epubs.surrey.ac.ukepubs.surrey.ac.uk/844862/1/gabriela bereghazyova di… · web...
TRANSCRIPT
DISCOURSES OF CORRUPTION IN SLOVAKIA: SOCIETY, MEDIA AND SMALL AND MEDIUM SIZED ENTERPRISES
by
Gabriela Bereghazyova
Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
School of Hospitality and Tourism Management
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
Supervisors: Professor Allan Williams, Professor Indira Carr
©Gabriela Bereghazyova 2017
1
DECLARATION
This thesis and the work to which it refers are the results of my own efforts. Any ideas, data,
images or text resulting from the work of others (whether published or unpublished) are fully
identified as such within the work and attributed to their originator in the text, bibliography or
in footnotes. This thesis has not been submitted in whole or in part for any other academic
degree or professional qualification. I agree that the University has the right to submit my work
to the plagiarism detection service TurnitinUK for originality checks. Whether or not drafts have
been so assessed, the University reserves the right to require an electronic version of the final
document (as submitted) for assessment as above.
Signature: ____________________________________________
Date: _____________________________________________
2
SUMMARY
This research provides insights into the appreciations of corruption in Slovakia against the dominant
international anti-corruption discourse. It critically analyses how international discourse impacts on
societal discourse on corruption in Slovakia by tracking the genealogy of corruption in media in the
country. Consequently, this project looks at how individual small and medium sized enterprises in
tourism and agriculture utilise this discourse in their understandings of and behaviours towards
corruption.
Discourse analysis of media texts revealed curious workings of the international discourse in the local
context. International truths are adopted and adapted to suit local appreciation of corruption in such a
way that it does little to combat corruption as it pardons petty corruption. It is grand and political
corruption that is condemned. This is reflected in the understandings of corruption among
enterpreneurs.
Petty corruption is either morally justified or condoned, while grand corruption is suffered. It means that
anti-corruption is not taken up by these actors to combat either petty or grand corruption. A vicious
circle of corruption is perpetuated as grand and petty corruption feed on one another. The thesis argues
for the need to abandon the seemingly universal international approach in favour of more context-
sensitive tailored solutions.
3
To be ignorant of what occurred before you were born is to remain always a child. For what is the worth of human life, unless it is woven into the life of our ancestors by the record of history?
(Cicero)
CONTENTS
4
GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS..................................................................................................................10
ABSTRACT..................................................................................................................................................11
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT...............................................................................................................................13
LIST OF TABLES..........................................................................................................................................14
CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................15
1.1 Why now, why corruption, why SMEs, why Slovakia?...............................................................15
1.1.1 Delimitation of SMEs..........................................................................................................18
1.2 The discourse perspective...............................................................................................................20
1.2.1 Concept of power.....................................................................................................................21
1.3 Research problem......................................................................................................................22
1.4 Aims, objectives and research questions...................................................................................23
1.5 Research contributions..............................................................................................................25
1.5.1 Theoretical contribution...........................................................................................................25
1.5.2 Methodological contribution....................................................................................................26
1.5.3 Empirical contribution..............................................................................................................27
CHAPTER TWO - INTERNATIONAL TREND-SETTER: INTERNATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION DISCOURSE......28
2.1 Anti-corruption: American corporate interests and the end of the Cold War................................29
2.2 Democracy, governance, anti-corruption........................................................................................31
2.3 Economic rationale..........................................................................................................................32
2.4 Principal –agent model of anti-corruption.......................................................................................34
2.5 Public/private – dividing or harmonising?.......................................................................................37
2.6 Benignity towards the private sector...............................................................................................38
2.7 Free media – bad news for corruption?...........................................................................................41
2.8 Placing economic man on anti-corruption throne...........................................................................42
CHAPTER THREE - ANTI-CORRUPTION AND SMEs: SHAPING CORRUPTION-AVERSE SMEs.......................44
3.1 The entrepreneur as a rational individualist....................................................................................45
3.1.1 Individualism, competitiveness and corruption........................................................................50
3.2 Defining the raison d’être of SMEs: progress and growth, growth, growth.....................................52
3.3 SMEs: little anti-corruption heroes..................................................................................................54
3.4 Conclusion.......................................................................................................................................55
CHAPTER FOUR - WHERE THE INTERNATIONAL MEETS THE LOCAL..........................................................56
4.1 The role of expert knowledge..........................................................................................................56
5
4.2 Complexities of EU knowledge transfer...........................................................................................58
4.2.1 Translation and understanding corruption...............................................................................60
4.3 Crafting space for the local within the international.......................................................................61
4.4 Conclusion.......................................................................................................................................63
CHAPTER FIVE - SLOVAKIA: CORRUPTION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN PERSPECTIVE.............................64
5.1 Communism – the root of all evil?...................................................................................................64
5.2 From Slovakia as a Hungarian district to Slovakia as an EU state....................................................65
5.2.1 Slovakia within Austria-Hungary...............................................................................................65
5.2.2 Czechoslovakia (1918-1938) – independence and freedom at last … or not?...........................67
5.2.3 The second Czechoslovakia (1945-1993)..................................................................................68
5.2.4 The Slovak Republic (since 1993)..............................................................................................69
5.3 Slovak entrepreneurship: now and then.........................................................................................71
5.3.1 Characteristics of the selected sectors.....................................................................................75
5.4 Anti-corruption in Slovakia..............................................................................................................79
5.4.1 Direct measures........................................................................................................................81
5.4.2 Indirect measures – control, supervision and information.......................................................83
5.4.3 Voluntary measures in the private sector.................................................................................86
5.5 Conclusion.......................................................................................................................................86
CHAPTER SIX - THEORY AND METHODOLOGY: LOOKING INTO CORRUPTION, RATHER THAN AT IT..........88
6.1.1 Governmentality: Self-governance of entrepreneurs...............................................................88
6.1.2 Genealogy and the meanings of corruption.............................................................................89
6.2 The sources of material and collection............................................................................................89
6.2.1 Step 1: The structure – Slovak media discourse on corruption.................................................89
6.2.2 Step 2: Self-governance of entrepreneurs and corruption-related activities............................95
6.3 Analysing the material.....................................................................................................................99
6.3.1 Genealogical analysis................................................................................................................99
6.3.2 Governmentality analysis.......................................................................................................101
6.4.1 Reflexivity...............................................................................................................................102
6.4.2 Research trustworthiness.......................................................................................................103
6.4.3 Not getting lost in translation.................................................................................................104
6.5 Ethical concerns.............................................................................................................................105
6
CHAPTER SEVEN - A NATURE OF CORRUPTION IN SLOVAKIA: FROM THE DAWN OF THE NATION TO THE PRESENT..................................................................................................................................................107
7.1 Pre-WW1: the struggle for national recognition (and power)......................................................108
7.1.1 Corrupt ‘magyarisers’.............................................................................................................110
7.1.2 Corrupt foe of the nation........................................................................................................113
7.1.3 Corruption as a sin..................................................................................................................116
7.2 Interwar years: entrenching past truths........................................................................................120
7.2.1 New horizons?........................................................................................................................121
7.2.2 Old wine in new bottles – corrupt enemy and national existence..........................................123
7.2.3 Shaming the opponent - gaining the rural public....................................................................127
7.3 1991: At the doorstep of transformation......................................................................................128
7.3.1 Corruption = fraudulent privatisation.....................................................................................129
7.3.2 Stubborn heritage...................................................................................................................130
7.4 1998: Breakpoint...........................................................................................................................133
7.4.1 Source of corruption – public sector.......................................................................................134
7.4.2 Good weapons never go out of fashion..................................................................................137
7.4.3 Neoliberalism seeping through...............................................................................................138
7.5 Mid 2010s: something old, something new and something borrowed.........................................139
7.5.1 Both sides of petty corruption................................................................................................140
7.5.3 Grand and political corruption................................................................................................146
7.5.4 Losing the sight of anti-corruption..........................................................................................155
7.5.5 Workings of the media discourse in society............................................................................158
7.5.6 The local media – promoter of anti-corruption?.....................................................................164
7.5.7 IACD: Building a house before laying foundations..................................................................166
7.5.8 Constructing entrepreneurs vis-à-vis corruption....................................................................169
7.6 Conclusion.....................................................................................................................................176
CHAPTER EIGHT - INDIVIDUAL UNDERSTANDINGS AND REALITIES OF CORRUPTION IN SME SECTOR....179
8.1 Understanding of the state and operating environment...............................................................179
8.1.1 Unfavourable legislation and formal norms...........................................................................180
8.1.2 Impact of highly regulated environment................................................................................185
8.1.3 Incompetent public administration........................................................................................188
8.2 SMEs versus the abusive state.......................................................................................................197
7
8.2.1 Perceptions of mid and low-ranking bureaucrats...................................................................204
8.3 Formal cooperation among entrepreneurs...................................................................................205
8.4 Bribery...........................................................................................................................................208
8.5.1 Bribery in applying for grants and subsidies...........................................................................212
8.5.2 From gifts to bribes to expression of thankfulness.................................................................213
8.5.3 Gaining agency........................................................................................................................216
8.5.4 Bribery as a universal evil?......................................................................................................217
8.5.5 Well-accepted practice of bribery...........................................................................................218
8.5.6 Fear, distrust and transparency..............................................................................................219
8.6 Bribery-averse SMEs: Morality as a deterrent of corruption.........................................................221
8.7 Favour-doing and informal networks............................................................................................223
8.7.1 Anonymity of cities vs familiarity in peripheries.....................................................................229
8.8 Civic and political passivity............................................................................................................231
8.9 Good or bad?.................................................................................................................................234
8.10 Heroic SMEs and survival as the top concern..............................................................................236
CHAPTER NINE - CONCLUDING REMARKS...............................................................................................240
9.1 Contributions.................................................................................................................................245
9.2 Where to next?..............................................................................................................................246
9.2.1 Institutional solutions.............................................................................................................247
9.2.2 Re-casting history and shifting mind-sets...............................................................................248
9.2.3 Rethinking corruption and individual responsibilisation.........................................................250
9.3 Reflections and limitations............................................................................................................253
9.4 Future directions...........................................................................................................................255
APPENDIX A A list of the collected media material..................................................................................258
APPENDIX B Popularity and positioning of analysed newspaper articles published in mid 2010s in Hospodárske noviny................................................................................................................................276
APPENDIX C Popularity and positioning of analysed newspaper articles published in mid 2010s in Nový čas...........................................................................................................................................................280
APPENDIX D Popularity and positioning of analysed newspaper articles published in mid 2010s in Plus Jeden Deň................................................................................................................................................286
APPENDIX E Popularity and positioning of analysed newspaper articles published in mid 2010s in Pravda................................................................................................................................................................287
APPENDIX F Popularity and positioning of analysed newspaper articles published in mid 2010s in Sme291
8
APPENDIX G Interview schedule for semi-structured interviews............................................................294
APPENDIX H Overview of the SME sample..............................................................................................295
APPENDIX I Ethical Approval....................................................................................................................299
BIBLIOGRAPHY.........................................................................................................................................300
GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS
BPI Bribe Payers Index
9
CEE Central Eastern Europe
EU European Union
CPI Corruption Perceptions Index
CSR Corporate Social Responsibility
HORECA Hotel, Restaurant, Café sector
IACD International anti-corruption discourse
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
SME Small and Medium-sized Enterprise
UNECE United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
UNIDO United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
USAID United States Agency for International Development
ABSTRACT
IACD has received a lot of attention in scholarly circles. The discourse itself has been the subject of a
number of critical analyses. However, not much is known regarding how IACD is received in local
contexts. Enquiries into the matter are only now beginning to attract attention. It is also surprising that
10
scholars in the field of corruption have somewhat neglected SMEs. SMEs are heralded as pillars of the
economy and society at large, while corruption is viewed as an obstacle to prosperity. Corruption in
SMEs is thus a timely issue.
This research provides insights into the appreciations of corruption on the meso-level of Slovakia and
micro-level of individual entrepreneurs in tourism and agriculture in the country against the macro-level
IACD. It critically analyses how IACD impacts on societal discourse on corruption in Slovakia by tracking
the genealogy of corruption from the time of the emergence of Slovakia as a nation in the 19 th century
to the present. Consequently, it looks into how individual SMEs in tourism and agriculture utilise this
discourse in their understandings and behaviours towards corruption, utilising the lens of
governmentality. The interview data was collected from 30 SMEs in Western and Central Slovakia.
Discourse analysis of media texts reveals curious workings of IACD in the local context where
international truths are adopted and adapted to suit local appreciation of corruption in such a way that
does little to combat corruption. IACD misses the crucial subtle meanings and moral refinements that
corruption carries in the Slovak context. These are embraced creatively by entrepreneurs. Corruption is
either morally justified or condoned. It manifests itself either in the direct undermining of the ongoing
anti-corruption efforts.
The findings shed light on the struggling anti-corruption fight in the country, the need to abandon the
universalising strategies of IACD in favour of more context-sensitive tailored solutions. Above all, the
thesis highlights a glaring gap in anti-corruption - its desire to ingrain western institutions with a little
foundational work in terms of shifting beliefs and mindsets of population. Without it, anti-corruption
can only offer limited results. Free media that are tasked with the role to raise awareness in populations,
that is to say to induce the particular mindset, do not take up this challenge in the face of pursuing their
own interests. In Slovakia, an approach that would set traditional rural morality, rather than economic
morality of IACD, at the heart of corruption, appears a way forward.
The principal contributions of this research stem from being the first study to explore corruption in
depth in SMEs, and thus the first to address corruption in tourism and agriculture not only in Slovakia or
CEE, but – at least in the English language - in the world. It brings fresh and, above all, detailed insights
into the mechanisms and dynamics of petty corruption. It is also the first study to devote extensive
attention to the ways corruption is discussed in the media.
11
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
When I embarked upon the PhD mission, I did not realise how demanding it was going to be. Living and
breathing the topic every day for over 3 years, it is now hard to imagine it will no longer shape the flow
of my days. It is beyond the possible to capture the numerous ways in which the journey of this project
enriched me – intellectually, personally and professionally. It also brought some pain and sacrifices. I am
12
a very different person now than I was in 2013 when I started. This transition is embodied by this thesis.
It has been both a great challenge and an immense pleasure. It seemed endless, yet it passed in the wink
of an eye.
It would have been impossible to arrive at writing these lines without the support of my supervisors. I
would like to express my endless gratitude to Allan Williams without whom I would not be at the
University of Surrey researching corruption. He helped me make my first baby step – writing the
proposal for this research. Allan was there to talk to at all times and resolve anything that came up,
embracing changes and detours I decided to take. He shared his burden, and hopefully some pleasure
and joy, with Indira Carr whose very different perspective strengthened and enriched my thesis. They
both read through endless number of pages of text that never made it to this final piece of work.
Above all, very special thanks go to my parents. It is safe to say that without them, you would never hold
this thesis in your hands. Ever since I remember, I was pushed and encouraged to exercise my brain
which eventually lead my steps here. They were there to hold my hand and calm my fears and anxieties
during those wonderful, but perilous PhD years. They offered a safe haven in which I could hide when I
needed to. Together with my sisters, grandparents and the rest of the family, they created a nurturing
environment in which I could ponder my work to my heart’s desire. I cannot thank them enough.
I was lucky to have the support of many friends and acquaintances who entered my life at numerous
stages of my PhD to seal their imprint on it. Sometimes, the smallest observation prompted a major shift
in my approach to this research. I cannot name them all, but I would hereby like to extend my
wholehearted thanks to them.
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 SMEs as defined by the EU............................................................................................................19Table 2 Circulation of selected newspapers January - April 2015 and January - April 2014.......................92Table 3 Corruption indicators..................................................................................................................162Table 4 Prosecutions for corruption.........................................................................................................164
13
CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION
1.1 Why now, why corruption, why SMEs, why Slovakia?
Corruption has entertained human thought since antiquity. However, it was only in the 1990s that we
witnessed an unprecedented rise of interest in the issue, the formation of an entire anti-corruption
14
industry and stabilisation of the meaning of corruption as abuse of power for private gain. International
anti-corruption discourse has been steadily gaining in prominence since the re-discovery of corruption in
the closing decades of the twentieth century. An ecosystem of international institutions and treaties, a
web of local NGOs across the world, civic activities, political memoranda and business initiatives
sprouted out of the geopolitical shifts of the 1990s. It created a relatively coherent narrative on
corruption and drove a well-coordinated international assault on the phenomena. Academic attention
has not been lagging behind. A myriad of studies concerned with corruption in general and IACD in
particular have surfaced. Yet, following nearly 2 decades of anti-corruption efforts and intense debates,
relatively little progress with respect to tackling corruption worldwide has been achieved (Persson et al,
2013).
The disappointing results of current anti-corruption approaches indeed did not go unnoticed by the
community of scholars. While some argue for more of the same solutions (Rose-Ackerman, 1997; 2001;
Klitgaard, 1998; 2014; Beblavý, 2009), with the World Bank, Transparency International, OECD and the
EU taking the lead in their continuance, others began to question the current frameworks on the
grounds of their suitable capacity to tackle corruption on the ground. One strand of the argument shines
a light on the very nature of IACD that is quintessentially Western presented as universally applicable
(Polzer, 2001; Krastev, 2000; 2004; Gebel, 2012). IACD itself came under a fierce academic scrutiny.
Likewise, understandings of corruption in contexts other than those Western ones in which IACD
originates have been explored (Pavarala and Malik, 2010; Ruud, 2000).
Anthropologists, ethnologists and sociologists alike have engaged in the debate over the complex
meanings of corruption that in turn determine social practices. These perspectives illuminate the need
to pay attention to local nuances and specificities that the universalistic IACD overlooks. While studies
examining local appreciations and practices of corruption across the world have been surfacing ever
since the outbreak of the anti-corruption obsession in the 1990s, Harrison (2007) noticed a lack of
engagement of this literature with the strand exploring IACD. Similarly, the studies scrutinising IACD
have not meaningfully connected their perspectives with local angles. Notwithstanding the
contributions of the above and similar studies to our richer understandings of corruption, they imply
that the local and the international are in fatal conflict with one another, hence the lack of effectiveness
of anti-corruption policies built on international universal knowledge. Albeit much has been said about
the fluidity of meanings of corruption, the negligence of the international dimension somewhat reduces
the accounts of local discourses of corruption to being embedded in local socio-cultural fabrics. It is
15
surprising how little attention has been devoted to the exploration of what happens at the intersection
of the international and the local. This appears as highly desirable at the time of internationalization of
spaces where the global and the local are condemned to constant and complex interactions. This is
particularly the case of Central Eastern Europe, greatly exposed to Western discourses due to
geographic closeness and advanced technological foundations in place allowing for knowledge transfers
and indeed the influence of the EU.
Although some research concerned with the interrelatedness of international and local anti-corruption
has emerged, we know relatively little about how the international and local meanings interact. For
instance, Sampson (2005) explored anti-corruption in the context of Romania to argue a case for using
and abusing corruption as a part and parcel of political lamenting and manoeuvring. However, this does
not penetrate deep enough into the construction of understandings of corruption. It provides insights
into the use of the discourse by local actors rather than elaborating on how the international anti-
corruption discourse interacts (or not) with local views of corruption. A first swallow with respect to
pursuing this line of argument are Gephart’s understandings of corruption discourse in Paraguay (2015)
and Chile (2016). He explores local uses of the international concepts in terms of filling the international
meanings of corruption with local connotations. To put this differently, it is not enough to merely
observe a misfit between the international and the national. Instead, it is time to take a look at the
processes behind the introduction of international anti-corruption into national contexts at the point
where the two worlds, diverse understandings behind diverse experiences, meet and work together to
produce disappointing results.
Slovakia serves as a good example of a country that has been a part of the anti-corruption movement
since the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989. The event sparked profound and at times dramatic social,
economic and legal changes in the pursuance of membership in prestigious organisations and rooting in
the Western structures. Anti-corruption has been at the heart of much reformist activity in the young
democracy since the conception of Slovakia as a sovereign state in 1993. This is reflected in Slovakia’s
ratification of all critical international anti-corruption instruments and the introduction of an array of
anti-corruption mechanisms. Despite this, the country is still seen as struggling to uproot corruption. The
highly esteemed Corruption Perception Index published annually by Transparency International creates
an image of a country failing to take a decisive step forward (2013b; 2014; 2015). As such, there appears
to be a gap between the acknowledgement of corruption as a problem and the tackling of this problem
on the ground.
16
This thesis reacts to Harrison’s (2007) call for a reflection on both the local and the international
dimension in studying corruption, and follows in the footsteps of the above-mentioned Gephardt’s
pioneering study in assessing why anti-corruption has been progressing at such a slow pace in Slovakia.
This approach is important as IACD does not impose itself on individual countries in a forceful manner.
Instead, it seeks to instil its tenets in societies across the world through a subtle process of ingraining
the international knowledge in individuals.
Given the current political and economic climate, enterprising activity is seen as a backbone of most
societies. SMEs are heralded as a pillar of the economy and an engine of society (Ucbasaran, 2008: 221,
European Commission, 2012). The concept of the independent, free, enterprising individual imbued with
agency, constitutes the core of entrepreneurial discourse, underpinned as it is by the “liberating
philosophy of personal achievement” (Drakopoulou, Dodd and Anderson, 2007: 350). Such a conception
of entrepreneurship underlies modern market democracy (Audretsch and Thurik, 2000). Put simply,
enterprise is highly valued. Radu and Redien-Collot (2008: 286) even argue that it is framed as a
‘miraculous alternative’ to a plethora of contemporary challenges ranging from social to environmental
issues. The fact that the role of entrepreneurship has been stressed in the recovery from the latest
recession and continued development (Clark, 2009) demonstrates the point. It follows from the above
that entrepreneurship appears as inherently good for society (Berglund and Johansson, 2007: 77).
SMEs, as a particular form of entrepreneurship, have attracted considerable attention. There has been
mounting interest in SMEs by international organisations, largely structured around their role in
development. For instance, the OECD, in the Bologna Charter on SME Policies, pins down the role of
SMEs in terms of job creation, economic growth and local development (2000). The United Nations also
foregrounds the economic aspects of SMEs’ contribution to developing economies whereby small and
medium businesses “constitute large pools of employment and substantially contribute to economic
growth” (UNIDO and UNODC, 2012: 1). The EU does not lag behind in framing SMEs as “a key driver for
economic growth, innovation [and] employment (European Commission, 2014). The OECD also
comments on the critical part of SMEs in developing countries in driving growth (2004). In short, SMEs
appear to offer an answer to the much sought-after prosperity for all, for which reducing corruption is
essential. In addition, the metaphor of SMEs as little acorns from which mighty oaks grow (Grosh and
17
Somolekae, 1996) further accentuates the importance of non-corrupt SMEs, as some of them grow into
large influential enterprises.
Corruption is seen as one of the greatest obstacles to development, the market and democracy, while
SMEs emerge as a tool of furthering that development. It is thus vital to understand how corruption
unfolds itself among SMEs. Notwithstanding that corruption has received plentiful mentions in the
entrepreneurship field of scholarly inquiry as an impediment, few studies single out corruption for a
thorough investigation (see for example Anokhin and Schultze, 2009; Tonoyan, 2005; Tonoyan et al,
2010). In light of the importance of SMEs and of corruption, it is puzzling how little research addresses
the topic. To the best of my knowledge, the studies concerned with SMEs, explore the phenomenon by
analysing large-scale statistical surveys, thereby providing broad and de-contextualised understandings
of the issue. As useful as such approaches are in raising the awareness of the problem, they are
considerably limited with respect to the appreciation of particularities of corruption in diverse
entrepreneurial settings and indeed on the level of individual enterprises. It is argued here that a more
nuanced and context-sensitive approach to the study of the prickly phenomenon in SMEs is needed, in
order to develop deeper understanding of corruption and the complexities of its workings in societies in
which SMEs are embedded. As Haller and Shore (2005) aptly observed, macro-political and economic
structures are not the only lenses for the appreciation of corruption. This thesis contends that
incorporation of the micro dimension is indispensable to the study of corruption and its circulation.
Slovakia, as a country in transition where SMEs themselves recognise corruption as one of their most
ominous impediments (Benfoddová et al, 2000; Olejarova, 2007), offers an opportunity of a glimpse into
struggles and challenges of countries on their way to embracing the system of free market democracy.
1.1.1 Delimitation of SMEs
At first glance, it might appear straightforward to define what SMEs are. However, there are multiple
definitions differing across countries describing SMEs using a variety of criteria, such as number of
employees, total net assets, annual turnover, balance sheets and investment levels to illustrate a few.
For instance, a firm with up to 500 employees falls within the category of SMEs in the USA and Germany,
whereas broad EU guidelines limit the number of employees in firms in the SME sector to 250.
Additionally, Tonge (2001) cautions against uniform indicators applied across different contexts in terms
of enterprise sectors.
18
Furthermore, Loecher (2000) points out that it is not only quantitative measures that define what SMEs
are. USAID (2007) with respect to the qualitative features of SMEs lists frequent merging of
management and ownership; distinctly personalised contacts; the central role of family funds and self-
financing, an often unclear competitive position, comprehensive knowledge rather than specialization
within departments found in large enterprises, and fusion of functions rather than elaborate division of
labour among others. Within the notion of confluence of functions, it could be stressed that control over
business typically rests in the hands of just a few individuals. Put simply, SMEs are more ‘personal’ in
many respects compared to large enterprises. However, it could be opined that a firm with 5 employees
will have the tendency to be more ‘personalised’ that an enterprise employing a staff of 250.
Indeed, the above just scratches the surface of discussions on the topic of SME definitions. Their close
scrutiny is not of interest in this thesis. Notwithstanding the shortcomings of general all-embracing
definitions, as the topic researched in this work is set in Europe and more specifically within the EU, the
EU definition is adopted here (see Table 1).
Table 1 SME`s as defined by the EU
Company category Employees Turnover Balance sheet total
Medium-sized <250 ≤ € 50 m ≤ € 43 m
Small <50 ≤ € 10 m ≤ € 10 m
Micro <10 ≤ € 2 m ≤ € 2 m
Source: European Commission, 2014
The quantitative definition supplemented with qualitative insights set above, serves merely as a broad
guideline to be cognizant of for the remainder of the thesis. It is not used here to wipe out differences
between various categories of SMEs and between individual SMEs. Nevertheless, this research reached
micro- and small enterprises, rather than medium-sized firms. This reduces the breadth of the work, but
also means that the heterogeneity of the firms is not as stark.
In addition, a distinction needs to be drawn so as to differentiate between large enterprises and SMEs.
Some differences have already been pointed out in the preceding paragraphs. It could be added that
SMEs and large enterprises do not only differ in terms of organisational structure, number of employees
19
and other indicators highlighted above, but also with respect to the amount of financial resources and
power imbalance vis-à-vis public administrations. These have ramifications for the dissimilar
appreciation of corruption and anti-corruption in SMEs and large enterprises recognised by IACD.
1.2 The discourse perspective
This research is grounded in a broadly postmodernist tradition. To briefly summarise the theoretical
foundations, it is maintained here that meanings are not natural and given as positivist tradition argues.
Instead, they are arrived at through social interaction and shaped by power. Knowledge which creates
meanings is a product of discourse. In turn, discourse does not refer merely to the production of
meanings and ways of thinking. Discourse constructs the ‘nature’ of what it talks about. It constitutes
knowledge, social practices, subjectivities and power relations intrinsic to knowledge, as well as relations
between these (Weedon, 1987: 108). To apply this to the topic of interest here, the contemporary
meaning of corruption as ‘abuse of power for private gain’ is not taken to be natural and objective.
Rather it arises from specific contexts of creators of the definition at a specific time and moulded by
specific power relations.
