empirical evidence from 40 years of regime changes

DO DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS PRODUCE BETTER HUMAN DEVELOPMENT OUTCOMES?

Empirical Evidence f rom 40 Years of Regime Changes

A Thesis

submitted to the Faculty of the

Graduate School of Arts and Sciences

of Georgetown University

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

degree of

Master of Public Policy

in Public Policy

By

Amit Reddy, M.A.

Washington, DC

April 12, 2012

ii

Copyright 2012 by Amit Reddy

All Rights Reserved

iii

D0 DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS PRODUCE BETTER HUMAN DEVELOPMENT OUTCOMES?

Empirical Evidence f rom 40 Years of Regime Changes

Amit Reddy, M.A.

Thesis Advisor: Andreas Kern, Ph.D.

ABSTRACT

This paper examines empirically the relationship between democratic transitions

and human development outcomes. It establishes that there is a distinct difference in

long run outcomes as opposed to those in the immediate aftermath of regime changes.

In contrast to the existing literature, which focuses on the effects of transitions with

respect to economic growth, I look at democratization’s effect on domestic policy

outputs in the form of public services. Building on the theory of regime transitions, this

paper hypothesizes that transitions lead to negative human development outcomes in

the short run as new democratic institutions attempt to take hold. Unless supported by

developed nations, these worsening conditions impose pressure on fledgling

governments, leading either to transition reversals or to ‘captured’ democracies. To

explore the impact of democratic transitions on the socio-economic development

outcomes I apply panel data analysis to 161 countries between the years 1960 and 2010.

The overall aim of the paper is to study not only the factors contributing to sustainable

democratic transitions, but also to highlight the difficulties in transforming institutional

configuration and its impact on socioeconomic outcomes. In doing so, the paper

contributes to the growing literature on the political economy of transitions.

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This thesis is dedicated to my professors at the Georgetown Public Policy Institute, particularly my thesis advisor, Andreas Kern, without whom none of this would be

possible.

I am also indebted to the feedback of my thesis group, especially Itai Nixon for all his constructive criticism.

Thank you, Amit Reddy

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 1

II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND BACKGROUND ................................... 3

III. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK ............................................................ 9

Conceptual Model ............................................................................... 12

IV. DATA AND METHODOLOGY ........................................................... 15

V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS ........................................... 19

VI. POLICY IMPLICATIONS .................................................................... 24

VII. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................... 26

Appendix A. Regression Tables ........................................................................ ... 29 Appendix B. Data Definition and Sources ....................................................... ... 32 Appendix C. …………………………………………………………………………………………… 36 C.1 Descriptive Statistics .................................................................. ... 36 C.2 Political Regime Table ............................................................... ... 38 C.3 Graphical Representation of Indicators Across Regime Types.... 40 Bibliography ......................................................................................................... 43

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LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

TABLE 1. Effects of Democratic Transition on Log Annual Difference in GDP per Capita……………………………………………........................................ 20 TABLE 2. Effects of Democratic Transition on Improvement In Safe Drinking Water Provision……...…………………………………..................................... 22

TABLE 3. Effects of Democratic Transition on Improved Sanitation Facilities………..……………………………………………............................................ 29 TABLE 4. Effects of Democratic Transition on Number of Telephone Lines per 1000 People……………………………..………........................................ 30

TABLE 5. Effects of Democratic Transition on Immunization Rates of Children between Ages 1 & 2…………………………………….................................... 31 TABLE 6.1 Descriptive Statistics of the Entire Population .…...................................... 36 TABLE 6.2 Descriptive Statistics of Countries that Experienced Democratization…. 36

TABLE 6.3 Descriptive Statistics of Countries that are Permanent Democracies…… 37

TABLE 6.4 Descriptive Statistics of Countries that are Permanent Autocracies…….. 37

TABLE 7. Political Regime Table…………………………………………………….………….…….. 38

FIGURE 1. GDP per Capita Growth Annual………………………………………………………... 40

FIGURE 2. Safe Drinking Water Improvements……………………………………………….... 40

FIGURE 3. Improved Sanitation Provision……………………………………………………….... 41 FIGURE 4. Telephone Lines per 100 People……………………………………………………….. 41

FIGURE 5. Immunization Rates………………………………………………………………………. 42 FIGURE 6. Net Development Assistance Received……………………………………………… 42

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I. INTRODUCTION

Does democratization actually hold benefits for the masses caught up in the process?

Even as I examine this question, Egypt’s hope of a peaceful transition to democracy is on

the brink of collapse as violent protests erupt across the country, and Libya’s fledgling

government is poised to disintegrate into a struggle over the nation’s resources. For the

past year, the Arab world has witnessed a wave of revolutions that have toppled long

established dictators in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen, while Syria is on the verge of

joining the ever-growing list. As the citizens of these countries, and the few remnants of

the autocratic world, move towards the establishment of democratic governments, they

do so with the hope of better futures. Whether these democratic transitions can succeed

and endure though, hinges mainly on the present. While much of the literature focuses

on the causes and long-run economic outcomes of democratic transitions, they have

tended to overlook the immediate effects during the process (see for instance,

Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2007). It is important to examine this immediate

relationship, because the stability and endurance of democracy depends on the new

government’s ability to capture and address the most pressing needs of the population;

therefore, establishing credibility in the process.

The growing consensus among researchers in development and political

economics is that democratic transitions lead to better outcomes of economic growth in

the long run, as put forth by Persson and Tabellini (2006), and Papaioannou and

Siourounis (2007). Meanwhile, Rodrik and Wacziarg (2005) look at growth in the short

run, i.e. in the transition years, and conclude that the process does not have negative

outcomes. Interestingly, few previous papers have studied whether a democratic

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transition is associated with better development outcomes, measured in the form of the

provision and distribution of important public services (see for instance, Lake and

Baum, 2001). Far more striking is the fact that, to the best of my knowledge no one has

attempted to examine development outcomes during the actual process of

democratization. This paper aims to fill this intellectual gap in the literature by posing

the question: ‘Do democratic transitions produce better human development outcomes

during and in the immediate aftermath of the change?’

Given the policy question, I want to explore whether public service provision,

especially with respect to health and education, accelerates, declines, or remains

constant in the years immediately following a regime change. To address this question I

use panel data from a sample of 161 countries, over the period 1960–2009. The

variables I look at for this paper are based on data from Polity IV (2010) to measure

democratic transitions, and The World Bank’s World Development Indicators and

Global Development Finance (2011) to measure human development outcomes, public

service inputs, and economic growth. In line with prior research, I estimate the effect of

democratic transitions using a difference-in-difference technique to study the before-

after variation, controlling for time-invariant country-specific effects and general time

trends.

