasure, and pain occur by introducing some terminology and making some

general remarks about the place of desire, pleasure, and pain in Empedocles' cosmos.

Empedocles uses the word "roots" (rJizwvmata) to refer to earth, water, air, and

fire, the material elements of the cosmos.135 The word "root" only loosely corresponds to

the doxographers' word "element" (stoicei'on) since the word "element" is used to refer

to Love and Strife as well as to the roots. In contrast to the doxographers, I will use the

word "principle" to cover the four roots plus Love and Strife.

It will be convenient to speak of "radical portions" as well as "roots." By a

"radical portion" I mean "a part of a root." To some extent, this phrase is supported by

Empedocles' own language at B22.1-2 where "the gleam (of the sun), earth, sky, and sea"

are described as "fitted together with their own parts (eJautw'n mevressin)." Admittedly,

the phrase "radical portion" is somewhat misleading since Empedocles himself

understands the four roots qua roots to be ingredients of things. As such, a root may be

and usually is a portion of a complex. Consequently, the reader should understand that I

am using the phrase "radical portion" in contrast to "radical mass," where, for instance,

the Earth, understood as the aggregation of all earth in the cosmos, constitutes a radical

mass of earth and thus the root earth in a fully unified state; earth as a radical portion

would be any part or subset of this radical mass, from a handful to a mountain.

I will distinguish desires and aversions as two motivational attitudes. The

motivation of one entity to congregate with another, I will call a "desire"; the motivation

of one entity to separate from another, I will call an "aversion." I will speak of an entity's

desire for a heterogeneous entity as a "heterogeneous desire," for example, a portion of

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fire's desire to congregate with a portion of air. I will speak of an entity's desire for a

homogeneous entity as a "homogeneous desire," for example, a portion of fire's desire to

congregate with another portion of fire.136 Accordingly, I will also speak of

heterogeneous and homogeneous aversions. For example, a portion of fire's motivation to

separate from a portion of water is a heterogeneous aversion, while a portion of fire's

motivation to separate from another portion of fire is a homogeneous aversion.

Now, some general remarks about the place of desire, pleasure, and pain within

Empedocles' conception of nature. First, it must be emphasized that, in a way, the

doxographers mislead us by the very fact that they suggest that Empedocles had opinions

on the subjects of desire, pleasure, and pain. This is misleading insofar as Empedocles

nowhere deliberately sets out to answer questions such as "Whence do desires and

pleasures derive?" While desire, in particular, plays a salient role within the cosmological

and perhaps botanical and zoological aspects of Empedocles' poem, the distinction of

desire, pleasure, and pain as explicit topics of ontological and psychological inquiry

arises only later in the Greek theoretical tradition. Consequently, it is more accurate to

speak less abstractly of the role that the concepts of desire, pleasure, and pain play within

Empedocles' poem, Empedocles' understanding of these concepts, his commitments

associated with them, and the contexts in which they are deployed.

For Empedocles, the roots are alive and divine. The roots are alive insofar as they

have psychological functions, including motivation, emotion, and reason. Insofar as the

roots are ungenerated and indestructible, they are divine.137 In contrast, what we call

biological kinds, in particular plants and animals, are not divine, but generated and

destroyed within phases of the endless cosmic cycle. On the other hand, since plants and

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animals are composed of complexes of radical portions, they are alive and possess higher

psychological functions. The relation between the psychological capacities of radical

portions themselves and the heterogeneous complexes of radical portions that they

constitute is, however, not examined in the fragments in a systematic way— although

such relations are understood to exist and explained in some instances.

Empedocles certainly has a theory of perception, especially visual perception, but

no fragments suggest that he had a particular interest in explaining pleasure and pain as

sensations or dimensions of perception. In contrast, desire or rather motivation is a salient

concept in his thought about the roots and compounds (assuming, as I do, that it is wrong

and anachronistic to dismiss talk of motivations as mere metaphor). To take a pertinent

point of contrast—in Aristotle's physical treatises,138 the examination of desire occurs

within the context of explaining psychological functions and differentiating forms of life.

In the sublunary sphere, yuchv itself and higher psychological functions largely correlate

with increasing organic complexity. For example, Aristotle grants plants yucaiv and

specifically the psychic functions of nutrition and growth; but he denies that plants have

desire or perception, in part because they lack adequate capacity for thermoregulation.139

Moreover, Aristotle wholly denies yucaiv to the basic material elements and

homoiomeries.140

For Empedocles, interest in motivation seems to arise in the context of explaining

change and the dynamics of the cosmos more broadly. The phenomena we group under

kinematics and dynamics, on the one hand, and the psychology of motivation and

behavior, on the other hand, Empedocles largely does not conceive as subject to different

forms of explanation. In addition, the sources of motivation in roots and complexes of

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radical portions are, for the most part, not conceived as intrinsic to subjects, in the sense

that the psyches of subjects are not conceived as their primary sources. Rather, the

principles of Love and Strife, which are also divinities and conceived as ontologically

independent from the roots, are the primary causes and sources of desire and aversion

respectively. As such, Empedocles' conception of motivation has strong affinities to the

Archaic conception of anthropomorphic divinities responsible for producing

psychological states in humans and animals. Empedocles' conception of the elements and

forces of nature is more anthropomorphic than Aristotle's, even while it is less so than

Homer's.

In order to show how the doxographical tradition differs from the primary

evidence for Empedocles' views on motivation and hedonic experience, I now turn to a

critical survey of that evidence, beginning with the motivation of the roots.

II. Empedocles' Fragments on the Motivations of the Roots

In Empedocles' fragments radical portions have heterogeneous desires. Indeed,

Empedocles repeatedly speaks of Love as mixing and blending heterogeneous radical

portions:

"… at one time all coming together into one by means of love."141

"… from the blending of water and earth and aither and sun, the forms and colors

of mortals came to be, which have now come to be, fitted together by Aphrodite

…"142

"As Kypris, then, when she had moistened earth in rain, gave it fierce fire to

strengthen, while preparing shapes."143

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Love does not merely blend heterogeneous radical portions, she influences the desires of

heterogeneous radical portions so that these portions desire to blend and mix. For

example, at B21.8 we read that the roots "come together in love and are desired

(poqei'tai) by one another." Consequently, the cosmological principle of the attraction of

homogeneous radical portions— implicit in Plato, explicitly attributed to Empedocles in

Aristotle, and an analytic constituent of Aëtius' opinion— is incomplete; in Empedocles'

poem radical portions are described as having heterogeneous as well as homogeneous

desires.

At least two fragments directly support the view that radical portions have

homogeneous desires. In B62.6 fire is said to rise up, "wanting to reach its like (qevlon

pro;" oJmoi'on iJkevsqai)." Similarly, in B110.9 things are said to "desire to reach their own

familiar kind (poqevonta fivlhn ejpi; gevnnan iJkevsqai)." I suggest that "things," the

subject in B110.9, refers to the roots. In B110 Empedocles is encouraging Pausanias to

cultivate stable wisdom. Stable wisdom is understood to consist of certain mixtures.

Empedocles cautions Pausanias that if his thoughts are distracted by worthless (deila;)

matters, the mixtures constitutive of wisdom will dissolve and the radical portions will

disperse and re-congregate with their own kinds.

Observe that in B110 and in B62 radical portions or roots are characterized as

desiring to arrive at (pro;" or ejpi; iJkevsqai) homogeneous radical portions. Neither B62

nor B110 nor any other fragment speaks of radical portions desiring to mix (meignuvnai)

or blend (kerannuvnai) with homogeneous radical portions.144 In other words, Empedocles

uses "mi'xi"" and "kra'si"" to refer to conjunctions of heterogeneous entities. Among the

surviving fragments, there is no distinct term for homogeneous conjunction. Hereafter I

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will continue to use the words "conjunction" and "congregation" to cover both

homogeneous and heterogeneous conjunction or congregation. The homogeneous desires

of radical portions, then, are homogeneous desires for congregation or conjunction, but

not for mixture or blending.

B110 expands upon the idea that unattended mixtures of radical portions in the

mind, if neglected, may dissolve, desiring to arrive at their own kind: "for … all things

have intelligence (frovnhsin) and a share of thought (vvnwvmato")."145 Wright comments:

"the basic frovnhsi" … exhibited by earth, air, fire, and water is an awareness of another

part like itself and a tendency to move toward it …"146 Thus, Wright suggests that radical

portions have homogeneous desires. Moreover, Wright suggests that these homogeneous

desires are, in some sense, intrinsic to the radical portions. Carl Müller—although not in

commenting on this passage— also maintains that radical portions have motivations of

self-love (Eigen-Liebe).147 But Müller's position differs from Wright's since Müller

attributes this self-love to Love.148 In other words, Müller does not suggest that such

homogeneous desires are intrinsic to radical portions. It is worthwhile to determine which

view is correct.

While B62 and B110 provide evidence that radical portions have homogeneous

desires, these fragments do not per se indicate that these homogeneous desires are

intrinsic. The source of radical portions' homogeneous desires is, therefore, questionable.

In considering this question, it helps to distinguish the homogeneous desires of radical

portions, whether or not intrinsic, from their heterogeneous aversions. Consider the

following fragments:

"And in wrath all (the roots) are distinct in form and separate."149

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"And at another time again all (the roots) being born apart separately by the

hostility of Strife."150

These fragments suggest that radical mixtures separate under the influence of Strife and

thus that Strife influences radical portions' motivations to separate. Precisely, Strife is

responsible for radical portions' heterogeneous aversions. Consequently, the conjunction

of homogeneous radical portions must be explained by two motivations: the aversion due

to Strife that motivates the radical portion to separate from heterogeneous radical portions

and the desire to congregate with homogeneous radical portions. These two motivations

are indeed distinct since in a cosmos in which only Strife's motivational influence

existed, radical portions would be separated from heterogeneous radical portions, but

would not also congregate with homogeneous radical portions. Such a universe might

appear mottled and consist of randomly ordered and sized radical portions; there would

be no guarantee that congregation of homogeneous radical portions would occur.

