epi: occupy wall streeters are right about skewed economic rewards in the united states

8/3/2019 EPI: Occupy Wall Streeters are Right About Skewed Economic Rewards In the United States

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ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE 1333 H STREET, NW SUITE 300, EAST TOWER WASHINGTON, DC 20005 202.775.8810 WWW.EPI.ORG

E P I B R I E F I N G PA P E RE C O N O M I C P O L I C Y I N S T I T U T E O C T O B E R 2 6 , 2 0 1 1 B R I E F I N G P A P E R # 3 3 1

he Occupy Wall Street movement has captured much the nations attention with a clear message: A U.S. econ-

omy driven by the interests o business and the wealthy has generated increasingly unequal economic outcomes

where the top 1 percent did exceptionally well but the vast majority did not do well at all.

According to the data, theyre undamentally right. Tis paper presents 12 gures that demonstrate how skewed

economic rewards (in income, wages, capital income, and wealth) have become in the United States. Tese gures, most

o which cover 1979 through 2007 (prior to the recession) generally

break out trends or the top 1 percent, the next richest 9 percent, andthen the bottom 90 percent o households or earners. While income

growth at the very topthe richest 1 percent and abovehas been

truly staggering, incomes at roughly the 90th percentile and above

(the richest 10 percent) have generally at least matched the rate o

economy-wide productivity. It is below the 90th percentile where one

really sees the potential ruits o economic growth (as measured by

economy-wide productivity) ailing to reach American households.

An economy that ails to cut in 90 percent o American households

on a air share o economic growth is one that needs serious reorm.

As the gures show:

Te top 1 percent o households have secured a very large share

o all o the gains in income59.9 percent o the gains rom

19792007, while the top 0.1 percent seized an even more dis-

proportionate share36 percent. In comparison, only 8.6 per-

cent o income gains have gone to the bottom 90 percent. Te

patterns are similar or wages and capital income.

OCCUPY WALL STREETERS

ARE RIGHT ABOUT

SKEWED ECONOMIC REWARDS

IN THE UNITED STATES

L A W R E N C E M I S H E L A N D J O S H B I V E N S


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EP I BRIEFING P AP ER # 331 OC T OBER 26, 2011 P AGE 2

As they have accrued a large share o income gains,

the incomes o the top 1 percent o households have

pulled ar away rom the incomes o typical Ameri-

cans. In 2007, average annual incomes o the top 1

percent o households were 42 times greater than in-

comes o the bottom 90 percent (up rom 14 timesgreater in 1979) and incomes o the top 0.1 percent

were 220 times greater (up rom 47 times greater in

1979).

Te nancial sectors share o the overall economy has

roughly doubled in recent decades, and now stands

at 7.6 percent o total national income. Relative to

this sectors share in 1979, this translates into an extra

$547 billion in compensation and prots claimed by

the sectora trend with questionable social payo.

Growth in wealth, not just incomes, has also becomegreatly skewed in recent decades. Most o the wealth

gains o the last generation went to those who al-

ready had the most wealth, a group increasingly dis-

tant rom the vast American middle-class. Te wealth

o the median household actually declined over this

time period. As a result, in 2009, wealth held by the

wealthiest 1 percent o households was 225 times

greater than that held by the median household.

The eect o policy on income andwealth inequalityNo one who has looked at trends in economic inequality

in the United States in recent decades could dispute the

dramatic increase in the share o all income claimed by

the richest subgroupsespecially the highest-earning 1

percent reerred to by Occupy Wall Street activists when

they say they represent the 99 percent o Americans let

behind. Mishel, Bernstein, and Shierholz (2009) pres-

ent a comprehensive review o these trends and Piketty

and Saez (2010, updating earlier reports) explore in moredepth the gains enjoyed by the top 1 percent.

Tere is some disagreement around the edges o the

debate concerning just how dramatic this income-share in-

crease was or when exactly it happenedwas it steady and

continuous, or the result o a couple o discrete jumps?

And there are those who discount the seriousness o the

divide, saying that middle-class incomes are managing to

grow despite the huge increase in the top earners share.

But no serious analyst denies that the top 1 percent (o

households or tax-units or amilies) has seen a very large

increase in incomes and in share o total income since the

late 1970s.

