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N A V Y L E A G U E O F T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S

ENSURING STRONG SEA SERVICES FOR A MARITIME NATION

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The Navy League of the United States

believes that we must always ensure

that our armed forces are ready to fight

and win our nation’s wars, deter those

who would seek to engage us and secure

access to the global commons to preserve

freedom of navigation.

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THE NAVY LEAGUE’S MARITIME POLICY STATEMENT IS PRODUCED BY THE

ORGANIZATION’S MARITIME POLICY COMMITTEE. THE ANALYSES AND

RECOMMENDATIONS THEREIN ARE DERIVED FROM MULTIPLE SOURCES, INCLUDING THE

EXPERTISE AND DECADES OF EXPERIENCE OF OUR MEMBERS, OPEN-SOURCE MATERIALS

AND PUBLIC INFORMATION FROM THE SEAGOING SERVICES. THE VIEWS EXPRESSED

IN THIS DOCUMENT ARE THOSE OF THE NAVY LEAGUE OF THE UNITED STATES AND DO NOT

NECESSARILY REFLECT THE OFFICIAL VIEWS OF THE U.S. NAVY, MARINE CORPS, COAST GUARD

OR MARITIME ADMINISTRATION.

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The United States is irrevocably tied to the

ocean and its international and domestic

waterways militarily, economically and politi-

cally. Since its founding, America’s prosperity

has relied on freedom of the seas. The world

looks very different today, but keeping conflict

far from our shores and maintaining sea lanes

free and open to commerce remain the under-

lying reason for the United States’ prosperity.

America’s sea services must be supported and

adequately funded if the United States is to

continue to reap the benefits of international

trade, upon which the American economy rests.

The Navy League must remain at the forefront

of public debate to warn of the dangers that

budget cuts and unstable funding pose to our

military capability.

The world has seen rapid geopolitical change in the past few years. China continues to quickly rise as a military and economic power, while showing a concerning desire to exert sovereign claims in international waters con-trary to all international law. China has built numerous artificial islands in international and disputed waters by dredging reefs and building airfields and other explicitly military assets on these islands. These structures have no legitimate place in international law and are a direct provocation to China’s neighbors. The United States is making a good-faith effort toward peaceful cooperation as China enters great-power status, but the country con-tinues to use diplomatic and economic tools to block U.S. physical and political access.

Since the 2008 invasion of Georgia, Russia controversially annexed parts of Ukraine in 2014 and conducted military operations in Syria, even launching advanced long-range cruise missiles from the Caspian Sea. Some have even accused Russia of conducting airstrikes on humanitarian workers and U.S. intelligence operatives. The Russian Navy has invested significant resources into new, capable multi-purpose nuclear attack submarines. Both Russia and China have been developing layered defensive and offensive systems that, when acting in concert, could significantly constrain U.S. operations during a potential conflict.

North Korea has continued developing its nuclear and ballistic-missile programs despite universal international condemnation. Pyongyang’s growing nuclear capabilities make the country’s bombastic and threatening rhetoric far more disconcerting.

The Islamic State group, al-Qaida and other transnational groups continue to threaten regional stability, our troops and our homeland through terrorist attacks.

Iran has harassed commerce and U.S. Navy vessels in the Strait of Hormuz, often showing reckless disregard for international standards and basic safety. Its naval forces — consisting of many small attack boats and mines — pack significant asymmetric offensive capability that can wreak havoc in one of the most vital oil transit locations in the world.

Meanwhile, technology is rapidly advancing and opening new methods of attack. Cyber is quickly developing as a new domain of warfare. American businesses and politi-cal parties have been the victims of brazen cyber attacks, often with personal and classified data being compromised. New advances in autonomous vehicles and platforms make them more easily available to potential adversaries.

Climate change, regional instability caused by natu-ral disasters, increased need for relief assets and mass migrations of people will continue to present new

THE NEED FOR STRONG MARITIME FORCES

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challenges. Transnational threats like drug smuggling and human trafficking also must be thwarted.

The past few years have shown that even with an exten-sive list of threats, new and unexpected ones will appear in the near future. The United States must be prepared to face them.

During this confluence of dramatic political and tech-nological change, the United States military is facing numerous internal challenges. Uncertain funding levels stemming from the Budget Control Act of 2011, a cycle of recurring continuing resolutions and the lingering shadow of sequestration continue to place great stress on our operating forces and their ability to maintain readiness. At a time when the sea services need breathing space to recapitalize their forces, there is not enough funding to adequately and simultaneously maintain current assets and procure new, much-needed platforms.

The Navy League believes that if adequate funding is not provided to support the sea services, American naval forces will be trapped in a cycle of decay from which they will be unable to escape. Without adequate, steady and predictable investment, the United States will be less secure and more vulnerable to threats. The wise path is to invest in our sea services now for a more secure future.

The capability demand from our combatant com-manders consistently outpaces the ability of forces to respond. Marine Corps aircraft are being worked past

their designed service lives due to high operating tempos during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, making them more expensive to maintain.

Carrier battlegroups are having to extend their deploy-ments, leaving less time for training, maintenance and crew time at home with their families.

The Coast Guard is responsible for protecting our shores and saving lives every day, and yet we have allowed the average age of the Coast Guard fleet to significantly exceed 40 years, with most medium-endurance cutters more than 50 years old.

Our entire logistical structure in time of war is put upon our civilian Merchant Mariners, and the number of U.S.-flag ships has decreased alarmingly in recent years. Many of these civilian ships also are aging without any planned replacement. The shipbuilding and repair industrial base must be preserved, but without steady, predictable work, these shipyards will significantly downsize and the United States will find itself unable to scale up or surge as needed.

Our forces cannot operate continuously without replace-ment. The fact that the capabilities of the sea services are in such high demand speak to their usefulness. Every platform must be replaced eventually, and many of our current assets need to be replaced soon.

Without appropriate funding levels, we cannot pro-cure new platforms, vehicles and equipment without underfunding current operations. If Congress does not provide adequate funds, our military can continue to expect extended deployments, deferred maintenance, less training, less time with family and more stress, and the American people will be less secure.

The Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard and U.S.-flag Merchant Marine must:

n Maintain the world’s finest maritime force.

n Execute needed recapitalization programs without placing more operating, maintenance and training constraints on current forces.

n Make tough budget decisions.

n Preserve the quality of the all-volunteer force and take care of our Sailors, Marines, Coast Guard men and women, and civilian mariners.

n Be forward deployed as America’s first response to crises around the world.

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An MH-60S Seahawk helicopter assigned to the Dusty Dogs of Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron 7 delivers cargo to the aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower during a vertical replenishment Nov. 11, 2016, in the Arabian Gulf. The ship and its Carrier Strike Group were supporting Operation Inherent Resolve, maritime security operations and theater security coop-eration efforts in the U.S. Fifth Fleet area of operations.

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STRATEGIES FOR ACTION

It is imperative that the United States maintain naval forces that can sustain our national commitment to global maritime security. The biggest impediment to maintaining that force is the lack of a fully funded, achievable ship-building program that produces the right quantity and quality of ships, with the right capabilities, for the right price, in economically affordable numbers over the next 25 years for all of our sea services. A shipbuilding plan must be defined and agreed upon by the Navy, the Department of Defense (DoD), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Transportation (DOT), Congress and the administration, and must be executed now. This plan must support the industrial base and ensure we have the capability to surge shipbuilding when needed.

Sea service leaders have difficult decisions ahead. The Navy League, recognizing these challenges and the potential reductions they would impose on our world-wide commitment of ship deployments, recommends funding the Department of the Navy to at least $170 bil-lion per year. Funding for the Department of the Navy’s Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN), account should be increased by $3 billion to $5 billion over the current needed level of $21 billion to adjust for the Navy’s new Force Structure Assessment goals, and increased for inflation each year. A force level of at least 355 ships is necessary to meet our nation’s global security challenges.

This nation also needs a Coast Guard fleet that matches the service’s program of record and the Department of Homeland Security’s Coast Guard Mission Needs Statement, with the Acquisition, Construction & Improvements (AC&I) budget line funded with at least $2 billion per year.

Without a sufficient number of ships and the dollars to operate them, we cannot maintain the desired forward presence. That forward presence and readiness to assist is one of the major contributors to America’s standing as a world power for good. Forward presence is extremely important for humanitarian assistance, conventional deter-rence and warfighting readiness. The readiness of these forward-deployed forces is the benchmark of our success. We must maintain our forces globally deployed to be ready to assist our friends and dissuade potential enemies.

The forward presence of our sea services signals the United States’ resolve to protect American interests, pro-mote global prosperity and defend freedom of navigation. Our presence gives the president options to keep conflict far from our shores. This includes homeporting units in places like Guam, Japan, Spain and Singapore. By 2020, the Navy expects to have 120 ships that routinely operate forward, a significant increase over 97 in 2014.

Partnership with our allies promotes stability and strengthens our relationships, decreasing the likelihood of war. The firing key cannot be our only tactic, and our partnerships promote peace, deter conflict and enable us to respond to aggression with coalitions instead of alone. Our partnerships signal U.S. resolve, and the visible exer-cises that we conduct with our allies remind potential enemies of our capabilities, so that they reconsider any tendency to challenge the United States at sea.

We are stronger with our allies — in Europe, Asia and the Pacific, the Middle East, Africa, the Western Hemisphere, and in the Arctic and Antarctic. Engagement with our allies is taking many forms, from foreign observers who are embarking onboard Coast Guard cutters, to allied staffs embarking on our Carrier Strike Groups, to large multinational exercises like Rim of the Pacific, UNITAS and Africa Partnership Station.

These exercises can lead to real-world operations. The 648-foot roll-on/roll-off and container ship MV Cape Ray’s involvement in the neutralization of Syrian chemical weapons at sea in 2014 is a good example of how military and civilian personnel, especially our Merchant Mariners, came together to accomplish a difficult and sensitive mis-sion in an environment where there were U.S., allied and U.N. equities involved.

Our partnerships and presence give us strategic agility and responsiveness. The support provided to Haiti fol-lowing Hurricane Matthew in 2016 is but one example of the tremendous value of our maritime forces being forward deployed. Within hours, Coast Guard person-nel, Marines and Sailors were on the scene to survey the damage and identify the response requirements on behalf of Joint Task Force Matthew. Helicopters provided search and rescue and medical evacuation options, and the flight decks, well decks and connectors aboard Navy and Marine Corps ships and Coast Guard cutters provided the self-deploying, self-sustaining means to deliver effective humanitarian assistance.

Maintaining a safe, secure and effective nuclear strategic deterrence capability to deter adversaries and guarantee the defense of the United States and our allies is the most important DoD mission. As confirmed in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, the ballistic-missile submarine (SSBN) Force provides the most survivable leg of the U.S. nuclear triad. SSBNs will be responsible for approximately 70 per-cent of deployed warheads under the 2011 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, also known as the New START Treaty. The current Ohio-class SSBN Force is reaching the end of its operational life. Conceived in the 1960s, designed

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in the 1970s and commissioned between 1984 and 1997, these submarines already have seen a service-life exten-sion from 30 to an unprecedented 42 years. A phased replacement program must continue to be a priority to ensure continuity of the operational force, ultimately resulting in a new, 12-boat Columbia-class SSBN Force.

