enegren final research paper

APUS

Homegrown Terrorism: The

Problem with Self-

RadicalizationCombatting Homegrown Terrorism

Mark Enegren

10/24/2013

Running head: Combatting Homegrown Terrorism 1

Homegrown Terrorism: The Problem with Self-Radicalization

Mark Enegren

APUS

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for (SCMT/529 International Terrorism)

October 24, 2013

Telephone: Not For Release

E-mail: Not For Release

Instructor: Dr. Steven Greer

Abstract


The bomb attack on the Boston Marathon in April rekindled the concerns about domestic

homegrown terrorism. Although, the Boston Marathon bombers were naturalized US citizens

their case follows a pattern common in the self-radicalization of homegrown terrorists. This

pattern includes obtaining terrorist propaganda frequently online, communicating with terrorists,

and in some cases receiving terrorist training abroad. The focus of this paper is not specifically

on Boston Marathon bombers but rather on homegrown terrorism and self-radicalization of

persons within the United States. Homegrown terrorists have been identified as US citizens,

citizens of other countries, legal residents, and illegal residents. The commonality between them

is becoming self-radicalized and turning against the United States. The August 2008 report from

the Defense Science Board titled Defense Imperatives for the New Administration emphasizes

that homegrown indigenous and or locally nourished terrorism presents additional challenges. In

their report, they mention that the pool of disaffected potential recruits may be growing, and that

self-radicalization is a particularly worrisome problem. Expanding on these thoughts this paper

examines past cases of self-radicalization and attempts to answer what can be done about the

problem of homegrown terrorism and self-radicalization.

Keywords: Terrorism, Homegrown Terrorism, Self-radicalization, Domestic Terrorism

History


Since 9/11, law enforcement and intelligence services have uncovered 60 plots by

terrorists to attack the United States (Jessica Zuckerman, 2013). Of these plots, 49 are considered

homegrown and 4 of these were successful (2013). The successful attacks include the driving of

an SUV into a crowd of students at the University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill in 2006; the

shooting at an Army recruiting center in Little Rock in 2009; the rampage shooting committed

by Nidal Hasan at Fort Hood in 2009; and the Boston Marathon bombings in April of this year.

Although, media attention has focused on large-scale attacks, the vast majority of planned

attacks on the United States have been at the hands of “American citizens, legal permanent

residents, or visitors radicalized predominately in the United States” (2013).

Domestic terrorism is not responsible for the most death and injury when compared to

international terrorism. International terrorism aimed at American targets overseas is responsible

for the vast majority of death and injury. According to one report between 2001 and 2009

excluding the 9/11 victims, there were 21 domestic fatalities as the result of terrorism, of this

number 13 included victims of Nidal Hassan’s rampage shooting at Ft. Hood (David B.

Muhlhausen, 2011). By contrast international terrorism against U.S. interests resulted in 879

deaths and 2,770 injuries (2011). Nonetheless, with incidents like the Ft. Hood attack and the

recent Boston Marathon bombing there is a perception that it is less safe to go about daily life

and business here in the United States. Since perception is reality for many people the statistical

probabilities are less important than the fact that domestic terrorism causes fear and angst among

the citizenry. As Hoffman puts it, terrorists “want maximum publicity to be generated by its

actions and moreover aims at intimidation and subjection to attain its objectives” (Hoffman,

2006, p. 214). There is little doubt about how much media attention a domestic terrorist act


garners and through it fear. Hoffman quoting Dr. Frederick Hacker, said “terrorists seek to

‘frighten and, by frightening, to dominate and control’” (Hoffman, 2006, p. 214). As Scott

Erickson puts it “Their participation in local conflicts also brings a level of media attention far

greater than that which can be generally obtained from indigenous fighters” (2013, para. 7).

It is important to bear in mind that the goal of terrorists is not necessarily to gain a

military victory but instead to cause fear and by doing so control potential victims. In the case of

domestic terrorism as pointed out in the aforementioned report, statistically the chances of

becoming a victim of domestic terrorism are almost nonexistent. Since 9/11, major efforts by the

United States military and intelligence communities have managed to disperse many of the

foremost terrorist organizations. Chief amongst these would be Al Qaeda. Although Al Qaeda

has been unable to mount a large-scale operation against the United States since the death of

Osama bin Laden, this has not stopped terrorists, including radicalized Americans from

attempting various attacks within the United States (James Jay Carafano, 2012). At the time that

Carafano wrote his report on 50 terror plots in April of 2012, nine “Islamist-inspired terror plots

against the United States have been foiled” (2012, para. 1).