The rest of the paper proceeds in the following fashion: The next section outlines

political and economic theories on regime change, also reviewing the existing literature

on the effects of transitions. Section 2 concentrates on the conceptual model and

assumptions on which the hypothesis of this paper rests. Having laid out the concept,

Section 3 delves deeper into the features of the data and methodology used, first to

identify democratic transitions and then to measure their impact on human

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development. In Section 4, I present the main empirical results and explain how these

results support my hypothesis. Finally, I summarize my findings, draw policy

implications, and discuss future research in Section 5 and section 6 respectively.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND BACKGROUND

Do democratic transitions always benefit people over autocratic regimes? In the field of

political theory and political economy there is an ongoing debate around regime changes

and their effectiveness (for a review, see among others Rao, 1984; Linz, 1996; Blasi and

Kroumova, 1996; Sen1999; Roderick 2004). Are democracies more proficient at

providing services to their constituents, or are autocratic regimes better positioned to

resolve collective action problems associated with the provision of public goods?

Conventional wisdom holds that democratic forms of governance will bring prosperity

and development to economically backward countries (Sen, 1999; Bourguignon and

Verdier, 2000; Lake & Baum, 2001), and hence it is important for western democracies

to foster democratic movements on autocratic nations. The other side argues that a

democratic polity can yield inefficient outcomes by enabling various groups to compete

for political influence (Besley and Coate, 1998; Tavares and Wacziarg, 2001), whereas ‘a

strong state with an iron hand neglects populist demands and enforces developmental

policies with its insulation from particularistic pressures’ (Rao, 1984, pp. 69-70).

The collapse of the Soviet bloc in 1989 was considered by many as the

culmination of the fight between liberal and illiberal ideologies. Francis Fukuyama

famously described it as the end of history – ‘What we may be witnessing is not just the

end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the

end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the

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universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government’

(Fukuyama, 1992, pp. 18). His interpretation has been shown to be premature, and since

the collapse of the Soviet Union, the failure of many of these new democracies and the

further deterioration in Sub-Saharan Africa has reopened the debate. As it became

clearer that democratic transitions themselves do not guarantee successful outcomes,

numerous papers have examined the nature of transitions and their immediate

outcomes (for example, Blasi and Kroumova, 1996; Roberts, 1999; Roland, 2001).

Before analyzing the effects of democratic transitions it is important to examine

the political economy of transitions, and the factors that influence the dissolution of

authoritarian regimes. Acemoglu and Robinson state that within democratic societies

the poor impose higher taxes on the rich than in non-democratic societies (Acemoglu

and Robinson, 2001). Furthermore, when a regime possesses discretionary powers it

ends up with exploitative institutions, which then tends to create distortionary policies

benefitting a small inner group at the expense of the population at large(Tavares and

Wacziarg, 2001). Invariably, and as supported by substantial evidence, this mostly

culminates in the formation of extremely unequal societies with a wealthy elite

dominating the majority. This makes the citizenry pro-democratic and correspondingly

gives the ruling elite an incentive to oppose democracy. The poor pose a threat through

revolution, especially during hard times. The rich will try to prevent a revolution by

offering concessions to the poor. ‘If the redistribution is insufficient the elite might be

forced to make a more credible commitment. This is what extending voting rights

achieves’ (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001, pp. 939).

The last two decades have witnessed democratization processes in some form or

the other in a majority of nations. This can be described by a change from less

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democratic to a more democratic political regime, or a movement from semi

authoritarian political system to a democratic political system like Nepal in 1991 or

Comoros in 1990. In some cases the shift has been from absolute dictatorships to fully

liberal democracies, as in the case of Gambia in 1994 and Zimbabwe in 1987. In the

analysis of underlying domestic dynamics that cause transitions, the questions asked

are, why do countries that have practiced dictatorships for decades head down the path

of democracy? Why do democracies find it hard to consolidate in economically

backward societies? In answer to these questions, Kugler proposes that it is a

combination of two processes; the modernization thesis which postulates that

development and modernization will lead to democratization, and the political agent

thesis which postulates that albeit within constraints, democratization was an outcome

of actions, not just of conditions (Przeworski and Limongi, 1997). Casper and Taylor

(1996), treat democratic transitions as a multistage process characterized by the erosion

and collapse of authoritarian rule, followed by democratic transition and consolidation.

Other studies emphasize the strategic relationship between the dictatorship and

its opposition, the population, and view the transition process as one of negotiation.

There are two different reasons for the discontent among general population which

endangers regime stability. Depending on the level of economic development, the

population is either discontent because of a ‘too low’ level of economic welfare or

because of a misaligned ‘welfare-repression balance’. When the source of discontent is

economic conditions, ‘then providing higher welfare in terms of public good provisions,

subsidizing taxes, increasing employment etc are perceived as a signal of the authority’s

capability to ease hardship; regime stability increases’ (Salhi, 2011). The corollary is that

if the authoritarian regime does not possess the resources to ease the population’s

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hardship, it must increase repression, therein disturbing the ‘welfare-repression

balance’ and hence regime stability.

The notion that transitions occur during times of economic hardship is also

implied in the theory of political transitions (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001) where the

authors show that regime changes are more likely during periods of recession because

costs of political turmoil are smaller to both rich and poor. Thus once nations head out

on the path to democracy their transitions face an uphill battle. Given the high

uncertainty about the outcome of reforms and the only recent exposure of the public to

democratic processes and institutions, political constraints are likely to play a

particularly important role in policy-making in transition countries (Pirttila and Kim,

2005). Furthermore, as already noted, if transitions are generally related to economic

downturns, then the expectations of the people will be hard to meet by any new regime

due to financial constraints. ‘It is the economic legacy of the authoritarian rule that

determines the policy agenda of its democratic successors’ (Haggard and Kaufman,

1997). When a new democratic government gains power after a crises it faces a difficult

and politically unpopular set of policy choices, which are centered on macroeconomic

stabilization and wider structural adjustment measures.

Another factor that has a crucial influence during the transition is the creation or

reorganization of state capacity. State building is the process by which state capacity is

created, enhanced, or restored, while capacity refers to the ability of the state to govern

effectively. While the authority of the old state is being eroded, that of the new

democratic state needs to be strengthened. The government will be required to take on

new functions, such as the provision of laws, building of administrative organizations,

and implementing regulations that support a market economy (Djankov and Shleifer,

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2003). Empirical studies confirm the close relationship between good institutions and

development (De Long and Shleifer, 1993; Besley, 1995; Easterly and Levine, 1997;

Acemoglu, 2001), but the initial impact of the fall in authoritative regime is institutional

disorganization. I hypothesize that this institutional vacuum leads to the breakdown or

capture of public services.

While most existing literature examines the factors leading up to regime changes

and the political economy that dictates them, it is only more recently that the focus has

shifted towards studying growth and development during the process. Examining these

effects of transitions, especially in the immediate aftermath, should better reveal the

factors discerning the establishment of successful democracies.