The replacement of these dedicated, uniquely configured strategic submarines occurs roughly every half century, creating a procurement requirement outside of the Navy’s phased ship construction program geared to support

“normal” fleet operations. The Columbia class, formerly known as the Ohio Replacement Program, is saving devel-opment costs by applying existing submarine equipment (Trident II missiles, Ohio- and Virginia-class compo-nents) to the design. Additionally, the U.S. and U.K. Royal navies are developing a common missile compartment for their respective new SSBN platforms under a cost-sharing agreement between our two nations.

Nevertheless, the relatively high cost of these unique, critical SSBNs and the phasing and duration of the total force construction effort creates an unrealistic and unaf-fordable funding requirement for incorporation into the existing Navy budget. Accordingly, the Navy League most strongly recommends the Columbia class be funded outside the existing Navy SCN account and protected from budget cuts in recognition of the unique national,

strategic mission of these platforms and to prevent the significant, unavoidable impact and disruption to Navy ship construction programs and the conventional ship construction industry. The fiscal 2015 National Defense Authorization Act created such an account — the National Sea-based Strategic Deterrent Fund — and it must be funded by congressional appropriators.

The sustained, forward-deployed presence of the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard and U.S.-flag Merchant Marine ships in the South China Sea, Arabian Gulf, Indian Ocean and Northeast Asia strengthens our partnerships, ensures access to sea lanes and promotes engagement with friends and competitors alike. The combined influence of our nation’s diplomacy and the presence of these forward-de-ployed maritime forces help prevent heightened tensions from escalating into conflict. Maritime forces usually are the first to respond because they are forward, they are ready and they are versatile. The power and potential of a forward-deployed naval force ready and able to respond within hours instead of days is unparalleled.

As our military and intelligence officers have testified before Congress, we are facing a return to great-power competition. Investments by other countries, notably China and Russia, in their own navies should push the United States to invest in its sea services to maintain its naval advantage.

The Gold Crew of the Ohio-class ballistic-missile submarine USS Kentucky transits the Hood Canal in Puget Sound, Wash., as the boat returns home to Naval Base Kitsap-Bangor Sept. 28, 2016, following a routine strategic deterrent patrol. Kentucky is one of eight ballistic-missile submarines stationed at the base.

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Preventing future conflict, providing partner-

ship and presence around the globe are the

cornerstones of a national security strategy

that underpins a healthy global economy

upon which the United States depends. As we

face a new global security environment, it is

imperative that we maintain a strong naval

presence that convinces potential adversaries

— and reassures our friends — that the United

States sea services team is forward deployed,

acting as an ever-present deterrent to conflict

in peaceful times, and can — with our global

partners — prevail across the full spectrum of

conflict if deterrence fails. For that, we need

hulls in the water and boots on deck, globally

deployed and ready to act. Today, we risk

abdicating those global responsibilities and

abandoning our leadership role for friends and

allies around the world if we do not make sig-

nificant investments in our sea services.

The sea services team — the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard and U.S.-flag Merchant Marine — provides the National Command Authority and our Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) with their only forcible-entry option that can operate independently of other countries. Positioning resources at sea enables maritime forces to respond rapidly and decisively — with a unique and effec-tive mix of capabilities — at sea and ashore.

Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) is arguably the mission conducted the most frequently by our maritime forces. It allows our sea services to be present globally, without infringement on foreign

governments or their shores. It is a mission that has endeared us to countries around the globe. We signal U.S. resolve as we work to help friends and allies during times of crises and promote global prosperity.

The maritime services are “where it matters, when it matters” — especially when it comes to HADR, offering resources, care and compassion to alleviate human suffer-ing. Our global presence allows us to help; it is the right thing to do. This is a mission ideally suited to a maritime force, be it a Carrier Battle Group, Amphibious Ready Group or Maritime Prepositioning Squadron. They have the transportation, the medical equipment, the people, the communications, the engineering capability — in short, everything required when disaster strikes — inherent in their makeup. It demonstrates that the United States sea services are there to help.

As with the aid rendered to Haiti in the wake of Hurricane Matthew, our maritime forces have been there to assist others in times of crisis. When a disaster strikes this year, and in years to come, the United States must have the resources in place to be able to respond. The American role as a friend to those in need is crucial to our success in building coalitions and relationships around the world, promoting peace among nations.

The U.S. sea services must be ready to respond to any cri-sis, be it from Mother Nature or man-made, but chronic underfunding and overextension amid fiscal and politi-cal pressures are bringing them to a breaking point. Continuing to do more with less is unacceptable.

THE LAW OF THE SEA

As the nation’s foremost citizens’ organization committed to preserving U.S. security through strong sea services, the Navy League of the United States strongly supports U.S. accession to the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. We urge the U.S. Senate to give its immediate advice and consent to this important treaty.

THE SEA SERVICES TEAM

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Joining the Convention would reinforce and codify the freedom-of-navigation rights on which U.S. naval forces depend every day for operational mobility, such as unre-stricted passage through critical international straits and freedom to operate in the exclusive economic zones that cover nearly 40 percent of the world’s oceans. In addition, the Convention provides a firm foundation for maritime counterterrorism, counterproliferation and law enforce-ment operations. Unfortunately, as long as the United States remains outside the Convention, our critical mari time activ-ities must find legal support in a complicated combination of older, less advantageous treaties, as well as “customary international law,” which is unwritten, easily distorted and potentially changed by those who do not share our interests.

Neither the old treaties nor customary law provides a permanent and reliable basis for resisting claims of coastal states who wish to extend their sovereignty over areas and activities crucial to U.S. maritime security. The Convention provides the firmest possible legal foundation for U.S. operations.

In addition to obvious military and law enforcement benefits, U.S. membership in the Convention will pro-vide clear, internationally recognized legal rights to offshore resources that will benefit our economy for years to come. By joining the Convention, the United States will gain an extension of our continental shelf and secure sovereign rights over hundreds of thousands of additional square miles in the Gulf of Mexico, along the Pacific coast and in the Arctic.

The Convention also would allow the U.S. government to sponsor American companies as they mine critical rare-earth minerals in the international deep seabed beyond the U.S. extended continental shelf. In addition, the Convention would protect U.S. companies’ rights to lay, maintain and repair the undersea cables vital to global communications and data transmissions. Regrettably, until the United States gains the legal certainty that accompanies Convention accession, U.S. industry will be unwilling and unable to make the investments necessary to realize the vast offshore opportunities waiting beyond current U.S. jurisdiction.

In 1982, the U.S. correctly refused to sign the Convention out of concern for its provisions on deep seabed mining, technology transfer and revenue sharing. These flaws were convincingly corrected in 1994. In the intervening years, opponents of the Convention have continued to raise objections to U.S. accession, including concerns that U.S. military operations will be subject to control by inter-national tribunals, that U.S. companies will be forced to surrender profits and sophisticated technology to terrorist organizations, and that the United States will give up sov-ereignty to the United Nations.

The Navy League has examined these objections carefully and believes they do not withstand scru-tiny. Indeed, the Law of the Sea Convention has been analyzed and studied for years and has received the unwavering and carefully considered support of the nation’s military leadership, as reaffirmed in congres-sional testimony by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Joseph F. Dunford Jr., Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Adm. John M. Richardson, Commandant of the Coast Guard Adm. Paul F. Zukunft and Pacific Commander Adm. Harry B. Harris Jr., and former sec-retaries of state. Likewise, the Convention continues to have the overwhelming support of business, diplomatic, environmental and bipartisan political leaders.

The Navy League believes it is long past time for the United States, as the world’s premier maritime nation, to reassert its leadership and secure the substantial benefits of a Convention the United States proposed and helped create more than 40 years ago. The United States should join the Law of the Sea Convention immediately.

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The Military Sealift Command fleet replenishment oiler USNS John Ericsson, right, and the San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock USS New Orleans transit the Strait of Hormuz June, 26, 2016. The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, to which the United States is not a signatory, codifies the freedom-of-navigation rights on which U.S. naval forces depend for operational mobility.


THE U.S. NAVY The enduring mission of the Navy is to main-

tain, train and equip combat-ready naval

forces capable of winning wars, deterring

aggression and maintaining freedom of the

seas. The Navy must continue what it does

best — ensure unencumbered access to the

global maritime commons. This strategy puts

even greater pressure on our shrinking naval

forces and underscores their vital contributions

to global security and economic prosperity.

The sea service leaders in 2015 renewed their

commitment and revised a cooperative strat-

egy first rolled out in 2013. The “Cooperative

Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: Forward,

Engaged, Ready” states, our naval forces

must be able to provide All Domain Access,

Deterrence, Sea Control, Power Projection and

Maritime Security.

Adm. Richardson is leading our Navy at a time when demand for credible, flexible and scalable naval forces, trained in multiple missions, continues to grow even as resources and funding dwindle. In his “A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority,” released in January 2016, the CNO outlines four major global forces that are changing the environment in which the Navy operates. The first is increased traffic on the oceans, seas and waterways. Thanks to the increasing connectedness of the global economy, opening trade routes in the Arctic and undersea access, the maritime system is increasingly congested, competitive and crowded.

Secondly, the ease of global information sharing increases connections and lowers barriers to participate in the global system. Third, increasing rates of technological change and progress, including information technologies, robotics and additive manufacturing/3-D printing will change the system.

The budget environment is described in the CNO’s document as another “force that shapes our security environment.” Continued significant budget reduc-tions will have far-reaching and irreversible effects on our Navy’s ability to carry out its maritime security

missions. The Navy’s new Force Structure Assessment demonstrates the need for an increased fleet to meet its fundamental missions.

The CNO is committed to ensuring that our Navy remains the most dominant, ready and influential naval force, globally and across all naval missions. However, U.S. leadership on the seas increasingly will be challenged by an emerging Chinese fleet that is growing and gain-ing blue-water capabilities. Today, our Navy is stretched beyond the capability to support all global commitments and requirements. Further budget-driven strategic reduc-tions will make it impossible for the Navy to meet its global security commitments.

Being “ready to fight and win today and tomorrow” is largely dependent upon our number of highly capable, fully ready-for-tasking Navy ships — hulls in the water. Rebuilding the fleet to at least 355 ships (from a current fleet of 276 ships), properly balanced to deliver the full range of combat capabilities required by the CCDRs, is a national imperative.

Without adequate Operations and Maintenance funding to support the required training and ship and aircraft maintenance for our current fleet, the nation will begin to field a hollow force that cannot meet national security demands or commitments. Ships, submarines, aircraft and weapon systems must be maintained. Without the ability to operate and maintain our fleet, we will continue down a path that leads to the abandonment of the world’s sea lanes to other nations who do not share our national commitment to democratic principles and a free-trade economy. The cascading effects of accumulated readiness reductions increase in a nonlinear fashion.

