©2000 Blackwell Science, Inc.

COMMENTARY

.

Entrapment: Global Ecological and/or Local Demographic? Reflections Upon Reading the BMJ’s

Six Billion Day Special Issue

Colin Butler

National Centre for Epidemiology and Population Health, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia

ABSTRACT

Global human population recently passed six billion. To

mark this, the

BMJ

(formerly the British Medical Journal)published a special edition that was both controversial andinnovative. It had 12 complimentary essays, written byleading demographers, epidemiologists, and public healthworkers. A key issue highlighted was a debate betweenthe nondemographer Maurice King and many demogra-phers, regarding the concept of “demographic entrap-ment.” King and his supporters argue that the limited re-serve carrying capacity of Rwanda was a major factor inthat country’s devastating civil war, a consequence ofwhich was the release of spare carrying capacity. In con-trast to this body of opinion, the key importance of popu-lation pressure as a factor in Rwanda’s war is denied, notonly by demographers but most other analysts of Rwanda.

A second major issue highlighted in the journal wasthat of overconsumption, particularly of natural capital.

The importance of this was partially recognized by the de-mographic papers, but none exhibited the sense of ur-gency concerning this conveyed in the two relevant paperswritten by epidemiologists and public health workers.

This article discusses relevant sections of the 12 pa-pers with regard to demographic entrapment and over-consumption. In addition, several other examples of de-mographic entrapment, both historic and contemporary,are suggested and described.

Finally, the suggestion by King that the whole worldmay be demographically entrapped is refined by consider-ation of ongoing global environmental changes, both an-thropogenic and natural, which are likely to reduce futureglobal carrying capacity. While such changes are, them-selves, unlikely to cause global under-nutrition, the nega-tive political and economic consequences of increased re-gional scarcity, consequent to approaching or passinglocal carrying capacities, are likely to exacerbate the risk ofregional conflict. These areas of conflict could widen, andbe aggravated by an increased frequency of natural disas-ters, predicted by some computerized climate changemodels. At the worst case, “civilization failure” or “bar-barianization” could result. The complex pathway to this,substantially caused by adverse global environmentalchange, is called global “ecological entrapment.”

INTRODUCTION

On October 12, 1999, demographers estimate thatglobal human population reached six billion (Mc-Michael

et al.

1999). To commemorate this, the

BMJ

devoted most of a special issue to an exami-

nation of the complex and often controversial re-lationship between population growth, resourceconsumption, and population health. Of 12 rele-vant contributions, the most controversial was bythe public health worker, King (1999). King hasrepeatedly proposed that the concept of “demo-graphic entrapment” usefully and succinctly de-

scribes the multiple, interacting forces that threatenthe population health status of many impover-

Address correspondence to: Colin Butler, National Centre for Epidemiology and Population Health, Australian National Uni-versity, Canberra, Australia; E-mail colin.butler@anu.edu.au.

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ished, rapidly expanding human populations, par-ticularly in sub-Saharan Africa, but perhaps alsoin parts of South Asia and Latin America.

DEMOGRAPHIC ENTRAPMENT THEORY

The term “demographic entrapment” was coinedby Lester Brown as recently as 1987 (Brown 1987)but the theory has roots that can be traced toMalthus and even to the ancient Greeks (Sallares1991). Malthus argued that, because food produc-tion is arithmetic, while human population in-crease is geometric, population growth would out-run food supplies, making famine inevitable (Short1998). However, improvements in agricultural pro-ductivity, including as a result of enclosure po-lices (Buck 1985) and, more recently, the GreenRevolution, combined with widespread use of con-traception, first by coitus interruptus (Santow 1995;van de Walle & Muhsam 1995) and later by tech-nology have meant repeated postponements ofthe worst Malthusian scenarios (Myers & Simon1994).

In the 1950s, the economists Nelson and Lie-benstein independently proposed a theory thatNelson called a “low level disequilibrium trap” bywhich rapid population growth undermined eco-nomic gains, forcing a decline in social and eco-nomic circumstances, in turn delaying fertilitytransition and causing further economic decline(Nelson 1956; Leibenstein 1957).

