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D 3.5
DELIVERABLE
PROJECT INFORMATION
Project Title: Systemic Seismic Vulnerability and Risk Analysis for Buildings, Lifeline Networks and Infrastructures Safety Gain
Acronym: SYNER-G
Project N°: 244061
Call N°: FP7-ENV-2009-1
Project start: 01 November 2009
Project end: 31 October 2012
DELIVERABLE INFORMATION
Deliverable Title: D3.5 - Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
Date of issue: 31 October 2010
Work Package: WP3 – Fragility functions of elements at risk
Deliverable/Task Leader: Aristotle University of Thessaloniki (AUTH)
Reviewer: Norwegian Geotechnical Institute (NGI)
REVISION: Final
Project Coordinator:
Institution:
e-mail:
fax:
telephone:
Prof. Kyriazis Pitilakis
Aristotle University of Thessaloniki
+ 30 2310 995619
+ 30 2310 995693
i
Abstract
This deliverable provides the technical report on the assessment of fragility functions for
water and waste-water system elements. This deliverable comprises four main parts. A short
review of past earthquake damages on water and waste-water system elements is provided
in the first part, including the description of physical damages, the identification of main
causes of damage and the classification of failure modes. The following two parts deal with
the identification of the main typologies of water and waste-water system components and
the general description of existing methodologies, damage states definitions, intensity
indexes and performance indicators of the elements. In the next part the validation of the
available vulnerability functions for pipes is provided based on damage data from recent
European earthquakes (Düzce and Lefkas). Finally, improved vulnerability functions for the
individual components are proposed along with the coding and digital description of fragility
functions.
Keywords: fragility functions, vulnerability, water system, waste-water system
iii
Acknowledgments
The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Community's
Seventh Framework Programme [FP7/2007-2013] under grant agreement n° 244061.
v
Deliverable Contributors
[AUTH] Alexoudi Maria, Dr. Civil Engineer, MSc
Kyriazis Pitilakis, Professor
Argyro Souli, Civil Engineer, MSc
vii
Table of Contents
1 Introduction........................................................................................................................................ 1
2 Damages from past ear thquakes ...................................................................................................... 3
2.1 PHYSICAL DAMAGES / MAIN CAUSES OF DAMAGE OF WATER SYSTEM
ELEMENTS.................................................................................................................. 3
2.1.1 Tanks ............................................................................................................... 6
2.1.2 Water Treatment Plant..................................................................................... 7
2.1.3 Canals.............................................................................................................. 7
2.1.4 Tunnels ............................................................................................................ 8
2.1.5 Pipes................................................................................................................ 9
2.1.6 Pumping Stations............................................................................................. 9
2.2 CLASSIFICATION OF FAILURE MODES / DIRECT LOSSES OF WATER
SYSTEM ELEMENTS.................................................................................................. 9
2.2.1 Pipes................................................................................................................ 9
2.3 PHYSICAL DAMAGES / MAIN CAUSES OF DAMAGE OF WASTE-WATER
SYSTEM ELEMENTS................................................................................................ 13
2.3.1 Waste-Water Treatment Plant ....................................................................... 15
2.3.2 Tunnels .......................................................................................................... 15
2.3.3 Pipes.............................................................................................................. 15
2.3.4 Lift Station...................................................................................................... 15
3 Methodology for the vulnerability assessment of water and waste-water system elements...... 16
3.1 IDENTIFICATION OF THE MAIN TYPOLOGIES OF WATER SYSTEM
ELEMENTS................................................................................................................ 16
3.1.1 Water Source................................................................................................. 17
3.1.2 Water Treatment Plant................................................................................... 17
3.1.3 Pumping Station ............................................................................................ 18
3.1.4 Storage .......................................................................................................... 19
3.1.5 Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) ..................................... 20
3.1.6 Conduits......................................................................................................... 21
3.2 SYNER-G TYPOLOGIES OF WATER SYSTEM ELEMENTS .................................. 26
3.3 IDENTIFICATION OF THE MAIN TYPOLOGIES OF WASTE-WATER SYSTEM
ELEMENTS................................................................................................................ 28
3.3.1 Conduits......................................................................................................... 29
viii
3.3.2 Waste-water Treatment Plant ........................................................................ 30
3.3.3 Lift station ...................................................................................................... 31
3.3.4 Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) ..................................... 32
3.4 SYNER-G TYPOLOGIES OF WASTE-WATER SYSTEM ELEMENTS .................... 33
3.5 GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF EXISTING METHODOLOGIES................................ 34
3.6 DAMAGE STATES OF WATER SYSTEM ELEMENTS ............................................ 34
3.6.1 Water Source................................................................................................. 34
3.6.2 Water Treatment Plant................................................................................... 35
3.6.3 Pumping Station ............................................................................................ 35
3.6.4 Storage tanks................................................................................................. 35
3.6.5 Canal ............................................................................................................. 35
3.6.6 Pipes.............................................................................................................. 35
3.6.7 Tunnels .......................................................................................................... 36
3.7 DAMAGE STATES OF WASTE-WATER SYSTEM ELEMENTS .............................. 36
3.7.1 Waste-Water Treatment Plant ....................................................................... 36
3.7.2 Conduits......................................................................................................... 36
3.7.3 Lift station ...................................................................................................... 36
3.8 INTENSITY INDEXES ............................................................................................... 36
3.8.1 Water System Elements ................................................................................ 37
3.8.2 Waste-Water System Elements..................................................................... 39
3.9 PERFORMANCE INDICATORS................................................................................ 39
3.9.1 Water System/ component performance indicators ....................................... 40
3.9.2 Waste-Water System/ component performance indicators............................ 45
4 Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements.................................................. 49
4.1 STATE-OF-THE-ART FRAGILITY CURVES PER COMPONENT OF WATER
SYSTEM .................................................................................................................... 49
4.2 STATE-OF-THE-ART FRAGILITY CURVES PER COMPONENT OF WASTE-
WATER SYSTEM ...................................................................................................... 61
4.3 VALIDATION / ADAPTATION / IMPROVEMENT...................................................... 63
4.3.1 Validation of vulnerability models for pipes.................................................... 64
4.4 FINAL PROPOSAL .................................................................................................... 77
4.4.1 WATER SYSTEM ELEMENTS...................................................................... 77
4.4.2 WASTE-WATER SYSTEM ELEMENTS........................................................ 91
5 Coding and digital descr iption of fragility functions.................................................................... 98
ix
List of Figures
Fig. 2-1 Tank failure in Izmit (Kocaeli 《arthquake,1999). ....................................................... 5
Fig. 2-2 Water pipe failure of north part of Anatolian fault (3.7 m- Kocaeli 《arthquake, 1999).
............................................................................................................................. 5
Fig. 2-3 Failure of Rinconada Water Treatment Plant (Loma Prieta, 1989)............................ 5
Fig. 2-4 Total collapse of 750,000-gallon tank near Castaic Junction (Northridge, 1994) ...... 5
Fig. 2-5 Different types of seismic response of pile foundation tanks (ASCE, 1997).............. 6
Fig. 2-6 Failure modes of segment pipes for wave propagation (O’Rourke and Liu, 1999).. 10
Fig. 2-7 Basic failure modes for ductile pipes ....................................................................... 11
Fig. 2-8 Failures modes of pipelines as result of liquefaction (O’Rourke and Palmer, 1996) 12
Fig. 2-9 Failures modes of pipelines as result of landslide (O’Rourke et al., 1998) .............. 12
Fig. 2-10 Failures modes of pipelines as result of fault crossing (O’ Rourke et al., 1998) .... 13
Fig. 2-11 Plenary view of waste-water treatment plant of Lefkas (Greece) .......................... 14
Fig. 2-12 No damage observed in waste-water lift station during the 2003 Lefkas earthquake
in Greece (from in-situ inspection Alexoudi and Argyroudis 2003).................... 15
Fig. 3-1 Breakdown of potable water system components ................................................... 16
Fig. 3-2 Breakdown of potable water conduits...................................................................... 22
Fig. 3-3 Breakdown of waste-water system. ......................................................................... 29
Fig. 3-4 Breakdown of waste-water conduits. ....................................................................... 29
Fig. 4-1 Location of Düzce and Lefkas island ....................................................................... 63
Fig. 4-2 Düzce. Analyzed method: 1D linear equivalent, Local Soil Condition: Based on Soil
Profiles, a) Earthquake: Kocaeli, 1999, PGA (g) [a(1)], PGV (m/sec) [a(2)], b)
Earthquake: Düzce, 1999, PGA (g) [b(1)], PGV (m/sec) [b(2)].......................... 65
Fig. 4-3 Mahallas that present low, moderate and extensive failures as result of Kocaeli
earthquake and O’Rourke and Ayala (1993) (a) and Eidinger and Avila (1999)
(b) relationships. The points represent the well documented damages shown
earlier. Earthquake: Kocaeli 1999, Microzonation study (Alexoudi et al. , 2007)
........................................................................................................................... 67
Fig. 4-4 Mahallas that present low, moderate and extensive failures as result of Düzce
earthquake and O’Rourke and Ayala (1993) (a) and Eidinger and Avila (1999)
(b) relationships. The failures collected are illustrated with points. For each
mahalla, ID is corresponded. Earthquake: Düzce 1999, Microzonation study.
(Alexoudi et al., 2007)........................................................................................ 67
Fig. 4-5 Mahallas that presents low, moderate and extensive failures (a) before the two
earthquakes, (b) after Kocaeli earthquake, (c) after Düzce earthquake (d)
x
present research as result of both earthquakes. Points illustrate the failures
collected while the ID corresponds to each mahalla. ........................................ 68
Fig. 4-6 Digitized Waste- Water network (left) in Düzce and distribution of waste-water pipe/
conduits diameters (up) ..................................................................................... 69
Fig. 4-7 Estimated damages of waste-water network as percentage of the total length of the
network for Kocaeli (a) and Düzce (b) earthquake (Alexoudi et al., 2008) ........ 69
Fig. 4-8 Spatial distribution of waste-water pipe damages in Düzce network for Kocaeli (a)
and Düzce (b) earthquake (Alexoudi et al., 2008) ............................................. 70
Fig. 4-9 Estimated waste-water pipe damages per mahalla for Kocaeli earthquake (a), for
Düzce earthquake (c) and recorded water pipe damages per mahalla after
Kocaeli earthquake (b) and Düzce earthquake (d) - (Alexoudi et al., 2008)...... 71
Fig. 4-10 Water distribution network of old city of Lefkas and the location of main water
system failures and secondary connections (p-primary network, sec-secondary
network-connections with customers................................................................. 72
Fig. 4-11 Vulnerability assessment of potable water system (Fragility curve: O’ Rourke and
Ayala, 1993, Earthquake: Lefkas 2003) ............................................................ 75
Fig. 4-12 Vulnerability assessment of potable water system (Fragility curve: Eidinger and
Avila, 1999, Earthquake: Lefkas 2003).............................................................. 75
Fig. 4-13 Vulnerability assessment of potable water system (Fragility curve: Isoyama et al.,
1998, Earthquake: Lefkas 2003) ....................................................................... 76
Fig. 4-14 Vulnerability assessment of potable water system (Fragility curve: ]LA, 2001,
Earthquake: Lefkas 2003) ................................................................................. 76
Fig. 4-15 Fragility curves for wells (Anchored components, low – rise R/C building with low
seismic code design) subjected to ground shaking ........................................... 78
Fig. 4-16 Fragility curves for wells (Anchored components, low – rise R/C building with
advanced seismic code design) subjected to ground shaking .......................... 79
Fig. 4-17 Fragility curves for Water Treatment Plant (Anchored components) subjected to
ground shaking.................................................................................................. 82
Fig. 4-18 Fragility curves for pumping station (Anchored components, low-rise R/C building
with low seismic code design) subjected to ground shaking ............................. 84
Fig. 4-19 Fragility curves for pumping station (Anchored components, low -rise R/C building
with advanced seismic code design) subjected to ground shaking ................... 85
Fig. 4-20 Fragility curves for above ground R/C tanks (wave propagation) .......................... 88
Fig. 4-21 Fragility curves for above ground R/C tanks (permanent ground deformations) ... 88
Fig. 4-22 Fragility curves for Waste- Water Treatment Plant (Anchored components)
subjected to ground shaking (low-rise R/C building with low seismic code
design)............................................................................................................... 92
Fig. 4-23 Fragility curves for Waste- Water Treatment Plant (Anchored components)
subjected to ground shaking (low-rise R/C building with advanced seismic code
design)............................................................................................................... 93
xi
Fig. 4-24 Fragility curves for lift station (Anchored components, low-rise R/C building with
low seismic code design) subjected to ground shaking..................................... 95
Fig. 4-25 Fragility curves for lift station (Anchored components, low-rise R/C building with
advanced seismic code design) subjected to ground shaking .......................... 96
xii
List of Tables
Table 2-1 Brief presentation of water system damages as result of Loma Prieta, Northridge
and Hyogo-ken Nanbu (Kobe) earthquake.......................................................... 3
Table 2-2 Restoration time of water system and number of customers influenced [1989
Loma Prieta, 1994 Northridge, 1995 Hyogo-ken Nanbu (Kobe) earthquakes].... 6
Table 2-3 Main failure modes of water treatment plants (ASCE, 1987).................................. 7
Table 2-4 Tunnel failures for different earthquakes ................................................................ 8
Table 2-5 Possible failure modes for pipes as result of wave propagation........................... 10
Table 2-6 Brief presentation of waste-water system damages as result of Loma Prieta,
Northridge and Hyogo-ken Nanbu (Kobe) earthquake ...................................... 14
Table 3-1 Typology of water storage tanks........................................................................... 20
Table 3-2 Typology of tunnels (ALA 2001a). ........................................................................ 25
Table 3-3 Comparison of the typologies of potable water elements provided in NIBS 2004,
ALA 2001a,b and SYNER-G ............................................................................. 27
Table 3-4 Comparison of the typologies of potable water elements provided in HAZUS
(NIBS, 2004) and SYNER-G ............................................................................. 33
Table 3-5 Intensity measures for the vulnerability assessment potable water system
elements ............................................................................................................ 38
Table 3-6 Intensity measures for the vulnerability assessment waste- water system elements
........................................................................................................................... 39
Table 3-7 Summary of Water Component Performance Indicators (WCPIs)........................ 41
Table 3-8 Summary of Water System Performance Indicators (WSPIs) .............................. 42
Table 3-9 Summary of Waste-Water Component Performance Indicators (PPIs)................ 47
Table 3-10 Summary of Waste-Water System Performance Indicators (WWSPIs) – ALA
(2004) ................................................................................................................ 47
Table 4-1 Review of existing fragility functions for potable water elements......................... 51
Table 4-2 Review of existing fragility functions for waste-water system elements................ 61
Table 4-3 Computed water pipe failures in the water network of Düzce due to ground
shaking for different fragility expressions, and input motions (Alexoudi et al.,
2010) ................................................................................................................. 66
Table 4-4 Estimated number of repairs for Lefkas earthquake using different fragility curves
........................................................................................................................... 73
Table 4-5 Comparison of Repair Rate/km (wave propagation) with the recorded damages of
water network of Lefkas..................................................................................... 74
Table 4-6 Comparison of the number of failures (wave propagation) for water system of
Lefkas................................................................................................................ 74
xiii
Table 4-7 Description of damage states for water source subject to ground shaking........... 77
Table 4-8 Parameters of fragility curves for water source (wells) ........................................ 78
Table 4-9 Subcomponent Damage Algorithms for Wells with Anchored Components (SRM-
LIFE, 2003-2007)............................................................................................... 79
Table 4-10 Description of damage states for Water Treatment Plant subjected to ground
shaking .............................................................................................................. 80
Table 4-11 Parameters of fragility curves for Water Treatment Plant ................................... 81
Table 4-12 Subcomponent Damage Algorithms for Water Treatment Plants with Anchored
Components ...................................................................................................... 81
Table 4-13 Description of damage states for Pumping Station subjected to ground shaking83
Table 4-14 Parameters of fragility curves for pumping station.............................................. 83
Table 4-15 Subcomponent Damage Algorithms for Water Treatment Plants with Anchored
Components ...................................................................................................... 85
Table 4-16 Fragility curves for anchorage R/C at grade tanks (wave propagation)- ALA
(2001a,b) ........................................................................................................... 86
Table 4-17 Fragility curves for unanchorage R/C at grade tanks (wave propagation)- ALA
(2001a,b) ........................................................................................................... 86
Table 4-18 Fragility curves for Open reservoirs with or without seismic design code (wave
propagation) ALA (2001a,b) .............................................................................. 87
Table 4-19 Fragility curves for unanchorage R/C at grade tanks (permanent deformations)-
ALA (2001a,b) ................................................................................................... 87
Table 4-20 Fragility curves for at-grade R/C tanks (wave propagation)- (HAZUS; NIBS,
2004) ................................................................................................................. 87
Table 4-21 Fragility curves for buried R/C tanks (permanent ground deformation)- (HAZUS;
NIBS, 2004) ....................................................................................................... 87
Table 4-22 Description of damage states for Canals (ALA, 2001a,b)................................... 89
Table 4-23 Vulnerability of canals (wave propagation, ALA, 2001a, b) ................................ 90
Table 4-24 Vulnerability of canals (permanent deformations, ALA, 2001a, b)...................... 90
Table 4-25 Description of damage states for Waste-Water Treatment Plant subjected to
ground shaking.................................................................................................. 91
Table 4-26 Parameters of fragility curves for Water Treatment Plant ................................... 92
Table 4-27 Subcomponent Damage Algorithms for Waste- Water Treatment Plants with
Anchored Components...................................................................................... 93
Table 4-28 Description of damage states for Lift Station subjected to ground shaking ........ 94
Table 4-29 Parameters of fragility curves for lift station........................................................ 95
Table 4-30 Subcomponent Damage Algorithms for Lift Station with Anchored Components96
D3.9 - Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
1
1 Introduction
The present report reviews the damages sustained by water and waste-water system
elements during past earthquakes, with special emphasis to European earthquakes.
Different failure modes are identified and classified respectively. The following components
are proposed to be studied within SYNER-G:
For Water System
o Water source
o Treatment plant
o Pumping station
o Storage
o Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)
o Conduits (pipes, tunnel, canals)
For Waste-Water System
o Conduits (pipes, tunnels)
o Treatment plant
o Lift station
o Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)
The description of the European typology for the different components is performed. A
review of existing methodologies for the vulnerability assessment of water and waste-water
system elements is followed by the definition, for each component, of some key parameters:
o Damage states scales.
o Intensity index (indices) (intensity-measure parameter).
o Performance indicators that can help specify the link between the damage state
of the component and its serviceability / functionality.
Finally, based on the review of state-of-the-art fragility curves for each component, and the
validation of some methods based on damage data from recent European earthquakes,
improved fragility functions for the individual components are proposed along with their
coding and digital description. For the proposed vulnerability functions, the following
parameters are provided:
o Typology classification of each component.
o Damage scale definition.
o Intensity index used.
o Fragility curve parameters, for each damage state and each typology.
D3.9 - Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
3
2 Damages from past earthquakes
Water and waste-water systems are prone to damage from earthquakes, not only under
severe levels of shaking but under moderate levels as well. Furthermore, as shown by the
experience during past earthquakes, seismic damage to water system elements can cause
extended direct and indirect economic losses, while environmental pollution is the main result
of waste-water failure.
2.1 PHYSICAL DAMAGES / MAIN CAUSES OF DAMAGE OF WATER SYSTEM ELEMENTS
The main damages in water network were observed in water pipes (Table 2-1); secondarily
in pumping stations, tanks and water treatment plants. The pipeline damages can be mainly
attributed to permanent ground deformation and less to wave propagation. Rigid pipe body,
connections, age and corrosion are some of the factors that influence the seismic response
of water network.
Table 2-1 Brief presentation of water system damages as result of Loma Prieta, Northridge and Hyogo-ken Nanbu (Kobe) earthquake
Earthquake/ System
Loma Prieta, 1989,
Mw=6.9, max. MMI=IX
Northridge, 1994,
Mw=6.7, max. MMI=IX
Hyogo-ken Nanbu (Kobe), 1995, Mw=6.9, max. JMA=VII
Water System
The 350 repairs in water
system mains of San
Francisco, Oakland and
Berkeley were observed in
cast iron and in asbestos-
cement pipe with
diameters 100-200mm. In
Santa Cruz area, 240
failures in the water
network were observed,
mainly concentrated in
areas with large
permanent deformations.
The electric power loss
had a great impact in
water distribution system
of San Francisco.
Moreover, the pipes that
were damaged influenced
the reliability of fire-
fighting system.
More than 1400 damages
were observed in Los
Angeles water network.
The most of the damages,
100 were observed in
water transmission pipes.