So, again, the question is whether the homogeneous desire is intrinsic, as Wright

suggests, or due to Love and as such extrinsic, as Müller suggests. Müller supports his

position by referring to B22, which begins:

"For all these things— the gleam (of the sun) and earth and sky and sea— are

fitted together (a[rqmia) with their own parts, which had become separated from

them in mortal things."

Müller suggests that the word "a[rqmia," here used to describe the conjunction of radical

portions, implies that Love is responsible for the conjunction of the homogeneous radical

portions because the word "a[rqmia" is used elsewhere among the fragments to refer to

the conjunctive activity of Love.151 In support of this, Müller cites B17.23:

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"by her [Love] they think loving thoughts and accomplish conjunctive (a[rqmia)

deeds."152

This is strong evidence. Thus, I suggest that Wright is wrong: radical portions'

homogeneous desires are not intrinsic; it is not the radical portion itself, but Love, albeit

within the radical portion, that is responsible for the radical portion's homogeneous

desire.

Granted this, the question whether homogeneous desires of radical portions are

intrinsic may be posed again, but according to a different and weaker sense of "intrinsic."

The homogeneous desire may not be intrinsic because its source is not the radical portion

itself, but it may be intrinsic because its source is Love as Eigen-Liebe, homogeneous

desire, that is ever-present in radical portions. There is good reason to think that radical

portions' homogeneous desires are not intrinsic in this alternative sense either. If

homogeneous desires were ever-present in radical portions and Love were responsible for

these desires, then a radical portion's separation from homogeneous portions and

conjunction with heterogeneous radical portions through the influence of Love would be

impossible. In this case, Love would simultaneously be responsible for two conjointly

unrealizable motivations: a homogeneous and a heterogeneous desire.153 Consequently,

when Love prevails upon a radical portion to mix, Love must then relinquish influence

upon that radical portion's homogeneous desire. Thus, homogeneous desire is not

intrinsic to a radical portion in this second sense of "intrinsic" either. Homogeneous

desire is not ever-present in radical portions.

From this it follows that there is an apparent asymmetry between the motivational

influences of Love and Strife on radical portions. Dissolution of mixture requires a

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homogeneous desire, due to Love, and a heterogeneous aversion, due to Strife. But while

the formation of mixtures requires heterogeneous desire due to Love, it does not require a

complementary homogeneous aversion due to Strife. Indeed, Müller emphasizes: "das

Gleichartige kann sich nicht verfeinden."154 I would more cautiously say that there is no

evidence in the fragments that radical portions are subject to homogeneous aversions.

Given the preceding account of the motivations of radical portions, it remains to

consider a complication pertaining to the role of radical portions' intrinsic properties. At

the culmination of Strife's influence, the cosmos is composed of concentric spheres of

earth, water, air, and fire, thus ordered from the center to the periphery. We have seen

that this organization of the roots or their radical portions results from heterogeneous

aversions due to Strife and homogeneous desires due to Love.155 However, this

organization of the concentric spheres cannot merely result from these extrinsic aversions

and desires, for these extrinsic motivations alone do not explain this particular ordering of

the concentric spheres. For instance, why at the apex of Strife's power should the cosmos

not be composed of concentric spheres of air, water, fire, and earth, thus ordered from its

center to its periphery? To explain the order Empedocles proposes and which loosely

corresponds to the present state of the world, geocentrically conceived, Empedocles

appears to rely on the view that radical portions have intrinsic properties.

That roots or radical portions have intrinsic properties is explicit at B17.28: "each

[root] has a distinct prerogative (timh'") and its own character (h\qo")." Empedocles'

attribution of distinct timaiv to the roots is an adaptation of traditional theological beliefs.

Wright comments: "Empedocles' description of the individual timai of the roots … recalls

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directly Homer's language on the … allotment of powers enjoyed by Zeus, Poseidon, and

Hades."156 Some of the specific intrinsic properties of the roots are described at B21.3-6:

"… the sun, bright to look upon and hot in every respect … and rain, in all things

cold and dark; and there flow from the earth things dense and solid."

Additionally, the Armenian translation of Philo's On Providence contains the following

claim about an intrinsic property of aither:

"Moreover, aither, being much lighter (than earth) moves all around it without

diversion."157

These passages encourage the view that the order of concentric spheres under the

dominion of Strife is to be explained, among other things, by the relative weights of

radical portions, with earth at the center because heaviest and fire at the periphery

because lightest.158 This interpretation of such intrinsic properties further complicates the

account of the motivation of radical portions. For instance, do the intrinsic properties of

radical portions imply that these portions have intrinsic kinetic tendencies, say, toward or

away from the center of the sphere? If so, should we also distinguish the intrinsic kinetic

tendencies of radical portions from their intrinsic combinatorial dispositions? If so, how

should we distinguish their intrinsic combinatorial dispositions from the influences of

Love and Strife upon their mixings and dissolutions?

It is not clear to me how to resolve these questions, but I would like to consider

several fragments relevant to them, beginning with B91:

"[Water is] more easily fitted to wine, but with oil it does not want (ejqevlei) [to

fit]."

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In explaining the ease and difficulty of fit among water and wine, on the one hand, and

water and oil, on the other hand, Empedocles might appeal to the intrinsic properties of

these substances. However, the use of "ejqevlei" complicates this interpretation. The verb

might, instead, encourage the attribution of the motivation of a radical portion such as

that of water to the influence of Love or Strife upon it. In short, while water evidently has

an aversion to mixing with oil, it is unclear whether this aversion is due to intrinsic

properties of water and oil or whether it is due to Strife.

Consider also B22.4-5:

"In the same way (wJ" au[tw"), as many as are more apt to blend (krh'sin

ejparkeva) have come to be loved by one another, made alike (oJmoiwqevntæ) by

Aphrodite."

The adverbial phrase "wJ" au[tw"" indicates that the account in B22.4-5 relates to a

preceding account. The preceding account (B22.1-3), discussed above, concerns the

conjunction of homogeneous radical portions in the great masses of the sun, sky, sea, and

earth. As I suggested, following Müller, Empedocles' use of "a[rqmia" in B22.1 indicates

that Love is responsible for the conjunction of the homogeneous radical portions in these

great masses. The phrase "wJ" au[tw"," therefore, indicates that the contents of B22.4-5

refer to a different set of entities.159 I assume that the entities in question are mixtures, as

my interpretation of "krh'sin" above would suggest, and thus that they are non-elemental

stuffs. Presumably, they are stuffs out of which, for instance, animals and plants are

composed. I suggest that the claim that the radical constituents of such stuffs are "more

apt to blend" is a claim about the intrinsic properties of the radical constituents, as, for

instance, water and wine are more apt to blend, whereas water and oil are less apt. But, as

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in B91, it is difficult to draw a distinction between the intrinsic and extrinsic sources of

the radical portions' motivations here. Indeed, at B22.5 Love is explicitly said to

participate in the blending.

At B22.5 Love is also said to make the radical portions alike (oJmoiwqevntæ). There

are two other fragments in which the word "oJmoi'o"" or it cognate is used. At B62.6,

discussed above, a portion of fire is said to seek its like (oJmoi'on). In this case oJmoiovth" is

understood in terms of the homogeneity of radical portions. At B17.35 Empedocles says

of radical portions throughout the cosmic cycle: "they become different at different times

and are always perpetually alike (oJmoi'a)." In this case, oJmoiovth" is being contrasted with

ajlloivwsi" to convey the idea that although radical portions undergo certain changes

during the cosmic cycle, their intrinsic properties remain the same. This use of "oJmoi'o""

is, then, either identical or very close to the use of "oJmoi'o"" in B62.6.

In contrast, at B22.5 heterogeneous radical portions are said to become alike.

Consequently, this use of "oJmoiovth"" cannot be identical to the other two uses. To

explain the use of "oJmoiovth"" at B22.5, I suggest drawing a distinction between the

intrinsic properties of a radical portion, which never change, and what may be called the

"expression" of these intrinsic properties, which can be affected by the radical portion's

relation to heterogeneous radical portions. For example, the expression of heat of a

radical portion of fire is limited when that portion is mixed with a portion of intrinsically

cold water. I suggest that the oJmoiovth" or assimilation of the heterogeneous radical

portions in B22.5 entails that the expressions of the intrinsic properties of the

heterogeneous radical portions are suppressed when these portions become participants in

mixtures. Rather than expressing their intrinsic properties, the heterogeneous radical

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portions constitutive of the mixture express what we might call emergent properties of

the mixture. Since the emergent properties are products of the conjunction of the

heterogeneous radical constituents, the heterogeneous portions are thereby conceived as

becoming alike. In other words, in mixtures heterogeneous radical portions share a

common expression.

This view, that mixtures involve constraint of the expression of certain intrinsic

properties of radical portions, finds support at B26.2 where radical portions are said to

"decline (fqivnei) into one another." Again, at B26.7 it is said that as radical portions

grow together they "become subordinated (uJpevnerqe)."160 Insofar as the emergent

properties expressed by mixtures differ from the intrinsic properties, which would

otherwise be expressed by the constitutive radical portions, the declining and

subordination of the radical portions within mixtures refers to constraints upon the radical

portions' expression of their intrinsic properties.161 An example illustrative of this

condition may be derived from Katerina Ierodiakonou's discussion of Empedocles' view

that the mixture of various proportions of two particular radical portions, brilliant fire and

dark water, produces the full array of colors.162 Part of Ierodiakonou's explanation refers

to the fact that Greek painters, to which Empedocles himself refers at B23, often blended

their colors, not prior to application, but in layered washes; for instance, they layered a

blue over a yellow wash, rather than mixing blue and yellow and then applying the

mixture to the surface. This is a good example of the way the expression of a single

colored layer is constrained and subordinated through its combination with another layer

and, more generally, of the way the expression of intrinsic properties of radical portions

becomes limited when those radical portions congregate with heterogeneous portions.

