env.governance

8/14/2019 Env.governance

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Who Governs the Global Environment?

summarises key lessons from social scienceresearch in the area of global governance.

It is organised around five questions:

Important contributions of GECP studies

to national and internat ional research are

highlighted in text boxes.

Key academic references for each project

are listed at the end of the document.

This document can be accessed and

downloaded from the internet at

www.gecko.ac.uk.

The website also offers valuable links to

researchers, project descriptions and

further web resources.

1 Do international environmental regimes work?

2 How fair are international environmental regimes?

3 Can environmental and trade objectives be better integrated?

4 Do global issues always call for global act ion?

5 How can policy be orchestrated for many players at many levels?


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Despite some impressive progress over the past 30 years, protecting

the natural environment is still one of todays top global issues.

Industrial pollution and other headline dangers have been

successfully tackled in places. Yet old ills stubbornly persist and new

dangers have been recognised.

At the Earth Summit in Rio in 1992, the international community affirmed

that current patterns of economic and social development are not

sustainable. Since then there have been many constructive responses in

government, business and the civil society to meet the challenges that lie

ahead. But protecting the environment has been recognised as a broader

and more challenging task than it seemed:

- Achieving sustainable development will require significant changes in the

way economic activities are organised and lifestyles are secured. Producers

as well as consumers have a role in reducing this pressure.

- Environmental policies succeed only if they also promise social benefits

such as poverty reduction and work in ways that bolster business

competitiveness. Conversely, all policy domains need to incorporate

environmental and social aspirations.

- Uncertainty is central to environmental problem-solving. Decisions have to

deal with conflicting opinions about environmental problems, the risks they

pose to different groups in society, and the need to build trust and engage

citizens in solutions.

At the same time, processes of political decision-making are growing more

dispersed. The world has become more interdependent. Many decisions

have shifted to the international, regional and local level. Politics is

increasingly conducted outside traditional institutions. Officialdom has to

listen more closely to voices in business and at societys grassroots, and

involve them in the outcomes that they seek.

Re-thinking thequestions

Who governs the global environment? Preface 1


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Protecting the environment effectively and fairly in the absence of a clearly

defined political centre presents many predicaments. There are great

opportunities for more open, legitimate and flexible governance, but thereare also dangers that expectations are not met. What is at stake, therefore,

is a new form of participatory governance, operating through partnerships,

and acting across geographical space and time. This prospect involves fresh

ways of visualising futures and assisting people to shape their own destinies.

Who governs the global environment?Preface2

D eci si ons have to deal

with conflicting opinions

about environmental

problems, the r i sks they

pose to different groups in

soci ety, and the need to

build trust and

engage ci t i zensin solutions.


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Planet-wide environmental problems like climate change and depletion

of the ozone layer first became common knowledge and mainstream

political concerns in the early 1990 s, partly through the public and

media debates surrounding the Earth Summit. Many assumed that solutions

would mainly be up to governments co-operating at international level. Some

progress has since been made in this intergovernmental arena, yet many

feel frustrated by its slow pace.

Key lessons of the past decade have been that:

- International agreements are rarely easy to establish, implement and

enforce. We should view them not as magic bullets, but as political

frameworks for long-term co-operation and learning.

- To be effective and fair, environmental law-giving must recognise that

capacities, interests and priorities are not the same in Southern

developing countries as they are in Northern countries. Most current

environmental strategies, rules and institutions skate over development

issues.

- International agreements on trade and on the environment are largely

separated. Linking the two more closely would give national and

international environmental policies more muscle.

- International agreements are not a universal remedy for globalenvironmental problems and are no substitute for local commitment. The

nature of the problem and its causes should decide the level at which

action is most urgently needed.

- As powers to make political decisions become more distributed and

diffuse, governments have to act more and more as strategists and go-

betweens whose mandate is to reconcile the plural interests of different

stakeholder groups.

Who governs the global environment? Summary 3

Summary:What have we learnt aboutglobal environmentalgovernance?

I nternat i onal agreements

are not a universal

remedy for globalenvi ronmental probl ems

and are no substitute

for local

commitment.


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Who governs the global environment?4


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The Global Environmental Change Programme (GECP) has

spearheaded the UK research communitys input to understanding

and shaping the international management of environmental

problems. Two concepts - governance and regime - are central. By

governance we mean the rules by which we govern ourselves and regulate

the conduct of organisations in society. By regime we mean the collection of

legal, institutional and political processes through which governance is

carried out. Better governance is measured in terms of establishing

effective, legitimate, fair and enduring ways of protecting the environment.

In the past 20 years, natural scientists have identified global concerns such

as climate change, loss of natural biodiversity, acid rain and deforestation.To fix such problems seemed beyond the scope of any national

governments. New international pacts, conventions and protocols rooted in

a common commitment to sustainable development seemed the right

response. Today, there are several hundred international environmental

regimes.

The development of these regimes poses fundamental questions. How fair

are environmental agreements? Who sets the agenda? What is the link

between environmental and other objectives, especially economic and social

development? Countries set different priorities and have different ideas

about their responsibility for dealing with problems. Such differences must

be catered for, and not for ethical reasons alone. International agreements

will fail to deliver unless they embrace pluralism.