Public policy, either through commission or omission,has played a central role in the increasing concentration o

income. For example, Baker (2006), Bivens (2010), and

Hacker and Pierson (2010) have all documented the role

o various policies in generating greater inequality. Te

decade-long surge in income inequality occurred in pre-

tax incomes, driven by developments in both major kinds

o market-based incomes, namely the wage and salary in-

comes rom work, and capital incomes (realized capital

gains, interest, dividends) rom wealth. And we know that

the most obvious way policy can aect incomesthrough

taxeshas clearly aided the widening o the income gap.

Te Congressional Budget Oce (CBO) shows that even

as their share o total incomes more than doubled between

1979 and 2007, the richest 1 percent o households eec-

tive ederal tax rate ell rom 37 percent to 29.5 percent.

Te clear policy tilt in avor o the highest-income

households in the completely visible realm o taxes sug-

gests that this group receives preerential treatment in

the much more opaque policy decisions that get made in

Washington every day. For example, Bartels (2007) shows

how policymakers give much larger weight to the preer-

ences o richer constituents.

What the Occupy Wall Street movement has done

with its We are the 99 percent campaign is to remind

Americans that economic outcomes are not just like the

weather, something that must simply be endured and

adapted to rather than orced to change. Instead, eco-

nomic outcomes are shaped by political decisions. Tis

insight is valuable because it coners the power to chal-

lenge the status quo, which is oten preserved by claims

that economic rewards are doled out through simplemeritocracy and that any intererence with market out-

comes will wreck the economy. Its not so. Markets are

alwaysshaped by policy, and policies in the United States

have been shaped to benet the already well-o. Chang-

ing the rules to ensure that rewards are more broadly

shared can lead to an economy that is both more e-

cient and more air.


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The widening income gapFigures AC display trends in growth o overall market in-

comes, including wages and salaries as well as interest, div-

idend, and capital income generated by holding wealth.

In the long period beore the current recession, rom 1979

to 2007, infation-adjusted average annual incomes o the

highest-income 1 percent o households grew by 224 per-

cent, as shown in Figure A. Tose even better o, the top0.1 percent (the highest-income one one-thousandth o

households), saw their incomes grow by 390 percent. In

contrast, incomes o the bottom 90 percent grew just 5

percent between 1979 and 2007and all o that growth

occurred in the unusually strong income growth that oc-

curred rom 1997 to 2000, a period ollowed by declining

income rom 2000 to 2007.1 Tese data include all sourc-

es o market-based incomes such as wages and salaries,

dividend and interest income, and realized capital gains,

but do not include government transer income (such as

Social Security income or unemployment benets).

Because o their vastly greater income growth, the

highest-earning 1 percent o households have rapidly

distanced themselves rom the vast majority (the bot-

tom 90 percent). As Figure B shows, average annualincomes o the top 1 percent o households in 1979

were 14 times greater than incomes o the bottom 90

percent; by 2007 incomes o the top 1 percent were 42

times greater. Te income gap between the upper 0.1

percent o households and the bottom 90 percent grew

even more, rom a top-to-bottom ratio o 47-to-1 in

1979 to 220-to-1 in 2007.

F I G U R E A

Incomes rise astest at the top

Percentage growth in household income, by rank on income scale, 19792007

SOURCE: Economic Policy Institute analysis of data from Piketty and Saez (2010).

Percentagegrowth

-25%

25%

75%

125%

175%

225%

275%

325%

375%

425%

1979

1981

1983

1985

1987

1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

1999

2001

2003

2005

2007

Top 0.1%

Top 1.0%

Bottom 90%

87%

56% -2%

324%

190%

7%

390%

224%

5%


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Te vastly greater income growth o the top highest-

income 1 percent o households also obtained a much

larger share o income growth than the vast majority

(the bottom 90 percent). As shown in Figure C, the top

1 percent gained 59.9 percent o all the income growth

generated between 1979 and 2007. In contrast, the bot-

tom 90 percent received just 8.6 percent o all the income

generated over the same period. Its illuminating to note

that the bottom 90 percent were able to claim just one-ourth o what the top one one-thousandth o households

claimed rom the growth o that period (36 percent).

Rising inequalityin income rom workFigures DF examine the rising inequality o wage and

salary incomein other words, income rom work. La-

bor earnings are by ar the most evenly distributed sourc-

es o overall income because, ater all, the vast major-

ity o non-retired households have members that work.

