end of executive

7/29/2019 End of Executive

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Norberto Jimenez & Loreto Barrioquinto vs Fernandez

Amnesty Compared w/ PardonAdmission Not Needed in Amnesty

Jimenez and Barrioquinto were charged for murder for the killings they

made during the war. The case was proceeded against Jimenez because

Barrioquinto was nowhere to be found. Jimenez was then sentenced to

life imprisonment. Before the period for perfecting an appeal had

expired, the defendant Jimenez became aware of Proclamation No. 8,

which grants amnesty in favor of all persons who may be charged with

an act penalized under the RPC in furtherance of the resistance to the

enemy or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy.

Barrioquinto learned about the proclamation and he surfaced in order to

invoke amnesty as well. However, Commissioner Fernandez of the

14th

Amnesty Commission refused to process the amnesty request of the

two accused because the two refused to admit to the crime as charged.

Jimenez & Barrioquinto in fact said that a certain Tolentino was the one

who committed the crime being charged to them.

ISSUE: Whether or not admission of guilt is necessary in amnesty.

HELD: Pardon is granted by the President and as such it is a private act

which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the

courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the

President with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of

which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one

after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or

communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or

after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after

conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the

consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it

abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does nor

work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of

suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the

pardon, and it in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the

civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence (art 36, RPC). While

amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense

itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged

that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as

though he had committed no offense.

In order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation,

it is not necessary that he should, as a condition precedent or sine qua

non, admit having committed the criminal act or offense with which he is

charged, and allege the amnesty as a defense; it is sufficient that the

evidence, either of the complainant or the accused, shows that the

offense committed comes within the terms of said Amnesty

Proclamation. Hence, it is not correct to say that invocation of the

benefits of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and

avoidance. Although the accused does not confess the imputation

against him, he may be declared by the courts or the Amnesty

Commissions entitled to the benefits of the amnesty. For, whether or not

he admits or confesses having committed the offense with which he ischarged, the Commissions should, if necessary or requested by the

interested party, conduct summary hearing of the witnesses both for the

complainants and the accused, on whether he has committed the offense

in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy, or against persons aiding in

the war efforts of the enemy, and decide whether he is entitled to the

benefits of amnesty and to be regarded as a patriot or hero who have

rendered invaluable services to the nation, or not, in accordance with

the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation. Since the Amnesty Proclamation


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is a public act, the courts as well as the Amnesty Commissions created

thereby should take notice of the terms of said Proclamation and apply

the benefits granted therein to cases coming within their province or

jurisdiction, whether pleaded or claimed by the person charged with such

offenses or not, if the evidence presented shows that the accused is

entitled to said benefits.

Gaudencio Vera et al vs People of the Philippines

AmnestyReversal of the Doctrine Held in the Barrioquinto Case

Vera, together with 92 others were charged for the crime of kidnapping

with murder done against a certain Lozaes. The said crime was

committed allegedly to aid the Japanese occupation. During the hearing,

none of the petitioners-defendants admitted having committed the crime

charged. In fact, Gaudencio Vera, the only defendant who took the

witness stand, instead of admitting the killing of the deceased Lozaes,

categorically denied it. Hence, the Amnesty Commission held that it

could not take cognizance of the case, on the ground that the benefits of

the Amnesty Proclamation, could be invoked only by defendants in a

criminal case who, admitting the commission of the crime, plead that

said commission was in pursuance of the resistance movement and

perpetrated against persons who aided the enemy during the Japanese

occupation. Consequently, the Commission ordered that the case be

remanded to the court of origin for trial.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused can avail of amnesty sans admission

of guilt.

HELD: It is rank inconsistency for appellant to justify an act, or seek

forgiveness for an act which, according to him, he has not committed.

Amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime, and when an accused

maintains that he has not committed a crime, he cannot have any use for

amnesty. Where an amnesty proclamation imposes certain conditions, as

in this case, it is incumbent upon the accused to prove the existence of

such conditions. The invocation of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of

confession and avoidance, which means that the pleader admits the

allegations against him but disclaims liability therefor on account of

intervening facts which, if proved, would bring the crime charged within

the scope of the amnesty proclamation. The present rule requires a

previous admission of guilt since a person would not need the benefit of

amnesty unless he was, to begin with, guilty of the offense covered by

the proclamation.

