Maria Hedlund Statsvetenskapliga institutionen Lunds universitet maria.hedlund@svet.lu.se

Epigenetic responsibility

Introduction ................................................................................................................................................... 1

Responsibility ................................................................................................................................................ 1 Causation ................................................................................................................................................... 2 Cognizance ................................................................................................................................................. 4 Community ................................................................................................................................................. 6

Collective responsibility ................................................................................................................................. 6 Distribution of responsibility ....................................................................................................................... 7 Different kinds of collectives ....................................................................................................................... 9

Prospective responsibility ............................................................................................................................ 11

Epigenetic responsibility? ............................................................................................................................ 13 Epigenetics ............................................................................................................................................... 14 Epigenetics and responsibility ................................................................................................................... 18

Concluding remarks ..................................................................................................................................... 21

References ................................................................................................................................................... 21

Papper att presenteras på Statsvetenskapliga förbundets årsmöte

Göteborg 30 september–2 oktober 2010

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Introduction

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate the importance to bring the emerging knowledge from

the research field of epigenetics together with the concept of responsibility. Epigenetics is

related to, but qualitatively different from, genetics, which for a long time has been an object

of inquiry for responsibility theorists. My argument is that epigenetics gives rise to partly

different questions of responsibility than does genetics. To show this, I will present the crucial

characteristics of epigenetics, outlining the main differences between genetics and epigenetics

of relevance for responsibility, and delineate reasons why issues of responsibility is central for

the societal governance of epigenetics. To do this, I will first discuss the concept of

responsibility with the purpose of highlighting aspects of responsibility that is of relevance for

the ethically charged knowledge field of epigenetics.

Responsibility

The concept of responsibility is elusive, and many different aspects could be relevant to

include in a discussion on responsibility. For the present purpose of discussing responsibility

in relation to epigenetics, focus is on three aspects. First, I present three basic features of

responsibility having to do with how to attribute responsibility on a general level: causation,

cognizance, and community. Second, I discuss these features in terms of collective

responsibility, dealing with situations where many actors relating to each other in different

ways. Third, having assigned responsibility to one or many actors, individually or collectively,

the question arises of what is to be done with this responsibility. This bring to the fore a time

dimension, or, in other words retrospective and prospective responsibility, involving the

notions of obligation and capacity.

Generally, it could be said that holding someone responsible for an outcome is to deploy

“reactive attitudes towards that person” (Sneddon 2005: 241). Criteria for deploying those

reactive attitudes is that the person has caused an outcome, and do not act in ignorance or

under compulsion (Thompson 1987: 40). A (blurry) distinction might be made between strict

causal responsibility and moral responsibility, where the difference could be to what extent the

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action in question “carries with it ascriptions of fault and blame” (Miller 2001: 458) or not.1

Of interest here is mainly moral responsibility.

Causation

The most simple definition of causation is that A causes B if, had A not happened, then B

would not have happened (Halpern 2006. 3). This is also to say that A is responsible for B.

However, such a statement carries with it a number of complications, like positive and negative

actions, intentionality of actions, and voluntariness. An actor can be the cause of an outcome

by positive action, i.e. “doing things with the result that these occur”, or by negative action, i.e. not

doing something “with the results that these events occur” (Harris 1974: 265). It seems

unassailable that actors have some kind of responsibility for what they have actually done (c.f.

Thompson 1987: 40), even if this not necessarily has to be a moral responsibility, i.e. involving

an appraisal of the agent‟s conduct (Miller 2001: 456). More contestable is the claim that

actors also are responsible for outcomes they have failed to prevent (Kamm 2007: 305; Miller

2001: 456).2 An argument for this position is that what matters is what comes about, not how

it came about (Harris 1974: 265). This attack on the causal link between inaction and

consequence also brings about the most obvious critique of this position, namely that causal

linkage between inaction and consequence is “more tenuous than that between action and

consequence” (Harris 1974: 265). For the moment, it suffices to declare that a causal link

between action or inaction and consequence carries with it some kind of responsibility. What

this responsibility implies for the actor causing that link is something I will be further

elaborating on below. Now I am going to look at the intentionality aspect of causation.

1 In one way such a “clarification” is circular: what is non-moral is what is not moral. However, the question of what qualifies as moral is not possible to settle. For instance, it could as well be argued that people should be held morally responsible for the outcomes of “all their voluntary actions, blameworthy or not” (Miller 2001: 460). Besides, disregarding where we chose to draw the line between moral and non-moral responsibility (if such a line is possible to draw at all), what is considered moral is always context dependent. This context dependency not only implies the non-universality of the notion, but also its potential to change. This is similar to a neo-Strawsonian account of moral as formulated by Sneddon, namely that moral responsibility appeals to relations between people and that acting morally responsible is to act “in accordance with e.g. rules, principles, expectations, etc” (Sneddon 2005: 247). In other words, an agent must be “potentially receptive to moral reasons before he is open to blame” (Talbert 2008: 531). 2 A stronger account of positive action is the claim that actors not only are responsible for their actions, but also have a duty to act in order to protect the right of others (Stieb 2009). This will be further dealt with in the section about retrospective and prospective responsibility.

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A complication of causation as a main feature of responsibility is that the consequences of

an action (or non-action) can be intentional or not (c.f. Lanteri 2009). This does not make a

difference for the actual causation–the by-passer falls by an actor pushing her irrespective of

the actor‟s intention to do so or if it happened by accident–but does have implications for the

kind of responsibility that could be assigned to the actor causing the fall. In the case of an

accidental event,3 the actor clearly has caused the falling of the by-passer, but as the actor did

not do something blameworthy or objectionable, there is no moral responsibility of the actor

towards the by-passer. In the case of deliberate pushing, however, the actor has not only

caused the falling, but also has done something blameworthy and, accordingly, has a moral

responsibility towards the by-passer (c.f. Miller 2001: 456; Talbert 2008: 516; Pizarro et al.

