environmental rationalities and the development state in east asia: prospects for a sustainability...

Technological Forecasting & Social Change 76 (2009) 229–240

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Technological Forecasting & Social Change

Environmental rationalities and the development state in East Asia:Prospects for a sustainability transition

David Angel a,⁎, Michael T. Rock b

a Clark University, Worcester, MA, USAb Bryn Mawr College, Bryn Mawr, PA, USA

a r t i c l e i n f o

⁎ Corresponding author. Graduate School of GeograE-mail address: [email protected] (D. Angel).

0040-1625/$ – see front matter © 2008 Elsevier Inc.doi:10.1016/j.techfore.2008.01.004

a b s t r a c t

Article history:Received 13 September 2007Received in revised form 6 January 2008Accepted 18 January 2008

This paper reviews what is known about recent trends in environmental governance amongthe newly industrializing countries of East Asia and the implications of these developments fora sustainability transition within the region. The conceptual starting point for the review isresearch that examines sustainability transitions within the framework of a multi-levelperspective on system innovation. One of the challenges presented by this framework is that ofunderstanding how existing political economies and governance structures promote stabilityor change in socio-technical regimes. By socio-technical regimes we mean the predominantorganizational, social and technological configurations through which societal needs areconstituted andmet. In the case of the rapidly industrializing and urbanizing economies of EastAsia, the trajectory of socio-technical regimes will have profound consequences for local,regional and global environments. Our review of trends in environmental governance as theyrelate to socio-technical regimes within the region traces a pattern of initial efforts tostrengthen environmental regulatory regimes very much along the lines of the policy modelsof OECD economies. The degree to which these initial efforts have taken root varies fromcountry to country in the region. What is beginning to emerge in several countries within theregion, however, are a variety of policy and institutional innovations that hold promise foropening up spaces for change in socio-technical regimes, and for creating opportunities fornew pathways of industrialization and urbanization to take hold that are less pollution,materials and energy-intensive.

© 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Keywords:Environmental governanceTechnologySustainability transitionEast Asia

Contents

1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2302. Environmental rationalities and the development state. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2323. Environmental governance reform: building capacity for environmental regulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2324. Assessing the effectiveness of pollution control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2335. Environmental governance reform: alternative approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2356. Beyond industrial and technological capability building . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2377. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239

phy, Clark University, 950 Main Street, Worcester MA 01610, USA.

All rights reserved.

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230 D. Angel, M.T. Rock / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 76 (2009) 229–240

1. Introduction

In prior work we examined the pathways taken and strategies used by industrializing economies in East Asia to improveenvironmental quality in the context of very rapid urban-industrial growth [1,2]. The focus was upon the ways in which many ofthe East Asian newly industrializing countries (NICs) over the past three decades were able to shift from a development pathwaycharacterized by some observers as ‘grow now and clean up later’, and from urban environmental conditions that were among theworst in the world, toward a pathway marked by incremental improvements in ambient urban air quality and other importantdimensions of environmental performance and resource use. The goal of the current paper is to extend this analysis to thechallenge of achieving a sustainability transition within these East Asian economies. For all the welcome successes in addressingthe environmental effects of rapid urban-industrial growth within the region, these successes can reasonably be described asfalling within existing socio-technical regimes with regard to intensity of resource use, pollution per unit of output, and other keymarkers of the economy–environment interface. In part because of the sheer scale of urban and industrial growth underwaywithin East Asian economies, such incremental improvements in environmental performance are unlikely to be sufficient toaddress local, regional and global environmental challenges, including trans-boundary air pollution, and the worldwide growth ingreenhouse gas emissions.

Thus in this paper our interest is in the ways in which the political economies and governance structures used to promoteimprovements toward the performance frontier of existing socio-technical regimes within the newly industrializing economies ofEast Asia might also support a shift toward new socio-technical regimes marked by dramatically lower levels of resource use andpollution per unit of output. By socio-technical regimes we mean the predominant organizational, social and technologicalconfigurations through which societal needs are constituted and met. Our conceptual point of departure is that of a sustainabilitytransition. Specifically, we seek to take up recent work within the field of systems innovation that has explored the ways in whichtransition occurs from one socio-technical regime to another. Within this prior work, transitions in socio-technical regimes areportrayed as non-linear shifts from one dynamically-stable state to another. Such regime transitions are described as havingemergent properties in the sense that much important structural change is unanticipated by the actors involved, and is theconsequence of multiple intersecting and at times contradictory processes. Regime shifts are also recognized as multi-scalar andoperating onmultiple time horizons. It is a fundamental premise of much of this literature that while most shifts in socio-technicalregimes involve major changes in technology, such changes in technology are deeply embedded in societies, that is in norms,values, laws, modes of governance, social relations and culture. Our core interest in this paper lies in an examination of the extentto which the political economy and environmental governance structures within East Asia, that in recent years have generatedsome success in improving environmental performance, will be conducive to efforts to achieve transitions in socio-technicalregime.

As the empirical context for the analysis, East Asia is of interest first and foremost because of the very rapid and large scaleprocesses of industrialization and urbanization currently underway within many countries in the region. Absent a major shift inthe energy, materials and pollution intensity of economic activity among these newly industrializing economies, the growth inresource use and pressure on the local and global environment attendant on industrialization and urbanization will be very large.Beyond the growth trajectory of these countries, the development pathways pursued successfully within the region, based aboveall on the accumulation of technological know-how and on industrial capability building, raise interesting questions concerningthe potential to harness these technological and industrial capabilities toward the challenge of a sustainability transition. Thestatus of many of these countries as late industrializers, along with their deep integration within global production networks andwith global markets, potentially open up new sources of influence on socio-technical regime change. While focused on theseshared structural characteristics of development pathways, however, it is equally important to keep in mind the large differencesamong countries within the region, ranging from the size of economies (from a city-state such as Singapore to the People'sRepublic of China) to the political structures of governance, and the varied levels of urbanization and of economic development.The geographical extent of economic activity in China, for example, along with major regional and urban–rural contrasts ineconomic welfare, present additional and distinctive challenges in promoting change in support of a sustainability transitionwithin the region [3].