The risks to the long-term health of the force are “owned” by the service chiefs. It is their responsibility to ensure that we do not hollow out the force. Hollowness does not happen overnight. It is the result of inadequate resourcing over multiple years, combined with a force stretched thin over 16 years of war and today’s security environment of simultaneous crises around the world. It is a recipe for mission failure with unacceptable losses in the future. To avoid hollowing out the force, everything must be on the table during budget discussions. Maintaining outdated and duplicative commands and unwanted infrastructure throughout the DoD is wasteful and strategically unsound. That money is needed elsewhere.

The Navy League of the United States fully endorses the CNO’s four “Lines of Effort” outlined in “A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority.” These lines of effort are inextricably linked and must be considered together to get a sense of the total effort:

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n Strengthen naval power at and from the sea: “Maintain a fleet that is trained and ready to oper-ate and fight decisively — from the deep ocean to the littorals, from the sea floor to space, and in the infor-mation domain. Align our organization to best support generating operational excellence.”

n Achieve high-velocity learning at every level: “Apply the best concepts, techniques and technologies to accel-erate learning as individuals, teams and organizations. Clearly know the objective and the theoretical limits of performance — set aspirational goals. Begin problem definition by studying history — do not relearn old les-sons. Start by seeing what you can accomplish without additional resources. During execution, conduct routine and rigorous self-assessment. Adapt processes to be inherently receptive to innovation and creativity.”

n Strengthen our Navy team for the future: “We are one Navy Team — comprised of a diverse mix of active duty and reserve Sailors, Navy Civilians, and our fam-ilies — with a history of service, sacrifice and success. We will build on this history to create a climate of operational excellence that will keep us ready to prevail in all future challenges.”

n Expand and strengthen our network of partners: “Deepen operational relationships with other services, agencies, industry, allies and partners — who operate with the Navy to support our shared interests.”

SHIPBUILDING

The nation’s capability to build naval ships is very tenu-ous due to a lack of stability and unpredictable demand. Due to this environment, second- and third-tier sup-pliers have diminished to sole domestic sources and commercial-capable suppliers reluctant to bid on unique naval demands. Without strong commitments, our ship-yards will face a long path to recover the industrial capability to rebuild an offensive naval force. We are at a historical tipping point. Without full-service shipyards and a supporting supplier base, the future of a credible naval force is illusionary.

The U.S. Navy is composed of a vast array of sea-based offensive and defensive national capabilities. Absent a robust industrial base of designers, planners, welders, pipefitters and electricians, those national capabilities cannot be sustained.

The U.S. maritime industry includes metal recyclers, principally located in Louisiana and Texas, who employ

thousands of American workers to recycle vessels to U.S. environmental and safety standards. The recycled metal is used by the U.S. steel industry and export markets. The money gained from the sale of obsolete government ves-sels funds maritime heritage grant programs and state maritime school initiatives.

The Navy League strongly supports increasing the SCN line to $24 billion to $26 billion to meet this shipbuild-ing goal. The Navy League also supports fully funding the Columbia-class submarine program throughout the budgeting process to include special legislation to work around continuing resolutions and sequestration, if necessary.

Inclusive in the required ship inventory of at least 355 are not less than:

n 12 aircraft carriers — Delivering CVN 78 (Gerald R. Ford) to bridge the gap caused by the decommissioning of USS Enterprise (CVN 65), continuing construction of CVN 79 (John F. Kennedy) and procurement of long-lead items for CVN 80 (Enterprise). It is vitally important to maintain the currently scheduled refueling of the Nimitz-class carriers that are essential elements of a shipbuilding strategy that ensures our persistent for-ward presence well into the future.

n 56 Small Surface Combatants (SSCs)/littoral combat ships (LCSs) — Delivering the currently contracted number of LCSs, along with the rapid fleet introduc-tion of the long-delayed combat modules, is a critical element of the Navy’s future force structure. In addi-tion, the back-fit of cost-effective and proven lethality and survivability enhancements developed through the SSC program will deliver much-needed capability improvements to these platforms. The recent initiation of an SSC program is strongly supported. These ships will take full advantage of investments in the LCS and incorporate lethality and survivability upgrades that will make the SSC a cost-effective, multimission addi-tion to the Navy’s future force.

n 66 attack submarines (SSNs) — In an environment with the growing threat of layered, offensive and defensive precision missile systems, our submarine force’s asymmetric stealth advantage and immunity from missile attack enables success for the entire Joint Force. Sustaining the gold-standard Virginia-class acquisition program — to include procurement of two Virginia-class SSNs per year through fiscal 2025 and the Virginia Payload Module (VPM) starting no later than fiscal 2019, with the first hull of the Block V and later builds — is vital to the sustainment of this critical capability. This strategy minimizes both the depth and


duration of the SSN shortfall below the current require-ment of 48, and with the VPM, the loss of undersea payload volume in the post-guided-missile submarine (SSGN) era. It also improves payload distribution across the force, which will complicate adversary planning.

n 14 Ohio-class/12 Columbia-class SSBNs and their Trident II D5 ballistic nuclear missiles — The nuclear triad of strategic bombers, ICBMs and sub-launched ballistic missiles has provided the United States with the strategic deterrence that has prevented global war for more than 50 years. The most survivable leg of the triad, the SSBN, provides 70 percent of the deployed nuclear warheads under the New START Treaty. Today’s 14 Ohio-class SSBNs are scheduled to be replaced by 12 Columbia SSBNs. This program has been shifted to the right and all options in further delaying design and construction of the Navy’s top shipbuilding priority have been exhausted. For the Navy to meet its strategic deterrence mission, the first replacement SSBN must be on patrol in fiscal 2031 and the 12 Columbia SSBNs must be fully funded and delivered on schedule. Understanding that the cost for this national imperative is high, the

Navy is driving program costs down to minimize the impact on other shipbuilding programs. The Navy League welcomes the fiscal 2015 National Defense Authorization Act’s creation of a National Sea-Based Strategic Deterrence Fund as a special repository to pay for the Ohio Replacement Program. Given the national mission of the SSBN, the infrequent need for recapitalization and the tremendous return on invest-ment, we strongly encourage top-line relief for the Columbia. This is consistent with historical funding of previous SSBN classes.

n 38 amphibious ships — Our forward-deployed amphibious warships, with a full complement of Marines embarked, are an essential element of our maritime security capability. The requirement to enable either a two-Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) amphibious assault, or two one-MEB assaults remains valid and is an essential element of maintain-ing maritime superiority. Thirty-eight ships also would provide forward-deployed amphibious warships in a one-to-three deployment rotation, and allow needed Navy-Marine Corps training to units other than those preparing for deployment.

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Aircraft carrier USS Harry S. Truman transits the Elizabeth River on Aug. 25, 2016, from its homeport at Naval Station Norfolk, Va., to Norfolk Naval Shipyard. Truman entered a Planned Incremental Availability at the shipyard for maintenance and refurbishment of shipboard systems to prepare for future operations.

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n 104 large surface combatants — Continuing construc-tion of new Arleigh Burke-class destroyers as well as the modernization of the Navy’s cruiser and destroyer inventory will ensure the sustainment of the land- attack, fleet air, missile-defense and anti-ballistic missile capabilities.

n 33 Combat Logistics Force ships — Construction of the 17 John Lewis-class oilers beginning in 2016 to replace the 15 Henry J. Kaiser-class oilers and two Supply-class Fast Combat Support Ships is essential to ensure the combatant forces are capable of long- endurance, forward-deployed missions without having to replenish at distant, vulnerable shore bases.

n 21 Maritime Preposition Ships — The plan is to grow from 14 Maritime Preposition Ships in two Squadrons to 21 total ships in three geographically dispersed Maritime Preposition Squadrons of seven ships each. Our forward-based maritime preposition squadrons with their civilian mariner and military force protection detachments are critical to the nation’s global humani-tarian disaster and crisis response capabilities.

As stated in “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready,” “A smaller force, driven by additional budget cuts or sequestration, would require us to make hard choices. We would be forced to execute this maritime strategy at increased levels of risk for some missions and functions, decrease forward presence, and reduce our footprint in some geographic regions. Such cuts would also limit our warfighting advantages. Specifically, in the event of a return to sequestration levels of funding, Navy surge-ready Carrier Strike Groups and Amphibious Ready Groups available for crises and contingencies would be insufficient to meet requirements, and the Navy’s ability to maintain appro-priate forward presence would be placed at risk.”

The Navy League recommends continuing to grow the fleet.

AIRCRAFT AND WEAPON SYSTEMS

Essential to the combat strength of our fleet is the naval aviation capability provided by a minimum of 12 carrier air wings, a fully integrated maritime patrol inventory, a modernized fleet helicopter force and complementary unmanned aircraft systems (UASs). Key to that capability is the timely introduction of the F-35C Lightning II joint strike fighter to our carriers and the continued upgrade of the fleet’s F/A-18E/F Super Hornets and the F/A-18C multirole strike fighters. The multiyear procurement of the E/A-18G Growler electronic attack aircraft and the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye airborne warning and control aircraft should continue until the current programs of record are complete. Funding for F/A-18 depot work and spares needs to increase to support an increase in aviation readiness. Full support for the procurement of the P-8A Poseidon long-range anti-submarine warfare, intelli-gence, surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft, the Triton Broad Area Maritime Support UAS and the Carrier Based Aerial Refueling System will ensure our maritime patrol supremacy well into the future.

Included in the Navy’s aviation inventory should be:

n 260 F-35C Lighting IIs for the Navy — The F-35 program is designed to field transformational strike aircraft for the Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force that include next-generation sensors and weapons systems, stealth characteristics and a high level of commonality among versions. The F-35C is designed for carrier options and will be a single-pilot strike fighter powered by the world’s most powerful fighter engine, with a multipurpose radar and internal bay for a low-observable cross-section and to carry preci-sion weapons.

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An F-35C Lightning II carrier variant, assigned to the Salty Dogs of Air Test and Evaluation Squadron 23, performs a fly-over above the flight deck of the aircraft carrier USS George Washington in the Atlantic Ocean Aug. 16, 2016. The F-35C is expected to be fleet operational in 2018.


n 153 E/A-18G Growlers — This aircraft combines mod-ern advances in airborne electronic attack systems and weapons with the unmatched tactical versatility, advancements and capabilities of the Block II Super Hornet.

n 75 E-2D Advanced Hawkeyes — The E-2D is designed for modern threats and increased detection over blue water, land and in the littorals. Its radar provides advanced 360-degree coverage with mechanical and electronic scanning capability for continuous detec-tion and tracking of targets, expanding maritime domain awareness operations and sorting the dense maritime picture.

n 117 P-8A Poseidons — The P-8A is capable of broad-area, maritime and littoral operations.

In addition to investing in next-generation aircraft, the Navy must ensure pilots are properly trained and air-craft is properly maintained. There has been a disturbing correlation of reduced budgets and increased aircraft acci-dents in recent years, and the Navy League is concerned that readiness is being reduced in this restricted budget environment. Given the challenges of maritime aviation, it is crucial that readiness be preserved.