Miguel Cristobal vs Alejo Labrador & Teofilo Santos

PardonRestoration of Civil & Political Rights

Santos was convicted of the crime of estafa. He was given pardon by the

president but even prior to his pardon he was already holding the position

as the municipality president of Malabon notwithstanding his conviction.

Cristobal, on the other hand, averred that Santos should be excluded

from the list of electors in Malabon because he was already convicted of

final judgment for any crime against property. This is pursuant to CA

357 of the New Election Code. The lower court presided by Labrador

ruled that Santos is exempt from the provision of the law by virtue of the

pardon restoring the respondent to his full civil and political rights,

except that with respect to the right to hold public office or employment,

he will be eligible for appointment only to positions which are clerical or

manual in nature and involving no money or property responsibility.

ISSUE: Whether or not Santos should not be excluded as an elector.


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HELD: It should be observed that there are two limitations upon the

exercise of this constitutional prerogative by the Chief Executive,

namely: (a) that the power be exercised after conviction; and (b) that

such power does not extend cases of impeachment. Subject to the

limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be

restricted or controlled by legislative action. It must remain where the

sovereign authority has placed it and must be exercised by the highest

authority to whom it is entrusted. An absolute pardon not only blots out

the crime committed, but removes all disabilities resulting from the

conviction. In the present case, the disability is the result of conviction

without which there would be no basis for disqualification from voting.

Imprisonment is not the only punishment which the law imposes upon

those who violate its command. There are accessory and resultant

disabilities, and the pardoning power likewise extends to such

disabilities. When granted after the term of imprisonment has expired,

absolute pardon removes all that is left of the consequences f conviction.

In the present case, while the pardon extended to respondent Santos is

conditional in the sense that he will be eligible for appointment only to

positions which a e clerical or manual in nature involving no money or

property responsibility, it is absolute insofar as it restores therespondent to full civil and political rights. Upon other hand, the

suggestion that the disqualification imposed in par (b) of sec 94 of CA

357, does not fall within the purview of the pardoning power of the

president, would lead to the impairment of the pardoning power of the

president, not contemplated in the Constitution, and would lead

furthermore to the result that there would be no way of restoring the

political privilege in a case of this nature except through legislative

action.

People of the Philippines vs Benedicto Jose

Conditional PardonHow it works after a change of sovereign

Jose was charged for violating Act 65 in 1944. Act 65 was an act of the

Natl Assembly of RP while the Japanese were still occupying the

country. After serving 6 months or in April 1944, Jose was granted a

conditional pardonthe simple condition was for him not to violate any

other Penal Laws of RP. Later he committed a crime of qualified theft.

The Fiscal then went on to file an additional charge against Jose for

violating the conditions of the pardon granted him. Jose argued that he

did not violate the pardon conditions at all because there is no pardon at

all. The pardon granted him is inoperative because the law he violated

before was a political law which was abrogated when the US army took

over the country as proclaimed by MacArthur in Oct 1944.

ISSUE: Whether the defendant can now be prosecuted for having

allegedly violated the conditional pardon granted by the President of the

so-called Republic of the Philippines.

HELD: The SC held that Jose cannot be prosecuted criminally for a

violation of the conditional pardon granted by the President of the so-

called RP (during the Jap Occupation), for the following reasons:

Because, without necessity of discussing and determining the intrinsic

validity of the conditional pardon, as an act done by the President of the

so-called RP, after the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, no

elaborate argument is required to show that the effectivity of a

conditional pardon depends on that of the sentence which inflicts upon a

defendant the punishment inflicted by the sentence ceases to be of any

effect in so far as the individual upon whom it is bestowed is concerned,


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for the latter cannot be required to serve a void sentence of penalty

imposed on him, even without such pardon.

Florencio Pelobello vs Gregorio Palatino

Absolute Pardon

Palatino was the mayor elect of Torrijos, Marinduque. Pelobello filed a

quo warranto proceeding alleging that Palatino is no longer qualified to

hold office because he was already convicted before and was even

imprisoned. Because of such conviction and imprisonment, Peleobello

averred that Palatino is already barred from voting and being voted upon.

Palatino also invoked par (a), sec 94 of the Election Code which supports

his contention.

ISSUE: Whether or not Palatino is eligible for public office.

HELD: Yes, Palatino was granted a conditional pardon by the then Gov-

Gen but such pardon was converted into an absolute pardon by President

Quezon who succeeded the Gov-Gen. The pardon was already after

Palatinos election but prior to him assuming office. The SC then held

that since there is an absolute pardon, all the former disabilities imposed

and attached to the prior conviction had been removed and that Palatino

is therefore eligible for the public office in question.