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The preceding account of "oJmoiwqevnta" at B22.5 relates to the problem of the

motivations of radical portions as follows. We may now wonder whether a radical portion

has an intrinsic motivation to express its intrinsic properties. If it does not, then a radical

portion's motivation to express its intrinsic properties would appear to be due to Strife. In

short, it is unclear, in this respect, what is responsible for the individuation of radical

portions.

Finally, in closing this discussion of the motivations of the roots, I want to focus

on the way Love is characterized as influencing the desires of radical portions. Aristotle

himself might have understood the principle of homogeneous elemental attraction as a

physical rather than a psychological principle since he viewed material elements as

lacking yucaiv. However, on the basis of Empedocles' fragments such a de-psychologized

conception of the motivations of radical portions is untenable. Empedocles' roots are

living gods, not mindless matter. By "living," I mean that the roots engage in functions of

living things.163 In particular, at B110.10, Empedocles says that "(all the roots) have

thought and a share of understanding." And at B17.9, the roots are said to "have learned

(memavqhke) to grow as one from many."164

B17.9 indicates that radical portions learn to mix through the influence of Love.

The concept of learning (mavqhsi") suggests rational persuasion. Indeed, numerous

fragments associate persuasion with reasoning.165 Thus, Love influences the behavior of

radical portions, at least partly, through informing their understanding. But although Love

rationally persuades radical portions to congregate, we hear nothing of Strife persuading

radical portions when she influences their aversions. As such, it appears that Empedocles

understands the natures of desiderative influence and aversive influence differently.

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Indeed, it is questionable whether the aversive influence of Strife has a rational aspect at

all. The fragments provide no evidence to think so. If this is correct, it suggests that the

cosmic and microcosmic struggles between Love and Strife can be understood as

struggles between rational persuasion and brute compulsion.

III. Empedocles' Fragments on the Motivations of Stuffs

I turn now to the motivations of non-elemental entities. The topic is crucial for

evaluating the doxographers' attribution to Empedocles of the view that desire arises

through deficiency and more specifically of Empedocles' explanation of nutritional desire

and physiology.

In addition to the homogeneous desires of radical portions, B90 includes the

congregation of non-elemental stuffs: "Thus, sweet grasped sweet and bitter rushed to

bitter, sharp approached sharp, and hot was born to hot."166 B90 derives from book 4 of

Plutarch's Dinner Conversations. The guests are discussing the question whether a

variety of foods is more easily digested than a single kind. Philinos has argued that a

simple diet is more easily digested. Marcion retorts that in digestion the body naturally

distributes the various components in the various foods to the various bodily parts as

needed. The result, he says, is as Empedocles describes it. B90 now follows, and Macrion

continues: "… when the vital heat dissolves the compound, kindred things (ta; oijkei'a)

approach those of their own kind (toi'" suggenevsin)."167

On the basis of Plutarch's use of Empedocles' verses to explain digestion, it may

be assumed that the context in which Empedocles' verses occur in Empedocles' own

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poem is itself an account of digestion.168 In addition, we have Pseudo-Galen and Galen's

testimonies that Empedocles conceived of digestion as the rotting (sh'yi") of food:

"How do Hippocrates, Eristratus, Empedocles, and Asclepiades say that

concoctions of nourishment occur? … Empedocles by rotting (shvyei)."169

"These men had an ancient custom of calling 'unrotted' (a[shpta) what we call

'unconcocted.'"170

Empedocles evidently conceived of this aspect of the process of digestion as being akin

to decomposition. Presumably, he thought that the body must decompose food to make

appropriate use of its basic constituents. As such, the so-called putrefaction of food in

digestion appears to be akin to the work of Strife, separating complexes rather than

conjoining simples.171

Wright agrees: "It would seem that food is broken up by sh'yi" in the stomach."172

However, this is merely one aspect of the process of digestion, the decomposition of

food. What of distribution of nutritional elements through the body? Wright continues:

"[The decomposed food] then passes to the liver, where it is transformed into blood.173

The blood moves through the body and gives to each part what is necessary for nutrition

and growth." Support for the claim in the final sentence derives from the Greek tradition's

rendition of Pseudo-Plutarch 5.27: "[According to Empedocles,] animals are nourished

through the settling of that which is appropriate (dia; th;n uJpovstasin tou' oijkeivou)."

The Greek word "uJpovstasi"" refers to sedimentation or the distribution, by separation,

of a portion of a solution. "to; oijkei'on" presumably refers to the stuff or element that is

distributed in the body as needed.

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But we have an interpretive problem: we are relying on Pseudo-Plutarch's account

of Empedocles' view of nutrition in the broad context of explaining Empedocles'

conception of nutritional desire, although we have already found good reason to suspect

contents of Pseudo-Plutarch's report of Empedocles' view of nutritional desire. Indeed, as

we have seen, ibn Lūqā's translation suggests that the Greek should read "tou' uJgrou',"

not "tou' oijkeivou." At this point, we should return to the fragments themselves. At B98

we learn that blood and flesh derive from all the roots in nearly equal quantities. B96

specifies the composition of bone. B96 is particularly valuable since it suggests that Love

(cp. aJrmonivh") is responsible for the use of nutritional elements and precisely that Love

mixes the nutritional elements into the existing, if partially deficient, mixtures that

constitute the various stuffs that compose the body. For convenience I will refer to these

bodily stuffs as "physiological stuffs."

In sum, nutrition can broadly be understood as the decomposition of food into

nutritional elements under the influence of Strife followed by a re-composition of the

nutritional elements into physiological stuffs such as flesh, bone, and blood under the

influence of Love. It makes sense to think that both destruction and reconstruction

operate in the nutritional process, for nourishment involves the transmutation of one

thing, a food-stuff, into another, a physiological stuff. Moreover, this account nicely

squares with our discussion of the homogeneous and heterogeneous motivations of

radical portions, thus also corroborating it as the correct account of Empedocles'

explanation of nutrition.

The account does not, however, explain, at least not obviously, the nature of

nutritional desire. In light of the preceding, it is perhaps reasonable to speculate as

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follows. Assume that, for instance, thirst arises through the depletion of radical portions

constitutive of physiological stuffs, in this case water. In one sense, then, a deficit of

water evokes the desire for water. Thus, Stobaeus reports correctly: "(nutritional) desire

is for that which is like because of that which is lacking." Similarly, Pseudo-Plutarch:

"deficiencies (ejlleivyei") in those elements that complete (ajpotelouvntwn) each" animal.

The concepts of deficiency and completion imply precisely that the subject and object of

desire stand in a relation of mereological, if not more precisely quantitative,

complementarity. Similarly, Stobaeus' formulation speaks of a "refilling (ajnaplhvrwsin)

in accordance with the deficiency (to; ejllei'pon)."

A further question now arises. Assuming that physiological stuffs are subjects of

desire, in accounting for nutritional desire on the basis of depletion it might seem rather

paradoxical that strength of desire would increase with the diminution of the desiring

subject. The desires of diminished stuffs should be weaker than those of undiminished

stuffs. Given our account of physiological stuffs qua mixtures as subjects of desire, the

problem may be resolved as follows. Take the case of thirst again. Although thirst arises

from a deficit of water, it is not the quantum of water in the body per se that desires its

quantitative complement. Rather, some physiological stuff such as the blood or flesh is

the subject of desire. Thus, although the stuff in question is dehydrated, the other

elements constitutive of the mixture appeal through desire, so to speak, for hydration.

Now if the body is starving, at some point physiological stuffs will naturally become

weakened to the point that their motivational appeals for nutrition themselves diminish.

But this is consistent with the experience of famine with which the Greeks were certainly

familiar.

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IV. Empedocles' Fragments on Pleasure and Pain

Among Empedocles' fragments we hear a good deal about the miseries for which

Strife is responsible: exile from the gods,174 disease,175 unhappiness,176 ill will,177 anger,178

evil quarrels,179 and lamentations.180 In contrast, we hear relatively little about pleasure or

joy. At B35.13 the rush of Love is described as gentle "hjpiovfrwn." At B17.24 we are told

that mortals refer to Aphrodite as Joy (Ghqosuvnhn). At B128.1-6 we get a pleasant image

of the worship of Aphrodite, in a sort of prelapsarian age, before animal sacrifice and the

ascendancy of Strife:

"(Humans then) had no god Ares or Battle-Din … (Instead, they worshipped)

Queen Kypris … with pious images, painted pictures, and perfumes of varied

odors, sacrifices of pure myrrh and fragrant frankincense …"181

On the basis of these fragments, we are perhaps entitled to infer that, among plants,

animals, and humans, that is, during the zoological phases of the cosmic cycle, Strife is

responsible for or plays a salient role in the suffering and pain of these entities, while

Love is responsible for or plays a salient role in their joy and pleasure. Indeed, at the apex

of Love's influence, the cosmos is described as "fixed in the dense cover of harmony, a

rounded sphere, rejoicing (gaivwn) in its joyous (perighqevi) solitude."182 Granted this,

Strife dissolves mixtures, whereas Love engenders them. Therefore, the doxographers'

claims that according to Empedocles pleasure derives from the conjunction of

elementally homogeneous entities, while pain derives from the conjunction of

heterogeneous entities is misguided.