2003). Analogous to the dimension of intentionality is the dimension of voluntariness.

Doing something voluntary can be said to be in control, which “is considered a necessary

condition for the ascription of responsibility in nearly every normative theory” (Pizarro et al.

2003: 267). A voluntary action, i.e. an action performed without compulsion, is blameworthy

in the similar manner as the deliberate action and thus ascribes moral responsibility to the

causing actor (c.f. Thompson 1987: 40, 47). In fact, you could say that an accidental event is a

kind of compulsion as far as the actor could not prevent it from happen.4 However,

compulsion normally refers to situations when an actor is forced to do something by law and

other rules inflicted on her, or by mental illness (Talbert 2008: 517). Such involuntariness

mitigates or eliminates responsibility of the actor, at least as far as the perspective is limited to

the backwards-looking dimension.5 Compulsion could also come about by real or perceived

expectations from the social context, i.e. no formal rules or orders from superiors literally

force the agent to act in a certain way, but informal norms and perceived expectations, which

3 A distinction can be made between action and events, where events may be given causal explanations, while actions may be given intentional or reason explanations (Duus-Otterström 2007: 275). 4 This way of arguing might resemble determinism, constituting a kind of involuntariness that would preclude (moral) responsibility (Honderich 1993: 117). However, it could be argued that the moral responsibility is compatible with determinism if the domain of justification of actions is considered internal to human attitudes “given with the fact of human society” and “neither calls for, nor permits, an external „rational‟ justification” (Strawson as cited by Sneddon 2005: 241), i.e. a justification outside of that being controllable. 5 The forward-looking dimension, which brings to the fore measures to remedy harm, primarily considers which part is more opt to change a bad situation and only secondarily which part is to blame for the emergence of the bad situation (Miller 2001: 469–471). This is discussed in the section of prospective responsibility.

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could be the case in many social contexts (c.f. Thompson 1987: 61–64). To put it simply,

agents “should be blamed only if they could have done otherwise” (Thompson 1987: 41).

Cognizance

The cognizance aspect of responsibility has to do with the role of knowledge in ascribing

responsibility. We can talk about, on the one hand, knowledge about the causal relations

making an actor responsible for an action or not, and, on the other hand, knowledge about

right and wrong referring to whether the actor knows that what she is doing is right or wrong.

Present in the cognizance aspect is also a time dimension, i.e. knowledge about what has

happened, about what could have happened and about what might happen in a future.

A prerequisite for being ascribed responsibility is that the actor has knowledge about the

causal relations and consequences of an action (Thompson 1987: 47). The consequences of an

action could reasonably be divided into direct and indirect consequences. Direct

consequences, e.g. someone pressing a doorknob with the cause that the door opens, or a

person lighting a cigarette with the cause that the person could smoke that cigarette, would of

course be easier to realize than indirect consequences of an action. Such indirect

consequences could happen in a short time after the action, as with the opening of the door or

the smoking of the cigarette, but they could also happen a long time after the action in

question. One example of this would be long-term health effects of smoking. An agent

realizing the consequences of her actions would reasonably be held responsible for the

consequences of those actions in a way that the non-realizing agent would not. The issue of

relevance for ascribing someone responsibility is to what extent the agent is able to realize the

effects of an action, of the effects of not to act, or the effects of acting differently. In other

words, to what extent would it be reasonable to expect the agent being foresighted? That, of

course, has to do with the period passing from the action to the consequence of that action,

and of the consequences being direct or indirect. An agent is generally more apt to realise

direct and short-term consequences than indirect and long-term consequences. This question

also has bearing on knowledge about right and wrong.

There are situations in which what is right or what is wrong is not contestable; legality

might be an example. In other situations, there are no definite rights or wrongs. Leaving aside

the normative issue of deciding what is right or wrong, good or bad, even in situations without

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any definite answer on the question of right and wrong there are context dependent norms of

what constitute a right or a good behaviour. For the point of this argument, we do not need to

go deeper into how these norms are made. Suffice is to say that bad actions resulting from

moral ignorance (real or alleged), i.e. ignorance of moral norms, irrespective of how these

norms have come about, is what we normally regard as “paradigm cases of moral

responsibility” (FitzPatrick 2008: 590). Of course, alleged moral ignorance constitutes a

stronger case for being ascribed responsibility than if the agent is really unknowing, as this has

to do with “acting against one‟s better judgment” (FitzPatrick 2008: 590). In the case of real

ignorance, responsibility is mitigated unless it is reasonable to expect that the agent should

have known (in a way similar to the obligation of all members in a society to know about the

law in this society).6

In this context, it would be helpful to make a differentiation between different levels of

knowledge. One way to do this is by distinguishing between degrees of knowledge, from total

ignorance on one end of a scale, to certain knowledge on the other end of this scale. Given a

constructivist epistemological standing, such a scale would better be made up from ignorance

on the one end to accepted instead of certain knowledge on the other end. Following the

categorisation of scientific knowledge of Knaggård (2009: 51), such a scale would also

comprise uncertain knowledge as a middle range of this scale.7 Using degrees of knowledge to

ascriptions of responsibility would be of central importance in further discussions of

epigenetics and responsibility.