People of the Philippines vs Eugenio Pasilan

Amnestywhen cannot be invokednew trial

Pasilan was a former guerilla fighting against the Japanese. In 1944,

while cleaning his gun outside the house of one Justina Miguel, a certain

Ciriaco Abarra passed by. Pasilan ordered Abarra to wait for him. Abarra

waited and after cleaning his gun, Pasilan interrogated Abarra. Abarra

was alleged to be supporting the Japanese cause and he was one of the

persons who accompanied the Japanese troops in raiding the barrio

where Pasilan lived. After interrogating, Pasilan inflicted upon Abarra 2

stab wounds on Abarras chest. Abarra run away towards the river. Ten

days later, the decaying body of Abarra was found. About 10 years after

the incident, Morales, an agent, was sent to the barrio to investigate

crimes committed during the war. He conducted some investigation and

was also able to have Miguel testify against Pasilan and he later found

Pasilan to be guilty for the murder of Abarra. On July 29, 1964, Pasilan

moved for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence which

allegedly would reverse the decision of the lower court. Alleged as newly

discovered evidence are sworn statement attesting to Justina Miguels

recantation. Pasilan likewise seeks to avail of Proclamation No. 8 by

President Roxas granting amnesty to persons who during the war

committed any act penalized under the RPC in furtherance of the

resistance against the enemy or against person aiding in the war efforts of

the enemy.

ISSUE: Whether or not Pasilan is eligible to be admitted for amnesty.

HELD:Not every recantation of a witness entitles the accused to a new

trial. Otherwise, the power to grant a new trial would rest not in the

courts but in the witnesses who have testified against the accused.

Recanting testimony, furthermore, is exceedingly unreliable. Since

Justina Miguels alleged recantation has already been passed upon by the

trial court, new trial is uncalled for.

Neither can the additional ground of amnesty entitle appellant to a new

trial. In the first place, Proclamation No. 8 of President Roxas is not a

newly discovered evidence, for it was already known when the case was

tried. Secondly, availing of the benefits granted by the amnesty

proclamation would be inconsistent with the plea of not guilty which


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appellant entered upon his arraignment. Amnesty presupposes the

commission of a crime, and when the accused maintains that he has not

committed a crime, he cannot avail of amnesty.

Salvacion Monsanto vs Deputy Exec Sec Fulgencio Factoran

Pardon Does not Extinguish Civil Liabilities & It is ProspectiveMonsanto was the Asst Treasurer of Calbayug City. She was charged for

the crime of Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents. She was

found guilty and was sentenced to jail. She was however granted pardon

by Marcos. She then wrote a letter to the Minister of Finance for her to

be reinstated to her former position since it was still vacant. She was also

requesting for back pays. The Minister of Finance referred the issue to

the Office of the President and Factoran denied Monsantos request

averring that Monsanto must first seek appointment and that the pardon

does not reinstate her former position. Also, Monsanto avers that by

reason of the pardon, she should no longer be compelled to answer for

the civil liabilities brought about by her acts.

ISSUE: Whether or not Monsanto should be reinstated to her former

post.

HELD: A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes noamends for the past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the

offender. It does not impose upon the government any obligation to make

reparation for what has been suffered. Since the offense has been

established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or suffered

while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and

justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required. This would

explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive

backpay for lost earnings and benefits. On the other hand, civil liability

arising from crime is governed by the RPC. It subsists notwithstanding

service of sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not served by

pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence. Petitioners civil liability

may only be extinguished by the same causes recognized in the Civil

Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due, remission of the debt,

merger of the rights of creditor and debtor, compensation and novation.

Rodolfo Llamas vs Exec Sec Orbos & Mariano Ocampo III

PardonApplicable to Administrative Cases

Ocampo III was the governor of Tarlac Province. Llamas together with

some other complainants filed an administrative case against Ocampo III

for alleged acts constituting graft and corruption. Ocampo III was found

guilty. He was suspended for office for 90 days hence his vice governor,

Llamas, assumed office. In not less than 30 days however, Ocampo IIIreturned with an AO showing that he was pardoned hence he can resume

office without completing the 90 day suspension imposed upon him.

ISSUE: Whether or not pardon is applicable to administrative cases.

HELD: The SC held that pardon is applicable to Administrative cases.