Under the circumstances set forth in the above section it is hard to guarantee

better outcomes, and so far, the evidence that democratizations yield subsequent

economic growth is quite weak. Political regimes still influence economic development,

but the effects appear difficult to identify from the within-country variation (Persson

and Tabellini, 2006). It is noticed that countries liberalizing their economy before

extending political rights do better. ‘A plausible interpretation is that young democracies

in closed economic environments are more likely bogged down in redistribution conflict

and populist policies, whereas young democracies in open economies are forced to pay

more attention to economic efficiency’ (Persson and Tabellini, 2006). It is also seen that

democratic reforms fail to boost economic performance in some autocracies, and this

might be due to economic collapse in the lead-up to democratization or alternatively,

political uncertainty exerting a negative influence on investments and savings. This

implies that stable and persistent democracy has a stronger effect on development than

democracy per-se. Papaioannou and Siourounis, on the other hand, challenge cross-

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sectional findings that democratic institutions have a negligible direct effect on

economic growth, showing that on average democratizations are associated with a one

half to one percent increase in annual per capita growth. Similarly, Rodrick argues that

major democratic transitions have, if anything, a positive effect on economic growth in

the short run. Democratizations tend to follow periods of low growth rather than

precede them, and moreover, democratic transitions are associated with a decline in

growth volatility (Rodrick and Wacziarg, 2004). Both these papers look at purely

macroeconomic outcomes in the form of GDP growth, which do not necessarily explain

redistribution or public service provision.

While there has been controversy over the question of whether democracy

enhances economic development, the consensus has been that democracy enhances

human development (Boix, 2001; Lake and Baum, 2001; Brown and Mobarak, 2009). It

is only recently that research has challenged this belief, arguing that there is no

correlation between regime type and various measures of human development or these

relationships are not significant (McGuire, 2004; Ross, 2006).

Regardless of whether a politician is democratically elected or an authoritarian

figure, the aim is to maximize on the rents earned from the power of the state. It follows

that states that earn more rents produce less of any public service than those that do

not. Therefore, ‘democracies, in which the political market is more contestable, should

produce larger quantities of public services’ (Lake and Baum, 2001). Lake and Baum

test their hypothesis, and find democracies producing large quantities of public services

both cross-sectionally and over time for a variety of public health and education

indicators. On the other hand, Gerring and Thacker find that ‘a country’s contemporary

level of democracy has only a weak association with improved human development

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while a country’s historical experience with democracy has a strong and robust influence

on human development’ (Gerring and Thacker, 2012; pg2). This would imply that

positive human development is not necessarily an immediate outcome of democratic

transitions.

III. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Unfortunately, there is little academic literature on the subject of human development

during transitions, or in the immediate years after democratization, and this paper aims

to fill that gap. The premise on which the rest of the paper is developed is that while

democratization may or may not be beneficial to nations in the long run, the actual

process of transition and the immediate aftermath leaves the population worse off in

terms of human development. A vast majority of transitions occur suddenly and at very

fast pace, and the underpinning of this argument is that this sudden change in regime

tends to leave both political and institutional vacuums within the state (Djankov,

Glaeser, Porta, Silanes, and Shleifer, 2003). Under most circumstances a state in

transition has neither, the capacity, the resources, nor the political incentive to reduce

rent seeking, all of which are prerequisites for successful public service delivery. Since it

is only over time that these factors come together, it can be expected that the years of

transition are some of the hardest years for populations.

A much studied example is the Soviet transition, where the fall of the communist

regime triggered extreme economic disorganization (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). ‘Even

as the markets began to work disorder manifest itself everywhere, with the unofficial

economy reaching perhaps 40% of the nation’s total economy’ (Johnson, Kaufmann,

and Shleifer, 1997). The experience of transition shows that policies of liberalization,

10

stabilization, and privatization that are not grounded in adequate institutions may not

deliver successful outcomes (Roland, 2000). ‘First and most immediately, the economic

crisis and breakdown of state institutions attending the collapse of the Soviet Union

forced the reformers to launch economic reform without adequate political, economic,

and administrative supports’ (Robert and Sherlock, 1999). Short on time to build basic

institutions and market infrastructure to support comprehensive economic

restructuring, they lost control of much of the processes. Simultaneously, weak

governments in combination with nascent institutions not only allow the emergence of

organized crime, but they may also divert the efforts of economic agents from

productive activity to rent-seeking activities, especially under initial conditions where

markets are repressed. ‘New democratic leaders can easily exploit and trade political

gains for short-run economic losses’ (Haggard and Kaufman, 1997).

A source of concern is how well the various political systems are at getting

efficiency-enhancing reforms adopted, and at overcoming the resistance of interest

groups who have an interest in preserving the status quo. Blasi and Kroumova argue

that ‘in the absence of institutionalized consultation with legislators and interest

groups, decision makers are deprived of feedback that may be essential in correcting

mistakes’ (Blasi, Kruse and Kroumova, 1996). This implies that the reforms are more

exposed to popular backlash and rapid reversal. Thus democratic institutions may well

be undermined by the failure to take swift action. Unfortunately, this is exactly the time

when the new regime also needs to build trust amongst the people, because depending

on the manner of its accession to power the government might face a lack of credibility.

‘However, the transition itself raises expectations that government will respond to new

political constituencies. Moreover, policy reform is difficult precisely because economic

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problems are more acute, and the demands for short-term economic relief more

widespread’ (Haggard and Kaufman, 1997).

For the incumbent, political survival is the predominant concern. Given the goal

of staying in power, a trade-off exists between implementing growth-enhancing policies

and the demand of citizens for enhanced welfare in the short run. The incumbents are

assessed to some extent by the economic welfare they generate for their citizens, in the

form of monetary transfers or the provision of public goods (Salhi, 2011). What path the

government takes depends on circumstances. When faced with strong elite conflict and

weak links between state and society there is a substantial reduction in the incentives of

incumbents to devote either the resources or the political capital which are required to

build state capacity. On the one hand the costs of creating state capacity and

implementing sound reforms will be perceived as acceptable if the incumbent has the

support of the elite and a popular base with the public. On the other hand, ‘when

political competition is weakly institutionalized and social bases of support are fragile,

politicians who face significant opposition are likely to view state resources as assets to

attract and cement political allies rather than build state capacity’ (Linz and Stepan,

1996).

When the incumbents are in possession of the financial/natural resources they

can provide the desired public services to appease their constituency. If the incumbents

are dependent on external help, there exists pressure to implement growth enhancing

strategies over public spending. Analytical models of transition (Chadha and Coricelli

(1997), and Roland (1999)) have stressed the importance of government expenditure to

support an efficient restructuring of the economy. Restructuring of the economy and

reallocation of resources implies transitory losses in the form of unemployment or

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disruption of public services. Most developing countries do not have the social safety

nets to protect against such losses, and unless the government takes certain steps to ease

the ensuing hardship, not only will there be resistance to the restructuring but also

resentment towards the new regime. To protect against all this the government must

possess the necessary funds.