To ascribe responsibility to an agent based on cognizance, it is not sufficient to consider if

she has knowledge and to which degree. In cases of uncertainty or ignorance, it is also relevant

to take into account why she is uncertain or ignorant. It could be argued that ignorance – or

uncertainty – counts as an excuse only if the ignorance is not due to the agent being negligent”

(c.f. Thompson 1987: 48). If the agent deliberately neglects to get such knowledge she

6 Situations when it is not reasonable to expect an agent to know about the moral norms are cases of brainwashing and strong indoctrination, unavailable knowledge about moral norms, cases “where it would be naïve to suppose that everyone who tried could reasonably be expected to come to the correct answer, even on the assumption that there is one”, and disagreement about background facts (FitzPatrick 2008: 612). 7 The rationale for this categorisation is based on scientific knowledge, or, rather, the logics of scientific knowledge generation. This would make the categorisation rather uncontroversial to apply in the context of emerging knowledge in the field of epigenetics. However, I would argue that the categorisations as such would be applicable to any kind of knowledge.

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reasonable would be expected to have, and if that knowledge is within reasonable reach, then

the responsibility falls heavier than in situations where the agent has done everything she could

to get hold of relevant knowledge. It could be argued that this criterion is especially valid for

public officials and other position holders who, by virtue of their role or position, could be

ascribed formal responsibility, and just because of this avoid getting hold of relevant

knowledge (c.f. Thompson 1987: 48–49).

Community

Another reason to ascribing responsibility to an actor is bonds between actors within a

community. As Lewis has put it: “we are all extensively „responsible for‟ our fellows in the

sense that we have duties towards them – most of our duties are of this sort” (Lewis 1948).

However, even though agents in communities of different kinds “see themselves as having

special responsibilities to one another” (Miller 2001: 462), this would not in itself be a

justifiable reason for group members having responsibility to other group members.8 The

special responsibility between members of a community is rather justified by group solidarity,

meaning the group members having a community of interest, bonds of sentiment, and that

goods and harms necessarily are collective and indivisible (Feinberg 1970: 61–62). In virtue of

such presumed group solidarity, family members, collegial groups, professions, followers of the

same religion, nations, and so on, would have a special responsibility to other members of that

community (c.f. May & Hoffman 1991: 3; De George 1981; Feinberg 1970: 61–62).

Collective responsibility

A special difficulty with the concept of responsibility arises when there are many actors

involved, actors that either act independently or in concert. Attempts to find solutions to such

problems include the notion of collective responsibility, which fundamentally has to do with

the question of what constitutes a moral subject. The problem of many actors causing an

outcome raises the question of who is to be held responsible for what. There are several

situations where many actors act independently of each other without the question of

collective responsibility being an issue. Of interest here are situations when it is reasonable to

8 Furthermore, it cannot explain distribution of responsibilities within the community (Miller 2001: 463), which will be discussed in the section on collective responsibility.

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talk about the many actors constituting a collective of some kind. Collectives are a species of

population differing from aggregates (Gilbert 2006: 95) in that the members of a collective

have some kind of ties to each other that the aggregate individuals do not (Gilbert 2006: 102).

The crucial question is whether a collective can be ascribed responsibility as a collective or, in

other words, if the responsibility for outcomes caused by many actors constituting a collective

is distributive or undistributive.

Distribution of responsibility

Given that it is reasonable to talk about a collective as an indivisible whole, two positions on

the questions of ascribing responsibility could be identified. First, there is the position that each

individual associated with the collective should be equally charged with moral responsibility for

outcomes generated by that collective (Thompson 1987: 44). Complications with this position

is that every individual in a collective does not have to be involved in the blameworthy action

or plays different roles within it, or they might not even know about what the collective has

done (c.f. Feinberg 1970: 69–71). A way to handle this is problem is to ascribe degrees of

responsibility in relation to the actual contribution of each group member. In fact, it is hard to

isolate the contribution of each individual in a collective, as “causes can combine in many

various different ways to bring about an outcome” (Gerstenberg & Lagnado 2010: 166). Each

cause can contribute, or add, something to the outcome, all causes might need to surpass a

certain threshold, or the situation can be what is called disjunction, namely that it takes only

one, but any one, of the causes to bring about the outcome (Gerstenberg & Lagnado 2010:

166–167). Even though experiments have shown that people in general are “sensitive to causal

functions that translates individual actions into a group outcome” (Gerstenberg & Lagnado

2010: 170), this does not help us to establish a justified assigning of responsibility in cases of

many actors. Furthermore, it could be argued that assigning responsibility to individuals in a

collective by degree is in fact not collective responsibility, but a case of individual

responsibility.

Second, and probably most contested, is the position holding that only the collective can be

charged with responsibility for outcomes caused by that collective (Thompson 1987: 44).

Generally it could be ascertained that the more cohesive the group, the less problematic the

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ascription of collective responsibility (Muyskens 1982: 172). However, a key issue is whether a

collective can be considered a moral agent, a prerequisite for moral responsibility.9

Is a collective a moral agent? One position is that it is. If the same requirements holds

for collective moral responsibility as for individual moral responsibility, a collective is morally

responsible if it has awareness of the moral nature of an action and could have done

something else (Held 1970: 90–91). Even if it is questionable if a collective can have such

awareness, it is reasonable to think that a collective could have done something else. This

might be the case in joint commitments. If members of a collective have a joint commitment

to perform a certain action, then they are jointly committed to perform this action as a single

body (Gilbert 2006: 100; 1993: 696–697). Does this also mean they should be held responsible

as a single body? According to this way of reasoning, it seems that they can, and that this

circumstance “does not entail anything about the personal moral responsibility of members of

the blameworthy collective” (Gilbert 2006: 114). In other words, a collective could be held

morally responsible even if the members of the collective could not, or at least not all of them,

a conclusion concomitant with the collective moral autonomy thesis (Copp 2007). Another

position is that a collective cannot be considered a moral agent. As Mäkelä puts it:

An important corollary of the collectivist view is that collectives are capable of bearing moral responsibility for actions and/or outcomes, even if none of their members is in any degree individually morally responsible for those actions and/or outcomes (Mäkelä 2007: 456).