Social and political obstacles have meant that many international

environmental regimes have not lived up to expectations. Researchers have

taken this as a cue to rethink the question of who governs the global

environment? If international mechanisms are not always up to the task,

and if countries see few incentives to go it alone what alternatives are

there for finding co-operative solutions to these problems?

Who governs the global environment? Int roduct ion 5

Governing the globalenvironment

Over the l ast

decade we have seen both

the potentials, but alsothe severe limitations,

of a new international

approach to

environmental

i ssues.


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In the past, debates about international environmental policy focused on the

role of governments that signed up to agreements and treaties. In todays

more interconnected world, decisions are influenced by a wider range ofdifferent players.

Non-governmental organisations (NGOs), corporate and financial interests,

and consumers and citizens groups have won a louder voice in influencing

decisions. They also have a bigger hand in delivering action.

Thus over the last decade we have seen both the potentials, but also the

limitations, of a new international approach to environmental issues.

Reflections on this experience by GECP researchers and others have

pointed to important new directions for global environmental governance.

The debate has moved from a focus on governments on to a multitude of

partners; from the international level to governance at different levels; from

a predominantly environmental focus to a more integrated approach; and

from a largely formal, legalistic process to a more open and participatory

response. Taken together, such shifts in thinking imply a radical rethink in

global environmental governance arrangements established in the wake of

the Rio process.

Who governs the global environment?Introduction6


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The number of international agreements that deal with such matters

as environmental pollution or the protection of natural resources has

mushroomed in recent decades. This new phenomenon has

prompted researchers to probe how such agreements work and to query the

informal rules and procedures that surround them often collectively

referred to as international regimes .

Controversy over the contribution that such regimes can make to political

problem-solving has polarised the debate into two positions. A realist point

of view holds that we cannot and should not expect much from international

environmental co-operation because governments pursue only those policies

that suit their own interests. Since national interests nearly always collidewhen shared resources are at stake, the chances are that states will be

unwilling or unlikely to create strong regimes. In contrast, the

institutionalist position argues that political institutions can develop a

dynamic of their own once common material or ethical objectives are agreed

on as a must. Hence international co-operation can be an effective platform

for policy reform, though not always in the manner intended.

Empirical studies have shown that the success of regimes, although hard to

measure, varies greatly. For example, the regime on tropical timber is widely

seen as a failure, but that on stratospheric ozone is usually presented as a

success. Some cases seem to confirm the realist viewpoint. Negotiations

are arduous, states do not comply with agreed measures and effective

sanctions against non-compliance are rarely set in place. In other cases,

however, regimes can create a cascade of indirect effects. They can draw

attention to a problem, contribute to shared understanding of causes and

effects of specific problems and boost institutional capacity in specific

areas.

Who governs the global environment? 1 2 3 4 5 7

Do internationalenvironmental regimeswork?1

International regimes

have been established

for a variety of

environmental problems,

but with varying

success.

What can we learn from

past experiences?

Under what conditions

can they be successful?

How are effective

environmental regimes

designed?


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By analysing and comparing different regimes to find out how their varying

success can be explained, research suggested how future agreements

should be designed. The purpose of regimes is to avoid a situation where

some countries contribute to the abatement of pollution while others benefit

from it without sharing the burden, a phenomenon know as free-riding .

Regimes therefore aim to define rules that give all states incentives to co-

operate and to contribute to agreed remedial measures. The success of

regimes cannot be attributed to any single factor. Moreover, the appropriate

choice of structure always depends on circumstances. Detail matters. Even

so, some elements can be identified that tend to make environmental

regimes work better whatever the circumstances, including:

- rules that ensure a fair distribution of costs and benefits, for example by

varying demands on developed and developing countries, or by offering

poorer countries financial aid and technology transfer

- strong but acceptable non-compliance mechanisms that use carrots, like

free advice or financial aid, as well as sticks like the suspension of voting

rights or even trade sanctions

- a robust institutional structure, including a well-managed secretariat,

routine meetings of member governments, mechanisms for monitoring

compliance and harmonised data collection.

Nonetheless, it is increasingly recognised that the direct effect of these

formal rules is only one element among many that decide how effective aregime will prove.

Do international environmental

regimes work?

1 2 3 4 58

Empirical studies

have shown that

the success of regi mes,

although hard to

measure, varies

greatly.

Box 1 : Common cause

Robin Churchill and Lynda Warren looked at the negotiation,

implementation, impact and effectiveness of three sets of international

agreements to protect the atmosphere. The pacts in question were the

Vienna Convention and its linked Montreal Protocol on protection of the

ozone layer, the Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution

(LRTAP), and the EU Large Combustion Plants Directive.