Yet labor earnings have become much more unequally

distributed in recent decades. Figure D shows that the

top 1 percent o wage and salary earners increased their

infation-adjusted average annual salaries by 144% rom

1979 to 2006. Te top one one-thousandth (0.1 percent)

o earners enjoyed annual wages growth o 324 percentover that same period.

In contrast, the bottom 90 percent o wage earners

increased their annual salaries by about 15 percent rom

1979 to 2006. Most o this growth occurred during the

relatively brie period o tight labor markets that accom-

panied the late 1990s boom. Between 1979 and 1995, av-

erage annual wages or the lowest-earning 90 percent grew

F I G U R E B

Highest-income groups distance themselves rom everyone else

Ratios o household incomes at top o scale to the bottom 90%, 1979-2007


Ratio

0

25

50

75

100

125

150

175

200

225

250

1979

1981

1983

1985

1987

1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

1999

2001

2003

2005

2007

Top 0.1% to bottom 90%

Top 1% to bottom 90%

47-to-1

14-to-1

90-to-1

187-to-1

22-to-1

37-to-1

220-to-1

42-to-1


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just 2.8 percent. And rom 2000 and 2006,

wages did not improve at all. Tus, nearly all

o the wage and salary growth o the bottom

90 percent rom 1979 to 2006 occurred rom

1995 to 2000 when unemployment was alling

and then remained low.

2

As with overall incomes, the disparity in

wage growth has signicantly widened the gap

in salary levels between the top earners and

everyone else, as shown in Figure E. In 1979

average annual salaries o the top 1 percent o

wage earners were 9.4 times that o those in the

bottom 90 percent, but by 2000 the gap had

more than doubled to 20-to-1, a level that was

maintained until 2006.

Te very highest-wage earnersthose

in the upper 0.1 percent (the top one one-

thousandth)increased their distance rom

F I G U R E C

Top 1% claims 59.9% o all income growth

Share o household income growth, by rank

on income scale, 19792007


Top 1%,59.9%

Bottom 90%,8.6%

Top 610%,10.5%

Next 4%,(9996)21.0%

Rest of top 1%,23.9%

Top 1/1000(0.1%), 36.0%

F I G U R E D

Wages grow much more at the top

Percentage growth in average annual wages and salaries, by rank on wage

and salary scale, 19792006

SOURCE: Wage data in Mishel, Bernstein, and Shierholz (2009), Table 3.10.

Percentagegrowth

-25

0

25

50

75

100

125

150

175

200

225

250

275

300

325

350

375

1979

1981

1983

1985

1987

1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

1999

2001

2003

2005

Top 0.1%

Bottom 90%

Top 1%

324%

15%

144%

145%

338%

15%63%

2%

124%

3%


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the earners in the bottom 90 percent even more rapidly;

the ratio o their earnings to those in the bottom 90 per-

cent rose rom 21-to-1 in 1979 to 80-to-1 in 2000. Tis

gap shrank ater the stock market bubble burst in the late

1990s (wage data include the realized stock options that

top corporate ocers receive) but had nearly recovered its

ormer size by 2006.

Figure F looks directly at the ratio o average com-

pensation earned by the chie executive ocers o largerms relative to the compensation o typical workers. In

1978, CEO compensation was 35 times greater than that

o the typical worker, up rom 24 times as great in 1965.

Ater 1979 the pay o CEOs skyrocketed; by 2000 their

pay was 299 times that the pay o a typical worker.

Tat level o CEO pay was admittedly somewhat in-

fated by the stock market boom in the late 1990s, and

retreated signicantly ater the tech bubble burst. How-

ever, by 2007, CEO pay had nearly restored itsel, attain-

ing a ratio o 277-to-1 relative to pay o a typical worker.

CEO pay ell again relative to typical workers in the Great

Recession but is again reestablishing itsel in the recovery.

In 2010, the ratio o 243-to-1 was the th highest o any

year since 1965. At this rate, it will likely not take long or

the gap to reach its prior peak.3

Increasing concentration oincome rom wealth-holdingFigures GH show that the trend o rapidly growing con-

centration in overall income and labor earnings is also ap-

parent in the growth o income earned rom wealth-hold-

ing, oten labeled either unearned or capital income.