Cutting-edge command, control, communications, com-puters, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) is central to a naval strike group’s combat capa-bilities and a critical force multiplier. An advanced C4ISR capability is not just an enabler of more efficient and effective operations, it also provides the information, command and control (C2) and precision targeting so essential to ultimate success.

The Navy is making significant advancements in new weapons systems that, if funded, developed, tested, inte-grated and fielded correctly, have the potential to be truly revolutionary. Potential adversaries are investing in lay-ered defensive and offensive systems like anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) and anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), which pose potential threats to the Navy’s surface fleet and thus restrict operations. The Navy’s response, a distributed lethality organizing concept, will boost the surface fleet’s attack capability, but is more effective with stronger ship-defense capabilities.

The Congressional Research Service outlined in its October 2016 report “Navy Lasers, Railgun, and Hypervelocity Projectile: Backgrounds and Issues for Congress” the greatest challenges to surface ship defensive systems: depth of magazine and cost-exchange ratio. Depth of magazine refers to the number of missiles a ship can carry; if a ship runs out of ammunition during a conflict,

it must withdraw and reload before returning to battle. Cost-exchange ratio compares how much it costs for the United States to shoot down a missile versus the amount it costs the adversary to build said missile. Unfavorable cost ratios during extended conflict are not sustainable.

The Navy has three potential weapons that would solve these problems: solid-state lasers (SSLs), the electro-magnetic railgun (EMRG) and the hypervelocity projectile (HVP). The SSL, which heats through oncoming missiles or small ships with a high-energy beam, has a low marginal cost per shot, a deep magazine and fast engagement times, and it could be used as a short-range defensive weapon. It was tested in 2014 and now is onboard USS Ponce, the Navy’s first Afloat Forward Staging Base (Interim), as an operational system. We encourage further development to field the SSL to counter ASCMs and ASBMs.

The EMRG is a launcher that uses electromagnetic pulses instead of propellant to fire weapons and also could be used to counter ASCMs and ASBMs and would improve the Navy’s cost-exchange ratio. The projectile developed for the EMRG — the HVP — also can be fired from exist-ing cannons. The HVP’s speed makes it effective against some ASCMs, and its low cost improves the cost-ex-change ratio and reduces depth of magazine limitations. All three programs need more development work to real-ize the full potential of these new technologies, but the potential value is significant for the Navy. We encourage the Navy to continue to develop, test and integrate these new technologies.

Continued investments in unmanned innovation, to include unmanned undersea, surface and aerial vehicles, are an essential element of sustained dominance. A family of unmanned vehicles — from the Large Displacement Unmanned Undersea Vehicle to torpedo tube and 3-inch launcher payloads — will enable execution of higher-risk missions with low unit costs while furthering the under-sea force’s reach.

The Navy League applauds the direction the Navy is taking in cyber warfare and cyber security to promote assured C2, electromagnetic maneuver warfare, cyber and integrated fires. We must be ready to fight and win in contested and denied environments by leveraging our superior tech-nology. The integration of all elements of cyber warfare — from policy and requirements to research and devel-opment, training, fielding and operations under the Navy Cyber Command/Tenth Fleet — has established the Navy as one of the nation’s critical resources in this complex and rapidly evolving warfare discipline.

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The Navy League of the United States supports:

n Continued full funding of the highly successful SSN building program at two ships per year, including fully funding the Block V SSN VPM required to offset the strike capability lost when the four SSGNs are decom-missioned between 2026 and 2028.

n Continued development, procurement and deployment of the Navy portion of the Ballistic Missile Defense System, including long-range surveillance and track-ing capability to queue ground-based intercept systems and, ultimately, the ability to detect, track and engage medium- and long-range ballistic missiles well distant from the United States.

n The sea services’ maritime domain awareness effort, which integrates national and global partner intelli-gence resources and information systems to provide the best intelligence picture of the world’s oceans.

n The Navy’s efforts to upgrade the quality and scope of mine countermeasures capabilities and improve the forward-deployed readiness of mine warfare forces.

n Increased attention to and funding for Navy and Coast Guard operations in the polar regions to protect our access to natural resources as well as preclude these regions from becoming sanctuaries for potential adver-saries. Communications, logistics, ship and aircraft modifications are essential for such operations.

n Increased emphasis on anti-submarine warfare, as our skills in that arena have atrophied in the face of an increasing threat.

n Adequate numbers of Navy amphibious ships and sealift platforms to provide the expeditionary lift to support present and future CCDR requirements.

n Continued funding for Combat Logistics Force assets, including oiler/dry cargo ships; large, medium-speed roll-on/roll-off ships; and new classes of sealift prep-ositioning vessels, all of which will be employed in the Maritime Prepositioning Force (Enhanced) squadrons.

n Realistic and sufficient operational training to ensure the safe, combat-effective performance of our young men and women, to include adequate flight hours and steaming days as well as active sonar operations in any ocean environment, pending conclusive evidence that such operations are not harmful to marine mammals.

n Capitalizing on the significant goodwill fostered by cooperation with multiple countries in response to piracy concerns.

n Procurement of sufficient weapons and munitions to meet Operation Plan requirements, of which we are woefully below. Additionally, there has been substan-tial war-gaming support to justify a recommendation that the Navy fund vertical-launch system rearming capability at sea to allow combatants to remain on station for longer periods of time.

n Increased funding in the respective Research, Development, Test and Evaluation budget lines to real-ize the full potential of SSLs, the EMRG and HVP.

n Recycling of U.S. government-owned ships in U.S. ship metal recycling facilities to provide employment to thousands of American workers and generate funds for maritime heritage grant programs and state maritime school initiatives.

n Investment in the next generation of warfighting technology through sustained funding for the Office of Naval Research.

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The coastal patrol ship USS Tempest fires the Griffin Missile System for a post-installation test fire for certification with Patrol Coastal Squadron 1 (PCRON 1) Feb. 1, 2016, in the Arabian Gulf. PCRON 1 was deployed to the U.S. 5th Fleet area of operations supporting maritime security opera-tions and theater security cooperation efforts.


THE U.S. MARINE CORPSThe Marine Corps remains America’s expe-

ditionary force in readiness. This amphibious

expeditionary role reflects the intent of the

82nd Congress in the early 1950s when it

directed, “The nation’s shock troops must be

the most ready when the nation is least ready

… to provide a balanced force in readiness for

a naval campaign and, at the same time, a

ground and air striking force ready to suppress

or contain international disturbances short of

large-scale war.” This prescient guidance on

a daily basis shapes the culture, organiza-

tion, training, equipment and priorities of

the Marine Corps and the Navy-Marine Corps

team. Everything the Marine Corps undertakes

must tangibly and visibly contribute to its

combat readiness and effectiveness.

Operating from expeditionary forward locations, amphib-ious warships and alternative sea-based platforms, Marines remain forward deployed around the world, protecting not only our nation, but also supporting the international order that underpins our prosperity and security. In a world of brushfire instabilities, violent extremism, nonstate threats and struggling sovereign entities, Marines are needed to respond to unfolding cri-ses and support and defend U.S. interests.

The Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) is a unique, scalable and flexible warfighting organization that combines the presence and power-projection capabili-ties of the entire naval force and leverages and applies the power and capabilities of joint, allied and coalition forces. In any crisis, contingency or major war, the operational and combat synergy of the MAGTF and the joint or allied expeditionary force is far more powerful and effective than the simple sum of its unit elements. Powerful maritime force combinations leverage their control of the seas and littorals to influence the affairs of populations ashore.

The Navy-Marine Corps amphibious team lives on the seams, bringing air, sea and ground capabilities together into one tightly knit tactical package. Marine forces are

designed for rapid crisis response, partnership building and smaller-scale expeditionary interventions, but also can scale up to larger forcible-entry operations from the sea as the situation demands. Routinely, Marines operate from austere expeditionary locations without the need for a large footprint ashore, but with the ability to swiftly move from one potential crisis area to another and back to sea when temporary interventions ashore are com-plete. They leverage their proximity to sources of conflict to respond within hours or days, rather than weeks. The MAGTF provides integrated cross-domain capabilities, leveraging the sea as maneuver space, and the ability to operate air and ground capabilities forward as a strategic hedge against unpredicted crises. It is a microcosm of the joint force, useful as an independent-maneuver element for joint commanders, or as an early entry capability for the larger joint force.

With integrated strike and long-range maneuver by air or surface, the Navy-Marine Corps team acts as a first responder for the joint force across a wide range of scenarios. Control of the seas and littorals remains a fun-damental objective and pillar of strength for our mari time nation and forces. The ethos and principles define the identity of the Marine Corps and connect all Marines — past, present and future — with who they are and with what they do on behalf of the American people and nation. The Marine Corps is light enough to move swiftly to the source of trouble, but heavy enough to prevail against most threats. Marines will maintain ready forces today to answer the call, fight and win. The flexibility and strategic mobility of the MAGTF make it ideal for creat-ing and exploiting access in uncertain or denied areas. Modern amphibious concepts seek to achieve their broad range of effects through dispersed-maneuver elements, integrated fires and expeditionary logistics rather than massed assault.

As the MV-22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft completes field-ing, the game-changing nature of the aircraft already has expanded MAGTF capabilities during both combat and crisis-response operations. The capability of the fifth-generation short-takeoff/vertical-landing F-35Bs operating from amphibious flight decks or dispersed expeditionary airfields will increase the organic capabili-ties of the MAGTF and provide more options and greater flexibility for joint planners and commanders. These two unique Marine Corps platforms are informing and shaping MAGTF combat development and will result in a far more combat-ready and capable Marine Corps in the future.

Additionally, the Marine Corps’ response capabilities are enhanced by two specialized Maritime Prepositioning Ship squadrons. Originally designed for pier-side or near-shore in-stream offload, this family of Military Sealift

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Command- (MSC-) owned and operated platforms con-tinues to be refined and upgraded so that Marine forces and equipment can be tactically offloaded at sea, thereby expanding the ability to project relief and influence, or reinforce, combat power without dependence on secure infrastructure. The Marine Corps continues to be closely aligned and partnered with the Navy in their collective efforts to restore relevant global U.S. maritime force capa-bility and capacity.

The Navy and Marine Corps amphibious expeditionary team now is facing an emerging security environment that seems perfectly aligned with their day-to-day naval capabilities for crisis response, building partner capacity, expeditionary access and disaster response. In larger con-tingencies, amphibious expeditionary Marines still provide an operational asymmetry from amphibious and other sea-based platforms that forces would-be opponents to defend across the range and depth of the region of con-flict. This multipurpose utility makes the Marines, and Navy amphibious expeditionary warships and forces, a compelling security investment in uncertain times.