The study revealed that the content of international air pollution

agreements is steered mainly by political and economic (as distinct from

scientific) factors. It usually represents what States have already achieved

or expect to achieve, so requires few new actions. This self-interested

agenda explains the high degree of compliance with the Montreal Protocol

and the first three protocols of the LRTAP Convention. In the absence of

scientific or political consensus a sensible way to proceed is by concludinga framework treaty that provides for later adoption of more specific

measures. The study also found more states are likely to participate if the

agreement contains differentiated obligations, whereby richer states are

assigned greater responsibilities to take action than poorer states. The

drawback to such exceptions is that they sometimes mean weakening the

agreement.

www.gecko.ac.uk


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Other soft factors can also play a crucial role. Regimes can not only give

material incentives for co-operation, but also shape the way those who

implement them define their interests. For example, they can choose to gain

long-term political credibility by committing themselves to ambitious

environmental policies, rather than trying to maximise short-term financial

benefits. Regimes have also helped build trust between governments and

bolstered their capacity to carry out effective policies. Though not always

tangible, a potential for extra social learning can be built into such

processes. These include:

- procedures for revising regime procedures and commitments

- implementation of review processes that identify and help countries finding

it difficult to fulfil their obligations

- transparent monitoring rules and conflict mediation processes to help

build trust

- bodies providing scientific, technical and economic advice on request.


regimes work?

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Box 2: Policing global pacts

Philippe Sands and James Cameron looked into mechanisms for securing

compliance to international environmental agreements such as the

Montreal Protocol, the Climate Change Convention and the International

Whaling Convention. Their research revealed that agreements must have

procedures that anticipate the full range of behaviour of countries with

diverse interests and varying levels of economic development.

Mechanisms for the transfer of technologies, the provision of financial

resources and for transparent reporting seem essential to encourage

compliance on the part of all parties.

Sands and Cameron also found that traditional means of settling

disputes through bilateral, or formal judicial or arbitration proceedings are

rarely if ever invoked. However, alternative non-compliance procedures

are being developed that take a more consultative approach and helpcountries that find it hard to meet their obligations. On the other hand, to

adopt an entirely soft approach is to risk weakening international legal

ties. The research therefore argues for procedures that identify and put

pressure on states that are capable of complying, but reluctant to act.

www.gecko.ac.uk

T he success of regi mes

cannot be attributedto any single factor,

but some common

el ements tend to

mak e regimes

work better.


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Two key lessons arise from GECP research into the effectiveness of

environmental regimes:

Structures and rules of international environmental regimes should not only

advance the formal aims of the regime, but also seek added gain in terms

of trust, capacity building and social learning.

Tell-tale qualities of effective regimes are flexibil ity and a capacity to adapt

institutions, rules and procedures, but without losing sight of the overall

objective.


regimes work?

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Box 3: Compliance check-ups

Owen Greene and Julian Salt probed into how environmental and arms

control agreements have tackled tasks like verification and monitoring of

agreed measures. What lessons, they asked, might these experiences

hold for verification and monitoring of national greenhouse gas emission

controls under the climate change convention? They found that

implementation review processes have important soft effects, which

include:

- helping treaty Parties and other stakeholders to learn about and fix

implementation problems

- building confidence

- adapting emission control regimes to changing conditions.

Verifying emissions of greenhouse gases is never an easy matter. Greene

and Salt propose new ways to identify and employ suitable proxy agencies

to improve verifiability, linked to guidelines for preparing national

inventories produced by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.

Subsequent international negotiations reflected the gist of these GECP

findings.

www.gecko.ac.uk

Soft factors

can play a

crucial role for

the success of

the regime.


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Sustainable development s headline message is that long-term

environmental stability, poverty relief and economic development can

and should be mutual goals. This concept represents a significant

advance on the debates of the 1970s and 1980s, when environmental

protection and economic development were often regarded as conflicting

aims. Many observers in industrialised nations accused the developing

world of over-exploiting vital global resources through deforestation and

other drastic forms of resource depletion.

Developing countries, for their part, eyed environmental policies warily as a

threat to their economic development options. In their view, industrialised

countries were to blame for most environmental problems, and it washypocritical of them to expect to deny poorer countries the right to pursue

the same level of industrial development.

Social justice and environmental protection might not always be compatible,

but the concept of sustainability requires policy for global environmental

security to embrace principles of fairness at the same time as spurring

economic prosperity. This agenda is a moral imperative in a world blighted

by poverty. But it is also a precondition for any successful co-operation

between North and South, for only agreements that are seen as fair will win

all-round participation.

General acceptance of the legitimate social priorities of poor countries doesnot define a fair international agreement. Negotiations at Rio over a draft

climate change convention bore striking witness to ways in which

fundamental questions of justice translate into practical political questions,

such as: How should we establish what levels of carbon a country can

release to the atmosphere? Should we aim for similar levels of emissions

per head of population or for equal cuts in all countries? Should

industrialised countries be called to account for historic emissions over

the past 100 years or more?


How fair are internationalenvironmental regimes?2

Industrialised countries

are responsible for a

large part of existing

environmental problems

and they are also better

placed to advance

solutions.

But production and

consumption in

developing countries

have increasing

environmental impact.

Do international

agreements take these

distinctive

responsibilities and

capabilities into

account?


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No widely accepted scale of values exists to help answer these questions.

Instead, the carbon emission targets agreed at the climate conference in

Kyoto were pieced together from a mix of environmental concerns, politicalpressures, economic interests, ethical considerations, and scientific advice.

How fair are international

environmental regimes?