The thesis draws on genealogy and governmentality within the discursive tradition, concepts which
connect the individual and the social in a dialectic relation. An active individual is an integral and
indispensable part of contemporary western society with its own rules and norms which operate
through the individual. To put it differently, culture as a bundle of norms and rules valid in certain
society at certain time is internalised by individuals and thereby shapes individual understandings of the
world (Foucault, 1984; 1988). This process is subtle. Norms are not imposed on individuals by the means
of violence or direct coercion (Foucault, 1980). Rather, subjects appropriate rules found in culture
around them in order to fit into society/a group (Foucault, 1987). In this way, individuals govern
themselves by actively using discourses found in their society, rather than passively receiving them. As
such, governmentality also allows for a degree of freedom and opens some space for creative
appropriation and customisation of rules within the process of internalisation.
The above leads to the conclusion that the application of anti-corruption measures flowing from the
knowledge that underpins IACD is not an unproblematic and straight-forward administration of a cure to
the illness of corruption. As meanings of corruption are negotiated, IACD is subject to interpretation on
national and personal levels. It is therefore far from certain that the international understandings of
corruption fully conform to the national appreciations, as these are shaped by the distinctiveness of
20
Slovak contextual realities. The theoretical background of this work is discussed in greater detail in
Chapter Six.
1.2.1 Concept of power
As the notion of power weaves throughout this thesis starting with the very definition of corruption
employed by IACD as the abuse of power, it is necessary to outline the contours of the complex issue of
power as understood here. Power is an extraordinarly open, fluid and above all contested notion,
therefore the brief discussion here is not intended to grasp the breadth and depth of the debates which
has been unnfolding over several centuries.
Following Foucault’s line of argument, knowledge and power are intimately intertwined; they operate in
tandem (1978). Power produces knowledge which in turn manifests, legitimates and further entrenches
power. Power is ubiquitous and pervasive and there is no escape from it (Foucault, 1980: 82).
Such power could be thought of in terms of a structure. It produces discourse and knowledge from
which stem norms that constrain our behaviour. However, power should not be thought of as static,
always repressive or restrictive but as changeable (1978: 92-93) and not easily seized or captured (1980:
74). Rather, as Foucault suggests, power is employed and exercised and essentially operates in a
bottom-up manner (ibid: 98; 1978: 94).
Power integrates a subject into social practices of following rules and norms, and provides an individual
with the requisite knowledge to do so. At the same, power equips a subject with the resources
necessary to challenge the very same norms it produced. As Foucault argued “where there is power,
there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in
relation to power.” (1978: 94).
Bevir explains that what Foucault takes away from a subject is autonomy, rather than agency (1999).
Agency thus rests in the ability to alter ourselves in the social context that influences us, not
independently of it (Foucault, 2008: 76). Agency, in Foucauldian understanding, recognizes the social
structure as a background to the performance of subjects who have the capacity to make decisions and
act in a way that changes the background by which the subject is influenced (Foucault, 1999: 68). Put
simply, agency and action occur in a social context which influences them.
The implications of the above discussion of the meaning of power for this thesis can be formulated as
follows. Recipients of the leading international anti-corruption discourse do not merely uncritically
21
consume this discourse, but rather adapt it to their societal contexts and ultimately their lives. Any
discourse is inescapably subject to interpretation by subjects who possess creative possibilities of
agency in the contemporary absence of violence and direct coercion, at least in the European context of
anti-corruption. As Nye aptly put it, democracy, free market and individual actuation are seductive
concepts and thus more effective than coercion (Nye, 2004). The power of IACD is soft, exercised
through economic and political incentives and cultural influences. Soft power works through the
individual creating complex power relations. Soft power allows room for agency by the virtue of its
‘softness’.
1.3 Research problem
Corruption has been in the limelight of scholarly attention for over two decades, yet we know relatively
little about the effects anti-corruption has on the ground. With the recognition that current anti-
corruption approaches are somewhat failing to meet high expectations when it comes to reducing
corruption, it is timely to appreciate the complexity of international/local interaction. So far, much of
the literature suggesting reasons for anti-corruption being less successful than hoped foregrounds a
mismatch between the international prescriptions and the local conditions. Only recently has the focus
started to shift towards appreciating the nuances of what happens when IACD arrives in a local context,
rather than dismissing the local as institutionally incapable of accommodating international solutions
and the international as ignoring the local and imposing its own paradigms. However, given the realities
of the world where the international and the local are meshed together in a number of intricate ways,
this understanding is no longer enough. Furthermore, the very nature of IACD that allows ample room
for the local agency to play itself out lends credence to this observation.
To a limited extent, IACD recognizes that for anti-corruption instruments to work, a solid bedrock of
particular knowledge on corruption must be in place. It does not completely overlook the issue of a
possible international/local clash. Free media are appreciated as a crucial vehicle in disseminating
international knowledge and educating populations to anti-corruption (Stapenhurst, 2000; Brunetti and
Weder, 2003; UNIDO and UNODC, 2012: 10). Yet, media have attracted little attention with respect to
fulfilling this duty. It appears that once media are free and independent, they automatically embark
upon the role of educators as far as IACD is concerned. We know little about how and whether they live
up to the IACD expectations.
22
Not only do we have limited knowledge about what happens on the societal level when it comes to
corruption discourse, we also know precious little about the consequences of that on individual
understandings of corruption and consequently individual appreciations of corruption among
entrepreneurs. All these elements make up the bigger picture of corruption in the society and as such
cannot be overlooked.
1.4 Aims, objectives and research questions
Following on from the above, the overarching aim of this thesis is to assess the workings of IACD in the
country and to develop a deeper understanding of corruption discourse circulating in Slovakia. It seeks
to shed light on the international/local interfaces, delving deep into the nuances of local appreciation of
the phenomenon through tracking the development of its meanings in history. This allows for
discernment of what is local, what is international in the current discourse and how the two
complement, inform, reinforce or bypass each other. It fits into the body of literature adopting a historic
stance towards corruption, that is to say exploring its complexities by grounding it in history. To gain an
appreciation of how corruption is seen in Slovak society, the research targets media as both reflectors
and creators of social realities. By doing so, it also addresses another gap in scholarly research – that of
accessing the role of media in furthering anti-corruption. Ultimately, the thesis explores meanings of
corruption at the intersection of the international, the national and the individual. The uniqueness of the
approach of this project rests precisely with tying together the international, the national and the
individual in a thorough and rich account of corruption in Slovakia.
To attain this goal, the research first explores understandings of corruption in the broader society as
reflected and constructed by media since the nineteenth century. The set of questions below and
related sub-questions guide the contribution of this investigation to filling the identified gap in scholarly
knowledge:
1) How have media constructions of corruption developed in Slovakia given its specific historical
and social contexts and IACD?
a) What is being represented as a truth/norm about corruption and the governor-governed
relation given the history of Slovakia and the influence of anti-corruption discourse?
b) How did events, conditions, institutions and discourses support these reifications of
corruption?
23
c) What is omitted, what is foregrounded and what is backgrounded in media constructions?
What alternatives/other explanations are ignored?
d) How do media discourses reflect societal realities of corruption?
This part sets out the structure of societal discourse on corruption by examining media material. The
findings of media discourse analysis were compared with anti-corruption indicators in the society to
grasp broader trends which allowed for the drawing of insights about the effects of IACD in Slovakia.
It is within this structure that individuals operate, socialise and learn norms and rules, as well as
commonly held truths. These insights are consecutively used to explore individual stances towards
corruption among entrepreneurs in tourism and agriculture.
The thesis continues with the second aim – exploration of the societal understandings of corruption
circulated by media on the individual level of SMEs, thereby addressing the paucity of knowledge on
corruption in individual SMEs. This was achieved by collecting perspectives of owners of SMEs through
interviews. Governmentality was used as an analytical tool to scrutinise this material in assessing the
extent and the way entrepreneurs use the discourse around them to make sense of corruption and
entrepreneurship and how this informs their conduct vis-à-vis corruption. This was navigated by a
further set of questions:
2) How does the broad appreciation of corruption on the societal level inform individual
entrepreneurs’ views on corruption?
e) In what way does the broad discourse on corruption provide an individual with a particular
telos (goal, direction) for life?
f) What are the forms of knowledge that the individual can establish about him/herself given
the overarching knowledge of corruption?
g) In what ways does an individual identify or not with the telos in constructing the self?
h) How is the self activated in daily encounters with the public administration?
i) How does it shape the individual conduct of entrepreneurs?
Addressing these questions revealed curious workings of IACD in the local context where international
truths are adopted and adapted to suit local appreciations of corruption in such a way that does little to
combat corruption. IACD misses the crucial subtle meanings and moral refinements that corruption
24
carries in the Slovak context. In turn, these are embraced creatively by entrepreneurs. Corruption is
either morally justified or condoned and it is the corruption of the state that channels much frustration
about corruption and anger about the situation in the country. This manifests itself either in the direct
undermining of the ongoing anti-corruption efforts or at least in the failure to encourage Slovak
entrepreneurs from getting on board with anti-corruption initiatives and apathy towards tackling
corruption in the country. This is reflected and cemented by the media. It is argued here that the way
forward rests with tying in the international with the local and re-casting corruption in light of rural
Slovak morality, encouraging entrepreneurs to conceive of corruption as harming fellow Slovaks.
1.5 Research contributions
The aim of this study is to make a contribution in the following areas - theoretical, methodological and
empirical.
1.5.1 Theoretical contribution
The uniqueness of the approach of this project rests with tying together the international, the national
and the individual in a thorough and rich account of corruption in Slovakia.
Much research has been concerned with anti-corruption discourse on the macro international level (see
for example Gebel, 2012; Polzer, 2001; Bukovansky, 2002; 2006; Hindess, 2005), as well as in national
contexts (Olivier De Sardan, 1999; Hasty, 2005; Polese, 2008). However, little is known about how the
international functions within the national on the individual level of SMEs, but also in society at the
meso level. The former only started coming to attention recently, with Gephart (2015; 2016) and
Bedirhanoğlu (2007) being notable examples. In his two works, Gephart looks at corruption discourse in
Latin America on the societal level through the lens of policy making and academia. Bedirhanoğlu
appreciates the neoliberal influence of IACD on media discourse on corruption in Turkey. However, we
know very little about how individuals conduct themselves vis-à-vis the overarching meanings of
corruption circulating in the society in which they operate and in relation to IACD. Notwithstanding
anthropological research has ventured into the muddy waters of the nitty gritty of corruption on the
ground, this is not linked to the effects of IACD as argued earlier.
As such, the uniqueness of this research rests with its incorporation of the international, the national
and the individual levels of discourse on corruption in Slovakia, thereby going a step further compared
to the above mentioned studies.
25
Furthermore, a similar perspective as those outlined above on corruption among SMEs is missing. This is
understandable given the difficulties related to researching this sensitive phenomenon, thereby
minimising the scope of scholarly inquiry into micro operations of the discourse and reducing research
to investigation on a much broader level. These studies typically utilise large scale quantitative
approaches, thereby missing out vital nuances that can help us understand how corruption circulates in
a transitional society in the twenty-first century after several decades of institutionalised anti-corruption
measures of the Western kind. This research focusses on SMEs to assess the individual workings of the
discourse in Slovakia, thus addressing the paucity of attention to this aspect of corruption discourses.
In addition to the above, the study also assesses whether and how local Slovak media fulfil their role as
promoters of anti-corruption. To the best of my knowledge, similar studies on the topic have not been
conducted.
1.5.2 Methodological contribution
Governmentality presents a useful approach to the study of corruption and anti-corruption in the era of
sophisticated governance mechanisms. Whereas its recognition has been growing in policy and politics
studies investigating contemporary international arrangements (Larner and Walters, 2004; Neumann
and Sending, 2007; Löwenheim, 2008), CSR (O’Laughlin, 2008; Vallentin and Murillo, 2012) and
entrepreneurship (Nadesan, 2002; Dahlstedt and Hertzberg, 2012), it has been little used in the anti-
corruption field of inquiry. A notable exception is Hansen’s account of anti-corruption governmentality
mechanisms targeting Western corporations (2011) and his work on anti-corruption indicators (2012).
Nevertheless, these focus on the structural facet of the discourse, rather than on the application of the
discourse and its internalisation (or not) by individuals. Again, the difficulties of exploring corruption on
an individual basis can be put forward as an obstacle to researching the ‘performance’ of the discourse
on the ground.
This study uses governmentality in a novel approach to corruption which rests with its interest in the
individual appropriations of the discourse circulated by media. This constitutes a new avenue of the
studying of corruption. Prerequisite foundations to this step are laid out by the genealogy of corruption
discourse in media in Slovakia throughout its short history. Genealogy allows for the exploration of local
nuances and the imported international knowledge. This is a relatively recent scholarly endeavour with
studies beginning to emerge that are grounded in local contexts. This research adds to the body of
26
literature utilising genealogy. However, attention has not been paid to the intersection of the local and
the international and consequently the personal individual.
1.5.3 Empirical contribution
This research aims to bring a new perspective on corruption and its circulation in Slovakia and more
specifically in its agriculture and tourism sectors. It produces fresh insights into how corruption ‘works’
on the ground in SMEs in the two sectors and thereby aims to contribute to fuller appreciation of SMEs
in Slovakia. It also provides a reflection on the functionality of IACD. This study is original due to the
richness of its data. Corruption is hard to talk about, given its illicit nature. Hence, qualitative data on the
matter are still rather rare, particularly so when it comes to SMEs. This material provides critical insights
into how corruption is seen and lived by individuals. It shows how Slovak entrepreneurial mindsets
operate which is essential to designing new ways forward. In order to shape individual views and
attitudes, we need to first understand them. Ultimately, it provides the empirical foundations on which
to build a way of guiding individual beliefs on corruption in such as way so as to reduce the willingness
of entrepreneurs to participate in the practice.
27
CHAPTER TWO - INTERNATIONAL TREND-SETTER: INTERNATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION DISCOURSE
The first part of this chapter explores the circumstances in which corruption emerges as a problem of
significant importance and weight, thereby shining some light on the foundational concepts of
corruption. It then moves onto presenting corruption as it is currently conceptualised.
The articulation of corruption as a pressing concern to be resolved, as in its contemporary manifestation,
has only recently emerged. Given the postmodern perspective endorsed in this thesis, the social and
historical circumstances of the revived interest in corruption on the scale we are witnessing are taken to
be of pivotal importance to the appreciation of the phenomenon in current discourse. Attention will be
particularly directed at the discourse of international institutions, namely the World Bank, the OECD, the
United Nations, Transparency International and the debates on the European level, that is to say the
Council of Europe and the European Commission. The first four of these organisations have been
recognised as prominent actors in the international fight against corruption (Bukovanski, 2002; 2006;
Polzer, 2001; Brown and Cloke, 2004; Gebel, 2012). The latter two European institutions are key
organisations in the geographical space of CEE that this study is directly concerned with.
This thesis employs the widely accepted international definition of corruption as abuse of power for
private gain, rather than seeking to establish what corruption means in Slovakia, assuming that this is
different from the internation appreciation. This is because the purpose of this research is first and
foremost to explore the workings of IACD in Slovakia, and therefore to scrutinise the phenomena
labelled as corruption in the early decades of the twenty first century. The definition itself is broad
thereby allowing for a wide range of behaviours at various levels of society, and considerable room for
local variants of corruption. Therefore, it encompasses systemic corruption which deeply penetrates a
society and reaches into many aspects of life, as well as sporadic corruption that is limited to isolated
instances. It also incorporates phenomena ranging from grand and political corruption, that involve top
political decision-makers, to everyday petty corruption that takes place where a public official meets the
public. It allows space for many methods of corruption and forms of abuse of public power from bribery
to nepotism and from favour-doing to favouritism. This is favoured here over a less defined approach
that leaves corruption and its meaning completely open, because it enables the research to shine a
targeted light on the adoption of the international discourse in Slovakia, rather than studying corruption
in Slovakia in isolation.
28
Nevertheless, the above is not to undermine the significance of national discourses on the issue. Indeed,
it is particularly the American anti-corruption discourse that has been influential on the international
scale, as will be argued later in this section. Furthermore, it will be recognised towards the end of the
chapter that although the international construction of corruption has come to dominate the debate, it
is not uncritically and automatically adopted at national levels.
This section sheds light on some of the central underpinning notions of the concept identified in the
literature, that is to say the understanding of human nature firmly grounded in the homo economicus
theory, the conceptualisation of corruption along the lines of principal-agent dynamics and finally the
construction of public/private dichotomy.
The chapter is structured as follows: a detailed look will be taken at the emergence of corruption as an
issue of international scope in the 1990s at the backdrop of socio-political and economic developments
related to the fall of communism, changing geopolitical landscape in the world and the East Asian crisis.
The subsequent section will ground anti-corruption discourse within broader discourses of
democratisation, governance and liberalisation. The debate will then proceed with a critical appraisal of
the articulation of the nature of corruption in international discourse with respect to the above outlined
topics. The focus here will be on the wider anti-corruption discourse. The discussion of corruption with
reference to SMEs will be undertaken in detail in the following chapter.
2.1 Anti-corruption: American corporate interests and the end of the Cold War
Much has been written about the contemporary rediscovery of corruption and its articulation as a
pressing international concern. Scholars in the field attribute the shift from a marginalized issue to a
pressing issue at the forefront of national and international agendas to the events of the 1990s. It is
worth noting that the roots of corruption as by and large understood today date back to the
Enlightenment era. However, even though corruption accompanied the idea of a modern state, it was
not until the 1990s that a clear anti-corruption agenda began to arise. Thus, the escalation of interest in
corruption in the last two decades could be conceived of in terms of a shift in discourse on corruption,
rather than its conception.
The US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act dating back to 1977 has posed a considerable constraint upon US
business (Tanzi, 1998: 5-6). Krastev (2000) opines that the US corporations subjected to anti-bribery
legislation have found themselves in a disadvantageous position vis-à-vis businesses unrestrained by
such rules and thus corruption came to be viewed as an undue advantage and needed to be addressed
29
in order to smooth out the international business playing field. This point is fundamental in drawing a
connection between corruption and liberalisation and marketisation discourses. It has fundamental
consequences for the construction of corruption and will be re-visited later.
The disintegration of the USSR, the fall of communism in CEE and the eventual end of the Cold War put
an abrupt end to the ideological, political and strategic certitudes of the Cold War world and its
discourses (Heywood, 1997; Krastev, 2000: 25-56). The common enemy of democracy – the communist
East – ceased to exist. The taken for granted leadership of the Western world, and the USA in particular,
accepted as necessary during the Cold War, moved onto the slippery slope of a legitimacy crisis (Kagan,
2004). With no USSR, there was no need for any such dominance. Krastev (2004) further argues that the
end of the Cold War ended political hypocrisy, for there was no longer the need to maintain the support
of (corrupt) dictators and hence corruption became intolerable. As such, the black and white discourse
of good democracy versus bad communism needed to reinvent itself in order to justify the continuance
of the legacy of free market democracy as the pinnacle of human achievement. It is now healthy
democracies versus unhealthy corrupt systems that constitute the reshaped narrative (Brown and Cloke,
2004: 280; Krastev, 2007).
The emergence of an interest in corruption has also been attributed to the increasing permeability of the
previously meticulously controlled borders, which brought the post-communist world and their problems
face-to-face with western democracies and translated into security threats ranging from terrorism to
nuclear proliferation (Baldwin, 1995; Bunn, 2009). The incorporation of the former Eastern bloc states
into global economic and political structures is one such example of changing geopolitical and social
landscapes contributing to the shift in the discourse. The decline of communism also effectively meant
that CEE became significant from the geopolitical point of view, partly due to its proximity to Russia in
the on-going power struggle between the West and Russia and its allies. The escalating international
efforts to bring post-communist countries in line with the modern norms of the West, believed to be the
apex of human development, (Brown and Cloke, 2004: 281; Theobald, 1999: 492; Rajan and Zingales,
1998) thus appear in the light of geopolitical recasting of power relations after the 1989 events.
Moving away from CEE, Bedirhanoğlu (2007) associates the emergence of international anti-corruption
activity with the East Asian crisis. Corruption has been suggested as one of the fundamental building
blocks of the financial turmoil that broke out in 1997 (Dornbusch, 1998: 180; IMF 1998). Bedirhanoğlu
(2007) contends that corruption was a convenient scapegoat, for it contributed to the avoidance of the
crisis of legitimacy in the West by drawing attention away from the excesses of the free market.
30
2.2 Democracy, governance, anti-corruption
The relatively recent recasting of democracy as governance has profoundly shaped the anti-corruption
debate. IACD is imbued with the notions of governance as a set of mechanisms, processes and structures
to assure democracy not only on national levels, but also in the globalised world (Held, 1997: 310; Weiss,
2005). Hence, the articulation of corruption as an international challenge mentioned earlier. For
instance, the World Bank (2011) constructs development of good governance and curbing corruption as
mutually constitutive actions. Corruption, depicted as a violation of democratic principles of equality and
inclusion (Warren, 2004: 328), the notion exemplified by the foreword of the United Nations’s
Convention against Corruption (UNODC, 2004), again emerges as a threat to such national and
international order. It could be further posited that corruption not only presents a hurdle, but even more
importantly stands out as the opposite of good governance (Best, 2007).
Moreover, the alignment of corruption with governance fulfils another role. The approach to tackling
corruption along the lines of the controlling eye of international organisations and responsibilisation of
individual countries has proven attractive to international organisations. A finely spun strategy of
regulation and control and an emphasis on ownership are readily found in the discourse of the World
Bank (Joseph, 2009: 422). This creates a semblance of autonomy and freedom of individual states
(Mikuš, 2011: 13). Adoption of such a blueprint for running the anti-corruption agenda ostensibly
grounds the responsibility for reducing corruption within individual countries and away from
international organisations and the model of market democracy (Löwenheim, 2008). On another level,
the governance perspective also, to a great extent, defends the international activity of the World Bank
in the overly political matters of corruption, which is vital given the World Bank’s proclaimed apolitical
nature (Marquette, 2001).
Furthermore, the governance facet of anti-corruption discourse is entwined with the liberalisation and
marketisation rhetoric of cutting back the state and bringing in the market (Pollitt, 2012). The
contemporary shift of interest away from the state as a producer of common goods, to the state as a
source of private gains, in other words corruption, is compatible with the neoliberal demand for a ‘small
government’ and new public management way of fighting the ‘nanny state’ (Atesoglu and Ozdikmenli,
2009: 276; Green-Pedersen, 2002).
31
The strong link between democracy and free markets, wherein democracy constitutes a precondition to
a liberal market (Almond, 1991; Berger, 1986), highlights the interconnectedness of the concepts,
illuminating corruption as ‘the common evil’ (Williams and Beare, 1999: 115).
The above reveals an idealised market economy standard and a rather clear image of corruption as an
impediment to the development and progress of such a model, as the cause of the unsatisfactory
success of the implementation of its tenets, and disappointing progress with respect to development of
the non-western world. Miller and Rose (1990) add that criteria of economic efficiency colonise realms
previously deemed non-economic, which allows for forming a close link between economic prosperity
and well-being. Tackling corruption is thus crucial to achieve the well-being of all populations. This is to
be done by implementing anti-corruption as a part and parcel of transformation to democracy.
2.3 Economic rationale
The past few decades have witnessed an increase in the penetration of economics into virtually all
spheres of life (Stigler, 1984), including IACD. Indeed, it could be posited that the economic rationale
behind the discourse was a moving force in the very beginning of the war against corruption. It is
epitomised by scholars such as Rose-Ackermann and Kaufmann. Furthermore, it continues to be
extremely influential despite abounding critique (Wedel, 2012). The developments toward more market
and less state in the name of governance have also been marked by the pre-eminence of economic logic
(Kay, 2008: 19).
Bukovansky (2002) observed a strong economic legacy in the foundations of the anti-corruption
discourse in her insightful analysis of the narratives of the United Nations, OECD, International Monetary
Fund and World Bank. Gebel (2012) specifies that it is the concept of homo economicus that fully
manifests itself in the range of anti-corruption policies. Adoption of homo economicus in the sphere of
the corruption debate translates into a system of incentives and penalties to which profit-maximising
economic man is expected to respond well (ibid).
IACD implies that everyone is regarded as inherently corrupt and it is the institutions of structure that
maintain order, constrain individual selfish desires and thereby curb corruption. Rose-Ackerman and
Truex aptly encapsulate the strand of institutional argumentation prevalent in the contemporary
discourse: “Corruption is a problem of institutional failure” (2012: 38) and the WB confirms that
“corruption often thrives amid weak institutions” (2013a: 89). Particularly, corruption has been framed
as a lack of democratic institutions (Bracking and Ivanov, 2007: 303; Brown et al, 2004: 4-5). Goel and
32
Nelson (2005) epitomise this point by arguing that less democratic countries are more prone to
corruption and that, given the close link between democracy, free markets and development, more
economic development is associated with less corruption. It is thus not surprising that the efforts to
curb corruption are centred around reforms of the inefficient structures incapable of controlling self-
interest resulting in technical and institutional solutions promoted by IACD (Bukovansky, 2006; Gebel,
2012; Bridoux and Gebel, 2012). These structures aim to increase the cost of corruption by introducing
incentives and thereby decreasing efficiency of corruption (Ackerman, 1997; Grzymala-Buse, 2008).
However, this also means that IACD presents self-interest as the highest principle (Gebel, 2012: 119).
An example of a practical policy recommendation drawing on the ‘carrot and stick’ strategy is the
suggestion to increase the salaries of civil servants to decrease incentives for corruption in the public
sector. Despite critique and cautioning against such a simplistic quick fix solution (Gong and Wu, 2012;
Lambsdorf, 2006), this option remains rather popular (Ackerman and Truex, 2012: 19). Other examples
include whistleblowing and free media, adjustments in the system of justice and civil service, internal
and external audits and reporting systems in both public and private spheres.
Moreover, as rational economic man lies at the core of the discourse, corruption is formulated largely in
terms of intentional conscious actions of individuals, thus removing the contextual background of the
tacit social and cultural norms and rules within which individuals operate. IACD effectively reduces
humans to conscious individuals operating in a socio-cultural vacuum, which indeed has been critiqued
by behavioural economists (Kahneman, 2003; Diamond and Vartiainen, 2007), political scientists (Lehrer,
2009; Westen, 2007), psychologists and neuroscientists (Bechara et al, 2000; Shiv and Fedorikhin, 1999)
and sociologists (Udehn, 1996; Baker and Forbes, 2006) alike.
This conception of human nature also raises an array of issues and paradoxes when coupled with the
anti-corruption argument. Profit-maximising homo economicus is in tension with the ubiquitous
emphasis on virtuous free individuals, bearers of moral standards, socially, economically and politically
thriving in democracy and resenting corruption as inherently evil (Bukovansky, 2006). Brown (2003)
elucidates that, given the emphasis on homo economicus and his/her selfish nature, individuals emerge
as calculating, rather than abiding by the rules conceived of as inherently good and right. As individuals
are taken to be rational cost and benefits calculators, fairer society is achieved by making corruption
unprofitable. Individuals abandon corruption as a futile activity, not than because it is deemed morally
and ethically wrong (Bukovansky, 2006; Gebel 2012). Gebel (2012), in her account of human nature in TI
discourse, argues that that the plentiful mentions of ethics and morality that have come to frame the
33
contemporary international rhetoric have a rather hollow sound to them due to the persisting
attachment to the homo economicus model, which appears rather resilient and set to stay.