Within the emerging body of research concernedwith socio-technical regimes, we draw particularly on two lines of work. First,Geels [4] and others have advocated for a multi-level perspective on systems innovation that analyses change in terms of theintersection of niches, regimes and landscapes. The approach is centrally focused on technology development. For reasonshighlighted below, such an analytical framing is something of a ‘good fit’ for the development pathways pursued by the East AsianNICs. Within this framing, there is a complex and dynamic interplay among particular technology niches (such as gasoline basedpassenger automobiles), socio-technical regimes (such as urban-industrial transportation and energy systems) and broaderdevelopments (such as the operation of market-based economies) that both enable and constrain actions within technologicalniches as well as the stability or dynamism of socio-technical regimes. The advantage of this approach is that it begins to introduceintermediate level categories that are more amenable to empirical and historical scrutiny than are broader concepts of transition.Thus prior research within this framework has examined how promising new technologies struggle to achieve traction in the faceof more mature existing technologies (such as efforts to introduce wind-based energy supply). One of the key findings of priorresearch is the strong path-dependency that typically builds up within existing socio-technical regimes [5,6].

Responding to the challenge of overcoming path-dependency, the second line of work that we draw upon focuses on the typesof governance structures, institutions and policy practices that might create opportunities for innovationwithin new technologicalniches, andmore generally, promote shifts in socio-technical regimes in linewith a sustainability transition [7]. The premise here is

231D. Angel, M.T. Rock / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 76 (2009) 229–240

that institutional reforms that open-up and facilitate innovation in technological niches, and that accelerate and deepen the impactof such innovation on an existing socio-technical regime, offer one of the most promising interventions for facilitating socio-technical regime change. The research also seeks to map out broader developments that may be disruptive of existing hegemonicsocio-technical regimes and thus create opportunities for promoting momentum within new socio-technical niches. Among theinterventions that have been explored is the use of scenario tools for sustainable production and consumption, subsidizinginvestments in new technological niches, creating spaces and platforms for public dialogue on alternative futures, and buildingstakeholder support for technological alternatives. Much of the existing work along these lines has been conducted in the contextof selected Western European economies [8]. The recommended policy interventions are reflective of the specific historical andnational contexts of governance in these regions, including for example the competence of government institutions, cultures ofpolicy formation and decision making, and so on. The question remains as to whether these interventions would travel well toother institutional contexts, and more broadly, how institutions and governance mediate the connections between landscapes,socio-technical regimes, and niches described within the systems innovation framework. At the same time, there are in Japan,South Korea and elsewhere in East Asia examples of successful approaches toward promoting the emergence of new socio-technical configurations, ranging from policy interventions in support of low emissions vehicles, to management of urbantransportation systems to reduce vehicle emissions [9,10].

In this paper we examine the ways in which the policy interventions considered within the framework of systems innovationare compatible with the political economies and governance structures that have supported recent environmental improvementswithin the East Asian NICs, and the implications of these interventions for efforts to promote a sustainability transition.We are alsointerested in whether the political economies of East Asia suggest alternative approaches toward inducing socio-technical regimechange to those identified above. Our analysis draws primarily on the experience of China, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand inaddressing environmental concerns associated with rapid urban and industrial growth over the past two decades, and then morerecently, the efforts underway in these countries to explore potential pathways toward a sustainability transition. While these fourcountries do not present a comprehensive view of the experience of newly industrializing countries within East Asia, they docapture much of the diversity of economic scale, political economy, governance, and institutional structure that likely mediate theimpact of policy interventions on the dynamics of existing and emerging socio-technical regimes in support of a sustainabilitytransition within the region.

As is discussed in detail below, the key starting pointing for our analysis is consideration of the role of the capitalistdevelopment state [11] in promoting technological learning, industrial upgrading and high speed industry-led economicgrowth within the region. Specifically, we are interested in how environmental rationalities were over the course of timeintroduced into the work of the development state within East Asia. We trace an initial period of institutional reform that wasfocused on building an effective environmental regulatory capability to manage the very large environmental challengesassociated with rapid urban and industrial growth. We argue that this initial institutional response to environmentalchallenges drew very much upon the models and policy tools of environmental regulation adopted within OECD economies.Building upon these successes in environmental regulation, albeit moving at different pace and at different times in theregion, we identify a more recent phase of environmental governance reform in which a variety of pragmatic policyinnovations, often quite novel and attuned to the institutional contexts of individual countries, are beginning to emerge. Oneimportant aspect of this recent reform in environmental governance is an effort to harness the institutional capabilities of thedevelopment state quite directly toward goals of environmental improvement (e.g. by integrating environmental goals intothe mandate of development agencies). Notwithstanding the variety of pathways pursued among the East Asian NICs towardspromoting technological learning and industrial upgrading, and the evolution in the role of the development state that hasoccurred over the past decade in response to both internal and external dynamics, we argue that this political economy willbe central to how the East Asian NICs attempt to engage with a sustainability transition. Stated differently, there is at leastsome indication that shifts in socio-technical regimes among the East Asian NICs may depend more on initiatives undertakenby mainstream institutions of industrial and urban development than is anticipated by the existing literature on systemsinnovation.

The paper is organized as follows. We begin by reviewing what is known about the ways in which the newly industrializingeconomies of East Asia have begun to address environmental concerns within the region, focusing on efforts to strengthenenvironmental regulation. Up until about a decade ago, there was little published work examining the efforts of East Asian NICs toaddress the environmental challenges associated with rapid industrial-urban growth. Much was written about the environmentalchallenge emerging in this part of the world; less was written about initial efforts to address this challenge. In part in response to asignificant positive shift in commitments to environmental improvement within these economies, there are now a growingnumber of studies of environmental policy initiatives within the region. A key theme of many of these studies is the challengeposed by the sheer scale of industrial and urban growth within the region and the likelihood that incremental reforms inenvironmental governance will be overwhelmed by the rate of growth of the economy [1]. At the same time, this literatureprovides some evidence of a second wave of environmental governance reform marked by pragmatic policy innovation and byefforts to take advantage of both the institutional strengths of the development state, and the global economic landscape withinwhich the East Asian economies are achieving rapid growth. This secondwave of environmental governance reform coincides withthe growing influence of discourses of environmental sustainability among political elites within the region. Among the keyfeatures of the context within which the East Asian NICs approach a sustainability transition are the deep integration with theglobal economy (and the contemporary form that this has takenwithin respect to global production networks and production andexport of manufactured goods), and the fact that this economic and urban development is occurring in the context of a much


stronger environmental rationality and awareness of global and local environmental challenges thanwas the case in earlier phasesof industrial-urban growth within OECD economies and elsewhere.