Demographic entrapment theory argues thata high risk of epidemic disease, conflict, or fam-ine, on sufficient scale to significantly reduce notonly population growth rates, but, in some cases,total population numbers, exists in populationswith little reserve environmental carrying capacity.Populations at the highest risk of demographicentrapment are unable to emigrate, and, by sodoing, free up carrying capacity, including by therepatriation of foreign currency, or import addi-tional carrying capacity in exchange for the ex-port of goods and services or by foreign aid (King1990; King 1993; King & Elliott 1993; King

et al.

1995; King & Elliott 1996a; King & Elliott 1996b;King & Elliott 1997; King 1999). Similar argu-ments, though avoiding the term “entrapment”were also advanced by another nondemographer,Rockwell (1998).

In other words, entrapped communities donot experience the comparatively smooth andrapid “demographic transition” that has charac-terized population growth rates in the developedworld and many parts of the developing world

(Robey

et al.

1993). Long-term population growthrates of entrapped communities are capped, butby periodic catastrophe rather than voluntary, con-scious, or even coerced means, such as throughChina’s one child policy, implemented in 1979.

RWANDA

Population crashes are commonplace in nonhu-man populations (Abernethy 1993). Yet, King’swork has caused enormous controversy amonghuman population scientists (Abbasi 1999) whoalmost universally deny or ignore his analysis (King1999). Liebenstein was also critical of demographictheory, though for their explanations for contin-ued high fertility, rather than for a substantial“correction” in population growth rates.

The most commonly accepted recent exam-ple of demographic entrapment is the civil war inAfrica’s Great Lakes region in 1994, particularlyin Rwanda (Bonneux 1994). Rwanda, the most fer-tile, but also most densely populated African statewas described by Belgian officials as dangerouslyoverpopulated in 1929 (King & Elliott 1996b).Several surveys, conducted in the 1960s, detectedand forecast serious problems if the high fertilityrate continued. Each, in various ways, concludedthat Rwanda’s carrying capacity was approachingits limit (King & Elliott 1996b). At the onset of itscivil war, Rwanda’s population was over 7.5 mil-lion (World Bank 1999) with a population densityof 280 per square kilometre. Half of its popula-tion was younger than 15. Rwanda’s annual popu-lation growth rate was consistently greater than3% between 1965 and 1985. From 1985, popula-tion growth, though falling, still averaged about2.5% per annum until the time of the genocide(World Bank 1999). Farms, which for generationshad been repeatedly divided, allowing a subsistenceliving to the next generation, reached minimumviable sizes, forcing unemployed youths to drift tothe towns and cities. Surrounded by countrieswith similarly high rates of agrarian-based pov-erty, emigration opportunities were few. When thewar erupted in 1994 between 500,000 and 800,000Rwandans—about 10% of the population—diedviolently within months. Up to another millionwere temporarily displaced in refugee camps,mainly in Zaire.

Many other regions of the world, for exampleSingapore and the Netherlands, successfully sus-tain far higher population densities (4991 and 457persons sq km, respectively, in 1997) (World Bank1999) than Rwanda, while several others have

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sustained consistently higher rates of populationgrowth, particularly certain oil-rich countries ofthe Middle East. Crucially, most, if not all, of thesecountries, by virtue of their successful export in-dustries, are able to exploit far larger ecologicalfootprints (Wackernagel & Rees 1995; Rees 1996)than that commanded by their territory alone.

In comparison, landlocked Rwanda has fewexports. Of these, coffee is by far the most impor-tant, responsible, at the time leading to the war,for earning 80% of total foreign exchange. Whencoffee prices fell by 50% in 1989, Rwanda suf-fered an economic crisis. Additionally, in 1990,the International Monetary Fund (IMF) imposeda structural adjustment program that included a50% devaluation of the Rwandan currency, andthe privatization of state utilities. Subsidized grainimports, recommended by the IMF, underminedlocal grain markets and the devaluation led to in-flation. Localized famine and small-scale massa-cres increased in frequency in the early 1990s. Aswell, a substantial part of emergency foreign aidprovided in the early 1990s was diverted to buyarms and a private jet for the Rwandan primeminister (Chossudovsky 1997). Rwanda, like manynations, has a long history of antagonism betweenits two main ethnic groups, the Hutu and Tutu.Though this antagonism was necessary for theconflict, it was not sufficient.