2.4 Principal –agent model of anti-corruption
The paradoxical nature of anti-corruption at once appealing to ethics and morality and calculative reason
is embodied in the principal-agent model on which much anti-corruption is built. An agent (government)
selected by a principal (citizens, society) is entrusted with power, authority and responsibility to act in
the principal’s interest (Laffont and Martimort, 2002: 12). Corruption arises due to interest and
information asymmetry between the two parties (Miller, 2005). Put differently, corruption occurs when
the agent’s interests are in conflict with those of the principal and the agent has more information than
the principal (Waterman and Meier, 1998: 173). Such a lack of information minimizes the principal’s
control over the agent. As the agents maximise their interests, reduction in corruption is to be achieved
by raising the agent’s costs of not acting in the principal’s interest and establishing incentives to act in
accordance with it (Jensen, 1983) and by reducing the scope of the agent’s discretion (Persson et al,
2013). In other words, IACD seeks to make corruption unprofitable through elaborate institutional
frameworks while also fixing the information asymmetry. These are embedded in the processes of
democratisation, privatisation, marketization, and enhancement of the rule of the law that raise the
costs of engaging in corruption. It could be said that at the heart of the idea is the concept of mistrust
that gives rise to the demand of public oversight.
Costs of corruption in the form of punishment ranging from imprisonment, penalties and confiscation of
proceeds of corruption represent the ‘stick’ approach. As punishment is contingent on getting caught,
that is to say on fixing the information asymmetry between the principal and the agent, anti-corruption
places much stress on transparency and oversight mechanisms. These range from independent control
bodies, public access to information, independent media and civil society watchdog organizations to
reporting and whistleblowing structures providing information to the principal. The part to be played by
the principal starts with uncovering corruption, hence the transparency mechanisms such as public
access to information, reporting and whistleblowing. When corruption is unearthed, the role of the
principal is to mobilise action against those perceived as corrupt (Johnston, 1998) so as to activate
punishment mechanisms.
Implicitly, principals are also important when it comes to the promotion of anti-corruption reforms and
legislation by providing pressure on the agent to meaningfully engage with anti-corruption in this way.
34
Given the rationale of the agent as a self-interested homo economicus, they cannot be expected to
introduce anti-corruption tools as this runs against their self-interest unless the principal demands this.
This role is somewhat overlooked by IACD. It appears that the external pressure of international actors
whether through membership in prestigious organisations, foreign aid, funding and other types of
support, is to guarantee that government embark upon anti-corruption. However, as Batory (2012)
observed in the context of CEE, this can be problematic as formal adoption of anti-corruption does not
necessarily guarantee its successful application on the ground.
The second application of the concept is the context of bureaucratic or petty corruption that occurs at
the meeting point of the citizens with mid and low-level bureaucrats and public administration. In this
case, the agent pertains to low and mid-ranking bureaucrats and the principal is the government,
ministries, control agencies and anti-corruption bodies. As in the case of the above, costs entail
punishments and various monitoring and transparency mechanisms that seek to correct the information
asymmetry. Raising awareness of corruption among the public and in the public sector complements the
above instruments with an aim to effectively educate and shape principals.
Both applications are reliant on the existence of a vigilant principal willing to publish misconduct. It is the
public or rather society that emerges as the ultimate upholder and champion of anti-corruption. Even in
the case of bureaucratic corruption where the role of the principal is fulfilled by the government, it is the
public that controls the government and other central bodies that serve the collective interest as the
principal-agent framework holds. Indeed, without the principal willing to act as the principal
(government) for instance for the reason of confluence of interests of the relevant public bodies, it is
society that would demand a change. Thus, anti-corruption in its present form is to a great extent reliant
on society acting as the watchful principal.
The model foregrounds the opportunistic agent while assuming the principal will always maintain its
integrity. Furthermore, Persson et al (2013) elaborate that the model is of little use in a thoroughly
corrupt setting where there is lack of principled principals. Mungiu Pippidi (2013) also highlighted the
issue stemming from taking the existence of the principal for granted. As principals are in short supply,
anti-corruption efforts based on the model fail to deliver on lowering corruption (Marquette, 2014). Even
when anti-corruption instruments are formally in place, they are of limited use without a fully engaged
and empowered public. Uncovering corruption by media is not particularly helpful if there is no
willingness to take consequent steps. Reporting mechanisms are useless without a society that is
prepared to make use of reports and to report. Public access to information is a rather appealing idea
35
but of limited effect where there is a limited supply of those eager to engage with the information.
Control bodies that are not willing to control, and anti-corruption laws where the judiciary is not
prepared to prosecute are likewise futile. Furthermore, in the situation of pervasive corruption, the
functioning of control bodies and anti-corruption bodies is limited. Simply, it has been argued that IACD
builds anti-corruption on non-existent realities (Aidt, 2003; Bauhr and Nasiritousi, 2012) due to the
reluctance to acknowledge local specificities and the blind belief in its own universality.
The above could be enriched with the argument that the model implies that the accumulated individual
interests of citizens form the common interest of the society. This is problematic in itself as it obscures
the notion of common interest (Brown and Cloke, 2004: 43; Doornbos, 2010). Also, IACD is vague as to
how to ingrain the particular truth of corruption as inefficient in narrowly self-interested actors on the
level of the society so as to encourage behaviour of principals. There are incentive/punishment
structures targeting agents, but what is to shape the societal homo economicus to arrive at the
conclusion that corruption is inefficient and needs to be tackled? It could be argued that these are the
international sanctions or the generally unfavourable international image. However, these are rather
indirect. Finally, what is efficient and what is not depends on the context. IACD assumes that unlike the
agent, the principal, that is to say the society, is inherently opposed to corruption due to the belief in the
universal wrongness of corruption jeopardising the common good. Again, the tension between self-
interested individuals and virtuous pure society emerges.
Civic participation and engagement are widely recognised as critical elements of anti-corruption by
international anti-corruption promoters (World Bank, 2011: 19; OECD, 2000; Transparency International,
2015). The popularity of this stance and of the principal-agent framework is rather telling given the
contextual realities and sensitivities of the twetieth century. Placing the responsibility for tackling
corruption with domestic societies avoids accusations of imperialism and imposition of foreign rules.
Following on from the above we could say that IACD is in its nature a collection of institutional fixes
when it comes to actual anti-corruption solutions. However, some argue that these are superficial
methods as democratic institutions can hardly function without democrats (Carothers, 2002). Shifting
minds is indeed a much greater challenge than an initial regime change and institutional adjustments
(Popper, 1990). On this note, Kopecky and Mudde (2000) observed that nation-building is not the same
as state-building. The two are interconnected, yet distinct. While the latter comprises building of
institutions, the former is a set of more deep and complex processes that establish national-
consciousness and a positive identification of citizens with the state. This forms the very foundations of a
36
democratic society which IACD has overlooked. It merely applies western institutions to non-western
contexts in the expectation of the functioning relations between citizens and state to emerge in response
to implementing reforms. Such an approach to democratisation and anti-corruption could be seen as an
artificial and rushed stimulation of a long-drawn and often violent development of the idea of
democracy in its cradle in the Western world.
2.5 Public/private – dividing or harmonising?
It has been advanced that IACD hinges upon a straightforward distinction between the public and the
private domains (Polzer, 2001: 18). Indeed, the widest definition of corruption as the abuse of power for
private gain (Council of Europe, 2008; World Bank, 2013; Transparency International, 2013a; UNODC,
2004) clearly draws a distinct line. Haller and Shore (2005) suggest that it is precisely an infringement of
the public and private distinction that constitutes corruption. Indeed, the level of corruption is measured
by how accurately society can differentiate the two realms (Rose-Ackermann, 1997). In relation to this,
Bratsis (2003) argues that a public realm free of private interests rather resembles a proverbial elephant
in the room that is obvious but ignored. He continues that, as it is problematic to draw a clear line
between the public and the private in an individual, without whom neither public nor private realm
would exist, the continued emphasis on the public/private divide obscures the mutual enmeshment of
the public and the private.
On the other hand, it could be argued that the principal-agent theory suggests that the private should be
brought in line with the public in one harmonious whole. In the context of the previously discussed
homo economicus model, the public emerges as rational individuals who recognize that their self-
interests are best achieved collectively, rather than individually. This becomes ever more relevant in the
era of governance and the increasing closeness between the public and the private spheres, epitomised
by the proliferation of public-private partnerships (Moulton and Wise, 2010).
It is rather perplexing how contemporary governance discourse meshes together the public and the
private, traditionally endowed with contrasting moral principles and values in western thought (Gal,
2005), while insisting on a strict dividing line between them and exerting pressure on the greater
involvement of the private sphere in running public services. IACD’s approach to the public and the
private which it seeks to reconcile and at the same time strictly divide is contradictory. The two spheres
cannot be harmonious and opposed to one another at the same time.
37
Nevertheless, the issue, however opaque, is to be resolved by transparency measures. Transparency
should act as a disinfectant on corrupt behaviour by reducing the room for hiding and privacy and
opening spaces for public scrutiny (Warren, 1974; Lambsdorff, 2002). Institutionalised mutual
surveillance takes on the form of systems of internal and external audits, elaborate systems of checks,
reporting mechanisms and the practice of whistleblowing, among others in both public and private
sectors (Kaufmann et al, 1998). A free press has also been put forward as an essential tool for increasing
transparency (Brunetti and Weder, 2003).
Collective gaze is to assure compliance with norms and rules and build trust, thereby fixing information
asymmetry (Branco and Delgado, 2012; Lindsted and Naurin, 2010: 301-302). However, it has been
observed in the example of Nicaragua that working transparency which brings about revelation of
corruption incidents in the public sector results in cynicism towards anti-corruption and democracy
(Brown and Cloke, 2005). Another example of this approach on a macro level are various rankings and
ratings designed to incentivise states to embark upon anti-corruption project (Best, 2007), such as the
eminently popular CPI. The GRECO system, established to oversee implementation and adherence to
international standards and European scales, serves as another monitoring tool. The importance of
surveillance has been further stregntened by the recent arguments of the tokenistic adoption and
implementation of anti-corruption policies by Eastern European governments (Batory, 2012).
2.6 Benignity towards the private sector
Notwithstanding that corruption in the private sector has started to be addressed by IACD, it remains
rather underdeveloped in juxtaposition with the widely debated corruption pertinent to the public
sector (Hindess, 2005). Argandoña (2003) postulates that this may be due to a dearth of information, as
private sphere actors do not tend to do their ‘dirty laundry’ in public, as well as the neoliberal
assumption that the private sector is inherently geared towards effectiveness and self-control, and thus
less prone to corruption. This is hardly surprising given the shaping force behind IACD addressed earlier.
The public sector has long been conceptualised as the primary source of corruption by drawing on the
governance rationale of ‘good state = small state’ and ‘small state = less corruption’ and the
contemporary pressure to ‘roll back the state’ (Clayton and Pontusson, 1998: 67; Pollitt, 2012). This is
explicitly manifested in the United Nation’s document concerned with corruption in SMEs (UNODC,
2004) which dedicates considerably more space to corruption with reference to the public than the
private sector. TI’s discourse on public and private corruption further supports the point. The section
38
concerned with government is infused with vehement claims such as “we must demand that they
[politicians and public officials] put in place regulations which will force them to act openly” and “an
ethical line has been crossed” (Transparency International, 2013c). In contrast to the above, discussion of
corruption in the private sector sounds considerably more lenient as it is permeated with notions of
“engagement [of multiple stakeholders], “work with companies” and “[assistance for] companies in the
development and implementation of anti-corruption programs” (Transparency International, 2013a).
Although corruption in the private sector has increasingly attracted the attention of international
organisations, such as through TI’s Bribe Payers Index (BPI) and the EU framework decision on
combatting corruption in the private sector, the issue remains relatively under-addressed in comparison
with corruption in the public sector (Gopinath, 2008). BPI that measures the inclination of companies to
engage in corruption was a response to the critique of a rather one-sided view of corruption
(Bukovansky, 2006: 188). Nevertheless, BPI has not reached the popularity of CPI (Sampson, 2010).
Galtung (2006: 109) goes even further in his suggestion that BPI has been generally disregarded by the
press and remains unfamiliar to the wider public. Furthermore, Ivanov (2007: 36) posits that this index
has not moved on from conceptualising corruption as state failure and consequently markets supported
and facilitated by the state continue to be presented as the answer to the issue (Bridoux and Gebel,
2012: 1953; Brown and Cloke: 2011: 119).
The rather benevolent attitude towards the private sector is mirrored in the informal approach of
international anti-corruption endeavours aimed at businesses. The notion of relaxation of state
regulation, such as certification and permits (2011a; European Commission, 2012) that are to be
replaced with self-regulation illustrates the point. This is rather reminiscent of CSR. CSR strategies to
combat corruption have gained in popularity, as ‘hard’ laws and international conventions are viewed as
rather limited and lacking in adequate enforcement mechanisms with respect to business involvement in
corruption (Adeyeye, 2011). As such, it has been advanced that, if corruption is to be curbed, private
sector players need to recognise their responsibilities and roles in the battle against corruption (Carr and
Outhwaite, 2008: 4). Moreover, Wood (2005: 247) maintains that CSR, through its prime example of
codes of conduct, subtly seeks to steer and direct the conduct of actors well beyond merely firms,
including civil society, customers, and suppliers through to legislators, regulators, and international
organisations. The equilibrium of interest and information in a society where the private sector plays an
increasingly eminent role is to be achieved by business self-governance. Self-control grounded in the
notion of opening up to scrutiny is offered as an answer to the question of how to root out corruption.
39
The exclusive reference to self-regulation of the private sector’s role in combating corruption in a report
of Transparency International Slovakia is an example (Šatníková, 2012).
Public disclosure of information, self-monitoring and oversight of business partners in the spirit of the
transparency debate has been embraced by the OECD, the United Nations, and the World Bank. The
notion of multiple eyes watching over others is thus presented in tandem with self-discipline. Internal
control, record-keeping and periodic reviews stand out as instruments to achieve greater efficiency
(OECD, 2004: 11; Transparency International, 2013a; UNIDO and UNODC, 2012: 96) to which corruption
is an obstacle. Therefore, transparency is constructed as good for business, for it generates efficiency,
quality and trust (Bushman et al, 2004: 208; Power, 1994). Furthermore, public reporting of a firm’s
performance has been argued to bolster that firm’s reputation (Bebbington et al, 2008). In other words,
commitment to anti-corruption maximises the individual and predominantly economic interests of firms.
It has been suggested that a ‘soft’ approach, seeking to mould private sector behaviour, is on the
increase (Héritier and Eckert, 2008), which does not come as a surprise given neoliberal trends. However,
it has been argued that this merely perpetuates liberal market philosophy, entrenches contemporary
power relations and cements the private interest instead of generating a meaningful shift in orientation
towards the public good (Banerjee, 2008; Mayes et al, 2013).
Gebel (2012) writes that Transparency International constructs the fight against corruption as being in
the interest of businesses themselves, guided by narrow self-interest, thus greatly reducing the noble
goals CSR claims to advance (Finemann, 1998; Banerjee, 2008, Painter-Morland, 2010). This point is
further supported by the weak linkage between ethical and moral connotations and corruption in the
private sector and points towards the dominance of homo economicus reasoning behind the
subscription to CSR (Gopinath, 2008). Aguinis and Glavas observed a strong economic rationale behind
CSR in their review of extant scholarly literature on the issue and assert that the majority of studies
suggest CSR is often applied as a token gesture (2012). Homo economicus continues to haunt the
trumpeted ethical and moral ends that the anti-corruption and CSR debates champion (Mayes et al,
2013).
Carr and Outhwaite (2011) conclude that the CSR measures are unlikely to counteract corruption,
precisely due to its lenient ‘soft’ approach. Furthermore, it is often governments that are put in charge
of incentivising responsible business through the facilitation and assurance of the smooth functioning of
the market, rather than through direct intervention (Haufler, 2001: 10). Not only does it place the state
which continues to be the main target of the anti-corruption discourse constructing it as a primary
40
source of corruption (Bridoux and Gebel, 2012: 1958; Christensen, 2011), in the position of a promoter
of an honest and just business environment, it also places the responsibility for achieving this goal on the
state, rather than on business. At the same time, the state faces the neoliberal pressures of cutting down
the state and is therefore put in a precarious position (Bukovansky, 2002).
2.7 Free media – bad news for corruption?
Contrary to much scholarly criticism regarding the negligence of local realities in building foundations on
which international anti-corruption can function (Aidt, 2003; Bauhr and Nasiritousi, 2012; Persson et al,
2013), it could be opined that IACD does not ignore the issue of ingraining societies with anti-corruption
knowledge entirely. However, it is rather vague when it comes to clarification of how the public and
SMEs are to emerge as corruption-averse. The spotlight is on educating populations about corruption.
IACD promotes raising awareness of local populations through educational programs, information kiosks,
campaigns and above all through media:
“A free and independent media is a principal means of fighting corruption. Their relevance
is related not only to the investigation of and reporting on corruption cases, but also to the
education of society and dissemination of anti-corruption efforts.” (UNIDO and UNODCDC,
2012).
Suphachalasai (2005) argues that free media and competitiveness between media is linked to lower
corruption as stories of corruption are rather attractive and are therefore sought out by competitive
media. Fell (2005) adds that in an atmosphere of political competition, political parties can use the free
media to surface cases of corruption, thereby contributing to a lowered level of political corruption.
Press freedom has been decisively linked to lower levels of corruption by Brunetti and Wedel (2003) who
suggest that a range of free media make it difficult for powerful groups to control what topics are
discussed and how. These and similar studies are largely concerned with political corruption and the role
of free media as the watchdog. Exposing corruption is taken to be synonymous with anti-corruption.
However, Camaj (2013) raises a warning that free media appears to be more effective in the context of
established mature democracies than in other regimes, suggesting that free media works best when
combined with independent judiciary and strong parliaments. This stance questions the capacity of the
free media when it comes to anti-corruption. Coronel (2009) adds that in the era of privately owned
media aiming to generate profit, the preferences for entertainment might and do overcome investigation
and news reporting and above all fulfilling the role of a watchdog. A problem of corporate owners of
41
media being attributed with considerable power in creating realities for large audiences has also been
raised (Hackett and Carroll, 2006: 1). With respect to the ownership of free media it could be added that
media are inescapably subject to neoliberal power arrangements. Being firmly embedded in the private
sector and its profit rationale is not the only issue. Private ownership by the very virtue of being private,
that is to say intimately intertwined with the market rationale inescapably impinges on how the media
construct truths about corruption. Brown and Cloke (2005) even problematize reporting on corruption
itself as it might increase scepticism towards democracy instead of fuelling anti-corruption as in the case
of Nicaragua. Furthermore, Sajó (2003) adds that an overwhelming focus on the wrongdoing of
governments wherein the media tend to side with the accusing party, often political opposition, has the
potential to silence other issues that the society needs to address.
The above problematizes the reliance of IACD on the media as a channel through which to raise
awareness of corruption and anti-corruption among the public. It assumes the media will ‘naturally’
promote anti-corruption, which ignores the complexities of environments in which media function along
with a plethora of interests at play when it comes to reporting about corruption. Given the IACD’s belief
in its universality and the universal wrongness of corruption, it expects independent media to circulate
this ‘universal’ knowledge in a ‘universal’ fashion. This is particularly important as anti-corruption hinges
on the public recognition of corruption that corresponds with IACD - as universally wrong phenomena
that damage wellbeing and development and as an issue to be tackled in the way IACD suggests. The
public that does not perceive corruption in this way cannot be expected to be of much help when it
comes to furthering anti-corruption of IACD. It appears that what is taken for granted with respect to
principals is that free local media promote and spread the ‘universal’ discourse in a universal fashion
thereby producing the perfectly rational principal and thus grounds for the principal-agent model.
Given that media are to play a vital role in facilitating and disseminating knowledge about corruption and
anti-corruption, it is surprising how little attention has been paid to critical examinations of the
knowledge of corruption that free media circulate.
2.8 Placing economic man on anti-corruption throne
To summarise the main points of the debate in this chapter, the pervasiveness of the homo economicus
paradigm against the backdrop of escalating liberalisation and marketisation has been argued to have
far-ranging ramifications for the articulation of the nature of corruption and ensuing elaboration of trust
and dividing line between public and private. Given the prevailing theory of economic man, corruption
42
emerges as merely a calculation of costs and benefits. To abandon corruption, it has to be made too
costly to do. This is to be achieved through an elaborate mix of punishment mechanisms, self-control,
surveillance, and knowledge heavily weighted with economic tendencies, in production of a responsible,
rational and above all governable homo economicus. IACD seeks to re-shape societies through
institutional reforms. Furthermore, it has been advanced that the theoretical and philosophical
foundations of anti-corruption discourse, inseparably linked to the overarching liberalisation debates,
lend a considerable advantage to private sector players and promote a neoliberal agenda through
fighting corruption internationally.
Therefore, the state, despite being ultimately responsible for its anti-corruption performance, which
includes the private sector, paradoxically recedes into the background and its role emerges along the
lines of creating a supportive market environment and maximisation of incentives for self-regulation. The
private sector, on the other hand, without the interference of the state and through opening up to
scrutiny in the spirit of governance, is expected to renounce corruption in the name of efficiency. In what
follows, the arguments elaborated in this chapter will be transposed to the specific context of SMEs.
While it has been recognised that IACD seeks to build foundations for these constructs to function, this
matter is somewhat neglected. Free media, as one of the prime sources of raising awareness, in other
words ingraining the population with requisite knowledge on which anti-corruption is contingent, is
overly relied upon and little assessed with regards to their contribution to the mission.
43
CHAPTER THREE - ANTI-CORRUPTION AND SMEs: SHAPING CORRUPTION-AVERSE SMEs
The previous chapter explored how IACD seeks to shape societies. This chapter looks at how IACD sets
about fashioning SMEs to fit its paradigm. Corruption has been framed as a futile inefficient activity and
thus it follows that a successful entrepreneur is indeed the one that does not engage in corruption. At
the core of this chapter is an exploration of the norms and values that underlie entrepreneurship, and
assessment of how these norms and values fit within the understanding of corruption outlined in the
preceding chapter. It assesses how this informs the design of strategies to combat corruption in SMEs
and ultimately how corruption-averse entrepreneurs are constructed.
Scholars in the field identify some fundamental assumptions in contemporary dominant media,
government and scholarly discourses that paint a rather distinctive picture of entrepreneurs as very
special individuals (Berglund and Johanson, 2007). The most proclaimed entrepreneurial traits
encompass individualism and rationality (Ogbor, 2000; Nijkamp, 2003; Bruni et al, 2004; Perren and
Jennings, 2005; Nicholson and Anderson, 2005; Gupta et al, 2005). These are inextricably linked and
mutually reinforcing concepts grounded in Western thought (Ogbor, 2000). Berglund and Johanson
(2007: 82-86) likened these to ‘thick threads’ of the web of entrepreneurial discourse. This is to not to
brush away the ‘thin threads’ of alternatives to the dominant discourse. Nevertheless, highlighting the
pre-eminent features of the discourse serves the purposes of this work best.
The above builds upon the foundations laid out in the preceding section. The dominant entrepreneurial
discourse and IACD have both been shaped predominantly by Western tradition. The nature of
entrepreneurship and some of the quintessential characteristics of the entrepreneur are explored within
international guidelines for SMEs. Namely, the attention here is directed towards the joint document of
the United Nation’s agencies UNIDO and UNODC - Corruption Prevention to Foster Small and Medium-
sized Enterprise Development (2012) and Transparency International’s Business Principles for
Countering Bribery (2004). These tools were tailored to SMEs. OECD et al Anti-Corruption Ethics and
Compliance Handbook for Business (2013) is also utilised, although to a lesser extent as it provides a
generic ‘manual’ for businesses of all sizes. The tenets of the entrepreneurial strand of IACD are
circulated in populations worldwide through educational programmes and workshops for
entrepreneurs, but also through media narrations of corruption and entrepreneurship.
44
The chapter is organised in the following order. It firstly clarifies how SMEs are conceptualised here. It
then moves on to the discussion of the link between entrepreneurship and corruption discourses and
their apparently easy enmeshment. The next section explores rationality and individualism as core
tenets of human nature constructed by anti-corruption discourse, their presence in entrepreneurial anti-
corruption and ramifications for anti-corruption instructions targeting SMEs.
3.1 The entrepreneur as a rational individualist
An argument has been put forward that entrepreneurial discourse exhibits a tendency to place an
individual at the centre of the dominant discourse on enterprising, thereby conveying an image of
entrepreneurship as an individual and individualistic activity (Johannisson, 1998; Hjorth and
Johannisson, 2003). Pursuant to this, individualistic societies are deemed more efficient and competitive
and by and large more business-friendly and less corrupt as will be shown below.
It has been suggested that the elemental building block for such appreciation of entrepreneurs was
Schumpeter’s work (Langlois, 200; Goss, 2005; Ebner, 2006) which carries the individual and his
characteristics at its heart (Drakopoulou Dodd and Anderson, 2007: 348). Furthermore, Schumpeter is
also linked to a romanticised ideal of the entrepreneur who challenges structures, battles the
establishment, propels growth and brings about change (Frank, 1998: 505). This is also a rather
masculine view of enterprising activity (Lewis, 2006). Notwithstanding the difficulties posed by the
external (corrupt) environment, an entrepreneur is reminded that he/she “ha[s] the opportunity to
make a real difference by helping to create a culture of zero tolerance towards bribery” (Transparency
International, 2008: 4).
This stance has been questioned on numerous occasions by scholars drawing attention to the relational
nature of entrepreneurship (see, for example, Grabher and Stark, 1997: 12-13; Jones and Conway, 2000;
Lechler, 2001; Goss, 2005). Indeed, Granovetter (1985) remarks that entrepreneurs are embedded
within the societies in which they operate and as such are far from the loners depicted by the dominant
discourse driven by neoliberal philosophy. Further criticism has been raised in psychology (Fiske and
Taylor, 2012) and neuroscience (Frith and Wolpert, 2004; Chudek and Henrich, 2011), which foreground
the importance of human interplay. Moreover, it has been noticed that Schumpeter himself in his later
work shifted away from the image of the isolated entrepreneur and acknowledged the social grounding
of entrepreneurs (Swedeberg, 1991).
45
Despite such observations, Drakopoulou Dodd and Anderson (2007) argue that individualism continues
to dominate entrepreneurial discourse. Claims of individualist cultures being more entrepreneurial than
their collectivist counterparts bolster and highlight the influence and the appeal of individualism
(Mueller and Thomas, 2001; Wennekers et al, 2002; Hayton et al, 2002). Pinillos and Reyes (2011)
somewhat soften the strong assertions of positive connection between individualism and
entrepreneurial activity by concluding that individualism cements entrepreneurship particularly in
developed economies. The link between individualism and development is distinct in the corruption
debate too. It is clearly evident in Mazar and Aggarwal’s (2011) remark that individualism represses
corruption whereas collectivism promotes it, which encapsulates this line of argument in IACD.
The preference of individualism is somewhat reflected in the tendency to treat corruption as bribery
which is conceptualised as an exchange between individuals (Transparency International, 2013a: 4). This
allows for certain neglect of broader societal and cultural contexts. It could be posited that bribery is
perhaps the most tangible form of corruption and it is therefore hardly unforeseen that it is in the
limelight. The United Nations (2012) attempts to engage more meaningfully with the critique of treating
instances of corruption as isolated acontextual occurrences. The document goes to great lengths in
stressing that SMEs, due to their size, are likely to engage in corruption because they have little choice
and limited power and that corruption is perceived as a norm in their operating environment. However,
society and culture is somewhat reduced to a barrier to an entrepreneur and treated as a set of external
incentives and punishments, rather than a much deeper underlying force behind their conduct. This also
reveals a tension between active SMEs as initiators of a change and passive entrepreneurs.
Any universalistic approach can only go so far in acknowledging local contexts. A plethora of studies on
the matter of entrepreneurship as embedded in social contexts brings to the surface a number of issues
to consider including a spatial location – whether a business is rural or urban (Siemens, 2012, Freire-
Gibb and Nielsen, 2014), cultural contexts of divergent countries and their social norms (Schnell and
Sofer, 2003; Bergmann, 2005) and human interactions (Fletcher, 2007) as well as gender (Hamilton,
2014), to name just a few. As such, the picture of entrepreneurship is much richer than what IACD
constructs in its narration.