2. Environmental rationalities and the development state

As is well known, over the past four decades the East Asian NICs have engaged in a highly successful process of technologicallearning, industrial upgrading, and rapid industry-led economic growth that has profoundly changed the position of thesecountries within the global economy [12]. This process, which began in Japan [11] spread first to Korea [13], Taiwan Province ofChina [14], Hong Kong, China [15] and Singapore [16] and subsequently to Indonesia [17,18], Malaysia [19] and Thailand [2]. In eachof these countries, technological and industrial capability building was accompanied by a dramatic growth in industrial output andin industrial activity as a share of country GDP, by an accelerated rural–urban transition, and by improvements in economic welfarethat significantly reduced the share of the population in poverty.

While there are significant differences among this group of rapidly developing economies, including differences in their abilityto engage in and succeed at upgrading their industrial and technological capabilities, their economic advance has been dominatedby a particular political economy, what Johnson [11] refers to as the capitalist developmental state. As many observers have noted,the East Asian NICs were above all focused on climbing a ladder of technological capability [20]. The driving force behind thissustained focus on industrial and technological capability building was in all cases a strong administrative bureaucracy, tied toexisting political elites, that was able to maintain a relationship of embedded autonomy with financial institutions and privateenterprise. The precise forms that these relations took, as well as the particular policy tools employed, varied from country tocountry within the region.

Government policies and institutions had an enormous impact on the success of firms in building technological capability, andmore generally in guiding the process of industrial development. Governments exercised considerable control over the allocationof finance capital either through direct ownership of banks or indirect control over lending practices. Governments also used acombination of top-down control and bottom up incentives to promote technological capability building, including subsidizedcredit, infant industry protections, and preferential access to capital and infrastructure. East Asian governments were able throughmuch of the period tomaintain political andmacro-economic stability, and to encourage a focus on long-term industrial capabilitybuilding. The precise form that these interventions took varied from country to country. In Singapore, there was greater emphasison creating a business environment and infrastructure attractive to foreign direct investment. In Taiwan, there was an emphasis onthe development of clusters of small and medium sized firms, and on subsidies for technological investment. In the Republic ofKorea, governments focused on the development of large national firms that could compete with foreign multi-nationals.

One consequence of this core institutional focus on industrial capability building, and more generally prioritizing poverty-reducing growth over other societal goals, was that rapid industrial growth occurred initially with little regard for environmentalconsequences. This was the case despite the fact that within the OECD economies the 1970s were a decade in which landmarkefforts to strengthen environmental protection were underway. Past work has described the pathway of development in East Asiaduring this initial period as that of ‘grow now and clean up later’ [21]. The grow now, clean up later philosophy was manifested inweak and under-resourced environmental regulatory institutions that lacked power relative to privileged government institutionsof finance, trade and industrial development. But it was also evident in the priority accorded to energy supply, large scaleinfrastructure development, and expansion of industrial production within national economies — priorities that would lead torapid growth in energy and materials use, and in flows of pollution and waste.

Much rapid industrial growth occurred in urban areas and served to drive forward an accelerated urban transition and thegrowth of mega-cities within the region. As Marcotullio [22–24] has noted, the urban transition in East Asia has been compressedand telescoped in ways that have different types of environmental problems presented at the same time (e.g. challenges of wastedisposal standing alongside issues of urban air pollution and control of hazardous materials) and often at lower levels of per capitaincome than was the case in OECD economies. Over time, however, growing concern over deteriorating environmental quality,especially urban air quality as well as surface water pollution, led these East Asian NICs to begin to address the environmentaleffects of rapid growth [25]. The initial focus in most countries within the region was on developing a more robust capability forenvironmental regulation, especially industrial and urban pollution control.

3. Environmental governance reform: building capacity for environmental regulation

A series of studies in the 1980s and 1990s drew global attention to the poor environmental quality and high levels of pollutionassociatedwith rapid industry-led growthwithin the East Asian region [21,26,27]. Urban air quality in themega-cities of the regionwas among the worst in the world and there were serious concerns with regard to pollution of rivers, access to clean water,destruction of habitat, haze, and other local and global environmental challenges. From the 1980s onward, and at different timesand with different pace across the region, governments began to pay increased attention to environmental concerns. Howeveruneven the process, and notwithstanding growing environmental challenges, most observers agree that a real shift in commitmentto addressing environmental concerns occurred in China [28,29], Korea [30], Taiwan [31], Singapore, Thailand [32], and the otherEast Asian NICs. The institutional context for beginning to address environment concerns, as well as the significance of anyparticular triggering events for action, varied from country to country. In Taiwan, for example, international pressures associatedwith the loss of diplomatic recognition and citizen pressures associated with democratization exerted powerful influences on theruling party, the Kuomintang (KMT). The KMT responded to these pressures by building a strong environmental regulatory agency


as a way of demonstrating to the world and Taiwan's citizens that the government was capable and effective with regard to theenvironment and other areas of concern. In Singapore, concern over the impact of environmental quality on the continued abilityof the city-state to attract foreign direct investment was an important factor in the decision to strengthen environmentalprotection.

As within the OECD economies, initial efforts to address environmental concerns focused on the development ofcomprehensive environmental protection legislation and on building a more robust environmental regulatory system. Industrialand urban pollution was a key focus for initial efforts to address environmental concerns. Rock [30] provides a review of thehistorical development of a stronger capability in industrial pollution control among the East Asian NICs during the 1980s andbeyond. One marker that is often used to place the timing of increased attention to environmental concerns within thedevelopment states of East Asia is the establishment of landmark environmental protection legislation. Singapore adopted a basicenvironmental law in 1972, and was followed by China and Malaysia in 1974, and Taiwan and Thailand in 1975, and Indonesia in1982 [30,33]. More important to making progress on environmental quality, however, was the establishment of independentenvironmental regulatory agencies and the increasing resources made available to these agencies in the 1980s and beyond. Herewe see some divergence among the East Asian NICs. Thus whereas Taiwan and Korea moved with increasing pace from the mid-1980s onward to build out robust institutional capability for industrial pollution control, Thailand's environmental legislation wasnot backed by such progress with the consequence that the problem of industrial pollution increased in Thailand during thisperiod. As we will discuss in more detail below, China continues to face major challenges in developing adequate institutionalcapability, resources and authority for industrial pollution control and urban environmental protection.