71

One further fragment includes the concepts h{desqai and ajnia'sqai (words I

momentarily leave untranslated) and deserves more careful consideration. In section III

of part one, I introduced and discussed Theophrastus' treatment of B107. Recall that in

this fragment Empedocles claims: "all things having been fittingly conjoined, and by

means of these (touvtoi") they have knowledge and experience pleasure (h{dontæ) and pain

(ajniw'ntai)." I previously translated "h{dontæ" and "ajniw'ntai" as "experience pleasure"

and "experience pain," in other words, as referring merely to sensations or perceptual

states of pleasure and pain. This translation conforms to Theophrastus' own conception of

B107 and is supported by the fact that Theophrastus' discussion of Empedocles occurs

within a treatise on the physiology of perception.183

Yet it is doubtful that Empedocles would have so understood "ajnia'sqai" and

"h{desqai" in B107. More likely, he used these verbs to mean "suffer distress" and "enjoy

or take pleasure in (something)," in other words, as emotional states and not merely

sensations. Two considerations encourage this interpretation. First, there is no reason to

think that at the time Empedocles composed his poem Greek thinkers had distinguished

or been theoretically motivated to distinguish pleasure and pain as perceptual states from

pleasure and pain as emotions. Second, the verbs "ajnia'sqai" and "h{desqai" are

consistently used in other Archaic texts to mean "suffer distress" and "enjoy or take

pleasure in (something)."184 We should therefore translate B107 as follows:

"… all things having been fittingly conjoined, and by means of these (touvtoi")

they have knowledge and experience joy and suffer distress."

Further support for this rendition of B107 is the association of ajnia'sqai and

h{desqai in this fragment with cognition. As Inwood, following Barnes, has suggested,

72

Theophrastus begins his quotation, "(out of these things) all things having been fittingly

conjoined," in mid verse; the words "out of these things (ejk touvtwn) …" which

immediately precede the quotation, are Theophrastus' own.185 "These things" (touvtwn)

refers to the six principles or rather portions of them, which, as Theophrastus suggests,

are constitutive of the blood and thereby enable cognition of like-by-like. Thus, as we

also noted, many scholars have followed Theophrastus and placed B109 ("… with earth

… we recognize earth; with water, water …") before B107. I had also noted

Theophrastus' comments on B107: "Therefore, it is principally by means of the blood that

we know (fronei'n), for in the blood the elements (stoicei'a) are blended more fully than

in our (other) parts." Indeed, in B98 blood is characterized as composed of more or less

equal quantities of radical portions, and B105 claims that "human understanding (novhma)

is blood around the heart." Consequently, it is reasonable to follow Theophrastus'

suggestion that understanding occurs by means of blood because blood contains all of the

elements of things that are to be understood.186

Now, at B17.21 Empedocles' exhortation to Pausanias to behold Love with his

mind (novw/), not with his eyes (o[mmasin), encourages the view that Empedocles conceives

of Love, and presumably Strife, as objects of understanding, rather than objects of

perception. Note that Heraclitus and in particular Parmenides provide Empedocles with

precedents for such an epistemological distinction, and that Melissos, Zeno, and

Democritus are examples of other fifth century thinkers who recognize such a

distinction.187 In light of this, I suggest that the concepts h{desqai and ajnia'sqai at B107.2

are understood not merely as perceptual states, but as richly emotional states more closely

allied to cognition than mere perception.188

73

V. Conclusion to Empedocles' Fragments

Examination of the doxographical material that purports to give Empedocles'

opinions on desire, pleasure, and pain in relation to Empedoclean fragments in which

related concepts occur suggests the following central conclusions. First, regarding the

topic of desire, in the doxographical material desire occurs between homogeneous

elements; in the fragments desire occurs between heterogeneous and homogeneous roots

or radical portions. Thus, the doxographical material simplifies and misleads. Second, the

fragments suggest that it is sensible to distinguish two types of motivation, desire and

aversion, corresponding to the influence of Love and Strife respectively. The

doxographical material gives no indication of this.189 Third, the fragments indicate that

most, if not all desires are extrinsic, both in the sense that Love, not the roots, is

responsible for desires and in the sense that neither homogeneous nor heterogeneous

desires, for which Love is responsible, are ever-present in radical portions. Again, the

doxographical material is silent on this point. Fourth, the fragments indicate that radical

portions have intrinsic combinatorial dispositions and kinetic tendencies. This may imply

that the roots or radical portions have some intrinsic motivations, but this is unclear. The

principle of homogeneous elemental attraction in the doxographical material may be said

to overlap with the notion of intrinsic properties; however, the doxographers precisely do

not distinguish between extrinsic and intrinsic sources of motivation in the cosmological

principle. Fifth, the fragments indicate that homogeneous elements do not mix or blend,

but simply congregate. In contrast, the doxographical material suggests that

homogeneous elements mix or blend. Moreover, the doxographical material does not

74

distinguish between mixture or blending, on the one hand, and congregation or

conjunction that does not involve mixture or blending, on the other. Sixth, the surviving

fragments mainly concern the motivations of roots, not stuffs, or organisms. This is

probably a function of the surviving evidence rather than of Empedocles' own interests.

No doubt, the roots play a central role in Empedocles' poem, but Empedocles' poem

clearly had considerably more to say about animals, plants, and their physiological and

psychological processes. As we have seen, the doxographers inform us that Empedocles'

poem contained content on nutrition, including appetite, and that appetites were attributed

to plants. This is a genuine contribution of the doxographical tradition to our

understanding of Empedocles' poem. In section III of part two, our discussion of the

motivations of stuffs, which included the physiology of nutrition and appetite, primarily

focused on examples from and considerations specific to animals. But, again, this is a

function of the surviving fragments; there is very little among the fragments alone from

which to reconstruct an account of the psychological functions of plants. Finally,

although evidence for an Empedoclean account of nutrition is slight, on the basis of the

doxographical evidence plus the material concerning motivation in the fragments, it is

possible to reconstruct some aspects of a plausible account: the object of nutritional

desire is not merely an elemental portion, but one in a certain quantity; and the subject

and object are not necessarily elementally homogeneous.

Regarding pleasure and pain, first, the fragments suggest that, broadly speaking,

Love is saliently responsible for harmonious conditions and to that extent for pleasure,

while Strife is correlatively responsible for inharmonious conditions and thus for misery

and suffering. However, this does not imply, as the doxographical material claims, that

75

pleasure arises through the blending of homogeneous elements,190 while pain arises

through the blending of heterogeneous elements. Second, the fragments do not suggest

that Empedocles was interested in the physiology of hedonic experience. This is

Theophrastus' misinterpretation. In particular, in B107, "h{desqai" and "ajnia'sqai" refer

to the emotions of joy and distress, not simply to the sensations of pleasure and pain.

VI. Conclusion

I began this paper by distinguishing three approaches to doxography:

reconstructionism, receptionism, and the dialogical approach. Regarding

reconstructionism, this study's results corroborate the work of many scholars, beginning

most significantly with Harold Cherniss,191 who argue that Aristotle's accounts of the

Presocratics are misleading. Since Diels, scholars have generally been more sympathetic

to Theophrastus.192 But, at least with regard to the doxographical material examined here,

this attitude appears questionable. Consequently, the reconstructionist project is fraught

with obstacles, some insurmountable. In the absence of primary evidence to serve as a

touchstone, I incline toward the harsh verdict of, for example, R. D. Dicks, who criticized

as extravagant Charles Kahn's reconstruction of Anaximander's astronomy on the basis of

Theophrastus.193 Similarly, in the case of Empedocles' views of desire, pleasure, and pain,

those few scholars who have treated this cluster of topics have relied on the

doxographical material uncritically and been misled by Diels.194

Some may find this negative conclusion regarding reconstructionism

unacceptable. But it should, at least, cast a cloud over their hopes of rescuing the earliest

philosophical-scientific thought from oblivion. However, it is only when the study of

76

doxography is bound to the reconstructionist agenda that such results must be received

negatively. Doxographical studies needn't be bound in this way. For example, it is

increasingly appreciated that the commentators of Late Antiquity make rich philosophical

contributions of their own.195 Generally speaking, the study of the reception of Presocratic

philosophy is a fruitful enterprise, and much work remains to be done.196

David Runia, commenting on the questions of the sources and reliability of just

books 4 and 5 of Aëtius' Placita, writes: "a limited section of this huge task has been

carried out, the rest remains to be done."197 As we await the second volume of Mansfeld

and Runia's Aëtiana, I hope, in sections V-IX of part one of this paper, to have shed a

little more light on the pre-Aëtian doxographical tradition. In doing so, I hope also to

have underscored the value of non-Greco-Roman sources. In general, greater

collaboration between Hellenists and Arabists is needed.

Finally, as far as I know, a professedly dialogical approach to doxography is

novel. Of course, such an approach is only feasible where a substantial body of both

primary and secondary materials exists. Thus, Empedocles provides an excellent field for

inquiry. But Heraclitus, Parmenides, and perhaps Xenophanes and Anaxagoras offer

additional opportunities for dialogical study.198 And of course this paper has examined

only a small set of Empedoclean doxographical passages.

I thank an anonymous referee, Rachana Kamtekar, and especially Brad Inwood for very

helpful comments on previous drafts. I am grateful to Robert Morrison and Beatrice

Gruendler for generous help with Arabic.

1 Epicrates, fr. 10 K-A.

2 E.g., H. Baltussen, Theophrastus against the Presocratics and Plato [Theophrastus],

77

(Leiden, 2000); W. Burkert, L. Gemelli Marciano, E. Matelli, & L. Orelli, eds.,

Fragmentsammlungen philosophischer Texte der Antike — Le raccolte dei frammenti di

filosofi antichi, (Göttingen, 1998); Hans Daiber, Aëtius Arabus [Arabus], (Wiesbaden,

1980); P. J. van der Eijk, ed., Ancient Histories of Medicine: Essays in Medical

Doxography and Historiography in Classical Antiquity [Medical], (Leiden, 1999);

Tryggve Göransson, Albinus, Alcinous, Arius Didymus, (Göteborg, 1995); David E.