It has been advanced that the construct of homo economicus and its assumptions about human nature
pervade IACD. Gebel (2012: 122) emphasises that the particular type of homo economicus on which
corruption is built is among the purest models in its embrace of rational utility-maximising individuals.
46
This means that IACD attributes the achievement of individual goals with primacy. This also applies to
SMEs.
The latter point is evident in the opening section of Transparency International’s Business Principles for
countering bribery. It provides a list of benefits that fighting corruption brings to an SME and all are
concerned with the individual advantage gained by a business that embarks upon anti-corruption
practices (Transparency International, 2008a: 5). These include:
“A record of integrity will enhance your opportunities to acquire government business”
“Your business will be more attractive to financial organisations”
“You, and not some bribe payer or bribe receiver, will be in control of your business…”
The last citation, in particular, emphasizes the individualist appeal to be ‘master of your own destiny’
and provides a telling example of the way the notion of individual effort and control is used by the
discourse in the construction of what entrepreneurs should pursue.
The costs of corruption are similarly constructed as costs borne by individual SMEs which could be
viewed as private transaction costs and not expanded to cover the wider business community or indeed
the society/societies within which SMEs operate. The UN (2012: 3) resorts to long-term costs of
corruption to businesses themselves in terms of negative impact upon business enlargement,
reinvestment, finding customers abroad, product quality, employment opportunities within an
enterprise, and research and development. The notion of a cost itself is rather illuminating as to the
underpinning values and norms of IACD. The particular framing of costs of corruption is indeed
grounded in an extensive body of literature which conceptualises corruption as swallowing finance that
could be used more productively (Levine, 2005), as a hurdle in terms of access to finance (Demirgüç-
Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998), and harming property rights (Levin and Satarov, 2000; Cull and Xu, 2005).
Corruption is also believed to have a damaging impact on innovation as resources are used for
corruption, rather than for innovations (Anokhin and Schulze, 2009). However, in thoroughly corrupt
environments corruption can serve to facilitate access to finance, innovation and so forth as the
proponents of the argument that corruption greases the wheels of entrepreneurship argue (Dreher and
Gassebner, 2013).
The above formulation of the impact of corruption on business, informed by individualism, is necessarily
reflected in the proposed cures which fall within a category of institutional betterment to encourage
47
individuals to abandon corruption and enhanced internal control mechanisms. For instance, the UN
recommends the establishment of efficient complaint and reporting mechanisms and improvement of
access to justice through affordable legal aid so as to minimise the costs of voicing complaints mainly on
an individual basis (2012: 5-30), as well as raising incentives for reporting corruption (ibid: 41). Raising
awareness among entrepreneurs as to the negative impact of corruption on their business is a part of
the effort and seeks to install the belief that corruption is wrong as essential to anti-corruption. Without
this belief, the other anti-corruption instruments can only be of limited effectiveness. Furthermore, the
issue of internal structures of oversight so as to keep a company under control is of debatable use in
micro and small enterprises, where the owner fulfils multiple if not all functions.
Despite a mention of collective redress mechanisms (United Nations, 2012: 36-37), the concept is rather
underdeveloped, which effectively draws attention and lends considerably more weight to mechanisms
that have an individual’s interests at its core. It is also suggested that award schemes which reward
compliance with anti-corruption standards should be introduced to provide incentives for individual
entrepreneurs in pursuance of individual success (ibid: 50). To further demonstrate the above, one only
needs to take a look at Transparency International’s (2008a) document which is entirely devoted to
systems of internal structures, of thorough checks and controls to prevent corruption and thereby
effectively isolates individuals in their own worlds.
On the other hand, it needs to be noted that the United Nations (2012: 49-54) dedicates some room in
the document to collective business action against corruption, namely in the form of business
partnerships as a response to the collective action problem faced by SMEs when not all businesses
denounce corruption. Nevertheless, by framing the reasons for engagement in anti-corruption activities
in purely individualist terms, collective action, as argued previously, emerges as recognition that
individual interest is best achieved collectively. This point is substantiated by the United Nations’
resorting to educating entrepreneurs in order for them to appreciate how harmful corruption is and as a
result of that knowledge actively pursuing collective action to achieve their own objectives. The
tendency to foster individualism is also problematic with respect to this point, as it breaks the society of
entrepreneurs into individuals at the same time as it seeks to encourage collaborative action.
Transparency International and OECD refer to collective action only marginally, which stands out starkly
in comparison with the elaborate account of firm-level actions to be taken.
The ideal of the entrepreneur as “a cultural hero of the Western world” (Anderson and Warren, 2011:
592) has been incorporated into IACD. The entrepreneur has become a hero of anti-corruption.
48
However, the usefulness of conceptualising the entrepreneur as an individualistic hero to achieve anti-
corruption ends could be challenged on the grounds of the very notion of individualism. The
individualistic entrepreneur identifies opportunities and mobilizes recourses to exploit them. If these
opportunities stem from corruption, opportunist entrepreneurs might be mobilised by the heroic
discourse of entrepreneurship to pursue them. In other words, it is questionable whether depicting
entrepreneurs as heroes facilitates the adoption of anti-corruption principles or silently nourishes
corruption.
Another shortcoming of the discourse is the construction of entrepreneurs as isolated in the world of
entrepreneurship. The only identity they own is that of entrepreneur. This presents a rather
decontextualized view of entrepreneurship which confines entrepreneurs within their venture and
disregards their multifarious social engagements. In turn, this presents a rather limited appreciation of
corruption and misses out on much vital nuance. In other words, treating corruption in SMEs as only
related to the venture fails to ground corruption into wider societal contexts and risks overlooking many
of its multifaceted manifestations, motivations and purposes.
Another underlying assumption of the homo economicus model intertwined with individualism is a
particular rationality. Gherardi (2003) posits that enterprise has been constructed as a rational economic
activity. Necessarily, entrepreneurs are portrayed as rational, which Ogbor (2000) argues to be deeply
rooted in the European/North American model of rational humans. Entrepreneurs are encouraged to
foster result-orientation, efficiency, control, independence and competitiveness (Ogbor, 2000; Carr and
Beaver, 2002; Bruni et al, 2004: 261) by which they are measured (Stevenson, 1990). These skills
essentially encompass what it means to be a rational entrepreneur and reveal the particular economic
rationality on which entrepreneurial discourse is built.
Enumeration of the financial costs of engaging in corruption, such as penalties, imprisonment and loss of
licenses, juxtaposed with the benefits of steering away from corruption overtly appeals to rational
individuals calculating costs and benefits. Manipulation of incentives to abandon corruption (United
Nations, 2012: 41) also points in the direction of the rational man. To illustrate the point further, the
United Nations (2013: 46) insinuates that in order to make an anti-corruption endeavour worthwhile to
SMEs, governments should consider tax incentives for SMEs that commit to zero-tolerance.
Entrepreneurs are encouraged to assess and evaluate and thus manage corruption risks (Transparency
International, 2008: 8), tacitly employing the notion of control by rational individuals.
49
Corruption is painted as an obstruction to the rational long-term efficiency of an enterprise in allocating
resources (United Nations, 2013; OECD et al, 2013), and thus a fundamental impediment to the success
of a business. Therefore, as observed by Transparency International (2008a) in the opening quote of
Business Principles for Countering Bribery, it does not make sense to engage in corruption, that is to say
corruption is irrational. To problematize this simple account of rationality, Stiglitz (2012) explores the
costs of collection of information and puts forward an argument of inclination of rational individuals to
take ‘shortcuts’ to reduce the cost of imperfect information and information asymmetries. Corruption
could serve as an example of such a ‘rational’ shortcut.
Furthermore, the rational entrepreneur is self-reliant and independent (Johansson, 2004: 276;
Drakopoulou Dodd and Anderson, 2007: 349-350). The notion of self-sufficiency has been argued to play
an apparent role in the construction of the entrepreneurial self-identity by entrepreneurs themselves
(Mallon and Cohen, 2001), which demonstrates the appeal and the power of such a conceptualisation of
entrepreneurship (Drakopoulou Dodd and Anderson, 2007: 351). This feature is particularly strongly
pronounced in Transparency International’s document (2008a: 6), which foregrounds being in control as
one of the main reasons to combat corruption as “a business run on bribery is a business not in control
of itself”. However, it is ignored that in certain contexts it might be corruption that provides one with
control. As such, the discourse justifies corruption deployed by rational individuals in order to achieve
self-reliance.
Moulding rational entrepreneurs through knowledge is bolstered with rational incentive and
punishment structures as discussed previously.
3.1.1 Individualism, competitiveness and corruption
Competitiveness and individualism are closely related. This is demonstrated by the argument that the
countries with prevailing individualistic cultures tend to be more competitive and more entrepreneurial
(Lee and Peterson, 2000). Leibbrandt et al (2013) in their study of fishermen also find that fisherman
from individualist societies are more competitive than their counterparts in collectivist societies. As
individualist cultures are more competitive and less corrupt, it follows that competition uproots
corruption for it drives efficiency (Ades and Di Tella, 1999). Corruption, on the other hand, is
synonymous with inefficiency (see Chapter Two). Therefore, increased competitiveness as an antidote to
corruption figures prominently in the international entrepreneurial anti-corruption blueprint.
50
The notion of competition manifests itself in the above outlined costs of corruption to an enterprise and
proposed solutions which seek to increase efficiency and effectiveness in allocating scarce resources,
thereby increasing competitiveness.
Perhaps the clearest employment of the notion of competitiveness and its role in combatting corruption
is found in the United Nations’ (2012) idea of awards for ethical business conduct already touched upon
above. Doane argues that the logic behind incentivising business to subscribe to such initiatives draws
on the notion of competitiveness and as such rests with economic rationality and the motive of profit
(2005: 26-27). Put simply, being perceived as ethical, in this case uncorrupt, pays and becomes a
competitive advantage (Vogel, 2005: 19), whereas being seen as corrupt implies a cost to business and
detracts from business opportunities. This mirrors a concern with CSR discourse, which in its appeal to
the economic rationality of business owners/managers favours doing well over doing good (Devinney,
2009). In other words, being ethical makes a firm more competitive in the first place. In turn, the overall
increase in competitiveness drives efficiency and thus reduces opportunities for corruption, for in a truly
competitive market corruption is simply too costly (Khanal, 2000). As Everett (2006) observed,
competition emerges as a discipline which once adopted forces enterprises to abstain from corruption.
Returning to the idea of anti-corruption business awards, pursuance of such a reward fulfils the role
disciplining competition.
However, this approach tends to deal with incidental, rather than systemic corruption. Furthermore,
individual profits could also be maximised through corruption even if this reduces general
competitiveness and welfare.
Individual reputation stands out as a core concern with respect to transparency. It encompasses
reputation vis-à-vis other businesses which facilitates entering into business relationships (Deelmann
and Loos, 2002: 2218), vis-à-vis financial institutions impacting upon the company’s chances to access
loans and funds (Vos et al, 2007: 2651; Berger and Frame, 2007: 13) and vis-a-vis customers and
potential customers which raises impacts on profitability (Margolis and Walsh, 2001). In other words,
auspicious reputation enhances competitiveness. It thus comes as little surprise that the reasons for
engaging with transparency given by Transparency International (2008a: 5-6) echo reputational
concerns. Simply expressed, bad reputation hurts business opportunities, because an enterprise
becomes an unattractive partner and candidate for support from financial institutions among others
(ibid). However, this relies on the existence of a corruption-averse society in which SMEs operate.
51
Individualistic transparency informs the suggestion of putting codes of conduct in place, maintaining
accurate records, regular reviewing of business partners, financial controls, communicating anti-
corruption endeavours to stake holders and reporting incidents of corruption, as well as employee anti-
corruption training and internal and external reporting mechanisms (Transparency International, 2008a;
UN, 2012; OECD et al, 2013). It is questionable to what extent this is applicable to particularly micro and
small enterprises.
In addition, it could be posited that too much transparency encourages homo economicus to resort to
secrecy in the protection of competitive advantage, such as in the protection of a new product or
production process. As such, transparency informed by individualism might breed corruption, rather
than counteracting it. Sparling (2013) even asserts that contemporary transparency underlined by
individualism breaks society into individuated subjects more prone to corruption.
3.2 Defining the raison d’être of SMEs: progress and growth, growth, growth
Drawing on the above characteristics of entrepreneurship, a picture emerges of what constitutes
enterprise objectives and how business success is defined. Following on from the proclaimed role of
entrepreneurship in development, Jones and Spicer (2005) argue that entrepreneurship is rather
uncritically approved. Ahl (2006: 226) further adds that the link between entrepreneurship and
innovation creates a semblance that entrepreneurship contributes to the betterment of things, and as
such meshes neatly with the discourse of modernity, wherein progress is attributed with great value.
Spangenberg (2010) maintains that the discourse of progress and development is underpinned by
economic rationale and reflects the market-driven ideology of economics (Swedberg, 2000).
Spangenberg (2010) further elaborates that economic growth emerges as an essential factor to any
progress.
The United Nations foregrounds the economic aspects of SMEs’ contribution to developing economies
whereby SMEs are “the engine of growth in many economies … and crucial for the development of
societies” (UNIDO and UNODC, 2012). The economic factor of development is reinforced throughout the
document by mentions of growth as a ‘natural’, hence unavoidable, objective that does not require any
further explanation or legitimation. Moreover, Perren and Jennings (2005: 177) observed a
contemporary trend in entrepreneurial discourse of assuming that enterprises strive to grow to the
point of having an impact not only nationally, but also internationally. This is reflected in TI’s discourse
(2008: 5) in its assertion that corruption impedes access to international markets.
52
As corruption hurts individualism, it impedes competition and innovation and by and large impedes the
market and necessarily has negative implications for growth which is fuelled by SMEs. Therefore,
corruption is bad for SMEs.
Given the above argument, SMEs are told that participating in corrupt activities influences decisions to
expand, reinvest and hire workforce (UNIDO and UNODC, 2013: 3). In other words, corruption seriously
impedes SMEs from fulfilling their ‘natural’ role dictated by economic rationality of the homo
economicus theory. However, the idea of continuous growth is in itself precarious. It is clear that if
growth is sustained and continued, an SME ceases to be an SME and starts being a corporation. It is thus
questionable, to what extent growth of SMEs is supported. Growth as such is not infinite as there are
limited material resources available, as Jackson (2009) amongst others observed in a critique of the
contemporary growth paradigm. As growth emerges as a prime imperative, it is worth asking to what
extent it collides with the demand of transparency. Does dedication to growth compromise
transparency when growth comes, as the discourse suggests in the first place? Therefore, it is important
to indicate that the demand for growth could effectively raise corruption, rather than eradicate it.
Indeed, a number of works have addressed alternative natures of entrepreneurship which do not
conform or are even in conflict with the dominant depiction discussed here. To illustrate the point, Hall
and Williams (2008) demonstrate that some business owners do not run their enterprise with solely
economic motivations such as progress, growth, competitiveness and so forth in mind, but rather in
pursuit of non-economic benefits such as flexibility, search and realisation of certain lifestyles. A growing
body of literature targets and explores female entrepreneurs and their way of running a business.
Among the motivations and the reasons for females to engage in entrepreneurial activities is security,
the desire for self-expression, and changes in their personal relationships (Morris et al, 2006;
Piperopulous, 2012). A growing body of literature addresses a phenomenon of social enterprising that
carries the idea of the common good of a community at its heart (Seelos and Mair, 2005; Brookes,
2009).
If not all SMEs operate with the single purpose of achieving growth, encouraging entrepreneurs to
denounce corruption solely on the grounds of economic efficiency might miss the point. In a situation
when an SME does not seek growth, it does not make much sense for them to abandon corrupt ways.
Furthermore, the discourse implies that corruption is an improper way of achieving entrepreneurial
success in the form of undue advantage. However, it could be opined that entrepreneurs engage in
corruption for other reasons. The discourse is silent about such motivations.
53
In addition, entrepreneurship emerges as an inherently good pursuit which makes it difficult or even
impossible to conceive of it in a negative way (Berglund and Johansson, 2007). The dismissal of anything
negative that enterprise might do or produce is reflected in the argument that entrepreneurs engage in
corruption because of immediate costs of not doing so to their business (UNIDO and UNODC, 2012: 3,
67, 68). In other words, the discourse strips entrepreneurs of much of the blame. Rather than projecting
such activities as bad or harmful, it merely asserts that corruption comes at the expense of longstanding
success (ibid, 2012: 4). Therefore, entrepreneurs need to be educated about corruption and must be
provided with access to information to become more rational (ibid, 2012: 8-10, 29, 30-38).
Moreover, a concern could be raised as to the usefulness of constructing the nature and the role of
SMEs in the above way. Its preoccupation with individual business and achievement of individual growth
at the expense of other broader societal objectives might lead to superficial and tokenistic dedication to
counter corruption.
3.3 SMEs: little anti-corruption heroes
The individualistic and rational nature of the entrepreneur translates into capacity to change his/her
entrepreneurial environment through action at an individual level. This insight is consistent with the
desirability of enterprising activity against the backdrop of neoliberalism. The above is the most
pronounced in Transparency International’s (2008a) document concerned purely with actions to be
taken by individual SMEs which snowball to a change, that is to say a shift away from corruption, in
business society and society at large. Pyysiäinen and Vesala (2013: 55-56) maintain that the idea of
improving the economy through steering individuals towards entrepreneurial activity is a linchpin of
societal discourses in contemporary Western societies.
Given the attractiveness of entrepreneurial individuals, it does not come as any surprise that
entrepreneurs are shown in a positive light in entrepreneurial anti-corruption discourse. Even when
entrepreneurs engage in corruption, they are portrayed as victims, rather than perpetrators (UNIDO and
UNODC, 2012: 3). This supports the claim that entrepreneurship had become associated with
predominantly, if not exclusively, positive connotations, which makes it difficult to think about
entrepreneurship in negative terms. Partaking in corruption emerges as necessary to keep an enterprise
alive.
Thus, the United Nation’s discourse does not allow holding SMEs accountable when it comes to
corruption. Instead, it blames the structure, namely the state, for the failure to create an environment in
54
which SMEs can thrive. As such, steering entrepreneurs away from corruption depends also on the
functionality of external institutions which help to shape their individual perceptions of corruption as
being too costly.
Interestingly, this does not deny agency to SMEs when it comes to battling corruption. Indeed, such a
removal of agency would directly contradict with entrepreneurial discourse which constructs
entrepreneurs as doers. Therefore, it could be concluded that SMEs in societies suffering corruption are
imbued with an active role as mavericks equipped with knowledge fighting against the difficulties
imposed by their environment; in this case, with corruption and pushing for change. Nevertheless, this
comes with little responsibility. Also, the core weakness of this approach is the potential of providing
further ‘rational’ grounds and justifications for corruption, rather than reasons to suppress the
phenomenon.
3.4 Conclusion
The particular conceptualisation of entrepreneurship resembles the romanticized image of an
entrepreneur as an individualistic rational challenger of obsolete structures, a source of improvement
and driver of development. By adopting the particular nature of entrepreneurship, the international
anti-corruption discourse positions entrepreneurs as anti-corruption fighters in a very specific manner
by appealing to their rationality.
IACD seeks to shape individuals to fit the particular image of entrepreneurship. The model entrepreneur
abandons corruption in order to be successful, that is to say in order to grow. In other words, the
discourse mobilises entrepreneurs to abandon corruption as this is good for their business. Any negative
aspects of entrepreneurship are entirely left out, which reflects the belief in the inherent virtue of SMEs
even if it entails corruption, for SMEs are merely victims of corrupt societal structures. Entrepreneurs
are called to combat corruption to improve their society through enhancing their business prospects.
Successful enterprise is therefore inherently good. What is good for enterprise is good for society.
However, it has been argued that such a blame-free construction and elevation of enterprise to a heroic
position might justify, rather than uproot, corruption among SMEs, as everything that an entrepreneur
does for his/her venture to succeed is conceptualized as positive.
55
CHAPTER FOUR - WHERE THE INTERNATIONAL MEETS THE LOCAL
The implementation of international norms, made enticing by their apparent universal application to
national contexts, is far from a straight-forward process. This section explores issues related to the
transfer of international knowledge onto the local.
Drawing on the notion of ‘international socialisation’, this part highlights the need to take the agency of
individual states into account in the process of the adoption of international rules and norms. This is a
vital point as the contemporary trends in international policy do not utilise coercion or even violence,
but rather resort to more subtle exercise of power through incentivising countries to embrace
international conventions. However, it is not just merely about receiving and complying with
international standards. It is about rooting complex knowledge on which these standards are built in a
different context with divergent norms, values, beliefs and thus knowledge.
The chapter is structured in the following way. It firstly discusses the matter of expert knowledge of
international organisations, before moving on to the intricacies of knowledge transfer in the EU context
addressing the matter of agency versus structure. Finally, the idea of ‘international socialisation’ which
considers both structure and agency and challenges the view of power as a zero-sum game in the
international realm is presented.
4.1 The role of expert knowledge
Policy transfer involves transmission of knowledge. In the case of anti-corruption efforts, policies draw
heavily on expert knowledge of international organisations (Bukovansky, 2002; 2006), often building
upon the experience of the perceived leader (Strang and Macy, 2001) - mature democracies, in the given
context. With respect to anti-corruption, these organisations are the United Nations, OECD,
Transparency International, Council of Europe and EU in the context of Europe as identified earlier.
The role of the leading organisations involved in the anti-corruption campaign rests with disseminating
knowledge, informing local policy and determining best practice. This is reflected in positioning
themselves as advisers. The argument that Porter and Webb (2007: 8) made with respect to the OECD,
namely that the organisation is paid attention to because it established itself as a source of perceived
impartial expertise knowledge, could be stretched to cover the other institutions. It is precisely the
status of an ‘objective expert’ that gives them power (Fischer, 2003). Haas (1992) maintains that
56
international expert organisations are seen as providers of unbiased advice to rational state actors, to
assist them redefine their interest and adjust the state to function in the contemporary economic,
political and social environment. In other words, expert actors produce common knowledge foundations
which guide policy making and assure convergence of the national with the international, wherein the
international represents the best practice (Radaelli, 2000: 28).
Thielemann (2001) observed that international institutions, such as the World Bank, OECD, and United
Nations are often thought about in terms of constraints imposed on states following rational choice
theory. The example of the tool of conditionality attached to World Bank loans is a case in point.
Favourable anti-corruption performance with respect to the implementation of anti-corruption measures
is an integral part of gaining access to international support, whichever form it might take. As such, there
is a pressure on governments to comply with core international treaties and conventions, because
ignoring them bears significant costs in terms of access to resources, foreign investment and so forth.
Dobbin et al (2007: 454) maintain that it is the manipulation of costs and benefits that have come to
signify a contemporary force that shapes states’ policies in the push towards compliance with
international standards. Monitoring and sanctions are understood as vital components of such coercive
strategies (Dorn and Fulton, 1997). Therefore, less powerful states have little choice with respect to the
acceptance of neoliberal prescriptions (Best, 2007), other than adherence to international standards
through their incorporation into national systems. This makes states ‘good’ members of the international
community.
On the other hand, the ‘prescribing states’, engage the rest of the world in the process of convergence in
order to improve and maintain stability and their own power (Mearsheimer, 1995; Owen, 2002). This a
rather zero-sum view of international knowledge exchanges as Realpolitik. It presents the seemingly
objective expert knowledge as a powerful political tool pushing through specific interests (Sabatier,
1987; Boswell, 2009).
However, knowledge is not only a means of controlling conduct, but also of empowerment. Knowledge is
empowering in the sense that it equips actors with the necessary tools for tackling issues difficult to
address, (Timmermans and Scholten, 2006) introducing the idea of local agency into the debate. There
are also abundant examples of international policy being (ab)used to further own local political interests
(Batory, 2012; Wolf, 2010). It could be added that given the lack of direct coercion, the international
approach to anti-corruption certainly leaves ample room for the local to situate itself within the
57
international knowledge and imbue international tenets with shades of local appreciations, although it
can also result in friction.
4.2 Complexities of EU knowledge transfer
The EU is perhaps the most influential organisation in the geographical space of CEE (Vachudova, 2009).
This is not only due to its spatial proximity, but also its supranational nature and the exceptional soft
power it exercises in the run up to EU membership. The Union has been actively taking part in
international anti-corruption initiatives. It could be argued that the EU acts as a mediator between
international organisations. It has little anti-corruption legislation of its own. Rather, it adopts
foundational international frameworks1 and requires its member states to transpose them into their
respective legal systems, and consequently implement them on the ground in the form of concrete anti-
corruption measures.
A vivid debate on the topic of compliance with European standards has emerged against the backdrop of
the recent calls for deeper integration of the EU. The discussions have also been a reflection on the
developments in new member states after two enlargement rounds in 2004 and 2007, which
incorporated a substantial group of Eastern European and Balkan states. Tensions have run high between
the old and the new members in the 2010s amounting to the earthquake fuelled by the UK’s vote to exit
the EU in 2016.
The focus here will lie particularly with the ‘fresh’ member states. They have been argued to be
relatively less powerful states, more exposed to external, that is to say EU, pressures, (Börzel et al, 2010).
Nevertheless, Geddes (2001) also reminds us that smaller and less powerful states are not paralysed by
the EU and can also actively engage with the dominant discourse to attain their objectives.
The conditionality aspect of the EU accession process has been acknowledged as a crucial tool of
consolidation of CEE states with European standards (Dimitrova and Steunenberg, 2004; Schimmelfennig
and Sedelmeier, 2004). However, conditionality ceases to exist after the accession, thereby significantly
altering the external incentive structure to comply in the new EU member states. Therefore, some
scholars expected that compliance with EU directives in these states would decline once they became
1 United Nation’s Convention Against Corruption. OECD’s Convention on Combatting Bribery of Foreign Public in International Business Transactions. Council of Europe’s Criminal Law Convention on Corruption and its additional Protocol. Council of Europe’s Civil Law Convention on Corruption and the 20 Guiding Principles against Corruption. Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA on Combatting Corruption in the Private Sector.
58
part of the Union (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005). In hindsight, König (2008) claims that such
fears did not materialise, as new members outperformed the old ones in a number of areas. It could be
added that the EU has some power in the post-accession period via naming and shaming, the working of
the European Court and withholding of funding. On a more positive note, scholars also show how the
processes of ‘europeanisation’ make resources available and mobilise actors to achieve aims that would
otherwise lie outside of the bounds of possibility, by providing a frame of reference to policy makers
(Geddes and Taylor, 2013; Thielemann, 2001).
However, as optimistic as such accounts of ‘success stories’ seem, it is important to bear in mind that
compliance on the surface might not necessarily translate into a fully-blown implementation on the
ground. Taking the discussion back to corruption, it has been suggested that local resistance is a
consequence of the lack of external pressure on the new states to actively, rather than symbolically,
engage in anti-corruption, resulting in insufficient progress of CEE (Batory, 2012). The instance of the
disbandment of the Special Court for Corruption and Organized Crime in Slovakia in 2009, and its
replacement by a new judicial authority with a broader scope of activity could be put forward as an
example. This act makes addressing corruption less prompt and direct.
An alternative approach asserts that the common knowledge basis from which congruence of
international and national interests flows is critical to how attractive or not a particular policy discourse
is at national level (Boswell et al, 2011). Also, Douglas writes of the importance of the ‘compliance
culture’, a foundational set of norms and values which can greatly facilitate the reception of a policy
(2001: 3149). Falkner and Treib (2008: 259-298) utilise the notion of knowledge compatibility to account
for the superficial adoption or neglect of EU regulations by its members. In other words, a lack of
compliance emerges when a policy is not tailored enough to the context in which it is sought to be
applied and when similarity or sameness of knowledge between the author of a policy and its recipient
is taken for granted.