A review of efforts to build institutional capability for environment protection within the East Asian NICs indicates that for themost part these countries drew upon the regulatory framework and policy tools that had proven successful in the United States andother OECD economies. In many cases the environmental agencies of OECD economies were directly involved in transferring whatwere regarded at the time as best practices in environmental regulation, typically as part of joint capacity-building initiatives andaid agreements. Ambient air quality standards, emissions permits, emissions charges, inspections and penalties were adopted aspart of efforts to build a robust environmental regulatory regime. More generally, the East Asian NICs appear to have learned fromthe experience of OECD economies with respect to evolving generations of policy approaches, from market-based instruments toso-called ‘third-generation’ policy approaches that employ information disclosure and a greater degree of civic engagement aspolicy tools. For example, many of the East Asian NICs moved quite rapidly to adopt market-based policy instruments such aspollution charges, and are experimenting with information disclosure and stakeholder participation in the policy process [34].Comparing approaches to environmental regulation across countries, it is evident that a series of common principles hold, such asthe importance of clear performance expectations and of the presence of robust enforcement mechanisms for performancerequirements.

4. Assessing the effectiveness of pollution control

Over the past decade, a literature has begun to emerge assessing the impact of efforts to strengthen institutional capability inindustrial pollution control on environmental quality among these East Asian NICs. Did these efforts succeed? Generally theliterature comes to three main conclusions. First, where policy tools and approaches were consistently applied, whether commandand control regulation, market-based instruments, or information disclosure, the results have generally been positive in terms ofreductions in emissions and pollutants [34]. For example, Vincent and Afsah [35] and Wang and Wheeler [36] demonstrate thatstronger environmental regulationwas associatedwith increased investments in pollution control by industry in several East AsianNICs. Vincent and Afsah [35] document the success of efforts to reduce pollution in the palm oil industry in Indonesia. In manycases, the East Asian NICs have shown pragmatism and creativity in the application of established policy tools. One example of thisis the use of information disclosure as a tool for promoting environmental improvement in large coastal cities in China [31].Recognizing that large cities in the rapidly growing coastal zone of China were competing against each other for economicinvestment (including foreign direct investment), and that urban environmental quality was increasingly becoming a factor inthese investment decisions, the State Environmental Protection Agency implemented an innovative environmental rating andinformation disclosure program in a set of large cities. This program is credited with being an influential element in successfulefforts to improve environmental quality in many of these large cities.

Second, whereas efforts to improve environmental regulation have gone a long way in some countries (e.g. Singapore, Taiwanand Korea), in other countries within the region institutional capability remains weak, uneven, and fails to overcome a series ofrecurrent institutional obstacles to more widespread progress on strengthening environmental protection. The experience ofTaiwan in strengthening pollution control of industry is illustrative of the case of more comprehensive reform [31]. By contrast,several recent studies conclude that China's efforts to strengthen environmental regulation of industry is very much in the earlystages of its development [37–40], despite recent strong central government support for improvement [41].

While China's first environmental protection laws date back to the 1970s, it is only within the last decade that intensified effortshave been made by the central government to elevate commitments to industrial pollution control and urban environmentalprotection. During the 1990s and after, China moved to strengthen environmental regulatory authority by raising the StateEnvironmental Protection Agency (SEPA) toMinisterial level, and by decentralizing responsibility for industrial pollution control tolocal Environmental Protection Bureaus (EPBs). One key challenge to overcome was the need to build environmental performanceinto the priorities of local government officials who had historically been rewarded primarily for their success in promoting localeconomic growth. While SEPA was elevated to Ministerial level, it lacked authority over the work of EPBs and could not, for


example, block local action on urban and industrial development projects on environmental grounds or force the closure of highlypolluting plants. Progress on strengthening regulatory capacity has been slow and uneven. As Mol [42] notes, decentralizationwasnot matched by the development of necessary capability and commitment to environmental improvement at the local level. Oliverand Ortolano [43] provide a case study of the failure of local level clean production programs as a result of weak local control andplanning capability in China. Dependent on local governments for resources, the local EPBs often lack authority or resources toinfluence investment decisions. Nitar [44, p 92] concludes that “one of the main reasons the Chinese central government has failedto create a strong environmental governance system is due to its inability to force powerful local governments to enforce strictpollution and conservations laws.”

Initiatives to reform the energy sector in Thailand are another example of efforts to strengthen environmental protectionthat have been uneven and partial, with the result that environmental challenges continue to mount. In Thailand, like the otherEast Asian NICs, the development of a reliable and ever expanding energy supply was a key part of the economic agenda of thedevelopment state. Access to electricity had broad development significance and was accorded a high priority with the resultthat most of the East Asian NICs have achieved high levels of access to electricity grids (reported at over 90% in Thailand by theend of the 1980s and approaching 100% in the 1990s). National governments in the region, supported by the World Bank andother multi-lateral development agencies, established state-owned energy enterprises responsible for electricity generation andtransmission (in the case of Thailand the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand — EGAT). During the 1980s, these agencieswere focused entirely on a supply-driven agenda, ensuring sufficient energy supply to meet the needs of rapid industrial andurban growth.

During the 1990s, however, the central government began to promote a broader agenda beyond energy supply, one that wasconcerned with demand management and increasing the share of energy drawn from renewable sources. As Foran [45] notes“a small sustainability agenda can be detected among Thai state agencies, including initiatives to increase renewable energy andenergy efficiency.” Foran's [45] analysis of the development of the energy supply system in Thailand describes, however, a series ofcontradictory impulses within Thai government institutions undergoing partial and incomplete reform and under increasingpressure from civil society. Without reform to an underlying cost-plus economic model, the utility (EGAT) had little incentive toinvest in energy supply management. A relatively closed planning process, along with fragmented responsibility, meant that initialwork by NGOs and international observers to promote reforms in energy planning processes was slow to take root. Reform of theenergy sector in Thailand became intertwinedwith a variety of broader issues concerning privatization of state-owned enterprises,foreign investment and debt, and concerns over corruption. The consequence is that while Thailand has ambitious goals to slowdown the growth in energy demand and enhance energy security, the institutional reforms and capability building needed toachieve this goal have been slow to develop.

A third conclusion of much of this literature on efforts to strengthen institutions of environmental regulation during the 1980sand 1990s within East Asia is that even where sustained incremental improvements in environmental performance have beenachieved, they are often over-ridden by the sheer scale effects of urban-industrial growth. In part this reflects the fact thatincremental improvement has meant movement toward the performance frontier of existing socio-technical regimes, rather thanshifts to new socio-technical regimes marked by dramatically lower energy, materials and pollution intensity of activity. Theparadigmatic example of this challenge within Asia and the world today, is of course, rapid urban-industrial growth in China.Developments within the energy sector illustrate the challenge presented by expansion within existing carbon-intensive socio-technical regimes, and the institutional obstacles to shifting to alternative regimes.