According to this position, collective agents do not satisfy the conditions of moral

responsibility, as they “lack the kind of control over their actions that is required” (Mäkelä

2007: 463). One argument is that the individuals of collectives control the aim, values,

preferences and inputs of collectives, and, individually or jointly, actually make the moral

decisions of the collective (Mäkelä 2007: 462; May & Hoffman 1991: 12–13). Another

argument is that the aim of collectives is to serve the purpose of its members (Mäkelä 2007:

462–463).10 Collectives cannot have moral plans for their lives (May & Hoffman 1991: 12–13),

and moral responsibility of collectives thus stems from the moral decisions of individuals “in

9 There are different kinds of problems associated with different kinds of responsibility. Causal and legal responsibility is not as controversial to ascribe to collectives as moral responsibility. 10 But: there are many kinds of collectives, e.g. welfare institutions, that serve other individuals than those constituting the collective, and have their aim set by others than by the actual members of the collective. For now, it suffices to say that this remark emphasizes the importance of the special character of the collective in question. More on this below.

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terms of the moral responsibilities of individuals” (Downie 1969: 50). On the other hand,

individuals in a collective have a role that they accept and enact, which makes the moral

responsibility of individuals belonging to a collective a complex matter. However, this

complexity does not remove the responsibility from the individuals, as they freely become

members of a collective,11 bring various moral qualities into the collective and thus create or

accept the rules of collectives (Downie 1969:50–51). As will be demonstrated below, both

positions are possible to defend, depending on what kind of collective one has in mind.

Another crucial question for the possibility of ascribing responsibility to collectives is

whether, or under which conditions, individuals could be blameworthy for the actions of other

individuals (McGary 1986: 79). One such condition is group solidarity, which could be a basis

for vicarious collective moral responsibility even though not all members are at fault. A

requirement for this is that the responsible party knows about the action in advance and have

the opportunity to prevent it (Feinberg 1970: 61–62, 73; McGary 1986: 83–84). Letting an

injustice happen might be less faulty than actually causing the injustice, but in a moral sense

faulty enough to make a person morally responsible (McGary 1986: 83). The sympathetic basis

for this way of reasoning is that “we live in a world where we can no longer view ourselves as

being detached from the actions of groups of which we are part” (McGary 1986: 86). As with

the issue of collective moral agents, the question of vicarious responsibility has different

answers in different kinds of collectives.

Different kinds of collectives

A crucial question for the possibility of ascribing collective responsibility is what kind of

collectives we are talking about. There are different kind of collectives, sharing the

characteristics of being a body of many individuals, but differing in degree of joint

commitment, organisation, decision-making procedures agreed on, and more (c.f. Held 1970:

89–90). As will be demonstrated, the rationale for distribution of collective responsibility

might differ in different kinds of collectives. Three different kinds of collectives of relevance

here are hierarchical organisations, professions, and random collectives.

11 This is valid in certain kinds of collectives; in other kinds of collectives, like families and nations, individuals mostly become members without their own free choice.

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In the case of hierarchical organisations, the dimension of authorisation is added to the

collective (Gilbert 2006: 103). Formal positions in such organisations might decide who is

responsible for the actions of the collective (c.f. May & Hoffman 1991: 1).12 This means that a

superior can be charged responsibility for the action or non-action of a subordinate; expected

obedience and loyalty of subordinates are factors weakening the responsibility of the individual

subordinate (May & Hoffman 1991: 11). This, however, does not necessarily free the

subordinate from guilt. While guilt is strictly individual, responsibility can be passed from one

party to another (Feinberg 1970: 60), as is the case in hierarchical organisations. However,

formal responsibility coincide with moral responsible only when those in top positions can be

expected to have control over outcomes (Thompson 1987: 41), an aspect having to do with

knowledge and relates to the issue of cognizance discussed above.13 This brings to the fore

responsibility of subordinates to supply superiors with knowledge, and in cases of a

threatening harm or misconduct of the formal organisation, in a next step, to go public with

knowledge the superior does not consider. According to De George, subordinates are morally

permitted to go public in such situations, while they are morally obliged to do so when the

knowledge in question is supported by documented evidence and there is evidence that going

public will prevent the harm or misconduct (De George 1981: 156–157; c.f. Lundquist 1998).

Actors failing to do something they are obliged to do are morally responsible for the

consequences of that non-action.

The question of non-distributive, collective responsibility may be less problematic in the

case of professions than in other collectives. This is because of certain characteristics of a

profession as compared to other collectives. First, in contrast to e.g. families or states (c.f.

Gilbert 2006: 112), a profession is chosen. “In choosing the profession, one assumes the

responsibility concomitant with being a professional”, and “chooses to adapt the values,

methodology, and „way of life‟ [rules, mores, customs etc] of the profession” (Muyskens 1982:

172). Second, for every profession there is certain collective power or rights given exclusively

to the profession. This power or these rights are coupled with a collective responsibility to

12 Of relevance for formal organisations is also the distinction between self-imposed or internal moral responsibilities, and external moral responsibilities, defined for the organisation by external parties (Maclagan 2008: 376). These different kinds of responsibilities might conflict, giving rise to moral dilemmas. 13 The same logic goes to positions that are not necessarily formal, as with the parent–child relation, where the parent could be expected to be in a position to control outcomes of actions of their child (c.f. Feinberg 1970).