The SC does not clearly see any valid and convincing reason why the

President cannot grant executive clemency in administrative cases. It is a

considered view that if the President can grant reprieves, commutations

and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much

more reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases,

which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses.

Wilfredo Torres vs Hon. Neptali Gonzales

Constitutional LawPardonNot Subject to Judicial Review/Scrutiny

In 1978, Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, he was pardoned by the

president w/ the condition that he shall not violate any penal laws again.


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In 1982, Torres was charged with multiple crimes of estafa. In 1986,

Gonzales petitioned for the cancellation of Torres pardon. Hence, the

president cancelled the pardon. Torres appealed the issue before the SC

averring that the Exec Dept erred in convicting him for violating the

conditions of his pardon because the estafa charges against him were not

yet final and executory as they were still on appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a

court is necessary before Torres can be validly rearrested and

recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and

accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence.

HELD: The SC affirmed the following:

1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions

of a conditional pardon are purely executive acts which are not subject to

judicial scrutiny.

2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a

pardon, and the proper consequences of such breach, may be either a

purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i)

of the Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting

of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under

Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. Where the President opts to

proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no

judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much

less conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a

convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.

3. Because due process is not semper et ubique judicial process, and

because the conditionally pardoned convict had already been accorded

judicial due process in his trial and conviction for the offense for which

he was conditionally pardoned, Section 64 (i) of the Revised

Administrative Code is not afflicted with a constitutional vice.

In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and

who is alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the

Executive Department has two options: (i) to proceed against him under

Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed

against him under Article 159 of the RPC which imposes the penalty of

prision correccional, minimum period, upon a convict who having been

granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of

the conditions of such pardon. Here, the President has chosen to

proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised

Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the Presidents

executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.

Nicolas vs Romulo

**This case is consolidated with Salonga vs Daniel Smith & BAYAN

vs Gloria Arroyo

Constitutional LawRatification of a TreatyValidity of the VFA

On the 1st

of November 2005, Daniel Smith committed the crime of rapeagainst Nicole. He was convicted of the said crime and was ordered by

the court to suffer imprisonment. Smith is a US serviceman convicted of

a crime against our penal laws and the crime was committed within the

countrys jurisdiction. But pursuant to the VFA, a treaty b/n the US and

RP, the US embassy was granted custody of Smith. Nicole, together with

the other petitioners appealed before the SC assailing the validity of the

VFA. Their contention is that the VFA was not ratified by the US senate

in the same way our senate ratified the VFA.


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ISSUE: Is the VFA void and unconstitutional & whether or not it is self-

executing.

HELD: The VFA is a self-executing Agreement because the parties

intend its provisions to be enforceable, precisely because the VFA is

intended to carry out obligations and undertakings under the RP-US

Mutual Defense Treaty. As a matter of fact, the VFA has been

implemented and executed, with the US faithfully complying with its

obligation to produce Smith before the court during the trial.

The VFA is covered by implementing legislation inasmuch as it is the

very purpose and intent of the US Congress that executive agreements

registered under this Act within 60 days from their ratification be

immediately implemented. The SC noted that the VFA are not like other

treaties that need implementing legislation such as the Vienna

Convention. As regards the implementation of the RP-US Mutual

Defense Treaty, military aid or assistance has been given under it and

this can only be done through implementing legislation. The VFA itself

is another form of implementation of its provisions.

TREATY-MAKING IN THE PHILIPPINES

What is a treaty?

Under Philippine Laws, Treaties are international agreements entered

into by the Philippines which require legislative concurrence after

executive ratification. This term may include compacts like conventions,

declarations, covenants and acts.

Under International Law, Treaty means an international agreement

concluded between States in written form and governed by international

law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related

instruments and whatever its particular designation.

Not all international agreements are governed by international law. The

convention applies only to those which are governed by the domestic

law of one of the parties or some other national law chosen by the

parties.

What is an executive Agreement?

Executive Agreementssimilar to treaties except that they do notrequire legislative concurrence.

What is the distinction between a treaty and an executive

agreement?

The difference between the two is sometimes difficult of ready

ascertainment. Under international law, there is no difference between

treaties and executive agreements in their binding effect upon states

concerned, as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained withintheir powers. International law continues to make no distinction between

treaties and executive agreements: they are equally binding obligations

upon nations.

In our jurisdiction, we have recognized the binding effect of executive

agreements even without the concurrence of the Senate or Congress.