Finally, it should also be taken into account that while the new government might

be willing to spend on public goods, the success of the task of providing public services,

including law and order, education and basic infrastructure depends not only on the

fiscal resources and extractive capabilities of the state, but also the professional

competencies of the state's administrative capacity. As mentioned earlier, in a majority

of cases transitions lead to a disruption or breakdown in state capacity. The outcome

from these situations could be an infusion of spending on public services purely as a

signaling effect, with little change in provision quality or outcome. All these issues lead

to the implication that human development is very likely to suffer a setback during

transitions, depending to some extent on prevailing conditions, and the level of external

help received by the new government.

CONCEPTUAL MODEL

Based on the framework set forth above it is possible to trace the paths available to any

new regime, and consequently examine the outcomes of each of these paths. Faced with

some or all of the hurdles outlined, i.e. economic difficulties, institutional vacuums, and

lack of democratic tradition/credibility the new regime might do one of the following.

(a) One option available to the new regime is to enrich itself through a process

of rent seeking. This includes a fire-sale of all public wealth to crony capitalists,

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establishing organized crime, and creating kleptocratic elite. The best example of this

process is Russia. During the mass privatization of state owned enterprises the

government permitted insider dealing, and indulged in massive giveaway of the

enterprises to well connected insiders. The reason this could happen was the lack of

established institutions (decent legal and enforcement infrastructure capacity) to

control the process, and the lack of transparency demanded by a population that is used

to democratic processes. Furthermore, ‘in a vicious circle, dirty privatization also

reinforces corruption and organized crime through bribery’ (Black and Kraakman,

1999). As we now know, around $5 billion of the international loans provided by the

World Bank and International Monetary Fund were stolen upon arrival in Russia. This

led to a complete collapse of the economy and the administration. Russia’s health care

collapsed, with a shortage of medicines and nutrition. There was skyrocketing growth in

drug addiction, alcoholism, crime, poverty and unemployment. In the final analysis, this

outcome has left the Russian public with an immense skepticism of the reform process

and of democratization. The result is a derailing of the democratic transition and the

installation of an illiberal and undemocratic regime such as the current one under Putin.

(b) A second route available to a new regime, especially if faced by economic

crisis, is to look towards the developed world for assistance and follow the ‘structural

readjustment policies’ prescribed by the IMF and World Bank. A common starting point

of these policies is the introduction of severe austerity programs, and a reduction in the

size of the government. The drastic cuts in ‘government services and subsides also target

education, health and other sectors that contribute to the social wage, especially of the

low income groups’ (Beneria, 1999). The readjustment also leads to temporary

unemployment and the process places more value in the market outcomes than in

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human development. In the short run these policies invariably have a negative impact,

with shrinking of household budgets for a substantial proportion of the population,

increasing poverty and loss of social safety nets. In the long term, it is expected that the

reforms will reverse the initial problems and result in overall growth. This outcome to a

large extent will depend on the continued assistance of the developed world, and the

ability of the new regime to maintain credibility with the population through these

hardships.

(c) A third path open to any new regime is to appease the population by

implementing populist policies through subsidies and increased spending on public

services. As the new regime attempts to establish itself it can build credibility within the

population by improving the public provisions that lead to human development like

education, health and basic utilities. But this would imply the access to large amounts of

capital and the prompt rebuilding of administrative capacity. At this point, the outcome

is dictated by whether the new regime has either the natural resource wealth or the

foreign aid to support its populist policies, and equally important whether it has the

capacity and the assistance to develop its state facilities. If the government does possess

these factors, then the result could be a positive effect on human development, which in

turn will lead to the government gaining credibility. On the other hand, if the state does

not possess either the finances or the capacity, what will be witnessed is an initial burst

of spending as a ‘signaling effect’, followed by a swift collapse as the new regime runs

bankrupt. This once again leads not only to the deterioration of human development but

also a loss in credibility of the democratic transition.

Two of the three scenarios presented above lead to the deterioration of public

services in the short run. Even in the third scenario, positive human development is

15

dependent on multiple factors. What this implies is that under most situations, during

the process of regime transition the human development outcomes of the population

take a negative turn. This is why the world over it has been so difficult for new

democracies to consolidate themselves. The results in the following section support this

conceptual framework through empirical analysis.

IV. DATA AND METHODOLOGY

Democratization Data: This paper utilizes two sources to identify and assess

democratic transition over the last 50 years. (a) the most popular method that regime

change can be identified is by using the Polity IV codes, which capture regime changes

that shift from autocracies to democracies and vice-versa. The dataset is available to the

public from the Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research data page, under the

Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2010,

produced by the Center for Systemic Peace, April 30th 2010. The dataset codes

“patterns of authority” and regime changes for all independent countries with a

population greater than 500,000 thousand, which stands at 164 countries as of 2010.

For the purpose of this paper the subpopulation of interest are those countries, which

have undergone regime changes between the years 1960 and 2005. I will use autocratic

countries, and other nations that had no-regime change to act as a counterfactual.

Polity IV adopts as its basic threshold value a 3-point change in the POLITY variable,

with each continuous, sequential change (in the same general direction) in a complex

transition occurring within three years or less of the previous change; this criteria

defines a “regime transition” (denoted with a non-zero value on the REGTRANS

variable and a flag value “1" on the D4 variable). This standard signifies a substantive,

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normative change in political authority considered sufficient to present real

opportunities for regime opponents to challenge the, as yet, non-institutionalized

authority of the polity. As such, the “regime transition” standard is used to define the

ending of an established polity and the beginning of a new polity.

(b) A second method of identifying democratic transitions is the dataset

constructed by Elias Papaioannou and Gregorios Siourounis. Using subjective political

freedom indicators, electoral archives, and historical resources in 174 countries in the

period 1960-2005, the authors identify 63 incidents of permanent democratic

transitions, 3 reverse transitions from relatively stable democracy to autocracy and 6

episodes of small improvements in representative norms (borderline democratizations).

The main reason for looking at this alternate dataset is that this Polity Project’s "polity

change" variable by construction does not capture a complete democratic (or autocratic)

transition, rather identifying a move towards change. For example, according to Polity

IV criterion Cambodia experienced a democratic transition in 1972 (when the Polity

index jumped from −9 to −5), and Chad democratized in 1994 (when the index jumped

from −7 to −3), but it is hard to call either of these real democracies. Another key

advantages of this dataset is that they also classify non-reforming countries to stable

autocracies and always democratic.