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Box 4 : Intergenerational contract

Andrew Dobson reviewed the links between social justice and

environmental sustainability to track the evolution and connections

between these two widely cherished concepts. He used the resulting

typologies to assess how far concepts of justice can be reconciled with

those of sustainability. Results of Dobson s study showed that while

common ground can be found between these two sets of ideas and

traditions, it is by no means as extensive as many advocates of

sustainable development suppose.

The study offers a framework for thinking about justice and sustainability.

Policymakers have to sett le tough either/ or choices between

environmental sustainability and social justice. For instance, what is the

impact on the poor of an energy tax? The greatest promise of a truce

between sustainability and justice lies not so much between protagonists

for one or the other within the present generation, as between present

and future generations. This special between generations case rests on

the premise that what is being sustained is also what is being shared out,

a link that is often missing from the debate over struggles for justice and

fair shares within a generation.

www.gecko.ac.uk

Box 5: What the public sees

Graham Chapman, Ivor Gaber and Keval Kumar investigated how the

public perceives environmental issues in India and in the UK, and how

mass media coverage shapes these perceptions. They systemat ically

recorded and analysed the content of newspapers, radio and TV

programmes in both countries for six weeks during 1993. They also

interviewed journalists and ran focus groups to gauge the public reaction

to broadcast material.

For the British public, environmental problems happen elsewhere, often

in developing or former Eastern bloc countries. The roots of

environmentalism in the Northern media are in the speeches of

politicians, lobbying on the part of the scientific community, and in

appealing images of wildlife on TV. Environmental concern in India stems

from immediate anxieties such as drought and famine. Environmental

stories are presented in terms of their relationship to development.

Environmentalism for its own sake is strong only among a tiny English-

speaking elite. For most Indians, the West s global environmental

concerns are seen as a new breed of colonialism. The notion that there

is one world is remote in both countries.

www.gecko

.ac

.uk


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Some environmental regimes offer incentives for the transfer of clean

technologies to the South, financial aid or differential sets of obligations.

For example, the Montreal Protocol on ozone depleting substances imposesstricter obligations for developed than for developing countries. It also

established a multilateral fund to compensate developing countries for

complying with the protocol so no country is made worse off by joining than

by remaining outside. On the other hand, these mechanisms have proved

hard to apply and so far their effects are mixed.

Past experience with fairness mechanisms in international regimes therefore

suggests that current instruments only have a very limited effect.

The following general lessons can be drawn:

- International regimes should make use of instruments such as technology

transfer, green aid and differentiated obligations to spread the load. Thereis a need to take account of wider issues such as debt, trade relations and

the representation of southern interests in international fora.

- As the environmental impact of developing countries grows, the co-

operation of North and South in environmental regimes becomes more vital.

Stringent global agreements will only be reached if they address social and

economic development in the South more effectively.

How fair are international environmental

regimes?

1 2 3 4 5 13

Box 6 : In from t he cold

Malcolm Hill examined the potential for using transfer of cleaner

technologies to reduce pollution in the former Soviet Union. Hisinvestigations revealed that a strong trend in favour of using natural gas

for power generation has reduced emissions, especially in European

Russia where they were affecting nearby parts of Western Europe.

Most coal-fired power stations in the former Soviet Union are too old to

justify high levels of investment in emission control equipment.

Opportunities for reducing emissions therefore arise mostly when new

power stations are being constructed. Nevertheless, building new

efficient power stations would remove heat that is currently brought to

homes and could leave needy people literally out in the cold. Another

barrier to technology transfer could be that power-engineering factories

face serious threats to business survival. It follows that potential for

technology transfer in Russia s electricity sector could be lower thanpreviously assumed.

www

.gecko.ac.uk


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By and large, international environmental regimes function in isolation

from other policy regimes that leverage major ecological impacts,

not least international trade policy.

Two principal concerns arise:

- Will the increasingly free international flow of goods, investment and

services undermine national environmental policies?

- Could a dominant global trading system override international

environmental treaties?

Global trade liberalisation may allow companies to gain competitive

advantage by relocating production sites to less regulated countries -pollution havens - then selling their products to countries with stricter

environmental policies. This loophole could dissuade governments from

taking environmental measures and even prompt a perverse race to the

bottom as countries remove safeguards in an effort to attract investment.

Unless countries were barred from preventing movements of dirty goods,

national environmental policies could have the effect of displacing polluting

activities into other parts of the world, instead of curbing them.

A clash of imperatives between trade systems and environment instruments

can be prevented if trade systems and environmental agreements are

integrated from the outset. Nonetheless, environmental provisos in

international trade agreements must not be abused to camouflage trade

barriers, especially if they are used to deny market access to developing

countries. Measures designed to have a combined effect on trade, as well

as on environmental protection, such as subsidy cuts for harmful

agricultural practices, should be stepped up and toughened.

Who governs the global environment?1 2 3 4 514

Can environmental andtrade objectives be betterintegrated?3

Does trade undermine

environmental

policies?

How can trade and


be better integrated?

Who should decide if

products are safe and

environmentally

friendly enough to be

traded internationally?