The three transmission
systems of San Fernando
were broken. The seismic
response of dams, water
drills, pumping station
was very good although
the electric power was
disrupted. Minor damages
were observed in water
treatment plants while
extensive damages were
recorded in above ground
tanks with no code
design.
86 reservoirs that give
water to Kobe were
empty in 24 hours. The
damages in water
network influence the
operability of fire-fighting
system. 1.610 repairs of
the main water system
and 71.235 repairs in
customer’s connection
as result of building
damages and permanent
ground deformation were
recorded. Electric Power
losses were responsible
for the malfunction of 3
emergency valves in
reservoirs and several
pumping stations
References EERI (1990), NRC (1994) EERI (1995), TCLEE
(1995), NIST (1994)
NIST (1996), NCEER
(1995) Shrestha (2001)
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
4
Europe and especially Balkan and Mediterranean countries have experienced several large
earthquakes, although limited records are available. In Bucharest earthquake (1977), water
system experienced extensive damages both in transmission and distribution system. In the
water treatment plant, the pumps in the pumping station were dislocated, causing
immediately the periodical stop of the treatment process. In three locations, transmission
pipes (diameter: 1200-2200mm, total length: 200km) were severely damaged with extensive
breaks in water supply. Moreover, water blow as result of water failures and extensive
electric power losses provoke the break of 120 connections in water distribution system.
Approximately 10% of 120 connections were steel pipes, while the remaining 90% were
concrete pipes. Asbestos-cement and cast iron pipes experienced no damages (Aldea et al.,
2002).
In Kocaeli (1999) earthquake, minor damages were recorded in the water treatment plant
and in the dam while 2 buried tanks of R/C were cracked, 70% of water distribution system in
Adapazari (500km) was destroyed while the rest had extensive leaks. Moreover, in the same
earthquake, water transmission system had experienced important damages especially in
areas close to the surface trace of the fault (Izmit). Extensive damages were occurred in
Golcuk area in the water distribution system. About 45% of the water network was destroyed
while the rest experienced important leaks. It is important to mention that Turkey’s water
systems are very old with extensive water loss even before the earthquake.
Greek experience is also limited in lifeline system damages. No major damages have been
observed in Greece. Although, failures were observed in pipes in Thessaloniki earthquake
(1978, Mw=6.4, R=29km, PGA= 0.15g, PGV= 16.7cm/sec, PGD=3.4cm). For a few days,
water supply in Thessaloniki stopped when the main pumping station was out of order. Water
was polluted with oil as a result of an oil pipe break nearby. In Kozani- Grevena earthquake
(1995, Mw= 6.6, R= 19km, PGA= 0.21g, PGV= 8.8cm/sec, PGD=1.5cm), the damages were
limited and localized. Water supply stopped in the majority of villages, the cause of the
supply interruption was never confirmed. Several assumptions were made that include
pipeline break and electric power failure. No important damages were occurred in the water
system after Kalamata earthquake (1986, Mw= 6.0, R= 12km, PGA= 0.27g, PGV=
32.3cm/sec, PGD=7.2cm). Many times, due to lack of experience, the results of earthquakes
are noticed later. The recording of water pipeline failures was performed after the Lefkas
earthquake (2003, ‒w=6.4, PGAtrans=0,42g, PGAlong= 0.34g, PGAvert=0.19g). In particular,
more than 30 failures in water customer’s connection were recorded and 10 failures in water
mains (Alexoudi, 2005).
Water system failures were observed in 1989 Loma Prieta, 1994 Northridge and 1999
Kocaeli earthquakes (Fig. 2-1 - Fig. 2-4)
The water failures are closely connected with restoration times and number of customers. An
important factor of restoration time is the interactions between the systems and the available
personnel after the earthquake. After the 1995 Hyogo-ken Nanbu (Kobe) earthquake,
restoration lasted 14 days. The restoration and design personnel were 450 people. About
1757 failures of main water system were fixed; in the secondary network the fixed repairs
were about 62.300. Restoration time of water system and number of customers influenced as
result of 1989 Loma Prieta, 1994 Northridge and 1995 Hyogo-ken Nanbu (Kobe),
earthquakes are illustrated in Table 2-2.
D3.9 - Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
5
Fig. 2-1 Tank failure in Izmit (Kocaeli 《arthquake,1999).
Fig. 2-2 Water pipe failure of north part of Anatolian fault (3.7 m- Kocaeli
《arthquake, 1999).
Fig. 2-3 Failure of Rinconada Water Treatment Plant (Loma Prieta, 1989)
Fig. 2-4 Total collapse of 750,000-gallon tank near Castaic Junction (Northridge,
1994)
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
6
Table 2-2 Restoration time of water system and number of customers influenced [1989 Loma Prieta, 1994 Northridge, 1995 Hyogo-ken Nanbu (Kobe) earthquakes].
Earthquake/ Water system
Loma Prieta, 1989
References: NIST GCR 97-719
Northridge, 1994.
References: NIST 871 (1994), NISTIR 539 (1994), NCEER (1994)
Hyogo-ken Nanbu Kobe, 1995
References: NCEER (1995), NIST 901 (1996)
Restoration days
Immediate Max … 7 days 14 days
N.b of customers influenced
- 50.000 people 1.300.000 people
According to international experience, for the repair of a point failure of the main potable
water pipes, 3- 6 people are needed for total recovery, while for the rest water system
failures about 1.5 people are needed.
2.1.1 Tanks
According to ]SCE (1997) there are six main failure modes for tanks: shell buckling mode,
roof and miscellaneous steel damage, anchorage failure, foundation failure, support system
failure, hydrodynamic pressure failure, connecting pipe failure and manhole failure.
The basic failure modes for tanks under seismic loads are presented in Error ! Not a valid link..
Fig. 2-5 Different types of seismic response of pile foundation tanks (ASCE, 1997)
D3.9 - Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
7
2.1.2 Water Treatment Plant
The main failure modes of water treatment plants and its elements are described briefly in
Table 2-3.
Table 2-3 Main failure modes of water treatment plants (ASCE, 1987)
2.1.3 Canals
Canal failure is often closely connected to the increased friction between the water and the
liner, as the result of debris residue that is lowering hydraulic capacity. Debris may have
entered into the canal causing higher sediment transport, which could cause scour of the
liner or earthen embankments. Damage to overcrossings may have also occurred.
Overcrossing damage could include the collapse of highway bridges and leakage of non-
potable material pipelines such as oil, gas, etc. Damage to bridge abutments could cause
constriction of the canal's cross-section to such an extent leading to significant flow
restriction which warrants immediate shutdown and repair (ALA, 2001a).
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
8
2.1.4 Tunnels
Ground shaking will induce stresses in the liner system of tunnels. If the level of shaking is
high, the liner can crack, which can result in tunnel collapse. For water tunnels, the impact of
liner failure may or may not be immediate. Small cracks in liners will not generally directly
impact the flow of water through the tunnel, although there may be some minor increases in
head loss. Over time, small cracks will allow water from the tunnel to enter the native
materials behind the liner, which could cause erosion of the materials and ultimately could
lead to more damage to the liner. For the most part, the factors that lead to the major
damage state are fault offset through the tunnel itself or landslide at the tunnel portals. Table
2 4 provides tunnel failures depending on the different coating for 10 different earthquakes.
Table 2-4 Tunnel failures for different earthquakes
Coating
Earthquake
(after Power et al., 1998)
‒w Unknown Without
Timber
Or Masonry
Liner
Concrete
Liner
Reinforced
Concrete
or Steel Pipe Liner
Total
San Francisco, CA (1906)
7.8 - 1 7 - - 8
Kanto, Japan (1923)
7.9 - 7 4 2 - 13
Kern Country, CA (1952)
7.4 - 4 - - - 4
Alaska (1964) 8.4 - 8 - - - 8
San Fernando, CA (1971)
6.6 - 8 - - 1 9
Loma Prieta, CA (1989)
7.1 3 - 2 11 6 22
Petrolia, CA (1992)
6.9 - - - 11 - 11
Hokkaido, Japan (1993)
7.8 - - - 1 1
Northridge, CA (1994)
6.7 6 - - 5 20 31
Hyogo-ken Nanbu (Kobe), Japan (1995)
6.9 3 - 1 87 6 97
Sum 204
D3.9 - Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
9
2.1.5 Pipes
Damage to segmented pipes (e.g., cast iron pipe having caulked bell-and-spigot joints) will
be heavy when crossing surface ruptured faults according to ALA (2001). Moreover, pipe
breaks occur due to relative vertical (differential) settlements at transition zones from fill to
better soil, and in areas of alluvial soils prone to localized liquefaction. Breaks can also occur
where pipes enter tanks or buildings. Landslides may also produce localized, severe damage
to buried pipe. Experience has also shown that welded pipelines with bends, elbows and
local eccentricities will concentrate deformation at these features, especially if permanent
ground deformations develop compression strains. Segmented pipe with somewhat rigid
caulking cannot tolerate much movement before leakage occurs. Pipeline damage tends to
concentrate at discontinuities such as pipe elbows, tees, in-line valves, reaction blocks and
service connections. Such features create anchor points or rigid locations that promote
force/stress concentrations. Locally high stresses can also occur at pipeline connections to
adjacent structures (e.g., tanks, buildings and bridges). Age and corrosion will accentuate
damage, especially in segmented steel, threaded steel and cast iron pipes. Age effects are
possibly strongly correlated with corrosion effects caused by the increasing impact of
corrosion over time. Corrosion weakens pipe by decreasing the material’s thickness and by
creating stress concentrations.
2.1.6 Pumping Stations
Pumping stations are complex components. Damages in pumping stations are closely
connected with the failure modes of their sub-components. The major subcomponents are
presented in the next section of this report.
2.2 CLASSIFICATION OF FAILURE MODES / DIRECT LOSSES OF WATER SYSTEM ELEMENTS
In general, water system failure may include damages in all water system components.
According to the redundancy and the importance of water elements, the failure of some
components has more impact than others. The definition of water system failures is defined
according to the operation period of the system (normal, crisis and recovery). Specifically,
water system failure can include disability:
o To supply the available water and pressure for fire-fighting purposes in the end-
point node.
o To serve customers’ needs in summer days with maximum daily consumption.
o To supply water to all customers independent of the region and the floor.
2.2.1 Pipes
The basic failure modes of pipes are presented in Table 2-5 and in Fig. 2-6 and Fig. 2-7 for
the case of wave propagation.
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
10
Table 2-5 Possible failure modes for pipes as result of wave propagation
Continuous pipes
(O’Rourke and Liu, 1999)
Segmented pipes (Singhal, 1984, O’Rourke and Liu, 1999)
ALA (2001a)
- Tensile failure
- Wrinkling
- Beam buckling
- Welded slip joint
- Axial pull-out
- Crushing of bell and
spigot joints
- Joint rotation
- Round flexural cracks
- Axial pull-out
- Joint rotation
- Tensile and bending
deformations of the pipe
barrel.
Fig. 2-6 Failure modes of segment pipes for wave propagation (O’Rourke and Liu, 1999)
D3.9 - Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
11
Fig. 2-7 Basic failure modes for ductile pipes
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
12
For liquefaction, landslides and fault crossing the pipeline failure modes are illustrated in Fig.
2-8 to Fig. 2-10, respectively.
Fig. 2-8 Failures modes of pipelines as result of liquefaction (O’Rourke and Palmer, 1996)
Fig. 2-9 Failures modes of pipelines as result of landslide (O’Rourke et al., 1998)
D3.9 - Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
13
Fig. 2-10 Failures modes of pipelines as result of fault crossing (O’ Rourke et al., 1998)
2.3 PHYSICAL DAMAGES / MAIN CAUSES OF DAMAGE OF WASTE-WATER SYSTEM ELEMENTS
The main damages in waste-water network were observed in waste-water pipes (Table 2-6);
secondarily in lift stations and waste-water treatment plants. The pipeline damages can be
attributed mainly to permanent ground deformation and less to wave propagation. Rigid pipe
body, connections, age and corrosion are some of the factors that influence the seismic
response of waste-water network.
In Europe, very limited data are available. In Bucharest earthquake (1977), no damages
were observed in waste-water pipeline network (total length: 1400km)- (Aldea et al., 2002).
No damages occurred in waste-water treatment plant as a result of Lefkas earthquake (2003)
in Greece. Two damages were recorded in the main waste-water system in the coastline of
Lefkas as a result of permanent deformations, although in several areas of the city a smell of
wastes was intense. Moreover, it must be mentioned that no damage was induced to the
pumping station despite the occurrence of 11cm settlement (Alexoudi, 2005).
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
14
Table 2-6 Brief presentation of waste-water system damages as result of Loma Prieta, Northridge and Hyogo-ken Nanbu (Kobe) earthquake
Earthquake/ System
Loma Prieta, 1989,
Mw=6.9, max. MMI=IX
Northridge, 1994,
Mw=6.7, max. MMI=IX
Hyogo-ken Nanbu (Kobe), 1995,
Mw=6.9, max. JMA=VII
Waste-Water System
As result of electric
power loss
(commercial and
back-up power if any)
in lift stations, lead
wastes to San
Francisco area and
polluted Monterey
Bays. Moreover,
extensive damages
were occurred in the
main waste-water
system of San
Francisco Bay and in
Watsonville. Minor to
moderate damages
were observed in
waste-water treatment
plant in the area of
San Francisco.
Minor to moderate
damages were
observed in waste-
water treatment plant
as result of wave
propagation and cracks
in the tanks. Moreover,
waste-water process
was also interrupted by
electric power loss. All
lift stations lost their
connection with electric
power system in LA
region. The waste-
water network was
destroyed by
permanent ground
deformations.
3 of the 8 waste-water
treatment plant were totally
destroyed. Extensive
damages were observed in
Higashi-mada Plant in
Kobe area as result of
permanent deformations.
The direct impact of the
Higashi-mada Plant failure
was the dismissal of wastes
without any treatment to
Osaka Bay. Waste-water
system mains, presented
total failure in areas with
large permanent
deformations. The loss of
electric power influence the
operability of pumping
stations.
References EERI (1990), NRC
(1994)
EERI (1995), TCLEE
(1995), NIST (1994)
NIST (1996), NCEER
(1995) Shrestha (2001)
Fig. 2-11 Plenary view of waste-water treatment plant of Lefkas (Greece)
D3.9 - Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
15
Fig. 2-12 No damage observed in waste-water
lift station during the 2003 Lefkas earthquake in Greece (from in-situ
inspection Alexoudi and Argyroudis 2003)
2.3.1 Waste-Water Treatment Plant
The main failure modes of waste-water treatment plants are the same as the potable water
treatment plants.
2.3.2 Tunnels
The main failure modes of tunnels are the same as in potable water system.
2.3.3 Pipes
The main failure modes of pipes are the same as in potable water system.
2.3.4 Lift Station
The main failure modes of lift stations are the same as in potable water system.
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
16
3 Methodology for the vulnerability assessment of water and waste-water system elements
3.1 IDENTIFICATION OF THE MAIN TYPOLOGIES OF WATER SYSTEM ELEMENTS
A potable water supply is necessary for drinking, food preparation, sanitation, fire-
extinguishing etc. Water (which may be non-potable) is also required for cooling equipment.
A potable water system consists of transmission and distribution systems:
o Transmission system stores “raw” water and delivers it to treatment plants. Such a
system is made up of canals, tunnels, elevated aqueducts and buried pipelines,
pumping plant and reservoirs.
o Distribution system delivers treated water to customers.
Various components comprise potable water system according to ALA (2001a); RISK-UE
(2001-2004) and LESSLOSS (2004-2007). The same components are also proposed in
SYNER-G (Fig. 3-1) as listed below:
o Water source
o Treatment plant
o Pumping station
o Storage
o Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)
o Conduits (pipes, tunnel, canals)
Fig. 3-1 Breakdown of potable water system components
POTABLE WATER SYSTEM
Water Source
- Springs
- Wells
- Rivers
- Lakes
- Impounding
reservoirs
Water Treatment Plant
Pumping station Building facilities
- System control
- Storage
- Administrative, customer
service
Storage
Pipes
Tunnels
Canals
D3.9 - Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
17
3.1.1 Water Source
The typical water sources are springs, shallow or deep wells, rivers, natural lakes, and
impounding reservoirs. Wells are used in many cities as both a primary and supplementary
source of water. Wells include a pump to bring the water up to the surface, various
electromechanical equipments and a building to enclose the well and the equipment.
Typology
Wells, springs or river catchments are different types of water sources.
Wells are described according to HAZUS (NIBS, 2004) with respect to:
o Anchored / Unanchored;
o The subcomponent.
The subcomponents of wells that are considered in SYNER-G are the same as in HAZUS
(NIBS, 2004):
o Electric power (commercial power)
o Well pump
o Building
o Electric equipment.
3.1.2 Water Treatment Plant
Water treatment plants are complex facilities, generally composed of a number of connected
physical and chemical unit processes, whose purpose is to improve the water quality.
Treatment processes used depend on the raw-water source and the quality of finished water
desired. A conventional water treatment plant consists of a coagulation process, followed by
a sedimentation process, and finally a filtration process. Components in the treatment
process include pre-sedimentation basins, aerators detention tanks, flocculators, clarifiers,
backwash tanks, conduit and channels, coal sand or sand filters, mixing tanks, settling tanks,
clear wells, and chemical tanks.
Alternatively, a water treatment plant can be regarded as a system of interconnected pipes,
basins, and channels through which the water moves, and where the flow is governed by
hydraulic principles.
Typology
Water Treatment Plant may be described (HAZUS; NIBS, 2004) with respect to:
o Its size (small, medium or large);
o Anchored / Unanchored;
o The subcomponent (equipment and backup power) considered.
The size of the water treatment plant may be considered as a typological parameter, due to
its increasing redundancy and importance factor for design (HAZUS; NIBS, 2004).
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
18
Small water treatment plants (~50 M Gallons å 189.500 m3/day), are assumed to consist of
a filter gallery with flocculation tanks (composed of paddles and baffles) and settling (or
sedimentation) basins as main components, chemical tanks (needed in the coagulation and
other destabilization processes), chlorination tanks, electrical and mechanical equipment,
and elevated pipes.
Medium water treatment plants are simulated by adding more redundancy to small treatment
plants (i.e. twice as many flocculation, sedimentation, chemical and chlorination tanks) and
large water treatment plants (i.e., three times as many flocculation, sedimentation, chemical
and chlorination tanks/basins) – (between or ‡200 M Gallons å 758.000 m3/day).
In SYNER-G, in order to account for the uncertainty in their final response as a result of the
different European practices used for Water Treatment Plants of different sizes and the semi-
anchorage of the subcomponents, only one fragility curve for Water Treatment Plant is
proposed independently of the size. It is also assumed that there is no back-up power in
case of loss of electric power (worst case scenario).
The following subcomponents that may be considered in SYNER-G for water treatment plant
are the same as in HAZUS (NIBS, 2004) except for the back-up power.
o Electric Power (commercial power);
o Chlorination equipment;
o Sediment floculation;
o Basins;
o Baffles, Paddles, Scrapers;
o Chemical Tanks;
o Electric equipment;
o Elevated pipe;
o Filter Gallery.
3.1.3 Pumping Station
A Pumping station is a facility that boosts water pressure in both transmission and
distribution systems. In general, pumping stations include larger stations adjacent to
reservoirs and rivers, and smaller stations distributed throughout the water system intended
to raise head.
Pumping stations typically comprise buildings, intake structures, pump and motor units,
pipes, valves, and associated electrical and control equipment (ATC-25, ALA 2001a).
Typology
Pumping Station may be described (HAZUS; NIBS, 2004) with respect to:
o Its size (small, medium or large);
o Anchored / Unanchored;
o The subcomponent (equipment and backup power) considered.
D3.9 - Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
19
A small pumping station boost less than 10 M Gallons (37.900 m3/day) to transmission and
distribution systems, according to HAZUS (NIBS 2004).
In SYNER-G, in order to account for the uncertainty in their final response as a result of the
different European practices used for Pumping Station of different sizes and the semi-
anchorage of the subcomponents, only one fragility curve for Pumping Station is proposed
independently of the size for different building categories. It is also assumed that there is no
back-up power in case of loss of electric power (worst case scenario).
The following subcomponents that may be considered in SYNER-G for a pumping station are
the same as in HAZUS (NIBS, 2004) except for the back-up power.
o Electric Power (backup, commercial power);
o Vertical/ Horizontal Pump;
o Building;
o Equipment.
Comment: See also D3.1 “Fragility functions for common RC building types in Europe” and D3.2 “Fragility functions for masonry buildings in Europe”.
3.1.4 Storage
Storage tanks can be located at the start, along the length or at the end of a water
transmission/distribution system. Their function may be to hold water for operational storage,
provide surge relief volumes, provide detention times for disinfection, and other uses.