Generally, treaties of any kind, whether bilateral or multilateral, require

Senate concurrence while executive agreements may be validly entered

into without such concurrence.

The members of the Constitutional Commission acknowledged the

distinction between a treaty and an executive agreement during their

deliberations of Section 21 Article VII. One of the issues in the

discussions was trying to identify the kind of international agreements

that require Senate concurrence.

Commissioner Joaquin Bernas made a clarification by quoting from the

decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Customs

vs. Eastern Sea Trading:


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The right of the executive to enter into binding agreements without the

necessity of subsequent Congressional approval has been confirmed by

long usage. From the earliest days of our history, we have entered into

executive agreements covering such subjects as commercial and consular

relations, most favored nation rights, patent rights, trademark and

copyright protection, postal and navigation arrangements and the

settlement of claims. The validity of this has never been seriouslyquestioned by our Courts.

Agreements with respect to the registration of trademarks have been

concluded by the executive and various countries under the Act of

Congress of March 3, 1881 (21 Stat. 502) . . . International agreements

involving political issues or changes of national policy and those

involving international agreements of a permanent character usually take

the form of treaties. But international agreements embodying

adjustments of detail, carrying out well established national policies andtraditions and those involving arrangements of a more or less temporary

nature usually take the form of executive agreements.

Commissioner Bernas further explained that international agreements,

which require Senate concurrence, are those, which are permanent in

nature. Also, if it is with prior authorization from Congress, it does not

need subsequent concurrence by Congress.

The Department of Foreign Affairs in its press release said that in

executive agreement, there is no fundamental change in policy, nor willthere be need for legislation to fund the agreement. It does not impinge

on any existing international legal obligation.

What is the rationale for distinguishing a treaty form an executive

agreement?

The distinction between a treaty or international agreement and an

executive agreement is of great significance in the Philippines because

the procedure followed in the process of ratification is different.

If what is involved is a treaty, the concurrence by at least two-thirds of

all the Members of the Senate is required.On the other hand, if what is

involved is an executive, there is no such requirement.

Gonzales vs Hechanova

Constitutional LawTreaty vs Executive AgreementsStatutes Can

Repeal Executive Agreements

Then President Diosdado Macapagal entered into two executive

agreements with Vietnam and Burma for the importation of rice without

complying with the requisite of securing a certification from the Natl

Economic Council showing that there is a shortage in cereals. Hence,

Hechanova authorized the importation of 67000 tons of rice from abroad

to the detriment of our local planters. Gonzales, then president of the

Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association assailed the executiveagreements. Gonzales averred that Hechanova is without jurisdiction or

in excess of jurisdiction, because RA 3452 prohibits the importation of

rice and corn by the Rice and Corn Administration or any other

government agency.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3452 prevails over the 2 executive

agreements entered into by Macapagal.

HELD: Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to

enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former may not interfere in the

performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise

of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have

acquired the status of laws, by indirectly repealing the same through an

executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act

prohibited by said laws. In the event of conflict between a treaty and a

statute, the one which is latest in point of time shall prevail, is not


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applicable to the case at bar, Hechanova not only admits, but, also, insists

that the contracts adverted to are not treaties. No such justification can be

given as regards executive agreements not authorized by previous

legislation, without completely upsetting the principle of separation of

powers and the system of checks and balances which are fundamental in

our constitutional set up.

As regards the question whether an executive or an international

agreement may be invalidated by our courts, suffice it to say that the

Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative, by

providing that the SC may not be deprived of its jurisdiction to review,

revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as

the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of

inferior courts in All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of

any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in

question. In other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of

a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also,

when it runs counter to an act of Congress.

Tan Sin vs The Deportation Board

Constitutional LawExecutive OrderPower to Deport an Undesirable

Alien

Tan Sin is a Chinaman residing in Pasay. In December 1953, he was

convicted of the crime of estafa. He was sentenced to jail. While in jail, a

special prosecutor in the Deportation Board recommended to the

president that Tan Sin be deported to China because he, by reason of the

crime he had committed, has become an undesirable alien. Tan Sin

averred that he cannot be prosecuted and be deported by the special

prosecutor (a person under the executive department) because only

Congress has the absolute and inherent power to deport aliens.

ISSUE: Whether or not Tans Sin can be deported by the President.