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This and other GECP research shows that the potential for ecological

dumping depends on specific conditions in countries, sectors and

companies. The environmental impact of international trade should not beexaggerated, but can give grounds for serious concern.

Trade agreements that aim to encourage the exchange of goods and

services between countries, such as the trading system of the World Trade

Organisation (WTO), still largely ignore environmental and social imperatives.

This can blunt the impact of national and international environmental

policies.

Can environmental and trade objectives


1 2 3 4 5 15

Box 7: Does greening hurt?

Alistair Ulph focused fresh scrutiny on research literature supporting the

argument that environmental policy has little impact on trade habits or

structures. This argument is based on an assumption that markets for

international trade are competitive. But that is not always the case.

By extending computer models of trade with imperfect competition, to

include environmental policies, Ulph studied the likely effects on the

chemical industry if Europe unilaterally introduced an energy tax. In this

scenario, a relat ively modest energy tax rate would force Europe s basic

chemicals industry to close down, partly on account of higher costs,

partly through knock-on relocation of suppliers between countries.

The study concludes that under conditions where competition is

imperfect, governments will seek to manipulate their environmentalpolicies for strategic trading reasons. If even only slightly more stringent

policies are put in place, the change can wipe out a countrys industrial

base in some sectors. According to the research, however, the

uncertainties and risks involved mean that no simplistic prediction can

help governments decide which instrument to choose, and policy-makers

should tread with care.

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w.gecko.ac.uk

Box 8: Trading at cross-purposes

Work by Alyson Warhurst marshals evidence that economic globalisationcan create positive environmental effects. Warhurst examined the

international mining and mineral processing industry to find out whether

clean technology transfer is happening, and how barriers to transfer can

be removed. Her main finding was that foreign direct investment in

developing countries can encourage the diffusion of clean technology,

especially against a background of privatisation, liberalisation and

strategic alliances. Rather than taking advantage of lower environmental

standards in developing countries, large firms studied sought commercial

advantages by transferring environmentally advanced technologies. They

did so with a view to fast returns and, as a result, sometimes exceeded

regulatory requirements.

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w.gecko.ac.uk


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Steps to establish a clearer distinction between environmental requirements

that are legitimate, and requirements that mask unfair trade barriers have

been called for by many commentators. The North American Free TradeAgreement (NAFTA) made some effort to respond to such calls. The questions

of who makes international environmental rules, and on what basis, are also

troubling. In some cases, WTO rules and international environmental

agreements collide head-on. For example, a UN protocol intended to regulate

the trade of genetically modified organisms under the biodiversity convention

was stuck for a long time because some countries argue that the protocol

would not comply with WTO rules on free trade.

The relationship between environmental agreements and trade agreements

needs to be clarified. Free trade need not clash with legitimate environmental

regulations at international level. Decisions in both realms should to be based

on scientific assessments that take responsible account of the risks

associated with new technologies and exercise precaution.

The following key lessons can be drawn:

- International trade can undermine national and environmental policies.

This can be prevented if trade systems and environmental agreements

become better integrated.

- Environmental mechanisms in trade agreements must not be abused as

trade barriers, especially to deny market access for developing countries.

- Measures that address trade as well as environmental issues, for example

reducing subsidies for ecologically harmful agricultural practices, should be

implemented more vigorously.

Can environmental and trade objectives


1 2 3 4 516

Box 9: Better safe than sorry

Brian Wynne, Andy Stirling, Chris Williams and other GECP researchers

have questioned the role of science in the decision-making process.

Science has been given a lead role in mediating disputes about the safety

and environmental impact of traded goods, such as GM food and meat

produced with the use of hormones. Research suggests that WTO will

need to be both more rigorous and more precautionary in its use of

regulatory science in order to address the controversy about its decisions.

Orthodox risk assessments based on the balance of probabilities play a

big part in WTO rulings on the safety of new products. Yet such

assessments can only characterise some of the potential outcomes of

using new products. Precautionary approaches should be favoured over

tests of probability as they acknowledge our incomplete knowledge of

potential outcomes, and do not assume new products are safe till proven

otherwise. Trade rules should acknowledge that scienti fic enquiry does not

always produce single answers, and that environmental and health

concerns must be met if the advantages of free trade are to last.

www.gecko.ac.uk


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Global environmental regimes in which national governments co-

operate to meet shared objectives are not the only response to

apparently global problems. So far their success has proven

limited. As a form of global governance without global government , regimes

rely on voluntary action by countries. At the same time, examples of

regional environmental regimes and local adaptation to environmental

change suggest that the global is not always the best level for action.

This recognition of many levels of governance reflects a perception that

government is becoming more dispersed. The capacity of national

governments to exercise power is being transformed. Local, regional and

international institutions have gained prominence, as have independentagencies and NGOs. This reflects wider trends in free societies, but is also

an acknowledgement that increasingly complex political, economic and

social systems cannot be governed from a single level.

Regional environmental regimes, defined by geographical features like seas

and river catchments rather than by political borders, may offer greater

opportunities to tackle problems at the appropriate level. They pay closer

attention to regional conditions and line up the formulation of policy

measures with the capacity to implement them. Regional international co-

operation is not new, but could provide a strong model for effective

collaboration in the future.