Causation is rarely, if ever, an “all or nothing”phenomenon; every cause, in turn, has its owncause. One useful way of categorizing cause is into“proximal” (McMichael 1999) and distal, or un-derlying, causes, with the caveat that the most ap-propriate explanatory level is that which best ad-dresses the question under consideration. Thesearguments suggest a possible mechanism by whichconflict between competing causal explanationsmay be resolved, particularly in an arena wherethe “most fundamental known cause” is subjec-tive.

The causes of genocide illustrate such anarena. Causation for the Rwandan conflict isclearly multifactorial, but it is surprising that sofew analyses of the Rwandan genocide (Omaar &de Waal 1995; Adelman & Suhrke 1996; Burkle1999; Des Forges 1999) give credence to the pos-sibility that high population pressure in an areawith little spare carrying capacity might be a ma-jor distal cause. This explanation, rather than be-ing rejected, is usually ignored. Some, however,hint at this factor. For example, Burkle writes: “anemerging view is that conflict related to ethnic is-sues is catalyzed in disrupted states by the need of

ethnic groups to fall back on what is consideredsafe and familiar. Territorial buffer zones thatonce separated ethnic groups disappear, causingincreased competition for resources and migra-tion of large populations, either as refugees whocross national boundaries or as internally dis-placed populations.”

King argues that the failure to explicitly con-sider overpopulation as an underlying cause ofthe Rwandan conflict is an example of denial andthat denial not only applies to the Rwanda geno-cide but to the concept of demographic entrap-ment in general and that this denial extends todemographers, humanitarian agencies such asUnited Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) (King& Elliott 1996b), and the U.S. State Department(King 1999).

Despite avoidance of the term “entrapment,”most of the demographic papers published in thespecial

BMJ

issue also provided support for ele-ments of demographic entrapment theory. Mal-colm Potts warned of a future world in which“millions of feral young males, with no hope ofemployment (who) will be fodder for political orreligious extremism” (Potts 1999). Unemployment,poverty, and an army of malleable young menwere key factors in the Rwandan genocide (Bon-neux 1994; Chossudovsky 1997).

Two other demographic papers discussed theworld’s two most populous nations, China and In-dia, both of which introduced coercive family plan-ning programs. In China this occurred because ofconcerns about the social and economic conse-quences of continued rapid population growth(Kane & Choi 1999). King and his supporterswould argue that the Chinese, by acting to rapidlyreduce their population growth rate, effectivelyintervened to slow, and perhaps reverse, any pro-gression towards demographic entrapment. Inthe same issue, the demographers Cassen andVisaria attributed many of India’s problems to“social and economic conditions and policy fail-ure rather than to rises in population” (Cassen &Visaria 1999). Yet later, these authors recognizethat “(an) increasing numbers of studies havefound that population growth can have a negativeeffect on savings and capital formation, and evenon the incidence of poverty.” An impoverishedpopulation, with no realistic hope of enrichmentby migration or employment, is an essential com-ponent of a demographically entrapped popula-tion. India may not be demographically entrapped,but its higher population growth rate puts it at ahigher risk than China (King 1991).

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Raleigh, another demographer writing in thesame issue, concurred with Potts that the largestincreases in world population will occur in coun-tries where poverty and unemployment are en-demic, with Africa’s share of world population ris-ing from 13% to 22% by 2050 (Raleigh 1999).She mentioned that Malthusian principles “con-tinue to dominate the population debate,” whileavoiding any reference to King, or to demo-graphic entrapment. Raleigh also acknowledgedthat Europe escaped earlier environmental limitsto demographic expansion, not only by gainsfrom the industrial revolution (which increasedEurope’s effective carrying capacity) but also fromcolonization, which had the same effect, resultingin massive expansion of the European ecologicalfootprint (Wackernagel & Rees 1995).