Frictions can also be understood as a way of states and individuals pursuing their own interests (Stone,
2004: 549). Thielemann demonstrates the argument with the example of European states inside and
outside the EU ‘using Europe’ as a source of rationale and legitimacy to achieve tougher rules regarding
asylum policies. Returning to anti-corruption discourse, its use and abuse in Eastern Europe as a tool of
discrediting political opponents (Sandholtz and Koetzle, 2000: 33) illustrates how policy can be utilised in
less positive ways. Simply, formal adoption should not be taken as the end point of the process, as
pointed out elsewhere (Holzinger and Knill, 2005: 776; Gadowska, 2010).
59
4.2.1 Translation and understanding corruption
The very rudimentary aspect of knowledge transfer, that is to say the translation of international norms
and rules, demonstrates the complexities of taking international knowledge and applying it in local
contexts. Translation is not merely a matter of a technical nature of simply transcoding text from one
language to another (Godard, 1989: 48). It is a process infused with the subtleties of meaning,
connotation and, inescapably, judgement and interpretation (Marshall and Rossman, 2006). As Bassnett-
McGuire (1980: 38) aptly put it, every translation is an invention precisely because languages do not
exist in a vacuum. To exemplify, the seemingly simple notion of vehicles in the sentence “the letting of
premises and sites for parking vehicles” within EU law has been translated and interpreted differently
across Europe (Cao, 2007: 134). Whereas the French, English, German, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese and
Finnish versions of vehicles include general means of transport, the Danish, Dutch, Swedish and Greek
versions refer to vehicles as land-based transport on wheels only (ibid).
Indeed, translation of complex concepts such as corruption or human rights is far more complicated. A
mundane translation thus becomes a convoluted matter of how international law is appropriated and
enacted in local contexts. Merry (2009: 3), with respect to human rights, observed that the notion does
not lend itself easily to translation due to specific conceptions of human nature and the state in different
cultural contexts. Furthermore, Bassnett and Lefevere (1990: 5) argue that translation is inescapably
entangled in power relations. For instance, Larmour (2006: 9) observed that the word corruption does
not have an equivalent in many languages and therefore corruption has been introduced as not only a
new word, but as a new concept, with a rather specific meaning laden with certain values and
assumptions. The very emergence of anti-corruption discourse in contexts where it was previously not
conceptualised could be argued to reflect international power relations. In her analysis of Georgian anti-
corruption interventions, Di Puppo (2010) concluded that the idea of corruption is adapted and
integrated into the local context, not simply translated at face value. She demonstrates this in an array of
interpretations of the fight against corruption against the backdrop of the local struggle for power. When
faced with its own corruption scandal revealed by the Chamber of Control, the Georgian Ministry of
Education portrayed the combat against corruption as a fight against old and inefficient institutions
ridden with legacies of communism in the pursuance of disbandment of the Chamber that produced an
ill-informed report. On the other hand, the opposition framed the story as a struggle for democracy
against the corrupt government.
60
4.3 Crafting space for the local within the international
The earlier discussion which touched upon the issue of structure and agency also played out as the local-
global debate. At the cost of simplification (this thesis is not dedicated to this particular issue), the
globalists construe the state and the local as increasingly less important in the face of the growing power
of international organisations and corporations (Biersteker, 1980). This line of argument broadly
corresponds with the above account of the role of international organisations and lack of a role for
individual states with limited power. On the other hand, the opposing camp posits that individual
governments are not a passive element, but remain pivotal players lying at the core of globalisation as
they create the essential conditions for the process to progress (Hirst and Thompson, 1995; Weiss;
2005). Similarly, Cox (1997) in his edited volume stresses how globalisation has in many respects
enhanced the power of the local.
Nevertheless, Evans and Davies (1999) caution against over-emphasising agency at micro-level and
meso-level at the expense of the macro-context. Instead, they view international developments and
local changes, structures and agents, as two sides of the same coin (ibid: 371). Similarly, Wilson (1998)
explores international pressures and internal desires to conform in the example of Costa Rica, on the
verge of economic collapse following plummeting coffee prices. The IMF stopped financial support for
the country following the public backlash against its demanded neoliberal reforms and their consequent
cessation. However, Costa Rica eventually returned to the neoliberal development strategy. As Wilson
argues, this was not only a result of international pressure, but more importantly of internal forces that
believed the country needed such changes. The pressure of civic society and political opposition on the
government to commit to anti-corruption in many Central European states, undoubtedly contributed to
the success of IACD in terms of its outreach in combination with external international pressure.
According to many commentators, the world is coming closer together in economic, social and political
senses, as well as culturally (Edwards, 1994; Castells, 2000; Harvey, 2000). In addition, recent
technological advancements which facilitate access to information and allow for knowledge sharing
mean that international and local perspectives are meshed together with international standards
becoming socially accepted (Dobbin et al, 2007: 452), rather than merely accepted or rejected.
Governments and the states they represent are viewed as entangled in an intricate web of power
relations at many levels and grounded in their specific contexts. Thus, policy transfer and the
implementation of international conventions, treaties, agreements and so forth are taken to link the
international (the structure) and the local (the agent) in a complex and reciprocal relationship, with the
61
two sides co-determining each other. As Mir et al aptly suggest, the ways in which local agency carves
out space for itself within the international realm (2008: 222) need to be paid attention to. This is at the
heart of the ‘international socialisation’ (Schimmelfennig, 2000) concept which refers to the process of
internalisation of norms, rules and practices institutionalised in the international environment. It also
relates to the concept of ‘path-creating path-dependence’ wherein individual agents create their own
paths within, not outside, constraints of structures and system (Williams and Balaz, 2007). This is the
perspective adopted here – the international meets the national, rather than replaces it, in a muddled
process of international knowledge transfer.
Over two decades of IACD being applied across the world, it is no longer enough to argue the case of a
misfit between the international and local in seeking answers to the fledgling success of anti-corruption.
While studies examining the local appreciations and practices of corruption across the world ( Olivier de
Sardan, 1999; Polese, 2008; Pavarala and Malik, 2010; Witsoe, 2011) and IACD (see Chapter Two) have
been surfacing ever since the outbreak of anti-corruption obsession in the 1990s, Harrison (2007)
noticed a lack of their mutual engagement. Albeit much has been said about fluidity of meanings of
corruption, the negligence of the international dimension somewhat reduces the accounts of local
discourses of corruption to being solely stuck in local socio-cultural fabrics. It is surprising how little
attention has been devoted to the exploration of what happens at the intersection of the international
and the local. This appears as highly desirable at the time of internationalisation of spaces where the
global and the local are condemned to constant and complex interactions. This is particularly the case of
CEE which is substantially exposed to Western discourses due to geographic closeness, advanced
technological foundations in place allowing for knowledge transfers, and indeed the influence of the EU.
Although research concerned with international and local anti-corruption has emerged, we know
relatively little about how international and local meanings interact. For instance, Sampson (2005)
explored anti-corruption in the context of Romania as used and abused for political lamenting and
manoeuvring. However, it is argued here that this does not penetrate deep enough into the
construction of understandings of corruption. It provides insights into the use of the discourse by local
actors rather than elaborating on how the international anti-corruption discourse interacts (or not) with
local views of corruption. A first swallow with respect to pursuing this line of argument are Gephart’s
studies of corruption discourse in Paraguay (2015) and in Chile (2016). He explores local uses of the
international in terms of filling the international meanings of corruption with local connotations.
62
As such, this research project reacts to Harrison’s call (2007) for a reflection of both the local and the
international dimension in studying corruption, and follows in the footsteps of the above mentioned
Gephardt’s pioneering study in accessing discourse on petty corruption and anti-corruption in Slovakia,
which is perceived to be ridden with corruption.
4.4 Conclusion
This chapter laid out the argument of resistance to dominant discourse, whether in the form of
superficial adoption, its use to achieve specific goals, both national and personal, but also in adapting
and adopting international notions to local contexts. It is critical to not look at international and local
knowledge as isolated with the international displacing the local or the local withstanding the
international, but rather to focus at their interface. This is captured by the idea of ‘international
socialisation’. It included the notion of international rules being subtly imposed on individual states, but
also factors in the local perspective wherein the local carves room for itself within the international
knowledge, not outside of it. This is made possible due to soft power that international institutions
exercise when it comes to corruption. Therefore, structure and agency need to be considered as part and
parcel of knowledge and policy transfer. IACD both constrains and facilitates resistance.
63
CHAPTER FIVE - SLOVAKIA: CORRUPTION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN PERSPECTIVE
Corruption has been highlighted throughout earlier chapters as a dysfunctional relationship between
entrepreneurs and the state. It manifests itself in the interaction with the public sector. However, it is not
enough to merely state that there is a problem. Rather, it is essential to track down the roots of this
broken relationship.
It has been contended previously that IACD locates entrepreneurs within the boundaries of a realm of
entrepreneurship largely detached from the complexities of the social world and its physical location
(see Chapter Three). Furthermore, the isolation is also temporal. Entrepreneurs are construed as existing
and running businesses now and thinking of the future. The past that is as essential to understanding the
present is silenced. This chapter begins to address the neglect by setting Slovak entrepreneurs within the
context of Slovakia as a country with a distinct social and economic fabric firmly grounded in its culture
and history. The entrepreneurs in whom this study is interested are not only entrepreneurs, but they are
Slovak entrepreneurs. Therefore, the appreciation of the societal context within which they operate is
indispensable in the study of their understanding of corruption.
This section looks at the history of the formation of Slovakia as a state, for this is fundamental to
understanding the current perception of the state and the public sector by entrepreneurs. This is not to
deny the role of the dominant discourse, but rather to explore how it functions on the local level of
Slovakia and how together with the local, shapes beliefs, views and behaviours with regards to
corruption.
Pursuant to the above, entrepreneurship in Slovakia will be looked through the lens of a history of the
present, which forms the first part of this chapter. Then, the anti-corruption tools in place in Slovakia in
the context of international anti-corruption mechanisms are reviewed. The third part moves on to the
past legacies of contemporary entrepreneurship. Finally, a brief introduction is given to the two sectors
of interest in this thesis, that is to say agriculture and tourism.
5.1 Communism – the root of all evil?
A large body of extant literature attributes the characteristic traits of Slovakia and other countries in CEE
in terms of their socio-economic and political development to their communist legacy. This explains the
frequent references to post-communist countries/states/Europe in the studies of CEE and the focus on
64
the transition from planned to market economy and from communism to democracy (see for example
Pridham and Vanhanen, 1994; Grabher and Stark, 1997; Pickles and Smith, 1998; Åslund, 2013). The
negative perception of the state, which complicates anti-corruption efforts, has also been explored
largely within the bounds of the communist period (Ledeneva, 2009).
Corruption in these countries has also been studied predominantly in the context of post-communism
and the processes of transition (Miller et al 2001, Sandholtz and Taagepera, 2005; Karklins, 2005;
Holmes, 2006). This is not surprising given the geopolitical backdrop of the emergence of the
contemporary notion of corruption discussed earlier.
However, some scholars explore pre-communist history in the search for explanations to the
contemporary struggles in the region (Kitschelt, 2003; Darden and Grzymala-Busse, 2006). An argument
has been put forward that, in order to shed light on the present state of matters in CEE, we need to look
at the pre-communist, as well as communist, history of the region (Petrovic, 2013). Viewed from this
perspective, communism becomes a stage in development that flows directly from a pre-communism
history, rather than the sole source of contemporary issues faced by Slovakia.
As such, a brief history of Slovakia since the nineteenth century will be outlined here. The nineteenth
century was selected as a useful practical starting point, as it was at this time that the construction of
Slovaks as a nation, a building block of Slovakia, a state of Slovaks, began to form in a meaningful way.
Notwithstanding the above, the nineteenth century is not the starting point, but rather a relatively
practical point of departure for this study.
It is important to reaffirm that history is looked at from a Slovak perspective as institutionalised in the
educational system.2 Indeed, this is a history of Slovakia, not the history. The story being told here would
be significantly different if narrated from a Hungarian, Czech or Western perspective.
5.2 From Slovakia as a Hungarian district to Slovakia as an EU state
5.2.1 Slovakia within Austria-Hungary
For most of its history, Slovakia was a component of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. This arrangement
lasted for nearly 1,000 years until its disintegration following the events of WW1. Within the monarchy,
modern day Slovakia (then Upper Hungary) occupied a position of an inferior member with little cultural,
2 A history of Slovakia given here is firmly grounded in the primary and secondary education curriculum as applied in text books used by all schools. For example, see Kováč, 2006; Krasnovský et al, 2011; Kováč et al, 2012.
65
administrative and economic independence. In the later part of this period, the absolutist monarchy of
Austria-Hungary failed to respond meaningfully to the industrialisation trends underway in Western
Europe, as Acemoglu and Robinson argue (2000). As a result, Austria-Hungary lagged behind its Western
counterparts. Hungary, under the administration of which Slovakia fell, in particular remained
unprogressive, rural and agrarian (Hyde-Price, 1996: 24).
Within the empire, modern-day Slovakia experienced so called ‘magyarisation’ pressures. This is an
umbrella term referring to Hungarian tendencies to assimilate non-Hungarian groups in Hungary
following the ‘one state, one nation, one language’ philosophy (Henderson, 2002: 3-4). ‘Magyarisation’
touched upon all spheres of life. Pursuance of any career other than ones at the bottom of the ladder
without falling in line with the official doctrine was challenging. Administrative, as well as economic and
political power in Slovakia was in the hands of those who identified themselves as Hungarians (Beneš,
1973) and on the central level in the hands of Hungarian overlords. As Hyde-Price (1996: 25) put it,
Slovakia lacked its own native ruling class.
Berend and Ránki (1967) link ‘magyarisation’ with the shift from mercantilism to capitalism in the empire
and the economic stagnation in the country. Seen from this perspective, ‘magyarisation’ emerges as a
strategy of modernisation and pursuance of greater administrative and market efficiency by
industrialisation, urbanisation and standardisation of public administration in a very diverse Hungary
(Schulze and Wolf, 2009). ‘Magyarisation’ could be viewed as a process of modern state creation, with
the state beginning to provide services such as education to the population. In turn, the role of the
population shifted from a passive source of public income to holders of the right to vote 3 actively
engaging with the matter of running the state.
Šoltés (2011) links ‘magyarisation’ with practices of nepotism as negative anti-social acts in public
discourse. On this issue, Vörös (2011) argues that the interconnection between public administration
and economic élites was tight, which completed the adverse image of ‘magyarisation’. Up to the present
day, ‘magyarisation’ is synonymous with Hungarian repression and continues to stir emotions and
political tension between modern Slovakia and Hungary. It is in the context of ‘magyarisation’ that the
push for the emancipation of Slovaks began with the formation of nascent intelligentsia (Henderson,
2002; Walters, 1988: 193).
3 Voting rights were limited to men above 20 who also fulfilled certain property and educational requirements according to the Act no. 5/1848 passed in 1848. In other words, voting rights privileged the ‘magyarised’ populus, about 5-6 % of the population. This would remain unchanged until after WW1.
66
An opportunity for Slovaks to relieve themselves from Hungarian administration came at the end of
WW1, which was lost by Austria-Hungary.
5.2.2 Czechoslovakia (1918-1938) – independence and freedom at last … or not?
After the disintegration of the empire, in a pragmatic move the Slovaks joined the Czechs in a new state
supported by the Allied forces. The current Czech Republic was also a former Austro-Hungarian land,
albeit with a significantly higher degree of autonomy. Furthermore, whereas Slovakia had remained
predominantly agricultural and rural as argued above, the Czech lands of the country had enjoyed
relatively high levels of industrialisation and urbanisation (Kaser, 1985: 82; Fawn and Hochman, 2010:
123-124; Petrovic, 2013: 63). In the face of the Slovak inexperience with running an administration, it
followed that the administrative positions vacated by Hungarians were mostly filled with Czechs
(Krajčovičová, 2009). Furthermore, a decisive share of the Slovak economy was in Czech hands (Teichova,
1988: 36). It could thus be said that the Slovak subordination to Hungarians now translated into an
uneven position within Czechoslovakia, leading to the disappointment of Slovaks with the new
arrangement, yet again unresponsive to Slovak needs (Henderson, 2002). This manifested itself in
renewed demands for greater autonomy and a renegotiation of the arrangement with the Czech
brothers voiced by the most influential political party in Slovakia – Hlinka’s Slovak People’s party. As
Hudek (2011) aptly put it, ‘czechization’ replaced ‘magyarization’ and fed internal political and social
tensions in the new republic.
Moreover, the closeness of the public sector and its representatives with economic élites was carried
over into the new republic. It was protected by legislation in pursuance of the ideological nationalist
goals of removing suspicious Hungarians and replacing them with Czechoslovaks in both public and
private sectors (Zemko, 2011; Hallon, 2011). We know very little about the engagement of the ‘ordinary’
people in corruption. Literature tends to address political and grand corruption in this period, as was the
case with corruption during the era of Austria-Hungary.
A period of an ‘independent’ Slovak State followed from 1939 to 1945 when Slovakia functioned as a
satellite state under the direct control of Nazi Germany, providing for the German war needs. Czech
influence was replaced by German rule. Nepotism and bribery, ideologically safeguarded by anti-Jewish
legislation as a means of protection against Jews, permeated the interaction between the state and the
citizens, for instance in the process of redistribution of Jewish property (Hlavinka, 2011). This point will
be revisited later with reference to entrepreneurship.
67
The defeat of Germany in WW2 marked the renewal of the pre-war arrangement and the beginning of
the second Czechoslovakia.
5.2.3 The second Czechoslovakia (1945-1993)
A brief era of relative democracy re-established after the end of WW2 was terminated in 1948 with the
resignation of the then coalition government and the takeover of the parliament by the Communist
Party. This event marked the beginning of over 40 years of communism.
Soviet-style communism, characterised by strong centralizing tendencies, a directive-planning system,
almost complete public ownership, the planning of production, the allocation of resources and setting
prices and salaries by government decision making, entirely transformed the public administration and
economy. Ultimate power rested with party leaders who were positioned in a rather parent-child
relationship vis-à-vis citizens (Nove, 1977: 24).
In order to maintain control, but also following from the patronising discourse of the Party, surveillance
of all aspect of life became omnipresent to prevent or correct any actions incompatible with the official
doctrine (Kharkhordin, 1997: 343). Karklins (2005) notes that it is through the action of the overbearing
state that the communist era established the negative perception of the state stripped of legitimacy in
the eyes of people. Further to this point, Miller et al (2001: 62) comment that the regime effectively
forged high interpersonal trust in defiance of the ubiquitous state and at the same time diminished
institutional trust.
In light of the previously elaborated history, communism could be argued to have perpetuated and
deepened the adverse perceptions of the state among Slovaks, rather than initiated the troublesome
relations. Additionally, centralised administration was once again anchored in Prague and thus mainly in
the hands of Czechs, thereby perpetuating the Slovak sense of inequality and unfulfilled national
aspirations (Leff, 1988; Pavlinek, 1995), which eventually played out as a crucial factor in the decision to
divorce the Czechoslovak marriage in the 1990s.
Notwithstanding the ubiquity of the gaze of the state, Kmeť (2011) maintains that behind the façade of
alignment with the official doctrine, informal activities flourished as people felt it was legitimate to
disobey laws and engage in illicit activities (Karklins, 2005: 15). Ledeneva argues that corruption in the
provision of goods, ranging from a new car to exit visas, through well-nourished networks effectively
sustained the system of centrally-planned economy compensating to a certain extent for shortages
68
(2009). Oltenau (2011) adds that it was for this reason that corruption was silently tolerated by the
regime. Indeed, given the discourse of the superiority of the all-knowing Party and its leaders, any
discussion of corruption among its ranks was precarious (Kmeť, 2011). In other words, corruption was by
and large a taboo topic.
With respect to the development in the economy, it is important to stress that it was during this period
that the industrialisation (particularly related to arms production and heavy industry) and urbanisation
of Slovakia accelerated. It built on the pre-war trends of moving industry to Slovakia as a result of the
Czechoslovak fear of direct confrontation with Germany and latterly wartime Germany’s utilisation of
Slovakia as a production base. The percentage of workers in agriculture declined from 60% to 12%
between 1948 and 1989 (Henderson, 2002: 1126), thereby dramatically changing the country’s economy.
This continues to influence the current focus of the Slovak economy on manufacturing which will be
again mentioned in the section on entrepreneurship in the country.
Against a background of socio-political and economic shifts during the last decades of the twentieth
century, following protests across the countries of the Eastern bloc, communism finally collapsed in
1989. A period of turbulent changes in the region commenced as it undertook a shift from centrally-
planned economies and communism to market economies and democracy.
5.2.4 The Slovak Republic (since 1993)
Despite the intense industrialisation activity, Slovakia lagged behind the Czech part of the republic at the
end of 1980s, which Pavlínek (1995) sees as one of the reasons behind the ‘velvet divorce’ in 1993.
Furthermore, Svejnar (2000) comments that the post-1989 crisis was more destructive to the Slovak
economy, which added to the long-standing sense of grievance and the perception of a state ignorant of
Slovak needs.
Czechoslovakia and its successor states began a painful and rapid process of transition in an era of
neoliberal trends worldwide. The shock therapy prescribed to the region entailed the establishment of
new constitutions, the decentralisation of power, a free electoral process, free media, a system of public
control mechanisms, accountability, and political pluralism, as well as price liberalisation, privatisation
and stabilisation, among others, in order to create a functioning free market and democracy (Marangos,
2002). Slovakia’s steps towards incorporation into the structures of mature western democracies were
largely determined by neoliberal policy interventions designed to facilitate the conversion. Prominent
international institutions, such as the EU, the OECD, and NATO played an important role in the transition
69
by providing a tantalising incentive of membership with related benefits, as well as support for reform
processes (Jacoby, 2001). Resources, in return for reforms and advice, also flowed from the WB and the
IMF (Deacon and Hulse, 1997).
However, the transition process was far from smooth. The landslide victory of the nationalist populist
party of Vladimir Meciar in 1992, with its authoritarian leanings, marked the beginning of a decade in
which Slovakia lagged behind its neighbours and many other transitional countries in terms of European
and broader international integration. This was argued to have been an outgrowth of communism,
marked by corruption, violations of law and criminal means being used to achieve political ends later
legitimated by democratic elections (Baer, 2001). Harris argues that democratisation processes in
Slovakia were subjugated to the party’s determination to maintain a grip on domestic power (2004: 185-
186). The murky process of the privatisation of medium and large enterprises marked by the clientelistic
policies of political élites is another example of the difficulties encountered during the transformation
era (Appel and Gould, 2000).
These developments translated into an unfavourable international perception of the country and
ultimately into putting Slovakia into the slow lane for EU and NATO memberships (Henderson, 2004:
146). It is against the backdrop of the above that Slovakia gained an unfavourable reputation as a “black
hole in the map of Europe” (Albright cited in Krause, 2003: 66) and corruption began to be
conceptualised as the stumbling block of progress, in line with IACD. Somewhat contrary to the negative
accounts of the years immediately following the fall of communism, Baer (2001) suggests that this stage
was a necessary phase on the way to democracy.
The pessimistic international accounts of Slovakia dovetailed with domestic perceptions of the country.
The perceived drifting away from the West during the Mečiar era due to corruption at governmental
level has been argued to have constituted a powerful tool for the then opposition in mobilising the
electorate into action (Fialová, 2007). Following the collapse of Mečiar’s party in the 1998 elections,
Slovakia embarked upon the ‘second wave’ of transition. In this period, the country successfully
embraced international neoliberal prescriptions regarding liberalisation, marketization and
democratisation and proclaimed the goal of combatting corruption in time to join the EU in the first
accession round in 2004. However, as Harris (2004) aptly points out, the formal adaptation to
international norms, rules and standards is faster and easier than societal adaptation.
70
In light of the pursuance of economic prosperity, an influx of FDI, promoted and supported by the
government, was crucial to shaping Slovak economy. The International Monetary Fund (2012: 7)
suggests that FDI rose from 15% of GDP in 2000 to nearly 60% in 2010. It flowed particularly to the
manufacturing sector (car production, electronics, machinery, metal and metal products industries)
which is not surprising given the orientation to heavy industry and manufacturing from before WW1 and
its intensification during communism. Large enterprises, a significant proportion of which are in foreign
hands, only amount to 0.1 % of all enterprises (Slovak Business Agency, 2012: 35), but their contribution
to GDP was established at the level of 47.8 % in 2011 (Ministry of Economy of Slovakia, 2012: 1).
Furthermore, the spread of FDI across the country was rather unequal, which has had far reaching
consequences for the current economy. Baláž (2007a) maintains that foreign investment has been
directed prevailingly into the western regions of Slovakia due to their more advanced infrastructure and
geographic location, as well as a more educated work force and higher level of urbanisation. The
ramification of this trend is the lagging behind of the eastern regions.
The above discussion paints a picture of significant dependence of Slovakia upon large enterprises and
FDI and on manufacturing, undoubtedly greatly influenced by the past developments. This short
historical account highlights the experience of subordination to foreign interests and alienation from the
state. In this light, membership of the EU, as well as the adoption of international policy packages, an
integral component of which are anti-corruption measures (see below), may be viewed as a continuation
of this experience. On the other hand, the history of democracy and the free market in Slovakia is rather
limited. These aspects need to be taken into account when approaching the issue of corruption in the
country.
5.3 Slovak entrepreneurship: now and then
This section seeks to track entrepreneurship in modern day Slovakia in light of the historic developments
presented above, so as to provide the grounds for the exploration of contemporary entrepreneurial
issues. Little attention has been paid in scholarly literature to the history of entrepreneurship in the
country; therefore the account of the phenomenon given here is rather sketchy, particularly in the case
of earlier history.
Unfolding ‘magyarization’ and its economic and social benefits in the Hungarian part of Austria-Hungary
placed entrepreneurs who did not identify themselves as Hungarians on the periphery of business life
(Schultz and Kubů, 2006; Hallon, 2003 ). This translated into a weak Slovak entrepreneurial class (Kocka,
71
1995: 794; Hyde-Price, 1996: 26), which had direct consequences for entrepreneurship in
Czechoslovakia.
Czechs, in addition to being more accomplished in public administration, also had far greater
entrepreneurial experience given their rather privileged position within the monarchy and a certain level
of autonomy that allowed them to participate in the market (Rudolph, 1976: 64-65). Slovaks were largely
deprived of this. Furthermore, the ramifications of the dysfunctional economy of Hungary, dominated as
it was by the agrarian sector following the disintegration of the empire, were combined with the loss of
traditional markets. Entrepreneurs found themselves in the difficult position when faced with their more
experienced and more advanced competitors from the Czech part of the country, as well as from abroad
(Průcha, 1995: 43; Henderson, 2002: 10; Bartlová, 2010: 60). It thus does not come as a surprise that
Czechs dominated the market. Lipták (1960: 153) estimates that only 11.5 % of capital in Slovakia was in
Slovak hands before the outbreak of WW2.
Some improvement came with the installation of Slovakia as a satellite state of Germany, when German
war requirements provided an impetus for the relative growth and stability of the economy, until the
tide of the war turned against Germany (Tkáč, 1997). However, it is important to note that the economy
was tailored to German requirements, with industries deemed unnecessary or inconvenient being
terminated (Berend and Ránki, 1967). Agriculture, metallurgy and arms production prospered, which laid
a solid basis for the future orientation of the Slovak economy and which continues to manifest itself
today.