MARINE CORPS STRATEGY 2016

Gen. Robert B. Neller, the 37th commandant of the Marine Corps, has published a Fragmentary Order #1 to the Commandant’s Planning Guidance and a Marine Corps Service Strategy that provide guidance and a framework for future force development that will ensure the service remains ready, relevant and responsive within the future operating environment and across the range of military operations. The Marine Corps strategy provides guid-ance, a 10-year outlook and defines the strategic ends to organize, train and equip the force consistent with the character of war in the first half of the 21st century. The ways and means will be executed through three sup-porting efforts: the Marine Corps Operating Concept; the Marine Corps Force Management Plan, focused on force generation and management over a near-term five-year period; and the Marine Corps Enterprise Investment Plan, which supports capability development.

The future of our nation rests on the ability of the Marine Corps, as part of the Naval and Joint Force, to out-think

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A U.S. Marine Corps MV-22B Osprey assigned to Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron 1 refuels during Weapons and Tactics Instructor course 1-17 (WTI 1-17) Oct. 20, 2016, at Yuma, Ariz. WTI 1-17 is a seven-week training event that emphasizes operational integration of the six functions of Marine Corps aviation in support of a Marine Air-Ground Task Force.


our foes, be disciplined and well trained, and develop and field capabilities that ensure we can fight and win our nation’s battles in any clime, place or contested space.

THE FUTURE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

The Marine Corps projects that over the next decade poten-tial adversaries will continue to observe and understand U.S. warfighting advantages in open terrain and likely will seek to challenge us in urban and other complex envi-ronments. They will continue to focus on the asymmetric advantage. Consequently, the integration of ISR, unmanned systems, lethal long-range weapons and information oper-ations is the new reality in future warfare. Information warfare, including cyber operations and open-source information technology, will cut across all Marine Corps warfighting functions. By leveraging advances in commer-cial technologies, our enemies can now contest the Marines at low cost with advanced systems. At the same time, the use of improvised explosive devices and the practice of hid-ing among the population will continue to complicate the future battlefield engagement environment.

THE STRATEGIC ENDS

The U.S. Marine Corps Service Strategy 2016 outlines six strategic ends that will guide future operational execution and force development:

n Enhanced and integrated naval expeditionary capa-bilities: The future MAGTF will be agile, adaptable and expeditionary. The MAGTF, as a naval expeditionary force, will have the skills, equipment and training to fight across all domains in a variety of conditions and meet a wide range of challenges from a variety of adversaries.

n Integrated and codified relationships with the Navy, Special Operations Forces and interagency community: Because they are forward deployed, the Marine Corps, Navy and Special Operations Forces play a unique role in strengthening alliances, gaining assured access and rapid action.

n Create and equip the 21st-century Marine: The 21st- century Marine must receive the best training and equipment. Marine Corps culture must reward innova-tion, intellectual curiosity and decision making, while setting the highest standards for physical fitness. It is the Marine Corps’ responsibility to ensure the best technology is available to our Marines.

n Create the 21st-century MAGTF: The warfighting concepts of the Marine Corps must focus on providing a unique set of capabilities that “exploit gaps against potential adversaries across the range of military operations.”

n Exploit technology: The Marine Corps must invest in and ensure it is using the most advanced technology available. The service should take advantage of auto-mation and unmanned technologies to improve its warfighting capability and potential.

n Recognize and prepare for threats in the urban lit-torals: The Marine Corps should anticipate future missions in urban littorals and develop technology, strategies and tactics for this environment. ISR and precision surface maneuvers must be prioritized for low signature and to gain advantage.

THE WAY FORWARD: MARINE CORPS OPERATING CONCEPT 2016

The Marine Corps Service Strategy 2016 states that Marines must look to their training, concepts and strategy documents to ensure they are able to adapt to new and unprecedented challenges and threats.

The Marine Corps’ “Operating Concept: How an Expeditionary Force Operates in the 21st Century,” referred to as the MOC, was unveiled by the commandant in September 2016. It describes how the Marine Corps will utilize its capabilities to fulfill its Title 10 mission responsibilities. The document notes that the central problem facing the Marine Corps as the nation’s force in readiness is that “the Marine Corps is currently not organized, trained and equipped to meet the demands of a future operating environment characterized by complex terrain, technology proliferation, information warfare, the need to shield and exploit signatures, and an increasingly non-permissive maritime domain.”

The MOC comes as the Marine Corps prepares for these challenges while also facing peer-capable forces across the range of military operations and, simultaneously, across the domains of land, sea, air, space, cyberspace and information. The MOC defines how the 21st-century MAGTF will fight and win in that environment, reaffirm-ing the maritime and amphibious tradition of the Marine Corps while operating jointly with other services.

The 21st century MAGTF will “conduct maneuver war-fare in the physical and cognitive dimensions of conflict to generate and exploit psychological, technological,

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temporal and spatial advantages over the adversary.” Avoiding linear, sequential and predictably phased approaches to warfare, the MAGTF will seek to execute missions simultaneously by operating at high tempo with distributed and networked forces. The MAGTF in the future will leverage the freedom of maneuver inherent in naval amphibious warfare to achieve these operations.

The MOC presents five “critical tasks” that are essential for the MAGTF to fight future adversaries: Integrate the naval force to fight at and from the sea, evolve the MAGTF, oper-ate with resilience in a contested-network environment, enhance the ability to maneuver in all domains and exploit the competence of the individual Marine.

Of these five tasks, the MOC particularly emphasizes that mission success in the future will continue to rely on the ability of individual Marines to think quickly and act deci-sively in chaotic situations.

The complexity of the future operating environment demands that the Marine Corps continues to recruit and retain men and women of character who are smart, fit and resilient. The MOC also recognizes the importance of providing opportunities for Marines to develop their skills

and knowledge through training, education, and a culture that cultivates creativity and encourages initiative.


n Continued funding to maintain a minimum end strength of at least 182,000 active-duty Marines and 38,500 Selective Marine Corps Reserves, which enable the Corps to support the Defense Strategic Guidance and the full mission spectrum around the globe. The Marine Corps is currently assessing the size of the force and, as of the publication of this document, may set new requirements.

n Full funding of costs associated with resetting, sus-taining and modernizing the Marine Corps to meet current and future force structure, infrastructure, training and readiness requirements.

n Acquisition of a total of 38 amphibious warships to meet forward-presence, crisis-response and wartime capability demands.

n Full operational status retention of two Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons (MPSs) and associated

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Lance Cpl. Zackary W. Rippin, infantry assaultman, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment (3/5), operates a Weaponized Multi-Utility Tactical Transport Vehicle during a company assault on Range 400 aboard the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms, Calif., Nov. 7, 2016. Commandant of the Marine Corps Gen. Robert B. Neller has designated 3/5 as the Marine Corps’ experimental force.


Expeditionary Transfer Docks (formerly called Mobile Landing Platforms), and sufficient numbers of high- and low-water-speed connector craft. Acquisition and full operating status funding for a third geographically forward-based MPS squadron of seven ships for a total of 21 MPS ships in three squadrons around the world.

n Acquisition of an affordable and capable Amphibious Combat Vehicle to ensure Marines have the ability to maneuver against increasingly capable adversaries, and replace the aging and costly Assault Amphibious Vehicle force.

n Continued acquisition of the F-35B to replace the majority of capabilities found in the AV-8B, EA-6B Prowlers and F/A-18 Hornets, along with the acquisi-tion of high-tech unmanned air and ground systems to further enhance the flexibility, mobility and versatility of Marine Corps forces.

n Development and acquisition of technologies and prod-ucts that provide distributed digital interoperability and seamless information sharing among fourth- and fifth-generation fighter and attack, rotary-wing and tiltrotor aircraft, amphibious warships, alternative sea-basing platforms and the entire MAGTF.

n Continued full-rate production of the MV-22 within a Multi-Year III procurement profile to complete the program of record and successfully meet the demand signals of the CCDRs.

n An increase to two active-duty VMM MV-22 squadrons for a total of 18 active and two Reserve component medium-lift squadrons and an increase of the program of record aircraft from 360 to 388.

n Recapitalization of Marine Corps aviation’s aging platforms, with the continued procurement of UH-1Y Venom and AH-1Z Viper helicopters, the acquisition of the CH-53K King Stallion helicopter, along with the full fielding of the KC-130J tanker, equipped with an improved aerial refueling system in both the Marine Corps active and Reserve components.

n Continued acquisition of the RQ-21 Blackjack UAS for expeditionary land and embarked Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit operations.

n Continued acquisition of the Intrepid Tiger II pod and Block X upgrade for F/A-18, AV-8B and H-1 series air-craft platforms to greatly expand the electronic warfare communications and radar jamming capabilities of the MAGTF, and acquisition of increased electronic warfare

capability for the F-35B beyond the original vision for the platform.

n Acquisition of two initial and four total C-40A aircraft for C-9 replacement, recapitalization and stand-up of the Marine Corps Reserve Operational Support Aircraft mission.

n Acquisition of modern aviation C2 systems, such as the Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar, Common Aviation C2 System, Composite Tracking Network and a future directed-energy weapons system. This family of sys-tems is designed to control the MAGTF’s airspace, serve as the digital gateway between the Ground Combat Element and Aviation Combat Element, and detect and engage low-observable air threats.

n Continued acquisition of MAGTF fires improvements, to include sufficient and affordable long-range, precision naval surface fires capabilities, such as the Long-Range Land Attack Projectile for joint crisis response, contingency and forcible-entry operations.

n Expeditionary forces that ensure a forward presence and the ability to execute unforeseen deployments around the world with ready, relevant and capable forces, supported by ISR assets that strengthen joint and combined capabilities.

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Maritime prepositioning force ship USNS GYSGT Fred W. Stockham and Expeditionary Transfer Dock USNS Montford Point perform a “skin-to-skin” maneuver March 13 off Pohang, South Korea. Montford Point acted as a floating pier for a simulated offload.

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THE U.S. COAST GUARDThe Coast Guard’s Posture Statement for

the fiscal 2017 budget notes, “As the world’s

premier, multi-mission, maritime service

responsible for the safety, security, and stew-

ardship of the Nation’s waters, the United

States Coast Guard offers a unique and endur-

ing value proposition to the Department of

Homeland Security and the American public. At

all times a military service and a branch of the

U.S. Armed Forces, a federal law enforcement

agency, a regulatory body, a first responder,

and a member of the U.S. Intelligence

Community, the Coast Guard serves on the

front line for a Nation whose economic pros-

perity and national security are inextricably

linked to vast maritime interests.”

To preserve these interests at home and abroad, the Coast Guard must employ a broad range of authorities and provide unique operational capabilities as best it can, despite the shortfall in investment in people, ships, air-craft and facilities.

Five areas of strategic focus continue to drive Coast Guard operations and capital investments, and enable the ser-vice to accomplish its daily missions as well as provide surge capabilities during increasingly uncertain times: The rise of transnational organized crime (TOC) networks; the imperative for southern maritime border security; increasing maritime commerce; emerging cyber risks; and future challenges in the polar regions.

EVOLVING THREATS AND CHALLENGES DRIVE STRATEGIES

The Coast Guard has promulgated foundational strategies to address each of the five focus areas:

n The rise of TOC networks.