Do global issues alwayscall for global action?4

Global regimes do not

always achieve

worthwhile goals.

Is local action likely to

be more efficient, fair

and apt to reconcile

different interests?

Are regional


a better alternative?


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Impacts of environmental change on natural and social systems form the

subject of much recent research. There has been a shift away from studying

physical impacts and physical vulnerability, such as the impact of flooding

on crops, to a more integrated understanding of natural risks, and social

and economic strategies for coping with them. This stems from earlier

findings that environmental crises are often not so much caused by natural

events as by political or socio-economic wrong turns. Examples are

inappropriate government policies, inequitable distribution of incomes and

land and inappropriate resource management. Such misjudgements,

distortions and omissions appear to be the main causes of the vulnerability

of people to environmental change.

Research aimed at disentangling the links between natural and social

systems has revealed that connections between, for example, climatic

conditions and agricultural practices are far more complex than previously

thought. They are best understood through concepts such as vulnerability

and adaptive capacity. Nurturing local capacity to cope with environmentalchange and disasters is often a more effective policy response than

providing for international crisis relief after the event. Such capacity will be a

vital item in the responses that will enable present and future generations

to adjust to the impacts of climate change and other long-range

environmental threats.

Do global issues always call for

global action?

1 2 3 4 518

Box 10: Pole positions

Research by Clive Archer and David Scrivener examined how mounting

concerns over environmental degradation in the Arctic region translated

into new frameworks for environmental co-operation, such as the

International Arctic Science Committee and the Arctic Environmental

Protection Strategy. They found these frameworks were mutually reinforcing

and showed how regional co-operation was made possible by improving

East-West political relations. On the other hand, competition between

these bodies arose for lack of political leadership to steer Arctic co-

operation. So far neither framework has had much impact on the region s

environmental problems. There is, moreover, little evidence that they have

significantly altered the internal policies of Arctic states.

Even so, they have achieved more than many expected. For example,

science into problems such as the radioactive contamination of the

Western Russian Arctic is being co-ordinated regionally. Fresh attention

has been brought to the Arctic, bolstering the capacity of governments to

play an informed role in environmental management.

www.gecko.ac.uk


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Key lessons about the relationship between environmental problems and

the level at which action should be taken include:

- International policymaking is not the only way in which environmental

damage can be remedied. There is often a need to help people adapt tochange. The challenge is to identify the right level of action.

- Before being tackled globally , environmental problems need to be

carefully scrutinised. Are the symptoms of the problem global or only

transboundary? Are the causes global or local? Are the effects natural or

the upshot of human decisions and actions?

Do global issues always call for

global action?

1 2 3 4 5 19

Box 11: Vulnerable in Vietnam

Neil Adger and Mick Kelly modelled the likely effects of climate change on

lives and livelihoods in northern Vietnam, against a backdrop of

economic transition. They developed a concept labelled social

vulnerability. For the individual, social vulnerability is primarily determined

by access to resources. At a collective level it is shaped more by

institutional and political factors.

Various lessons emerged. Policy measures to reduce vulnerability should

clearly set their sights on poverty reduction as a clear-cut priority. Risk-

spreading through income diversification can be promoted in a number of

ways. In northern Vietnam, as elsewhere, loss of rights to commonly-held

resources, such as fisheries, and the inefficiency of outmoded forms of

collective action make communities more vulnerable.

At a deeper level, inequitable distribution of resources leads to greater

vulnerabilities to the impacts of climate change. Alternative resource use

strategies, such as mangrove rehabilitation, would help meet current

development needs, as well as reducing longer-term impacts.

www.gecko.ac.uk

T he abi l i ty to cope

wi th envi ronmental

change i s best

devel oped at

the local level.


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Implementing environmental policies is assigned to an increasingly

complex array of interests, ways and means. Different levels of

governance interact and a miscellany of interests competes for a lead

role in the policy process. The traditional perception of international policy

as an inter-state system in which sovereign governments negotiate without

giving way to supranational authority seems inadequate to describe the

types of governance that are now emerging.

It is also clear that a shift to a powerful global government is not realistic.

Global governance is (and will largely remain) governance without a central

power hierarchy able to impose its will. For a number of political, socio-

economic and technological reasons, the cast of players has increased,

most visibly in the growing influence of NGOs. International regimes have

contributed much to this process.

The effectiveness and legitimacy of international environmental regimes

depends on how different levels of policy-making interact with one another.

Yet understanding of this process is still at an early stage. Interaction varies

from case to case. No general model of multi-level governance exists.

The flow of responsibility and authority is specific to the regime in question,

evoking a new politics and a new set of mechanisms every time.

Relations between richer and poorer countries have to be negotiated

anew at every turn.

Who governs the global environment?1 2 3 4 520

How can policy beorchestrated for manyplayers at many levels?5

If environmental

decision-making is

becoming more

dispersed, there is a

risk of confusion and

loss of momentum.

How can mult i-level

governance be made

to work?

What is the role of

governments, and of

other stakeholders

such as businesses,

citizens, local

authorities and interest

groups?