I group the countries into five categories based on the political regimes and

transitions from the period 1960-2005. (1) ‘always authoritarian’ are those countries

that are throughout the sample period autocratic. (2) ‘always democratic’ are those

countries which throughout the sample period remain democracies. (3) ‘permanent

democratization’ is the group of interest in this paper and includes all the countries that

abandoned autocratic ruling in the period 1960-2005 and have remained democratic

17

therein without any reversals. (4) ‘borderline democratization’ includes countries that

have taken some steps towards democratic rule, but are still far from establishing

credible democracy. (5) ‘reversals’ indicate countries that experienced a turn-around

from democratic governments into authoritarian regimes.

Data on Human Dvelopment:

As my dependent variables, I investigate numerous indicators of the level of education,

public health, and utilities provided by the state. Although the form of state involvement

differs from direct production in some countries to regulation of private service

providers in others, both are core areas of state responsibility in nearly every country. I

use multiple indicators of both physical input and output for each area to account for

two factors. For one, measuring purely outcome indicators does not take into

consideration that indicators like life expectancy and literacy are persistent, i.e. they are

not truly sensitive to short term impacts. On the other hand, measuring only input

indicators could lead to a biased result as it is hard to parse out the quality of these

inputs, for example the outcome of a public expense that is purely used as a signal

mechanism to gain popular support might not be as effective as the input indicates.

The World Development Indicators (2011) is the source of all numerous

indicators of the human development outcomes and public service inputs. The data is

obtained from the World Bank, which is available for public access in Excel format,

downloadable from the organization’s web page. The WDI includes data from 209

countries spanning from 1960 to 201o. In addition, to check for robustness the paper

will use some other indicators that measure public service inputs like telephone

connectivity, and electricity penetration. The model also uses controls to account for

18

natural resources and foreign aid. By controlling for foreign aid, natural resources, and

debt ratios, we can isolate the effects of transitions from external influence.

Empirical Model:

To analyze the relationship between democratic transitions and human development

outcomes I use annual frequency data (panel data) and examine the within-country

effects of transitions. I employ the following regression equation to make the analysis:

xi,t = αi + ηt + δdemoci,t + controli,t + vi,t

The dependent variable xi,t is the development indicator of interest in country i in year

t. Country fixed-effects (αi) and year fixed-effects (ηt) control for country characteristics

that are time invariant, and global trends that vary across time but not between

countries, respectively. The controli,t includes natural resources and foreign aid for a

country i at time t. The main variable of interest, democi,t is an indicator (dummy)

variable that takes the value one in the year a permanent democratization episode

occurs and in all years following. Countries that do not undergo permanent

democratizations take on the value 0 for democi,t through all years. The regression

constitutes a difference-in-difference model, where democratization countries are the

‘treated’ group, while non-reforming countries (always democratic, always autocratic

and always in intermediate status) serve as the ‘control’ group. Due to the inclusion of

country and year fixed-effects the coefficient δ measures the annual growth effect of

democratization in reforming countries compared to the general evolution of growth in

non-reforming countries. Most importantly, the specification accounts for time-

invariant country characteristics, such as geography, social norms and colonization that

may influence both economic and political development.

19

The model involves multiple time periods to measure the change in human

development at different stages of a democracy; at time ‘t+3’ for the period immediately

after transition, at ‘t+5’ for the period 5 years after the transition, a period ‘t+10’ for ten

years after democratization, and finally ‘t+all’ which covers all subsequent years after a

democratization episode. By looking at these time periods we can analyze the trend in

the impact of democratization.

V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

As a first step, I evaluate the effects of democratic transitions on the annual log

difference in real GDP per capita using a time and country fixed effects regression.

While this paper’s variables of interest are human development, there are two reasons to

study the effects on GDP (a) to test the model by comparing to previous results by other

authors (b) compare the effects on economic development with that of human

development to see if they follow a similar trend. Table1 presents the results for the

regression. The country fixed effects only isolates the within effect of democratization by

adding a vector of country dummies (αi). Looking at column (I) of the country fixed

effects the coefficient on democratization is seen to be 1.106 and statistically significant

at the 1% level. The difference-in-difference coefficient where I control for both country

and year fixed-effects implies an even larger average growth effect of democratization of

TABLE 1: EFFECTS OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION ON LOG ANNUAL DIFFERENCE REAL GDP PER CAPITA

Model1: Country Fixed Effects Model2: Country & Time Fixed Effects

1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4

All Years After Transition 1.106** 1.360**

(0.401) (0.441)

10 Years After Transition 0.224 0.831*

(0.366) (0.373)

5 Years After Transition -0.572 0.510

(0.458) (0.465)

3 Years After Transition -1.215* 0.169

(0.615) (0.615)

Constant 1.498** 1.712** 1.770** 1.778** 1.809* 1.745* 1.735* 1.732*

(0.087) (0.041) (0.026) (0.021) (0.869) (0.862) (0.861) (0.861)

Observations 5,699 5,699 5,699 5,699 5,699 5,699 5,699 5,699

R-squared 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.083 0.081 0.080 0.080

Number of ccode 157 157 157 157 157 157 157 157

Robust standard errors in parentheses

** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

Source: own calculations based on OLS model with country and time fixed effects.

20

21

approximately 1.36%, and is statistically different from zero at the 1% significance level.

What this implies is that in the long run democratization has a significantly positive

effect on log GDP growth of greater than 1%. These results are extremely similar to those

found by Elias Papaioannou and Gregorios Siourounis, who in their paper

‘Democratization and Growth’, show results of 1.44%.

While that is the long run growth result, what are the results in the short run.

Looking at the results across shortening time periods of ten years, five years and three

years after the democratization process, both the models show a similar trend of

decreasing effects of the democratization process. Column (4) of the country fixed

effects model shows that the effect of democratization on log GDP growth is negative in

the first three years subsequent to the democratization episode, with a coefficient of -

1.25%, and significant at the 5% level. While column (4) of both country and fixed effect

model still maintains a positive sign for three years after democratization, the

magnitude has become really small, and the relation is no longer statistically significant.

Similarly, Table 2 shows the effects of democratization on the improvement in safe

drinking water provision. As we’ve seen in the case of GDP, the country fixed effects

model shows that in the long run, measured by all years after transition, the coefficient

is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. The coefficient is also significantly

large and reveals an 8.5 percentage points increase in the size of population that has

access to safe water. But looking towards column (2), column (3) and column (4) a

decrease in the levels of provision of safe water is observed, especially in column (4)

which is in the three years immediately after transition, where there is a decrease of 3.5

percentage points in the population access to drinking water and this is statistically

significant at the 1%level.