“[T]he global operating environment for terrorist networks [has] become increasingly

hostile” (James Jay Carafano, 2012, para. 2). Understandably, harming the United States of

America within its contiguous borders is increasingly difficult for terrorists. Through use of the

Patriot Act, monitoring electronic communications between terrorists is easier. Furthermore,

counterterrorism and intelligence efforts are making entry into the United States a more difficult


proposition than in the past. Nonetheless, terrorist networks continue to work towards attacking

the United States at home. For example, the recent attack at the Westgate Mall in Kenya by Al

Shabaab reinforces the need for continued vigilance. One of Al Shabaab’s stated goals is to

attack the American homeland (David Inserra, 2013). This goal may be closer than people realize

when considering that Al Shabaab is actively recruiting within Muslim communities in the

United States. Reportedly, two or three radicalized American citizens participated in the attacks

on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi (Howden, 2013). In Erickson’s report on radicalization he

highlights that “Minneapolis has seen multiple individuals travel to East Africa to participate in

Islamic extremism with the Islamist group Al-Shabaab” (2013, para. 8).This points out how the

global dynamic has changed and explains why terrorist organizations, such as Al Shabaab, are

actively trying to radicalized and recruit American citizens (2013).

By radicalizing American citizens or residents, terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda

achieve several valuable goals. A homegrown terrorist for example, especially one with ties to

terrorist areas in other countries may have the social and language skills necessary to transition

between two disparate cultures and communities (James Jay Carafano, 2012). Additionally,

homegrown terrorists possess the ability and knowledge as well as documents to travel easily

between points within the United States and sometimes areas outside the United States (2012).

As Erickson points out “Their ability to move more freely in and out of the United States, or

other Western nations, makes them invaluable and less prone to scrutiny by the intelligence

community” (2013, para. 6).


Because the self-radicalized terrorist may not have direct connections to terrorist

organizations and frequently acts as a “lone wolf”, detection by traditional law enforcement

means may be more difficult (2012). The lack of connections to known terrorist organizations

and the tendency to involve fewer players also make detection of the homegrown terrorist more

difficult and more lucrative for terrorist organizations (2012). Because the global environment

for terrorists has been radically altered through the Global War on Terror, and because the

benefits of recruiting or radicalizing new adherents to their cause, the phenomena of homegrown

terrorism will certainly continue and possibly grow. It is because of these facts that actions need

to be taken to identify, detain if necessary, and stop the homegrown terrorist before they act. As

past terrorist events illustrate, the homegrown terrorists should not be taken lightly. One needs

look no further than two of the successful attacks, the Ft. Hood attack and the Boston Marathon

bombing to realize the impact these plots have upon the American psyche if left unchecked.

Unfortunately, detection and interception of these actors is not always easy, and as has been

stated in many ways, they only have to succeed once, whereas the defense must prevail every

time.

The Process of Radicalization

After the Boston bombing, people started asking questions about how young men

that essentially grew up in the United States could become Islamic terrorists. Another attacker,

Nidal Hasan also became radicalized and this, while a member of the armed forces and

ostensibly protecting the Constitution and the homeland from jihadists. How did this happen?

According to a Congressional Research Service report between 1,000 and 2,000 Americans have


travelled abroad to participate in fighting, frequently in their homelands, and to participate in

extremist Islamic activities (Bjelopera, 2013). Occurrences of this nature are known as “foreign

fighters” (2013). These foreign fighters are frequently exposed to the idea of participating in

violent conflicts by what some call “bridge” figures or recruiters that promote the jihadi lifestyle

and philosophy of the terrorist organizations (Erickson, 2013).

Bridge figures use modern means of communication such as social networking,

YouTube, Twitter, websites, and blogs, to facilitate their messages (Erickson, 2013). In the case

of Hasan, email exchanges between him and Anwar al-Awlaki precipitated his transformation

from an officer in the United States Army to an Islamic Jihadist (Herridge, 2012). In her article,

Herridge explains how al-Awlaki used as many as 60 email accounts to maintain discreet

communications with adherents such as Hasan (2012).

According to the Congressional Research Service report on the radicalization

process, the term radicalization “describes the process of acquiring and holding radical,

extremist, or jihadist beliefs” and the term violent extremism means “violent action taken on the

basis of radical or extremist beliefs” (Bjelopera, 2013). This same CRS report also provides an

NYPD intelligence division study on domestic radicalization that has been widely disseminated

among law enforcement nationwide. In the NYPD report, which CRS says should be read with

caution, the NYPD suggests four steps in the process of moving from radicalization to violent

extremism (2013). The first step is referred to as a pre-radicalization phase, where the individual

leads a relatively normal life unaware and uninterested in jihad (2013). The second step involves


self-identification stemming from a crisis or trigger to prompt them to explore Salafism (2013).

