VERTIA ENVELOPdNT

Mitary Monograph by Major Eiehard Jo Allen

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NOT FOR PUBLICATIO

VERTICAL ENVEJOM ENT

In many respects, vertical enelopmnt as executed b h i-

borne division is the modern counterpart of the light cavalry as

conceived and tsed so skillfully by Philip of Macedon and his son

Alexander the Great some five hundred ears before Christ. The

dif ficulties they experienced with the mass o.f the infantry

Phalanx locked with the enemy in a prolonged and often indecisive

struggle led them to seek a means of gaining a speedi-Ler decision.

Interestingly enough, their difficulties, manpower and materiel

resources have continueddto be a thorn. to military powers despite

new inventions and weapons for beyond the wildest imaginings of an

Alexander. Alexander's solution was found 'in the mobility of

the horse and the envelopment and shock -action of lar-"ge numbers of

mounted warriors.

In our most recent war, the armoe division- and the airborne

40 ~division were successifully emtployed in many instances -to speed the

dec ision, yet, the still numerous exarmples of prolonged engagements

of large mas se s of land. f orc es herald -an even greater ef font in the

of employment and the plannin f.or an opetainbf aahtAgainb' aaht

feg.1iment are best illustrated by historical example and it will be

the aim here to present, the problems encountered by a regimental

staff in an actual operation along with the solutions theref'or,

The operati-on which will be described is that of the 501st

Parachute Infantry Regiment of- the 101st Airborne Division in the

D day operations of' 6 June 194 in Normandy. During tbis operation,

the author w-vas Regimental S-3. This operation was chosen due to

its significance as the first successful airborne operation of such

magnituide and its many peculiarities resulting from the numerous

combat and service elements involved,

The regiment was activated in December 1942 with a cadre of

officers and, non-commissioned officers from many diff erent branches.

The bulk of the men were newly inducted selectees and the actual

training began in January- 1943. Eighteen months later the regiment

was in England reacbi f or operations, having completed the normal

cycle of training including two months in the Tennessee Maneuver

at ea. Each man had had an average of about fifteen jumps, approx-

imately one-third of wh')ich were night jumps. Insofar as it is.

possible to estimate such things,, it could be concluded that the

it was physically, psychologically and technically prepared- for

combat.

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that it was abdut one third smaller in size and was equipped with

a higher proportion of automatic weapons and miscellaneous items

peculiar to an-airborne unit.

Bef ore going into the details of planningndexeuino

the mission, some, of the background i*s needed. The'staff began

working on the operation at approximately D- 60, however, the

shi*f ting of enemy units required a change in Ithe plan of employ-

ment of the division as of D-14. Thu6", although the staff had been

f amiliar with the area of the. operation and had been working on the

bperation and had been working on the logistical plan .' or two

months, it wat then-faced with a comparatively short per-iod in which

to prepare a comklete revision of the tacti1cal plan.

The 101st Airborne Division and the 82nd Airborne Division were

assigned the mission of landing on the Cotentin Peninsula of France

in rear of Utah Beach area to seize certain key areas and generally,

facilitate the landing of the assault divisions of the First United

Army. In addition to the miAssion of seizing certain causeways on

Utah'Beach, the 101st DiJ*vi,sion was assigned the mission of seizing

the locks on the DOUEJS RIVER at LA -BARQUETTE and the destruction

of !two bridges across the D0U RTVER at CARENTAN. The latter part

of the Mission was in, turn assigned to'501st Parachtte Regiment less

3Ard Attalion n cD Ii in Reere.(Se.ap1 n 2)Nrmlcans

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Included in the Regimental mission wer.t~e following..instruction s:

(a) Drop zone In vicinity of BASE ADDE VILLE.

(b) Drop time- 0130 D day or P4A.(c) Flight pattern - (see map 1>

(d). Attachrne'nts:; (1) 907 "Glider Fie.d, Artillery landing H-I

vi cinityv HI ESVI LLE.

(2) -One Naval Fire Control Party with priority on fires

of U.S. Cruiser Quincy and. the U.S. Battleship Nevada

(e) Regiment prepared upon -relief by ground units to assemble

vicinity ISIJ it 0s iiion preparatory to seizure of

CARENTAN.

The mission as stated was clear enough and-with these'facts the

staff began the planning of the operatiobn.

TERRAIN

The area of operations of the regiment i1"ncluding -the rop zone

is a basin like area formed by' the DOUVtE RTVM,? and its lobks at

LA BARQUETTE. -The basin 'is approximately one Mile wide throughout

and is cut by numerous canals four to frive feet in width and five

to ten feet in depth, the canals serving the purpose of containinrg

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The road ne-t in the area consists of the main highway from

CHERBOURE to CARENTA~il a secondary road from vicini ty of Utah Beach

t o ST COME DUI MONT, and a net of wagon tra'it througho'ut the area.

The high ground at ST CC~E DU 1MONT commands the entire area.,

Observation and fields of fire are excellent, while cover and con-

cea'lment are poor.

ENEKY

The enemy was known to have elements of two divisions in the

general area of ,the operati on and was also known to be very conscious

of an airborne threat. Daily air photo coverage indicated continuoufs

construction of anti-gilder poles and gun Jimplacements in the entire.

area. Since the operations area was some f ive thousand yards in rear

of he tlnti Walit was estimated that the target area was the

area of the enemy's local reserves and local artillery for support

of the beach defenses. Insofar as the regimental area was concerned,

the best capability_ of the enemy Was that of opposing the op'erati on

inregimental strength 'within an hour after the drop.