TABLE2: EFFECTS OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION ON IMPROVEMENT IN SAFE DRINKING WATER PROVISION

Model 1: Country Fixed Effects Model 2: Country & Time Fixed Effects

1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4

All Years After Transition 8.655** 3.846**

(1.139) (1.206)

Ten Years After Transition -1.479* 0.443

(0.620) (0.455)

Five Years After Transition -2.968** -0.153

(0.551) (0.539)

Three Years After Transition -3.590** -0.566

(0.741) (0.719)

Constant 77.893** 81.202** 81.174** 81.131** 75.618** 76.235** 76.301** 76.322**

(0.406) (0.094) (0.037) (0.032) (0.532) (0.517) (0.514) (0.513)

Observations 724 724 724 724 724 724 724 724

R-squared 0.129 0.009 0.021 0.020 0.420 0.400 0.399 0.400

Number of ccode 156 156 156 156 156 156 156 156


** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 Source: own calculations based on OLS model with country and time fixed effects

22

23

Once I run the regression controlling for both, time and country effects as done in

model 2, the magnitude on the coefficients reduces and they are no longer statistically

significant except for in column 1 (the long run effects). This difference in model 1 and

model 2 is probably a result of the fact that the indicator is influenced by a time trend,

which is not accounted for in model 1. Nonetheless, when compared, the columns show

the same trend as observed in the model 1, that is, the coefficients are decreasing as the

number of years post transition decrease. When looking at the coefficient for three years

after transition it is seen that there is nearly a 0.5 percentage point reduction in the

access to safe drinking water.

Table 3, Table 4 and Table 5 (refer Appendix-A) also look at development

indicators and the results are similar, all of them pointing in the same direction of

decreasing human development inputs in the years immediately after democratization,

with significant improvements in the long run. Table 3 examines the effect of

democratization on the improvement in sanitation provision and there is a marked drop

in the provision of services in the three years immediately after transition, which is

statistically significant in the country fixed effects model and has a magnitude of -2.4

percentage points, that is a decrease of 2.4% of the population’s access to good

sanitation. While it is not statistically significant in model 2, it must be noted that the

coefficient is positive immediately after transitions but then turns negative in the five

and ten year windows, before improving in the long run. Table 4 and Table 5, which

measure the effects on number of telephones per 100 people and the immunization rates

of children, also follow as similar negative trend as we approach the years immediately

24

following democratization. The coefficient on telephones during the three year window

is -2.7 in model 1 and -2.8 in model 2, and both are statistically significant at the 1%

level. Similarly the coefficients for the three year period on immunization are -2.6

percentage points and nearly -1 percentage points, though neither of these values is

statistically significant.

These results indicate that while democratization is good for long term growth

there is little evidence to say that this holds in the short term, in fact all the evidence

supports my argument that the immediate after effects of a democratization process is

the worsening of conditions for the population at large. While the conceptual framework

of this paper outlines the key forces that might be at work here, i.e. the lack of state

capacity, economic weakness, and political rent seeking, there are numerous other

factors that are also influencing these outcomes, which are unique to each country. To

the greatest extent, all new regimes are faced with an uphill struggle, and what the

empirical results in this paper indicate is that regardless of the options available during

the process of transition, in the short run the populations are faced with deteriorating

human development.

VI. POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The theory outlined in this paper, and the accompanying empirical results, indicate that

overthrowing an authoritarian regime in itself does not solve the human development

issues facing much of the developing world. The years immediately following the

transition show the greatest decline in the state’s provision of public services. These are

25

not only the hardest years on the population, but also when the nascent democracy is

most vulnerable in its attempt to establish itself. This has significant bearing on how

both international and domestic policy makers approach the process of democratization.

Of the 165 democratization episodes in the last 50 years, 84 of them have been

derailed within the five year window of the transition. Western democracies that want to

bring about democratic transitions in the developing world must recognize that

replacing the authoritarian regime is only the first step in the process of establishing

democracy within a country. In fact, looking at the data (refer to appendix-C.3, Figure

6), it is seen that on average countries receive less foreign aid in the three years

following the transition than in the years preceding them, which implies a loss of

financial resources for the new regime when they need it the most. Developed nations

need to embrace a more long term strategy that involves supporting the nascent

government with both financial assistance and capacity building assistance.

Furthermore, the western world should recognize the constraints faced by both the

fledgling government and the population when pushing for structural reforms and

austerity measures. If no consideration is given to the hardships faced by the citizen, not

only will there be resistance to the reform, but also a negative backlash against the

western world.

For the nascent government, these findings imply that for the transition to lead to

the successful establishment of a democratic regime the government’s policies must

safeguard the population from the negative effects of the reformation period. These

early years are the key to democratization, especially if the government wants to build

26

credibility for itself and for the democratic process. When democracy is sold to the

population as the solution to that ails the country, the transition brings with it huge

expectations from the people. Policy makers while introducing reforms must also take

steps towards addressing these expectations, otherwise the population will either

become disenchanted with the democratic process or actively turn against it. Human

development leads to human capital, and the new government in recognition of the fact

that this human capital is the source of future growth must not neglect the basic

provision of health and education in the early stages. Though it is important to

implement macroeconomic reforms, the new government must be prepared, and make

it a priority, to provide the social safety nets to mitigate some of the losses faced by the

population.

VII. CONCLUSION The relationship between democracy and human development has been the topic of

much debate and there are numerous studies that argue both sides. Despite this

immense literature, both theoretic and empirical, on the effects of democratization on

development, the political science literature lacks a comprehensive analysis of the short

term effects of the process of transition, i.e. the outcomes in the years immediately

following a democratic transition episode. In this paper I analyze the impacts on human

development after incidents of permanent democratic transitions.

The political theory of transitions indicates that regime change is accompanied by

institutional vacuums, economic difficulties and the lack of democratic traditions. I

27

develop on this theory to empirically show that under most circumstances over the first

few years the new regime will be faced with deteriorating human development. In

contrast to the previous literature that examines the relationship using cross-sectional

approach, I look at within-country effects to test my hypothesis. Having identified 63

incidents of permanent democratization episodes, using panel econometrics that control

for country-specific characteristics and general time trends, I show that in the three

years following a democratization episode GDP growth, access to safe drinking water,

access to clean sanitation, the rates of immunization, and the availability of telephone

lines all show negative outcomes. These results support my hypothesis. The results also

show all these indicators recording a positive growth in the long run, indicating that the

long term outcomes of democratization are good for the population.

From a policy perspective, the results suggest that when implementing

democratic regime changes it is important to recognize that the process of transition has

deleterious effects on the provision of basic public services, and a substantial effort must

be made to mitigate these negative effects. If these basic needs of the population are not

met, there are reasonable expectations that the democratic transition will not succeed,

as is borne out by the fact that a majority of transitions that fail do so within the first

three years. But this outlook does not necessarily have to hold true for all scenarios and

countries. It is important to recognize the shortcomings of the paper, most importantly

the inability to empirically parse out the effects of foreign aid and natural resource rents.