Hahm, "The Ethical Doxography of Arius Didymus," in W. Haase, & H. Temporini, eds.,

Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt, Teil II: Band 36.4, (Berlin, 1990) 2935-

3055; J. Mansfeld, "Doxography and Dialectic: the Sitz im Leben of the 'Placita'," in W.

Haase, & H. Temporini, eds., Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt, Teil II, Band

36.4, (Berlin, 1990) 3056-3229; J. Mansfeld, Heresiography in Context: Hippolytus'

Elenchos as a Source for Greek Philosophy, (Leiden, 1992); Mansfeld, J., & Runia, D.T.,

Aëtiana [Aëtiana], (Leiden, 1997); Jørgen Mejer, Diogenes Laertius and his Hellenistic

Background, (Basel, 1978); G. Most, ed., Collecting Fragments, (Heidelberg, 1997); C.

Osborne, Rethinking Early Greek Philosophy: Hippolytus of Rome and the Presocratics

[Rethinking], (London, 1987); G. Cambiano, ed., Storiografia e dossografia nella

filosofia antica, (Rome, 1986); W. W. Fortenbaugh, ed., On Stoic and Peripatetic Ethics:

the Work of Arius Didymus, (New Brunswick, 1983).

3 Throughout I use the concept of doxography in a broad sense to refer to works and

passages that refer to the ideas or quote passages from their predecessors. For instance,

Plato contains doxographical material. This broad usage is merely an expository

convenience.

4 I assume Empedocles composed a single poem On Nature.

78

5 Doxographi Graeci [Dox], (Berlin, 1879); Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker

[Fragments], (Berlin, 1903, revised editions in 1906, 1912, 1922).

6 For the prehistory to Diels' work and doxographical theory, see chapters one and two in

Mansfeld and Runia, Aëtiana, 1-120.

7 Osborne, Rethinking, is a good example of receptionist scholarship.

8 " jEmpedoklh'" ta;" hJdona;" givnesqai toi'" me;n oJmoivoi" tw'n oJmoivwn, kata; de; to;

ejllei'pon pro;" th;n ajnaplhvrwsin, w{ste tw/' ejlleivponti hJ o[rexi" tou' oJmoivou. ta;"

dæ ajlghdovna" toi'" ejnantivoi": [h]] ajllotriou'sqai ga;r pro;" a[lla o{sa diafevrei

katav te th;n suvgkrisin kai; th;n tw'n stoiceivwn kra'sin." Diels attributes the

Stobaeus passage to Aëtius (4.9.15) and includes it in Diels, Fragments, at 31 A95. The

reference to Stobaeus occurs in Diels, Dox, 440; the attribution of the Stobaeus passage to

Aëtius occurs in Diels, Dox, 398. Cp. [Galen] Hist. Phil. 39.

9 "Povqen aiJ ojrevxei" givnontai toi'" zw/voi" kai; hJdonaiv…" (5.28)

10 " jEmpedoklh'" ta;" me;n ojrevxei" givnesqai toi'" zwv/oi" kata; ta;" ejlleivyei" tw'n

ajpotelouvntwn e{kaston stoiceivwn. ta;" de; hJdona;" ejx oijkeivou kata; ta;" tw'n

suggenw'n kai; oJmoivwn kravsei", ta;" de; ojclhvsei" kai; ta;" <ajlghdovna" ejx

ajnoikeivou>."10 This is the text that Diels, Fragments, DK31 A95, prints.

11 TLG gives 324 references. To these should be added several from the Peripatetic On

Plants, which is not part of the TLG database. I discuss the relevant references from On

Plants in section VIII. The TLG search was based on explicit references to Empedocles,

which were checked for completeness against the sources of the A and B fragments in

Diels, Fragments.

79

12 Aristotle (DL 8.52, 57, 74); Hippobotus (51, 69, 72); Timaeus (51, 54, 60, 63-66, 71);

Heraclides of Lembos (51, 52, 53, 58, 60, 61); Apollodorus (52); Satyrus (53, 58, 59, 60);

Favorinus (53, 73); Neanthes (55, 58, 72); Theophrastus (55); Hermippus (56, 69);

Alcidamas (56); Hieronymus (58); Xanthus (63); Heraclides of Pontus (67); Diodorus

(70); Demetrius (74). Suidas attributes to Zeno of Elea a work on the interpretation of

Empedocles, but I assume this attribution is mistaken; cp. Jackson P. Hershbell, "Plutarch

as a Source for Empedocles Re-Examined," The American Journal of Philology 92

(1971) 156-84, at 156 and n.3.

13 Diels, Dox, 396. Note that Diels derives the basic structure of books and chapters of

Aëtius' Placita from Pseudo-Plutarch's epitome.

14 Photius' catalogue is printed in C. Wachsmuth and O. Hense, Ioannis Stobaei

Anthologium [Anthologium], (Leipzig, 1884) Bd. 1, 3-10.

15 jEmpedoklh'" trevfesqai me;n ta; zw/'a dia; th;n uJpovstasin tou' oijkeivou. I discuss

this opinion further below.

16 Likewise, Stobaeus 1.50.25 is misplaced within Stobaeus' Anthology itself; it does not

belong in a chapter devoted to perception, but in the lost chapter devoted to nourishment

and growth (1.46). Moreover, the content of Stobaeus 1.50.25 must derive from Aëtius'

chapter on nourishment and growth, 5.27.

17 George Malcolm Stratton, Theophrastus and the Greek Physiological Psychology

before Aristotle, (London, 1917) 74, follows Gottlob Schneider, Theophrasti Eresii quae

supersunt [Eresii], (Leipzig, 1818-21) vol. 2, 617, in adding "ta;."

80

18 §9. By "te ta; moriva kai; th;n kra'sin" I take Theophrastus to mean that pleasure

arises through a relation of two entities a and b, wherein the parts of a and b are alike and

a and b blend.

19 §16.

20 In §16 Theophrastus supports his account of Empedocles' on pleasure and pain by

reference to B22.5-6: "hostile, they are most separate from one another, in birth and

mixture and in molded forms." The verses continue: "(they are) entirely unfit to be

together and (are) much pained." Here it suffices to note that Empedocles is not speaking

of the mixture of unlike elements, but of entities that are separate from and antagonistic

to one another and, in particular, resistant to blending.

21 The following section will suggest that Theophrastus' account of Empedocles' theory of

perception is more complex.

22 A. A. Long, "Thinking and Sense-Perception in Empedocles: Mysticism or

Materialism?" Classical Quarterly 16 (1966) 256-76, at 261 claims that although "there

is no necessary connection between like constituents and symmetry of pores (and

effluences) … the distinction between the two forms of likeness would probably have

been unnoticed (at the time that Empedocles composed his poem)." I reject this

suggestion on the grounds that it assumes that Theophrastus' interpretation of

Empedocles is accurate.

23 §7.

24 §10.

25 §16.

81

26 Incidentally, it is not clear to me that this is such a cogent criticism, within the terms of

Theophrastus' own interpretation. One might respond that, say, all olfactory perception

requires some conformity of effluences and pores. But pleasant smells occur when the

conformity is precise, whereas unpleasant smells occur when the conformity is relatively

imprecise.

27 This claim also assumes that Aëtius' opinion is consistent with Stobaeus' in suggesting

that the object of desire is like the subject of desire. I defend this assumption in section

VIII. Note also that while Aëtius' conjunction of Empedocles' views of desire, pleasure,

and pain produces an incoherent conception of pain, Theophrastus' account does not.

28 Note that Theophrastus is here indebted to Aristotle DA 427a22.

29 I follow Jonathan Barnes, "Review of Wright" ['Review'], Classical Review 32 (1982)

191-6, at 194 and Brad Inwood, The Poem of Empedocles [Poem], (Toronto, 2001) 285,

in taking Theophrastus' quotation to begin in mid verse. I discuss this point in section IV

of part two.

30 I translate "ajniw'ntai" here following my interpretation of Theophrastus' interpretation

of the verse. I suggest an alternative translation in section IV of part two.

31 I have added Roman numerals to facilitate exegesis.

32 H. Stein, Empedocles Agrigentus, (Bonn, 1852); M. R. Wright, Empedocles: The

Extant Fragments [Empedocles], (New Haven, 1981) 234; David Sedley, "Empedocles'

Theory of Vision and Theophrastus' De Sensibus" ['Vision'], in W.W. Fortenbaugh, D.

Gutas, eds., Theophrastus: his Psychological, Doxographical and Scientific Writings,

(New Brunswick, 1992) 28.

82

33 The same problem may arise in the case of Love and Strife if Love and Strife are not

material elements.

34 'Vision,' 29, 31. Compare Sedley's contention ('Vision,' 29) that "Theophrastus'

conflating the fitting-in (= structural conformity) model with a like-by-like principle may

(rest on) no more than … (a) false construal of B109." In fact, I am not sure that Sedley

and I are wholly in agreement. We agree that Theophrastus conflates the fitting-in model

with the likeness principle. The question is how Sedley understands Theophrastus'

misreading of B109.

35 404b8-12.

36 1000b3-9.

37 jEmpedoklh'" JHrakleivdh" para; ta;" summetriva" tw'n povrwn ta;" kata; mevro"

aijsqhvsei" givnesqai tou' oijkeivou tw'n aijsqhtw'n eJkavsth/ aJrmovzonto". Stobaeus

1.50.42 has the same words with two qualifications. First, several additional names

appear: Parmenides, Anaxagoras, Democritus, and Epicurus. Second, the last three words

read: "eJkavstou eJkavsth/ ejnarmovttonto"." It may also be questioned whether Diels'

location of this content in Aëtius 4.9 is justified. Again, 4.9 concerns the question

whether perceptions are true. But the content of Pseudo-Plutarch 4.9 and Stobaeus

1.50.42 doesn't correspond to this question. Rather, Aëtius 4.8, whose rubric is

"Concerning perception and perceptibles," seems to be the more appropriate location.