As in the case of Thailand described above, the primary concern of the Chinese government with regard to energy policy hasbeen that of securing sufficient energy supply. Over the period 1980–2000, China's Gross Domestic Product quadrupled in size.With industry consuming approximately 70% of energy supply, this led to massive increases in energy demand. Interestingly, overthis period the energy intensity of economic activity declined significantly, driven in part by the closure and restructuring of old,energy-intensive state-owned factories, by sectoral shifts, and by the take up of more energy efficient process technologies withinmanufacturing industries. Energy intensity, measured as the amount of energy used for each unit of GDP, declined at an averagerate of 5% to 6% per year over this period. But even with the very significant reductions in energy intensities, energy consumptiondoubled over these two decades. Even more worrying, since 2000 energy consumption has grown in parallel with GDP and energyconsumption is now growing annually at above 10% per annum.

All of this increase in energy consumption required massive increases in energy supply which in the case of China entailslarge amounts of coal-based power as well as imports of oil [46,47]. Despite the growing availability internationally of advancedclean coal technologies as well as renewable sources of energy, China has predominantly built coal-based power plants based onless energy efficient and more pollution intensive (and typically lower price) older technologies [48]. The result is that thegrowth in energy supply in China is occurring overwhelmingly within existing carbon-intensive socio-technical regimes.Gallagher [48] cites the lack of an overall policy framework and of strong incentives for investment in energy efficiency andcutting-edge power plants (such as IGCC power plants) as key reasons why there is not more movement toward the technologyfrontier or to alternative technologies in the Chinese energy sector. In the same vein, Ohshita and Ortolano [49] use a model of‘fragmented authoritarianism’ to explain the slow uptake of clean coal technology in China. The authors argue that the limitedadoption of clean coal technology is a result of conflicting interests among different central government agencies, tensionsbetween central and local governments in policy implementation, and a lack of strong incentives for firms to adopt clean coaltechnology.

China's medium and long term energy plan involves an ambitious commitment to energy conservation, energy efficiency andincreased use of renewables and nuclear power. In its most recent five year plan, the Chinese government set the goal of reducing


energy consumption per unit of gross domestic product by 20%. Energy saving responsibility agreements have been signed withprovincial governments and state-owned enterprises. There are now increasing incentives for wind energy [50]. Efforts areunderway to restructure the power sector and to build up the authority of an independent regulator. But these incremental reformsare consistently overtaken by the pace of growth of the economy. The Chinese government recently reported that energyconsumption per unit of GDP in 2006 went down by amodest 1.2% and overall energy consumption continues to growat above 10%per year.

The example of energy consumption in China is illustrative of the broad concern that while efforts are underway to strengthenenvironmental protection within the East Asian NICs, incremental strengthening of environmental regulatory capacity has not ledto a shift in the pathways of urban-industrial development to socio-technical regimes that are less energy, materials and pollutionintensive. From energy supply to urban mobility, the socio-technical regimes dominant within OECD economies have for the mostpart been the guiding model for urban and industrial growth with the East Asian NICs. In some countries, such as Singapore, Koreaand Taiwan, leading firms within industries have moved to the performance frontier of best practice technologies, demonstratingenvironmental performance on a par with that of OECD economies. In other countries and industries, there is still a heavydependence on older technologies and uneven enforcement of environmental regulation.

5. Environmental governance reform: alternative approaches

In the previous section of this paper we reviewed an initial phase of reform of environmental governance within East Asia NICsthat was focused on the strengthening of environmental regulatory capacity. These reforms have had important impacts onenvironmental quality and indeed we know of no country within the region that has secured improvements in urban-industrialenvironmental performance absent robust institutions of environmental regulation. The strengthening of regulatory capacity hasnot, by and large, resulted in shifts in socio-technical regimes from those observedwithin OECD economies. Inmanyways this is notsurprising in that urban-industrial development has been based on technologies overwhelmingly sourced from OECD economies,has drawn on similar paradigms for financing infrastructure and supporting urban development, and has incorporatedenvironmental regulatory approaches similar to (and in fact based on and by) those observed within OECD countries. The politicaleconomy,modes of governance and development context of the East AsianNICsmay, however, create opportunities to influence thedynamics of socio-technical regimes. We now review reforms in environmental governance that draw upon this distinct context,beginning with initiatives to integrate environmental concerns more directly into the key institutions of the development state.

The more recent phase of environmental reform initiatives coincides with the widespread adoption of discourses ofenvironmental sustainability among the political elites of many countries within the region. In part this reflects the participation ofthese elites in numerous and varied international dialogues within which environmental sustainability is either the explicit focus,such as discussions of the Kyoto Protocol, or an element of broader discussions, as in the case of the Strategic Economic Dialogueinitiated between the governments of the United States and China. Movement beyond a discourse on environmental sustainability,and beyond the adoption of ambitious goals for slowing the growth of energy use and other priorities, has, however, been unevenand partial. In some cases, such as Thailand, political instability has weakened institutional capability to move forward. In othercases, such as Indonesia, decentralization of policy implementation in the absence of capacity-building at the local and regionalscale has undermined progress on environmental reform. Concern over maintaining economic growth and achieving adequateenergy supply is ever present. These challenges notwithstanding, there are numerous examples of pragmatic governmentinitiatives within the region that go beyond controlling pollution to considering issues of energy, materials and pollution intensityof economic activity, and that go beyond the scale of individual firms or communities in an effort to influence broader elements ofthe economy–environment interface and existing socio-technical regimes.

The literature on systems innovation identifies issues of industrial and technological learning, capacity-building in alternativetechnological niches, and the economics of reducing the cost of emerging technologies as key aspects of the challenge ofovercoming lock-in to existing socio-technical regimes. Importantly this literature identifies these challenges as being both issuesof industrial and technological capacity and of social structure (institutions, norms, rules and regulations, consumption behavior,and so on). If we turn first to the question of industrial and technological capability building, therewould seem to be something of agood fit for the efforts pursued by the East Asian NICs to become globally competitive in a variety of industrial sectors over the pastthree decades. As discussed above, the development state played key roles in facilitating and promoting industrial andtechnological capability buildingwithin the East Asian NICs. Is there an opportunity to harness these same institutional capabilitiesin support of the emergence of alternative niches and associated socio-technical regimes within East Asia that are less energy,materials and pollution intensive? To respond to this question, it is useful to return to some of the key features of the observedpathways of technological and industrial capability building within the region.