Most water systems include various types of storage reservoirs in their transmission/
distribution systems. Storage reservoirs can be either tanks or open cut reservoirs.
Open Cut Reservoir simply means that the reservoir is built by creating a reservoir in the
natural lie of the land, often with one side of the reservoir made up of an earthen
embankment dam. Many open cut reservoirs are enclosed by adding a roof so that treated
water inside is protected from contamination from outside sources.
A tank is a vessel that holds water. Water tanks are usually built of steel, concrete or wood
(most often redwood). Tanks can be elevated by columns, built “at-grade” to rest directly on
the ground or on a foundation on the ground, or buried. Also, in some smaller parts of
distribution systems, water can be stored in pressure tanks, which are small horizontal
pressure vessels on supports, at grade.
Typology
Storage typology parameters may be the following:
o Material (wood, steel or concrete);
o Size;
o Anchorage;
o Position (at grade or elevated);
o Type of roof;
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
20
o Seismic design.
o foundation type
o Construction technique
Table 3-1 Typology of water storage tanks.
Element Tanks
Steel
Elevated tanks have capacities ranging between 750-53000m3, they are
generally from steel or concrete and founded on piles or with surface
foundations. They are usually located in small cities or rural areas. Elevated steel
tanks typically have lateral load resistant capacity for wind or earthquakes. In
many cases they do not have any seismic design. The roofs of steel tanks are
either made of steel or wood. It is also possible, to have steel tanks without roofs.
Concrete
In general, tanks in Europe and in Greece are reinforced concrete (R/C) with roof
from concrete. Concrete tanks can be either at-grade or buried, anchored or un-
anchored. Many reinforced concrete tanks are post-tensioned. In urban areas in
Greece, tanks are reinforced concrete or post-tensioned, with surface foundation
or supported on piles.
Wood
Wood tanks are generally at-grade, they have limited capacity less than 1500m3
and they are not anchored. Elevated tanks are rarely used and they are usually
constructed from sekou wood. In Greece, we do not find any, in contrast to e.g.
Scandinavian countries where they are still in use.
Masonry There are only masonry and masonry with reinforced concrete structures. This
kind of tanks is still in use in some parts of the water system.
Open cut
reservoirs
An open cut reservoir is made by cutting into the ground. They usually not
include roof structures. In rare cases, a roof structure is installed to protect water
from external pollution.
3.1.5 Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)
Various types of in-line components exist along water transmission pipelines, including
portions of the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system located along the
conveyance system and various flow control mechanisms (e.g., valves and gates).
In-line SCADA hardware includes a variety of components, including:
o Instrumentation;
o Power Supply (normal, backup);
o Communication components (normal, backup);
o Weather enclosures (electrical cabinets and vaults).
D3.9 - Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
21
SCADA system components in water transmission systems are the followings.
o Instruments attached to the pipeline may include flow and pressure devices that
are sometimes installed in a venturi section of pipeline.
o Instruments attached to a canal may include various types of float instruments,
which are used to assess the water level in the canal.
o Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) and Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) are
most commonly solid state devices. An RTU device picks up the analog signals
from one or more channels of SCADA system devices at one location. The RTU
converts these signals into a suitable format for transmission to a central SCADA
computer, often at a location remote from the devices. A PLC can control when
pumps are turned on or off, based on real time data or pre-programmed logic.
o Most water systems have used manual recorders to track pressures, flows and
gradient information. These recorders are still in use in many water systems. The
recorders sometimes report on the same information as the automated SCADA
system, often using the same instruments. Also, since the installation of
automated SCADA system hardware is often relegated to a few locations in the
water system, the manual recorder may be the only recording device at a location.
o SCADA Cabinet is a metal enclosure that is mounted to a floor or bolted to a wall.
o Most SCADA systems include battery backups.
o Communication Links. The remote SCADA system is connected in some manner
to the central location SCADA computer system. The most common links are
radio, leased landlines and, to a lesser extent, microwaves; the use of public
switched landlines is rare.
o Canal gate structures.
Typology
The location of the valves is often important when deciding how a pipeline system performs
as a whole; damage to a pipeline between two valves will need to be isolated by closing the
valves. Thus, typology depends on the following parameters:
o Intervals between valves on conduits;
o Anchorage of SCADA cabinet and inside equipments;
o Number and type of communication links.
3.1.6 Conduits
Transmission conduits are typically large size pipes (more than 400mm in diameter) or
channels (canals) that convey water from its source (reservoirs, lakes, rivers) to the
treatment plant.
Transmission pipelines are commonly made of concrete, ductile iron, cast iron, or steel.
These could be elevated/at grade or buried. Elevated or at grade pipes are typically made of
steel (welded or riveted), and they can run in single or multiple lines.
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
22
Canals are typically lined with concrete, mainly to avoid excessive loss of water by seepage
and to control erosion. In addition to concrete lining, expansion joints are usually used to
account for swelling and shrinkage under varying temperature and moisture conditions.
Distribution of water through conduits can be accomplished by gravity, or by pumps in
conjunction with on-line storage. Except for storage reservoirs located at a much higher
altitude than the area being served, distribution of water would necessitate, at least, some
pumping along the way. Typically, water is pumped at a relatively constant rate, with flow in
excess of consumption being stored in elevated storage tanks. The stored water provides a
reserve for fire flow and may be used for general-purpose flow should the electric power fail,
or in case of pumping capacity loss.
Conduits are artificial channels made for the conveyance of fluids (Fig. 3-2). They fall into
two categories:
o Free-flow conduits guide the fluid as it flows down a sloping surface.
o Pressure conduits confine and guide fluid movement under pressure.
Free-flow conduits may be simple open channels or ditches, or pipes or tunnels flowing
partially full. A pressurized conduit can be a pipeline or tunnel flowing under internal
pressure.
Fig. 3-2 Breakdown of potable water conduits.
Typology
Beyond the nature of the conduits (see suitable sections), typology depends mainly on the
flowing (gravity or pumped systems) and secondarily to the appurtenances along the
aqueduct.
o Gravity system aqueducts deliver the flow from higher elevations to lower
elevations, and do not need any pumping to move the water.
o Pumped-system aqueducts require pumps along the length of the aqueduct to
keep the water moving.
Appurtenances along the length of the aqueduct includes various turnouts, gates, valves, etc.
Often ignored for a simplified earthquake loss estimate, these may be important if there are
particular component vulnerabilities, or if a system model that includes connectivity is to be
used.
D3.9 - Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
23
3.1.6.1 Pipes (Common to potable water and waste-water systems)
Pipes can be free-flow or pressure conduits, buried or elevated. Several materials can be
used. In order to avoid contamination of treated water, potable water pipes are most of the
time pressurized.
Typology
Pipe typology depends on the following parameters:
o Location (buried or elevated);
o Material (type, strength);
o Geometry (diameter, wall thickness);
o Type of joints, continuous or segmented pipes;
o Appurtenances and branches;
o Corrosiveness (age and soil conditions).
The selection of material type and pipe size are based on the desired carrying capacity,
availability of material, durability and cost.
Location: Elevated pipes are large-diameter pipes supported on bents. They are often used
in areas that traverse poor soils, and the bents are often supported on piles that extend to
competent materials. Pile supports can be made of wood, concrete or concrete-encased
steel. Buried pipes are buried 1 to 5 m or deeper in the ground.
Material: For detailed diagnostics of pipe failure, mechanical characteristics of material will
be required. Otherwise, pipeline material allows simplified assessment. Pipes are commonly
made of:
o Asbestos Cement (AC),
o Concrete (C),
o Cast Iron (CI),
o Ductile Iron (DI),
o Welded Steel (S),
o PolyVinyl Chloride (PVC),
o High Density PolyEthylene (HDPE).
o Vitrified Clay;
o Brick;
o Bituminised fibre;
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
24
Geometry: The diameter of distribution pipe is important both in terms of pipe damage
algorithms and post-earthquake performance of the entire water system. For more detailed
study, wall thickness is also required. Pipe diameters are generally greater than 4 inches and
one should consider the following classes:
o Small diameter means 4 to 12 inches (…100 to 300 mm);
o Large diameter mean 16 inches and more (@400 mm).
Type of joints: A jointed pipeline consists of pipe segments coupled by relatively flexible (or
weak) connections (e.g., a bell-and-spigot cast iron piping system). Continuous pipelines are
those having rigid joints, such as continuous welded steel pipelines.
Appurtenances and branches: Pipeline damage tends to concentrate at discontinuities such
as pipe elbows, tees, in-line valves, reaction blocks and service connections. Such features
create anchor points or rigid locations that promote force/stress concentrations. Locally high
stresses can also occur at pipeline connections to adjacent structures (e.g., tanks, buildings
and bridges), especially if there is insufficient flexibility to accommodate relative
displacements between the pipe and the structure.
Corrosiveness: Corrosion will accentuate damage, especially in segmented steel, threaded
steel and cast iron pipes. Older pipes appear to have a higher incidence of failure than newer
pipes. Age effects are possibly strongly correlated with corrosion effects caused by the
increasing impact of corrosion over time. Soil conditions can also influence corrosion.
Experience has also shown that continuous pipelines with bends, elbows and local
eccentricities will concentrate deformation at these features, especially if permanent ground
deformations develop compression strains. Other pipe attributes that may be developed
when collecting inventory data include: leak history, encasement, corrosion protection
systems, location of air valve and blow-offs, etc. These attributes may yield some extra
information as to the pipeline's fragility, but they may not be available to the analyst in all
cases.
Functionality: Distribution pipes represent the network that delivers water to consumption
areas. Distribution pipes may be further subdivided into primary lines, secondary lines and
small distribution mains. The primary mains carry flow from the pumping station to and from
elevated storage tanks, and to the consumption areas, whether residential, industrial,
commercial, or public. These lines are typically laid out in interlocking loops. Secondary lines
have smaller loops within the primary mains and run from one primary line to another. They
serve primarily to provide a large amount of water for fire fighting without excessive pressure
loss. Small distribution lines represent the mains that supply water to the user and to the fire
hydrants.
D3.9 - Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
25
3.1.6.2 Tunnels (common to roadway, railway, potable water and waste-water
systems)
Whatever the content (potable or waste-water, road or railway), tunnels are confined
structures. They are often not redundant, and major disruption to the utility or transportation
system is likely to occur should a tunnel become non-functional.
Typology
Tunnels may be described according to (Table 3-2):
o Construction technique,
o Liner system
o Geologic conditions.
For a more detailed assessment, the shape of the section, the depth, the length and the
diameter of the tunnel, the liner thickness might be a useful information.
Table 3-2 Typology of tunnels (ALA 2001a).
Typology Poor-to-average construction Good construction
Rock
conditions
Tunnels in average or poor rock,
either unsupported masonry or
timber liners, or unreinforced
concrete with frequent voids
behind lining and/or weak
concrete.
Tunnels in very sound rock and designed
for geologic conditions (e.g., special
support such as rock bolts or stronger
liners in weak zones); unreinforced, strong
concrete liners with contact grouting to
assure continuous contact with rock;
average rock; or tunnels with reinforced
concrete or steel liners with contact
grouting.
Alluvial
soil or
Cut and
Cover
conditions
Tunnels that are bored or cut and
cover box-type tunnels and include
tunnels with masonry, timber or
unreinforced concrete liners, or any
liner in poor contact with the soil.
These also include cut and cover
box tunnels not designed for
racking mode of deformation.
Tunnels designed for seismic loading,
including racking mode of deformation for
cut and cover box tunnels. These also
include tunnels with reinforced strong
concrete or steel liners in bored tunnels in
good contact with soil.
A more detailed description can be found in D3.7 “Fragility functions for roadway system
elements” where it presents the final proposal for SYNER-G.
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
26
3.1.6.3 Canals
Canals are free-flowing conduits, usually open to the atmosphere, and usually at grade. They
tend to be larger than pipelines operated under pressure. The advantages of using a canal
include the possibility of construction with locally available materials, longer life than metal
pipelines, and lower loss of hydraulic capacity with age. The disadvantages include the need
to provide the ultimate flow capacity initially and the likelihood of interference with local
drainage. Flumes are open-channel sections that carry water in elevated structures.
Typology
Canals can be formed by cutting a ditch into the ground, building up levees, or a combination
of the two. Most often, canals are concrete-lined to reduce water losses. Canals can traverse
both stable and unstable geologic conditions. Thus, canal typology may consider whether the
canal is:
o Open cut or built up using levees;
o Reinforced, unreinforced liners or unlined embankments.
Flumes sections are commonly made of wood or metal. The support systems can be built of
wood, concrete or steel. The support structures might be a few feet high where the flume
runs along a contour, or very tall where the flume crosses a creek or river. Flumes are
specialized structures and are not specifically addressed here.
3.2 SYNER-G TYPOLOGIES OF WATER SYSTEM ELEMENTS
In summary, Table 3-3 provides a comparison of the typologies of potable water elements
provided by HAZUS (NIBS, 2004) and ALA (2001a,b). The third column provides SYNER-G
proposal for potable water elements.
In Greece, the typology of potable water systems’ elements is based on international
practice, although some features do not exist. In particular, components’ anchorage is not
based on any specifications, despite the fact that some measures are taken for their seismic
support. Usually, it depends on the workers’ expertise and the local experience from
earthquakes. Thus, there is not a standard level of anchorage and the water system
components cannot be considered as anchored. Regarding potable water treatment in
Greece, there are some treatment facilities in water sources or even in central pumping
stations. Transmission conduits from water sources are in general closed-type, but there are
also some open parts. The reason for this, except from the cost, is because these canals
were initially used for irrigation. In general, distribution systems are comprised from pipes
with different materials, connection types and diameters. Construction codes for water
systems do not exist in Greece until nowadays; although, at the end of the 70’s,
specifications for the pipelines’ materials started to be applied, while special references are
made to technical reports for the best construction practices. Nevertheless, large parts of the
water systems in Greece have not been constructed using specific studies, resulting in lack
of data for their characteristics. Storage tanks are usually constructed from concrete with
concrete roof. They are half-full and not anchored. In big urban centres, they are anchored
D3.9 - Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
27
with surface foundation or sited on piles according to the soil type. Pumping stations are
reinforced concrete buildings, designed according to the current seismic codes. They usually
have one part elevated, with the largest part being below ground where the tank and electric
and mechanical equipment are located. In Greece (Thessaloniki), SCADAs exist in about
40% of the water pumping stations and in 3 points in water transmission pipeline in
Thessaloniki.
Table 3-3 Comparison of the typologies of potable water elements provided in NIBS 2004, ALA 2001a,b and SYNER-G
Element ⦆』〈S, 2003 ALA (2001a,b) SYNER-G
Water
Sources
(wells)
Components’
anchorage -
Components’
anchorage
Water
Treatment
Plant
Size
Components’
anchorage
-
Size
Components’
anchorage
Tunnels
-
Soil type
Quality of
construction
See D3.7 “Fragility functions for roadway system elements”
Canals -
Material of
construction
Amount of debris that
may enter the canal
after an earthquake
Material of
construction
Amount of debris that
may enter the canal
after an earthquake
Pipes
Material
Type of joints/
connection
Material
Diameter
Type of joints/
connection
Soil type
Material
Type of joints/
connection
Tanks
Material
Foundation type
Anchorage
Size
Material
Anchorage
Foundation type
Seismic design
Size
Material
Anchorage
Foundation type
Seismic design
Pumping
station
Size
Components’
anchorage
-
Size
Components’
anchorage
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
28
In France water is managed through dedicated plans called SDAGE (Schéma Directeur
d’Aménagement et de Gestion des Eaux). These plans enable the protection of water
resources from natural hazards. Up to now water management is very local and involves a
great number of actors (more than 36.000 municipalities and 30 000 services). This explains
the lack of harmonized national database. However a national observatory for water and
waste-water systems was launched in 2009 (according to the new law on water, 30/12/2008).
This observatory has defined a number of descriptive and performance indicators and aims
at harmonizing data formats on the territory. These data should become available in the
following years (www.services.eaufrance.fr) and should enable a targeted improvement of
the systems. In France the sources of drinking water are mainly underground water tables
(2/3) and surface water (1/3). The distribution network for drinking water represents about
878.000 km. The leaks are assumed to represent about 20% and to be due to corrosion,
ground modification, old joints and individual connexion. The priority concerning the
replacement of pipes is the following: grey cast-iron/steel (<1960) and cement-asbestos,
PVC (<1975), grey cast-iron/steel (>1960), PVC (>1975), ductile cast-iron. In 2002 there
were about 27.514 distribution units, but there are few standardised information at national
level on drinking water units.
A typology of potable water systems in Austria has not been available. Instead of that a brief
description of water system of Vienna is given here. The potable water system in Vienna can
principally be divided into two main water lines. These are the first and second
Hochquellenleitung. The capacity of the first conduit is 220.000 m3/day and that of the
second conduit is 217.000 m3/day. The first conduit is mostly made out of brickwork and
concrete canals. The down-grade is sufficient enough, so that there are no pumping stations
needed. The second conduit has a total length of about 200 km and the down grade is so
high that there are no pumping stations needed. There are about 30 high-level tanks in
Vienna.
3.3 IDENTIFICATION OF THE MAIN TYPOLOGIES OF WASTE-WATER SYSTEM ELEMENTS
Waste-water system can alternatively be called sewer network. Sewer network is comprised
of components that work together to:
o Collect
o Transmit
o Treat
o Dispose of sewage
Various components comprise waste-water system according to RISK-UE (2001-2004) and
LESSLOSS (2004-2007). The same components were also proposed in SYNER-G (Fig. 3-3).
o Conduits (pipes, tunnels)
o Treatment plant
o Lift station
o Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)
D3.9 - Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
29
Fig. 3-3 Breakdown of waste-water system.
3.3.1 Conduits
Conduits are artificial channels made for the conveyance of fluids. Mainly free-flow conduits
that guide the fluid as it flows down a sloping surface are present in waste-water system.
Free-flow conduits may be pipes or tunnels flowing partially full. Collection sewers are
generally closed conduits that carry normally sewage with a partial flow. They could be
sanitary sewers, storm sewers, or combined sewers. Interceptors are large diameter sewer
mains, usually located at the lowest elevation areas.
Fig. 3-4 Breakdown of waste-water conduits.
Typology
In general, mains in the sanitary sewer system are underground conduits that normally follow
valleys or natural streambeds. Waste-water conduits are usually designed as free flow
channels except where lift stations are required to overcome topographic barriers.
Sometimes the sanitary sewer system flow is combined with the storm water system prior to
treatment.
3.3.1.1 Pipes (Common to potable water and waste-water systems)
Waste-water pipes are most of the time free flow conduits.
WASTE WATER SYSTEM
Waste-Water Treatment
Plant
Lift station Building Facilities
- System control
- Storage
- Administration/
customer service
Conduits
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
30
Typology
The typology of waste-water pipes is the same as in potable water pipes. More specific pipe
materials used for collection sewers and interceptor sewers are similar to those for potable
water. The most commonly used sewer material is clay pipe manufactured with integral bell
and spigot end. Concrete pipes are mostly used for storm drains and for sanitary sewers
carrying non corrosive sewage (i.e. with organic materials). For the smaller diameter range,
plastic pipes are also used.
3.3.1.2 Tunnels
The typology of waste-water tunnels is the same as in potable water tunnels. A more detailed
description can be found in D3.7 “Fragility functions for roadway system elements”.
3.3.2 Waste-water Treatment Plant
Waste-water treatment plants in the sanitary sewer system are complex facilities which
include a number of buildings and underground or on ground reinforced concrete tank and
basins. Common components at a treatment plant include trickling filter, clarifiers, chlorine
tanks, recirculation and waste-water pumping stations, chlorine storage and handling, tanks,
and pipelines. Concrete channels are frequently used to convey the waste-water from one
location to another within the complex. Within the buildings there are mechanical, electrical,
and control equipment, as well as piping and valves. Conventional waste-water treatment
consists of:
o preliminary processes (pumping, screening, and grit removal),
o primary settling to remove heavy solids and floatable materials,
o secondary biological aeration to metabolise and flocculate colloidal and dissolved
organics.
Preliminary treatment units vary but generally include screens to protect pumps and prevent
solids from fouling grit-removal units and flumes. Additional preliminary treatments (flotation,
flocculation, and chemical treatment) may be required for industrial wastes.
Primary treatment typically comprises sedimentation, which removes up to half the
suspended solids.
Secondary treatment removes remaining organic matter using activated-sludge processes,
trickling filters or biological towers. Chlorination of effluents is commonly required.”
Waste sludge may be stored in a tank and concentrated in a thickener. Raw sludge can be
disposed of by anaerobic digestion and vacuum filtration, with centrifugation and wet
combustion also currently used.
D3.9 - Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
31
Typology
Waste-Water Treatment Plant may be described (HAZUS; NIBS, 2004) with respect to:
o Its size (small, medium or large);
o Anchored / Unanchored;
o The subcomponent (equipment and back-up power) considered.