Furthermore, in a satellite state which abided by the anti-Jewish legislation, non-Jewish Slovaks
benefited from aryanisation (Nedelsky, 2001).4 According to Kamenec (2011: 188), 12,000 Jewish
businesses and shops were affected. Notwithstanding that Germany maintained a firm grip on key
industries and large firms, and that many small and medium sized businesses were liquidated, some
small-scale entrepreneurship among non-Jewish Slovaks was encouraged by transferring aryanised
Jewish businesses to non-Jewish Slovak hands (Průcha, 2004: 188). Nonetheless, Zemko (2011) argues
that the process was shaped by nepotism and bribery. Kamenec (2001) adds that given this, aryanisation
harmed rather than helped the economy by transferring enterprises to inexperienced new owners, a
situation reminiscent of the privatisation process later in the 1990s (see below).
4 Confiscation of Jewish property and businesses.
72
The rise of communism and its tenet of central planning in Czechoslovakia brought in fundamental
changes. Initially, the government declared their support for small and medium sized enterprises and
nationalization only affected businesses with over 50 employees, land holdings of more than 50 hectares
and key industries (Henderson, 2002: 18). However, given the communist distrust of the market, by
1964 private enterprises were effectively liquidated or merged into state-controlled firms (Bohatá and
Mládek, 1999: 462). McDermott and Mejstrik (1993) contend that in the mid-1980s, private enterprises
contributed to the national produce only by a negligible 3.3 %. Bohatá and Mládek (1999: 462) add that
the private sector was strictly regulated and highly taxed and above all faced with unpredictable public
administration.
Whereas it could be argued that entrepreneurship as it exists in market economies was largely
eradicated, Ledeneva (1998) suggests that a very distinct form developed in the context of societies
under communist rule. She claims that the failures of a centrally-planned economy resulted in shortages
and forced people to fulfil their needs through informal exchanges (2008: 118). An equivalent of a
successful entrepreneur was a well-connected individual with political patronage who mastered the skill
of circumventing formal procedures (Ledeneva, 1998). Rehn and Taalas (2004: 237) go as far as
suggesting that “the system forced all citizens to become micro-entrepreneurs, to enact
entrepreneurship in even the most mundane facets of everyday life”. Thus, entrepreneurship in this
period is tightly connected with the notion of widespread corruption providing for scarce resources,
whether these were oranges or education, as necessary for life under the regime.
Benáček (1997) suggests that the informal second economy and the entrepreneurial activity which
unfolded within the centralised planned economy set the foundations for the private business activity
following the collapse of the regime.
Privatisation as one of the pillars of transition is illuminating with respect to the above. The first wave of
privatisation, so called ‘small privatisation’, encompassed as the name suggests mainly small service
sector properties and created a large number of small enterprises (Williams and Baláž, 1999). Although
some argue that this process was relatively transparent (Dervis, 1994: 50), others suggest that the
allocation was shaped by informal networks forged during the previous regime (Williams and Baláž,
2000: 720). Furthermore, Benáček (1997) maintains that given the unequal distribution of capital, it was
the privileged group of the pre-1989 era that found themselves in a favourable initial position to acquire
an enterprise. He adds that the omnipresence of entrepreneurship in communism and the informal
economy at least in part accounted for the SME boom in the initial stages of transition (ibid). Williams
73
and Baláž (2000) add that this was also due to the lack of policy regulations. Since the 1990s, enterprise
in Slovakia has caught up with regulation. A ‘large privatisation’ followed starting in 1991 that was
fraught with corruption (Hamm et al, 2012). Miller et al (2001: 42) argue that privatisation opened
considerable space for public officials at all levels to enrich themselves with the top ranking
representatives not being an exception and the losses to the country amounting to billions of crowns. A
term ‘tunnelling’ was coined to capture various shady techniques of stripping assets from public
corporations that were rife in the 1990s and continue to affect the public procurement and allocation of
public subsidies today.
Another aspect of the expansion of the SME sector is the presence of international support for its
development, as a strategy for countering high unemployment and economic slowdown after 1989
(Earle and Sakova, 2000; Fultz and Ruck, 2001). Bateman (2000) argues that the importance of the
establishment and progress of the SME sector is reflected in the eager promotion of and the financial
support for Business Support Centres set up so as to assist the advancement of the sector.
Currently, SMEs account for 99.9 % of enterprises in Slovakia, employ nearly 72% of the economically
active population, and yet only account for slightly over 50 % of GDP (Ministry of Economy of Slovakia,
2012). Out of 378,092 registered SMEs, nearly 97% are micro enterprises. Following the tradition of
manufacturing in Slovakia, SMEs are relatively highly concentrated in manufacturing sectors benefiting
from governmental support and being among the most competitive (European Commission, 2013). This
is one aspect of the domination of large manufacturing businesses dominated by FDI which only
constitute 0.1% of enterprises but produce 45% of GDP. Another facet of the importance of large
enterprises for the Slovak economy is the reliance of the SME sector on big business. This is manifested
in the location of a significant proportion of SMEs in western regions where most large enterprises are
based (Slovak Business Agency, 2010: 46).
In the light of the above, SMEs are relegated to a supportive role to large firms in the national economic
strategy. The strategic document of the government for the future direction of the economy clearly
ascribes this function to the SME sector and justifies the support for SMEs by the importance of
retention of large private sector players (Government Office of Slovakia, 2013).
74
5.3.1 Characteristics of the selected sectors
5.3.1.1 Agriculture – metamorphosis of the traditional industry
The history of Slovakia is intimately intertwined with agriculture. It has been argued here that agriculture
was the core sector of the Slovak economy until the era of increasing industrialisation in the period
between 1948 and 1989. The proportion of Slovaks working in this sphere fell from 60% to 12% at this
time and further decreased from 1989 to 2012 to 3.12 % in 2012 (Ministry of Labour of Slovakia, 2012:
7). The contribution of agriculture to GDP was slightly under 4% in 2010 (UNECE, 2009) and 3.3% in
2012 (Širá, 2013: 105). Against the backdrop of the historical ascendancy of agriculture in Slovakia, it is
not surprising that there is dissatisfaction in the sector with the underprivileged position that agriculture
now occupies in society (Slovak Agriculture and Food Chamber, no date).
The sector went through dramatic changes during the centuries. The era of Austria-Hungary established
a strongly centralised agriculture industry with a preponderance of large farm estates. This arrangement
underwent changes following the foundation of Czechoslovakia. A land reform was designed and
administered in order to increase Slovak ownership of land and minimise the occurrence of large estates
which bore the negative connotation of Hungarian primacy (Krajčovičová, 2009: 213-214). The objective
was to establish smaller enterprises that would function more effectively. As Krajčovičová (ibid: 221-222)
argues this aim was met only partially, as a significant proportion of enterprises were still classified as
large estates on the brink of WW2. Furthermore, planting Czechoslovaks in estates previously owned by
Hungarians to meet nationalist objectives was an opaque process. Zemko (2011) provocatively asserts
that the allocation of land and property was effectively an example of non-criminal and ideologically
justified corruption based on nepotism firmly grounded in the law. A striking parallel could be drawn
with the much later ‘large privatisation’ processes mentioned earlier.
The trend of downsizing enterprises in agriculture was ended with the advent of communism and the
introduction of collectivisation policies in 1948, which eventually removed private enterprises. They
were replaced by a public institution of collective farming which ‘encouraged’ individual farmers to work
collectively. Kirschbaum (2007: 77) posits that by 1960, collective or state ownership in agriculture rose
to over 80% of agricultural land. The remaining 20% of land remained in private hands. However, this
was largely unproductive land in mountainous regions not suitable for large-scale intensive agricultural
production (Špulerová et al, 2011: 159). As with other sectors, agriculture was highly centralised.
Agricultural policies at this time aimed to maintain low prices of agricultural products and full self-
75
sufficiency with respect to products of the Slovak climate (Kazda, 2002). Furthermore, as noted
previously, agriculture was gradually replaced with (mainly) heavy industry.
After the disintegration of the regime in 1989, 98% of collective farms opted to remain in the collective
arrangement (Swain, 1999: 1212). Furthermore, the transformation process and privatisation did not
introduce radical changes on the ground, as the vast majority of agricultural assets remained in the
hands of former members of predecessor collective farms (ibid: 1201 – 1205). Moreover, Bezemer posits
that access to resources in the first years of transition was limited due to the considerable extent of
allocation through network links (2002: 1314). Notwithstanding that the cooperative farm model is still
present in contemporary entrepreneurship in agriculture, where over 40% of land was still farmed by
co-op farms in 2010 (Statistical Office of Slovakia, 2010: 5), this form of enterprise is in decline (Ministry
of Labour of Slovakia, 2013: 49). Agriculture lags behind other forms of enterprise in competitiveness,
effectiveness and adaptability, due partially to the minimal changes to co-op farms during the process of
transformation and from current legal arrangements. As such, entrepreneurs increasingly prefer other
types of entrepreneurial forms (Lazíková and Bandlerová, no date: 139-140). This is also due to widening
opportunities and improved access to finance which renders co-op farming no longer a necessity.
However, the tradition of large farms could be argued to be alive and well. Although small farms
constitute over 90% of all agricultural enterprises, they farm only on 10% of agricultural land
(Chrastinová et al, 2013: 54).
At the present time, Slovak agriculture is faced with multiple challenges, flowing in part from the
historical developments which underpin its insufficient flexibility and adaptability and the gaps in
knowledge which result in unsound strategic decisions (Grznár and Szabo, 2012). The unfinished and
unclear land arrangement, unresolved and fragmented ownership, as well as external influences and
pressures have been also been put forward as explanations for an agriculture sector struggling to cope in
a competitive market (Swinnen and Vranken, no date: 58-60; Adamkoviová, 2005; Schwarcz et al, 2013).
The reduced purchasing power of the domestic market caused by recession in the 1990s and decreasing
living standards, translated into severe damage to traditional demand. This, coupled with the influx of
cheaper imported goods and the strong presence of foreign supermarket chains has further contributed
to the contemporary difficulties of the sector (Dries et al, 2004; Adamkovičová, 2005).
As for the farmers themselves, they perceive the public disinterest in the sector and the prioritisation of
manufacturing by the government reflected in insufficient support of agriculture, as the main problem
and reason why the sector struggles in the face of the openness of the Slovak economy (Semančík,
76
2014). On the other hand, the Ministry of Agriculture has sought an explanation for the unfavourable
terms of Slovak membership of the EU (Ministry of Labour of Slovakia, 2013).
Contrary to the calls for more state involvement in agriculture, Kazda et al (2002) highlight that the scope
of public intervention in agriculture in the form of a number of public funding channels and a range of
subsidies is too large as it is. This in turn creates a considerable scope for corruption. The study adds
that the convoluted organisational structure of public institutions in agriculture and difficulties of control
posed by the spatial spread in addition to the volume of state intervention predispose the sector to
corruption.
5.3.2.1 Tourism sector: a ‘new’ industry
Contrary to the traditional agricultural sector, tourism represents a rather novel field.
Inquiry into tourism is a relatively recent endeavour. Understandably, tourism before the era of
communism attracts little attention. It has been opined that domestic leisure activities were reserved to
the privileged and that tourists were largely contained in a few spa resorts (Copp and Ivy, 2001: 346).
The advent of industrialization and urbanization brought in the engagement of the middle and later
working classes and the foundations of mass tourism in Europe. Nevertheless, a substantial
development of the tourism industry in Slovakia did not take place until the mid-twentieth century due
to its unfavourable economic situation and delayed industrialisation (ibid).
The period of communism opened an interesting chapter of tourism. As Hall (2001: 93) argues, tourism
became a tool of ideological propaganda which offered an opportunity to promote a positive image of
the country and to demonstrate the superiority of communism over capitalism. However, the
overwhelming majority of visitors came from other communist countries and areas of Czechoslovakia
itself.
Another aspect of centrally-planned tourism in communism was the collective provision of recreation
and subsidized holidays for workers along the lines of restoration of the bodies and minds of socialist
workers in order to enhance productivity of labour (Allcock, 1986). Domestic and foreign holidays were
also allocated on the basis of workers’ productivity as a reward and motivation (Franc and Knapík, 2013:
92). Overall, Williams and Baláž (2001: 30) argue that tourism enterprises were typically distinguished by
moderate quality, low prices and high capacity.
77
The post-1989 shift towards free market democracy engendered the tourism sector with a number of
opportunities and challenges. Williams and Baláž (2000) assert that, given the interest of foreign visitors
in the years after the fall communism, the small size of tourism businesses, the relatively unregulated
legal environment and rather low capital entry made tourism enterprises attractive targets in the process
of privatisation.
The lingering legacy of centrally-planned tourism, the decline in international demand in the 1990s
coupled with a downturn in domestic demand for tourism services linked to the post-1989 crisis and the
opening of borders which expended travel opportunities, took its toll on the sector (Kučerová, 2012). The
negative trends shook up the large number of tourism enterprises which emerged after 1989 and
stabilised the figure. Williams and Baláž (2000: 720) opine that a significant proportion of enterprises did
not survive, for the owners were not equipped with the essential knowledge and skills to run a profitable
business or had purchased enterprises with the aim of short-term exploitation. Escalating red tape,
obscure and partial legislation, lack of capital and high interest rates were also put forward as
explanations for the high failure rate in the first years of transition (Baláž, 2007b: 31). These are
highlighted by the sector as the principal challenges now.
Baláž (ibid) suggests that the above negative trends decisively shaped the current Slovak tourism sector.
He asserts that the decrease in international tourist numbers combined with the boom in sophisticated
manufacturing industries, which in subsequent years positively influenced the income of Slovak
households and provided a stimulus for domestic tourism, made Slovaks the main users of tourism
services in the country.
Domestic tourists are currently critical to the sector. Notwithstanding the limitation of tourism statistics
which only capture the visitors staying in some form of commercial accommodation, national statistical
accounts offer a glimpse into the patterns of tourism in Slovakia. Slovak tourists significantly
outnumbered foreign visitors in the last decade, with the second largest group being Czechs (ŠÚ SR,
2013a).
The EU accession has been argued to have favourably impacted on the tourism sector by facilitating visits
by foreigners and foreign travel by Slovaks (Hughes and Allen, 2009). However, Baláž cautions that these
changes were relatively minor and represent a continuation of broader trends (2007b). He concludes
that the EU membership has not resulted in dramatic changes and is unlikely to do so in the immediate
future (2007a).
78
The industry gained a tainted reputation with respect to untransparent allocation of EU funds which led
to a cut in EU funding for the sector for the period between 2014-2020 (European Commission, 2012).
Currently, tourism contributes to GDP 2.6 % (Statistical Office of Slovakia, 2013b) and thus represents a
rather minor industry in a country previously dependent on agriculture and then on heavy industry and
manufacturing. The underprivileged position tourism occupies in the economy is partly explained by the
stance of the state vis-à-vis the sector in the period of communism. Williams and Baláž (2001: 30) assert
that tourism was viewed as an ‘unproductive’ field in a system geared towards material production and
thus did not feature high on the priority list of the government. Today, the sector still points to the
problem of its marginal position on the agenda of successive Slovak governments, which is reflected in
the lack of a comprehensive tourism policy framework (HORECA, 2010) and a lack of consistent and
systematic public support for the sector (Slovak Tourism Association, 2016).
5.4 Anti-corruption in Slovakia
Anti-corruption activities in the region started to develop following the collapse of communism (see
Chapter Two for more detail) and quickly gained pace. The power of IACD merged with myriad economic,
social and political difficulties during the transition era and integration into Western structures, which
meant that corruption was elevated from a marginal issue to a priority (Sičáková-Beblavá et al, 2011).
Furthermore, the phenomenon has become an easy explanation for virtually everything that
malfunctioned in the societies of CEE (Krastev, 2004: 7), Slovakia not being an exception. This also
translates into a high politicisation of the issue in the country with corruption being frequently used in
political competition for power as a means to compromise the reputation of rivals (Deegan-Krause and
Haughton, 2009).
Slovakia meaningfully embarked upon a fight against corruption with the arrival of a centre-right
western-oriented government in 1998, which saw a rapid introduction of anti-corruption mechanisms in
the attempt to overturn the negative stance of the EU towards Slovak membership during the Mečiar
era. Some argue that it was the exclusion from the EU, as well as the NATO enlargement discussions in
1997, that effectively brought about a political change at the very top of public administration and the
accession of a democratic government (Bútorová, 1998), and thus effectively an anti-corruption project.
Indeed, Pechova (2012) comments that anti-corruption measures were mainly legitimized by the pursuit
of EU affiliation, for which curbing corruption was a prerequisite (Pawelke, 2010). Sičáková-Beblavá et al
79
(2011) also agree on the preeminent motivating role of potential memberships in prominent
international organisations for the commencement of anti-corruption norms implementation.
However, it has also been noted that the flurry of legislation and the introduction of new institutions
which were built on the tenets of the international discourse have not achieved a significant reduction of
corruption practices (Furutan, 2009). Batory seeks the explanation for such unsatisfactory progress in the
absence of motivation, induced by the absence of conditionalities attached to EU membership once CEE
countries became EU members (2012). Kartal (2014) elaborates that, rather than conditionalities, it was
EU political leverage that offered powerful electoral incentives to opposition parties, which translated
into mounting pressure on governments to deliver reforms. He continues that, with the weakening of
this leverage, pressure also recedes and the communist legacies surfaced once again. De Ridder (2009)
also links the lack of meaningful improvement in Slovakia to the limited power of the EU incentives, as
well the EU’s fuzzy stance towards corruption (2009). Pridham adds that although the EU pressure
resulted in the adoption of anti-corruption on the structural level, it translated into a rather limited
behavioural change.
Börzel (2005) provides a more optimistic view that, although conditionality as a significant force behind
the adoption of international norms has ceased, there are other motivating factors at play, such as
funding, legitimacy, reputation, attractiveness of a country as an investment destination and so forth,
that will continue to exercise much more subtle pressure on the new member states so as not to
backslide.
It could be added that the current unsatisfactory situation is a complex composite of overly optimistic
expectations as to the speed of progress in CEE, the changing dynamics of internal and external pressure,
and the pace at which anti-corruption legislation was introduced into contexts which were far from
Bruszt’s ‘institutional deserts’ (2002). A lack of reflection on the prospects and functionality of
international norms when introduced to countries with distinct pre-communist and communist
institutional legacies could certainly be put forward as another valid point. As Pridham (2008) puts it, the
adoption of international norms has effectively laid some foundations in Slovakia which are here to stay.
The accession and the initial introduction of international anti-corruption standards into domestic
structures was merely a start on which to build further.
Given the focus of this thesis on entrepreneurs and their interaction with the public sector, anti-
corruption legal tools could be divided into those tackling corruption directly and those that seek to
80
lower corruption by indirectly shaping the behaviour of public administrators and entrepreneurs.
Voluntary private sector instruments will also be considered. An in-depth review of the Slovak anti-
corruption framework is not pursued here. Rather, the core mechanisms relevant to the studied problem
will be outlined in the following pages.
It is worth noting that the Slovak legislation framework does not have a special anti-corruption law.
Instead, corruption and corruption-related issues are covered by a number of legislative acts.
International norms that constitute the foundation of the Slovak anti-corruption framework (Staroňová,
2008: 15)5 have been transposed into Slovak legislation in a rather piecemeal approach. Furthermore,
the legislation does not define corruption. Rather, it recognizes corruption as antisocial and unlawful acts
in the public and private sectors which are predominantly defined as giving/taking bribes.6 A bribe is
articulated as an undue financial or other advantage.7 At the same, time the institution of gifts of a very
small value as socially acceptable8 is legally recognised. In the absence of any indication as to the upper
limit of the value of such gifts, this phenomenon could be viewed as a deep-seated cultural practice that
is potentially problematic, particularly in cases of petty corruption.
5.4.1 Direct measures
The anti-corruption legislation which touches directly on entrepreneurs is concerned with the private
sector on the one hand and the public officials inhabiting the public sector with which entrepreneurs
come into contact at various occasions, on the other. The following provisions, except for the code of
conduct, are punitive in nature.
Legislation concerning conduct in the public sector encompasses a spectrum of provisions designed so as
to protect public service from undue influence. It includes the notion of the protection of the public
interest and the incompatibility of high functions in public service with any other position, occupation or
activity.9 It also establishes responsibility for misconduct in public office, whether this is intentional or
caused by negligence. A separate law concerned with conflict of interest bans high public officials from
receiving gifts10 aimed at steering their conduct as public officials.
5 Slovakia is a signatory of all essential international documents, namely the UN’s Convention Against Corruption, the OECD’s Convention of Combatting Bribery of Foreign Public Officials, the Council of Europe’s Criminal Law Convention on Corruption and its additional protocol and Civil Law Convention on Corruption, the EU’s Council Framework Decision on Combatting Corruption in the Private Sector.
6 Criminal Code §328-336a
7 Criminal Code §131 section 3
8 Supreme Court decision no. 17/1978
9 Constitutional Law no.357/2004 Coll.
10 Constitutional Law no.119/1995 Coll.
81
The above is closely linked to the notion of abuse of public office which stretches not only across ‘top
jobs’ in the public sector, but since 2010 also covers public administrators at all levels and introduces
civil, as well as criminal liability for corruption.11 Another act covers responsibility for any damage caused
by maladministration or unlawful decisions, including any misconduct in public office which falls within
the category of corruption.12
The control of the conduct of public administrators at all levels is further shaped by the binding Code of
Ethics of Civil Servants (Ministry of Interior of Slovakia, no date). The Code anchors the commitment to
impartial professional conduct and actions in line with the public interest, rather than on behalf of their
own private interest. Strict abiding to the principle of equality and a ban on the reception or elicitation
of gifts connected to their public administration position constitutes another norm.
With respect to the private sector, bribery is understood as a form of unfair competition and the law
establishes the possibility for the harmed party to claim compensation.13 Currently, the legislation does
not recognise direct criminal liability of legal entities, including liability for crimes of corruption. This is
despite Slovakia being signatory of the OECD’s Convention of Combatting Bribery in Public Officials in
1999 in which direct criminal liability is firmly anchored. Only responsibility that allows for confiscation
of the proceeds of corruption and confiscation of property, is in place. A recently law that entered into
force in 2015 introduces full direct responsibility and a new scale of punishment. According to the new
law, legal persons could be sanctioned by banning business activity and applications for public funding,
prohibition from participating in public tenders and cancellation of legal entity status.14 The postponed
introduction of this fundamental concept has been argued to be a result of the workings of private
sector lobbies, as well as a reflection of a lack of interest of the public (Si čáková-Beblavá et al, 2011: 110-
112).
Specialized institutions designed with the aim of revealing and punishing corruption have been founded
in Slovakia. These include the Anti-corruption Office at the Presidium of the Police Force, the Specialized
Court, the Specialized Prosecution Office, and the Department of Control and Fighting corruption within
Government Office. Among these measures is an interesting and contested institution of ‘a specialized
11 Criminal Law no. 301/2005 Coll.
12 Act no. 514/2003 Coll.
13 Commercial Code §49
14 Proposed law on Criminal Liability of Legal Entities
82
agent’15 with the role of actively initiating bribery or passively reacting to an offer of a bribe so as to
tackle the difficulties of uncovering corruption.
5.4.2 Indirect measures – control, supervision and information
Whereas the above legal instruments directly set the costs of corruption in the form of punishment
mechanisms, a wide raft of indirect measures seeks to shape the conduct of public administrators and
entrepreneurs in a more subtle manner through tools of control, efficiency, transparency and access to
information. This set of anti-corruption instruments is preventative in nature.
The rationalisation of public administration in the early 2000s is an example of an indirect way of seeking
to lower corruption. It entails simplification, formalisation and the use of IT technologies (for instance, e-
governance, electronic auctions and electronic registries, electronic submission of projects for funding,
electronic submission of tax reports and so forth). These aim to shorten waiting periods, to simplify and
formalise procedures to assure equality, to limit the scope for arbitrariness in public administration and
to minimise personal contact between public administration and entrepreneurs (Staroňová, 2008: 26).
The overhaul of the Business Registry is another demonstration of the above. The reform standardised
forms, defining clear registration requirements for legal entities and a maximum 5-day waiting period,
among other changes.16 The fast-track additional payment introduced to the Real Estate Registry17 is an
interesting example of streamlining public administration by the legalisation of previously illicit money
given to administrators so as to speed up their performance.
The legislation establishes a system of internal and external audits of local governments to prevent an
illicit use of public finance and strengthens the role of the Supreme Audit Office. 18 However, the instance
of the selection of the president of the Supreme Audit Office illuminates the appropriateness of the
sceptical stance as to the functionality of formal rules and norms. The term of office of the current
president ended in 2012. Since then, the coalition and the opposition were not capable of agreeing on a
new president. Several attempts to fill the position failed following objections by the government to the
candidate put forward by the opposition. It appears that the function is highly politicised and therefore
15 Act no. 272/1999 Coll.; 173/2000 Coll.; 366/2000 Coll.
16 Act no. 530/2003 Coll. on Companies Register
17 Act no. 162/1995 Coll. on the Real Estate Cadaster and the Entries of Ownership and Other Rights to the Real Estate §32; Act no. 145/1995 Coll. on Administrative Fees.
18 Constitutional Law no. 463/2005 Coll.
83
its effectiveness as an impartial and neutral office is debatable. The effectiveness of internal audits has
also been questioned (Kováčová, 2012).
Technologies, namely cameras, are also used in the name of anti-corruption. One such measure is the
installation of cameras in police cars to assure transparency in police conduct and to prevent bribe-
taking. The already mentioned controversial institution of an ‘agent-provocateur’ could also be
conceived of as a subtle preventative and control measure. The awareness of the possibility of presence
of an agent drawing on the notion of the ubiquitous gaze seeks to mould individual behaviour, thus
indirectly controlling corruption.
The matter of public funding stands out as a principal concern with respect to the control mechanisms in
the public sector (see above). This problem also arises with public funding of private enterprises,
whether this funding comes from national, EU or other sources. Here, a formulation of elemental
guidelines, rules and norms which are to be applied consistently and universally to all applications lies at
its heart. Another tool for assuring the corruption-free assignment of public resources is the online
publication of all applications, that is to say applications that were granted public funding, as well as
unsuccessful projects with a clearly listed reason for rejection.19
The tools of constraining corruption in the private sector consist of mandatory book-keeping 20 and
reporting to public authorities,21 particularly on the matters of income, bolstered by random checks.
With respect to reporting on monthly, quarterly and yearly bases depending on the particular type of
report and type of enterprise, the bureaucratic burden has been argued to be rising according to the
Slovak Association of Small Enterprises (2013). This is problematic given that on the one hand more
measures are put in place with a direct or indirect aim of curbing corruption, whereas on the other hand
excessive regulation could do more harm than good.
The last set of anti-corruption mechanisms are information instruments. The foundation bloc of this
category of anti-corruption measures is the Act on Free Access to Information.22 The law endorses the
notion of the facilitation of the access to information to the public, as well as the mandatory provision of
information by the central government and local governments as to the functioning of public
institutions, organizational structure, contact information and so forth. Public institutions are also
19 Act no. 71/2013 Coll. on the Granting of Subsidies by the Ministry of Economy; Regulation no. 525/2009 Coll.
20 Act no. 431/2002 Coll. on Accounting
21 Act no. 563/2009 Coll. on Tax Administration; Act no. 222/2004 Coll. on VAT; Act No. 595/2003 on Income Tax
22 Act no. 211/2000 Coll.
84
obliged to publish information related to the availability of public funding and to announce public
procurement competitions and their results so as to lower the scope for opaque allocation of public
finance and public contracts.
Notwithstanding that legislation addresses the duty of the public sector to provide a range of
information, there are significant gaps in its operationalization. For instance, the duty to declare public
procurement competition is often legally bypassed by invoking ‘direct assignment’ of public contracts in
exceptional circumstances or where the contract is of low value.23 The blurry nature of exceptional
circumstances, as Vlach and Urnsíni (2007: 9) argue, opens up room for tailoring the understanding and
popularity of this method in public procurement.