Recall that through the initial period of rapid industrial development in East Asia (in the 1970s and 1980s) firms in most casesbegan with very limited technological capabilities. They faced a daunting set of problems and choices and constraints. Firmsneeded to engage in a process of global scanning to identify and assess technological opportunities open to them. They thenneeded to figure out how to acquire these technologies, whether through foreign direct investment, licensing agreements, turn-key projects, or equipment purchases. Having acquired technology, firms needed to learn how to adopt, adapt, maintain andinnovate on the technology, and to build production capability. Firms needed to understand the dynamics of markets locally andglobally, and they had to figure out how to create, maintain and support networks of customers, suppliers and subcontractors. Allof this constituted a daunting set of tasks and the initial focus of most firms was on technology transfer and adoption. We shouldnote immediately that this does not imply persistent low levels of technological capability. Over several decades, this technological


development work brought many firms within these economies to positions of technological leadership within individualindustries, a position now sustained by growing investments in research and development. The point here is, however, that for themost part the East Asian NICs did not build industrial and technological capability through an initial focus on indigenous basicresearch in university, government and firm-based laboratories.

Efforts to build industrial and technological capability took advantage of and fostered a profound moment in the globalizationof the worldwide industrial economy. East Asian NICs encouraged foreign investment and the development of industrialproduction capability as part of an emergent model first of multi-national production, and then of fully global productionnetworks. As described in the opening paper of this volume, the result was a phase of economic globalization in the last quarter ofthe twentieth century that was qualitatively distinct from earlier eras of globalization, especially in terms of the emphasis placedon industrial production andmerchandise exports as the leading edge of integration into the global economy. Globalization for theEast Asian NICs involved a series of elements, including access to technology around the world, production for export, relativelyhigh levels of foreign direct investment within some countries in the region, and increasingly deep integration into the productionnetworks of global firms. Globalizationwas thus both a platform for processes of industrial and technological upgradingwithin theregion (through the acquisition of technology, capital, know-how and information) and a mechanism for supporting andaccommodating the subsequent growth in production capacity for world markets.

Over time, the role of the state in supporting the process of industrial and technological capability building among the EastAsian NICs has shifted. As firms in locations such as Korea, Taiwan, and increasingly mainland China emerged as technologicalleaders within focal industries, the state became a less important contributor to the direct acquisition of technological capability,and to the strategic development of industries. At the same time, the rules of the World Trade Organization placed constraints onsome of the infant industry protection strategies previously used to support the development of industries among East Asian NICs.Many firms within the region are now part of complex global production/distribution/consumption networks that are alsoimportant platforms for developing technological know-how and market information. New strategic roles for the state have alsoemerged, as for example in the growing emphasis placed upon basic R&D, and upon the development of a science and technologyinfrastructure within universities.

Given these developments, what evidence is there of the East Asian NICs attempting to harness the institutional capabilitiesof the development state toward the promotion of alternative socio-technical regimes that are less energy, materials andpollution intensive? One approach that is visible within the region is the integration of environmental priorities into themandate of mainstream institutions of economic development, an approach that Angel and Rock [51] have labeled policyintegration. The specifics of policy integration vary significantly across countries and economies. In Singapore, policy integrationduring the 1990s involved linking the promotional decisions of the Economic Development Board (EDB), an investmentpromotion agency, to the infrastructure decisions of its premier infrastructure agency, the Jurong Town Corporation, and byrequiring firms receiving support from these agencies to meet the environmental requirements of its environmental agency, theMinistry of the Environment (ENV) [30]. More recently, Singapore has drawn upon the resources of its Economic DevelopmentBoard in the establishment of a New Energy Technology Center. As has been the case with its overall economic developmentstrategy over the past two decades, Singapore is placing particular emphasis on its location as a site for foreign directinvestment by European and Japanese renewable energy firms seeking to establish regional technology centers for Asianmarkets.

In Taiwan, the Industrial Development Board (IDB) has adopted an industrial environmental improvement program thatbenchmarks the environmental performance of Taiwanese firms in particular industries against international best practices.Taiwan's government institutions then support firms in global scanning and assessment of alternative technologies that reduceenergy, materials and pollution intensities in a manner that builds directly on the success achieved during the 1970s and 1980s inupgrading overall technological capability. Similarly programs of support for enhancing industrial capability in both overallindustrial environmental performance and in emerging sectors, such as fuel cells and wind energy, are to be observed in other EastAsian NICs, including Korea and China.

Several authors have argued that the resources of the development state provide an opportunity for new pathways foraddressing environmental concerns. In looking at the approach the government of Taiwan is taking toward improving theenvironmental performance of industry, Yang [52] concludes that embedded social network relationships between the state andfirms, relations that are at the core of the functioning of the development state, are helping to promote environmentalimprovement among firms. Similarly, Lang [53] indicates that experience in forming strategic collaborations between state andindustry has been an important factor in the progress Singapore has made in reducing waste from industry. At the same time, Tu[54] stresses the contradictory impulses that remainwithin the Taiwanese development state and the set of relationships betweenthe state and government that have built up around industrial capability development. Tu [54] argues that NGOs have metconsiderable resistance to efforts to address environmental concerns associated with high technology industries in part because ofthe central role these industries have played in the countries economic development strategy over several decades. Ho [55, p 18]describes a similar contradictory positioning of the Chinese development state reflecting “the persistent tension between theenvironmental aspirations of reformers, on the one hand, and protectionist, developmental tendencies on the other.”

There are a number of notable differences in these recent efforts to harness institutions of industrial and technologicalcapability building to the goals of environmental improvement, as compared to efforts in the 1970s and 1980s to build globallycompetitive manufacturing capability. First, whereas in prior decades most firms in East Asian NICs typically had limited industrialand technological capability, this is no longer the case and firms in Korea, Thailand, Taiwan and elsewhere now are drawing uponconsiderable in-house expertise and internal R&D to pursue environmental improvements and explore emerging technology


niches. Equally important, firms in East Asia are increasingly becoming part of global production/consumption networks thatprovide an additional set of firm-based resources and platforms for technological learning and industrial capability building.Interestingly, the participation in global production networks allows firms to develop leading-edge capabilities in environmentalimprovement even in the context of somewhat weaker environmental regulatory and industrial development institutions. Rockand Angel [2] detail one such case involving a cement firm in Thailand that has achieved among the highest energy efficiency of allcement plants worldwide, and is now serving as a knowledge resource for cement plants within the global corporation of which itis a part.