The size of the waste-water treatment plant may be considered as a typological parameter,
due to its increasing redundancy (HAZUS; NIBS, 2004) and importance factor for design.
Small treatment plants (~50 M Gallons å 189.500 m3/day) are assumed to consist of a filter
gallery with flocculation tanks (composed of paddles and baffles) and settling (or
sedimentation) basins as main components, chemical tanks (needed in the coagulation and
other destabilization processes), chlorination tanks, electrical and mechanical equipment,
and elevated pipes.
Medium treatment plants (50 < x <200M Gallons) are simulated by adding more redundancy
to small treatment plants (i.e. twice as many flocculation, sedimentation, chemical and
chlorination tanks).
Large treatment plants (‡200 M Gallons å 758 000 m3/day) are simulated by adding even
more redundancy to small treatment plants (i.e., three times as many flocculation,
sedimentation, chemical and chlorination tanks/basins).
Whether the subcomponents (equipment and back-up power) are anchored or not is another
typological parameter. In order to account for the uncertainty in their final response as result
of the different European practices used for Waste-Water Treatment Plants of different sizes
and the semi-anchorage of subcomponents, only one fragility curve for Waste-Water
Treatment Plant is proposed independently of the size. It is also assumed that there is no
back-up power in case of loss of electric power (worst case scenario).
The following subcomponents that may be considered in SYNER-G for waste-water
treatment plant are the same as in HAZUS (NIBS, 2004) except for the back-up power:
o Electric Power (commercial power);
o Chlorination equipment;
o Sediment floculation;
o Chemical Tanks;
o Electric equipment;
o Elevated pipe.
o Building
Also, the treatment level could be considered (primary, secondary, tertiary).
3.3.3 Lift station
Lift or pumping stations serve to raise sewage over topographical rises or to boost the
disposals. They are typically used to transport accumulated waste-water from a low point in
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
32
the collection system to a treatment plant. If the lift station is out of service for more than a
short time, untreated sewage will either spill out near the lift station, or back up into the
collection sewer system. Pumping stations consist primarily of a wet well, which intercepts
incoming flows and permit equalization of pump loadings and a bank of pumps, which lift the
waste-water from the wet well. The centrifugal pump finds widest use at pumping stations.
Thus, a plant is usually composed of a building, one or more pumps, electrical equipment,
and, in some cases, back-up power systems. Lift stations are often at least partially
underground.
Typology
Lift station may be described (HAZUS; NIBS, 2004) with respect to:
o Its size (small, medium or large);
o Anchored / Unanchored;
o The subcomponent (equipment and backup power) considered.
Small lift stations transport less than 10 M Gallons (37 900 m3/day) of disposal according to
HAZUS (NIBS, 2004) while medium/large lift station transfer more than 10 M Gallons.
In SYNER-G in order to account or for the uncertainty in their final response as a result of the
different European practices used for lift stations of different sizes and the semi- anchorage
of subcomponents, only one fragility curve for Pumping Stations is proposed independently
of the size for different building types. It is also assumed that there is no back-up power in
case of loss of electric power (worst case scenario).
The following subcomponents may be considered in a pumping station (HAZUS; NIBS, 2004)
expect for the back-up power:
o Electric Power (commercial power);
o Vertical/ Horizontal Pump;
o Building;
o Equipment.
3.3.4 Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA)
Various types of in-line components exist along waste-water transmission pipelines, including
portions of the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system located along the
conveyance system and various flow control mechanisms (e.g., valves and gates).
In-line SCADA the hardware includes a variety of components, including:
o Instrumentation;
o Power Supply (normal, backup);
o Communication components (normal, backup);
o Weather enclosures (electrical cabinets and vaults).
D3.9 - Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
33
SCADA system components in waste-water transmission systems are the following:
o Instruments attached to the pipeline may include flow devices that are sometimes
installed in a venturi section of pipeline.
o Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) and Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) are
most commonly solid state devices. An RTU device picks up the analog signals
from one or more channels of SCADA system devices at one location. The RTU
converts these signals into a suitable format for transmission to a central SCADA
computer, often at a location remote from the devices. A PLC can control when
pumps are turned on or off, based on real time data or pre-programmed logic.
o SCADA Cabinet is a metal enclosure that is mounted to a floor or bolted to a wall.
o Most SCADA systems include battery backups.
o Communication Links. The remote SCADA system is connected in some manner to the central location SCADA computer system. The most common links are radio, leased landlines and, to a lesser extent, microwaves; the use of public switched landlines is rare.
Typology
The location of the valves is often important when deciding how a pipeline system performs
as a whole; damage to a pipeline between two valves will need to be isolated by closing the
valves. Thus, typology depends on the following parameters:
o Intervals between valves on conduits;
o Anchorage of SCADA cabinet and inside equipments;
o Number and type of communication links.
3.4 SYNER-G TYPOLOGIES OF WASTE-WATER SYSTEM ELEMENTS
In summary, Table 3-4 provides a comparison of the typologies of waste-water elements
provided by HAZUS (NIBS, 2004) and the proposal within SYNER-G.
Table 3-4 Comparison of the typologies of potable water elements provided in HAZUS (NIBS, 2004) and SYNER-G
Element ⦆』〈S, 2003 SYNER-G
Waste-Water Treatment Plant
Size
Components’ anchorage
Size
Components’ anchorage
Tunnels
-
See D3.7 “Fragility functions for roadway system elements”
Pipes Material
Type of joints/ connection
Material
Type of joints/ connection
Lift station Size
Components’ anchorage
Size
Components’ anchorage
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
34
In Greece, collection sewers (sanitary, storm or combined sewers) are usually closed
conduits. The older storm sewers are constructed from clay, while the newer ones are made
of concrete. Sanitary sewers carrying non-organic materials are also constructed from
concrete; they usually are large-diameter, gravity pipes. Smaller conduits are constructed
from PVC. Pressure (usually steel) pipes are used for the conveyance of sewage from
pumping stations of Central Sewage Conduits to areas of higher elevation. Central Sewage
Conduits have diameters >1.000mm and constructed from reinforced concrete (sometimes
pre-stressed). In Greece (Thessaloniki), SCADA exists in all lift stations.
In France the waste-water collection system represents about 280.000 km of pipes. Among
these pipes 10% were assumed to be older than 60 years in 2002, and some pipes were not
installed correctly in the 70s, which makes replacement necessary. These pipes feed about
17.300 waste-water treatment plants with a total capacity of 76 millions Equivalent-Human
(75% of these plants were built after 1990). Plants with capacity >100.000 EH represent only
about 113 plants, whereas plants with capacity < 500 EH are numerous (about 6.225). The
most used technique is the activated sludge process for waste-water treatment.
In Austria, collection sewers (sanitary, storm or combined sewers) are closed conduits.
Older sewers can be constructed from clay or brickwork. The younger ones are constructed
from concrete or PVC. The waste-water system in Vienna is roughly 2.400 km long and
takes all sewage in Vienna to one main sewage treatment plant.
3.5 GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF EXISTING METHODOLOGIES
Fragility relationships are a critical component of seismic impact assessment. The fragility, or
vulnerability, functions relate the severity of shaking to the probability of reaching a level of
damage (e.g. light, medium, extensive, near-collapse) to various infrastructure items. The
level of shaking can be quantified using numerous shaking parameters, including peak
ground acceleration, velocity, displacement, spectral acceleration, spectral velocity or
spectral displacement. Each infrastructure item requires a corresponding set of fragilities to
determine damage level likelihoods (probability).
In general, fragility functions relate a level of shaking, or system demand, to the conditional
probability of a specific system reaching or exceeding a limit state response. A deterministic
response, or the vertical line, indicates a lack of uncertainty in the system response. Fragility
curves close to vertical indicate a low level of uncertainty, while those with a much higher
uncertainty are spread over a much wider range of shaking values.
3.6 DAMAGE STATES OF WATER SYSTEM ELEMENTS
3.6.1 Water Source
Parameters defining damage states of water sources are:
o Type and extent (level) of structural damage (HAZUS; NIBS, 2004).
o Serviceability state (HAZUS; NIBS, 2004).
D3.9 - Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
35
3.6.2 Water Treatment Plant
Parameters defining damage states of water treatment plant are:
o Type and extent (level) of structural damage (HAZUS; NIBS, 2004; SRM-LIFE,
2003-2007).
o Serviceability state (HAZUS; NIBS, 2004; SRM-LIFE, 2003-2007)
o Functionality level (Ballantyne et al., 2009)
o Restoration Cost (% of replacement cost) - (Ballantyne et al., 2009)
3.6.3 Pumping Station
Parameters defining damage states of pumping station are:
o Type and extent (level) of structural damage (HAZUS; NIBS, 2004; SRM-LIFE,
2003-2007).
o Serviceability state (HAZUS, NIBS, 2004; SRM-LIFE, 2003-2007).
o Reliability index (Scawthorn, 1996)
3.6.4 Storage tanks
Parameters defining damage states of storage tanks are:
o Description of the type and extent (level) of structural damage (HAZUS; NIBS,
2004; SRM-LIFE, 2003-2007; O’Rourke and So, 1999).
o Loss of context (HAZUS; NIBS, 2004; SRM-LIFE, 2003-2007; ALA, 2001;
O’Rourke and So, 1999)
3.6.5 Canal
Parameters defining damage states of canals are:
o Hydraulic performance of a canal
3.6.6 Pipes
Parameters defining damage states of pipes are:
o Repair rate per km (Katayama et al., 1975; ATC-13,1985; Isoyama and
Katayama, 1982; Memphis, Tennessee, 1985; O’ Rourke and Ayala, 1993;
Eidinger et al., 1995; Eidinger, 1998; Isoyama, 1998; O’Rourke et al.,1998;
O’Rourke and Leon, 1999; Eidinger and Avila, 1999; Isoyama et al., 2000; Toprak,
1998; Hung, 2001; Honegger and Eguchi, 1992; Heubach, 1995; Eidinger et
al.,1999; ]LA, 2001a,b; Yeh et al., 2006)
o Break/ 1000 feet (Eguchi , 1983; Wang et al., 1991; O’Rourke and Deyoe, 2004)
o Vulnerability class (Ballantyne and Heubach, 1996)
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
36
3.6.7 Tunnels
See D3.7 “Fragility functions for roadway system elements”
3.7 DAMAGE STATES OF WASTE-WATER SYSTEM ELEMENTS
3.7.1 Waste-Water Treatment Plant
Parameters defining damage states of waste-water treatment plant are:
o Type and extent (level) of structural damage (HAZUS; NIBS, 2004; SRM-LIFE,
2003-2007).
o Serviceability state (HAZUS; NIBS, 2004; SRM-LIFE, 2003-2007)
3.7.2 Conduits
Parameters defining damage states of conduits are:
o Level of ground strain (Mataki et al., 1996)
Moreover, for the case of waste-water pipes, the parameters defining damage states are the
same as in potable water system while for the case of tunnels are the same as for roadway system elements
3.7.3 Lift station
Parameters defining damage states of lift station are:
o Type and extent (level) of structural damage (HAZUS; NIBS, 2004; SRM-LIFE,
2003-2007).
o Serviceability state (HAZUS; NIBS, 2004; SRM-LIFE, 2003-2007).
3.8 INTENSITY INDEXES
The characteristics of ground motions that influence the seismic performance and integrity of
lifelines are intensity, frequency content and duration of the motions. Each of these
characteristics of ground motion at a given site is influenced by the nature of the fault rupture
process, the travel path followed by the resulting seismic waves as they propagate from the
ruptured fault to the site, the “site effects” including the effects of local soil conditions, the
basin effects and topography. The intensity of the shaking has been typically represented
using the parameter given below:
o Peak Ground Horizontal Acceleration (PGAH).
o Peak Ground Vertical Acceleration (PGAV).
o Acceleration time history (ies) a(t).
D3.9 - Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
37
o Peak Ground Horizontal Velocity (PGVH).
o Peak Ground Vertical Velocity (PGVV).
o Peak Ground Displacement (PGD).
o Acceleration, Velocity and Displacement Response Spectrum SA(T, つ) for a
suitable range of periods. (normally <10 Hz but recently up to 20 Hz as well
especially for the displacement spectra)
o Transient ground strains
o Arias Intensity
o Fourier Spectrum
o Fundamental period of the ground motion (it is related to the site effects as well)
o Duration (Bracketed Duration, Significant Duration).
o Equivalent number of uniform cycles, Neq.
o In case of slope movement, fault crossing and liquefaction induced phenomena
(lateral spreading and subsidence), the Permanent Ground Deformations
(displacements, PGD) - total and differential - are the key parameters.
The main issue is to define the appropriate ground motion intensity parameter that best
captures the response of each element, minimizes the dispersion of that response and is
related to the approach that is followed for the derivation of fragility curves. As a general
apposition, the empirical fragility curves relate the observed damages with the seismic
intensity and so PGA and PGVs are the more suitable parameters with lower uncertainties.
For linear lifeline systems like pipelines it has been proved that peak ground velocity is better
correlated to the observed damages, and thus the vulnerability assessment should be based
on ground velocity estimates. An alternative approach may be the use of ground strains
(longitudinal and transversal) or/and differential ground displacements, which are directly
correlated to the ground velocity. For other lifeline components it may be peak ground
acceleration (i.e. buildings, tanks, water treatment plant). Of course permanent ground
deformations are also a key parameter.
3.8.1 Water System Elements
The following is a comprehensive list of the different descriptors used for the components in
potable water system (Table 3-5).
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
38
Table 3-5 Intensity measures for the vulnerability assessment potable water system elements
Element at risk
Reference Intensity Measure
Comments
Wells
NIBS (2004)
SRMLIFE (2003-2007)
PGA
Complex components including several subcomponents. The overall performance of the component is based on the subcomponents. Fragility curves based on PGA are given for each subcomponent.
Water Treatment Plants
NIBS (2004)
SRMLIFE (2003-2007)
PGA
Complex components including several subcomponents. The overall performance of the component is based on the subcomponents. Fragility curves based on PGA are given for each subcomponent.
Pumping Stations
NIBS (2004)
SRMLIFE (2003-2007)
PGA
Complex components including several subcomponents. The overall performance of the component is based on the subcomponents. Fragility curves based on PGA are given for each subcomponent.
NIBS (2004) PGA Water Storage Tanks ALA (2001a,b)
PGA, PGD*
Barenberg (1988) PGV Empirical fragility curve
Eguchi (1991) MMI Mercalli Intensity
O’ Rourke and Ayala (1993)
PGV
Empirical fragility curve for wave propagation. Good correlation with damages (Alexoudi , 2005; Alexoudi et al., 2007; Pitilakis et al., 2005) for Düzce (Turkey), Lefkas island (Greece) earthquake.
Eidinger and Avila (1999)
PGV, PGD*
Empirical fragility curves for wave propagation and for permanent ground deformation.
Hwang and Lin (1997)
PGA Empirical fragility curve for wave propagation
Isoyama et al. (1998) PGV Empirical fragility curve for wave propagation
O’Rourke and Jeon (1999)
Vscaled Empirical fragility curve for wave propagation
ALA (2001a,b) PGA, PGD*
Empirical fragility curve for wave propagation and for permanent deformation
Porter et al. (1991) PGD* Empirical fragility curve for permanent ground deformation
Honegger and Eguchi (1992)
PGD* Empirical fragility curve for permanent ground deformation
Heubach (1995) PGD* Empirical fragility curve for permanent ground deformation
Pipes
Terzi et al. (2006) PGD* Empirical fragility curve for permanent ground deformation
PGD*: Permanent Ground Displacements
D3.9 - Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
39
3.8.2 Waste-Water System Elements
The following is a comprehensive list of the different descriptors used for the components in
potable water system (Table 3-6).
Table 3-6 Intensity measures for the vulnerability assessment waste- water system elements
Element at risk Reference Intensity Measure
Comments
Waste-Water Treatment Plants
NIBS (2004)
SRMLIFE (2003-2007)
PGA
Complex components including several subcomponents. The overall performance of the component is based on the subcomponents. Fragility curves based on PGA are given for each subcomponent.
Lift Stations NIBS (2004)
SRMLIFE (2003-2007)
PGA
Complex components including several subcomponents. The overall performance of the component is based on the subcomponents. Fragility curves based on PGA are given for each subcomponent.
Tunnel (Interceptors)
as tunnels in Roads
Pipes (Sewer) as potable water pipes
3.9 PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
In general, the performance measures used to assess the performance of water, waste-
water system can be defined by:
o Inventory Functions: physical characteristics, numbers of facilities.
o Engineering: structural integrity, deterioration.
o Operational Reliability: Connectivity/ Serviceability/ Operability/ Functionality.
o Direct/ Indirect consequences in economy (e.g Cost/Benefit Analysis, capital and
financial resources).
o Demand: e.g. pressure and flow (for water system).
o Safety and Security.
Water system and waste-water system are very complex systems comprised by several
individual components (e.g Water System å water source, water treatment plants, pipelines,
tunnels, canals, storage tanks, pumping stations and SCADA; Waste-Water System å
waste-water treatment plants, lift stations, pipelines and tunnels). The overall performance of
a system depends on the individual performance of its components. For that reason, some
specific performance measures can be defined for each component and for the whole
system.
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
40
3.9.1 Water System/ component performance indicators
ALA (2002) proposes some performance metrics for water system that are related to:
o Percent (%) served (in total or by sector) within a specific number of days with raw
water with adequate fire flow pressures, and/or
o Percent (%) served (in total or by sector) within a specific number of days with
fully treated water
These metrics could be measured alternatively in terms of number of service connections,
populations served, or volume of water served (i.e., cubic feet or gallons) for the whole water
system.
Each water component, according to ALA (2002), can have different importance with respect
to a set of performance objectives. Their importance can be accounted according to
Component Criticality Rating (CCR), that is:
LSR = Life Safety Rating (based on fraction of time occupied)
FFR = Fire Flow Rating (significance to fire fighting)
DWR = Drinking Water Rating (significance to drinking water supply)
DPR = Damage Potential Rating (potential for causing damage to adjacent facilities)
Essential to the evaluation of water system performance is a system vulnerability model. In
such a system vulnerability model, the basic issues to be addressed are if the final nodes
(service zones, service connections, fire hydrants) have (a) flows with adequate fire flow and
pressures or (b) potable water supply that meets stringent safe drinking water health
standards.
Simpler, water system performance indicators can be described by water flow [m3/h],
discharge / pressure [bar] / number of people supplied [people/km2 supplied] (or ratio of
zones [%]) / drinkability / ratio of critical facilities supplied [%].
In a case of water system components:
o Water source: water flow [m3/h] and drinkability, reserve [m3]
o Treatment plant: treatment capacity (qualitative and quantitative [m3/h])
o Pumping station: flow capacity [m3/h]
o Storage tanks: reserve [m3]
o Tunnels: water flow [m3/h],
o Pipes: water flow [m3/h], repair rates [repair per km]
o Canals: water flow [m3/h]
o SCADA
A summary of water component performance indicators is given in Table 3-7. Furthermore, a
summary of water system performance indicators is provided in Table 3-8.
D3.9 - Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
41
Table 3-7 Summary of Water Component Performance Indicators (WCPIs).
A/A Approach Component Description Reference
1 Functionality analysis
Pipeline Certain critical pipelines serving critical facilities remain operational during and following an earthquake ALA (2005)
2 Acceptable damage rate evaluation
Pipeline An acceptable damage rate should be about 0.03 to 0.06 breaks per 1,000 feet of equivalent 6-inch diameter pipe, in order to confirm with the service restoration target.
ALA (2005)
3 Redundancy analysis
Pipeline Especially for transmission pipelines (Function Class II – pipes)
ALA (2005)
4 Operability Pipelines, Storage facilities, Pumping station
Estimation of the performance of pipelines after the comparison of the condition of existing pipeline with the ideal pipe with appropriate design and construction practice. Water storage facilities and pump structures needed to supply water pressure to rest network.
ASCE 7-02 provisions
5 Acceptable damage states
All components JWWA defines important facilities and for them defines the damage state that complies with the acceptable performance criterion
1997 JWWA Guidelines
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
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Table 3-8 Summary of Water System Performance Indicators (WSPIs)
A/A Analysis Type Description Comments Reference
1a Connectivity
Examines:
- “Damage ratio”: the degree of physical damage to the system (defined as the expected number of failures per unit length or per link)
- “Service ratio: indicates the ratio of normally supplied houses to the total number in the system. This value increases as restoration proceeds
Propose a diagram between damage ratio (km) and Service ratio (%).