With respect to the easy access to information as an important anti-corruption measure, the advantages
of the Internet make it a preferred way of publishing information. This is reflected in the establishment
of the online legal information portal, online business and cadastral registries and online gazettes where
information on businesses which they are required to provide (e.g. in the form of annual reports) can be
found, in addition to already mentioned types of information placed on the websites of public
institutions.
Closely linked to the provision of information are reporting mechanisms which are indispensable to the
fight against corruption. The anti-corruption hotline has been established in line with international
recommendations of a reliable anonymous reporting structure to cement transparency. However, since
2011 when the hotline was first launched, only 161 cases of corruption have been reported
(Government Office of Slovakia, 2014) which is a relatively small number in a country where corruption
is believed to be wide-spread and deep-seated. In addition, a website where it is possible to report
corruption was launched in 2014 by private sector actors. Its effectiveness remains to be seen.
Protection of whistle-blowers, vital to fruitful reporting, has been criticised as insufficient by the EU
(European Community, 2014) and Transparency International (2012), which attribute blame to this for
the lack of results in anti-corruption efforts. The current legislation only refers to protection with
reference to filing a complaint.24 New legislation aiming to correct this shortcoming is in progress.
23 Act no. 25/2006 Coll. §58-59 on Public Procurement
24 Labour Code §13; Act no. 400/2009 Coll. on Civil Service §59; Act no. 9/2010 on Complaints.
85
5.4.3 Voluntary measures in the private sector
In addition to the above, a range of voluntary private-sector led mechanisms to curb corruption in
business has been spreading in Slovakia. Among these are codes of conduct promoted by specialized
professional associations and awards by associations, as well as large businesses, foundations and
national agencies for ethical conduct. These tools are an integral constituent of the educational activities
targeting entrepreneurs.
Anti-corruption principles are implicit in business codes of conduct supported by international
organisations, among which are Transparency International, OECD, World Economic Forum and the
United Nations. Professional associations are particularly important with respect to SMEs, for they
promote ethical guidelines through their educational activities and/or more directly through the
compulsory adoption of a professional code of conduct of a particular association by its members.
Competitions and awards are another way of promoting anti-corruption in a sector, either explicitly in
the form of awards of ethical conduct or implicitly by rewarding outstanding entrepreneurs where
ethical conduct is part and parcel of the judging criteria. Among the most pronounced are Responsible
Small/Medium Sized Business by the Foundation Pontis, Entrepreneur of the Year by Ernst & Young,
Female Entrepreneur of the Year by the Slovak Business Agency and the Grand Prize of the Slovak
Chamber of Commerce and Industry for ethical conduct.
All of the above provide a subtle pressure on entrepreneurs to renounce corruption. However, such
initiatives are relatively recent worldwide and are in their early stages in Slovakia.
5.5 Conclusion
The chapter explored some aspects of Slovak history relevant to the study of corruption among
entrepreneurs. It highlights the novelty of democracy and the free market in Slovakia. The Slovak past is
strongly marked by its experience of subordination to foreign administration, which influenced the
country in many respects, one of which is a lack of entrepreneurial experience. Corruption appears to
have been present in small-scale enterprise in some form.
The two sectors this work is concerned with have been conceptualised as marginalised industries with
their unique features being a result of past legacies (including corruption) and challenges. Agriculture, a
traditional sector, and tourism, a new industry in comparison with agriculture, suffer from a prioritisation
of other industries at the national level. Given the reliance of Slovakia on large enterprises to fuel its
86
economy, it follows that both sectors, as well as Slovak SMEs on the whole, are indirectly dependent on
them. Thus, large enterprises, many of them foreign, are a mixed blessing. Furthermore, both sectors
perceive the administrative burden placed on them by the state as excessive, which opens up space for
corruption. Entrepreneurs in both sectors find themselves struggling in the face of perceived neglect of
the state administration and fierce international competition.
The past patterns are critical to the operationalization of anti-corruption policies in the country. These
are to a great extent informed by international norms and range from punitive instruments to preventive
tools of access to information and transparency.
87
CHAPTER SIX - THEORY AND METHODOLOGY: LOOKING INTO CORRUPTION, RATHER THAN AT IT
The chapter lays the methodological foundations of this research. Attention here will be turned towards
governmentality, genealogy and existential phenomenology. It is argued here that the exploration of
individual perceptions of corruption without the appreciation of the specific cultural and historic
understandings of corruption in which individuals are anchored would effectively ignore the social
context and thus provide a rather incomplete picture. As such, the study aims to provide insights into
meanings of corruption at the intercection of two levels – the national level of the Slovak society and the
individual level of entrepreneurs, including a personal experience.
This chapter is organised as follows. The first section presents underpinnings of this study. The past
utilisation of governmentality, genealogy and phenomenology in entrepreneurial and corruption studies
are looked at in the second section. The distinctive challenges in researching corruption in Slovakia will
also be outlined here. The analytical framework for the study is presented in the fourth part. Matters of
reflexivity and issues relating to research trustworthiness, as well as translation are taken into account in
the fifth part. The closing section outlines ethical considerations of the study.
6.1 Theoretical background
6.1.1 Governmentality: Self-governance of entrepreneurs
Foucault’s (1984, 1988) enmeshment of individual agency and societal structures producing discourse is
encapsulated in the idea of governmentality conceptualised as a tool of control through freedom which
encourages subjects to self-regulate themselves. Foucault uses Plutarch at this occasion to illustrate the
mechanism by which governmentality works:
“You must have learned principles so firmly that when your desires, your appetites or your
fears awaken like barking dogs, the logos [the rules, norms, truths] will speak with the voice
of a master who silences the dogs by a single command” (1987: 117).
Put differently, governmentality begets a state of “conscious and permanent visibility” leading to self-
government. Thus, as one internalises surveillance and the norms and measures that delineate what is
‘normal’, one effectively starts to oversee oneself in order to establish whether he/she falls within the
limits of the ‘normal’, thereby exercising self-regulation (MacLeod and Durrheim, 2002). It treats an
individual as an agent and pursues internalization of norms and rules found in a culture around them in
order to fit into a group/a society by adopting its truths (Foucault, 1993). The internalised rules and the
88
individual who internalises them are inseparable. This constitutes a fruitful avenue of researching
individual views and behaviours in the contemporary societies functioning on the principles of free
market democracy where populations are not coerced forcefully into thinking and behaving in a way
that is deemed as normal in a given society. Furthermore, the ultimate aim of entrepreneurial anti-
corruption strategies is to achieve an internally driven desire in entrepreneurs to abandon corruption,
making governmentality a well-suited approach to examining the workings of IACD.
6.1.2 Genealogy and the meanings of corruption
As individual conduct is taken to be a complex process of giving the self to the self through the
acquirement and endorsement of rules as patterns inherent in each culture, these rules deserve close
attention.
To explore present knowledge, Foucault suggested looking into the past to show how certain practices
moulded core truths that we use in our daily lives. This point is encapsulated in the term ‘the history of
the present’ or ‘effective history’ (Foucault, 1977), as a way of using history to diagnose the present
(Rabinow and Rose; 2003). What genealogy looks for are “the instances of discursive production, of the
production of power, of the propagation of knowledge” (Foucault, 1980: 12). It is about showing how
certain knowledge was capable of being accepted at certain times (Foucault, 1987: 103).
To return to the point of interest of this work, the meanings of corruption arise from intricate power
plays of the past; they do not exist independently and objectively in the present. These need to be
explored in order to understand how individual entrepreneurs construct themselves with respect to
corruption. As such genealogy coupled with the concept of governmentality, provides the historicity of
the self-conduct of entrepreneurs grounded in contextual realities of Slovakia.
6.2 The sources of material and collection
The collection of material consisted of two steps. Firstly, material for genealogical analysis of the
meanings of corruption was gathered. Following from this step, individual interviews were conducted.
6.2.1 Step 1: The structure – Slovak media discourse on corruption
To identify Slovak conceptualisations of corruption, media discourse was scrutinised to answer the first
research question: How have media constructions of corruption developed in Slovakia given its specific
historical and social contexts and IACD?
89
Media was selected, for it represents an influential tool capable of forming individual opinions and
attitudes. As Fairclough argued, the role of media is far from simply providing objective and impartial
facts (1995). Radu and Redien-Collot (2008: 206) add that media reflects public perceptions, and
Ljunggren and Alsos (2001:2) comment that media’s representations of phenomena can be understood
as general understandings of phenomena in society. This double role as the reflector and creator of
attitudes to corruption makes media well-suited to explore the meanings of corruption on the level of
Slovak society. In addition, as argued earlier, media are heralded as anti-corruption fighters.
As the genealogical analysis strives to maintain continuity, print media were an ideal window into a
public discourse on corruption across the research era. Furthermore, they have been published in an
accessible language and circulated to a wide audience, thereby having a wide reach and thus a
substantial capacity to influence thinking about corruption. In comparison, other available sources of
data, for instance policy documents, court reports, legislation or government and NGO reports, are not
as easily and immediately available and are not available for all periods. More importantly, this thesis
sought to gain a broad understanding, rather than highly detailed in insights in specific areas, of what
corruption means in Slovakia. Not only would it have been difficult to process such a volume of material
in the limited time of a doctoral training, it would limit the appreciation of corruption to the legal
perspective. This is problematic given the purpose of this genealogical analysis. Furthermore, such
sources as court records are not accessible to the general public, and therefore have limited power to
shape general understandings and meanings of corruption. Similarly, reports and policy documents are
written in a language that is not accessible to the general population due to its complexity. Nor do they
reach such large numbers of people as media articles.
Continuity is also the reason behind favouring print media over television. In addition, this decision was
shaped by for practical constraints. Whereas the past issues of newspapers are available in a number of
libraries, channel archive of TV news providers are not publicly accessible, except for the latest
broadcasts. Indeed, broadcasting is a relatively recent phenomenon when considering that this study
spans from the nineteenth century to present. Print media guarantee a coherent approach across the
90
studied period. Also, the time frame of the research imposed limits on the amount of material that can
be feasibly analysed.
Social media were exluded from the analysis to maintain consistency of analysed sources across more
than one century. Furthermore, social media introduce a very different way of circulating information
with dynamics that are unlike the traditional media. As this research was primarily concerned with
outlining the broad boundaries of discussions of corruption since the nineteenth century to the present,
incorporating the component of the social media was problemaatic as it would require a different
approach and thus break the consistency.
As such, this source comprises of the following newspapers:
a) SME [We]
b) Pravda [Truth]
c) Hospodárske noviny {Economic Newspaper]
d) Nový čas [New Times]
e) Plus 1 deň [Plus 1 Day]
The former two sources cover the right and left-wing political spectrum of Slovak readership. Both
papers are well-established and target a wide audience. SME is a centre-right oriented daily newspaper,
whereas the stance of Pravda is politically geared towards the left. Hospodárske noviny is the most read
economically oriented daily newspaper. The latter two are the most prominent tabloid newspapers with
centrist orientation. The 5 newspapers are in the top 5 of most sold daily prints in the first half of 2014
(see Table 2 below).
Table 2 Circulation of selected newspapers January - April 2015 and January - April 2014
Newspaper 2015 2014 Founded
Nový čas 95,724 104,228 1991
Plus Jeden Deň 43, 246 43,738 2006
Sme 32,811 41,720 1993
Hospodárske noviny 12,702 12,062 1993
Pravda 43,565 48,996 1920, in modern
91
form 1989
Source: Poláš, 2015
Mirroring current trends, the sale of print copies is on the decrease with more readers accessing online
versions of these newspapers (Višňovský, 2012). For this reason, articles published online were collected
to reflect this trend. Searching in online archives also allowed more efficient identification and collection
of data as print copies of newspapers woud require a far more time-consuming search. Online material
also corresponded with printed version to a large extent as each article indicated whether it was
published in print. However, the amount of metarial that is published in print is limited, while the online
platforms of the selected newspapers offer more content and thus richer data, particularly in the case of
petty corruption.
Corruption is a rather ‘popular’ topic in Slovakia. It is a rare occurrence that a week passes without a
mention of corruption in the media. Given the large amount of data available on the theme and the
focus on the most recent constructions of corruption, only articles published between February 2014
and February 2015 were analysed. Plus 1 deň was an exception as the online archive of this source only
reached back to November 2014 and its hard copies were not available in central libraries in Bratislava
at the time of the material collection. Contacting the newspaper directly did not bring any results either.
As such, only those articles that were accessible were analysed.
Internet archives of the aforementioned news providers were searched using the following terms:
korup[corrup]; korupcia [corruption], korupčný[corrupt], úplatok [bribe], úplatky [bribes], úplt [brib].
This decision was based on the findings of my two previous MSc research projects which established the
broad overview of how corruption is talked about in the country (Bereghazyova, 2011; 2012).
Indeed, to track the genealogy of the knowledge about corruption, it is not enough to merely look at
recent sources. The historic sources which comprised of the below were scrutinized. As Slovak archives
were not completely digitalized at the time of this research, all newspapers were only available on
microfilm. This meant that each issue had to be scanned for relevant material. The impossibility to
search by specific terms made it very time consuming to search for any material connected with
corruption. As such, particular years were singled out for each period, as detailed below, and only
articles published in those years were searched.
92
19th and early 20th centuries to the foundation of Czechoslovakia (1918)
i) Slovenskje národňje novini [Slovak National Newspaper] was published between 1845 and 1848
before it was banned following the intensification of ‘magyarisation’. It was the first political
newspaper published in the Slovak language and the principal medium airing revolutionary views
during the climax of the cultural and political rebellion against the Hungarian state. It would go on
to form the fundamentals of a Slovak perception of their history and of the world around. Year 1848
was searched as this is when the Slovak emancipation activities peaked.
ii) Národné noviny [National Newspaper], the representative and the unofficial print media of the
Slovak National Party (the oldest Slovak political party). Given the large amount of data to sift
through, only articles published in the years 1903, 1907 and 1912 were analysed. These timeframes
were singled out as they saw an eruption of scandals at the Hungarian political scene (Cieger, 2011).
iii) Národný hlásnik [National Herald] was similar in its views and objectives to the latter paper.
However, Národný hlásnik was not purely political as it commented on various aspects of everyday
life, such as home keeping, literature and so forth and thus appealed to a wider audience. The same
approach to the selection of articles as applied to the previous source will be used.
Other newspapers and magazines were published prior to 1918 in Slovakia. Some of them, namely
Slovenské noviny [Slovak News], were ‘magyarisation’ media and thus of not much use here. Others
were local newspapers and magazines with limited readership. As this thesis is interested in the
contemporary understanding of corruption in the early twenty first century, and developments through
the eras, the constructions that defined the present appreciations of corruption were favoured. This was
also due to time constraints and the fact that the genealogy of corruption was explored to lay the
foundations of individual entrepreneurial ways of seeing corruption.
1918-1939
During the period of 1918-1939, a wide array of newspapers was published. Two sources were selected
for analysis for their complex interest in contemporary events and privileged role in the society due to
the influence of political parties behind them.
93
iv) Slovenský denník [Slovakia Daily] of the political right.
v) Slovák [Slovak] of the political left.
Most parties active in Czechoslovakia circulated their own newspapers in the interwar period forming
the core of journalism at the time creating a wealth of material. Indeed, all were focused at promoting
the interests of their political publishers. The two newspapers examined here were the most influential
media and thus serve as a good foundation for exploring the debate in the interwar years. Again, it was
the perspectives of these newspapers that continued to shape the discourse in Slovakia until today. Both
were readily accessible and available for study and thus selected for this research.
Again, a vast amount of data was produced by these newspapers. Therefore, issues published in 1921,
1928, and 1935 were scrutinized. The year 1921 was marked by a post- war depression; 1928 represents
a year of political tensions in one of the leading parties and a core member of coalition governments in
the interwar period, and 1935 stands for a year of general elections. Together, the three years illustrate
social, political and economic situations in the country.
From 1939 until 1989, with an exclusion of a brief intermezzo from 1945 to 1948, this period was marked
by censorship under Nazi Germany and state socialism. As such, articles published at this time do not
constitute worthwhile material for this study as they are capable of shedding little light on the relations
between Slovaks and the public administration and on corruption as such.
1989-1992
The end of communism did not bring an instant boom of new printed media. Many of the current most-
widely read newspapers were not in existence until 1992/3 and as such the choice is rather limited for
this period. Notwithstanding, newspapers did emerge in this period, their uptake by readers was slow
and many ceased to exist following a short time span. The following outlets were chosen to represent
divergent perspectives that were characteristic of the time and popular with readers. This selection
captured re-orientation from the Communist doctrine to left wing social democracy by including Pravda,
as well as rising right-wing pro-market orientations in the making and thus rather broad and unclear
enmeshment of democracy, free market and autocracy as a symptom of transitioning towards a new
system embodied by governmental Národná obroda.
vi) Daily left-wing newspaper Pravda [Truth]
vii) Right-wing inclined Národná Obroda [National Revival]
94
Issues published in 1991 as the midpoint between the fall of the Iron Curtain and the establishment of
independent Slovakia were searched given the limited time frames of this project.
All articles included in the study and their codes can be found in Appendix A.
6.2.2 Step 2: Self-governance of entrepreneurs and corruption-related activities
Following on from the investigation into the meanings of corruption, the research moved on to the study
of how the specific knowledge about corruption shapes entrepreneurial beliefs and activities in tourism
and agriculture vis-à-vis IACD. This encompasses the second set research question: How does the broad
appreciation of corruption on the societal level inform individual entrepreneurs’ views on corruption?
The study incorporated 25 tourism and 25 agriculture businesses from Western and Central Slovakia as
the limited time and issues with reaching out to entrepreneurs meant that the East of the country was
not included. This will be highlighted in Chapter Nine. Nevertheless, Western and Central Slovakia shed
some light on regional differences. Owners of businesses were targeted and approached through gate
keepers, who will be further discussed later in this chapter. Interviews took place at the business
premises of participating enterprises. Following each interview, participants were asked to recommend
other enterpreneurs willing to take part in the research in order to widen the sample.
Agriculture and tourism were selected for a comparative study as two rather different sectors capable of
providing unique perspectives on entrepreneurial engagement (or not) with corruption. Tourism and
agriculture are neither in a privileged position vis-à-vis state support. This opens space for corruption in
interaction with public administration. Also, from a practical point of view, the access to these sectors
was facilitated by my previous tourism-oriented research and contacts made at the time and by my agri-
entrepreneurial family background.
As to the agriculture sector, primary producers were approached in any agriculture subsector. Tourism
enterprises, such as hotels, guest houses and travel agencies and so forth as the providers of services
directly aimed at tourists were favoured. This is not to deny the complexity, the multi-faceted nature
and interconnectedness of tourism enterprises and other sectors of the economy. Rather, narrowing the
scope for the selection of participants helps to maintain compactness and coherence of findings, as well
as facilitate tourism-specific discussion during interviews. The study does not focus on particular
subsectors of agriculture and tourism sectors so as to allow for great variety. Brief characteristics of
participating enterprises can be found in Appendix H. The full interview schedule which shaped the
95
directon of each interview is presented in Appendix G in the format of semi-structured interviews.
Questions were informed by the literature review and the insights of the genealogical inquiry. The
lietarure review, as well as the geneaological analysis raised the issue of little importance of petty
corruption and the tendency to ground responsibility with the public sector. This was reflected in the
questions about the public sector and their role in enterprising in general. Furthermoe, the literature
review illuminated the matter of public officials as the innitiators of corruption and constraining petty
corruption to bribery, which is what questions inquiring into the flow of each exchange reflect. The
genealogical analysis uncovered the tendency of the media to portray the state as the enemy of the
people and this was mirrored in asking entrepreneurs about their perceptions of the state. In addition,
the literature review was concerned with the strong Western influence and economic rationality shaping
what is understood as corurption, while the genealogical analysis revealed a tailored application of the
international concept of corruption. These aspected were also explored in interviews by delving into
other informal activites and ways of using or abusic public and private power. These constituted the
departure point for each discussion. Once interviewees introduced their experience of corruption, the
following questions were tailored to the context of each incident.
Non-probability purposive sampling was utilised to collect interviews. This method is desirable in
situations where probability sampling would not be possible due to difficulties in accessing the members
of a population or due to a sensitive nature of a researched topic (Babbie, 2013: 199; Bernard, 2011:
143). Both of these issues were of concern here. Gate-keeper and snowballing approaches to non-
probability sampling were felt to be the most appropriate means of collecting interview material as will
be discussed in more depth below. Entrepreneurs were approached and recruited via multiple entry
points – by the original four gatekeepers and consequently via interviewed entrepreneurs themselves.
Kvale and Brinkmann (2009) infer that a qualitative study utilising interviews needs to carry out 15-25
interviews before data saturation is reached. Data saturation is a point when no new insights,
information and themes are coming from each new interview. Auerbach and Silverstein (2003: 102)
elaborate that it is at this point that each additional interview does no longer contribute to an
understanding of theoretical constructs, rather it only confirms what had already been revealed. The
upper limit was chosen here to allow the maximum space to obtain trustworthy data. Nevertheless, data
saturation was reached after 15 interviews in each sector and thus interviewing was discontinued. This is
believed to be due to consistency in perceiving and experiencing the public sector by entrepreneurs in
these sectors which was not expected at the outset of the project.
96
6.2.2.1 Challenges of the Slovak environment
The culture of public participation in research is rather weak in Slovakia and disinterest and even distrust
in research and its objectives (perhaps as a legacy of communism) posed severe limitations on the
research. This is made even more complicated by the precarious nature of corruption. Entrepreneurs are
not willing to talk about the taboo of their involvement in corruption to a stranger despite assurances of
confidentiality and privacy widely recommended to overcome the issues of distrust or fear (Saunders et
al, 2009; Bryman, 2012). This was experienced during my previous research. In other contexts, talking to
a stranger might facilitate a debate because one speaks more openly to a stranger precisely because
he/she is a stranger. However, in Slovakia, being a stranger does not guarantee openness. Rather, it
results in a more cautious attitude on the side of interviewees.
The above is reflected in the unwilligness to talk about corruption while the recorder was capturisng
every word said. The first interview was recorded. Despite the outgoing nature and willingness of the
interviewee to talk about his business, I found it impossible to initiate a discussion on the topic of
corruption. This theme was only opened by the participant once the recording device was switched off
during a tour of his guest house. I experimented with not recording the second interview and found it
much easier to build trust and connection with the interviewee to the extent the delicate topic was
open for discussion. This approach was consequently applied to all ensuing interviews. It appears that
disrupting the stereotypical interviewer-interviewee set up in favour of a more fluid and open
conversation in movement was a great facilitator of trust and openness on the side of participants. Not
recording the words of entrepreneurs made the conversations confidential.
Communism also shaped the dynamics in the relationship between the researched and the researcher.
The researcher is perceived by the research subjects as holding a privileged position of the ‘knower’.
The relationship then resembles a tutor-pupil arrangement which is highly undesirable. This is reflected
in the desire to provide ‘right’ answers to interview questions in a well-meant attempt to please the
researcher. Anxiety of interviewees about giving the memorised ‘right’ answers to conform with the
norm and pass ‘the test’ is another manifestation of the above. In addition, corruption is seen as bad
and even evil. Thus, there is a tendency to provide such answers that present participants in a
favourable light, whether this is done consciously or not. This is indeed a concern with interviewing in
general, however the notion gains on salience as the matter discussed here is potentially illicit. Again,
this emerged as a critical issue from my previous research experience in the country.
97
Tackling the above was vital to the collection of material that was usable. This is not to accuse
participants of intentionally misleading the researcher. Indeed, reactions similar to those outlined here
are telling in their own right. However, such answers would not be capable of answering questions this
research presents and as such must be minimised.
6.2.2.2 Gate-keepers as trust builders
The above challenges were mitigated by building trust with the participants. Trust is a rather elusive
concept. Here it refers to a vital component of the interviewer-interviewee rapport. Its intention is
some degree of solidarity and confidence. The importance of perceiving the interviewer in this manner
cannot be stressed enough, for it relaxes the interviewee and allows for the interview to unfold as a
conversation (and not a question-answer exercise) and for the interviewees to open themselves up.
A working rapport was established via gatekeepers. Gatekeepers are usually referred to as persons
holding formal authority to sanction, or to deny, access to potential participants (King and Horrocks,
2010: 31). Here, gatekeepers were slightly different from those described in literature. They were
individuals known to me and well-connected in entrepreneurial circles with ability to broker interviews.
They did not hold a formal position. Their role rested in approaching potential participants on a personal
basis, conveying trustworthiness of the research and the researcher and eliciting interest in
participation. Participants agreed to take part not because of gate-keepers’ authority, but because of a
personal connection and informal subtle pressure exercised by the gate-keepers which made a negative
answer as to the participation a matter of denying help to a friend or an acquaintance.
Despite the numerous advantages of using gate-keepers, their involvement raises a number of concerns
regarding their capacity to misinterpret the research and its intentions, as well as imposing their own
agendas and own views as to whom should be interviewed (Streiner and Sidani, 2010: 53-54). Such
perils sought to be overcome by familiarising the gate-keepers with the research in person, re-iterating
motivations for researching the particular topic, as well as aims of the project. Close collaboration and
debate was pursued when the gate-keepers came with initial suggestions for participants. Consequently,
when doubts arose as to the appropriateness of involving a respondent, a discussion with the
responsible gate-keeper ensued to ensure the problem would not be repeated. Nevertheless, it is not
possible and neither desirable to remove the agency of gate-keepers. Their involvement is seen as a
fruitful contribution to the project and not an undesirable intrusion.
98
6.3 Analysing the material
It is worth noting that Foucault’s work does not offer any user-friendly manual. Indeed, Foucault himself
resisted and rejected a development of a coherent theory and methodology as any theory necessarily
imposes limitations. As he (1974: 523-524) put it,
“I would like my book to be a kind of toolbox which others can rummage through to find a tool
which they can use however they wish in their own area”.
Foucault therefore allows for a great malleability and versatility of his strategies within the broad
tradition of postmodernism and constructionism, but at the same time opens room for critique. It is
hardly surprising that his work has been argued to be rather unstructructured, unsystematic and
incoherent (Schmidt and Kristensen, 1985: 5). To counteract criticism, Andersen (2003: 2) suggests that
what Foucault has to offer is not a theory, but rather a plethora of analytical strategies. Genealogy and
governmentality employed here are not consistently formulated methods, but strategies adapted to fit
the studied phenomenon at a specific time in a specific place.
6.3.1 Genealogical analysis
A genealogical approach was used to analyse data obtained from the media. The aim was to answer the
initial question, ‘What is a media construction of corruption in Slovakia given its specific contexts and
IACD?’.
Foucauldian genealogy, as Andersen (2003: 20) maintains, is concerned with questioning the present
discourses and practices by relating them back to the conditions of domination and power structures
through which they have been shaped. As such, Kendal and Wickham (1999) suggest looking for
contingencies (rather than causes), as well as discontinuities and silences. The aim is to question the
unquestioned continuities which we employ to organise our own discourse. Discontinuities are crucial
for they signal a break with the old and emergence of the new. However, the old and the new also
emerge in a dialectic relationship. In other words, the new emerges out of the old, not out of nowhere.
Silences highlight the particularity of certain discourse.
Asking questions listed below facilitated a critical investigation of present Slovak knowledge about
corruption.
99
What is being represented as a truth/norm (about corruption and the public administration
relation) given the history of Slovakia and the influence of anti-corruption discourse?
How did the events, conditions, institutions and discourses support these reifications of
corruption?
What is omitted? What is foregrounded and what is backgrounded? What alternatives/other
explanations are ignored?
The answers to the above questions will be pursued through a set of steps in which different aspects of
the material will come under close scrutiny and assure a systematic and thorough analysis.
1) Set the broad context of material.
2) Draw out core themes for each studied period. This was informed by literature review,
exploration of the context of Slovakia, as well as the articles themselves. The list of themes
underwent several adjustment and additions. Consequently, articles were manually coded. Each
text was examined for occurrence of the identified themes.