23/28

Regimes still provide an important focus for analysis, but organisations

(including business) not formally part of them can also play a significant

role. Viewed in this way, regimes provide a basis for alliances, rather than

defining standard solutions. The same policy formulae are not always

appropriate for national or local circumstances. For example, Western

climate policies would not always be appropriate for developing countries.

How can policy be orchestrated for many

players at many levels?

1 2 3 4 5 21

Box 12: Strategy samba

A study by Jacqueline Roddick examined the involvement of the Latin

American region in the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, with a focus on Brazil,

Colombia and Costa Rica. Roddick found that the Rio conference

strengthened NGOs in the countries studied and helped bring them

together. Increased NGO involvement has also been part of a wider

process of democratisation and decentralisation.

In Colombia and Costa Rica, for example, new regulatory controls and

economic incentives have been created, as well as new arrangements

such as Sustainable Development Commissions. In Brazil, international

pressure and local support for the concepts such as eco-development

contributed to pioneering local experiments in urban sustainable

development, despite fierce social tensions. The research highlightsthe fundamental effects international regimes can have on political

structures, institutions and instruments within countries.

www.gecko.ac.uk

Box 1 3 : Thinking regionally

Philip Lowe and Stephen Ward analysed how UK environmental policy

changed through Britain s membership of the European Community.

Their study showed how Britain s previously fragmented and pragmatic

approach to environmental problems has been modified by the weight of

EU directives and resulting systematic legal frameworks. As a result,much of the UKs highly flexible style of regulation has been codified

and made subject to legally defined standards, whilst the government

has been obliged to crystallise and formalise national policy.

European integration has also led to higher standards of protection

being adopted in the UK in all sub-sectors of environmental policy.

Lowe and Ward also observed that influence has been a two-way process.

The main British contributions to European environmental policy have

tended to be procedural rather than substantive, such as waste

management plans, environmental auditing and integrated pollut ion

control. The researchers conclude that British environmental policy and

politics can no longer be understood outside their European context.

www.gecko.ac.uk


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A number of key lessons emerge from these findings:

- Because decisions are taken in complex relationships between different

agents of policy, governments have become nodes for communication and

decision-making, constantly interacting with concerned groups.

- Before the efficiency of links between levels can be improved, policy-

makers have to acknowledge the need for complex processes of bargaining

involving several policy areas at once. Barriers to co-operation and

questions of competency, transparency and legitimacy need to be

recognised and overcome.

How can policy be orchestrated for

many players at many levels?

1 2 3 4 522

Box 14: A new policy climate

Andrew Jordan and Tim O Riordan studied the pathways by which

international agreements are implemented in national contexts. By cross-

matching theories of international relations with theories of domestic

public policy they analysed the politics surrounding the implementation of

the climate change and ozone depletion conventions. Using case studies

of UK and other EU Member States, Jordan and ORiordan tracked how

international policy continues to be made and then re-made through the

domestic implementation process.

Across all the states studied, national practices and traditions affected

(and in turn were affected by) the international agreement in question.

The study concludes that policy stakeholders need to view international

policymaking as an ongoing, multi-level challenge. It also underlines theneed for academics to study policies throughout their full life cycle, from

initiation to final implementation.

www.gecko.ac.uk


25/28

Experience over the past ten years of research has shown that

international regimes can make a useful contribution to mobilising

people and political institutions to cope with global environmental

change. However, we must remain realistic about their limitations. In order

to make these institutions more effective, we must deal with a number of

potential weaknesses.

For example, ways have to be found to integrate agreements and policies

across different areas such as forests, climate protection and biodiversity.

In the future greater success may be achieved by combining these domains

of environmental action within unified regimes at a regional, rather than a

global, level. Environment and development imperatives have to bereconciled in more comprehensible ways if poorer countries are to be

encouraged to co-operate. Even though global agreements can be improved,

research has emphasised the need to widen their focus so they make

sense in the context of local, regional and national levels of governance.

This conclusion, however, raises awkward issues. One of tomorrows big

new challenges will be to manage the linkages between levels, for example

between global environmental regimes, national governments and local

communities. Yet the new pluralism raises questions about the legitimacy of

the political influence of NGOs, corporations and other groups. New

processes will have to be developed that ensure that these more complex

processes of environmental governance also become more transparent and

accountable.


Unansweredquestions


26/28

Box 8: Trading at cross-purposes

Warhurst A (1999) Technology Transfer and the

Diffusion of Clean Technology: Public Policy and

Corporate Strategy. CRC Press: Florida.

Box 9: Better safe than sorry

Andy Stirling (1999) On Science and Precaution in the

Management of Technological Risk. Final Report of a

project for the EC Forward Studies Unit under the

auspices of the ESTO Network.

Alister Scott, Andy Stirling, Nick Mabey, Frans Berkhout,

Chris Williams, Chris Rose, Michael Jacobs, Robin

Grove-White, Ian Scoones, Melissa Leach (1999)

Precautionary Approach to Risk Assessment , Nature

Vol 402, p. 348.

Box 10: Pole positions

Scrivener D (1995) Environmental Co-operation in the

Euro-Arctic. Environmental Polit ics, Vol 4 No 2, Frank

Cass: London, pp. 320-327.