Furthermore, the theory indicates that many democratic transitions took place amidst

recessions and collapse of state capacity. Therefore the deterioration of services

28

observed in the years immediately following transitions might well be driven by the

years leading to the transition rather than the process of transition. Thus, the key issue

of causality remains unclear.

Taking into consideration the political turmoil in the Middle East, and the

questions faced by the developed world with respect to supporting the democratization

of this region, this paper lays the foundation to understand the factors that might effect

the human development outcome of these populations, and therein the establishment of

democracy. Further theoretical and empirical work should model the effects of

democratic transitions, controlling for external aid, thus generating more insight into

the interplay between democratization and the geo-political importance of the country.

Another key avenue for further research is in determining the J-curve result to explore

the point in time, where after the initial negative trend, human development starts

improving, just as reforms are expected to make things worse before they get better,

(Hellman, 1998). This knowledge will help us better understand the time and resources

required to implement a successful transition to democracy. My overall findings do

support the theory that democratization does hold benefits for the population in the

long run, and external support might play an important, welfare enhancing role in the

transition processes.

Appendix – A

Regression Tables

Source: own calculations based on OLS model with country and time fixed effects

TABLE3: EFFECT OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION ON IMPROVED SANITATION FACILITY


1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4

All Years After Transition 5.755** 1.073

(1.250) (1.335)

Ten Years After Transition -1.880** -0.263

(0.679) (0.657)

Five Years After Transition -2.577** -0.114

(0.594) (0.543)

Three Years After Transition -2.400** 0.316

(0.727) (0.667)

Constant 63.427** 65.841** 65.724** 65.654** 61.078** 61.305** 61.278** 61.248**

(0.461) (0.106) (0.040) (0.032) (0.569) (0.527) (0.512) (0.511)

Observations 708 708 708 708 708 708 708 708

R-squared 0.069 0.017 0.020 0.011 0.357 0.356 0.356 0.356

Number of ccode 155 155 155 155 155 155 155 155


** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

29

TABLE4: EFFECT OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION ON NUMBER OF TELEPHONE LINES PER 100 PEOPLE

Model 1: Country Fixed Effects Model 2: Time & Country Fixed Effects

1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4

All Years After Transition 6.764** -1.360

(1.068) (1.142)

Ten Years After Transition -0.381 -2.952**

(0.698) (0.629)

Five Years After Transition -2.224** -2.932**

(0.586) (0.501)

Three Years After Transition -2.749** -2.809**

(0.577) (0.466)

Constant 10.762** 12.412** 12.502** 12.466** -1.076 -1.056 -1.084 -1.097

(0.253) (0.087) (0.036) (0.021) (1.578) (1.573) (1.582) (1.586)

Observations 5,220 5,220 5,220 5,220 5,220 5,220 5,220 5,220

R-squared 0.083 0.000 0.006 0.006 0.440 0.452 0.447 0.443

Number of ccode 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160



30

TABLE5: EFFECT OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION ON IMMUNIZATION OF CHILDREN BETWEEN AGES 1 & 2


1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4

All Years After Transition 23.184** 4.159+

(2.286) (2.482)

Ten Years After Transition 2.890 1.131

(2.177) (1.380)

Five Years After Transition -1.128 -0.225

(2.064) (1.232)

Three Years After Transition -2.630 -0.995

(2.015) (1.215)

Constant 67.805** 73.983** 74.488** 74.518** 42.822** 42.912** 43.004** 43.032**

(0.651) (0.320) (0.147) (0.084) (2.291) (2.280) (2.285) (2.284)

Observations 4,273 4,273 4,273 4,273 4,273 4,273 4,273 4,273

R-squared 0.139 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.539 0.536 0.536 0.536

Number of ccode 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160



31

32

APPENDIX – B

DATA DEFINITION AND SOURCES

Polity IV Data: The independent variable that drives the question posed by this

paper is Regime Change, or alternately Democratic Transitions. To identify regime

change I will use the Polity IV (2010) codes, a dataset under the Polity IV Project:

Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2010, produced by the Center

for Systemic Peace, April 30th 2010. The dataset is available to the public, and can

be downloaded off the web in Excel format from the Integrated Network for Societal

Conflict Research data page. The dataset codes “patterns of authority” and regime

changes for all independent countries with a population greater than 500,000

thousand, which stands at 164 countries as of 2010. For the purpose of this paper

the subpopulation of interest are those countries, which have undergone regime

changes between the years 1970 and 2000. While the focus is on democratic

transitions, I will use autocratic countries that had no-regime change to act as a

counterfactual. Depending on the criteria my sample size could vary between 70

and 100 observations of regime changes.

CCODE (Numeric Country Code): Each country in the Polity IV dataset is defined

by a three-digit numeric code, derived from the Correlates of War's listing of members

of the interstate system.

33

SCODE (Alpha Country Code): Each country in the Polity IV dataset is defined by a

three-letter alpha code, derived from the Correlates of War's listing of members of the

interstate system.

YEAR (Year Coded): A four-digit code is used. Polity codes are assigned according

to the regime in place on December 31 of the year coded.

POLITY (Combined Polity Score): The POLITY score is computed by subtracting

the AUTOC score from the DEMOC score; the resulting unified polity scale ranges from

+10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic).

REGTRANS (Regime Transition): The Polity has undergone a substantive regime

transition, a “regime change”, defined simply as a three-point change in either the

polity’s DEMOC or AUTOC score and may be either a negative value change or a positive

value change. A “democratic transition” is defined as at least a three-point positive

POLITY value change in three years or less from autocracy to a partial democracy.

D4 (Regime Transition Completed): Variable D4 is a flag variable that designates (by

code “1") the year of a regime change or the final year of a multi-year regime transition.

CHANGE (Total change in POLITY value): Net difference between PRIOR (the last

recorded POLITY value) and POST (new) polity values across a continuous polity

change.

STANDARDIZED AUTHORITY CODES (Transition Periods): A score of "-88"

indicates a period of transition. Some new polities are preceded by a "transition period"

during which new institutions are planned, legally constituted, and put into effect.

34

Democratic and quasi-democratic polities are particularly likely to be so established, in

a procedure involving constitutional conventions and referenda. During this period of

transition, all authority characteristic indicators are scored "-88".

World Bank World Development Indicators

NY.GDP.PCAP.KD (GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$)): GDP per capita is

gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross value

added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any

subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making

deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of

natural resources. Data are in constant U.S. dollars.

SH.H2O.SAFE.ZS (Improved water source, as a % of population with access):

Access to an improved water source refers to the percentage of the population with

reasonable access to an adequate amount of water from an improved source, such as a

household connection, public standpipe, borehole, protected well or spring, and

rainwater collection.

SH.STA.ACSN (Improved sanitation facilities, as % of population with access):

Access to improved sanitation facilities refers to the percentage of the population with at

least adequate access to excreta disposal facilities. Improved facilities range from simple

but protected pit latrines to flush toilets with a sewerage connection.