HELD: Sec 69 of the RAC provides:

A subject of a foreign power residing in the Philippines shall not bedeported, expelled, or excluded from said Islands or repatriated to his

own country by the President of the Philippines except upon prior

investigation conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent, of the

ground upon which such action is contemplated. In such case the person

concerned shall be informed of the charge or charges against him and he

shall be allowed not less than three days for the preparation of his

defense. He shall also have the right to be heard by himself or counsel, to

produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to cross-examine the opposing

witnesses.

Pursuant thereto, on 5 Jan 1951 the President promulgated EO 398

reorganizing the Deportation Board. Par 1, sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of

the said EO provides:

(a) The Deportation Board, motu proprio or upon complaint of any

person, is authorized to conduct investigations in the manner prescribed

in section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code to determine whether a

subject of a foreign power residing in the Philippines is an undesirable

alien or not, and thereafter to recommend to the President of the

Philippines the deportation of such alien.

(b) The Deportation Board, motu proprio or upon the filing of the formal

charges by the Special Prosecutor of the Board, shall issue the warrant of

arrest against the alien or aliens complained of.


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The power to deport aliens is lodged in the President. As an act of state,

it is vested in the Executive by virtue of his office, subject only to the

regulations prescribed in Sec 69 of the RAC or to such future legislation

as may be promulgated on the subject. There is no provision in the

Constitution nor act of the legislature defining the power, as it is evident

that it is the intention of the law to grant to the Chief Executive full

discretion to determine whether an aliens residence in the country is so

undesirable as to affect or injure the security, welfare or interest of the

state. The adjudication of facts upon which deportation is predicated also

devolves on the Chief Executive whose decision is final and executory.

Commissioner of Customs & Collector of Customs vs Eastern Sea

Trading

Constitutional LawTreaties vs Executive Agreements

EST was a shipping company charged in the importation from Japan of

onion and garlic into the Philippines. In 1956, the Commissioner of

Customs ordered the seizure and forfeiture of the import goods because

EST was not able to comply with Central Bank Circulars 44 and 45. The

said circulars were pursuant to EO 328 w/c sought to regulate the

importation of such non-dollar goods from Japan (as there was a Trade

and Financial Agreement b/n the Philippines and Japan then). EST

questioned the validity of the said EO averring that the said EO was

never concurred upon by the Senate. The issue was elevated to the Court

of Tax Appeals and the latter ruled in favor of EST. The Commissioner

appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the EO is subject to the concurrence of at least

2/3 of the Senate.

HELD:No, executive Agreements are not like treaties which are subject

to the concurrence of at least 2/3 of the members of the Senate.

Agreements concluded by the President which fall short of treaties are

commonly referred to as executive agreements and are no less common

in our scheme of government than are the more formal instruments

treaties and conventions. They sometimes take the form of exchanges of

notes and at other times that of more formal documents denominated

agreements or protocols. The point where ordinary correspondence

between this and other governments ends and agreements whether

denominated executive agreements or exchanges of notes or otherwise

begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. It would be

useless to undertake to discuss here the large variety of executive

agreements as such, concluded from time to time. Hundreds of executive

agreements, other than those entered into under the trade- agreements

act, have been negotiated with foreign governments. . . . It would seem to

be sufficient, in order to show that the trade agreements under the act of

1934 are not anomalous in character, that they are not treaties, and that

they have abundant precedent in our history, to refer to certain classes of

agreements heretofore entered into by the Executive without the approval

of the Senate. They cover such subjects as the inspection of vessels,navigation dues, income tax on shipping profits, the admission of civil

aircraft, customs matters, and commercial relations generally,

international claims, postal matters, the registration of trade-marks and

copyrights, etc. Some of them were concluded not by specific

congressional authorization but in conformity with policies declared in

acts of Congress with respect to the general subject matter, such as tariff

acts; while still others, particularly those with respect to the settlement of


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claims against foreign governments, were concluded independently of

any legislation.

Lao Ichong vs Jaime Hernandez

Constitutional LawTreaties May Be Superseded by Municipal Laws in

the Exercise of Police Power

Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take

advantage of business opportunities herein abound (then) particularly

in the retail business. For some time he and his fellow Chinese

businessmen enjoyed a monopoly in the local market in Pasay. Until in

June 1954 when Congress passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade

Nationalization Act the purpose of which is to reserve to Filipinos the

right to engage in the retail business. Ichong then petitioned for the

nullification of the said Act on the ground that it contravened severaltreaties concluded by the RP which, according to him, violates the equal

protection clause (pacta sund servanda). He said that as a Chinese

businessman engaged in the business here in the country who helps in the

income generation of the country he should be given equal opportunity.

ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or

generally accepted principles.

HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted

principle. In this case, there is no conflict at all between the raised

generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of

the law clause does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it

merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like

circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and

liabilities enforced; and, that the equal protection clause is not

infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling

within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class,

and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who

fall within such class and those who do not.

For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would

be in conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it

represented an exercise of the police power which, being inherent could

not be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty.

Hence, Ichong can no longer assert his right to operate his market stalls

in the Pasay city market.

Ernesto Hidalgo vs President Marcos

Constitutional LawPresidents Immunity From Suit

In December 1977, a referendum was scheduled to be held. The purpose

of which was to merge the office of the Prime Minister and the Office of

the President. Hidalgo petitioned before the court to enjoin COMELEC

and the president from proceeding with the said referendum.

ISSUE: Whether or not the president can be sued and compelled through

a mandamus by the SC.

HELD: The SC did not give due course to Hidalgos petition and the SC

invoked the presidents immunity from suit.The SC ruled the following:(1)The President cannot be compelled by mandamus or otherwise to

convene the interim National Assembly because, inter alia, this body

was abrogated and supplanted by the interim Batasang Pambansa by

virtue of the 1976 amendments to the Constitution, particularly

Amendment No. 1 which partly provides that There shall be, in lieu of

the interim National Assembly, an Interim Batasang Pambansa.


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(2)The 1976 amendments to the Constitution ratified by the people in the

October 16-17, 1976 referendum-plebiscite and now form part of the

Constitution, hence, the December 17, 1977 referendum, contrary to

Hidalgos posture, may not be said to be designed to effectuate their

ratification. The holding of the coming referendum is an exercise

authorized by one of those amendments, i.e., Amendment No. 7, which

provides that a referendum may be called at any time the government

deems it necessary to ascertain the will of the people regarding any

important matter whether of national or local interest.

(3)No constitutional infirmity attaches to Presidential Decree No. 1229

because the referendum called for therein will not result in an

amendment to the Constitution. The question, Do you vote that

President Marcos continue in office as incumbent President and be PM

after the organization of the Interim Batasang Pambansa as provided for

in Amendment No. 3 of the 1976 Amendments to the Constitution?, to

be submitted to the people in the December 17, 1977 referendum, is in

neither the nature nor the form of an amendment. It merely asks the

people to either reaffirm or repudiate the confidence in the President

which they had previously expressed. If the people vote yes,

Amendment No. 3, which provides, inter alia, that The incumbent

President of the Philippines shall be the Prime Minister and he shall

continue to exercise all his powers even after the interim Batasang

Pambansa is organized and ready to discharge its functions and likewise

he shall continue to exercise his powers and prerogatives under the

Nineteen Hundred and Thirty Five Constitution and the powers vested in

the President and the Prime Minister under this Constitution, will

simply be reaffirmed and reinforced. If the people vote no, the

President, as he has categorically announced, will, in deference to the

will of the people and exercising a public officers prerogative , resign.

The cessation in office, for any reason, by the incumbent President will

not result in an amendment to the Constitution, the provisions of which

will remain unaltered.

Soliven vs Makasiar

Constitutional LawPresidents Immunity From SuitMust Be Invoked

by the President

Beltran is among the petitioners in this case. He together with others was

charged for libel by the president. Cory herself filed a complaint-

affidavit against him and others. Makasiar averred that Cory cannot file a

complaint affidavit because this would defeat her immunity from suit. He

grounded his contention on the principle that a president cannot be sued.

However, if a president would sue then the president would allow herself

to be placed under the courts jurisdiction and conversely she would be

consenting to be sued back. Also, considering the functions of a

president, the president may not be able to appear in court to be a witness

for herself thus she may be liable for contempt.

ISSUE: Whether or not such immunity can be invoked by Beltran, aperson other than the president.

HELD: The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of

immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and

functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being

the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring

all of the office-holders time, also demands undivided attention.

But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by

virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office;


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not by any other person in the Presidents behalf. Thus, an accused like

Beltran et al, in a criminal case in which the President is complainant

cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case

from proceeding against such accused.

Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the Presidentfrom waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed

the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the courts

jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it

is solely the Presidents prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be

assumed and imposed by any other person.