Application for the restoration process of water transmission system in the City of Tokyo
Kawakami (1990)
1b Connectivity
Uses:
Formal graph theoretic notions to define characteristic measures of the network, such as an importance ordering of the vertices, the characteristic path length and redundancy
Dueñas-Osorio et al. (2007a) examine the loss of connectivity of a water distribution system
Dueñas-Osorio et al. (2007a, 2007b, 2009)
1c Connectivity
Examines:
- The “Reachability” of water to certain key nodes
- The probability that a certain amount of water flow would reach key locations
Application for the water distribution system in the East of San Francisco.
Moghtaderi-Zadeh et al. (1982)
1d Connectivity
Estimate:
- Connectivity matrix
- Reachability matrix
For simplified evaluations, a graphical portrayal of the system is adequate.
ALA (2002)
2a Serviceability
Examines:
Probability distribution of the percentage of customers who would lose their service after an earthquake
Application for the water distribution system in Shelby County, TN
Adachi and Ellingwood (2008)
D3.9 - Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
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A/A Analysis Type Description Comments Reference
2b Serviceability
Evaluate:
Their particular systems ability to meet hydraulic requirements including existing and future water needs (i.e. fire flow, maximum day or MD and maximum hour or MH domestic needs, storage needs, etc) and to properly size future facilities
The water system operating conditions are defined below:
Pre-Natural Hazard Water System Condition
Post Natural Hazard Water System Condition
Water System Restoration
Water System Start Up Condition
ALA (2002)
3
Investment cost for upgraded
Examines:
- Life cycle cost minimum criterion (minimum expected costs on seismic investment)
- Cost benefit ratio criterion
- Positive value balance criterion.
Application for water supply lifeline network located in the metropolitan area of Japan
Imai and Koike (2010)
4 Performance level criterion
Accounts:
Restoration process after the physical damage of the network
Considers 90 % of customers restored within 3-days following an earthquake having a 10% chance of exceedance in 50-years
A typical water utility will be able to isolate most of the leaking and broken pipes within 1 day or so
Propose a diagram between equivalent damage ratio (km) and Percentage (%) of customers with water
ALA (2005)
D3.9 - Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
45
3.9.2 Waste-Water System/ component performance indicators
For waste-water system, ALA (2004) propose as performance indicators, capacity measures
(e.g. flow of waste-water at selected points); measures of reliability (such as frequency and
magnitude of sanitary or combined sewer overflows (SSOs, CSOs), and the frequency and
magnitude of discharge of inadequately treated sewage, percentage treated, etc.); measures
of safety and health (similar to reliability examples as they impact water quality); and
financial measures. The Environmental Protection Agency National Pollution Discharge
Elimination System (EPA NPDES) permit requirements incorporate relevant performance
measures such as discharge volume and water quality. Potential metrics recommended for
the performance of waste-water system according to ALA (2004), are:
1) Public health/backup of raw sewage: This accounts for the probability of achieving
performance objective (e.g. – 90% probability of achieving), the probabilities of occurrence
(e.g. 50% in 50 years) and different criteria as a function of method of contact (backup into
buildings, overflow onto city streets).
2) Discharge of raw/inadequately treated sewage: Metrics commonly used quantify the
impact on public health and the environment (e.g. flow associated with biochemical oxygen
demand, dissolved oxygen of the receiving water).
3) Direct damage/financial impact: Direct damage to waste-water system components can
include cleanup and repair costs associated with flood inundation of a treatment plant or
repair cost of the collection system (pipelines, tunnels etc) while secondary damage
(economical cost) can be occurred to commercial or industrial facilities (e.g., factories shut
down) due to loss of waste-water service.
4) Security system performance: The performance objective is stated in terms of probability
of limiting raw sewage discharge when subjected to a design basis threat.
Moreover, performance indexes for waste-water system can account “Societal Factors”
(ALA, 2004):
o Fines and/or jail time - resulting from illegal discharges.
o Loss of public confidence – resulting from release of raw sewage, back-up of raw
sewage into households, or discharging partially treated sewage into the
receiving body.
o Political – resulting from peer pressure from other regional waste-water
organizations, or local politicians concerned about discharge of raw or partially
treated sewage in their area.
o Public health and safety – injury or death to utility staff or the public due to
exposure to raw or partially treated sewage, chemical release, or building
collapse
In addition, several other factors (economic factors) can describe waste-water performance
(ALA, 2004) such as:
o Substantial fines levied by regulating authorities.
o Direct loss - repair costs of facilities damaged in hazard events.
o Capital improvement plan – identify and prioritize projects to optimize a capital
improvement plan.
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
46
o Project design – define capacity, reliability or other parameters to optimize a new
project.
o Level of service (outage time) – define expected service outage times associated
with various events with associated probabilities of occurrence.
Simpler, waste-water system performance indicators can be described by waste-water flow [m3/h], discharge / number of people supplied / km2 treated (or ratio per zones [%]) / ratio of critical facilities supplied [%].
D3.9 - Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
47
Table 3-9 Summary of Waste-Water Component Performance Indicators (PPIs).
A/A Approach Component Description Reference
1 Operability Collection* and treatment systems Achieving performance objective (% probability of achieving)
2 Functionality Collection and treatment systems Estimation of violation maximum duration e.g. 7 days, 30 days ALA (2005)
*The collection and conveyance system is the system of pipes that collects the sewage from the sources and conveys it to a central point for treatment and/or disposal.
Table 3-10 Summary of Waste-Water System Performance Indicators (WWSPIs) – ALA (2004)
Performance Objective Category 100-Year Return Event (40% in 50 years)
500-Year Return Event (10% in 50 years)
Reference
Public Health
Backup of any raw sewage into buildings Not acceptable (less than 1% probability of occurrence)
Not acceptable (less than 5% probability of occurrence)
Overflow of raw sewage into streets Acceptable in localized areas;
less than 24 hrs
Acceptable (treatment plant is inundated) less than 72 hrs
Environmental
Discharge of raw sewage to stormwater
system, ditch or stream
Acceptable in localized areas;
less than 72 hrs
Acceptable
less than 7 days
Discharge of raw sewage to lake or river Acceptable in accordance with
CSO/NPDES
Acceptable
less than 30 days
Discharge of raw sewage to salt water Acceptable in accordance with
CSO/NPDES
Acceptable
less than 90 days
Discharge of disinfected primary effluent Acceptable
less than 30 days
Acceptable
less than 180 days
Discharge of disinfected secondary effluent
(meet NPDES permit requirements Acceptable Acceptable
ALA (2004)
D3.9 - Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
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4 Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
4.1 STATE-OF-THE-ART FRAGILITY CURVES PER COMPONENT OF WATER SYSTEM
Table 4-1 presents a brief review of existing fragility functions for water source, water
treatment plant, pumping station, storage tanks, pipes, tunnels, canals and conduits
D3.9 - Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
51
Table 4-1 Review of existing fragility functions for potable water elements
* Anchored equipment in general refers to equipment designed with special seismic tiedowns or tiebacks, while unanchored equipment refers
to equipment designed with no special considerations other than the manufacturer's normal requirements.
Component Reference Methodology Classification Earthquake descriptor
Damage States and Index
Water Source
NIBS, 2004
HAZUS – empirical fragility functions.
Two parameters (median and standard deviation く) log-normal cumulative distributions.
Complex component.
A distinction is made according to:
- Subcomponents (anchored or unanchored)
Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA)
Five damage states:
None (ds1), slight/minor (ds2), moderate (ds3), extensive (ds4) and complete (ds5).
Index:
Description of the type and extent (level) of structural damage and serviceability state.
Water Treatment Plant
NIBS, 2004
HAZUS – empirical fragility functions.
Two parameters (median and standard deviation く) log-normal cumulative distributions.
Complex component.
A distinction is made according to:
- Subcomponents (anchored or unanchored)*
- Size (small, medium or large)
Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA)
Five damage states:
None (ds1), slight/minor (ds2), moderate (ds3), extensive (ds4) and complete (ds5).
Index:
Description of the type and extent (level) of structural damage and serviceability state.
Water Treatment Plant
SRM-LIFE 2003- 2007
HAZUS – empirical fragility functions.
Two parameters (median and standard deviation く) log-normal cumulative distributions.
Complex component.
- anchored subcomponents independently from the size
Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA)
Five damage states:
None (ds1), slight/minor (ds2), moderate (ds3), extensive (ds4) and complete (ds5).
Index:
Description of the type and extent (level) of structural damage and serviceability state.
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
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Component Reference Methodology Classification Earthquake descriptor
Damage States and Index
Water Treatment Plant
Ballantyne et al., 2009
TCLEE 2009
There are no fragility curves given
Complex component.
Each of the WTP’s system components were evaluated using:
ASCE Seismic Evaluation of Existing Buildings (ASCE 31.03)
American Concrete Institute Code Requirements for Environmental Engineering Concrete Structures (ACI- 350- 06).
Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA) and Permanent Ground Deformation (PGD)
Three damage states:
Light, Moderate, Severe
According to:
Functionality and Restoration Cost (% of replacement cost)
Pumping Station
NIBS, 2004
HAZUS – empirical fragility functions.
Two parameters (median and standard deviation く) log-normal cumulative distributions.
Anchored or unanchored subcomponents
Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA)
Five damage states:
None (ds1), slight/minor (ds2), moderate (ds3), extensive (ds4) and complete (ds5).
Index:
Description of the type and extent (level) of structural damage and serviceability state.
Pumping Station
SRM-LIFE 2003- 2007
Empirical fragility functions.
Two parameters (median and standard deviation く) log-normal cumulative distributions. Adapted to SRM-LIFE BTM (Kappos et al., 2006)
Anchored or unanchored subcomponents
Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA)
Five damage states:
None (ds1), slight/minor (ds2), moderate (ds3), extensive (ds4) and complete (ds5).
Index:
Description of the type and extent (level) of structural damage and serviceability state.
D3.9 - Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
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Component Reference Methodology Classification Earthquake descriptor
Damage States and Index
Pumping Station
Scawthorn, 1996
No fragility functions
Pumping station fault tree diagram.
There are no fragility curves given for subcomponents.
- Reliability index:
Low, Moderate, High
Storage tanks
NIBS, 2004
HAZUS – empirical fragility functions.
Two parameters (median and standard deviation く) log-normal cumulative distributions.
Above ground RC tanks Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA)
None, Slight, Moderate, Extensive, Complete
Description of the type and extent (level) of structural damage and loss of context
Storage tanks
O’Rourke and So, 1999
Empirical fragility functions.
On-grade steel tanks
Height to diameter ratio, amount of stored content
Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA)
Four damage states:
None (ds1), slight/minor (ds2), extensive (ds3) and complete (ds4).
Description of the type and extent (level) of structural damage in the roof and loss of context
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
54
Component Reference Methodology Classification Earthquake descriptor
Damage States and Index
Storage tanks
ALA, 2001a, b
Empirical fragility functions
A distinction is made according to:
- Anchorage
- Material (redwood, steel, post-tensioned circular concrete tank, R/C)
- Size (according to gallons)
- Seismic design (no, nominal)
- Roof (integral shell roof, wood roof, over open cut reservoir)
Types:
- Unanchored redwood tank (50,000 - 500,000 gall)
- Unanchored post-tensioned circular concrete tank (1,000,000+ gallons)
- Unanchored steel tank with integral shell roof (100,000 - 2,000,000 gallons)
- Unanchored steel tank with wood roof (100,000 - 2,000,000 gallons)
- Anchored steel tank with integral steel roof (100,000 - 2,000,000 gallons)
- Unanchored steel tank with integral steel roof (2,000,000+ gallons)
- Anchored steel tank with wood roof (2,000,000+ gallons)
- Anchored reinforced (or prestressed) concrete tank (50,000 - 1,000,000 gallons)
- Elevated steel tank with no seismic design
- Elevated steel tank with nominal seismic design
- Roof over open cut reservoir
Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA) &
Permanent Ground Deformation (PGD)
Four damage states according to:
- Roof damage
- Anchor bolts
damage
- Overflow pipe
damage
- Elephant foot buckle
- Inlet pipe leak
- Wall uplift
- Elephant foot buckle
- Hoop Overstress
D3.9 - Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
55
Component Reference Methodology Classification Earthquake descriptor
Damage States and Index
Katayama et al., 1975
Empirical relation
log(R.R/km)= A+6,39*log(PGA)
According to the soil conditions and pipeline age
(A- coefficient)
Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA) (g)
Repair rate per km
Eguchi, 1983
Empirical numbers
Y= 1.5 ( Asbestos Cement (AC)
Y= 1.0 (Cast- iron (CI)
Y= 0.8 ( Welded steel with Caulked joints (WSCJ)
Y= 0.7 ( Welded steel with Gas- welded joints
(WSGWJ)
Y= 0.1 ( Welded steel with Arc-welded joints (WSAWJ)
According to material - Y: break/ 1000 feet
ATC-13,1985
- Buried pipelines - None, Slight, Light, Moderate, Heavy, Major, Destroyed
(based on RR/km)
Isoyama and Katayama, 1982
Empirical relation (RR/km)= 1.698*10-16*PGA6.06
For Cast iron pipes Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA)
Repair rate per km
Pipe
Memphis, Tennessee, 1985
Empirical relation
ÕÖÔÄ
ÅÃ /
?くMMIg
gCdCn 10
According to soil conditions and diameter
』mm: Mercalli Intensity
N: Repair rate per km
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
56
Component Reference Methodology Classification Earthquake descriptor
Damage States and Index
Wang et al., 1991
Empirical relation
Poor soil conditions:
Log Y= 1.837*(I) -14.065
Average soil conditions:
Log Y=1.717*(I)-14.221
Good soil conditions:
Log Y=1.522*(I)-14.045
According to soil conditions 』mm: MSK intensity
Y: Breaks/ km
O’ Rourke and Ayala, 1993
Empirical relation RR/km=
K*(0.0001*PGV2.25)
According to pipe material (flexible, rigid)
Peak Ground Velocity (PGV) (cm/sec)
Repair rate per km
Eidinger et al., 1995; Eidinger, 1998
Empirical relation (RR/km)
0.0012*PGV0.7677
0.0006*PGV1.5542
6*10-5 * PGV2.2949
According to pipe material (asbestos-cement, cast –iron, steel)
Peak Ground Velocity (PGV) (cm/sec)
Repair rate per km
Isoyama, 1998
Empirical relation
RR/km =
Cp*Cd*3.11*10-3* (PGV-15)1.3
According to pipe material and diameter
Peak Ground Velocity (PGV) (cm/sec)
Repair rate per km
O’Rourke et al., 1998
Empirical relation
RR/km =
101.25log10(PGA-0.63)
Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA) (cm/sec2)
Repair rate per km
O’Rourke and Leon, 1999
Empirical relation
RR/km =
0.050*(vscaled)0.865 ,
vscaled = PGV/ Do1.138
According to diameter Peak Ground Velocity (PGV) (cm/sec)
Repair rate per km
D3.9 - Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
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Component Reference Methodology Classification Earthquake descriptor
Damage States and Index
Eidinger and Avila, 1999
Empirical relation
RR/km =
K1*1.512*(PGV1.98)
According to pipe material, diameter, joint type and soil
Peak Ground Velocity (PGV) (m/sec)
Repair rate per km
Isoyama et al., 2000
Empirical relation
R.R(ゅ) = 2.88*10-6*(PGA-100)1.97
R.R(ゅ) = 3.11*10-3*(PGV-15)1.3
For Cast – iron pipes Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA) (cm/sec2)
Repair rate per km
]LA, 2001 Empirical relation
R.R/km =K1* 0.241*PGV
According to pipe material Peak Ground Velocity (PGV) (m/sec)
Repair rate per km
Toprak, 1998
Empirical relation
Log(RR)=1.36*log(PGA)-0.61
For all buried pipes Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA)
Repair rate per km
Hung, 2001 Empirical relation
RR/km=26.58*PGA4.29
For all buried pipes Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA) (cm/sec2)
Repair rate per km
O’Rourke and Deyoe, 2004
Empirical relation
(rigid pipes)
R.R./km =k1*513* i0.89
(wave propagation)
R.R./km =k1*724* i0.89
(wave propagation & permanent deformation)
Buried pipelines
Brittle pipes, R or S waves
Peak Ground Velocity (PGV), strain
Repair rate per km
Pipe
Porter et al., 1991
Empirical relation
According to pipe material Permanent Ground Deformation (PGD) (inches)
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
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Component Reference Methodology Classification Earthquake descriptor
Damage States and Index
Honegger and Eguchi, 1992
Empirical relation
R.R/km =【*(7.821*PGD0.56)
According to pipe material Permanent Ground Deformation (PGD)
Repair rate per km
Heubach,
1995
Empirical relation
100*[1-exp[(0.283*PGD)1.33]]
100*[1-exp[(0.899*PGD)1.11]]
100*[1-exp[(0.578*PGD)1.55]]
100*[1-exp[(1.120*PGD)1.69]]
100*[1-exp[(0.743*PGD)0.71]]
100*[1-exp[-(1.120*PGD)0.761]]
100*[1-exp[-(0.644*PGD)1.37]]
100*[1-exp[-(1.530*PGD)1.62]]
100*[1-exp[-(0.961*PGD)1.64]]
100*[1-exp[-(1.830*PGD)1.83]]
According to pipe material and joint type
Permanent Ground Deformation (PGD) (m)
Repair rate per km
Eidinger et al.,1999
Empirical relation
R.R./km =K2*23.674*(PGD)0.53
According to pipe material and joint type
Permanent Ground Deformation (PGD) (m)
Repair rate per km
]LA, 2001a,b Empirical relation
R.R./km = K2*11.223*PGD0.319
According to pipe material and joint type
Permanent Ground Deformation (PGD) (m)
Repair rate per km
Pipe
Yeh et al., 2006
Empirical relation
RR = 1.028ゅ10-3* PGA0.9735 (R2= 0.9388)
Ji – Ji earthquake Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA)
Repair rate per km
D3.9 - Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
59
Component Reference Methodology Classification Earthquake descriptor
Damage States and Index
Ballantyne and Heubach, 1996
Empirical figure
According to material (welded steel, old steel and cast iron, locked converse, asbestos cement, cast iron post 1955)
Permanent Ground Displacement (PGD)
Five Vulnerability Class (High, Moderate- High, Moderate, Low- Moderate, Low) according to Damage Rate
Tunnel As in Roadline System
Canal ALA, 2001a,b
Empirical Minor damage:
0.1 repairs/ km
(PGV = 20 - 35 inches/sec)
0.01 repairs/ km
(PGV = 5 - 15 inches/sec)
0 below PGV < 5 inches/sec
Moderate damage: for PGD= 1-5 inches
Major damage: for PGDs > 6 inches
Peak Ground Velocity (PGV) and Permanent Ground Deformation (PGD)
Four Vulnerability Class (No, Minor, Moderate, Major)
Index: according to hydraulic performance of a canal
D3.9 - Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
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4.2 STATE-OF-THE-ART FRAGILITY CURVES PER COMPONENT OF WASTE-WATER SYSTEM
Table 4-2 presents a brief review of existing fragility functions for waste landfill, waste-water treatment plant, lift station, pipes, tunnels and
conduits
Table 4-2 Review of existing fragility functions for waste-water system elements
Component Reference Methodology Classification Earthquake descriptor Damage States and
Index
Solid Waste Landfill
Matasovic et al., 1998
According to the real damage observations
- - Five damage categories:
V: Major damage, IV: Significant damage, III: Moderate damage, II: Minor damage, I: Little or No damage
Index: According to restoration process (need time to repair)
Waste- water Treatment Plant
NIBS, 2004 HAZUS – empirical fragility functions.
Two parameters (median and standard deviation く) log-normal cumulative distributions.
Complex component.
A distinction is made according to:
- Subcomponents
(anchored or unanchored)*
- Size
(small, medium or large)
Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA)
Five damage states:
None (ds1), slight/minor (ds2), moderate (ds3), extensive (ds4) and complete (ds5).
Index:
Description of the type and extent (level) of structural damage and serviceability state.
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
62
Component Reference Methodology Classification Earthquake descriptor Damage States and
Index
Waste- water Treatment Plant
SRM-LIFE, 2003- 2007
SRM-LIFE based on HAZUS empirical fragility functions.
Two parameters (median and standard deviation く) log-normal cumulative distributions.
Complex component with
anchored subcomponents independently from the size but according to the building type
Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA)
Five damage states:
None (ds1), slight/minor (ds2), moderate (ds3), extensive (ds4) and complete (ds5).
Index:
Description of the type and extent (level) of structural damage and serviceability state.
Conduits Mataki et al., 1996
Design Code
Compression strain:
ic = 35*te/ Dm (%)
Tensile strain: it = 3%
According to “Earthquake Resistant Design code for Gas Pipeline (High-Pressure)” and
“Earthquake Resistant Design Code for Gas Pipeline (Medium & Low Pressure)
Strain
Lift Station As in potable water system
Pipes As in potable water system
Tunnel / As in roadline system
Buildings
See Task 3.1
See also Task 3.2
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
63
4.3 VALIDATION / ADAPTATION / IMPROVEMENT
Recent destructive earthquakes (Kocaeli, Ms=7.8, 17-08-1999 & Düzce, Ms= 7.3, 12-11-
1999 in Turkey and Lefkas, Ms=6.4, 14/8/2003 in Greece) provoked important damages to
lifelines due to ground shaking or/and permanent ground deformations.