38 By "improved upon" I simply mean presented a more coherent account, not that the

account is also more accurate.

39 815a16. The Greek phrase "ejpiqumiva/ kinei'sqai" is a translation of the Latin phrase

"desiderio moveri." As H. J. Drossaart Lulofs and E. L. J. Poortman note: "this is an

83

elaborate translation of a single Arabic substantive (Nicolaus Damascenus De Plantis

Five Translations [Nicolaus], (Amsterdam, 1989) 246) I discuss the text and textual

tradition of De Plantis further in section IX.

40 EN 1155a32-b8. Cp. the following passage from the Eudemian Ethics: "The natural

philosophers also arrange the whole of nature (th;n o{lhn fuvsin), taking as a principle the

movement (ijevnai) of like to like. That is why Empedocles said that the dog sat on the tile,

because the tile had the greatest likeness to the dog." (1235a10-12; cp. MM 1208b11-15)

41 17.218.

42 214b2-5.

43 215e5-216a1.

44 Almost nothing in Theophrastus concerns desire. That which does can be found in

Theophrastus' Metaphysics and relates to Theophrastus' critical considerations of

Aristotle's view of the relation between the celestial bodies and the unmoved mover. Cp.

also fr. 271 FHS&G (= 53 Wi) and CP 2.7.2.12.

45 Catalogues and titles of Theophrastus' writings are assembled in W. W. Fortenbaugh et

al., Theophrastus of Eresus: Sources for his Life, Writings, Thought, and Influence,

(Leiden, 1992) vol. 1, 1-53. Fortenbaugh et al., vol. 2, 125, give two passages related to

food and digestion among the Theophrastean testimonies. But the reference to

Theophrastus in the first (Athen. Deipnosophistae 44B-C, p. 340 in Fortenbaugh) seems

to be based on Athenaeus' misunderstanding of Plutarch 660E (see n.1), while the second

(Plin. NH 28.54, p. 341 in Fortenbaugh) seems to be based on Theophrastus' On Fatigue

(see the note on lines 2-3 in the critical apparatus on p.124).

46 DA 416b30-31.

84

47 Mete. 381b13; SV 456b5; PA 650b10, 653b13, 674a20, 678a19; GA784b2.

48 For example, in his commentary on On the Soul Simplicius (116.16) takes Aristotle's

reference to a more detailed discussion of nutrition to refer to On the Generation of

Animals. Likewise, in his commentary on On Sense and Sensibilia (79.10-11) Alexander

claims that Aristotle has discussed nourishment in On the Generation of Animals. Cp.

Martha Nussbaum, Aristotle's De Motu Animalium, (Princeton, 1978) 375-6.

49 "Le traité d' Aristote sur la nutrition," Revue de philologie, de litterature et d' histoire

anciennes 26 (1952) 29-35.

50 "The manner in which the parts grow at the expense of blood and indeed the whole

question of nutrition will find a more suitable place for exposition ejn toi'" peri;

genevsew" kai; ejn eJtevroi"."

51 Aristotle On the Parts of Animals I-IV, (Oxford, 2001) 201.

52 DL 5.59. Cp. Aristotle's statement at GA784b2: "We must speak further of this

explanation ejn toi'" peri; aujxhvsew" kai; trofh'"."

53 None is included in Fritz Wehrli's edition, Straton von Lampsakos, (Basel, 1950).

Diocles Carystus fr. 51c4 attests that Strato held that disease arises from an excess of

nourishment. But it is questionable whether this reference derives from Strato's On

Nourishment and Growth.

54 Cp. David T. Runia, "The Placita Ascribed to Doctors in Aëtius' Doxography on

Physics," in van der Eijk, Medical, 189-250.

55 Cp. Iain M. Lonie, The Hippocratic Treatises "On Generation" "On the Nature of the

Child" "Diseases IV" [Hippocratic], (Berlin, 1981) 71.

56 39.5.

85

57 Lonie, Hippocratic, 298.

58 Cp. the Hippocratic explanation of appetite in Ivan Garofalo, ed., Anonymi medici de

morbis acutis et chroniis, Brian Fuchs, trans., (Leiden, 1997) §11. Philip van der Eijk,

Diocles of Carystus, Brill, 2000, vol. 2, 70, suggests that the author's reference to

Hippocrates refers to Acut. (spur.) 54, but I see nothing there to confirm this.

59 It has been suggested that Meno's collection focused on pathological, rather than

physiological conditions such as healthy appetites and digestive processes (Daniela

Manetti, "'Aristotle' and the Role of Doxography in the Anonymus Londinensis (Pbrlibr

Inv. 137)," in van der Eijk, Medical, 95-141). If so, Meno's collection could not be

Aëtius' source. But the view that Meno's collection only discussed pathological

conditions lacks justification. The testimonies pertaining to Meno's collection, assembled

in W. H. S. Jones, The Medical Writings of Anonymus Londinensis, (Cambridge, 1947) 5-

6, reveal almost nothing about the contents.

60 Runia in van der Eijk, Medical.

61 Several other medical treatments of nourishment predate Aëtius and could have

contained doxographical material on nutrition and desire. Cp. the fragments of

Phylotimus' On Nourishment, in F. Steckerl, The Fragments of Praxagoras of Cos and

His School, Leiden 1958, 109-20, and the so-called physiological section in the

Anonymus Londinensis, esp. §§22ff.

62 The text stops after "kai; ta;"." On this Diels, Dox, 440, n.21, writes: "spatium

sesquialterius versus relinquunt BC."

63 Dox, 440.

86

64 It is not discussed in G.S. Kirk and J.E. Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers,

(Cambridge, 1957); N. van der Ben, The Proem of Empedocles' Peri Physios,

(Amsterdam, 1975); Jonathan Barnes, The Presocratic Philosophers, (London, 1979);

Wright, Empedocles; D. O' Brien, Pour Interpréter Empédocle, (Leiden, 1981); Peter

Kingsley, Ancient Philosophy Mystery and Magic [Mystery], (Oxford, 1995); Alain

Martin and Oliver Primavesi, L'Empédocle de Strasbourg, (Berlin, 1999); Simon

Trépanier, Empedocles An Interpretation [Interpretation], (New York, 2004). It is

included in Ettore Bignone, Empedocle, (Rome, 1916) 384, who follows Diels: "I piaceri

derivano dall' azione del simile sul simile, e per compenso degli elementi che

scarsegiano; donde in ciò che ne difetta, la tendenza al simile. Per azione dei contrari

avviene invece il dolore; e sono avverse fra loro tutte le cose che sono dissimili per

struttura e per mescolanza degli elementi." It is referred to by O'Brien in Empedocles'

Cosmic Cycle [Cycle], (Cambridge, 1969) 190, but it is not rendered.

65 Empédocle [Empédocle], (Paris, 1965) vols. I-III, at III, 469.

66 I will clarify the function of these phrases shortly.

67 Empédocle II, 202.

68 Empédocle III, 468.

69 Empédocle III, 468-9.

70 Aëtius 5.24.2, 25.4.

71 [Plut.] 875e7 = Stob. 1.10.12.6; DL 2.9.10; Hippolytus Ref. haer. 16.2.3. Cf. also Stob.

1.40.1.202-3. See Aristot. Met. D.25, 1023a26-b11.

72 [Plut.] 875e7 = Stob. 1.10.12.6.

87

73 The closest case is: "to; a[ndra calkeva qoruvbou" aujtw/' kai; kinduvnou" kinh'sai."

(Theodoret, Interpret. in xiv epist. Paul. vo1. 82, 856.2)

74 Eresii, vol. 2, 617.

75 [Reliquiae], (Amsterdam) vol. alt., 460.

76 n.218, p.461.

77 In his 1971 Teubner edition Mau rightly places daggers around "uJgrou' kai; ta;" tw'n

kinduvnwn kai; oJmoivwn kinhvsei"."

78 p.440.

79 An exception is Kinglsey, Mystery, who is aware of this source; however, he does not

discuss (E) or (D) or Stobaeus 1.50.31.

80 This information derives from Daiber, Arabus, 5-6.

81 Ibid. 75.

82 Aëtiana, 161.

83 Cp. Mansfeld and Runia, Aëtiana, 156-60.

84 Daiber translates: "Aber die Freuden entstehen aus der Feuchtigkeit infolge der in der

Art sich gleichenden Wachstumsbewegungen [oder: infolge der Bewegungen des in der

Art sich gleichenden Wachstums]. Der Ärger indessen entsteht infolge der Berühren und

Zusammentreffen im Widerspruch stehenden Dinge." (Arabus, 245)

85 There is one trivial difference: the Arabic word for "pain," "l-adhā," is singular,

whereas the Greek is plural, "ta;" ojclhvsei"."

86 Perhaps because ibn Lūqā couldn't make sense of the genitive phrase "tw'n oJmoivwn" in

relation to "th'" aujxevsew"" and "ta;" kinhvsei"," he translated it with deliberate

ambiguity, capable of modifying either "h≥arakāti" or "l-tarbiyati."

88

87 Likewise in the question "Povqen aiJ oJrevxei" givnonta toi'" zw/voi" kai; aiJ hJdonaiv…"

88 815a15-18.

89 815b16-17.

90 Cp. J. B. Skemp, "Plants in Plato's Timaeus," Classical Quarterly 41 (1947) 53-60.

91 77b5-6. Cp. Tht. 167b.

92 77b1-3.

93 The author of On Plants informs us that Anaxagoras also regards plants as zw'/a 815b16;

cp. Plut. 911D where the view is attributed to Democritus, Anaxagoras, and Plato. Cp.

also DL 8.28 where the view is also attributed to Pythagoras.

94 424a32-b3; cp. Damian Murphy, "Aristotle on Why Plants Cannot Perceive"

['Aristotle'], Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 29 (2005) 295-339.