F I G U R E E

Top wage earners distance themselves

Ratio o wages and salaries at top o earnings scale to bottom 90%, 19792006

SOURCE: Wage data in Mishel, Bernstein, and Shierholz (2009), Table 3.10.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

1979

1981

1983

1985

1987

1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

1999

2001

2003

2005

Top 0.1%

Top 1.0%

77-to-1

20-to-1

80-to-1

20-to-1

46-to-1

15-to-1

21-to-1

9.4-to-1


7/13


Essentially, capital incomes are always and everywhere

less equally distributed than wage income. As shown in

Figure G, in 1979 the top 1 percent o households on

the income scale already claimed 38 percent o all capital

income generated in the economy. By 2007 this share had

ballooned to 57 percent. Te next richest 9 percent saw

their share o capital incomes shrink rom 29 percent in

1979 to 23 percent in 2007. And the bottom 90 percent,

which collected 33 percent o capital incomes in 1979,claimed only 20 percent by 2007. Tis startling concen-

tration o already unequally distributed capital incomes

dees the logic o claims that there is a natural limit to

how much o the ruits o economic growth can go to any

one group.

Te very large rise in the share o all capital incomes

collected by the highest-income 1 percent since 1979

means that this group has also collected a disproportion-

ate share o the growth in these incomes over the same

period. Basically, i the top 1 percents share o all capital

incomes had remained constant between 1979 and 2007,

they would have claimed 37 percent o capital income

growth in the economy in those years. Instead, as Fig-

ure H shows, the top 1 percent alone collected a whop-

ping 86.5 percent o growth in capital incomes during

this period.4 Te next highest-income 4 percent claimed10.7 percent o all capital income growth while the bot-

tom 95 percent claimed just 2.8 percent o the growth in

these incomes. Tis gure departs rom the convention

o the other charts in not isolating the bottom 90 percent

because their average capital incomes fellbetween 1979

and 2007, registering as negative capital income growth,

which is hard to depict in a pie chart.

F I G U R E F

CEOs distance themselves rom the average worker

Ratio o average annual CEO compensation to average worker compensation, 19652010

SOURCE: Update of Mishel, Bernstein, and Shierholz (2009).

Ratio

24-to-1

100-to-1

299-to-1277-to-1

185-to-1

35-to-1

126-to-1

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

1965

1967

1969

1971

1973

1975

1977

1979

1981

1983

1985

1987

1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

1999

2001

2003

2005

2007

2009

243-to-1


8/13


The fnancial sectorsincreasing claim on growthMuch o the rising share o total income claimed by the

top-earning 1 percent is associated with the rise o the

nancial sector, which is a dominant employer at the top.

Figure I shows the share o total gross domestic product,

or national income, attributable to compensation and

prots in the corporate nancial sector. Between 1929just beore the Great Depression ended the rst Gilded

Ageand 1973, this share ell rom 3.7 percent to 3.2

percent. But between 1973 and 2007, this share more

than doubled, to nearly 7 percent.

And nancial sector compensation and prots share

o GDP rebounded quickly rom the dip o the Great

Recession and actually passed its pre-recession peak. By

2010, in act, the rising share o nance translates into

an extra $547 billion claimed by this sector relative to

the case where its share had remained at its 1979 level

(3.8 percent). Tis is serious money. Te payo to these

larger claims made by the nancial sector are dubious.

For example, business investment in plant and equip-

ment (i.e., the productivity-generating investment that

nancial rms are supposed to make cheaper and saer)did not rise between 1973 and 2007. Residential invest-

ment, outside o the bubble-infated mid-2000s, has also

ailed to show any persistent upward climb during the

time that the nancial sector has claimed an ever-larger

piece o the pie. It is, in short, not o-base to wonder

whether there is any return to orking over a much larger

share o economic activity to the nancial sector.

F I G U R E G

Returns rom wealth-holding are rapidly concentrating

Share o total capital incomes claimed by income percentiles, 19792007

SOURCE: Economic Policy Institute analysis of data from the Congressional Budget Oce collection of data on eective federal tax rates.

ShareofT

otalCapitalIncome

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

1979

1981

1983

1985

1987

1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

1999

2001

2003

2005

2007

Top 1%

1979: 38%

2007: 57%

1979: 29%

2007: 23%

Bottom 90%

1979: 33%

2007: 20%

9199th percentile


9/13


F I G U R E H

Those with highest incomes gain disproportionate

share o capital income growth

Share o total capital income growth claimed,

by percentile rank in income,19792007

SOURCE: Economic Policy Institute analysis of data from the Congressional

Budget Oce collection of data on eective federal tax.