The challenge: TOC networks present criminal-terror- insurgency interdependencies that weaken regional gov-ernments and threaten our national interests. A recent U.N. Study on Global Homicide found that eight of the top 10 national homicide rates were found in countries in Central American and around the Caribbean.

The Coast Guard’s approach: Central to the Coast Guard’s strategy is a unity-of-effort approach, lever-aging the capabilities across our government and those of our international partners. Targeting and interdicting these sophisticated networks requires a counternetwork approach integrating robust cyber capabilities, actionable intelligence and capable operational platforms.

n The imperative for southern border security.

The challenge: A significant threat to our national security, our southern border covers 6 million square miles of ocean and shoreline and offers the major avenue for illicit drug and human trafficking, illegal migration and terrorism.

The Coast Guard’s approach: As the lead federal agency for maritime law enforcement, the Coast Guard plays a lead role in the Southern Border and Approaches Campaign Plan, including participating in three DHS operational Joint Task Forces (JTFs). The service will leverage a common intelligence picture and a targeted presence to interdict threats far from our borders.

n Increasing maritime commerce.

The challenge: Adm. Zukunft’s “2015-2019 Strategic Intent” notes that “the prosperity of our Nation is inextricably linked to a safe and efficient Maritime Transportation System (MTS). … [And] the increase

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The U.S. Coast Guard Cutter James, the fifth National Security Cutter (NSC) to enter service, is shown here transiting toward its home port of Charleston, S.C., on Aug. 28, 2015. The NSC is the largest and most tech-nologically advanced class of cutters in the Coast Guard’s fleet.


in demand on the MTS to support the production and transportation of oil and gas refined products and chem-icals, and manufactured goods will challenge the Coast Guard’s capacity to ensure the [necessary] safety, secu-rity, and environmental stewardship.”

The Coast Guard’s approach: By improving regulatory frameworks, including those with regard to cyber security, contingency plans and preparedness activities, and devel-oping workforce capacities and competencies to address ever-increasing complexities, the Coast Guard will continue to promote a safe, secure, efficient and resilient MTS.

n Emerging cyber risks.

The challenge: The dramatic growth of cyber technol-ogy has spanned significant and numerous risks to Coast Guard networks and systems as well as to our nation’s critical maritime infrastructure and the MTS.

The Coast Guard’s approach: The Coast Guard is focused on developing broader capabilities to ensure greater operational effectiveness, defense of its networks and protection of maritime cyber infrastructures in the private and public sectors.

n Future challenges in the polar regions.

The challenge: The primary near-term risks are from increasing maritime activity in the wake of diminishing ice coverage. Daunting challenges to polar governance stem from increased maritime traffic on previously unnaviga-ble routes, increased tourism and the associated demands for greater Coast Guard intelligence, surveillance, recon-naissance and response capabilities, and the geo-strategic draw of extremely rich natural resources.

The Coast Guard’s approach: Our nation faces significant risks in both polar regions due to the lack of icebreaking capacity. And President Barack Obama’s call in 2015 to main-tain the capacity for year-round access will require renewed icebreaking capabilities. While pursuing a unit of effort approach in the near term with our international partners, the Coast Guard also seeks to accelerate the acquisition of a new heavy icebreaker and plan for additional icebreakers.

INADEQUATE RESOURCING ELEVATES RISKS

These evolving threats the Coast Guard faces across its broad mission set raise several strategic concerns that need to be addressed in the coming budget years. In par-ticular, the Navy League is concerned about:

n Aging fleet and other capital assets. A substantial portion of assets well beyond their intended service lives could seriously degrade critical mission capabilities and put personnel at undue risk. For example, a sizeable portion of the Coast Guard’s cutter fleet is more than 40 years old, with some medium-endurance cutters past the age of 50, and the Coast Guard’s information technology/intelli-gence capabilities require updates and modernization.

n “Blended” retirement system. Just as the fleet is being recapitalized, the revised personnel retirement system may cause unintended consequences for both recruiting and retention.

n The Coast Guard has a retirement accounting sys-tem unlike that in the DoD and likely will have a sizeable shortfall in fiscal 2018 to fully fund that account. This is related to the changes in the mili-tary retirement system taking effect on Jan. 1, 2018, which is similar to a 401(k) plan where the service matches part of a member’s contribution.

n The Navy League also is concerned that the new revised retirement system could impact retention 10 to 15 years in the future, as experienced personnel opt to leave the Coast Guard because they no longer will have to wait for 20 years’ service to achieve retire-ment benefits, possibly resulting in a hollow force.

n Invest in people. As the Coast Guard begins accepting new cutters in new homeports, the men and women of the Coast Guard will need more training and support. Facilities like child development centers, healthcare facilities and housing will be necessary in the new homeports where the ships will be clustered.

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The Coast Guard Fast Response Cutter Joseph Tezanos conducts sea trials off the coast of Key West, Fla., on July 19, 2016. Joseph Tezanos was com-missioned August 2016.

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n Cyber expertise. The MTS is encountering increased risk from cyber-related threats, and personnel with cyber experience are in very high demand for jobs outside the Coast Guard. Estimates have shown there will be 40 million cyber-related jobs in the United States by 2020.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO ENABLE SERVICE TO PROTECT AND DEFEND

To support the five strategic focus areas and address these concerns in fiscal 2017, Coast Guard needs can be prior-itized into two general groups: the recapitalization of air and surface assets and building workforce and mission support capabilities. The Coast Guard must adequately recapitalize aging air and surface assets, already decades beyond their planned service life.

The Navy League recommends:

n An AC&I Budget of at least $2 billion a year to fully fund the Coast Guard’s mission needs.

n At least $100 million for long-lead-time materials for the Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC). This is the Navy League’s highest priority for the Coast Guard. It is critical to secure sufficient funding to begin construc-tion of at least two OPCs per year, starting with $100 million for long-lead-time materials in fiscal 2017.

n Funding for at least six Fast Response Cutters (FRCs) per year. Continued funding is needed to deliver at least six new FRCs per year, which affords the optimum delivery schedule to replace the obsolete 110-foot Patrol Boats. The funding requested in fiscal 2017 for four FRCs prolongs the recapitalization, requiring the Coast Guard to overcome challenges associated with sustain-ing legacy assets for longer periods of time.

n An increase to the FRC program of record by six hulls to replace the aging 110-foot patrol boats in Southwest Asia. Since 2003, the Coast Guard has operated six 110-foot patrol boats in the Persian Gulf, which have sustained an extraordinarily high oper-ational tempo. The hulls are well past their intended operational life and are becoming prohibitively expen-sive to maintain and operate.

n Fully funding acquisition activities in fiscal 2017 to begin constructing heavy icebreakers in fiscal 2020. The “2016 State of the Coast Guard” address noted that “the [nation] has no insurance policy — no self-rescue capa-bility whatsoever — should the Polar Star and her nearly 40-year-old engineering plant suffer a … casualty and become beset in the ice of Antarctica.” The polar regions are critical strategic geo-graphic regions and the effects of a warming climate are increasing access to our 200-mile Economic Exclusion Zone (EEZ). The U.S. needs year-round assured access to these strategic polar regions. Yet the nation’s icebreaking capability has atrophied for years. The Coast Guard’s High Latitude Study indicated the

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An aviation survival technician is lowered from an MH-65 Dolphin helicopter during training near the North Head Light in Ilwaco, Wash., Nov. 10, 2016. The training was part of the week-long Advanced Helicopter Rescue School.


need for three heavy and three medium icebreakers for projected levels of human activity, and to meet the nation’s needs. This also is consistent with the Department of Homeland Security’s Mission Needs Statement approved in 2013. In addition, as a national security issue, the ice-breakers should be U.S.-built, and not leased. Federal law requires a heavy investment to fund the entire lease up front, if leased from allied nations.

n A parallel effort to reinvigorate polar aviation. Icebreakers deploy with an air detachment aboard to support operations as well as to provide a critical search and rescue capability. With the degradation of our nation’s icebreaking capabilities has come a paral-lel decline in polar aviation capabilities.

n Multiyear funding. To maximize the efficiency of this recapitalization effort, Congress should consider multiyear procurements and block-buy programs for cost savings.

To provide adequate mission support and workforce capac-ity, old assets need more maintenance and new assets need more training investment. Investments the Coast Guard is making to recapitalize operational platforms must be matched by a commensurate investment in people.

n Restoring and fully funding authorized Reserve force levels. Since fiscal 2012, the Coast Guard Reserve, the service’s only surge force, has experienced a 17.5 percent reduction in budgetary resources and the reduction of 1,100 Selected Reserve and 118 full-time support positions. These reductions result in increased operational risk, reduced levels of readiness and put undue pressure on operational commanders to take up the resulting slack in management and oversight of Reservists. The Navy League recommends Congress at least maintain Coast Guard Reserve force levels at 7,000.

n Recapitalizing shore infrastructure. Shore infrastruc-ture, which has been underfunded for decades, remains a top unfunded priority. A $1.4 billion backlog of improvements currently is being funded at only about $30 million per year, for some infrastructure that is already more than 100 years old. Additional funding is needed now to avoid irreparable damage to facilities.

n Aviation and C4ISR/IT improvements. Continue improvements, including:

n Support, including spare parts, for the HC-130J long-range surveillance aircraft.

n Funding for C-27J spare parts, in addition to fund-ing for a C-27J simulator and continued activities of the HC-27J Asset Project Office.

n Modernization and sustainment of the Coast Guard’s fleet of HH-65 Dolphin helicopters, converting them to MH-65 short-range recovery helicopters.

n Treating C4ISR/IT as capital assets and fund accordingly.

n Investing in research, development, test & evaluation (RDT&E) and innovation.

n RDT&E plays a crucial role in positioning the Coast Guard for mission success both in the near term and over the strategic planning horizon. RDT&E is a vital element in Coast Guard decision making, ensuring that the service maintains its readiness for existing and future operational challenges, such as increased activity in the Arctic, cyber security, technology shifts, environmental incidents and natural disasters.

n Innovation is an emerging area among govern-ment agencies, providing a means for leadership to quickly use unconventional methods to address gaps and challenges. The Coast Guard Innovation Program seeks to create a culture of continuous learning within the organization, where solutions are shared rapidly across communities and geo-graphic areas. This “in-sourcing” of ideas provides vital employee engagement and collaboration, strengthening programs, requirements development and the resolution of service challenges.

n Investing in an agile and technically proficient workforce to meet emerging demands of maritime commerce. Improvements should include:

n Acquisition of enterprise systems that support a data-driven marine safety mission.

n Investment in marine infrastructure to improve mariner situational awareness, including upgrades to sensors, electronic aids-to-navigation and marine infrastructure support units such as river tenders and domestic icebreakers.

n An increase in the number of contingency planners and MTS Response Unit personnel.

n Growing a workforce with specialized skills and training to meet the ever-increasing complexity of technology used by the maritime industry while striv-ing to reduce shipping’s environmental footprint.