95 The rubric occurs at Pseudo-Plutarch 5.26 and Stobaeus 1.45, on which see Diels, Dox,

438-440, and in Ibn Lūqā, on which see Daiber, Arabus, 242-3.

96 Stobaeus 1.45 has the opinions of Plato, Thales, and Aristotle verbatim, but the opinion

of Empedocles is lacking. However, ibn Lūqā, translated by Daiber, has: "Empedokles

glaubte, daß die Baüme vor den Lebewesen geworden sind …" (Arabus, 243, with my

italics) Cp. however the Empedoclean opinion at Pseudo-Plutarch 5.19, whose rubric is

"Concerning the genesis of zw/'a, how they came to be and whether they are destructible":

"Empedocles (says that) the first genesis of animals and plants (tw'n zw/vwn kai; tw'n

futw'n) did not at all consist of whole-natured forms …" (Diels, Dox, 430; likewise ibn

Lūqā, on which see Daiber, Arabus, 234-5)

97 Diels, Dox, 440, represents the rubric at Stobaeus 1.46 as "Peri; trofh'"." In Photius'

catalogue in Wachsmuth and Hense, Anthologium, 5, it is listed as "Peri; trofh'" kai;

89

oJrevxew"." Evidently, Stobaeus conjoined opinions on nourishment (as well as growth)

and desire.

98 The Greek word "uJpovstasi"" refers to the process by which the elements of foods,

disintegrated through digestion, are distributed to the appropriate organs or parts of the

body.

99 " jEmpedoklh'" trevfesqai me;n ta; zw/'a dia; th;n uJpovstasin tou' oijkeivou, au[xesqai

de; dia; th;n parousivan tou' qermou', meiou'sqai de; kai; fqivnein dia; th;n e[kleiyin

eJkatevrwn: tou;" de; nu'n ajnqrwvpou" toi'" prwvtoi" sumballomevnou" brefw'n ejpevcein

tavxin. jAnaxagovra" trevfesqai me;n …" (Diels, Dox, 440) I have added Roman

numerals to facilitate exegesis.

100 I am providing an English translation of Daiber's German (Dox, 245): "Anaxagoras

glaubte: die Lebewesen werden durch die Feuchtigkeit ernährt, welche jedes ihrer Organe

durch das Verzehren und in der Ernährung herbeizieht. Sie wachsen, wenn zu ihnen viel

Nahrung gelangt, werden aber schwach und siechen dahin, wenn das, was von ihnen

zerfällt, viel ist." Thus— I note in passing— ibn Lūqā provides a new Anaxagorean

testimony. This is noted by Daiber, Arabus, 515, but the passage is not included in, for

instance, Patricia Curd's recent edition, Anaxagoras of Clazomenae: Fragments and

Testimonies, (Toronto, 2007).

101 I discuss (ii) separately at the end of this section.

102 Daiber, Arabus, 245, translates: "Empedokles glaubte, daß die Ernährung durch die

Bestandigkeit und das Bleiben der Feuchtigkeit (möglich) ist …"

103 Not "tou' oijkeivou" as the Greek tradition has it.

90

104 Of course, the doxographical tradition could have viewed Empedocles' position on

growth and nourishment as pertaining to animals as well as plants, so long as the tradition

admitted the reasonable point that blood is the moisture in animals analogous to water in

plants. Thus, "ta; zw/'a" in 5.27 could be read to include plants and animals. But while

this may be, the evidence for Empedocles' view of the role of heat and moisture in growth

and nutrition derives from the opinion on plants, not animals.

105 I temporarily postpone rendering the final clause on pain.

106 Aëtiana, 270, item (3).

107 Cp. Daiber's remark (Arabus, 245): "Die Rolle und Zugehörigkeit des Passus DIELS

440a8-10 (in der arabischen Version am Schluß des Empedokles-Abschnittes) muß noch

näher untersucht werden."

108 Unfortunately, it is not discussed in David Sedley's Creationism and its Critics,

(Berkeley, 2007).

109 Censorinus, de die nat. 4.7; Plut. Quaest. conv. 730d-e; cp. [Plut.] 5.19.

110 It is also possible that (ii) derives from a lost Anaximandrean opinion from Placita

5.21, 22, or 23, whose rubrics are "At what time are animals formed in the womb?"

"From what elements are our specific parts composed?" and "When does a human being

reach maturity?" respectively.

111 5.25.

112 "e[sti peri; futw'n Qeofravstw/ pragmateiva gegrammevnh: jAristotevlou" ga;r ouj

fevretai." (In de sens. comm. 86.11) I owe this reference to H. J. Dossaart Lulofs,

"Aristotle's Peri; Futw'n" ['Plants'], Journal of Hellenic Studies 77 (1957) 75-80, at 75.

91

113 Mete. 339a7, 359b20; Sens. 442b25; Long. 467b4 (direct reference); Iuv. 468a31; HA

539a20 (direct reference); GA 716a1, 731a29, 783b20. I owe these references to Dossaart

Lulofs and Poortman, Nicolaus, 14, n.1; however, their reference to PA 656a2f. does not

seem to me a good one.

114 Arist. Frag. ed. Rose (2nd ed.) 267-78.

115 Dossaart Lulofs 'Plants,' Nicolaus.

116 Cp. Dossaart Lulofs, Nicolaus, 566, who alternatively suggests (567-8) Planudes'

contemporary Manuel Holobolos.

117 On Alfred's dates, see ibid. 470-3.

118 Ibid. 123.

119 On the identification of Nicolaus as the author, see ibid. 9-11. Cp. H. J. Dossaart

Lulofs, Nicolaus Damascenus On the Philosophy of Aristotle, (Leiden, 1965).

120 Dossaart Lulofs, Nicolaus, 17-47.

121 Ibid. 115. In addition, we have a Hebrew translation from the Arabic by Qalonymos

ben Qalonymos, made in 1314, a Hebrew epitome, and an anonymous Hebrew

commentary on sections 1-33, on which see ibid. 347-86.

122 Drossaart Lulofs, 'Plants,' 77, indicates a number of borrowings from Theophrastus'

HP.

123 In the Syriac fragments, see Drossaart Lulofs, Nicolaus, 56, 68, 70; in the Arabic, see

126, 128, 140, 142 (and cp. 218, 220); in the Hebrew, see 390, 448, 450, 452; in the

Latin, see 517, 518.

92

124 Empedocles at CP 1.7.1.2, 1.12.5.5, 1.13.2.3, 1.21.5.8, 1.22.2.6; Anaxagoras at HP

3.1.4.3, CP 1.5.2.6; Democritus at CP 1.8.2.2, 2.11.7.7, 6.1.2.7, 6.1.6.1, 6.6.1.5, 6.7.2.1,

6.17.11.7; Plato at CP 6.1.4.2.

125 In the Arabic in Dossaart Lulofs, Nicolaus, 127; cp. the Hebrew commentary at p.449.

In the Latin, the nonsensical name "Abrucalis" occurs where "Empedocles" should

(p.517; on this see p.493). In the Syriac fragment (p.71) only pleasure and pain are

mentioned and the opinion is only attributed to Anaxagoras.

126 In the Arabic, p.129; likewise in the Syriac, p.69, and Latin, p.518.

127 In the Arabic, p.127, 129; likewise in the Latin, p.517; only Plato in the Syriac, p.71.

128 In the Arabic, p.127; likewise in the Syriac, p.71, and Hebrew commentary, p.448, and

Latin, p.517.

129 P.220; in the Hebrew (p.392) the author of the statement is unspecified; in the Latin it

is, again, "Abrucalis" (p.525). Drossaart Lulofs and Poortman note (p.269): "The

statement ascribed to Empedocles is similar to the quotation (or rather paraphrase) in

Aetius Dox. 5.26.4." Compare also the following two passages. Ibn Lūqā's translation of

Anaxagoras' opinion on nourishment at Placita 5.27 runs: "Anaxagoras believed that

animals are nourished from moisture which each of their organs draws in during feeding

and nourishing. They grow when they acquire a lot of nourishment, but become weak and

infirm when they lose a lot." Nicolaus reports (p.126): "Anaxagoras naively asserts that

plants are animals and that they feel joy and sadness, and he cites as proof the shedding

of their leaves in due season." The affinity I see in these latter two passages lies in the

correlations between weakness and infirmity, sadness or pain, and the shedding of leaves.

(Note also that "he cites as proof the stretching of their leaves and twigs in their time

93

towards moisture and their withdrawing from the opposite" is a variant of manuscript D,

on which cp. the Hebrew, p.448.)

130 The dotted line between Aristotle's On Plants and Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics is

intended to acknowledge that Aristotle does not use himself as a doxographical source—

an odd notion— but just that the Empedoclean cosmological principle in Nicomachean

Ethics is an analytic component of the hypothetical Empedoclean nutritional principle of

botanical appetite in On Plants. Likewise, the dotted line between ibn Lūqā's Placita and

Pseudo-Plutarch's Placita is intended to acknowledge that ibn Lūqā's Placita does not use

Pseudo-Plutarch's Placita as a doxographical source.

131 "Filiva in Plato's Lysis," Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 103 (2007) 235-59, at

236-7.

132 Lys. 215e.

133 This, for instance, is Balthussen's conclusion (Theophrastus, 245).

134 Cp. also the ontological diairesis at Tht. 152e.

135 B6.1.

136 Strictly speaking, then, it makes little sense to speak of a root's desire for a

homogeneous root.

137 I do not mean to suggest that this is the only characteristic of the roots that identifies

them as divinities.

138 I ignore the role of desire in the ethical treatises.

139 Cp. Murphy, 'Aristotle,' 331.

140 Cp. ibid. 336-8.

141 B17.7.

94

142 B71.

143 B73. Cp. B21, B28, B35, B98, 101, 102.

144 At B59.1, where daivmwn is said to have mixed (ejmivsgeto) with daivmwn, I understand

Empedocles to be speaking of heterogeneous radical portions qua daivmone". Cp. Wright,

Empedocles, 212; contrast O'Brien, Cycle, 325-36. B22.4 is a more complicated case,

which I discuss below.