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maintain acceptable professional standards (Muyskens 1982: 172–173). Third, professions are

self-regulatory and monopolistic. The appeal to collective responsibility can be used to show

that “the group‟s conduct is below standards we can reasonably expect the group to meet”

(Muyskens 1982: 173). A condition for non-distributive, collective responsibility is that

members of a group performing undesirable acts do that in accordance with the rules, mores,

customs etc of that group (Muyskens 1982: 170–171). Referring to Feinberg, Muyskens

emphasizes that the collective responsibility ascribed to professions is distinct from the guilt of

individual members of professions (Muyskens 1982: 176), a way of reasoning resembling that

of hierarchies.

A third special kind of collective is random collectives, or, as Held put it, a random collection

of individuals, like train passengers witnessing a crime at the train. Such a collective differs

from organised groups in the sense of lacking decision-making methods (Held 1970: 97). A

prerequisite for individual moral responsibility is that the individual is aware of the nature of

the moral nature of an action and could have done something else, but it is doubtful if a

random collective fulfil these requirements (Held1970: 94). According to Held, a random

collective is morally responsible when it is obvious “to the reasonable person” (Held 1970: 94)

that an action is called for, and the random collection does not constitute itself into a group

capable of deciding upon an action” (Held 1970: 97). In contrast to an organised collective,

where different members can hold different roles or positions and thereby not be ascribed the

same degree of responsibility, the moral responsibility of this random collection should be

equally distributed, i.e. each member is equally responsible (Held 1970: 97).14

Prospective responsibility

So far, we have been mainly occupied with the backward-looking or retrospective question of

who to blame (praise) for a bad (good) situation. An important question remains, namely,

what it really means to be blamed (or praised)15 in relation to the arisen bad situation. If the

blaming should have any significance in real world situations, forward-looking or prospective

14 Bates (1971) differs between collective action performed individually by one or a number of members of the random group, and joint action by group members. In cases of joint action, Bates claims, members who tried to do a rightful action with the help of others are not morally responsible for the non-action (Bates 1971: 106). This way of arguing is similar to Gilbert‟s (1993) discussion about obligations generated by joint commitments. 15 For the sake of argument, I will only talk about blame in this regard.

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responsibility must follow the blaming (c.f. Maclagan 2008: 376). In other words, what does

responsibility implicate prospectively for doing something about the bad situation? Two

aspects of prospective or remedial responsibility are considered here: obligation and capacity.

When talking about causal responsibility straightforward, it could easily be argued that the

agent causing the harm has a responsibility to remedy this harm (Miller 2001: 456).16 However,

remedial responsibility not necessarily belongs to the agent causing the harm. There are

instances where no particular agent can be identified, e.g. external causes like natural disasters,

situations where the actions of several agents could be plausibly linked to the harm caused, and

situations where harm is caused by action considered legitimate (Miller 2001: 458). The point

here is that causal responsibility in itself is not sufficient to attribute responsibility to mitigate

or remedy a bad situation, or remedial responsibility (Miller 2001: 458). An agent can have a

moral obligation to remedy a bad outcome irrespective of the agent‟s role in generating that

outcome.

Generally, obligation means to have a reason to act that is not the creatures of a person‟s

will (Gilbert 1993: 686–687). Certain relations between parties cause such reasons to act, i.e.

obligations. A distinction can be made between context insensitive and context sensitive

obligations. A context insensitive obligation could be the result of a joint commitment, which

is an interdependent agreement to act in a certain way. This means that no individual in this

joint commitment is committed until all the others are, and that no individual alone can create

or destroy the reasons for action. (Gilbert 1993: 693–694). A joint commitment is a context

insensitive obligation, as it does not disappear if the context is enlarged (Gilbert 1993: 699).

The obligation of the joint commitment is absolute, and does not disappear “unless and until

those who participate in it concur in its dissolution” (Gilbert 1993: 699).

A context sensitive obligation, in contrast, disappear if the context is enlarged. Take the

case of a by-passer noticing an injured child and no one else is there to rescue this child. Then

the by-passer is morally obliged to rescue this child based on her being there and, therefore,

best placed to put the situation right (c.f. Miller 2001: 460). However, consider an enlargement

of the context by the scenario of a worse accident happening close by and the by-passer is the

16 However, it is not always obvious what particular action would best remedy a bad situation, which might give rise to moral dilemmas. E.g. in the case of a factory generating dangerous pollution, an immediate obligation would be to close this factory. At the same time, there could be an obligation “to provide employment for the workforce” (Maclagan 2008: 378–379).

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only one available to rescue those involved. Then it could be argued that the by-passer is

obliged to remedy this bad situation before, or in the place of, remedying the injured child,

based on “where the most value lies” (Gilbert 1993: 699– 700, footnote 36). Enlarging the

context changed the relative value of the act of rescuing the injured child (Gilbert 1993,

footnote 36). One could easily think about other situations generating obligations for others

than the causing parties, or situations where identifiable causing actors are hard to discern.

Warfare, starvation, environmental problems, and other global issues are obvious examples. In

such cases, the question of obligation is tightly connected to the notion of capacity.