HISTORICAL EXAMPLES OF DEMOGRAPHIC ENTRAPMENT

A well-documented case of population decline,arguably because of the surpassing of sustainablecarrying capacity, occurred in Ireland during theGreat Hunger of the late 1840s. Most of the Irishwere forced, by poverty, to subsist on a staple con-sisting almost entirely of potatoes. During the po-tato blight-induced famine between 1845 and 1849,the Irish population declined from about eightmillion to four million. Though much of this pop-ulation decline was from emigration, more than amillion people are estimated to have died of fam-ine and famine related fever (Woodham-Smith1962). Grain, spared from the blight that de-stroyed successive potato crops, continued to beexported from Ireland during the famine years,but the Irish peasants could not afford its cost.This fact can be used to argue that the Irish carry-ing capacity was greater than if judged solely by itspotato output. However, the parts of Ireland usedfor the growing of grain were effectively as eco-nomically remote from the Irish poor as if theyhad been on the moon.

The land and capital available to support mostof the Irish population were confined almostentirely to their potato patches, the seed potatotubers, and the rudimentary tools used for thecultivation of the potato. When the blight struckduring a particularly damp summer, decimatingthe potato crop, the alternative foods raised onthe available land were hopelessly inadequate fornutrition. Famine in succeeding summers was ex-acerbated by an absence of seed potatoes, con-sumed before they could be planted. Fishing was

an undeveloped cottage industry, limited by poortechnology and low capital investment. Even to-day, the Irish population has not fully recovered.With hindsight, the population boom that pre-ceded the famine years may be analyzed as a tem-porary, unsustainable phenomenon, a form of“overshoot” (Catton 1980) vulnerable to adverseexternal events, such as the blight.

The thesis of demographic entrapment alsoassumes that compensatory aid or subsidy to cush-ion adverse shocks, in the form of resource trans-fer from better-endowed regions, such as main-land Britain, was inadequate. This was largely thecase during the Irish famine, in part because ofthe British government’s belief that Malthusianforces were operant in Ireland, and should not beresisted. The belief was also held that food subsi-dies and excessive humanitarian aid—even theprovision of seed potatoes—would interfere withfree market policies, thus contributing to greatereconomic distress in future. However, illustrativeof the multiple and possibly overlapping modelsof causation that can be applied, is the view thatthe British response to the Irish famine was ra-cially motivated, a form of 19th century ethniccleansing by default.

More controversial is speculation that climatechange, as Europe left behind the MediaevalWarm period (Hughes & Diaz 1994) to enter theLittle Ice Age (Grove 1988) together with thecomparatively high population pressure present atthe start of the 14th century, may have combinedto reduce per capita food availability. In turn, theresultant deterioration in nutrition may have con-tributed to the very high death rates of the BlackDeath, where, in some regions, one third of thepopulation died (McNeill 1976). The consequentcomparative labor shortage and upward wage pres-sure had profound social effects, contributing, atleast in western Europe, to the eventual abolitionof serfdom (Dyer 1989). The resulting expandedcarrying capacity may also have contributed to theRenaissance.

Sallares (1991) claims that the population ofAncient Greece expanded rapidly until it reacheda carrying capacity crisis in the 4th century BC,though demographic entrapment was avoided be-cause substantial emigration was possible, includ-ing to the Orient following Alexander’s conquests.

HIV/AIDS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

In the past decade HIV/AIDS has led to substan-tial reductions in life expectancy in several sub-

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175

Saharan African nations. This has also substan-tially reduced population growth rates (Garnett &Anderson 1993; United Nations Population Divi-sion Department of Economic and Social Affairs1999). The proximal causes of HIV/AIDS in Af-rica are undoubtedly multifactorial: they includepoverty (Makgoba, 2000) national indebtedness,poor education, literacy and health standards, thepoor status of women, corruption, poor leader-ship, adverse trade policies and so on. Perhaps ofeven more importance is a culture of bravado, de-nial, and risk-taking, particularly among the young(Caldwell 2000). However, a major upstream, ordistal, cause for many of these factors is the pres-sure placed on impoverished societies to improvesocial and material conditions in the face of highpopulation growth, unsupported by significantlylarge and valuable export industries. Furthermore,because, unlike malaria, HIV/AIDS discriminatelykills young, economically productive adults, this dis-ease has substantial, adverse flow-on effects (Piot2000) which in turn may aggravate demographicentrapment, by amplifying many of the proximalfactors of both entrapment and HIV/AIDS.