Bottom 95%, 2.8% 96th99th, 10.7%

Top 1%,86.5%

The concentrationo wealthTe concentration o wealth has mirrored

trends in the concentration oincome. Wealth

is a measure o a households assets (such as real

estate, stocks, bonds, and cash) minus their lia-bilities (such as home mortgages and other per-

sonal debt). Te only available data covering

recent decades dates back to 1983 and shows

that the wealth held by the wealthiest 1% o

households grew ar more than the wealth o

the median household, whose wealth was ac-

tually lower in 2009 than in 1983. Figure J

shows that the wealth o the top 1 percent grew

over the 1980s and 90s and by 2007 was 103

percent greater than in 1983. Te nancial cri-sis in 2008 reduced the wealth o those at the

top but by 2009 their wealth remained 48 per-

F I G U R E I

Financial sector claims growing share o economy

Financial sector compensation and profts as share o gross domestic product, 19292010

SOURCE: Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) data on National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA), tables 1.1.5 and 1.1.14.

ShareofoverallGDP

0%

1%

2%

3%

4%

5%

6%

7%

8%

1929

1932

1935

1938

1941

1944

1947

1950

1953

1956

1959

1962

1965

1968

1971

1974

1977

1980

1983

1986

1989

1992

1995

1998

2001

2004

2007

2010

3.8%3.7%

6.9%

7.6%

$547 billion in

2010 dollars


10/13

EP I BRIEFING P AP ER # 331 OC T OBER 26, 2011 PAGE 10

cent greater than in 1983. Te median households wealth

ared ar worse. Ater alling in the early 1990s the me-

dian households wealth rose and was 48 percent greater in

2007 than in 1983. But the all o wealth in the nancial

crisis was sharper or those in the middle than at the top

because those in the middle have much o their wealth in

housing, values o which ell dramatically ater the hous-

ing bubble burst. By 2009 the median households wealth

had allen so much that their wealth was 13.5 percent less

than what it was in 1983.5

Not surprisingly, the gap between the wealth o those

at the top and those in the middle substantially grew

over the last ew decades, as Figure K shows. In 1983

the wealthiest 1 percent o households had wealth that

was 131 times greater than wealth o the median house-

hold. Tis gap grew until the early 1990s and again in the

2000s, and by 2009 the top 1 percent had 225 times as

much wealth as the median household.6

Perhaps more startlingly, more than 94 percent of the

gainsin wealth rom 1983 to 2009 accrued to the top th

o wealthiest households, with 40.2 percent o the gains go-

ing to the wealthiest 1 percent and 41.5 percent going to

the next wealthiest 4 percent o households (Figure L). Tis

translated to gains among the wealthiest 1 percent o $4.5

million per household and gains among the next wealthiest

4 percent o roughly $1.2 million per household.7

In other words, the richest 5 percent o households

obtained roughly 82 percent o all the nations gains in

wealth between 1983 and 2009. Te bottom 60 percent o

households actually had less wealth in 2009 than in 1983,

F I G U R E J

No gains in wealth or the middle

Percentage growth in household wealth, 19832009

SOURCE: Economic Policy Institute analysis of Wol in Allegretto (2010).

NOTE: Data points represent data for available years.

Pe

rcentagegrowth

27%

23%17%

42%

63%

78%

103%

48%

7%

-9% -11%

11%

24% 23%

48%

-13%

-20.0%

0.0%

20.0%

40.0%

60.0%

80.0%

100.0%

120.0%

1983 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2009

Wealthiest 1%

Median


11/13


meaning they did not participate at all in the growth o

wealth over this period.

Basing policy in the true pictureo income and wealth

Te insights oered by the data on income, wealth, andinequality should shape the economic policy debate going

orward. Most immediately, they should inorm budget

decit debates about what the United States can aord.

Te nation can easily aord more ederal government sup-

port aimed at reducing todays historically high and per-

sistent rates o joblessness. In act it is the cheapest option

in all major economic respects (Mishel 2011).

Once the current crisis o joblessness has passed and

smaller imbalances between ederal investment and rev-

enues are appropriately targeted, attention should turn to

supporting the same level o economic security and dig-

nity that we have provided or generations. Tis would

mean ending the unnecessary calls to close budget decits

by cutting the benets provided by Social Security, Medi-care, and Medicaid.