Capacity to do something about a bad situation might, but need not, differ from the logic

of ascribing responsibility on the basis of causation, which exclusively looks at the past to

identify who is to blame for a bad outcome. The capacity principle has more to do with the

bad situation as such, and how it could be remedied, than with who actually caused this bad

situation. The principle of capacity “holds that remedial responsibilities ought to be assigned

according to the capacity of each agent to discharge them” (Miller 2001: 460). Instead of

asking who is responsible for bringing a bad situation about, the central point is who is “best

placed to put it right?” (Miller 2001: 460). In this way, the capacity principle is separated from

causal responsibility, which could constitute a legitimacy problem. Apparently, the capacity

principle needs somehow to be linked to the agent that is assigned responsibility. One clear

example is the link between a child and its parent.17 Another example would be the by-passer

watching someone getting hurt by falling in the street without the by-passer being involved in

what happened. By being there, it could be argued, the by-passer has not only a moral

obligation, but also a capacity to help this person.18 In this example, there is a clear link

between the agents, as they happen to be at the same place at the same time. This is not

always the case in situations where the capacity principle might be applicable.

Epigenetic responsibility?

17 In this example, though, other principles might free the child from responsibility in the first place: lack of knowledge and lack of ability to realize the consequences of its actions. Nevertheless, the example illustrates that the agent causing a bad situation does not necessarily be the same agent responsible for remedying it. 18 This example resembles the case of the injured child. As these cases illustrate, both the obligation principle and the capacity principle could thus be used to ascribe moral responsibility in cases of an innocent by-passer.

14

Epigenetics is related to, but different from, genetics. The relation between the genome and

the epigenome has been described as the genome being “the hard disc of a computer

containing the blueprint for the creation, function, maintenance and reproduction of the

organism”, while the epigenome being “the operating system to make all of that information

accessible” (Rosqvist 2009: 18). From the perspective of social science in general and political

theory in particular, the crucial differences between genetics and epigenetics are i) the genome

being environmentally independent, while the epigenome being environmentally dependent; ii)

genetic effects are irreversible, while epigenetic effects are reversible; iii) genetic changes are

slow, while epigenetic changes are rapid; and iv) the genome is definitely inheritable, while

epigenetic trans-generational inheritance is an uncertain is uncertain whether the epigenome is

inherited from one generation to the next.

In the following, I will introduce the emerging research field of epigenetics, especially

pointing at these characteristics of epigenetics, as I judge them of special importance for the

question of responsibility. Then I use an actor–structure reasoning to demonstrate the role of

epigenetics in affecting people‟s lives on a societal level, with the purpose to couple the

characteristics of epigenetics to responsibility.

Epigenetics

Epigenetics can be described as biological mechanisms programming or modifying gene

function without changing gene sequence (Szyf et al 2007: 10). Characteristics or traits in

organisms – its phenotype – are brought about by such epigenetic mechanisms. In other

words, new phenotypes are created “under „instructions‟ given not only by the genome” (Balon

2002: 5), but also by epigenetic mechanisms. A fundamental characteristics of epigenetic

phenomena is that “one genotype can show alternative phenotypes” (Richards 2006: 395). In

other words, “there is no one-to-one correspondence between genotype and phenotype” (Ho

as quoted by Balon 2002: 5). Most simply this is demonstrated by the existence of different

cell types – blood, liver, bone etc. – being a result of the differentiation process, i.e. the process

of specification of cells during development. All cells in an organism carry the same DNA

before, during, and after this specification. Still, some develop into blood cells, other to liver

15

cells etc., and this is a result of epigenetic mechanisms (Lotem & Sachs 2006).19 This role of

epigenetics is highlighted by the metaphor of epigenetics being an on–off switch of genes

(Butcher & Beck 2008: 392). This metaphor is old (Chong & Whitelaw 2004: 692) and not

quite accurate20 although quite a popular one (c.f. Jersild 2009), as is the cell conductor

metaphor (c.f. Attefall 2009). These metaphors point to what epigenetic mechanisms actually

do, namely regulating the functioning of genes (Ptak & Petronis 2008: 258).

One kind of phenotypic differences thus consists of the result of the differentiation

process. Another kind of phenotypic difference is different dispositions for diseases. A good

illustration of this is that of monozygotic twins, i.e. genetically identical twins, being

phenotypically different, e.g. one having a disposition for autoimmune diseases or mental

disorders, while the other has not (e.g. Javierre et al 2009; Kato et al 2005). Phenotypic

differences (discordance) in genetically identical twins are usually treated as a proof of an

environmental contribution (Javierre et al 2009; Petronis 2006: 347). This is no news. What is

new, however, is the emerging insight of epigenetic research about how environment affects the

development of life, namely that epigenetic modifications are induced by the environment. Environment

should here be understood broadly as the bio-environment (organisms in our bodies), the

physical environment (food, temperature), and social environment (stress, well-being and so

forth), both intrauterine and postnatal (Szyf 2009: 887–879). The effects of the dialogue

between the genome and its environment (Zhang & Meaney 2010: 458) are normally described

as being most profound early in life – prenatally and short after birth – and have to do with an

adaptation or matching of the offspring to the current environment (Gluckman et al 2007). If

the conditions in later life do not correspond to the environment in early life, e.g. food scarcity

in early life and food abundance in adult life, this preparation turns out to be inaccurate and

will cause a mismatch between the epigenetic programming and the actual living conditions.

This mismatch between the genotype, environment and lifestyle might be a cause of many

health related outcomes, not least of complex diseases (Weaver 2009: 315; Chong & Whitelaw

2004: 694; Ptak & Petronis 2008). Epigenetic change is continuously occurring (although most

profound in early life), but certain factors might give rise to unfitting adaptation.