The third step is when the bridge figure or as the NYPD report states a “spiritual sanctioner”

indoctrinates or encourages the adoption of jihadist ideology (2013). The final stage is when the

radicalized individual self identifies as a violent jihadist and starts planning terrorist attacks

(2013). Although, the NYPD report describes what some refer to as a “conveyor belt” like

process, others suggest that the radicalization process and movement towards violent jihad varies

greatly (2013).

Studies by the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis indicate that the radicalization

dynamic varies across ideological and ethno-religious spectrums, different geographic regions,

and socio-economic conditions (Bjelopera, 2013). Moreover, there are many diverse “pathways”

to radicalization and individuals and groups can radicalize or “de-radicalize” because of a variety

of factors. (2013, p. 13).

Regardless of the path to radicalization and violent jihad, what seems clear from

reviewing the CRS report is that the “bridge figure” or “spiritual sanctioner” is critically

important to the development of this mindset. The CRS report refers to these individuals as

“intermediaries” and suggests that they play a key role in the radicalization process (Bjelopera,

2013). The report identifies “Four charismatic U.S. citizens [that] have played especially

prominent roles in international jihadist propaganda” (2013, p. 14)


Anwar al-Awlaki, Samir Khan, Adam Gadahn, and Omar Hammami all U.S.

citizens played important roles in the recruiting and development of homegrown terrorists. Of the

group only one was actually born in a foreign country, Samir Kahn was born in Saudi Arabia but

lived in Queens and Charlotte. Al Awlaki was known to have mentored those seeking to

radicalize and reportedly exchanged several emails with Nidal Hasan prior to Hasan’s rampage

shooting at Ft. Hood. His sermons are also widely distributed on the internet and other

radicalized homegrown terrorists have been found with his videos in their possession, for

example Marcos Alonso Zea was found with Awlaki’s speeches on his computer after his recent

arrest for trying to join al Qaeda overseas (Secret, 2013). Additionally, Zea was also found with

copies of “Inspire” a magazine aimed at recruiting westerners. Inspire was edited by Samir Kahn

prior to his death while accompanying Awlaki, both were killed in a U.S. drone strike.

According to the CRS report quoting Robbie Brown and Kim Severson of the New York Times,

Inspire magazine was “described as ‘a slick magazine for jihadists ... that featured political and

how-to articles written in a comfortable American vernacular’” (Bjelopera, 2013).

Adam Gadahn, himself influenced by two jihadists as a young man (Bjelopera,

2013) is known for his videos posted online which condemn the United States and encourage

others to join the Jihad. Infamously, Gadahn is the first American charged with treason since

1952 (Stimson, 2010) and remains at large today with a 5 million dollar bounty (Catherine

Herridge, 2013). Omar Hammami, like Gadahn is also known for posting videos online calling

for jihad as well as teaching urban warfare (Bjelopera, 2013). He is tied to the al Shabaab group

and is suspected of recruiting, leading assaults in battle and handling finances.


One common thread with all of these terrorists is that they use modern means of

communication to spread their propaganda. The internet has in some ways become key to their

recruiting efforts. They use it to communicate with potential recruits as well as spread videos of

everything from speeches to training in warfare. As the CRS report points out “Social networks

appear to be central to the radicalization process and to terrorist plots as well” (Bjelopera, 2013,

p. 19). The report expands on this idea suggesting that the internet may facilitate these networks

(2013), which is not difficult to understand considering the difficulties for terrorists to travel

freely to and from the United States. Interestingly, after recent reports in the media of discovered

plots to attack American interests, that were reportedly ferreted out electronically, ostensibly by

the NSA acting through the Patriot Act, terrorist “chatter” diminished remarkably (Cushing,

2013). This suggests that terrorists may have to revert to face-to-face meetings in order to avoid

electronic communications being compromised. One issue is that in the United States, espousal

of contrary ideas is protected under the Constitution. This is because “Americans have the right

under the First Amendment to adopt, express, or disseminate ideas, even hateful and extremist

ones” (Bjelopera, 2013, pp. 11-12). Only after a would be terrorists starts to implement a plan to

attack does law enforcement have the ability to do more than observe, and even this observation

may be on shaky legal ground with respect to Fourth Amendment issues.