Fig. 4-1 Location of Düzce and Lefkas island
Few hundreds of damages to buried pipelines of the water supply systems and waste-water
network were reported in Düzce while in Lefkas (Fig. 4-1) the reported damages were much
lower but equally important. The aim of this section is to compare the estimated damages
with the observed and reported ones in the two cities, in order to validate existing fragility
curves. This comparative study is one of the first well-documented cases in the whole
Mediterranean region, where we have an important lack of data regarding lifeline damages
during earthquakes. The methodology applied is based on a detailed inventory of the
observed damages and a site-specific ground response analysis to simulate the spatial
variability of ground motions during the two severe earthquakes occurred in Düzce and
Lefkas.
Several studies were performed in Düzce (Alexoudi, 2005; Pitilakis et al., 2005; Alexoudi et
al., 2007, 2008, 2010) for water and waste-water system aiming to record the observed
damages and to compare with the computed ones obtained when several commonly used
fragility curves are applied.
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
64
4.3.1 Validation of vulnerability models for pipes
4.3.1.1 Düzce
Düzce is situated between Ankara and Istanbul and is located nearby the North Anatolian
Fault (NAF) and next to Düzce fault that is small branch of NAF. Two major earthquakes
Kocaeli (17/8/1999, 40.702 N, 29.987 E, Mw= 7.4) and Düzce (12/11/1999, 31.15E, 40.77N,
Mw= 7.2, h=10km) earthquakes occurred in the area provoking important damages in
Düzce.
DÜZCE POTABLE WATER SYSTEM
The water supply system in Düzce dates back to 1940’s. The pre-existing network is thought
to be about 500 km in length, although no maps exist to confirm this (Tadday and Sahin,
2001). This old network was still in use at the time of Kocaeli and Düzce earthquakes. The
new network is connected to the old one with a series of bypasses. The old network is
mainly CI (cast iron), with some AC (Asbestos cement) pipes. The whole distribution network
is therefore made up of pipes normally classified as brittle. A 600mm diameter AC pipe
conveys raw water from the main source, the River Ugur, to the water treatment plant which
lies to the south of the town. A 1m diameter steel pipe then carries the treated water to the
distribution network, joining the town in the Azmimilli District. Twin CI pipes, of diameter
125mm, transport water from a well-field and reservoir to supplement the main river water
supply; these pipes join the town in the north-east. The digitized network is a mixed system
as is comprised by some old water branches and the new network. The total length is 298km
and the average depth of the water pipes of Düzce water system is 1.50m.
A site-response study was conducted for the city of Düzce using as input the deconvoluted
time history of the 17/8/1999 Kocaeli and 12/11/1999 Düzce main-shock that was recorded
in the Meteorological Station. The geotechnical map for Düzce derived from the existing
geological and geotechnical data, numerous very shallow, 10-20m, boreholes and few (10)
well documented deep (40-100m) boreholes which were collected in the framework of a
research project (SRM-DGC, 2006-2008). Bedrock’s depth (B120m) was defined using both
geological and seismic data (compilation of a large number of aftershocks at the
Meteorological Station and estimation of the H/V spectral ratio). The above result was also
validated with data from topographic maps of the area as well as microtremor measurements
(Kudo et al., 2000; Rosenblad et al., 2001). Using the aforementioned geotechnical and
geological data, numerous 2D cross-sections were constructed along the city of Düzce.
Based on the 2D cross-sections, approximately thirty typical soil profiles were proposed in
specific sites along the city in order to perform a set of 1D equivalent linear analysis. The
spatial distribution of the computed mean values of the peak ground acceleration and peak
ground velocities combined with the digitized water system is presented in Fig. 4-2 for both
Kocaeli and Düzce earthquakes respectively.
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
65
a(1) a(2)
b(1) b(2)
Fig. 4-2 Düzce. Analyzed method: 1D linear equivalent, Local Soil Condition: Based on Soil Profiles, a) Earthquake: Kocaeli, 1999, PGA (g) [a(1)], PGV (m/sec) [a(2)], b)
Earthquake: Düzce, 1999, PGA (g) [b(1)], PGV (m/sec) [b(2)]
In order to validate the available fragility curves for water pipes, different vulnerability
functions were selected in order to compare the estimated damages in Düzce (Turkey) water
pipeline network with the observed ones after Düzce and Kocaeli earthquakes. Table 4-3
gives the computed water pipe failures due to ground shaking for four different fragility
expressions and the two input motion for the digitized network of 298.81km.
For 2 months after Kocaeli and Düzce earthquakes, about 298 and 238 potable water pipe
failures respectively were recording by Tromans (2004) in a water network of 433.60km in 29
mahallas. After the available transforming of the two lengths (298.81/433.60) in order to
compare the results, the recorded water pipe damages are 200 and 164 for Kocaeli and
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
66
Düzce earthquake respectively. The average monthly repairs before the earthquakes were
95 and the real water losses were calculated to 80% of the initial supply.
Table 4-3 Computed water pipe failures in the water network of Düzce due to ground shaking for different fragility expressions, and input motions (Alexoudi et al., 2010)
Fragility curves/ Earthquake DÜZCE KOCAELI
O’ Rourke and Ayala (1993) 147 116
Isoyama et al. (1998) 80 66
Eidinger and Avila (1999) 104 84
]LA (2001) 28 25
Recorded 164 200
Comparing the computed (Table 4-3) and the recorded damages, after excluding the
average pre-earthquake monthly repairs, it derives that the O’ Rourke and Ayala (1993)
relation describes better the real event given the inherent uncertainties in the pipes individual
characteristics and the recorded damages from Kocaeli earthquake. ALA (2001) fragility
curve, underestimates the failures induced by wave propagation compared with other
relations, while the failures that Eidinger and Avila (1999) predicts is 20 - 30 % lower
compared to the recorded ones from the two earthquakes. The estimated failures by
Isoyama et al. (1998) relation, are about the half of the ones that are obtained when the O’
Rourke and Ayala (1993) relation is applied. It is noticed that the recorded failures from
Kocaeli earthquake is unjustified larger compared with the ones from Düzce earthquake,
although the parameters of input motion and Aries Intensity connected with Düzce
earthquake is 2 times larger than the Kocaeli earthquake. Also, Düzce earthquake had larger
duration compared with Kocaeli earthquake.
Moreover, for Eidinger and Avila (1999) and O’Rourke and Ayala (1993) fragility relations, a
spatial distribution of the computed damages in each mahalla is presented in Fig. 4-3 and
Fig. 4-4 for the two earthquakes. Analyzing the results, it is shown that the spatial distribution
of damages of the O’Rourke and Ayala relation is generally well correlated with the Tromans
(2004) and Alexoudi (2005) recorded data (Fig. 4-5).
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
67
a)
1
8
3
6
2
7
5
4
17
14
15
28 29
1916
9
10
26
12
23
18
1311
22
25
20
2427
21
0 1,100 2,200 3,300 4,400550km
pipe_failure
REHAZKOC
Low
Moderate
High
¯
b)
1
8
3
6
2
7
5
4
17
14
15
28 29
1916
9
10
26
12
23
18
1311
22
25
20
2427
21
0 1,100 2,200 3,300 4,400550km
pipe_failure
REEIDKOC
Low
Moderate
High
¯
Fig. 4-3 Mahallas that present low, moderate and extensive failures as result of Kocaeli earthquake and O’Rourke and Ayala (1993) (a) and Eidinger and Avila (1999) (b) relationships. The points represent the well documented damages shown earlier.
Earthquake: Kocaeli 1999, Microzonation study (Alexoudi et al. , 2007)
a)
[
1
8
3
6
2
7
5
4
17
14
15
28 29
1916
9
10
26
12
23
18
1311
22
25
20
2427
21
0 1,200 2,400 3,600 4,800600km
Legend
waterfailure
REHAZDUZ
Low
Moderate
High
¯
b)
[
1
8
3
6
2
7
5
4
17
14
15
28 29
1916
9
10
26
12
23
18
1311
22
25
20
2427
21
0 1,200 2,400 3,600 4,800600km
Legend
waterfailure
REEIDDUZ
Low
Moderate
High
¯
Fig. 4-4 Mahallas that present low, moderate and extensive failures as result of Düzce earthquake and O’Rourke and Ayala (1993) (a) and Eidinger and Avila (1999) (b)
relationships. The failures collected are illustrated with points. For each mahalla, ID is corresponded. Earthquake: Düzce 1999, Microzonation study. (Alexoudi et al., 2007)
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
68
a)
[
1
8
3
6
2
7
5
4
17
14
15
28 29
1916
9
10
26
12
23
18
1311
22
25
20
2427
21
0 1,200 2,400 3,600 4,800600km
Legend
waterfailure
REPRESEISM
Low
Moderate
High
¯
b)
[
1
8
3
6
2
7
5
4
17
14
15
28 29
1916
9
10
26
12
23
18
1311
22
25
20
2427
21
0 1,200 2,400 3,600 4,800600km
Legend
waterfailure
REKOCAEL
Low
Moderate
High
¯
c)
[
1
8
3
6
2
7
5
4
17
14
15
28 29
1916
9
10
26
12
23
18
1311
22
25
20
2427
21
0 1,200 2,400 3,600 4,800600km
Legend
waterfailure
REDUZCE
Low
Moderate
High
¯
d)
[
1
8
3
6
2
7
5
4
17
14
15
28 29
1916
9
10
26
12
23
18
1311
22
25
20
2427
21
0 1,200 2,400 3,600 4,800600km
Legend
waterfailure
REEBRU
Low
Moderate
High
¯
Fig. 4-5 Mahallas that presents low, moderate and extensive failures (a) before the two earthquakes, (b) after Kocaeli earthquake, (c) after Düzce earthquake (d) present
research as result of both earthquakes. Points illustrate the failures collected while the ID corresponds to each mahalla.
DÜZCE WASTE-WATER SYSTEM
The waste-water supply system in Düzce is a gravity network that dates back to the 1940’s
although several parts of the system are dating back to the early 1900’s. The pre-existing
network is estimated to be about 300 km in length, although no maps exist to confirm this.
Both old and new networks were in use at the time of Kocaeli and Düzce earthquakes. The
parts of the network that was digitized consist of 50.60km pipes-conduits with circular shape
while the rest (3.44km) has different shapes (rectangular, oval, and orthogonal. The material
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
69
of waste-water pipes is concrete and the distribution of their diameters is illustrated in Fig.
4-6. Information about the dimension, the shapes and the material for the rest network is not
available. Taking into account the 93% of the material type of waste-water pipes, whole
network can be characterized as a brittle network (Alexoudi, 2005).
0,00 5,00 10,00 15,00 20,00
Length (km)
200mm
400mm
800mm
1000mm
4000mm
Dia
met
er (
mm
)
Waste-Water pipes/ tunnel (diameter)
4000mm
1200mm
1000mm
900mm
800mm
600mm
400mm
300mm
200mm
Fig. 4-6 Digitized Waste- Water network (left) in Düzce and distribution of waste-water pipe/ conduits
diameters (up)
Applying, O’ Rourke and Ayala (1993) fragility function we estimate a total number of 52
damages (10 breaks, 42 leaks) and 44 damages (9 breaks, 35 leaks) as a result of ground
shaking for Düzce and Kocaeli earthquake respectively (Fig. 4-7).
a)86%
10%
4%
Break
Leak
No- damage
b) 84%
11%
5%
Break
Leak
No- damage
Fig. 4-7 Estimated damages of waste-water network as percentage of the total length of the network for Kocaeli (a) and Düzce (b) earthquake (Alexoudi et al., 2008)
The spatial distribution of the damages of waste-water network as result of Düzce and
Kocaeli earthquake is illustrated in Fig. 4-8.
Tromans (2004) database for water pipes was used for the validation of the estimated
damages of waste-water system resulted from the conducted vulnerability assessment of
Kocaeli and Düzce earthquakes. It is assumed that the failures of water system of Düzce are
quite similar to the damages of waste-water system, an estimation that is made by the
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
70
Waste - Water Company of Düzce, although, some individual characteristics of the two
networks can enlarge the different seismic response of the two networks. In particular, the
material, the oldness of the network and the construction practice can alter greatly the
response of a pipe.
a) b)
Fig. 4-8 Spatial distribution of waste-water pipe damages in Düzce network for Kocaeli (a) and Düzce (b) earthquake (Alexoudi et al., 2008)
A comparison between the recorded water pipe damages derived from Tromans (2004)
database and the estimated damages of waste-water system as result of Kocaeli earthquake
are illustrated in Fig. 4-9 a,b. It can be noticed that the expected damages from the two
earthquakes are located in the southern part of the city in almost the same mahallas that
important damages in potable water system were observed and high PGV values were
calculated. For the Düzce earthquake the corresponding damages (Fig. 4-9 c,d) have some
minor differences, mainly due to the limited time for recovery between the two earthquakes.
Moreover, the damages in waste-water system are very hard to recognize as they are not
related with the reduction of pressure or even flow and there were no available records
before and after the earthquakes.
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
71
a) b)
c) d)
Fig. 4-9 Estimated waste-water pipe damages per mahalla for Kocaeli earthquake (a), for Düzce earthquake (c) and recorded water pipe damages per mahalla after Kocaeli
earthquake (b) and Düzce earthquake (d) - (Alexoudi et al., 2008)
4.3.1.2 LEFKAS
LEFKAS POTABLE WATER SYSTEM
Lefkas water supply system was constructed in 1978 for daily design consumption of
5400m3. It was designed to provide water for drinking and fire protection. Nowadays, in
winter time, it serves about 9.000 people (old city and new parts of the city) and more than
12.000 people in touristic period (May-October). 29.114 km of pipes are in the old city and
more than 20 km in the new city. The main water source is river Louros at the main land, but
in touristic period the city uses also ground water supply from 2 shallow wells (150m3/ day/
well). Moreover, an R/C tank with a capacity of 1000m3 serves distribution network, as an
external reservoir in order to cover the increased summer daily demands. Lefkas potable
water distribution network is composed by 86% PVC pipes (internal pressure: 10atm) with
special couplings in the joints and about 14% asbestos-cement pipes (older than 1978). The
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
72
system was in very good condition with a very small number of pre-earthquake reported
leaks.
After the August 2003 seismic event (14/08/2003, Ms=6.4) the main water network of the city
of Lefkas suffered 10 failures in water mains (old city), 5 in the marina area and more than
80 damages in service connections in both parts of the city. The location of the failures is
illustrated in Fig. 4-10.
Fig. 4-10 Water distribution network of old city of Lefkas and the location of main water system failures and secondary connections (p-primary network, sec-secondary
network-connections with customers.
In general, the damages observed along the coastline (3 damages- 1 double damage) and in
“Gyra” (3 damages), resulted from permanent ground deformation due to soil liquefaction.
The rest 4 damages can be attributed to wave propagation and material failures. The failure
modes that were observed for PVC and asbestos cement pipes in Lefkas earthquake were
direct failures of the pipe body and a slip-out of joints. The failures in Marina and in coastline
are attributed to the large vertical and horizontal displacements due to liquefaction.
The basic geotechnical-geological formations in the city of Lefkas are constituted from recent
deposits (present at depths varying from 10.6 to 16.0m) overlying to a stiff to hard marl layer
extended to the bedrock surface. Top deposits include an upper layer of soft to medium
cohesive soils (shear wave velocities Vs=180-250m/sec2) with locally situated layers of loose
saturated sandy-silty soils, quite susceptible to liquefaction, mostly present at the coastal
parts of the examined region, underlying a layer of debris 1.0-5.7m deep. The lower layer of
the deposits, are medium clays and silts in the central part of the city, while in the coastal
region medium to dense layers of silty sands prevail. The soil classification and simplified
geotechnical characterization of the area was based on several cross sections along with the
information from laboratory and in-situ tests (mostly NSPT). Shear wave velocities were
estimated using both existing cross-hole data and empirical correlations with NSPT, which
seemed to be in reasonable agreement with the available cross-hole data.
The geotechnical information is based on 17 geotechnical boreholes with SPT and in few
cases with cross-hole Vs measurements. The dynamic properties (G-け-D curves) are rather
well known from RC tests. The available record of the main shock (PGA-0.45g) is recorded
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
73
in a site where the soil profile of 60m is very well known with all the necessary data. This
was particularly important to conduct the deconvolution analyses. In order to account for the
effect of liquefaction phenomena on the ground motion characteristics, several elastoplastic
analyses (using the 1D-Cyclic program, 2001) were performed for selected profiles along the
coastal part of the city and the marina area, where liquefaction induced phenomena were
observed after the earthquake. The latter were conducted using the same input motions with
the equivalent linear elastic analyses for wave propagation. The recorded PGV is
39.6cm/sec (EW component) while the computed PGV values vary from 30cm/sec to
46.60cm/sec.
The estimated number of repairs based on different fragility curves is presented in Table 4-4
both for wave propagation and permanent ground deformation. A comparison between the
number of repairs, the repair rate/km and the observed damages for the potable water
network of Lefkas is given in Table 4-5 and Table 4-6 (Alexoudi, 2005; Pitilakis et al., 2005).
Table 4-4 Estimated number of repairs for Lefkas earthquake using different fragility curves
Vulnerability relations
Wave propagation PGVew=30-46.60cm/sec
Permanent deformation PGD= 1.0- 40.42cm
Combination
RR/kmPGV RR/kmPGD RR/kmPGVPGD O’Rourke and Ayala (1993) &
Honegger and Eguchi (1992)
(NIBS, 2004)
RR/km=
0.137
4 repairs
(3 leaks,
1 break) RR/km=
0.137
4 repairs
(1 leak,
3 breaks) RR/km=
0.206
6 repairs
(2 leaks,
4 breaks)
Eidinger and Avila (1999)
RR/km=
0.103
3 repairs
(2 leaks,
1 break)
RR/km=
0.893
26 repairs
(5 leaks,
21 breaks)
RR/km=
0.859
25 repairs (3 leaks,
22 breaks)
ALA (2001) RR/km=0.034
1 repairs
(1 leaks,
0 break) RR/km=0.756
22 repairs
(4 leaks,
18 breaks)
RR/km=
0.721
21 repairs (3 leaks,
18 breaks)
Isoyama et al. (1998) RR/km=
0.103
3 repairs
(2 leaks,
1 break)
Heubach (1995)
RR/km=0.309
9 repairs
(2 leaks,
7 breaks)
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
74
Table 4-5 Comparison of Repair Rate/km (wave propagation) with the recorded damages of water network of Lefkas
RR/ km O’ Rourke and Ayala
(1993)
Eidinger and
Avila (1999)
Isoyama (1998)
]LA (2001a.b)
Recorded damages
RRPGV/km 0.137 0.103 0.103 0.034 0.137
Table 4-6 Comparison of the number of failures (wave propagation) for water system of Lefkas
Vulnerability relations No. of failures Recorded damages
O’ Rourke and Ayala (1993) 4
Eidinger and Avila (1999) 3
Isoyama et al. (1998) 3
]LA (2001) 1
4
Applying O’ Rourke and Ayala (1993) fragility relation four damages were estimated for
water system in Lefkas for the seismic scenario of 2003 Lefkas earthquake. ALA (2001)
underestimates the damages for wave propagation as it predicts only one. For the case of
permanent deformation, Honegger and Eguchi (1992) relation estimates 4 damages, while
ALA (2001) 22 damages. In general, NIBS (2004) gives very close to the observed failures
comparing to ALA (2001) which overestimates the damages for permanent ground
deformation. The spatial distribution of estimated damages (lines with red- breaks, with
orange- leaks) of potable water system via the recorded ones (points) is given for 4 different
fragility curves in Fig. 4-11 to Fig. 4-14 (for the case of wave propagation).