19 As an effect, “the epigenome varies from tissue to tissue”, while “genomic information is uniform among the different cells of a complex organism” (Fraga et al 2005: 10609). 20 The process is more dynamic than simply switching on or off genes. A gene could be on at a certain stage and off at another, it could be on in one cell and off in another and so on (c.f. Mohn & Schübeler 2009).

16

Environmental factors affecting epigenetical modifications comprise exposure to toxins

(Szyf et al 2007: 9, 10), pharmaceutical drugs (Csoka & Szyf 2009), individual life style, i.e. diet

(Sloboda et al 2007; Stein et al 2009), physical activity and smoking habits (Fraga et al 2005:

10609), and early life stress factors such as defective care giving (Szyf et al 2007) or caesarean

section (Weaver 2009: 321). Furthermore, epigenetic changes occur in processes of assisted

reproduction (Niemiz & Feinberg 2004; Weaver et al 2009: 536; Kato et al 2005: 624). There

are also signs indicating that internal factors such as the ageing process affect epigenetic

mechanisms (Fraga et al 2005: 10609). These and other environmental factors might cause the

epigenetic modifications that covariate with certain diseases or the predisposition for certain

diseases.

On the cellular level, epigenetic modifications give long-term, stable effects and are

commonly referred to as cellular epigenetic inheritance, i.e. the epigenetic modifications persist

during cell division from mother cell to daughter cell (Jablonka & Raz 2009: 132). Epigenetic

change also has the result of predisposing for certain diseases, or other kinds of unfit

preparation for the supposed environment of the adult organism. Such modifications are

associated with stable changes in the phenotype, emerging in infancy and sustaining into

adulthood (Champagne & Curley 2009; Gluckman et al 2007; Burdge et al 2008). However,

there are also signs of the epigenome being dynamic, susceptible to influences at any time of

life (Szyf 2009; 2007; c.f. Petronis 2006). Relating to this is the claim that epigenetic effects are

reversible (Szyf 2009; Szyf et al 2007: 15; Meaney & Szyf 2005: 461; Weaver et al 2006: 3480,

3485). A consequence of this is that in difference from genetics, epigenetics offers hope to

“prevent or therapeutically intervene to reverse deleterious epigenetic aberrations” (Szyf 2009:

879). Epigenetic changes also have the “potential to offer a mechanism by which cellular

metabolism can be rapidly regulated independently of long-term, irreversible evolutionary [and

slow] mutagenesis” (Bouchard et al 2010: 309–310, my emphasis).

Maybe the most exciting and definitely the most contested quality of epigenetics is the

question of trans-generational inheritance. There are many claims of epigenetic inheritance

between generations of individuals without continued exposure of the epigenetic trigger (e.g.

Jablonka & Raz 2008; Petronis 2006; Flanagan et al 2006; Chong & Whitelaw 2004; Weaver et

al 2004; Rakyan & Whitelaw 2003; Petronis & Gottesman 2000). However, critics point to

17

weak evidence and that replications of studies claiming trans-generational epigenetic

Figure 1 The role of epigenetics [very preliminary!]

Phenotype

Environment Epigenetics Genes Phenotype

DNA package Phenotype

(diet, smoking habits, exposure to toxins, stress, and more)

(epigenetic mechanisms, e.g. modifications of DNA package)

(physical, psychological and behavioural traits, predisposition for diseases, obesity, mental disorders and more)

inheritance have not been possible. In a recent review, Skinner et al (2010) conclude that trans-

generational inheritance, which presupposes epigenomic alterations of the germ line

is possible, but not very common.21 The occurrence of trans-generational epigenetic

inheritance still appears to be an open question.

As a social scientist, my understanding of epigenetic mechanisms is of course that of a

layman. However, my interpretation of the results of these and other studies is that what can

be established is that epigenetic modifications do occur; in fact, epigenetics “provides a

remarkable insight into the biology that governs the function of the genome in response to

environmental signals” (Zhang & Meaney 2010: 441). More uncertain are the causal effects of

those epigenetic modifications to phenotype, i.e. how they come about in humans. Figure 1 is

a sketchy attempt to illustrate the relation between the environment, epigenetics, and

phenotypes. The unbroken line symbolise that DNA remains unchanged, while the

environment, mediated by epigenetic mechanisms, affects the epigenetic modifications, here

imagined to happen inside the dotted line square outside of the genes, symbolising the protein

complexes in which the DNA is packed.

21 The often referred reason why epigenetic induced effects would not be inherited trans-generationally is that the epigenetic mechanisms would be reset for each generation. According to Skinner, this is not the case for imprinted genes (i.e. genes whose expression is determined by the parent that contributed them, in difference from most genes determining the gene expression of the offspring in an equal mix of the genes from both parents). Epigenetic mechanisms working on imprinted genes would thus be inherited trans-generationally (Skinner et al 2010: 215–216).

18

Another way to visualise the gene–environment interaction is proposed in figure 2. In this

three dimensional figure, genetics is represented at the x-axis, life span development at the y-

axis, and environment at the z-axis. Epigenomic variation can then be scattered as lines

representing the degree of genetic influence and environmental influence during lifespan

development.

I hope that the exposition above has been clear enough to make the reader agree with me

that we can understand epigenetics as

a link between genotype and phenotype;

an inculcation of the significance of the environment in a wide sense for behaviour

and diseases;

a biological explanation of environmental influence on development, and,

conceivably;

heredity that is possible to influence.

Figure 2 Three-dimensional model of gene–environment interaction and epigenomic variation epigenome variation lifespan develop- ment (y) less genetics affection less environmental affection genetics (x) environment (z) more genetics affection more environmental affection

Source: lecture by Shuk-mei Ho at Pufendorf symposium on epigenetics, Lund University, May 3–4, 2010.