Second, globalization is generating intensified market pressures for addressing environmental concerns. The export-orientedeconomies of East Asia have long been finely attuned to the expectations of global markets, whether in terms of on-time delivery orproduct and production quality. Increasingly firms within these economies, along with government institutions that support thestrategic development of industrial capability, are responding to environmental expectations in markets. These expectations take anumber of forms, ranging from certification schemes to investor codes-of-conduct, end-market regulation and more broadly,concern over brand reputation in the context of worldwide scrutiny of firm environmental performance. As Angel and others havedescribed [56], in some cases these pressures have resulted in the adoption of firm-based global environmental standards thatexceed existing country-based environmental regulations.

Third, in the context of participation in the WTO, there are now greater constraints on governments in East Asia on the policytools available to support nascent industry development (e.g. domestic content requirements). Gallagher's [57] analysis oftechnology adoption in the Chinese automobile sector is instructive in this regard. China was relatively late in developing aconsistent overall strategy for the development of its automobile industry, and comprehensive automobile emissions standardswere not put in place until the late 1990s. Before China adopted standards for automobile emissions in 2000, there were fewincentives for either domestic suppliers or foreign automobile manufacturers to emphasize low emission vehicles. By the time agrowing emphasis was placed by the government on the promotion of technology transfer of best available technologies, some ofthe tools for accomplishing this had been limited by entry to the WTO. One consequence was that joint venture agreementsadopted in the 1990s between domestic suppliers and international automobile manufacturers did not promote the transfer oftechnology to Chinese firms. In reviewing developments since the late 1990s, Oliver [58] notes that common technologies for fuelefficiency adopted in these countries are now widely employed in vehicles produced in China. “However, more advanced engineand transmission technologies for greater fuel efficiency, which are still in the early adoption process in the west, have rarely beenbrought to China.”

6. Beyond industrial and technological capability building

The examples used above focus on the narrow issue of building industrial and technological capabilitywithin technology nichesthat present opportunities for reducing the energy, materials and pollution intensity of economic activity. But one of the keyarguments of the systems innovation literature is that shifts in socio-technical regimes will depend upon broader social change(that is not just improvements in particular technology niches but shifts in the way in which underlying social needs, such asenergy and mobility are met). Here it is possible to point to examples of innovative and pragmatic institutional responses withinthe region, if not to broadly successful alternative institutional forms.

Among the important areas of concern in this regard is urban transportation, and finding alternatives to a predominant andrapidly growing dependence on personal automobiles as the basis formobility within cities. There is currently quite awide range oflevels of vehicle ownership among the East Asian NICs. In 2005 there were on average about 25 vehicles per thousand people inChina. The corresponding number was about 580 in Japan and 300 in the Republic of Korea [58]. Singapore is an example of a (verysmall) country that has mobilized a culture of strong government involvement in shaping urban development and associatedlevels of automobile usage. Currently the level of personal vehicle ownership in Singapore is approximately 113 vehicles perthousand residents, far lower than in many of the other higher income countries within the region [59]. This level of vehicleownership is achieved in part through high tariffs and charges on vehicle ownership, and by limiting licenses for vehicles throughan auction system. Singapore maintains a Vehicle Quota System (where rights to own vehicles are auctioned) and an extensivesystem of electronic road pricing. There are tax incentives in favor of the use of low emission vehicles, and an extensive publictransport system that involves both mass rapid transit (rail) and buses. As a consequence of these initiatives, public transport iswidely used within Singapore and utilization levels are increasing. Similar experiments with promoting greater use of publictransport and controlling the rate of growth of personal vehicle ownership are to be observed in other East Asian cities, such asGuangzhou, China, where passenger travel on public transport per capita has increased by 120% over the past decade [60].

One of the other lines of analysis raised by the systems innovation research is the role of civil society in opening up space forconsideration of alternative socio-technical regimes. One of the most discussed elements of the current political economy of theEast Asian NICs is a perceived increased space for civil society, for the involvement of a broader array of a groups and organizationsin public debate on directions for the future, and more generally a belief in democratic process and decision making [61]. Severalstudies now document the growing number and influence of NGOs within China [28], Taiwan [62], Vietnam [63] and other EastAsian NICs. Case studies document social movements successfully impacting the environment performance of industry within theregion [64,65]. Similarly, Rock [30] describes the crucial role that environmental movements and public complaint played indecisions by the government of Taiwan to strengthen its commitment to environmental protection. And yet the role and potentialcontribution of NGOs varies considerable across the region. Of particular interest in this regard is the growth of environmentalNGOs in China.


There are approximately 2000 environmental groups registered with the Chinese government as NGOs, with perhaps as manyregistered as for-profit business entities, or not registered at all [66]. Moore and Warren [67] detail the changing legal basis forpublic participation in environment decision making in China, including providing legal status to NGOs. Economy [66] argues thatthe Chinese government, and especially the State Environmental Protection Agency, has taken a generally positive attitude towardthe growing involvement of NGOs in environmental governance, though the activities of these NGOs remain tightly regulated. Ho[28] suggests that two factors are especially important for understanding the role of NGOs in the China. The first relates to thetiming of the growth in environmental movements, occurring at roughly the same time as a tendency toward the ‘greening’ of thedevelopment state in response to environmental challenges. The second relates to the national government's alternating politics oftolerance and strict control of civil society organizations [28]. Ho [28] argues that these two factors have led to a situation inwhichenvironmental social movements have tended to be less confrontational in relation to national government institutions and moreoriented to courting influence in policy making. Ho [68] describes the emergent social formation in China as embedded activism.Ho is quick to warn that the situation is in constant flux and that there is a diversity of positioning of environmental movements atthe national and local levels. At the local level, many environmental protection bureaus remain wary of NGO activity, concernedwith among other issues the prospect of having attention drawn by NGOs to low levels of compliance with existing environmentregulations.

7. Conclusions

In this paper we have explored recent trends in environmental governance among the East Asian NICs, and more generally, theopportunities and constraints that the political economies of these countries present for reducing the environmental problemsassociated with rapid urban-industrial growth. The East Asian NICs have consistently pursued development pathways thatprivilege poverty-reducing industry-led growth. Environmental improvement is being sought and achieved in the context of thisprimary commitment to shared growth. Our review suggests that the introduction of stronger environmental rationalities into thework of the development states within the region is occurring in two phases. The first phase involved strengthening of basicinstitutions of environmental regulation at national and local levels. We argue that this phase of environmental governance reformdrew heavily upon models of environmental protection observed in OECD countries, and that the process of strengtheningenvironmental regulation has been uneven and incomplete across the region. While the strengthening of environmentalprotection has led to improvements in environmental quality, it has not by and large been a force for transition to socio-technicalregimes that are dramatically less energy and pollution intensive. In this context, we describe the beginnings of a second phase ofenvironmental governance reform that draws more heavily upon the distinctive political-economic context of these economies,including the historic role of the development state and their deep integration into the global economy. Where progress is beingmade on environmental improvement within the region, it is typically occurring within the context of competent governmentinstitutions that have recognized the need to promote environmental improvement alongside of economic growth, and withpublic support for these societal goals. One form that this is taking is the introduction of environmental mandates into the work ofprimary agencies of economic development, and more generally the harnessing of the capabilities of the development state inaddressing rising environmental concerns.