145 B110.10.

146 Wright, Empedocles, 260-1.

147 Carl Werner Müller, Gleiches zum Gleichem [Gleiches], (Wiesbaden, 1965) 27-39.

148 "Unter der Herrschaft des Neikos bricht diese Einheit auseinander. Zwischen das

Artverschiedene legt sich trennend der Streit, und die Liebe muß sich auf die

Freundschaft des Gleichartigen beschränken; sie wird zur Eigen-Liebe, was den völligen

Zerfall des Alls in seine vier Elemente bedeutet." (ibid. 31)

149 B21.

150 B26.

151 "… das Wort a[rqmio" [findet] sich an anderer Stelle als Bezeichnung für die 'Werke'

der Liebe angewandt." (Gleiches, 36)

152 Müller also refers to B91: "(Water) is more easily conjoined (ejnavrqmion) with wine,

with oil is does not want to mix." But since Love is not mentioned or vaguely implied in

this fragment, it cannot be used to support the thesis. I discuss B91 further below.

153 I emphasize that this is different from Love's responsibility for a radical portion's

desires to simultaneously mix and congregate with a radical mixture containing some

homogeneous and some heterogeneous radical portions.

95

154 Müller continues: "… denn wäre Haß gegen sich selbst, eine Vorstellung, für den

Griechen ebenso absurd, wie ihm die Eigenliebe selbstverständlich und natürlich ist."

(Gleiches, 30). But we have at least seen that in certain mixtures Eigen-liebe is

relinquished.

155 Note that this implies a further cosmological asymmetry: at the apex of Love's

influence, Strife is ostracized to the periphery of the sphere (B35.10, B36); however, at

the apex of Strife's power, Love should still inhere within the segregated concentric

spheres. If Love were ostracized to the periphery in turn, then radical portions would lack

homogeneous desires and thus a mottled universe would result. At B35.4 (cp. 17.58 =

ensemble a (ii) 19) Love is described as in the midst of the whirl (ejn de; mevsh/ filovth"

strofavliggi), but the context of the verse does not imply that Love is constrained to the

center because Strife is at the apex of its power. (Alternatively, Empedocles may be

inconsistent.)

156 Wright, Empedocles, 22, who cites Il. 15.187-93, 209.

157 This translation, by Abraham Terian, is based on an Armenian prose translation of

Philo's work (Inwood, Poem, 236-7).

158 Cp. Aristot. GC 315a11, and see O'Brien, Cycle, 34-36.

159 Consequently, my interpretation significantly differs from Müller's, on which see

Gleiches, 36-38, n.35.

160 I follow Inwood's (Poem, 231) translation. Simon Trépanier, "Empedocles on the

Ultimate Symmetry of the World," Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 24 (2003) 1-57,

translates the Greek as "subsumed." Wright (Empedocles, 181) as "subdued." See also

O'Brien, Cycle, 320-1.

96

161 Note that for Empedocles to be consistent, he must recognize a way in which this

aspect of each root can be limited without jeopardizing the identity of the root. It seems

to me he can. The juxtaposition of yellow and red dots may produce the appearance of

orange; thus, the yellow dots fail to be perceived as yellow, yet they do not fail to be

yellow.

162 Katerina Ierodiakonou, "Empedocles on Colour and Colour Vision," Oxford Studies in

Ancient Philosophy 29 (2005) 1-37.

163 Cp. Trépanier, Interpretation, 32: "for Empedocles, 'matter has mind.' This panpsychic

creed … immediately distinguishes his physics from its standard modern counterpart."

164 Cp. B26.8 and B35.14.

165 B4.2-3, 71.1, 114.3, 133.3. Cp. B35.6 where, under the influence of Love, the roots are

said to come together, "not suddenly, but voluntarily (qelhma;)."

166 B90 (= Plut. Quaest. conviv. 663a; cp. Macrob. Sat. 7.5.17). While the hot or heat may

be identified here with fire, sweetness, bitterness, and sharpness cannot be identified with

individual roots.

167 663b.

168 Cp. Plutarch's reference to Empedocles at 688a.

169 A77 (= [Galen], Def. med. 99).

170 A77 (= Galen, In Hipp. aph. comm. 1).

171 On this point, cp. B121: "And parching diseases and rots (shvyie") …" and ensemble

d.2 where rotting ([sh]po[m]evnoi") is associated with wretched necessity.

172 Empedocles, 231, with references to Galen Def. med. 99, 19.372K and Plt. Phd. 96a-b.

97

173 Wright (Empedocles, 232) refers to Simp. In phys. 372.5: "th;n de; gastevra

pevttousan, to; de; h|par ejxaimatou'n" and Plut. Quaest. conv. 683e "poluaivmaton to;

h|par."

174 B11. Cp. B121, presumably a reference to earth, which is characterized as a joyless

(ajterpeva) place.

175 B1.10; cp. B121. Strife is not explicitly said to be responsible for diseases in either of

these fragments, but this is a reasonable inference.

176 B9.4. Cp. B145.

177 B26.7.

178 B37.9.

179 B38.4. Cp. B124.

180 B124. Again, strife is not explicitly said to be responsible for lamentations here. But

this is a reasonable inference, especially in view of B38. Cp. also B118, which

presumably refers to the daivmwn's alienation from the gods.

181 B128.1-6. The fragment continues to describe how Aphrodite's altar was not soiled

with the blood of slaughtered animals. Cp. B62.7 which, in speaking of incomplete

animals, says that they do not yet show any "lovely (ejrato;n) frame of limbs." This

suggests that completely formed animals have lovely limbs and thus that Aphrodite

fashions attractive creatures. On this, cp. B64.

182 B27.

183 Theophrastus' own conception of perceptual pleasure and pain (Cp. On the Senses §§

31-2) seems consistent with, if not identical to Aristotle's, viz., the ejnevrgeia of the

98

natural state, which occurs when the perceptual organ, in its optimal condition, is

activated by the optimal perceptual object, under optimal environmental conditions.

184 For instance, consider the uses of "ajnia'n" at H. Il. 2.291; Od. 1.133, 2.115, 3.117,

15.335; Thgn. 655, 991. Uses of "h{dein" are less common in Archaic literature (e.g.

Anacr. 148), but, as LSJ indicates, in Classical literature (e.g., Hdt. 1.69, 3.34; A. Pr.

758; Ar. Eq. 623, 696; S. Ph. 715, 1314 ) the verb is used, in various constructions, to

convey the idea of enjoying or taking pleasure in something, not simply experiencing a

sensation of pleasure.

185 There is a lacuna of 14 letters in manuscript P preceding "pavnta pephvgasin

aJrmosqevnta." Karsten, Reliquiae, followed by Diels, Fragments, adds "ejk touvtwn" from

Theophrastus and then supplies "ga;r." Inwood (Poem, 285), following Barnes ('Review,'

194), takes "ejk touvtwn" to be Theophrastus' words and simply leaves a lacuna.

186 I emphasize that the nature of such understanding remains obscure. Rachana

Kamtekar, "Empedocles on Knowledge by Likes," (under review) has proposed a novel

interpretation of B110 and Empedocles' conception of knowledge by affinity.

187 Cp. also Jean-Claude Picot, "Les cinq sources dont parle Empédocle," Revue des

études grecques 117 (2004) 393-446, which argues for a novel epistemological

interpretation of B143, according to which the five sources (krhnavwn pevnte) are the five

senses from which wisdom may be derived.

188 I do not mean to suggest that in B107.2 Empedocles claims that all h{desqai and

ajnia'sqai derive from the mind; I simply mean that Empedocles here uses the concepts of

joy and suffering as mental. (Granted this, it still remains unclear how joy and distress are

to be understood. Perhaps joy is a response to the recognition of Love, its manifestations

99

and effects, while distress is accordingly a response to the recognition of Strife. Yet in

order to clarify these emotions, we need a better explanation of the cognition of Love and

Strife themselves.)

189 Note, however, that Aristotle at least recognizes that Empedocles conceives of Love as

responsible for aggregating and Strife for segregating things, for at Met. 985a he

criticizes Empedocles for inconsistency on this point.

190 Again, the doxographers do not distinguish between congregation and blending.

191 Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy, (Baltimore, 1935).

192 Most recently, cp. Baltussen, Theophrastus.

193 D. R. Dicks, "Solstices, Equinoxes, and the Presocratics," Journal of Hellenic Studies

85 (1965) 26-40, especially at 35-39 and n.60.

194 Cp. W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, (Cambridge, 1962) vol. 1, 242;

Bollack, Empédocle, III, 469; Wright, Empedocles, 234-5. In addition, one finds passing

references to DK31 A95 as an accurate representation of Empedocles' thought. I have

already mentioned Lonie, Hippocratic, 298. Cp. Boris Nikolsky, "Epicurus on Pleasure,"

Phronesis 46 (2001) 440-65, at 445, with reference to DK31 A95 at n.21. I too (Trials of

Reason Plato and the Crafting of Philosophy, (Oxford University Press, 2008) 65) was

misled by Diels' rendition.

195 I have in mind the work of the Ancient Commentators on Aristotle Project.

196 Again, Osborne, Rethinking, deserves mention. Also cp., for example, John Palmer,

Plato's Reception of Parmenides, (Oxford, 1999) and Roberto Polito, The Sceptical

Road: Aenesidemus' Appropriation of Heraclitus, (Leiden, 2004).

197 In van der Eijk, Medical, 227.

100

198 Cp. David Runia, "Xenophanes on the Moon: a Doxographicum in Aëtius," Phronesis

34 (1989) 245–269.

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