In the same BMJ issue, the demographer TimDyson highlighted the precarious situation of cur-rent and near-future food supply in sub-SaharanAfrica. He stressed that “political stability every-where will be absolutely essential to ensure thatthere is enough food available in future” (Dyson1999). This prospect seems unlikely in an increas-ingly lawless Africa, the scene already of a numberof post-Clausewitzian (i.e., conflict beyond the con-trol of a traditional state) wars (Gray 1999) fromthe Congo to Sierra Leone and Nigeria. Nor arewar and diseases such as HIV/AIDS the only ma-jor threats to African population health. Droughts,sometimes leading to famine and related to the ElNiño/La Niña cycle, periodically affect many partsof Africa, and could intensify, particularly if, assome predict, the ENSO cycle becomes more ex-treme (Feely

et al.

1999). Furthermore, in the lastmillennium, Africa is thought to have several timesbeen affected by much more prolonged droughtsthan any observed in the last century, one of whichoccurred during the Medieval Warm Period (Ver-schuren

et al.

2000). Devastating as these droughtsmust have been, Africa in the past is likely to havehad greater reserve carrying capacity than is nowthe case, even considering improvements in agri-cultural productivity. Previously, en masse migra-tions to lightly populated areas may have beenpossible; today, this is inconceivable without sub-stantial conflict.

INDONESIA

Many of Indonesia’s current economic, social, andpolitical problems, on a background of increas-ingly severe conflict, may be symptoms of early de-mographic entrapment. With sufficient aid and astrengthening of its current transition to democ-racy, Indonesia may enter a virtuous cycle, escap-ing further entrapment. Increased political repres-sion, more conflict, and further destruction of theenvironmental commons, for example through arepetition of the El Niño and drought-associated1998 forest fires and haze, are likely to furthererode international investment confidence, deepenthe economic crisis and increase the risk of en-trapment through negative feedback.

A similar analysis can be made for Haiti(Homer-Dixon 1994) and North Korea.

OVERCONSUMPTION

The second key theme of the special BMJ issuewas overconsumption (Butler 1994; Butler 1997)of resources, particularly of natural capital, in-cluding ecosystem buffers (Costanza

et al.

1997;Costanza

et al.

2000). This topic was principallydiscussed in an editorial (McMichael

et al.

1999)and one paper written by two epidemiologists(McMichael & Powles 1999). Several of the demo-graphic papers paid limited attention to the glo-bal environmental consequences of overcon-sumption, and its implications for populationgrowth, while others, probably deliberately, leftthis to the more environmental papers.

Caldwell (1999) wrote “if the global ecosys-tems can tolerate a world of 6–9 billion for an-other century or two they may prove durable forthe rest of time.” Potts (1999) implicitly recog-nized consumption, arguing that the rich coun-tries will damage the biosphere through “globalwarming and other changes.” However, he is outof date. Though, until now the atmospheric bur-den of greenhouse gases has mostly originatedfrom poor countries, in the future this will change(Butler 1997; Bolin 1998).

The discussion of China barely mentioned en-vironmental concerns, and contained no discus-sion of the global impact of environmental changeon China, nor of China’s increasing ability to in-fluence the global environment, including tradepatterns, by its consumption of both animal pro-tein (Brown 1995) and fossil fuels (Drennen &Erickson 1998). Tim Dyson, however, discussedthe former problem, concluding, optimistically,

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that any grain shortfall demanded by China andother developing countries might be met by in-creased exports from South America and Austra-lia. Given Australia’s increasing soil salinity (White1997) and its comparatively low rate of wheat yieldincrease (Hamblin & Kyneur 1993) Australia mayforego this opportunity for increased exports.