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
75
!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
Legend
waterfsecond
! waterfailures
Waterpipes(PGVHAZREP)
break
leak
full-function
PGV_EW (cm/sec)
High : 46.60cm/sec
Medium : 38.30cm/sec
Low : 30.00cm/sec
260 0 260130 m
Fig. 4-11 Vulnerability assessment of potable water system (Fragility curve: O’ Rourke and Ayala, 1993, Earthquake: Lefkas 2003)
!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
Legend
waterfsecond
! waterfailures
Waterpipes(PGVEIDREP)
break
leak
full-function
PGV_EW (cm/sec)
High : 46.60cm/sec
Medium : 38.30cm/sec
Low : 30.00cm/sec
260 0 260130 m
Fig. 4-12 Vulnerability assessment of potable water system (Fragility curve: Eidinger and Avila, 1999, Earthquake: Lefkas 2003)
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
76
!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
Legend
waterfsecond
! waterfailures
Waterpipes(PGVISOY)
break
leak
full-function
PGV_EW (cm/sec)
High : 46.60cm/sec
Medium : 38.30cm/sec
Low : 30.00cm/sec
260 0 260130 m
Fig. 4-13 Vulnerability assessment of potable water system (Fragility curve: Isoyama et al., 1998, Earthquake: Lefkas 2003)
!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
Legend
waterfsecond
! waterfailures
Waterpipes(PGVALA)
leak
full-function
PGV_EW (cm/sec)
High : 46.60cm/sec
Medium : 38.30cm/sec
Low : 30.00cm/sec
260 0 260130 m
Fig. 4-14 Vulnerability assessment of potable water system (Fragility curve: ]LA, 2001, Earthquake: Lefkas 2003)
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
77
4.4 FINAL PROPOSAL
4.4.1 WATER SYSTEM ELEMENTS
4.4.1.1 Water Source
Wells are complex components that include several subcomponents. HAZUS (NIBS, 2004)
gives fragility curves for anchored and for unanchored subcomponents. Although, there are
no specific guidelines in Europe, all subcomponent are anchored. In order to account the
uncertainty in their final response, a semi- anchorage of subcomponents can be defined.
The description of damage states for water source is provided in Table 4-7 while the
corresponding fragility curves due to peak ground acceleration are given in Table 4-8.
Table 4-7 Description of damage states for water source subject to ground shaking
Damage state
Description Restoration cost
(%) Serviceability
Minor
Malfunction of well pump and motor for a short time (less than three days) due
to loss of electric power and backup power if any, or light
damage to buildings
10-30 Normal flow and water pressure
Operational after limited
repairs
Moderate
Malfunction of well pump and motor for about a week due to loss of electric power
and backup power if any, considerable damage to
mechanical and electrical equipment, or moderate
damage to buildings
30-50 Operational after repairs
Extensive
The building being extensively damaged or the well pump and vertical shaft
being badly distorted and non-functional
50-75
Reduce flow and water pressure
Partially operational
after extensive repairs
Complete Building collapsing
75-100 Not water available
Not repairable
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
78
Table 4-8 Parameters of fragility curves for water source (wells)
Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA)
Description Damage state
Median (g) く
(log-standard deviation)
Minor 0.16 0.70
Moderate 0.18 0.65
Extensive 0.30 0.65
Anchored components (low-rise R/C building with low seismic
code design) Complete 0.40 0.75
Minor 0.25 0.55
Moderate 0.45 0.50
Extensive 0.85 0.55
Anchored components (low
height R/C building with advanced seismic code
design) Complete
2.10 0.70
Wells (anchored components) Low-rise building with low seismic code design
0,00
0,20
0,40
0,60
0,80
1,00
0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00 1,20 1,40 1,60 1,80 2,00
PGA (g)
[Pro
bab
ilit
y D
s> d
s /
PG
A]
Minor damages Moderate damages Extensive damages Complete damages
Fig. 4-15 Fragility curves for wells (Anchored components, low – rise R/C building with low seismic code design) subjected to ground shaking
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
79
Wells (anchored components) Low-rise building with advange seismic code design
0,00
0,20
0,40
0,60
0,80
1,00
0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00 1,20 1,40 1,60 1,80 2,00
PGA (g)
[Pro
bab
ility
Ds>
ds
/ PG
A]
Minor damages Moderate damages Extensive damages Complete damages
Fig. 4-16 Fragility curves for wells (Anchored components, low – rise R/C building with advanced seismic code design) subjected to ground shaking
Table 4-9 Subcomponent Damage Algorithms for Wells with Anchored Components (SRM-LIFE, 2003-2007)
Peak Ground Acceleration
Subcomponents Damage
State Median
(g)
Electric Power (Backup) minor
moderate
0.50
0.70
0.60
0.80
Loss of commercial Power minor
moderate
0.15
0.30
0.40
0.40
Well Pump extensive 1.00 0.60
Electric Equipment moderate 0.80 0.60
Building (low-rise R/C building with low seismic
code design)
minor
moderate
extensive
complete
0.18
0.23
0.30
0.41
0.73
0.73
0.73
0.73
Building (low height R/C building with advanced seismic code design)
minor
moderate
extensive
complete
0.28
0.72
1.66
2.17
0.73
0.73
0.73
0.73
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
80
Comment: For the buildings sub-component, the typology and fragility curves proposed in
SRM-LIFE (2003-2007) were used. The upgrade of fragility curves will be made after the
finalization of D3.1 “Fragility functions for common RC building types in Europe” and the
proposal of buildings’ typologies and fragility functions for SYNER-G.
4.4.1.2 Water Treatment Plant
Water Treatment Plants are complex components that include several subcomponents.
HAZUS (NIBS, 2004) gives fragility curves for anchored and for unanchored subcomponents
for different sizes of Water Treatment Plants. There are no specific guidelines in the
anchorage of the subcomponents in Europe for Water Treatment Plants. In order to account
for the uncertainty in their final response as a result of the different European practices used
for Water Treatment Plants of different sizes and the semi- anchorage of subcomponents,
only one fragility curve for Water Treatment Plant is proposed independently of the size. It is
also assumed that there is no back-up power in case of loss of electric power (worst case
scenario). The description of damage states for Water Treatment Plant is provided in Table
4-10 while the corresponding fragility curves are given in Table 4-11.
Table 4-10 Description of damage states for Water Treatment Plant subjected to ground shaking
Damage state
Description Restoration
cost (%) Serviceability
Minor
Malfunction of plant for a short time (<3 days) due to loss of electric power,
considerable damage to various equipment, light damage to
sedimentation basins, light damage to chlorination tanks, or light damage to chemical tanks. Loss of water quality
may occur.
10-30 Normal flow and water pressure
Operational after limited
repairs
Moderate
Malfunction of plant for about a week due to loss of electric power and backup
power if any, extensive damage to various equipments, considerable damage to sedimentation basins,
considerable damage to chlorination tanks with no loss of contents, or
considerable damage to chemical tanks. Loss of water quality is imminent
30-50 Operational after repairs
Extensive
The pipes connecting the different basins and chemical units being extensively
damaged. This type of damage will likely result in the shutdown of the plant.
50-75
Reduce flow and water pressure
Partially operational
after extensive
repairs
Complete The complete failure of all pipings or extensive damage to the filter gallery
75-100 Not water available
Not repairable
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
81
Table 4-11 Parameters of fragility curves for Water Treatment Plant
Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA)
Description Damage state Median (g)
く
(log-standard deviation)
Minor 0.15 0.30
Moderate 0.30 0.25
Extensive 0.55 0.60
Water Treatment Plants with anchored
components Complete 0.90 0.55
Table 4-12 Subcomponent Damage Algorithms for Water Treatment Plants with Anchored Components
Peak Ground Acceleration
Subcomponents Damage State Median (g)
Loss of commercial Power minor
moderate
0.15
0.30
0.40
0.40
Chlorination
Equipment
minor
moderate
0.50
0.85
0.60
0.70
Sediment Flocculation minor
moderate
0.36
0.60
0.50
0.50
Chemical
Tanks
minor
moderate
0.35
0.55
0.70
0.70
Electric Equipment moderate 0.80 0.60
Elevated Pipe extensive
complete
0.53
1.00
0.60
0.60
Filter Gallery complete 2.00 1.00
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
82
Water Treatment Plant (anchored components, without back-up power)
0,000
0,200
0,400
0,600
0,800
1,000
0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00 1,20 1,40 1,60 1,80 2,00
PGA (g)
[Pro
bab
ilit
y D
s> d
s /
PG
A]
Minor damages Moderate damages Extensive damages Complete damages
Fig. 4-17 Fragility curves for Water Treatment Plant (Anchored components) subjected to ground shaking
4.4.1.3 Pumping Station
Pumping Stations are complex components that include several subcomponents. HAZUS
(NIBS, 2004) gives fragility curves for anchored and for unanchored subcomponents for
different sizes of Pumping Stations. There are no specific guidelines in the anchorage of the
subcomponents in Europe for pumping stations. In order to account for the uncertainty in
their final response as a result of the different European practices used for Pumping Stations
of different sizes and the semi- anchorage of subcomponents, only one fragility curve for
Pumping Stations is proposed independently of the size for different building categories. It is
also assumed that there is no back-up power in case of loss of electric power (worst case
scenario).The description of damage states for pumping station is provided in Table 4-13
while the corresponding fragility curves are given in Table 4-14.
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
83
Table 4-13 Description of damage states for Pumping Station subjected to ground shaking
Damage state
Description Restoration cost
(%) Serviceability
Minor
Malfunction of plant for a short time (< 3 days) due to
loss of electric power or slight damage to buildings
10-30 Normal flow and water pressure
Operational after limited
repairs
Moderate
The loss of electric power for about a week,
considerable damage to mechanical and electrical equipment, or moderate
damage to buildings.
30-50 Operational after repairs
Extensive
The building being extensively damaged or the
pumps being badly damaged beyond repair
50-75
Reduce flow and water pressure
Partially operational
after extensive repairs
Complete The building collapsing. 75-100 Not water available
Not repairable
Table 4-14 Parameters of fragility curves for pumping station
Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA)
Description Damage state
Median (g) く
(log-standard deviation)
Minor 0.10 0.55
Moderate 0.15 0.55
Extensive 0.30 0.70
Anchored components (low-rise R/C building with low seismic
code design) Complete 0.40 0.75
Minor 0.15 0.30
Moderate 0.30 0.35
Extensive 1.1 0.55
Anchored components (low- rise R/C building with advanced seismic code
design) Complete 2.1 0.70
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
84
Pumping station(anchored components, low-rise building with low seismic code
design, without back-up power)
0,00
0,25
0,50
0,75
1,00
0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00 1,20 1,40 1,60 1,80 2,00
PGA (g)
[Pro
ba
bili
ty D
s>
ds
/ P
GA
]
Minor damages Moderate damages Extensive damages Complete damages
Fig. 4-18 Fragility curves for pumping station (Anchored components, low-rise R/C building with low seismic code design) subjected to ground shaking
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
85
Pumping station(anchored components, low-rise building with advance seismic
code design, without back-up power)
0,00
0,25
0,50
0,75
1,00
0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00 1,20 1,40 1,60 1,80 2,00
PGA (g)
[Pro
ba
bili
ty D
s>
ds
/ P
GA
]
Minor damages Moderate damages Extensive damages Complete damages
Fig. 4-19 Fragility curves for pumping station (Anchored components, low -rise R/C building with advanced seismic code design) subjected to ground shaking
Table 4-15 Subcomponent Damage Algorithms for Water Treatment Plants with Anchored Components
Peak Ground Acceleration
Subcomponents Damage State Median (g)
Loss of commercial Power minor
moderate
0.15
0.30
0.40
0.40
Electric and Mechanical Equipment
moderate 0.80 0.60
Vertical/ Horizontal Pump* extensive 1.25/1.60 0.60
Low-rise R/C building with low seismic code design
minor
moderate
extensive
complete
0.18
0.23
0.30
0.41
0.73
0.73
0.73
0.73
Low height R/C building with advanced seismic
code design
minor
moderate
extensive
complete
0.28
0.72
1.66
2.17
0.73
0.73
0.73
0.73
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
86
Comment: For the buildings sub-components, the typology and fragility curves proposed in
SRM-LIFE (2003-2007) were used (Kappos et al., 2006). The upgrade of fragility curves will
be made after the finalization of D3.1 “Fragility functions for common RC building types in
Europe” and the proposal of buildings’ typologies and fragility functions for SYNER-G.
4.4.1.4 Storage tanks
Different fragility curves are illustrated (Table 4-16 - Table 4-19) by ALA (2001a,b) and
HAZUS (NIBS, 2004) for wave propagation (PGA) and for permanent ground deformation
(PGD)- (Table 4-20, Table 4-21). In Europe, the more common typology is R/C tanks without
anchorage.
Table 4-16 Fragility curves for anchorage R/C at grade tanks (wave propagation)- ALA (2001a,b)
Failure Type Serviceability Median PGA (g)
Uplift of wall– Crush concrete
1.30 0.50
Cracking or shearing of tank
wall 1.60 0.50
Sliding
No operational
1.10 0.50
Hoop overstress Operational 4.10 0.50
Table 4-17 Fragility curves for unanchorage R/C at grade tanks (wave propagation)- ALA (2001a,b)
Failure Type Serviceability Median PGA
(g)
Cracking or shearing of tank wall
Loss of context
No operational 1.05 0.45
Roof damage No loss of
context 2.60 0.45
Uplift of wall– Crush concrete
Small leak 2.00 0.45
Sliding Small leak
Operational
0.25 0.45
Loss of context
No operational 0.75 0.45 Hoop overstress
Small leak Operational 0.45 0.45
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
87
Table 4-18 Fragility curves for Open reservoirs with or without seismic design code (wave propagation) ALA (2001a,b)
Failure Type Serviceability Median PGA (g)
Extensive 1.00 0.55 Roof damage Minor
Operational 0.60 0.55
Table 4-19 Fragility curves for unanchorage R/C at grade tanks (permanent deformations)- ALA (2001a,b)
Typology Serviceability Median PGD (m)
Anchored R/C
Un-anchored 0.06 0.50
At columns 0.06 Steel
At grade
No operational
0.09 0.50
Wooden No operational 0.09 0.50
Without roof Operational 0.20 0.50
Table 4-20 Fragility curves for at-grade R/C tanks (wave propagation)- (HAZUS; NIBS, 2004)
Typology Damage states Median PGA (g)
Anchored at-grade R/C tank
minor
moderate
extensive
complete
0.25
0.52
0.95
1.64
0.55
0.70
0.60
0.70
Unanchored
at-grade R/C tank
minor
moderate
extensive
complete
0.18
0.42
0.70
1.04
0.60
0.70
0.55
0.60
Table 4-21 Fragility curves for buried R/C tanks (permanent ground deformation)- (HAZUS; NIBS, 2004)
Typology Damage states Median PGA (g)
Buried R/C tanks
minor
moderate
extensive
complete
0.05
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.50
A comparison between the different R/C tanks based on ALA (2001) and HAZUS (NIBS,
2004) is illustrated in Fig. 4-20 and in Fig. 4-21. In Europe, there is no available studies, as
far as we know, that evaluate the two different fragility curves. In SYNER-G, ALA (2001)
fragility curves are proposed for the estimation of the vulnerability through the operability of
the tanks.
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
88
Above ground R/C tanks (wave propagation)
0,00
0,20
0,40
0,60
0,80
1,00
0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00 1,20 1,40 1,60 1,80 2,00
PGA (g)
[Pro
ba
bili
ty D
s>
ds
/ P
GA
]
Minor damages Moderate damages Extensive damages Complete damages
ALA_Operative ALA_No- operative
Fig. 4-20 Fragility curves for above ground R/C tanks (wave propagation)
Above ground R/C tanks (permanent deformation)
0,00
0,20
0,40
0,60
0,80
1,00
0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00 1,20 1,40 1,60 1,80 2,00
PGD (m)
[Pro
ba
bili
ty D
s>
ds
/ P
GA
]
Minor damages Moderate damages Extensive damages
Complete damages ALA_PGD_no_operate
Fig. 4-21 Fragility curves for above ground R/C tanks (permanent ground deformations)
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
89
4.4.1.5 Canal
Failures in canals can be produced by landslides and by the damage of other infrastructures
that can influence the flow.
Table 4-22 Description of damage states for Canals (ALA, 2001a,b)
Damage state
Description Damage Rate
No damage The canal has the same hydraulic performance after the earthquake
Minor
Some increase in the leak rate of the canal has occurred. Damage to the canal liner may occur, causing increased friction between the water and the liner and lowering hydraulic capacity. The liner damage may be due to PGDs in the form of settlements or lateral spreads due to liquefaction, movement due to landslide, offset movement due to fault offset, or excessive ground shaking. Landslide debris may have entered into the canal causing higher sediment transport, which could cause scour of the liner or earthen embankments. Overall, the canal can be operated at up to 90% of capacity without having to be shut down for make repairs.
Minor damage to unreinforced liners or unlined embankments may be expected at Repair Rate/km 0.1 for ground shaking velocities of PGV = 20 to 35 inches/ sec. The minor damage rate drops to 0.01 repairs per kilometer for ground shaking velocities of PGV = 5 to 15 inches/ sec and 0 below that. Damage to reinforced liners is one quarter of these rates. Bounds on the damage estimate can be estimated assuming plus 100% to minus 50% at the plus or minus one standard deviation level, respectively.
Moderate
Some increase in the leak rate of the canal has occurred. Damage to the canal liner has occurred, causing increased friction between water and the liner, lowering hydraulic capacity. The liner damage may be due to PGDs in the form of settlements or lateral spreads due to liquefaction, movement due to landslide, offset movement due to fault offset, or excessive ground shaking. Landslide debris may have entered into the canal causes higher sediment transport, which could cause scour of the liner or earthen embankments. Overall, the canal can be operated in the short term at up to 50% to 90% of capacity; however, a shutdown of the canal soon after the earthquake will be required to make repairs. Damage to canal overcrossings may have occurred, and temporary shutdown of the canal is needed to make repairs. Damage to bridge abutments could cause constriction of the canal’s cross-section to such an extent that it causes a significant flow restriction.
Moderate damage is expected if lateral or vertical movements of the embankments due to liquefaction or landslide are in the range of 1 to 5 inches. Moderate damage occurs due to fault offset across the canal of 1 to 5 inches. Moderate damage is expected if small debris flows into the canal from adjacent landslides
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
90
Damage state
Description Damage Rate
Major damage
The canal is damaged to such an extent that immediate shutdown is required. The damage may be due to PGDs in the form of settlements or lateral spreads due to liquefaction, movement due to landslide, offset movement due to fault offset, or excessive ground shaking. Landslide debris may have entered the canal and caused excessive sediment transport, or may block the canal’s cross-section to such a degree that the flow of water is disrupted, overflowing over the canal’s banks and causing subsequent flooding. Damage to overcrossings may have occurred, requiring immediate shutdown of the canal. Overcrossing damage could include the collapse of highway bridges and leakage of non-potable material pipelines such as oil, gas, etc. Damage to bridge abutments could cause constriction of the canal's cross-section to such an extent that a significant flow restriction which warrants immediate shutdown and repair.
Major damage is expected if PGDs of the embankments are predicted to be six inches or greater. Major damage occurs due to fault offset across the canal of six inches or more. Major damage is expected if a significant amount of debris is predicted to flow into the canal from adjacent landslides. The differentiation of moderate or major damage states for debris flows into the canal should factor in hydraulic constraints caused by the size of the debris flow, the potential for scour due to the type of debris and water quality
requirement
Table 4-23 Vulnerability of canals (wave propagation, ALA, 2001a, b)
Typology PGV 0.5 m/s PGV>0.5 m/s (R.R=0.1 repair/km)
Unreinforced liners or unlined No Minor
Reinforced liners No No
Table 4-24 Vulnerability of canals (permanent deformations, ALA, 2001a, b)
Typology PGD 0.025 m PGD 0.025 m PGD 0.15 m
Unreinforced liners or unlined
Reinforced liners No/minor Moderate Major damages
4.4.1.6 Pipes
The proposed vulnerability curves for pipes, based on the validation provided before (§4.3)
are the empirical fragility curves of O’Rourke and Ayala (1993) for the case of wave
propagation and Honneger and Eguchi (1992) for the case of permanent ground
deformation.
4.4.1.7 Tunnels
As proposed in D3.7 “Fragility functions for roadway system elements”
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
91
4.4.2 WASTE-WATER SYSTEM ELEMENTS
4.4.2.1 Waste-Water Treatment Plant
Waste-Water Treatment Plants are complex components that include several
subcomponents. HAZUS (NIBS, 2004) gives fragility curves for anchored and for
unanchored subcomponents for different size of Waste-Water Treatment Plants. There are
no specific guidelines referring to the anchorage of the subcomponents in Europe for Waste-
Water Treatment Plants. In order to account for the uncertainty in their final response as a
result of the different European practices used for Waste-Water Treatment Plants of different
sizes and the semi- anchorage of subcomponents, only one fragility curve for Waste-Water
Treatment Plant is proposed independently of the size. It is also assumed that there is no
back-up power in case of loss of electric power (worst case scenario). The description of
damage states for Waste-Water Treatment Plant is provided in Table 4-25 while the
corresponding vulnerability curves are given in Table 4-26.
Table 4-25 Description of damage states for Waste-Water Treatment Plant subjected to ground shaking
Damage state
Description Restoration
cost (%) Serviceability
Minor
Malfunction of plant for a short time (< 3 days) due to loss of electric power, considerable
damage to various equipment, light damage to sedimentation
basins, light damage to chlorination tanks, or light
damage to chemical tanks.