Combatting Radicalization

With respect to combatting homegrown radicalization and terrorism, there are two

main approaches available to law enforcement and the intelligence community. These two


approaches, proactive and reactive, are not new to law enforcement. However, politics can play a

part in determining how homegrown terrorism is addressed. In their report from July 2013

addressing 60 terrorist plots discovered since 9/11, Zuckerman et. al. recommend that the current

administration refocus efforts on proactive approaches rather than reactive policies designed with

emphasis on prosecution rather than discovery and disruption. It is unlikely, that the radicalized

terrorist intent on violent jihad will be dissuaded by the thought of prosecution. Terrorists today

are religious fundamentalists and as such view themselves as holy warriors who feel that all

those opposed to them should be annihilated (Turk, 2004). As Clive Walker pointed out jihadists

harbor fanatical, nonnegotiable objectives and punishment is unlikely to daunt them (Walker,

2007).

Aside from adopting a proactive stance, the means to ferret out would be

homegrown terrorists should continue. The United States should maintain a robust

counterterrorism stance by continuing to support the Patriot Act, and other NSA surveillance

programs (Jessica Zuckerman, 2013). These programs, in spite of recent allegations of abuse,

serve a vital function in detecting electronic communications, and monitoring internet traffic

including social networking sites, and websites utilized by terrorist organizations for recruiting

and dissemination of information and orders. Additionally, these activities should be augmented

by counterterrorism strategies aimed at developing informants and agents within communities

that could be considered at risk for possible recruitment and radicalization. For example, several

jihadists have been identified as coming from the Muslim community in and around

Minneapolis. Most recently, al Shabaab reportedly used two or three recruits from this


community is part of the assault team used in the Westgate more attack in Nairobi Kenya

(Howden, 2013).

As news reports regarding uncovering of potential plots by terrorist elements

show, local law enforcement agents are frequently in the vanguard when it comes to exposing

and detecting homegrown terrorism. According to one report, 80% of the 64 terror plots were

uncovered initially by law enforcement officials during routine activities (Scott G Erickson,

2012). As the authors of the report put it “A well-informed and capable infrastructure of law

enforcement personnel, coupled with a vigilant citizenry, has proven to be an important shield

against the machinations of diverse and disparate groups of organizations and individuals with

terrorist inclinations” (2012, para. 16).

This fusion of intelligence, tips from the public, and good police work results in leads,

leading to investigations and ultimately apprehensions. As an example, the authors provide the

case of an Islamic prison gang called Jam’yyat al-Islam al-Saheeh (JIS). To finance their jihadist

plots members of JIS committed street robberies and crimes (2012). Following up on evidence

left at a crime scene officers executed a search warrant resulting in the discovery of documents

outlining a plot to attack military and Jewish establishments in the area (2012). The ultimate

convictions of the members of this terrorist scheme owed its success to front-line police officers

investigating seemingly, what appeared to be a simple robbery. Through efforts such as these as

well as maintained vigilance over electronic mediums coupled with a proactive stance

homegrown terrorism and radicalization, ultimately leading to violent jihad may be thwarted.


Given the current parameters under which terrorists operate, homegrown terrorism is likely to be

a favored tactic in the future. The ability to combat this insidious tactic remains with increased

vigilance combined with current counterterrorism techniques.


Works Cited

Bjelopera, J. P. (2013). American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat. Washington

D.C.: Congressional Research Service.

Catherine Herridge, L. T. (2013, October 24).

http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/10/24/benghazi-suspects-not-on-state-department-

list/. Retrieved from www.foxnews.com:

http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/10/24/benghazi-suspects-not-on-state-

department-list/

Cushing, T. (2013, October 2). http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131001/15163124717/nsa-

now-claiming-terrorist-chatter-leak-unnamed-govt-officials-more-damaging-than-all-

snowdens-combined.shtml. Retrieved from www.techdirt.com:

http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131001/15163124717/nsa-now-claiming-terrorist-

chatter-leak-unnamed-govt-officials-more-damaging-than-all-snowdens-combined.shtml

David B. Muhlhausen, J. B. (2011). Terror Trends: 40 Years' Data on International and

Domestic Terrorism. Washington D.C.: Heritage Foundation. Retrieved from

http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/05/terror-trends-40-years-data-on-

international-and-domestic-terrorism

David Inserra, S. P. (2013, September 30).

http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/09/lessons-from-kenya-attack-and-us-

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http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/09/lessons-from-kenya-attack-and-us-

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Erickson, S. (2013). What Motivated the Boston Bomber's trip to Russia? Washington D.C.:

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Hoffman, B. (2006). Inside Terrorism. New York: Columbia University Press.

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http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/oct/04/westgate-mall-attacks-kenya-

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Scott G Erickson, M. A. (2012). A Comprehensive Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) System

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