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THE U.S.-FLAG MERCHANT MARINEThe National Security Directive on Sealift states,

“Sealift is essential both to executing this

country’s defense strategy and to maintain-

ing a wartime economy. … The United States’

national sealift objective is to ensure that

sufficient military and civil maritime resources

will be available to meet defense deployments

and essential economic requirements in sup-

port of our national security strategy. … The

U.S.-owned commercial ocean carrier industry,

to the extent it is capable, will be relied upon

to provide sealift in peace, crisis and war. This

capability will be augmented during crisis and

war by reserve fleets comprised of ships with

national defense features that are not available

in sufficient numbers or types in the active

U.S.-owned commercial industry.”

This sealift capacity is dependent on having a sufficiently large oceangoing U.S.-flag fleet operating in foreign and domestic trades with an adequate pool of skilled U.S. Mer - chant Mariners to crew each commercial and government- owned reserve sealift vessel. Although promulgated in 1989, this policy remains relevant today. However, there are now serious challenges to meeting its objectives. Commercial U.S.-flag vessels engaged in international trade, and the Navy’s and Maritime Administration’s (MARAD’s) reserve sealift fleets, are under economic and fiscal pressures that are impacting their long-term ability to surge and support our naval forces in a crisis.

While the domestic (Jones Act) component of the U.S.-flag fleet is stabilizing because of recent recapitalization of ships in the Hawaii and Puerto Rico trades, and the new tankers being added to transport shale oil, the num-ber of non-Jones Act U.S. vessels in international trade has declined by nearly 25 percent, from 106 to 78, over the last four years. This is primarily the result of a 50 percent decline in government-impelled cargo revenue since 2012 due to reduced military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and legislation that reduced cargo prefer-ence requirements for food aid and challenges related to

uniform implementation of cargo preference across fed-eral activities.

Additionally, the deactivation of Maritime Prepositioning Squadron One and the reduction of Army prepositioning ships reduced the number of seagoing billets. These losses of “blue-water” U.S.-flag vessels since January 2010 have resulted in a loss of more than 2,800 mariner jobs. MARAD assesses that we no longer can crew all U.S.-flag commercial and government reserve sealift vessels for a sustained period of more than six months. Additionally, budget sequestration and continuing resolutions nega-tively impact the funding provided to support U.S.-flag vessels operating in international trade and the readiness of the federal government reserve sealift fleets.

Although funding for the 60-ship Maritime Security Program (MSP) and other MARAD initiatives has been mostly restored through budget compromises over the last four years, future years’ funding is uncertain due to continuing resolutions and the Budget Control Act fund-ing caps that return in 2018. Funding for MARAD’s Ready Reserve Force (RRF) of 46 vessels and MSC’s 15 reduced operating status vessels has been declining, and even greater reductions after fiscal 2017 are likely if seques-tration is reimposed, much like those proposed for 2014 before the budget compromise. This could reduce reserve sealift readiness and capacity below levels that would fully meet the CCDRs’ operations plans for major deploy-ment of ground forces, which call for 95 percent of unit equipment and sustaining supplies to be moved by stra-tegic sealift. Reduced funding will decrease the number of mariners employed on these vessels, and without ade-quate sealift and sealift manning, mission capability will be compromised.

Another issue with the RRF is the advanced age of most of its vessels, now averaging more than 41 years. Without substantial increases to future shipbuilding budgets, the Navy will not have sufficient construction funds to recapitalize these ships during the next decade, when they reach the end of their expected service lives. While some of these ships can have their lives extended five or 10 years, they eventually will need to be replaced. One alternative recently explored by the Navy was the option of supporting the development of coastwise services of dual-use vessels (commercial ships with military utility). These commercial ships would alleviate congestion, road wear and pollution along the I-5/I-95/I-10 corridors in peacetime by carrying domestic 53-foot tractor trailers/boxes along these American Marine Highways, while also being quickly available to support a major deployment of military equipment through participation in the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA) program. This pro-gram, in which all MSP vessels and at least 50 percent


of the Jones Act fleet participate, fulfills the intent of the National Sealift policy that commercial ships have priority in meeting sealift requirements.

Beyond the availability of sealift shipping, the train-ing of U.S. mariners is a critical issue. Even though the number of ships has been declining, the demographics of the Merchant Mariners crewing them and the demands of the offshore oil and inland waterway industries have resulted in a robust demand for graduates of the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy, the six state maritime acade-mies and industry training schools. Fewer training billets afloat and aging training ships at the state maritime academies are making it increasingly difficult to provide these new entrants the required sea time to meet the increased licensing and certification requirements when the International Maritime Organization Standards for Training, Certification and Watchkeeping go into effect on Jan. 1, 2017. The academies need five new training vessels, the first delivered by 2020, that will prepare them for their role in the maritime community.


n The Jones Act. Vessels in domestic waterborne trade are required to be owned by U.S. citizens, built in the United States, U.S. flagged and crewed by U.S. mariners. The Jones Act keeps American shipping companies, shipyards, mariners and thousands of people working. Since it provides for the majority of oceangoing ships under the U.S. flag, any weakening of the Jones Act would weaken national and economic security by diminishing the seafaring and shipbuilding industrial bases. Additionally, eliminating the Jones Act would create an enormous and costly burden on the Coast Guard and Customs and Boarder Protection to ensure foreign mariners are properly vetted at hundreds of inland waterway locations to preclude homeland security incidents.

n The Maritime Security Program. The 60-vessel MSP, authorized through fiscal 2025, provides the foundation to support the U.S. commercial fleet operating in the international trade and an economically viable U.S.-flag Merchant Marine for national defense and economic security. Sustaining the MSP fleet component of VISA for future surge and sustainment operations requires full, long-term funding for program stability, including continued exemption from sequestration, even during continuing resolutions. Additionally, to help compensate for further reductions in military and other prefer-ence cargoes and ensure continued economic viability, Congress has authorized increasing the payment closer

to the full extra cost of U.S.-flag operation, estimated to be between $5 million and $7 million annually. Congress now needs to appropriate at least $5 million per year per ship ($300 million total) to keep these ships under the U.S. flag since ship operators cannot sustain losses indefinitely. This is critical since the MSP fleet makes up 80 percent of the total U.S.-flag com-mercial fleet in foreign trade, with only about a dozen other ships supported only by preference cargoes.

n A National Maritime Transportation Strategy. This is MARAD’s initiative to develop a national strat-egy focusing on cargo, readiness, infrastructure and advocacy that will recommend legislation, regulatory and policy changes to reverse the decline in the U.S. Merchant Marine, especially the U.S.-flag fleet oper-ating in international trade and to support the wider U.S. maritime industry, from shipbuilding to port infrastructure.

n Funding for the RRF and MSC’s reduced operating service fleets. This must be sufficient to ensure these fleets match CCDR readiness and capacity requirements to rapidly deploy ground forces in support of a major contingency.

n U.S. cargo-preference laws. These laws include the DoD, other government agencies and foreign aid preference cargoes. Full compliance by government agencies and shippers needs to be enforced through rulemaking or new legislation to ensure the long-term sustainability of the U.S.-flag fleet. Restoration of the requirement that 75 percent of the Food-for-Peace car-goes be carried on U.S.-flag ships is strongly supported to increase the number of U.S.-flag ships and the mar-iners needed to operate them. Additionally, restoring the full loan guarantee authorities of the Export-Import Bank is critical for the economic survival of several U.S.-flag ships in foreign commerce as projects financed by the bank are shipped under the U.S. flag.

n Export of a percentage of liquefied natural gas and crude oil on U.S.-built, U.S.-flag ships. This will help stem the decline of U.S. shipping in foreign trade and provide additional work for U.S. shipyards.

n Budgetary and legislative measures that preclude capital and operations-related changes in the applica-tion of U.S. tax laws. This is to counter IRS advice that land components of intermodal transport activities do not qualify as “qualified shipping activities” under the Tonnage Tax law, and that MSP payments are subject to regular corporate rates of taxation, which could seriously impact the cost to operate vessels under the U.S. flag, jeopardizing their economic viability.

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n The repeal of current Internal Revenue Code language. This is so Capital Construction Fund deposits and earnings are treated the same way for purposes of the corporate alternative minimum tax, as they are under the regular corporate income tax, helping to expand U.S. shipping by making the financing of U.S. ship construction less expensive.

n The maritime academies. Full funding, at authorized levels, is needed to meet the operational and mainte-nance requirements and capital improvements at the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy and federal assistance at the six state maritime academies for the Student Incentive Program.

n Training ships. Recapitalization of five trainings ships for the state maritime academies, through the National Security Multi-mission Vessel (NSMV) Program, to be initiated by fiscal 2017, as the current fleet begins to reach or exceed economic service life in 2020. Initial funding of $50 million in fiscal 2017, followed by funding for one ship a year, will ensure the long-term capacity to train licensed mariners to serve the nation’s maritime requirements.

n A strong strategic sealift officer component in the U.S. Navy Reserve. This would ensure that critical

skills and experience are retained to support Navy and sealift transportation and to provide a backup pool of licensed mariners.

n A robust Military-to-Mariner program. This would facilitate the transition of former Army, Navy and Coast Guard Sailors/Mariners to certificated/licensed Merchant Mariner positions to help address projected shortfalls.

n World War II Mariners. Legislation for the Department of Veterans Affairs to treat Merchant Marine veterans of World War II as they do all other veterans.

n Dual-use vessels. The Navy and MARAD should actively work to operationalize the concept of the dual-use vessel on America’s Marine Highways for recapitalizing the RRF, or to propose another viable alternative, by developing and implementing legislative and policy changes for enactment in fiscal 2017.

n Considering consolidation of all MARAD program authorizations in the NDAA and appropriations in the Defense Appropriation Bill. This would ensure that MARAD’s programs are properly funded to meet national security requirements, including Title XI, NSMV, R&D, etc. The current arrangement results in a fragmented program execution and insufficient resources.

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A Merchant Mariner aboard the fast sealift ship SS Capella takes a reading on gauges in the engine room as the ship was underway in the Pacific Sept. 30, 2016, to conduct a 120-hour turbo activation. The U.S. Transportation Command conducts turbo activation to measure personnel and material readiness of the selected Ready Reserve Force. Capella, more than 40 years old, still is among the fastest cargo ships in the world.


THE MARINE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMThe U.S. Marine Transportation System (MTS)

consists of waterways, ports and their inter-

modal connections, vessels and vehicles. The

more than 40,000 American-built, American-

crewed vessels operating in domestic maritime

transportation contribute more than $100

billion per year to the U.S. economy. These

vessels move more than 1 billion tons of

cargo annually and create 500,000 direct jobs.

Additionally, annual taxes generated by the

domestic fleet top $11.5 billion.