10-30 Normal flow
and pressure
Operational after limited
repairs
Moderate
Malfunction of plant for about a week due to loss of electric power, extensive damage to
various equipment, considerable damage to sedimentation basins,
considerable damage to chlorination tanks with no loss of contents, or considerable damage to chemical tanks.
30-50 Operational after repairs
Extensive
The pipes connecting the different basins and chemical
units being extensively damaged.
50-75
Reduce flow and pressure
Partially operational
after extensive
repairs
Complete
The complete failure of all pipings or extensive damages
of the buildings that with various equipment.
75-100 No available Not
repairable
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
92
Table 4-26 Parameters of fragility curves for Water Treatment Plant
Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA)
Description Damage state
Median (g) く
(log-standard deviation)
Minor 0.15 0.35
Moderate 0.30 0.20
Extensive 0.45 0.50
Waste-Water Treatment Plants with anchored components (low-rise R/C
building with low seismic code design)
Complete 0.50 0.50
Minor 0.15 0.35
Moderate 0.30 0.20
Extensive 0.45 0.50
Waste-Water Treatment Plants with anchored components (low-rise R/C building with advanced seismic code
design) Complete 1.00 0.50
Waste- Water Treatment Plants with anchored components (low-rise R/C building with low seismic code design, without back-up power)
0,00
0,20
0,40
0,60
0,80
1,00
0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00 1,20 1,40 1,60 1,80 2,00
PGA (g)
[Pro
ba
bili
ty D
s>
ds
/ P
GA
]
Minor damages Moderate damages Extensive damages Complete damages
Fig. 4-22 Fragility curves for Waste- Water Treatment Plant (Anchored components) subjected to ground shaking (low-rise R/C building with low seismic code design)
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
93
Waste- Water Treatment Plants with anchored components (low-rise R/C building with advance seismic code design, without back-up power)
0,00
0,20
0,40
0,60
0,80
1,00
0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00 1,20 1,40 1,60 1,80 2,00
PGA (g)
[Pro
ba
bili
ty D
s>
ds
/ P
GA
]
Minor damages Moderate damages Extensive damages Complete damages
Fig. 4-23 Fragility curves for Waste- Water Treatment Plant (Anchored components) subjected to ground shaking (low-rise R/C building with advanced seismic code
design)
Table 4-27 Subcomponent Damage Algorithms for Waste- Water Treatment Plants with Anchored Components
Peak Ground Acceleration
Subcomponents Damage State Median (g)
Loss of commercial Power minor
moderate
0.15
0.30
0.40
0.40
Chlorination
Equipment
minor
moderate
0.65
1.00
0.60
0.70
Sediment Flocculation
minor
moderate
extensive
0.36
0.60
1.20
0.50
0.50
0.60
Chemical
Tanks
minor
moderate
0.40
0.65
0.70
0.70
Electrical/ Mechanical Equipment moderate 1.00 0.60
Elevated Pipe extensive
complete
0.53
1.00
0.60
0.60
Building (low-rise R/C building with low seismic code design)
complete 2.17 0.73
Building (low height R/C building with advanced seismic code design)
complete 0.41 0.73
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
94
Comment: For the buildings sub-components, the typology and fragility curves proposed in
SRM-LIFE (2003-2007) were used (Kappos et al., 2006). The upgrade of fragility curves will
be made after the finalization of D3.1 “Fragility functions for common RC building types in
Europe” and the proposal of buildings’ typologies and fragility functions for SYNER-G.
4.4.2.2 Lift station
Lift Stations are complex components that include several subcomponents. HAZUS (NIBS,
2004) gives fragility curves for anchored and for unanchored subcomponents for different
sizes of lift stations. There are no specific guidelines referring the anchorage of the
subcomponents in Europe for lift station. In order to account for the uncertainty in their final
response as a result of the different European practices used for lift stations of different sizes
and the semi- anchorage of subcomponents, only one fragility curve for Pumping Station is
proposed independently of the size for different building types. It is also assumed that there
is no back-up power in case of loss of electric power (worst case scenario). The description
of damage states for lift station is provided in Table 4-28 while the corresponding
vulnerability curves are given in Table 4 29.
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
95
Table 4-28 Description of damage states for Lift Station subjected to ground shaking
Damage state
Description Restoration cost
(%) Serviceability
Minor
Malfunction of lift station for a short time (< 3 days) due to loss of electric power or slight damage to buildings
10-30 Normal flow Operational after limited
repairs
Moderate
The loss of electric power for about a week,
considerable damage to mechanical and electrical equipment, or moderate
damage to buildings.
30-50 Operational after repairs
Extensive
The building being extensively damaged, or the
pumps being badly damaged beyond repair
50-75
Reduce flow
Partially operational
after extensive repairs
Complete The building collapsing. 75-100 Not water Not repairable
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
96
Table 4-29 Parameters of fragility curves for lift station
Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA)
Description Damage state
Median (g) く
(log-standard deviation)
Minor 0.10 0.55
Moderate 0.15 0.55
Extensive 0.30 0.70
Anchored components (low-rise R/C building with low seismic
code design) Complete 0.40 0.75
Minor 0.15 0.30
Moderate 0.30 0.35
Extensive 1.1 0.55
Anchored components (low- rise R/C building with advanced seismic code
design) Complete 2.1 0.70
Lift station (anchored components, low-rise building with low seismic code design, without back-up power)
0,00
0,25
0,50
0,75
1,00
0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00 1,20 1,40 1,60 1,80 2,00
PGA (g)
[Pro
ba
bili
ty D
s>
ds
/ P
GA
]
Minor damages Moderate damages Extensive damages Complete damages
Fig. 4-24 Fragility curves for lift station (Anchored components, low-rise R/C building with low seismic code design) subjected to ground shaking
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
97
Lift station (anchored components, low-rise building with advance seismic code design, without back-up power)
0,00
0,25
0,50
0,75
1,00
0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00 1,20 1,40 1,60 1,80 2,00
PGA (g)
[Pro
ba
bili
ty D
s>
ds
/ P
GA
]
Minor damages Moderate damages Extensive damages Complete damages
Fig. 4-25 Fragility curves for lift station (Anchored components, low-rise R/C building with advanced seismic code design) subjected to ground shaking
Table 4-30 Subcomponent Damage Algorithms for Lift Station with Anchored Components
Peak Ground Acceleration
Subcomponents Damage State Median (g)
Loss of commercial Power
minor
moderate
0.15
0.30
0.40
0.40
Electric and Mechanical Equipment
moderate 0.80 0.60
Vertical/ Horizontal Pump*
extensive 1.25/1.60 0.60
Building (low-rise R/C building with low
seismic code design)
minor
moderate
extensive
complete
0.18
0.23
0.30
0.41
0.73
0.73
0.73
0.73
Building (low-rise R/C building with advance seismic code design)
minor
moderate
extensive
complete
0.28
0.72
1.66
2.17
0.73
0.73
0.73
0.73
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
98
Comment: For the buildings sub-components, the typology and fragility curves proposed in
SRM-LIFE (2003-2007) were used. The upgrade of fragility curves will be made after the
finalization of D3.1 “Fragility functions for common RC building types in Europe” and the
proposal of buildings’ typologies and fragility functions for SYNER-G.
4.4.2.3 Conduits
For tunnels as proposed in D3.7 “Fragility functions for roadway system elements”
For pipes as proposed for potable water system: O’Rourke and Ayala (1993) for the case of
wave propagation and Honneger and Eguchi (1992) for the case of permanent ground
deformation.
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
99
5 Coding and digital description of fragility functions
System Water System
Element at risk Well Code PWSW
Reference NIBS, 2004
Method Empirical
Function Lognormal
Typology Component anchorage, according to building typology
None Minor Moderate Extensive Complete Damage states
-
Malfunction of well pump and motor for a short time (less than three days) due to loss of electric power and backup power if any, or light damage to buildings
Malfunction of well pump and motor for about a week due to loss of electric power and backup power if any, considerable damage to mechanical and electrical equipment, or moderate damage to buildings
The building being extensively damaged or the well pump and vertical shaft being badly distorted and non-functional
Building collapsing.
Functionality states
Usable Operational after limited repairs
Operational after repairs
Partially operational after extensive repairs
Not repairable
Seismic intensity parameter
Peak Ground Acceleration PGA (g)
Figures Wells (anchored components) Low-rise building with low seismic code design
0,00
0,20
0,40
0,60
0,80
1,00
0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00 1,20 1,40 1,60 1,80 2,00
PGA (g)
[Pro
bab
ilit
y D
s> d
s /
PG
A]
Minor damages Moderate damages Extensive damages Complete damages
Wells (anchored components) Low-rise building with advange seismic code design
0,00
0,20
0,40
0,60
0,80
1,00
0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00 1,20 1,40 1,60 1,80 2,00
PGA (g)
[Pro
bab
ility
Ds>
ds
/ PG
A]
Minor damages Moderate damages Extensive damages Complete damages Parameters (median values, く values)
Comments Distinction according to building typology.
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
100
System Water System
Element at risk Tunnels Code
Comments See D3.7 “Fragility functions for roadway system elements”
System Water System
Element at risk Pipes Code PWSPIPES
Reference NIBS, 2004
Method Empirical
Function O’Rourke and Ayala (1993) – wave propagation
Honneger and Eguchi (1992) - permanent ground deformation.
Typology Pipe material (flexible, rigid)
Damage states No damage Leak Break
Functionality states
- Reduced supply and pressure
No water supply is available
Seismic intensity parameter
Peak Ground Acceleration PGA (g) – wave propagation
Permanent Ground Deformation PGD (m)
Parameters RR/km= K*(0.0001*PGV2.25) å Wave Propagation
RR/km =【*(7.821*PGD0.56) å Permanent Ground Deformation
Comments -
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
101
System Water System
Element at risk Water Treatment Plant Code PWSWTP
Reference SRM-LIFE, 2003-2007
Method Empirical
Function Lognormal
Typology Independently of the size (anchored components, no back-up power)
None Minor Moderate Extensive Complete Damage states
-
Malfunction of plant for a short time (<3 days) due to loss of electric power, considerable damage to various equipment, light damage to sedimentation basins, light damage to chlorination tanks, or light damage to chemical tanks. Loss of water quality may occur.
Malfunction of plant for about a week due to loss of electric power and backup power if any, extensive damage to various equipments, considerable damage to sedimentation basins, considerable damage to chlorination tanks with no loss of contents, or considerable damage to chemical tanks. Loss of water quality is imminent
The pipes connecting the different basins and chemical units being extensively damaged. This type of damage will likely result in the shutdown of the plant.
The complete failure of all pipings or extensive damage to the filter gallery
Functionality states
Usable Operational after limited repairs
Operational after repairs
Partially operational after extensive repairs
Not repairable
Seismic intensity parameter
Peak Ground Acceleration PGA (g)
Figures Water Treatment Plant (anchored components, without back-up power)
0,000
0,200
0,400
0,600
0,800
1,000
0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00 1,20 1,40 1,60 1,80 2,00
PGA (g)
[Pro
bab
ilit
y D
s> d
s /
PG
A]
Minor damages Moderate damages Extensive damages Complete damages Parameters (median values, く values)
Comments -
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
102
System Water System
Element at risk Pumping Station Code PWSP
Reference SRM-LIFE, 2003-2007
Method Empirical
Function Lognormal
Typology Independently of the size (anchored components, no back-up power) according to building typology
None Minor Moderate Extensive Complete Damage states
-
Malfunction of plant for a short time (< 3 days) due to loss of electric power or slight damage to buildings
The loss of electric power for about a week, considerable damage to mechanical and electrical equipment or moderate damage to buildings.
The building
being
extensively
damaged or
the pumps
being badly
damaged
beyond repair
The building
collapsing
Functionality states
Usable Operational after limited repairs
Operational after repairs
Partially operational after extensive repairs
Not repairable
Seismic intensity parameter
Peak Ground Acceleration PGA (g)
Figures Pumping station(anchored components, low-rise building with low seismic code
design, without back-up power)
0,00
0,25
0,50
0,75
1,00
0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00 1,20 1,40 1,60 1,80 2,00
PGA (g)
[Pro
ba
bili
ty D
s>
ds
/ P
GA
]
Minor damages Moderate damages Extensive damages Complete damages
Pumping station(anchored components, low-rise building with advance seismic
code design, without back-up power)
0,00
0,25
0,50
0,75
1,00
0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00 1,20 1,40 1,60 1,80 2,00
PGA (g)
[Pro
ba
bili
ty D
s>
ds
/ P
GA
]
Minor damages Moderate damages Extensive damages Complete damages Parameters (median values, く values)
Comments Distinction according to building typology.
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
103
System Water System
Element at risk Canals Code PWSC
Reference ALA, 2001
Method Empirical
Function -
Typology -
Damage states None Minor Moderate Major damage
Functionality states The canal has the same hydraulic performance after the earthquake
Some increase in the leak rate of the canal has occurred. Damage to the canal liner may occur, causing increased friction between the water and the liner and lowering hydraulic capacity. The liner damage may be due to PGDs in the form of settlements or lateral spreads due to liquefaction, movement due to landslide, offset movement due to fault offset, or excessive ground shaking. Landslide debris may have entered into the canal causing higher sediment transport, which could cause scour of the liner or earthen embankments. Overall, the canal can be operated at up to 90% of capacity without having to be shut down for make repairs.
Some increase in the leak rate of the canal has occurred. Damage to the canal liner has occurred, causing increased friction between water and the liner, lowering hydraulic capacity. The liner damage may be due to PGDs in the form of settlements or lateral spreads due to liquefaction, movement due to landslide, offset movement due to fault offset, or excessive ground shaking. Landslide debris may have entered into the canal causes higher sediment transport, which could cause scour of the liner or earthen embankments. Overall, the canal can be operated in the short term at up to 50% to 90% of capacity; however, a shutdown of the canal soon after the earthquake will be required to make repairs. Damage to canal overcrossings may have occurred, and temporary shutdown of the canal is needed to make repairs. Damage to bridge abutments could cause constriction of the canal’s cross-section to such an extent that it causes a significant flow restriction.
The canal is damaged to such an extent that immediate shutdown is required. The damage may be due to PGDs in the form of settlements or lateral spreads due to liquefaction, movement due to landslide, offset movement due to fault offset, or excessive ground shaking. Landslide debris may have entered the canal and caused excessive sediment transport, or may block the canal’s cross-section to such a degree that the flow of water is disrupted, overflowing over the canal’s banks and causing subsequent flooding. Damage to overcrossings may have occurred, requiring immediate shutdown of the canal. Overcrossing damage could include the collapse of highway bridges and leakage of non-potable material pipelines such as oil, gas, etc. Damage to bridge abutments could cause constriction of the canal's cross-section to such an extent that a significant flow restriction which warrants immediate shutdown and repair
Seismic intensity parameter
Peak Ground Velocity PGV (g) – wave propagation
Permanent Ground Deformation PGD (m)
Parameters
Comments -
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
104
System Water System
Element at risk Storage Tank Code PWSST
Reference ALA (2001a,b)
Method Empirical
Function Lognormal
Typology According to material, anchorage,
According to different material and type the damage states alters Damage states
- Uplift of wall– Crush concrete, Cracking or shearing of tank wall, Sliding, Hoop overstress, Roof damage
- Minor, moderate, extensive, complete
Functionality states
- No loss of context, Small leak, Loss of context
- No operational, Operational
Seismic intensity parameter
Peak Ground Acceleration PGA (g)
Permanent Ground Deformation PGD (m)
Figures Above ground R/C tanks (wave propagation)
0,00
0,20
0,40
0,60
0,80
1,00
0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00 1,20 1,40 1,60 1,80 2,00
PGA (g)
[Pro
ba
bili
ty D
s>
ds
/ P
GA
]
Minor damages Moderate damages Extensive damages Complete damages
ALA_Operative ALA_No- operative
Above ground R/C tanks (permanent deformation)
0,00
0,20
0,40
0,60
0,80
1,00
0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00 1,20 1,40 1,60 1,80 2,00
PGD (m)
[Pro
ba
bili
ty D
s>
ds /
PG
A]
Minor damages Moderate damages Extensive damages
Complete damages ALA_PGD_no_operate Anchorage R/C at grade tanks (wave propagation)
Unanchorage R/C at grade tanks (wave propagation)
Open reservoirs with or without seismic design code (wave propagation)
Parameters (median values, く values)
Unanchorage R/C at grade tanks (permanent deformations)
Comments -
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
105
System Waste-Water System
Element at risk Waste-Water Treatment Plant Code WWSWWTP
Reference SRM-LIFE, 2003-2007
Method Empirical
Function Lognormal
Typology Independently of the size (anchored components, no back-up power) based on building typology
None Minor Moderate Extensive Complete Damage states
-
Malfunction of plant for a short time (< 3 days) due to loss of electric power, considerable damage to various equipment, light damage to sedimentation basins, light damage to chlorination tanks, or light damage to chemical tanks.
Malfunction of plant
for about a week due
to loss of electric
power, extensive
damage to various
equipment,
considerable damage
to sedimentation
basins, considerable
damage to
chlorination tanks
with no loss of
contents, or
considerable damage
to chemical tanks
The pipes
connecting
the
different
basins and
chemical
units being
extensively
damaged.
The
complete
failure of all
pipings or
extensive
damages of
the
buildings
that with
various
equipment.
Functionality states
- Operational after limited repairs
Operational after repairs
Partially operational after extensive repairs
Not repairable
Seismic intensity parameter
Peak Ground Acceleration PGA (g)
Figures Waste- Water Treatment Plants with anchored components (low-rise R/C building with low seismic code design, without back-up power)
0,00
0,20
0,40
0,60
0,80
1,00
0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00 1,20 1,40 1,60 1,80 2,00
PGA (g)
[Pro
ba
bili
ty D
s>
ds
/ P
GA
]
Minor damages Moderate damages Extensive damages Complete damages
Waste- Water Treatment Plants with anchored components (low-rise R/C building with advance seismic code design, without back-up power)
0,00
0,20
0,40
0,60
0,80
1,00
0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00 1,20 1,40 1,60 1,80 2,00
PGA (g)
[Pro
ba
bili
ty D
s>
ds
/ P
GA
]
Minor damages Moderate damages Extensive damages Complete damages Parameters (median values, く values)
Comments -
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
106
System Waste-Water System
Element at risk Pipes Code WWSPIPES
Reference NIBS, 2004
Method Empirical
Function O’Rourke and Ayala (1993) – wave propagation
Honneger and Eguchi (1992) - permanent ground deformation.
Typology Pipe material (flexible, rigid)
Damage states No damage Leak Break
Functionality states
- Reduced supply and pressure
No water supply is available
Seismic intensity parameter
Peak Ground Acceleration PGA (g) – wave propagation
Permanent Ground Deformation PGD (m)
Parameters RR/km= K*(0.0001*PGV2.25) å Wave Propagation
RR/km =【*(7.821*PGD0.56) å Permanent Ground Deformation
Comments The same vulnerability functions as in potable water system
System Waste-Water System
Element at risk Tunnels Code
Comments See D3.7 “Fragility functions for roadway system elements”
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
107
System Waste-Water System
Element at risk Lift Station Code WWSLS
Reference SRM-LIFE, 2003-2007
Method Empirical
Function Lognormal
Typology Independently of the size (anchored components, no back-up power) according to building typology
None Minor Moderate Extensive Complete Damage states
-
Malfunction of lift station for a short time (< 3 days) due to loss of electric power or slight damage to buildings
The loss of electric power for about a week, considerable damage to mechanical and electrical equipment, or moderate damage to buildings.
The building
being
extensively
damaged, or
the pumps
being badly
damaged
beyond repair
The building
collapsing
Functionality states
Usable Operational after limited repairs
Operational after repairs
Partially operational after extensive repairs
Not repairable
Seismic intensity parameter
Peak Ground Acceleration PGA (g)
Figures Lift station (anchored components, low-rise building with low seismic code design, without back-up power)
0,00
0,25
0,50
0,75
1,00
0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00 1,20 1,40 1,60 1,80 2,00
PGA (g)
[Pro
ba
bili
ty D
s>
ds
/ P
GA
]
Minor damages Moderate damages Extensive damages Complete damages
Lift station (anchored components, low-rise building with advance seismic code design, without back-up power)
0,00
0,25
0,50
0,75
1,00
0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60 0,80 1,00 1,20 1,40 1,60 1,80 2,00
PGA (g)
[Pro
ba
bili
ty D
s>
ds
/ P
GA
]
Minor damages Moderate damages Extensive damages Complete damages Parameters (median values, く values)
Comments Distinction according to building typology.
D3.5 -Fragility functions for water and waste-water system elements
109
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