19

Epigenetics and responsibility

The most fundamental relation brought to the fore by epigenetics is, I argue, that of

responsibility. If we stay with the – oversimplified and still uncertain – picture of epigenetics

as heredity that is possible to influence, and turn to a political science point of view, one way

to structure the different factors affecting epigenetic modifications that, in turn, affect the

phenotype, is to divide them according to level of influence or, in other words, in an actor–

structure perspective. What constitutes an actor or a structure is contingent to the level of

analysis (Lundquist 1987), but as a starting point, the environmental factors known to induce

change in the epigenetic pattern can be divided into factors directly related to the individual

(diet, life style etc), to society or the state (living conditions, working environment, health care

etc) and social structures (class, gender etc). As we will see, it is not self-evident which entity is

regarded an actor or a structure. Figure 3 might help illustrate the point.

Figure 3 Actors and structures affecting and affected by epigenetic patterns

Affecting Affected

The individual

Actor

The individual

Children? Grandchildren?

Other members of society Other than

the individual

Actor/s

Institutions

Structural conditions

The structure related factors in figure 3 could more or less be categorised as actor related,

depending on perspective. From the point of view of the individual, factors that the individual

her/himself definitely22 can affect, like diet, smoking or exercise habits, clearly are actor related

factors, while factors like living conditions, the availability of health care or gender relations are

factors that the individual her/himself definitely cannot directly affect (although in some cases

indirectly and in the long run) clearly are structure related factors. However, from the

22 Although there is always the eternal question of the free will, for the argument I am trying to make it will suffice to stipulate that certain factors are definitely out of control for the individual.

20

perspective of society or the state, factors here categorised as structures, more or less could be

affected by state or other institution, i.e. some kind of actors.

This occupation with the actor–structure categories and the attempt to establish causal

links aims at highlighting responsibility as a main concept. Responsibility, I argue, can be seen as

a dividing line between genetics and epigenetics relevant for political theory. To put it simply:

we cannot control or genome (unless to a limited extent the genome of our children by the

help of different embryo diagnosis techniques used in assisted reproduction aimed at sorting

out genes for certain diseases before implantation), but the epigenome is both possible to

influence by our life style (even if knowledge about this still is in patches) and potentially (in a

future) possible to revert by drugs.23

Finally, I will couple the crucial characteristics of epigenetics with different understandings

of responsibility.

The environmentally dependent epigenome gives rise to many different questions on

responsibility, the most intriguing being that of collective responsibility. The social

environment is something that individual actors cannot control by themselves. Consequently,

many actors or collective actors in different constellations somehow are responsible for a

social environment that is favourable regarding epigenetic influence. Should those collective

actors – societal institutions, lawmakers, corporations – have a responsibility to protect the

individuals against epigenetical effects created by unfavourable societal environments? But

also individual responsibility is present, if we talk about the “micro environment” individuals

create for themselves by their own life style and which have epigenetic effects that might affect

their own health. Should individuals have a responsibility to care about their epigenomes not

to burden society with costly health care? In addition, how about the “micro environment” a

pregnant woman creates for her foetus? Considering the profound affection by epigenetics of

early intrauterine life, should she be responsible for harmful epigenetic effects on her child

before she even knows she is pregnant?

The reversibility of epigenetic effects opens up for questions on drugs and other means to

reverse unfavourable epigenetic effects. As such effects could be the result of a detrimental

23 The epigenome is said to be a potential drug target (Unoki et al 2009). This potential is made concrete by the expressed hope of a treatment of cancer by epigenetic drugs in a near future (e.g. Bracken & Helin 2009).

21

life style, it is reasonable to hold the individual causally responsible for these effects. Would

the possibility to remedy those effects by drugs free the individual from moral responsibility?

The possible trans-generational inheritance of epigenetic effects brings to the fore

responsibility for future generations. Should people living now have a responsibility not to

transmit unhealthy epigenetic effects to future generations?

[As is obvious, this part of the study is still to be elaborated. The idea is to explore

empirical questions on responsibility arisen by the characteristics of epigenetics, and discuss

them in the light of theoretical understandings of responsibility. A further aim is to go from

this to concrete empirical analysis of political decision-making institutions such as advisory

bioethical committees.]

Concluding remarks

Research results on the effects of epigenetic mechanisms in many respects are uncertain.

There is evidence in parts. Specific studies of specific mechanisms can with a reasonable level

of certainty claim knowledge about epigenetic mechanisms. However, the knowledge base is

patchy and far from constituting a base of a general theory. One difficulty has to do with the

possibility to test epigenetic hypotheses. Another difficulty has to do with causes and effects.

Are epigenetic changes a cause or an effect of phenotypic differences between i.e. psychiatric

patients and others? Furthermore, the stability/plasticity dimension of the epigenome,

brought to the for by on the one hand the mismatch model, on the other hand by the claims of

reversibility, is also a factor rending the development of a general theory difficult. Finally yet

importantly, the question of trans-generational heritability – “the weakest part of epigenetics”24

– could be said to be the most intriguing aspect of epigenetics, at least in relation to political

theory as it put questions of inter-generational responsibility on edge. This question is burning

also in the field of genetics, but mostly in relation to the possibilities of manipulating the

genome, which are small and more of an exception than a rule. The core of epigenetics, on the

other hand, is exactly the susceptibility for change of the epigenome. This and other

characteristics make epigenetics an urgent object of inquiry for responsibility theorists.

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