As one of the world’s trade leaders, the United States requires a technologically advanced, secure, efficient and environmentally sound MTS. Our economic prosperity is dependent on international trade, of which more than 99 percent of overseas trade, by weight (excluding Canada and Mexico), moves by water. Roughly $2 trillion of trade flows through U.S. ports. Trade flowing through the nation’s ports and waterways is expected to increase substantially by 2030, creating greater congestion on overburdened land, port, water, passenger and freight delivery systems. Only a truly seamless, integrated, multimodal transportation sys-tem with an expanded America’s Marine Highway (AMH) system as part of the National Freight Strategic Plan and associated National Maritime Transportation Strategy will meet the nation’s growing needs.


n Incorporating marine highway corridors, connec-tors and state freight systems as part of the National Freight Strategic Plan to improve infrastructure and developing AMH vessels to expand the use of water-ways for freight and passengers.

n MARAD’s “green” programs, with resources to pro-mote sustainability throughout the MTS, including research and technology in areas such as ballast water, port and vessel emissions, alternate fuels and energy management.

n An exemption from the Harbor Maintenance Tax for waterborne cargo that is transshipped or shipped between U.S. ports. This is a double tax on imports because taxes also are paid when imports first land in the United States, and it is a significant disincentive for increased domestic waterborne transport.

n Additional resources for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ dredging and new construction projects, such as a second Poe-sized lock on the Great Lakes, and for the U.S. Coast Guard to upgrade aids to navi-gation in river and harbor channels that connect U.S. ports to the world. The Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund (HMTF), resourced from the Harbor Maintenance Tax (fees of about $1.7 billion a year), was intended to pay for the construction and maintenance of harbor and navigation channels and aids when it was developed in 1986. While recent legislation has authorized increasing expenditures to 100 percent of funds received in the HMTF over the next eight years, recent appropriations and budget submissions have not always met targets. Appropriation of the full authorization is mandatory since there are billions of dollars in project backlogs, including urgent investments to accommodate the larger ships using the expanded Panama Canal.

n Use of the Inland Waterway Trust Fund to repair/replace aging infrastructure on the inland waterway system. The system is capable of carrying huge additional amounts of freight and petroleum products at a fraction of the cost of other modes of transport. Any increased revenue generated for this fund needs to be invested in reducing the billions of dollars in backlogged main-tenance to upgrade/replace much of the obsolete and unreliable river lock-and-dam infrastructure.

n Increased investment in maritime research and devel-opment on par with other modes of transportation.

n Funding for the Title XI Federal Ship Financing Program to support recapitalization of Jones Act tonnage and new capacity to meet the AMH shipping needs. There are several hundred million dollars in pending and expected applications for new vessel con-struction in U.S. shipyards that cannot be fully funded. At least $30 million is needed now, followed by about $30 million in annual appropriations to keep up with the expected demand.

n Priority access to terminals, vessel berths and stag-ing areas at the 17 commercial strategic ports for military cargo that support the short-notice military surge deployments under the National Port Readiness Network.

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n Efforts to develop a national capacity for the MTS to recover from major disruptions to ensure the conti-nuity of key maritime activities. This should include the maintenance of a robust U.S. salvage vessel and oil spill recovery capability to ensure expeditious clearing of vital channels and harbors.

n Increased share of grants for funding intermodal and freight-related maritime projects from provisions in the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act and in the Transportation Investment Generating Economic Recovery Act. These grants, and the credit assistance provided through DOT’s Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act program, can help improve the movement of freight through ports and reduce congestion.

PERSONNEL POLICIES As the high demand for sea services support

across the globe continues at an extraor-

dinarily high level, inadequate budgets,

continuing budget resolutions and sequestra-

tion jeopardize the readiness of our maritime

forces. Our Navy personnel often are deploying

for up to nine months away from their home-

port. Marines are deploying at a rate that far

exceeds the 1:3 deploy-to-dwell ratio that

is needed to keep them highly effective. The

demands on Coast Guard personnel continue

at a high pace since 9/11. The number of

Merchant Mariners available to man our MSP

and Federal Reserve Sealift ships in time of

war continue to fall short of what is required.

Not only do much of the services’ equipment require repair and replacement, but we also must continue to attract, train and retain intelligent, highly motivated and capable men and women. An all-volunteer force that continues as the premier fighting force in the world must not see its leaders repeat history by ignoring the needs of our warfighters. Our warfighters must receive adequate pay raises in accordance with the 2003 law that ties military pay raises to private-sector growth; high-quality support

infrastructure, such as housing, commissary and exchange availability; and modern office and classroom facilities. Additionally, we must recognize the deleterious effects of reduced training time and resources, as well as extended deployment periods and reduced dwell time for our ser-vice men and women. These effects are exacerbated by continuing resolutions and sequestration. Recruiting and retention are dependent on compensation, health-care benefits, retirement and quality of life to attract and retain dedicated and qualified professionals, while training and education are mandatory for operational readiness.

Navy manning should be set at 321,000 personnel if the Navy is to fight and win in major combat operations as well as succeed in irregular warfare, humanitarian assis-tance and disaster response. Additionally, ship deployment schedules should not exceed the nominal six-month cycle, with sufficient downtime and training periods provided before the next deployment cycle to assure the effective-ness of our Sailors when sailing in harm’s way.

The Marine Corps’ active-duty end strength is a mini-mum of 182,000, and a Selective Marine Corps Reserve end strength of at least 38,500 is critical to ensure that the Marines are able to reshape the post-drawdown force such that it remains fully capable, with a 1:2 deploy-to-dwell ratio and a goal of a 1:3 ratio, and is ready to respond when called across the range of military operations.

The Coast Guard is a critical component of our coun-try’s national defense capability. Since 9/11, Coast Guard manning has fallen short of what is required to support the mission-rich environment into which the service has been thrust. The Coast Guard must have sufficient per-sonnel resources so it can safely and proficiently execute these evolving missions, while maintaining its core com-petencies. The Coast Guard manning should be set and maintained at 42,069 military personnel.

The national imperative to correctly size the maritime forces and avoid a weakened force after more than a decade of war requires the will of the American peo-ple, the presi dent and Congress to commit the necessary resources. Reducing the number of personnel and con-tinued reductions in providing for their basic needs, force recapitalization and operations, while expecting to recruit as well as retain the men and women in the sea services, is not consistent with this national imperative of having a strong sea service force at the tip of the spear. Sea service personnel are not being recognized for their extreme value to this nation.

Our men and women in uniform make up the finest fight-ing force in the world. It is critical that the next generation of Sailors, Marines, Coast Guard men and women, and


Merchant Mariners be prepared to face the challenges ahead and excel as leaders. Supporting youth programs such as the Naval Sea Cadet Corps, Navy League Cadet Corps, Young Marines and Junior Reserve Officers Training Corps is an investment in our nation’s future. There must be a con-certed effort to achieve excellence in all areas of educating and training America’s youth, particularly in the areas of science, technology, engineering and math (STEM).


n Recruiting and retention policies that ensure adequate personnel for the current and future operational tempo to support the war on terrorism and natural/man-made disaster response, while ensuring the readiness to fight and win in a major combat operation.

n Authorized end strength for the Navy of 321,000 active-duty personnel.

n Authorized end strength for the Coast Guard of 42,069 active-duty personnel.

n Authorized end strength for the Marines of a minimum of 182,000 active-duty personnel.

n Unencumbered training, including being provided the material and equipment necessary to accomplish the training necessary to meet the demands of full-scale combat and irregular warfare.

n Sufficient funding for education and training of Merchant Mariners to ensure an adequate pool of skilled personnel for the commercial maritime industry and military strategic sealift activities.

n Adequate funding to properly maintain and improve the shore infrastructure to support current and future missions.

n Continuing care for our wounded warriors through-out the duration of their physical and/or psychological infirmity. The nation’s responsibility to those who are wounded in its service does not end when the emer-gent, or secondary, medical support is completed. Many, if not most, of our wounded veterans will bear the scars of their wounds — mentally and physically — for the rest of their lives. The Marine Corps’ Wounded Warrior Regiment and the Navy’s Safe Harbor Program provide the type of assistance our wounded/injured Marines, Sailors and Coast Guard men and women need to recover from the trauma of war. The Navy League endorses full support of these programs.

n TRICARE programs that ensure the continued medical care promised to our warriors and their families.

n Programs for educating and motivating America’s youth to achieve the highest standards of personal excellence, moral integrity, patriotism and mental and physical fit-ness. Among the top priorities in this area is increased support for the U.S. Naval Sea Cadet Corps, as well as the Navy Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC), the Navy and Marine Corps Junior ROTC, Young Marines and maritime-related high school programs.

n Military Officers Association of America legislative efforts for the services to preclude another hollowed- out force like the United States experienced in the 1980s and ’90s.

n Providing incentives for Navy active-duty/ Selected Reserve health-care professionals and nuclear-trained professionals to join or remain in the service.

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Petty Officer 1st Class Martin Wright, assigned to Navy Reserve Fleet Combat Camera Pacific (FCCP), uses a saw to cut rebar during FCCP’s Winter Quick Shot Nov. 15, 2016, in Azusa, Calif. Quick Shot is a biannual exercise that provides live-fire and scenario-based training to combined joint combat camera assets.

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CONCLUSIONThe Navy League is committed to educating

the senior leadership in the executive and

legislative branches of the U.S. government,

the media and the American people about

the critical importance of the Navy, Marine

Corps, Coast Guard and U.S.-flag Merchant

Marine as they protect our national interests

throughout the world. The combination of

partnership and presence are keys to our suc-

cess in the future.

Our National Defense Strategy must be designed around the threats we face today, and the uncertain world in which we live. We believe strongly that letting budget drive strategy is a mistake when considering how our economic prosperity and national security are inextricably

tied to free and open access to the seas. The risks are undeniable if we do not fund the sea services at a level that enables the nation to sustain the readiness of our operating forces. Most importantly, we must have the appropriate number of ships to accomplish the myriad missions that our naval forces are called on to perform.

We must not break faith with the men and women who have sworn an oath to protect and defend our nation. To preserve the quality of the all-volunteer force and not break faith with the nation’s volunteers, we must give them the tools they need to be successful.

The Navy League of the United States believes that we must always ensure our armed forces are ready to fight and win our nation’s wars, deter those who would seek to engage us and secure access to the global commons to preserve freedom of navigation. Our recommendations are made to ensure we have the very best sea services in the world. As President Theodore Roosevelt, at whose encour-agement the Navy League was founded in 1902, once said, “The Navy is the surest guarantor of peace which this country possesses.”

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Sailors and Marines man the rails aboard the amphibious assault ship USS Makin Island as it departs Naval Base San Diego Oct. 14, 2016, for a Western Pacific deployment. Makin Island, the flagship of the Makin Island Amphibious Ready Group, deployed with the embarked 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit in support of the Navy’s maritime strategy in the U.S. Third, Fifth and Seventh Fleet areas of responsibility.


NAVY LEAGUE MISSIONThe Navy League of the United States is a nonprofit

organization dedicated to educating our citizens about

the importance of sea power to U.S. national security

and to supporting the men and women of the U.S.

Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard and U.S.-flag

Merchant Marine and their families.

2300 Wilson Boulevard, Suite 200 Arlington, VA 22201-5424703-528-1775703-528-2333 (FAX)www.navyleague.org

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