IT.MLT.MAIN.P2 (Telephone lines (per 100 people)): Telephone lines are fixed

telephone lines that connect a subscriber's terminal equipment to the public switched

35

telephone network and that have a port on a telephone exchange. Integrated services

digital network channels and fixed wireless subscribers are included.

SH.IMM.IDPT (Immunization, DPT (% of children ages 12-23 months)): Child

immunization measures the percentage of children ages 12-23 months who received

vaccinations before 12 months or at any time before the survey. A child is considered

adequately immunized against diphtheria, pertussis (or whooping cough), and tetanus

(DPT) after receiving three doses of vaccine.

DT.ODA.ALLD.KD (Net official development assistance and official aid

received (constant 2009 US$)): Net official development assistance (ODA) consists of

disbursements of loans made on concessional terms, and grants by official agencies of

the members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), by multilateral

institutions, and by non-DAC countries to promote economic development and welfare

in countries and territories. Net official aid refers to aid flows (net of repayments) from

official donors to countries and territories in part II of the DAC list of recipients. Data

are in constant 2009 U.S. dollars.

NY.GDP.TOTL.RT.ZS (Total natural resources rents, as % of GDP): Total

natural resources rents are the sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents (hard and

soft), mineral rents, and forest rents.

36

Appendix – C

C1. DESCRPITIVE STATISTICS

Table6.1 Descriptive Statistics of the Entire Population

Dependent Variables No of Observations

Mean Standard Deviation

Minimum Maximum

GDP per Capita Growth Annual 5855 1.8996 6.343979 -50.29 101.13

Improvements in Safe Drinking Water Provision

708 80.977 31.86616 4 100

Improved Sanitation Provision 724 65.548 20.05245 3 100

Number of Telephone Lines per 1000 People

5220 12.364 16.5893 0 74.462

Immunization of Children Between Age 1 & 2

4273 74.407 24.79917 1 99

Source: Table based on own statistical analysis

Table 6.2 Descriptive Statistics of Countries that Experienced Democratization

Dependent Variables Number of Observations


Minimum Maximum



277 82.12 18.61152 17 100



1933 10.24 12.41977 0.0314 57.42


1596 77.53 22.37948 1 99


37

Table 6.3 Descriptive Statistics of Countries that are Permanent Democracies



Minimum Maximum



169 93.508 12.55659 39 100



1232 28.583 21.31323 0.076 74.46


983 83.808 17.26421 6 99


Table 6.4 Descriptive Statistics of Countries that are Permanent Autocracies



Minimum Maximum



254 71.59 20.77971 3 100



1835 5.117 8.310745 0 48.31


1529 67.78 27.45846 1 99


38

C.2 Political Regime Table Table 7. Democratization Episodes

Year Permanent Autocracy

Permanent Democracy

Borderlines Year

Albania 1992 Afghanistan Antigua Central African Republic

1993

Argentina 1983 Algeria Australia Comoros 1990

Armenia 1998 Angola Austria Iran 1997

Bangladesh 1991 Arab Emirates

Bahamas Nepal 1991

Benin 1991 Azerbaijan Barbados Niger 1999

Bolivia 1982 Bahrain Belgium Pakistan 1988

Brazil 1985 Belarus Belize

Bulgaria 1991 Bhutan Botswana

Cape Verde 1991 Bosnia Canada

Chile 1990 Brunei Colombia Reversal Year

Croatia 2000 Burkina Faso Costa Rica Gambia 1994

Czech Rep. 1993 Burundi Cyprus Lebanon 1975

Djibouti 1999 Cambodia Denmark Zimbabwe 1987

Dom. Rep 1978 Cameroon Dominica

Ecuador 1979 Chad Fiji

El Salvador 1994 China Finland

Estonia 1992 Congo, Dem. France

Ethiopia 1995 Congo, Rep. Germany

FYROM 1991 Cote d'Ivoire Iceland

Georgia 1995 Cuba India

Ghana 1996 Egypt Ireland

Greece 1975 Equatorial Guinea

Israel

Grenada 1984 Eritrea Italy

Guatemala 1996 Gabon Jamaica

Guyana 1992 Guinea Japan

Honduras 1982 Guinea-Bissau

Kiribati

Hungary 1990 Haiti Luxembourg

Indonesia 1999 Iraq Malta

Korea, Rep 1988 Jordan Mauritius

Latvia 1993 Kazakhstan Namibia

Lesotho 1993 Kenya Netherlands

Lithuania 1993 Kuwait New Zealand

39

Madagascar 1993 Kyrgyz Republic

Norway

Malawi 1994 Laos Papua New Guinea

Mali 1992 Liberia Sri Lanka

Mexico 1997 Libya Sweden

Moldova 1994 Mauritania Switzerland

Mongolia 1993 Morocco Trinidad & Toba

Mozambique 1994 Myanmar United Kingdom

Nicaragua 1990 North Korea United States

Nigeria 1999 Oman Venezuela

Panama 1994 Qatar Tonga

Paraguay 1993 Rwanda

Peru 1980 Saudi Arabia

Philippines 1987 Seychelles

Poland 1990 Sierra Leone

Portugal 1976 Singapore

Romania 1990 Somalia

Russia 1993 Sudan

Sao Tome. 1991 Swaziland

Senegal 2000 Syria

Serbia-Montenegro

2000 Tajikistan

Slovak Rep. 1993 Togo

Slovenia 1992 Tunisia

South Africa 1994 Turkmenistan

Spain 1978 Uganda

Suriname 1991 Uzbekistan

Tanzania 1995 Vietnam

Thailand 1992 Yemen

Turkey 1983 Malaysia

Ukraine 1994

Uruguay 1985

Zambia 1991

Source: Own table, adapted from Papaioannou, E. & Siourounis, G. (2004)

40

C.3 Graphical Representation of Indicators Across Regime Types

1.812711

2.179186 1.994951

0.5709631

Figure1. GDP per Capita Growth Annual

Transition Countries Permanent Democracies

Permanent Autocracies 3 year transition period

82.12996

93.50888

71.59724 74.35484

Figure2: Safe Drinking Water Improvements


Permanent Autocracies 3 year transition period

Source: Illustrations based on own calculations


41

67.45161

86.50943

54.74137 56.54839

Figure3: Improved Sanitation Provision


Permanent Autocracies 3 Year Transition Period

10.24433

28.58359

5.117316

8.443647

Figure4: Telephone Lines per 100 People


Permanent Autocracies 3 Year Transition Period



42

77.53133 83.80875

67.78352 72.93855

Figure5: Immunization Rates


Permanent Autocracies 3 Year Transition period

537000000

567000000

576000000

Figure6: Net Development Assistance Received

Three years post transition Three years pre transition

All years after transition



43

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