Dyson gave serious attention to the risk thatclimate change may impair future food security,but in the coming quarter of a century, to whichhis analysis was confined, he concluded this is un-likely. He also argued that analyses of famine interms of food entitlement is “obvious” and poten-tially misleading, because they distract attentionfrom a more fundamental problem, that of foodproduction. However, others, most noticeably Sen,have argued that ignoring lack of entitlement risksgiving attention to other less fundamental causesand that food production itself is influenced byother entitlement issues (Sen 1981; George 1985).

Dyson speculated that recent variability in theU.S. grain harvest may be partially induced by cli-mate change. Despite speculation triggered by aslight fall in per capita grain production that thewhole world may be entrapped, (King & Elliott1996a) enough grain is currently grown to easilyfeed eight billion vegetarians (Dyson 1996). How-ever, the avoidance of mass starvation is predi-cated on a reasonably even distribution of thisharvest. If the world has only one really poor har-vest in the coming decades, fair distribution ofthat harvest is essential to avoid massive famine.By 2025, at the limit of Dyson’s forecast, food pro-duction problems may be intensifying as a resultof adverse environmental change, including fromthe encroachment of seawater in coastal areas ofpoor countries, as sea level continues to rise(Houghton

et al.

1996).The discussion of India (Cassen & Visaria

1999) touched on several environmental issues,but its authors did not discuss the global environ-mental pressures that are increasingly likely to im-pact India, including the prediction, made by oneof the Hadley Climate Center’s simulations, thatclimate change will differentially harm agricul-tural productivity in South Asia (Parry

et al.

1999).Conflict in Africa, another likely regional loser

in agricultural capacity as a consequence of cli-mate change, is likely to intensify in the comingdecades, in part as a consequence of demographicentrapment. However, while the main weaponsare limited to machetes, such conflicts are likely toremain localized. In contrast, any intensificationof demographic entrapment in South Asia, lead-

ing to political and or economic destabilization, islikely to increase the risk of regional nuclear war.Such conflict may be much harder to contain.

GLOBAL ECOLOGICAL ENTRAPMENT

In addition to regional demographic entrapment,there is a nontrivial risk of what I have previouslydescribed as global ecological entrapment (But-ler 1994; Butler 1997). Localized ecological andenvironmental changes are likely to contribute toregional demographic entrapment, illustrated,for example, by recurring floods in North Koreaat the time of harvest. Global ecological entrap-ment differs from regional demographic entrap-ment in a number of ways. It could affect farwealthier countries than those at high risk of de-mographic entrapment, for example by chaoticflow-on effects from conflict in poorer regions,not only from nuclear weapons in South Asia, butpossibly other, non-nuclear weapons of mass de-struction, including biological and chemicalweapons (Sidel

et al.

1998).Other elements potentially leading to global

ecological entrapment include economic losses,including those to the re-insurance industry andthe global stock market, and damage to infra-structure, because of extreme weather events. In-creased numbers of refugees, displaced by war,poverty, and environmental disasters, (Red Cross,2000) including those displaced by the redistribu-tion of global agricultural capacity, are likely inthe coming century (Döös 1994). These factorsare likely to interact, inexorably increasing therisk of conflict of increasing scope (Homer-Dixon1994). “Civilization failure” or “barbarianization”(Swart 1996) could result. Eventually, if unchecked,this could lead to civilization collapse.

Though disputed, (Snooks 1996) there is evi-dence of at least four previous episodes of civiliza-tion failure, caused in part by ecological factors.These include the ancient Sumerians, the Mayans,the agricultural Indian communities of the U.S.South-west, and the Easter Islanders (Jacobsen &Adams 1958; Tainter 1988; Ponting 1991; Paine &Freter 1996; Cordell 1997; Dunning

et al.

1997).The risk of global ecological entrapment seems

highest in the next two centuries, and humanitymay sense its predicament before the worst conse-quences unfold. In addition to the mechanismssuggested above, civilization may be severely stressedby a number of other catastrophic, but not im-possible, environmental scenarios. These includebreakup of the Western Antarctic Ice Shelf or

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Greenland Ice Shelves, each of which would leadto a sea level rise of several meters. This could be-come detected but unstoppable (Mercer 1978;Oppenheimer 1998; Pearce 1999; Krabill

et al.