Box 11: Vulnerable in Vietnam

Adger WN (1999) Social Vulnerability to Climate Change

and Extremes in Coastal Vietnam. World Development,

Vol 27 No 2.

Box 12: Strategy samba

Roddick J (1997) Earth Summit North and South:

Building a Safe House in the Winds of Change. Global

Environmental Change, Vol 7 No 2, pp. 147-165.

Box 13: Thinking regionally

Lowe P and Ward S (1998) British Environmental Policy

and Europe: Politics and Policy in Transition. Routledge:

London.

Box 14: A new policy climate

Jordan AJ (1998) The Ozone Endgame: The

Implementation of the Montreal Protocol in the UK.

Environmental Politics, 7, 4, pp. 23-52.

Box 1: Common cause

Churchill R and Kutting G (1994) International

Environmental Agreements and the Free Movement of

Goods in the EC: The Case of the Montreal Protocol.

European Environmental Law Review, Vol 3,

pp. 329-335.

Churchill R, Kutting G and Warren L (1995)

The 1994 UN ECE Sulphur Protocol . Journal of

Environmental Law, Vol 7 No 2, Oxford University

Press: Oxford, pp. 169-197.

Box 2: Policing global pacts

Cameron J, Werksman J, Roderick P (ed) (1996)

Improving Compliance with International

Environmental Law. Earthscan: London.

Box 3: Compliance check-ups

Greene O and Salt J (1993) Verification Issues in the

Development of an Effective Climate Change

Convention. World Resource Review, Vol 5 No 3,

pp.271-285.

Box 4 : I ntergenerational contract

Dobson A (1998) Justice and the Environment.

Oxford University Press.

Dobson A (1996) Environmental Sustainabilities: An

Analysis and a Typology. Environmental Politics, Vol 5

No 3, pp. 401-428.

Box 5 : What the public sees

Anderson A and Gaber I (1993) The Road from Rio:

the Causes of Environmental Antisappointment . In:

Intermedia, Vol 21 No 6, pp. 27-29.

Box 6: In from the coldHill MR (1997) Environment and Technology in the

Former USSR : The Case of Acid Rain and Power

Generation. Edward Elgar: Cheltenham.

Environmental Economics, pp. 40-43.

Box 7: Does greening hurt?

Ulph, A M (1996) Environmental Policy and

International trade when Government and Producers

Act Strategically. Journal of Environmental Economics

and Management, Vol 30(3), pp. 265-281.

References1 2 3 4 524


27/28

Credits 1 2 3 4 5 25

Text: Julia Hertin, Ian Scoones, Frans Berkhout

Advice and comments: Louise Daniel, Andy Jordan, Robert Lamb,Tim O Riordan, Alister Scott, Jim Skea

We would like to thank the members of the GEC advisory committees for

very valuable advice:

Dr Helen apSimon, Dr Janet Asherson, Professor Jacquie Burgess, Christine

Drury, Ian Dwyer, Dr Paul Ekins, Nigel Gilbert, Dr Charlotte Grezo, Professor

Robin Grove-White, Professor Alan Irwin, Peter Jones, Dr Andrew Jordan,

Duncan McLaren, Dr Jane Metcalfe, Professor Tim ORiordan, Ronan Palmer,

Professor Judith Petts, Nigel Riglar, Chris Rose, Bridget Rosewell, Richard

Sandbrook, Dr Andrew Skinner, Professor Alistair Ulph, Professor John

Vogler, Bernie Walsh, Professor Alan Warde, Professor John Whalley,

Dr Stephen Young.

Design: Michael Munday 01273 483560

Print: APR Printing & Design Ltd

The document should be referenced as:

ESRC Global Environmental Change Programme (2000)


University of Sussex, Brighton

ISBN 0-903622-92-0


28/28

The Global Environment al Change Progr amme (GECP) is a

ten-year research programme established to bring social science expertise

to bear on environmental research with global implications. Supported by

the Economic and Social Research Council, the Programme has run since

1991. It has supported 150 empirical research projects, Fellowships and

PhD studentships across the UK. The programme ends in June 2000.

The findings of the GECP are presented in a set of documents covering

three thematic areas:

Risky Choices, Soft Disasters:

environmental decision making under uncertainty


Producing Greener, Consuming Smarter

All three documents can be accessed and downloaded from the internet at

www.gecko.ac.uk. The website also offers valuable links to researchers,

project descriptions and further web resources.

Until June 2000, when the programme ends, The Global Environmental

Change Programme Office is at:

Mantell Building, University of Sussex, Falmer, Brighton BN1 9RF

Tel: 01273 678935, fax: 01273 604483, email: [email protected]

The website will remain at www.gecko.ac.uk.

The Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) promotes and

supports research in the social sciences. By advancing knowledge, the

ESRC aims to contribute to the UKs economic competitiveness, the

effectiveness of public services and the quality of life.

For more information about the ESRC, visit the web site

www.esrc.ac.uk or contact:

External Relations Division,

ESRC, Polaris House, North Star Avenue, Swindon SN2 1UJ

Tel: 01793-413122, fax 01793-413130.

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