LOGISTICAL PLANNING.

Although the puirpose here i s t o discuss tactical Planning, a,

brief reswnme bf the' logist-ical problem imay be advisable.

The entire supply problem centered around the fact that the

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was required s ince this tonnage is very small for a regiment even

for only twelve hours. This is particulaa*y true when consid-ri ng

the fact that this figure included all types of supplies and the

situation ird cated .that only a fifty per cent recovery could. be

expected.

The- mos t important result of the logistical planning'-ras the

decision to carry everything possible on the individual., Leg bagswere designed to hold all crew serwtk.weapons and radios except

the 3CR 284. In addition,, each individual-carried extra awmition,

mines., and explosives.

In this way the primary objective of the logistical plan was

obtained.- The regiment could fight after landing without the

immediate necessity of searching for equipment -bundles.

ANALYSIS

I The significance of the two bridges across the DOUVE RIVER

was obvious. They afforded the enemy access to the beachhead area.

If the locks on the Douve River actually corntrolled the water level in

the basin area, they too were an important -objective. About this

latter point, higher headquarters were not certain.4

The terrain offered little alternative as to the tactical

plan. The objectives could not be taken if the enemy held and was

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ST COMhE DU MONT made it inadvisable to jump directly on the hi-"gh

ground. The only solution then lay in dropping near the high

ground and thereaf ter attackingA it and the objectives at the slame

time.

The enemy~ sit.-uatiofi and terrain plus previous experienc-es with'

dispersion on night jumps indicated that there was a good probability

that the initial stages of' the :'action would be a battle -royal.

The fact that the drop wvas to be at night also greatlyt increased

the problem of planning the assembly.

In spite of these disadvantages, the regimb-dnt could expect to

have in its favor) surprise, confus-ion, and the knowled ge thZ-1t prior

to H1-1 hour all vehicles would be enemy vehicles.

TherLe was little choice in the matter of selecting the drop

zone and assembly area. As already mentioned above, higher head-

quater ha spcifed hatthe drop be in the vicinity of' the town

of BASS ADDEVILLE. This fact p1-us the fact that the tactical plan

demanded an area near ST COME DU MONT led to the selection of the

area east of and adjacent to BAST0 DEVLE

For the assembly, every possible aid was devised. Area assign-

ments, unit sounds (bugles, whistles, etc), unit lights, and the

The objectivJ"es of the regiment, were assignedgvnth1s

Battalion the mission of seizing the objectives assigned by

division and th4 2nd -Battalion the mission of. seizing the high

ground at ST COME DU MONT. Battalions were to move -'out immediatel

after assembl'iwithout further orders.

The final considerat14 in the tactical plan wasgie to the

problem which would arisej,,n the event, of a scattered drop or

Inability to assemble due 'ttd enemy activit~y. It was decided that

every -indtvidual be thrpughly instructed on the nature of the entire

mission and that ini case asseinbi" was impos sible thley were to

proceed to their &nit obje'ctivesindividually. This instruction Wa-,s

stressed. throughout briefing.

EXECUTION (spee maps 3 and .4)

As the. formation of, aircraft transpnorting the regiment approach-

ed the area of the drop, numerous clouds were encountered. The

result was a dispersion far grpeater than the most pessimiastic staff

memnber had imagind.Approxihately fortyprcnofteegmt

landed on or within two thotisand yards of the intented drop zone.

The remaining sixty pet 7cent landed from five to twenty miles away

in every direction. This fact plus the intense enemy fire received

maeteplanned assembly impossible. 'In additin h e atlo

was handicapped considerably by the loss of its entire staff,, the

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In spite of these dif ficulties, groiaps began to f orma as the

result. Of the, mo'vement of individuals toward the objectives. By

daylight, the regimental commander* was. still without communication

to any unit,,but he had. capotured the locks on the DOUVE RIVM with,

60t men. The Second battalion camander was attacking ST COM 4

DU MONT from th'e northeast with about three'hundited men-and a staff

0fficer was attacking ST COME DU. MONT fro-m the east with. about three

hundred~fifty men. The two bridges across the DOUVERIVERwere

hel4 by about twventy men each, but they were unable to destroy the

bridges because sufficient explosives were not available.

About one hour after daylight,- the regimental commnander was

i- contact-with existing -units. It Was then that the enemy began

a coordinated attack to el-iminate the two large groups pressing

ST 02 E DU YTMONT., Through the use of relayed messages, it was pdssible

to bring the full weight of the naval fire support against the

attack and the attack -was broken up.

By noon of D day tank and, artillery support ,from the beachhead

arrived and the emergenc-y had passed. Before the regimental'

COmmander could execute a, plan to dest'oythe two bridges, the enemy

blew them, fromn remote locations:

Thus, ith approximately one-half of the actual strength of the

SUMAARY

No single operation can be pointed out as an example which

will1 provide an inflexible rule for future use, however, it is

believed that this operation is at leatt indicative of the fact

that vertical envelopment'pan be successful underthe most adverse.

conditions.

The continued study -,n d planning f or such operatiorv is of vital

5cocer'toall tacticians today, not only f or the opportunities

they, themselves offer but also for the valuable lessons to be learn-

.ed for use in anti-airborne defense.

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