2000). Temperatures in Western Europe, heatedby the Gulf Stream, could paradoxically be low-ered by ongoing climate change, by as much asfive degrees, if the formation of North AtlanticDeepwater is blocked, interrupting the global “con-veyor belt” which transports warm tropical watersto the far North Atlantic (Broecker 1987; Adkins

et al.

1997; Kerr 1998).

ENTRAPMENT TABOOS

I agree with King that both the language andthought of both demographic and ecological en-trapment are tabooed and denied (Cairns 1999)but disagree that this need be through conscioussuppression by vested interests, including by theU.S. State Department, as King suggests. There maybe factors other than resource overconsumptionthat limit U.S. discussion of entrapment. For exam-ple, it is claimed that, during the Rwandan masskillings, the U.S. State Department obfuscated theissue of whether genocide was occurring, to mini-mize the chance of military intervention, arguablycalled for by the 1948 Genocide Act, to which theU.S. was a signatory (Omaar & de Waal 1995).

However, in support of King’s contention,there is considerable evidence of vested interests,from both the U.S. and other fossil-fuel-depen-dent economies, participating in attempts to stifleand distort the climate change debate (Edwards1997; Karliner 1997; Beder 1998; Gelbspan 1998;Holden 1998).

DISENTRAPMENT

Global ecological entrapment is, at present, mainlyof theoretical concern. However, minimizing itsrisk entails action as early as possible, in particularbecause of the inertia of anthropogenic green-house gas accumulation, population expansion,macro-climatic effects as a result of global warm-ing, and because of the irreversibility of speciesextinction and bioregional ecosystem service de-pletion. Consideration of these dark possibilitiesshould strengthen the “precautionary principle.”However, many economic and political factors, in-cluding an almost blind faith in the ability of themarket to replace ecosystem function by artificialcapital undermine this (Arrow

et al.

1995; Cos-tanza

et al.

2000).

There are indications that a massive techno-logical and social transition (von Weizsäcker

et al.

1997; Hawken

et al.

1999) enabling a dramatic re-duction in the per capita ecological footprint ispossible, without politically unacceptable depriva-tion. Market mechanisms, pricing of externalities,economies of scale enabling cheaper productionof environmentally less damaging consumer goods,and pollution emission trading all promise to con-tribute to the sustainability transition. In 1998, forthe first time, total global carbon emissions fell,despite growth in world GNP (Flavin 1999). Anincreasing number of corporations appear to sensethat longer-term profits will be made by consider-ing sustainability. Even if the U.S. fails to ratify theKyoto Protocol, market forces may lead to its defacto ratification, though much deeper cuts inglobal carbon dioxide production are required tostabilize atmospheric CO

2

.Reducing the risk of regional demographic

entrapment is in the self-interest of wealthier econ-omies because it also reduces the risk of globalecological entrapment, which, unlike localized de-mographic entrapment, risks population healthin wealthier countries. This will require far higherlevels of aid to poorer countries than has beenthe case. A vital component of this is debt forgive-ness, fairer trade and technology transition, re-sulting in the reduction of global inequality. Amore equal world will increase educational op-portunity and health care to the poor, accelerat-ing the demographic transition, without coercion.“Technological leapfrogging” (Reddy & Goldem-berg 1990) by which wealthy countries enable poorpopulations to bypass stages of technical develop-ment, for example by passing directly from ani-mal-drawn to solar-powered energy, offers a mech-anism by which global living standards can beimproved with reduced environmental harm.

Aristotle argued in favor of limiting inequality“on the grounds that otherwise envy, and hencepolitical instability, would ensue, and give rise tocivil conflict” (Bowen 1970). Had he been alivetoday, he might have added, lest sustainability becompromised.

Global recognition of the possibility of eco-logical entrapment may now be similar to thatgiven to demographic pressures in the time lead-ing to the 1974 Bucharest conference. The spe-cial BMJ issue, not only on population, but alsooverconsumption, undoubtedly increased the pro-file of ecological factors as a critical issue for ourcommon future. King, the BMJ, and the papersthat implicitly recognize the possibility of ecologi-

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cal entrapment (King 1999; McMichael

et al.

1999;McMichael & Powles 1999) are to be congratulated.

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