Tirty years o economic data show that the U.S. econ-

omy has generated signicant levels o income and should

continue to do so into the uture; in other words, there is

no economicconstraint that mandates that we scale back

expectations or living standards growth in coming years

(Mishel 2011). But this vast income that has been gener-

F I G U R E K

Wealthiest households distance themselves rom typical households

Ratio o the wealthiest 1% o households to median household wealth, 19622009

SOURCE: EPI analysis of Wolf in Allegretto (2010).

NOTE: Data points represent data for available years.

Ratio

125-to-1131-to-1

156-to-1

176-to-1173-to-1

168-to-1173-to-1

190-to-1

181-to1

225-to-1

0

25

50

75

100

125

150

175

200

225

250

1962 1983 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2009


12/13


ated has been distributed in an extremely skewed ashion;

typical American amilies have not benetted rom it near-

ly as much as they could have. Tis is a politicalproblem

that, i solved, has the potential to make our country more

air and the vast majority o its citizens more prosperous.

Te politics o economic policymaking may be bro-

ken, but the U.S. economy is not broke, the data show.

Te country does have the economic wherewithal to pro-

vide a decent standard o living or all.

F I G U R E L

The rich gain most o the growth in wealth

Share o total wealth gain, by percentile rank in wealth, 1983-2009

SOURCE: Economic Policy Institute analysis of Wol in Allegretto (2010).

Shareoftotalwealthgain,

%

40.2%41.5%

10.2% 9.8%

5.7%

-1.4% -2.0%

-4.1%

-10%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

Top 1%

(99-100)

Next 4%

(95-99)

Next 5%

(90-95)

Next 10%

(80-90)

upper middle

fifth

middle

fifth

lower middle

fifth

lowest

fifth

-7.5%

81.7%


13/13


Endnotes1. Economic Policy Institute analysis o able A6: op ractiles

income levels (including capital gains) in the United Statesrom Income Inequality in the United States, 1913-1998 withTomas Piketty, Quarterly Journal o Economics, 118(1), 2003,1-39 (Longer updated version published in A.B. Atkinson and .Piketty eds., Oxord University Press, 2007) (ables and Figures

updated to 2008 in Excel ormat, July 2010).

2. Based on able 3.10 in Mishel, Bernstein, and Shierholz (2009),which uses data rom Kopczuk, Saez and Song (2007), able A-3.Data in able 3.10 or 2006 was extrapolated rom 2004 data us-ing growth rates rom Social Security Administration wage statis-tics (http://www.ssa.gov/OAC/COLA/awidevelop.html). SSAprovides data on share o total wages and employment in annual

wage brackets such as or those earning between $95,000.00 and$99,999.99. We employ the midpoint o the bracket to computetotal wage income in each bracket and sum all brackets. Our es-timate o total wage income was 99.1 percent o the actual. Weused interpolation to derive cutos building rom the bottom upto obtain the 090 percent bracket and then estimating the re-maining categories. Tis allowed us to estimate the wage shares

or upper wage groups. o obtain absolute wage trends we usedthe SSA data on the total wage pool and employment and com-puted the real wage per worker (based on their share o wages andemployment) in the dierent groups.

3. Te CEO pay data are described in the table note or table 3.41 inMishel, Bernstein, and Shierholz (2009).Te compensation dataor typical workers comes rom the Bureau o Labor Statisticsseries on average hourly earnings o production, non-supervisory

workers infated to compensation using the ratio o compensationto wages in the Bureau o Economic Analysis National Incomeand Product Accounts.

4. Te data in Figure G comes directly rom the Congressional Bud-get Oce, which calculates the share o all capital income goingto various income groupings. Figure H is calculated by EPI withslightly dierent data, specically the CBO estimates o averageincomes sources o incomes by income groupings. What are be-ing labeled as growth in capital incomes between 1979 and 2007in Figure H are dividends, interest payments, capital gains, andother business income, which includes partnership income, in-come rom S corporations, and rental income.

5. Te data on wealth are based on Wols analysis o the FederalReserve Boards Survey o Consumer Finances presented in able3 o Allegretto (2010)

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

ReerencesAllegretto, Sylvia. 2009. Te State of Working Americas Wealth,2011: Trough Volatility and urmoil the Gap Widens. EconomicPolicy Institute Brieng Paper #292. Washington, D.C.: EPI.

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epi: occupy wall streeters are right about skewed economic rewards in the united states

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