Given the deep integration into the global economy through global production networks and export-oriented industrialproduction, the East Asian NICs are particularly attuned to the sensitivities of global markets. This connection likely provides one ofthemore significant points of entry for shifts in socio-technical regimeswithin the region, perhapsmore so than in other countries.At the same time, current and future markets in Asia are becoming increasingly influential in the strategies of many global firms.The connections here takemany forms. The East Asian NICs are very sensitive to globalmarket conditions, including the emergenceof significant end-market regulation as a driver of environmental performance. These countries also continue a deep investment in‘global scanning’ of technology options and opportunities, along with a high level of international sourcing of equipment fromOECD economies. As indicated, many firms in the East Asian NICs are part of extensive global production/consumption networksthat involve strict requirements on production process and sourcing qualification. The standards and practices adopted withinthese global production networks (such as firm-based global environmental standards) constitute another important strand in thedynamic stability of socio-technical regimes. The East Asian NICs also continue to invest in participation in international scienceand technology networks, including the labor markets for scientists and engineers trained overseas. More broadly, the politicalelites within many of the East Asian NICs demonstrate considerable interest in, and sensitivity to, the framing of trans-nationalelite consensus on issues of global economic development and the environment (including trans-national discussions on anappropriate response to the threat of global warming). All of this suggests that the dynamic interplay of niches, regimes andlandscapes anticipated in existing research on system innovation is likely to have far more of a global geography than is suggestedin work to date.

Much of the early discussion on the prospects for a sustainability transition in developing Asia drew upon a concept oftechnology leap-frogging. By taking advantage of cutting-edge technologies that were less energy and resource intensive,industrializing economies in Asia and elsewhere had the opportunity to ‘leap-frog’ over existing technology regimes and attendantenvironmental problems. This concept certainly has resonance in terms of the capacity of firms and industries to take advantage ofleading-edge technologies. Examples of technology leap-frogging tend, however, to be focused on movement to the performancefrontier of an existing socio-technological regime, and within that, individual sectors. Recent reviews have generally been quitepessimistic about the prospects for technology leap-frogging in East Asia (see, for example, Ho [69]). Kojima [70] argues that inmany developing countries there is much remaining opportunity for capturing ‘low hanging fruit’ within existing socio-technical


regimes (e.g. providing piped water and basic sanitation services, improving automobile emissions standards and end-of-pipeindustrial pollution controls), and that pursuing these opportunities is likely to have more impact on the environment than effortsto leap-frog to alternative socio-technical regimes. More generally, Perkins [71] argues that traditional concepts of leap-froggingare not sensitive to the development priorities of industrializing countries, and to their uneven capabilities in industrial andtechnological upgrading.

The systems innovation framework proposed by Geels [4] and others provides a significant advance over these earlier simpleconcepts of technological leap-frogging. The multi-scalar approach draws attention to the complex inter-connections amonglandscapes, social-technical regimes and niches that underlie pathways of economic development, and to the social processes andinstitutions that mediate these inter-connections. This review of recent trends in environmental governance among East AsianNICs draws attention to international variety in these mediating contexts of institutions, governance and political economies. Twoparticular features of the development pathways of the East Asian are of particular interest in this regard. First, there is at leastsome indication that shifts in socio-technical regimes among the East Asian NICs may depend more on initiatives undertaken bymainstream institutions of industrial and urban development and associated political elites (as opposed to being located ‘outside’of the work of these institutions) than is the case within OECD economies. This certainly would reflect the pattern of the past threedecades as effective bureaucracies with embedded autonomy from business elites helped steer these economies through a processof successful technological upgrading and industrial capacity-building.

Second, there is also some evidence that the dynamic relations among niches, regimes and landscapes in developing Asia willbe far more global character than is anticipated in existing literature on system innovation. The literature on system innovationcertainly takes care to note the multi-scalar character of processes involved regime change. But this literature does not reallyanticipate the degree to which key processes involved are likely to be global in scope, whether this is through the influence oftrans-national elite consensus, the impact of end-market regulation, or the cascading impact of firm-based standards with globalproduction networks. Many of the parameters of this intersection between economic globalization and a sustainability transitionin East Asia are dealt with in more depth in a subsequent paper in this volume.

Lastly, the experience of East Asia confirms the importance of placing the dynamics of socio-technical regimes within thebroadest of social, cultural and institutional contexts. Major questions of security, of democratization, of political reform, and ofdecentralization and regional autonomy are verymuch in play within countries in the region. Each of these issues has the potentialto impact commitments to, and institutional capacity for, promoting shifts in socio-technical regimes to patterns of developmentthat are less energy, materials and pollution intensive. At the same time, the recent history of success in building globally-competitive industrial and technological capabilities promotes a focus on emerging technological and market opportunities thatcan open up alternatives to currently dominant socio-technical regimes within East Asia and the global economy as a whole.

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David Angel holds the Laskoff Professorship in Economics, Technology and the Environment at Clark University where he is also Professor of Geography, Provostand Vice President for Academic Affairs. His currentwork focuses on global economic change and the environment with a particular focus on rapidly industrializingeconomies in Asia.

Michael T. Rock is the Harvey Wexler Professor of Economics at Bryn Mawr College in the U.S. His published research focuses on the environment anddevelopment in East Asia and on the role of industrial policy in development in Southeast Asia. His work has been supported by the U.S. National ScienceFoundation, the MacArthur Foundation, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, USAID, and the New Industrial Technology Development Organization inthe Ministry of the Economy, Trade and Industry in Japan. His current projects include work on the impact of MNC firm-based standards on the environmentalperformance of subsidiaries and their suppliers; firm-based studies of technological learning of indigenous industrial firms in Southeast Asia; and a book ondemocracy and development in Southeast Asia.

environmental rationalities and the development state in east asia: prospects for a sustainability...

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