3) Examine the structure of the text. Attention was also paid to which themes each text uses and
how they are combined.
4) Collect discursive statements on each theme to piece together a picture of truths the texts
establish.
5) Identify rhetorical devices. This step looked at what type of language the texts use by looking at
the kind of nouns, verbs and adjectives, grammar elements, such sentence structures, tense, use
of direct voice are used to shed light on the logic and rationale. It also provided vital clues to the
appreciation of the target audience of the texts. In addition, the above is complemented with a
study of rhetorical features used to shape the argument.
6) Establish how context informs the argument.
All of the above were brought together in the final stage of interpretation of the material. It illuminated a
knowledge about corruption established in each period and allowed for a scrutiny of the development of
the knowledge about corruption, as well as the interaction of the local truths with IACD. It is important
to note here that genealogy emphasizes breadth over depth, for it looks for broad patterns, rather than
in-depth details which would be a Herculean task given the amount of material produced throughout the
centuries.
100
Finally, reflections on the above were set within the context of contemporary anti-corruption
developments in Slovakia. Indicators of anti-corruption were juxtaposed with the findings of the analysis
so as to shed light on the workings of the discourse and its power effects. Annual reports of the National
Criminal Agency published in the current consistent form since 2012 were used for this purpose.
6.3.2 Governmentality analysis
Moving on to governmentality, at the core of its inquiries is the way humans turn themselves into
subjects (Foucault, 1982: 778). The idea of subjecting and subjectivation underpin the concept and relate
governmentality to genealogy. Many interpretations exist on what Foucault meant by these terms and
given Foucault’s ambivalence on technologies of the self and his own perspective on how his work
should be used, validates them all. Some conjoin the two terms (Butler, 2001). Others draw fine
distinctions (Deleuze, 1988).
Here, subjecting is understood as discursive formation of a subject and the process of subordination to
power which through knowledge created the subject (Anderson, 2003). Foucault (1982: 781) explained
the power that characterises subjection as power that “categorises the individual, marks him by his own
individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognize
and which others have to recognize in him”. In this thesis, subjecting is concerned with the rules and
norms related to corruption.
On the other hand, subjectivation refers to an active subject and to the practises of self-formation.
Foucault (ibid: 264) comments on subjectivation as “the way which people are invited or incited to
recognize their … obligations”. It is the process by which one gives oneself to oneself (Schmidt, 1990).
Therefore, subjectivation could be described as a process of self-transformation in order to achieve a
certain form of being. Applied to our context, subjectivation is the way the individual constructs
him/herself vis-à-vis corruption which is tied into the manner he/she conduct themselves in the role of
entrepreneur when it comes to corruption.
To utilise governmentality, Andersen (2003: 24-26) puts forward a list of broad guidelines. These were
adapted here to suit the purpose of this research.
What are the forms of knowledge that the individual can establish about him/herself given the
overarching knowledge of corruption?
101
In what way does the broad discourse on corruption provide an individual with a particular telos
(goal, direction) for life?
In what ways does an individual identify or not with the telos in constructing the self?
Through what activities does one activate the self?
The above questions were applied to individual interviews with entrepreneurs to answer the second
research question, ‘How does the broad appreciation of corruption on societal level inform individual
entrepreneurs’ views on corruption?’ and the associated subquestions.
The broad meanings of corruption established in the previous step were used to analyse the interview
data to establish in what way the media constructions of corruption inform (or not) individual views and
how these are used by individuals to construct themselves vis-à-vis corruption.
The analysis sheds light on the understanding and practice of corruption in agricultural and tourism
SMEs and provides insights into the workings of how IACD has merged with the local truths and their
utilisation by entrepreneurs in the two sectors.
It is important to note here that the interview material is capable of reflecting on the narrative side of
discourse. Given the sensitive nature of corruption, it is unfeasible to observe the actual conduct of
entrepreneurs. However, this limitation will be balanced with positioning of the individual narrative
constructions with the current situation in the sectors of agriculture and tourism with respect to
corruption so as to provide some (albeit limited) link to practices on the ground.
6.4.1 Reflexivity
The researcher’s cultural, political, social, economic and personal contexts and conditions have
ramifications for the study. They inescapably enter research at various points from the choice of
epistemological and ontological positioning, topic selection, through literature review, research design
to data collection, analysis and interpretation of research findings. They are also reflected in the choice
of articles for analysis, directly and indirectly affect the selection of interviewees and shape the
questions posed in interviews. A complete awareness of the range of influences on the research would
be an unfeasible endeavour given the complex filters through which we make sense of the world, some
of which are not conscious. This notwithstanding, a level of self-reflection is indispensable as it situates
the authors in the process of research and at the same time keeps the authors in the state of constant
questioning and exploring of their own position (Honer, 2004). However, reflexivity is not employed
102
here for the purpose of producing more ‘credible’ or more ‘accurate’ findings as some suggest (Seale,
1999), but rather to highlight the complexities of doing engaged qualitative research (Reed et al, 2011).
It forms so called ‘uncomfortable reflexivity’ which brings to light the messiness of engaging in research
involving complex human beings while also facilitating valuable insights into the social worlds of humans
vis-à-vis constraints and realities that are unavoidable when attempting to do the work, given the
impossibility of providing a 100% objective and complete answers to the complicated questions about
the social world of humans (Pillow, 2010).
I am a female Slovak and I come from an entrepreneurial background with certain experiences and
knowledge of corruption which I bring with me, for better and for worse. Furthermore, I am in an
epistemologically privileged position, having been educated at UK institutions (Exeter, Bristol and
Surrey). Thus, it could be posited that I am now in a certain way closer to a British researcher in the
sphere of corruption studies than to a Slovak. This means my understanding of corruption differs from
the broad meanings corruption carries in Slovakia. At the same time, the experience of living and
studying in the UK allowed me to situate the Slovak discourse grounded in Slovakia’s past in the broader
international context. In other words, having feet in both camps meant that I was capable of zooming in
on Slovakia, as well as zooming out and seeing how Slovakia fits into the bigger picture of IACD.
Finally, this thesis emerges at a specific time – the beginning of the twenty-first century (mid to late
2010s), with its unique political challenges (for instance frictions within the EU, Brexit, Slovak presidency
of the EU, geopolitical tensions between the West and Russia, security threats to Western democracies),
social (consequences of Brexit for Slovakia, the refugee crisis) and economic concerns (fragile state after
the global economic downturn in the late 2000s) and at a specific place – the University of Surrey.
Handwritten notes were taken throughout the research to map out changes in personal beliefs and
attitudes that shaped the study. Also, the context chapter is effectively a reflection on the societal,
economic and political contexts of Slovakia and allows the reader to further position the thesis and the
researcher.
6.4.2 Research trustworthiness
The notions of reliability, validity and generalisability, relevant to positivist research, have been subject
to scholarly debates with reference to their use in qualitative research (Kilduff and Mehra, 1997; Leitch
et al, 2010; Grbich, 1999: 9). This is due to critical differences in their ontological fundamentals.
103
There is an array of different approaches to the appraisal of the quality of postmodern and
interpretative research (for an overview see Angen, 2000). For the purposes of this work, the judging
principles are based on transferability, dependability and confirmability which together constitute the
trustworthiness criterion of the quality of research, that is to say to what extent is the data and the
analysis believable (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Guba, 1981).
The notion of transferability is linked to the concept of the fit of the research findings to similar
contexts. The use others make of a research is fundamental, as the recipients of the data are in the best
position to establish whether findings are applicable to a new situation (Tripp, 1985: 35). To aid this
assessment, thick descriptions found in Chapter Four provide the reader with requisite knowledge of the
specificities of the researched issue. Flyvbjerg (1993) concludes that transferability provides a congruous
alternative to the positivist claims of generalizability of research findings which postmodern traditions
deem unattainable.
A coherent and intelligible analysis, based on tools detailed in this chapter and consistent, systematic
and meticulous record-keeping underpin dependability, that is to say the consistency of findings, and
confirmability, the extent to which research findings can be validated by others. A combination of data
resources, media articles and individual interviews are a way of triangulating data sources and
uncovering inconsistencies (Patton, 1999) and thus delivering on the dependability criterion. Additional
triangulation is done by combining different methods, that is to say discourse analysis of media material,
governmentality analysis of interview data. Theoretical foundations of the analysis, as well as the
approach to data collection have been clarified so as to facilitate any external inspection and enhance
confirmability. However, it is important to note that ‘audit’ of research is rather problematic given the
central tenet of multiple truths and realities and contextuality of knowledge which presupposes varied
interpretation of data. Nevertheless, meticulous documentation of the research process allows for some
assessment.
6.4.3 Not getting lost in translation
All data was collected in Slovak. In order to ensure the production of coherent, congruent, accurate and
meaningful data, translation was delayed to later stages of the analysis so as to minimize disruptions of
the intricate links between language, meaning and culture (Temple and Young, 2004). Nevertheless,
some translation was inevitable and was carried out by myself, a native speaker of Slovak, which allows
104
for a close attention to meanings. As it is the case with postmodern research, translation is inherently
subject to the socio-cultural positioning of the researcher. Nevertheless, any further interpretation
issues and external influence over the research are avoided by the absence of an interpreter. Phrases
and words in Slovak are used throughout the analytical part of the thesis to remind the reader of the
specific socio-cultural context from which the discourse emerges.
6.5 Ethical concerns
Given the sensitive nature, corruption has an array of ethical implications.
Potential danger to the research resides in the assumption that individuals think of their involvement in
corruption along the lines of corruption. Drawing on previous experience, such taken for grantedness of
black and white perceptions of corruption could result in the interviewer and the interviewee talking
past each other or indeed in not being able to discuss individual corruption-related behaviour of the
entrepreneur. With this is mind, participants were not sensitised to the exact point of interest of the
research as recommended by Saunders and Thornhill (2011). The discussion was shaped as a debate
about the public administration-SMEs relations. Gate-keepers were familiarised with these issues.
In the case of Slovakia, anonymity and confidentiality do not have the positive connotations they hold in
the Western world. This could be illustrated by participants’ response when presented with a consent
form during my previous research (Bereghazyova, 2012). At best, interviewees regarded the form as a
mere meaningless rubber-stamping exercise. At worst, it was treated with suspicion stemming from the
experience of communism when placing one’s signature on an official form was associated with a loss of
anonymity. Thus, instead of facilitating interaction, stressing confidentiality and attempting to cement it
by the physical form of a consent sheet could seriously undermine the research. Therefore, oral, rather
than written, informed consent was obtained to avoid contamination of the relationships between the
researcher and the interviewee. Interviewees were also guaranteed the right to withdraw from the
interview or later from the research at any time. Originally, all interviews were to be recorded. However,
this had to be abandoned in favour of note-taking. This point will be revisited in the concluding chapter.
Strict confidentiality was adhered to throughout the research. This thesis is interested in the stories of
entrepreneurs about corruption broadly, hence the conceptualization of interviews as a debate about
their experience with the public administration. It minimised the hazard of any comments on specific
105
acts of corruption being made. Hence, I did not have access to any evidence of corruption to
substantiate a report of corruption in accordance with the Slovak Criminal Law Act § 340 Coll.
Interviews were coded and the codes are kept separately on a password protected USB drive. Coded
interview transcripts are saved on a password protected laptop.
106
CHAPTER SEVEN - A NATURE OF CORRUPTION IN SLOVAKIA: FROM THE DAWN OF THE NATION TO THE PRESENT
This chapter sets out to look at the issue of corruption in Slovakia through the lens of shared
understandings of the phenomena. Works examining corruption in Slovakia in the pre-1990s era have
recently started emerging to complement studies of the contemporary phenomenon which has been
under intense scrutiny since the 1990s. What this analysis offers is a coherent approach that tracks a
genealogy of the discourse on corruption. It studies the meanings of corruption throughout the modern
history of Slovakia thereby revealing its nuanced understandings and contextual complexities that
shaped and continue to shape the appreciation of corruption in Slovakia today, answering the first
research question ‘How have media constructions of corruption developed in Slovakia given its specific
contexts and IACD?’
The genealogical analysis laid out here contributes to a body of literature that challenges the ultimate
assumption of IACD which would have us believe that corruption carries the same universal essence
across time and space.
The above is based on Foucaldian-inspired genealogical analysis of newspaper texts scrutinising the
media discourse since the nineteenth century to present, tracking important events and crucial periods
of the Slovak history (for a full account see Chapter Four). Newspapers that have shaped public
understandings and history were selected to cast light on the broader discourse circulating in the
society.
As such, this chapter echoes the recent concern of a lack of attention paid to contextual realities of
countries fighting corruption. It also introduces the issue of a lack of critical self-assessment on the side
of IACD as to its workings on the ground across the world on the example of Slovakia. The findings
presented here support the line of argument which promotes the necessity of shifting away from
generalising discourses towards more localised and tailored appreciations of local issues and approaches
to its alleviation. Above all, it calls for more reflexivity as to the workings of IACD when adopted and
adapted to local contexts. Anti-corruption struggling to take off the ground in Slovakia is not merely a
manifestation of the international and the local talking past each other, but rather of their complex
interplays. Together, they produce unexpected and sometimes bizarre effects. The local nuances are
appreciated by looking at their development in history. The present always exists in relation to the past.
107
The past shapes present day practices. This is not to say that the present is a linear continuation of the
past, but rather that the present is built on the remnants of the past which shape it to some extent
along the lines of ‘path-dependent path-creation’ (Williams, 2013). Thus, the past is not to be taken
deterministically, but it needs to be acknowledged to gain more informed and deeper understandings of
the current trends and tendencies in the studied phenomena.
The chapter is organised as follows. It starts the investigation into the development of the discourse in
nineteenth century Austria-Hungary before turning its attention to the construction of corruption in the
interwar period and post-1989. Finally, the current discourse on Slovakia is analysed and its implications
discussed in light of genealogical insights gained by tracking the meaning of corruption into the past. A
conclusion summarises core arguments raised throughout the chapter.
7.1 Pre-WW1: the struggle for national recognition (and power)
The Slovak National Revival movement used press media as a tool of circulating its agenda. The first
newspapers concerned with political, economic and social issues in Slovak were authored by leaders of
the movement. As Smith aptly observed, it is worth mentioning that the pre-revival traditions were so
weak in Slovakia that it is more appropriate to talk about constructing the Slovak nation, rather than
awakening or reviving it (1986: 178). Indeed, the idea of modern nation states embodied by citizens
emerged out of the Enlightenment tradition which in turn provided grounds for national revivals (Bakke,
1999). Thus, despite its name ‘Slovak National Revival’, the movement could be argued to have set the
foundations of Slovak nationhood and identity from which a Slovak world view emerged. As Bakke
poignantly argues, there is a little evidence that Slovaks had a clear idea of being Slovaks before the
nineteenth century (1999: 137). Indeed, Kirschbaum (1995: 9) even suggests that the land occupied by
Slovaks was for the first time referred to as Slovakia in 1849.
The press was an influential tool in5 shaping the nation. The newspapers studied here were the leading
media of the movement at the time. Their constructions of corruption are deeply embedded into the
108
This section focuses on the period when the ‘Slovak National Revival’ culminated, a movement
which aimed to ‘awaken’ the Slovak nation amidst the pressure of ‘magyarisation’ gaining speed in
the Hungarian part of Austria-Hungary. It covers the mid-nineteenth century to the outbreak of the
WW1. For detailed contextual realities of the era please refer to Chapter Four.
process of forming the Slovak psyche. These form a blueprint for understanding corruption in Slovakia.
The potency of the first conceptualisations of corruption in the Slovak language is reflected in their
presence in the current discourse as will be demonstrated later in this chapter.
Slovenskje národňje novini was a pioneering Slovak political newspaper. It aired revolutionary views of
the Movement in favour of greater Slovak empowerment. It targeted the educated audience of Upper
Hungary who identified themselves as being Slovak, that is to say a slim layer of the intelligentsia, the
emerging middle class and petty nobility as the core opponents to ‘magyarization’.25 Following its ban,
the role was taken up by Národné noviny. Both were controlled by Protestant intelligentsia. Catholic
rebels joined forces with the Movement and contributed to the agenda in their leading newspaper
Národný hlásnik. It furthered the same agenda to the Catholic audience in the same social circles as the
Protestant media. In the later period, it was heavily funded by Russian promoters of panslavism
promoting the idea of unity of all Slavs, reflecting the tensions on the continent which spiralled into
WW1. The circulation of these newspapers mirrored the suppression of the Slovak press. The most
popular Národný hlásnik only had 2,500 subscribers at its peak time towards the end of 1800s.
Nevertheless, this media was significant to forming Slovak consciousness as a building bloc of the nation,
the tradition which was followed after WW1.
Given the contextual backdrop, the discourse on corruption targeted the social strata which identified
themselves as Slovaks and thereby were disadvantaged by ‘magyarisation’. Elaborate sentence
structures and Latin expressions permeate the Slovak language used signalling that its target audience
was educated. These were not the Slovak peasant classes.
On the other hand, it was also peppered with metaphors and similes drawn from rural culture and
unsophisticated crude words. This points in the direction of an educated Slovak population adopted
from a rural social background dominant in Upper Hungary. This background is vital to the
understanding of the foundations of the construction of corruption. The very choice of the Slovak
language is telling of the media identity and that of their journalists and politics, as well as audience. The
Slovak intelligentsia involved in newspaper publication was educated in Hungarian, Czech or Austrian
institutions and thus was capable of using any of these languages, most importantly German and
Hungarian, but chose not to. Bakke (1999: 149) supports the centrality of the figure of a peasant in the
Slovak nationhood and identity.
25 Policies aiming to foster a unified Hungarian nation – economically, culturally and linguistically. For more information see Context Chapter.
109
7.1.1 Corrupt ‘magyarisers’
Press articles from this era constructed corruption as a rather fuzzy concept. It covered more concrete
activities that are identified as corruption today such as nepotism, favouritism, bribery and profiteering.
It also referred to a broad notion of harm inflicted on Slovaks without specifying the form of behaviours
to which it related. Newspaper tests often discuss corruption in broad terms as misconduct of public
officials, particularly in the earlier period. Both the concrete and less specific categories of corruption
had in common the notion of abuse of Slovaks.
This is hardly surprising given the context and the background of the newspapers examined here. In
addition, this period saw an uptake of ideas of the Enlightenment by Slovak educated classes as a result
of modernisation of the education system (Bakke, 1999). It opened education to a wider population and
allowed for greater circulation of ideas creating a new phenomenon – a middle class emergent from the
peasant layer of the society. Given the late industrialisation of Slovakia, the urban working class was
small. It is against this backdrop that corruption took on the notion of failure to observe the social
contract between the governed people and governors and smoothly translated into a construct of
Hungarian exploitation of Slovaks. One of the central messages of the Enlightenment was indeed equal
treatment of all subjects by their governments, which the idea of corruption as abuse of power to rule
or govern taps into. Indeed, this was not a new concept. Mungiu-Pippidi (2013) argues it was a much
older idea that merely became incorporated into the construct of the modern state.
Hand in hand with the above, the discourse of corruption was restricted to government and public
administration at large, both elected and non-elected posts on all levels. The agenda of ‘magyarisation’
was designed and advanced by these bodies. Indeed, the narration on corruption was a part of a
broader discourse that promoted a vision of the Slovak nation, rather than a uniform Hungarian nation
forged by ‘magyarisation’. Corruption emerges as a way of attacking institutions active in the process of
‘magyarisation’.
The below discursive fragments epitomise the way in which the idea of corruption was used and what
phenomena it described.
“Kormos26 used his high position to acquire money in order to afford a life which required
more than could be provided by his position… Letters provide a proof that Kormos asked for
money in return for his judgement, his influence” (Nrn7).
26A judge of the King’s court, the supreme judicial authority.
110
The main protagonist of the affair, a public official was placed into a position of an active subject
carrying out demands while the bribe-givers remained passive and were scarcely mentioned. The
public official was portrayed as the prime source of corruption, the leading instigator and
consequently as the only responsible party. The antagonist was portrayed as a greedy abuser of
public power. The above account is an example of a rather rare dispassionate portrayal of
corruption, based on evidence which reflects the influence of the Enlightenment. It was rationality
that the movement placed at the heart of its philosophy challenging authority by the use of
reason (Withers, 2007).
Other articles reveal more heated representations of corruption often involving elected officials
whom are referred to as ‘swindlers’ and ‘wicked creatures’, a testimony to the rural and religious
background of authors.
“Koloman Széll snatched a fat worm like a hungry trout… He was named a governor
of the Agrarian and Mortgage Bank! Koloman Széll was the president of the Agrarian
and Mortgage Bank and had to resign when he became the prime minister enforcing
the incompatibility law … However, in order for him to keep his mandate and get a
cushy job at the bank, the government created a new post of the ‘governor’ of the
Agrarian and Mortgage Bank… If this is not corruption and bypassing of the law, then
there is no sun in the sky and no sea on the Earth.” (Nrn16)
Using a simile27 of worm and trout, the above fragment painted a vivid picture of a rapacious public
official in the reckless pursuit of his self-interest. Furthermore, the government is portrayed as
conducive to such behaviour thereby assembling a picture of a reality of far-reaching corruption
engulfing the entire system and reaching to its top departments – the central government and the
parliament.
The tendency to stretch a concrete occurrence of corruption to demonstrate the state of the entire
system of public service permeated much of the press texts on the issue as the below excerpts illustrate.
Furthermore, this claim is also supported by the structure of articles discussing corruption. They
frequently start with a mention of wider conditions and situations in Hungary breeding individual
instances of corruption. The readers’ minds were set into thinking about a concrete situation as a mere
reflection of a devastating state of affairs in the country.
27 A figure of speech that described something by comparing it to something else.
111
“Nepotism and corruption blossom in Hungary. Nepotism and corruption are the fruits of
the Hungarian oligarchy. Here is the newest proof: In Čongrád, the head of the district
county Farkas was sentenced to the loss of his office because he was taking his salary from
Kristóffy. Another public official was sentenced merely to a fine of 200 crowns for the same
matter. Farkas appealed: ‘When those who issue orders do not keep them – members of
the parliament asked and took their salaries from someone whom they said was not eligible
to give them. Such swindlers as Hervay István and dr Dóza Samuel took salaries that
Kristóffy assigned to them for 5 months but have not been accused…That is coalitional
politics’ (Nrn17)”.
“We should despise not at the Szapáry simony [a case of a member of parliament bribing
the opposition] but at general conditions in which wicked poisonous creatures thrive, do
dirty deals, thieve, intrigue, judge, lie, deceive.” (Nrn18).
“What happened to the minister of justice Polónyi and the coalition sheds clear light on the
Hungarian situation – there is no doubt that every Hungarian government keeps itself in
power by dishonourableness, bribery and violence” (Nh3).
In other words, corrupt public officials were not merely ‘bad apples’. Rather, the entire tree was
presented as ridden with corruption. The latter excerpt cements the projection of boundless corruption
as a fact by using the words ‘there is no doubt’. The responsibility for adverse situation and the source
of corruption in the country was clearly assigned to political representatives. Individuals, but above all
the entire system were construed as selfishly pursuing its own interests whether this was monetary
benefits and/or power rather than serving the country and the people they governed.
The above leads to a conclusion that the chief aim of articles on corruption was not to simply inform
readers about individual failures. Instead, it strived to cast an unfavourable light on government and
politics restricted to Hungarian ruling classes. The Movement pursued a weakening of Hungarian rule in
Slovakia in favour of greater power transfer into the Slovak hands.
It is important to stress that the studied sources employed similar language and circulated similar stories
on corruption.
112
7.1.2 Corrupt foe of the nation
At the time of a battle for greater political, social, cultural and economic space for Slovaks, the discourse
positioned selfish government and public administration clearly, firmly and unquestionably as the
enemy of the nation in an attack on legitimacy of governors heading the system.
At this stage, it is helpful to take a look at the wider picture of the state and its administration to gain a
fuller appreciation of how the stark animosity between Slovaks and the state was built. Corruption
represented only one of an array of administrative prechmaty [misdemeanours] disadvantaging Slovaks
and subjecting them to the whims of ‘magyarisers’.
“Look! These people [public officials] are given power not to protect silent, courageous
citizens but to terrorise them… There is no place which does not teem with such
administrative misdemeanours against the people. Misdemeanour, falsity, violence … are
not exceptions but rules.” (Nrn10).
“All state institutions, beginning with those in charge of roads to the very top ones, only
seek to give a hard time to the citizens whom are summoned to their imperial offices for no
reason for all sorts of petty futile matters.” (Nrn5).
“Usury, abuse, plundering people, sucking their blood and sweat merged with
administrative violence…” (Nrn10).
The discourse circulated a bleak picture of administrative oppression of Slovaks by those holding power
to administer Slovak matters. Instances of harassment of Slovaks by authorities are portrayed as a part
of everyday life, rather than exceptional occurrences, thereby building a truth of all-pervading
administrative pressure. There was not escape from it and it reached into all spheres of life.
The pernicious nature of conduct of public authorities, including corruption, was further enhanced by
relating them to physical destruction - starvation (Snn1; Snn2). The promoters of the discourse
elaborately linked the economic and social conditions in Upper Hungary which belonged to the poorer
parts of the empire to their construction of corruption. A stark contrast between the corrupt authorities
seeking self-enrichment and poverty-stricken Slovaks was painted in vivid colours and in an emotive
fashion. To illustrate the point, a certain senior civil servant who was also an entrepreneur was depicted
as greedily amassing millions through corrupt deals while depriving his workers of a decent life. He is
accused of being “the slaver of white slaves who makes his employees work 18-20 hours a day for a
113
sweat wage.” (Nrn19). Social questions such as rights of workers were part and parcel of the
Enlightenment project that found a strong response in the context of Upper Hungary.
In addition to violence, the disparity in wealth was a pronounced feature of constructing a deep chasm
between Slovaks and public authorities.
“The government stole four million of your money for their grub and booze, but does
not have four pennies to educate the Slovak farmer. The government is using our
own money to climb our backs and to ruthlessly rob us of everything.” (Nh6)
The above reflect on the issue of the common interests of Slovaks jeopardised by the self-centred public
power pursuing its own interests rather than the common good. It should not come as a surprise that
the state tried to supress such opinions being voiced. Slovak newspapers promoting Slovak interests as
distinct from Hungarian interests were under pressure for financial resources and were circulated at the
cost of criminal punishment. At the most severe, death penalties were given to those caught promoting
the Slovak propaganda.
Given that ‘magyarisation’ triggered a demand for national recognition and that the discourse on
corruption emerged vis-à-vis these realities, corruption served to mark the difference between Slovaks
and those holding public power. In other words, the discourse on corruption became a means of
‘othering’ the rival. The strategy of creating the category of the ‘other’ in constructing a binary
opposition between the Occident and Orient in western perception was described by Said in his ground-
breaking work Orientalism (2003). Projecting something as the other draws dividing lines. Slovaks are
everything that the Hungarian state is not – honest, pure and moral.
In mobilising ‘the’ Slovak interests, the newspapers constructed a particular Slovak identity that is best
described as ľud - the ‘people’. With Upper Hungary being overwhelmingly a rural space from which the
leaders of the movement and promoters of the discourse emerged, this feature was reflected in the
Slovak identity as also noted elsewhere (Bakke, 1999). Indeed, references to rural ties of the ‘people’ in
the form of similes, metaphors; examples such as the above case of the farmer cement this argument. It
is connected to the idealised notion of rural-anchored hard-working and meagre Slovak ‘people’.
This identity was built in contrast to the rich, powerful, scheming, abusive and elitist Hungarian
authorities. Hudek (2011) came to a similar conclusion in his work on a Slovak identity as defined
predominantly by a conflict with the Hungarian conceptualisations of the state and reality at this time.
114
Thus, the particular Slovak identity that the discourse constructed reflected and internalised social and
political tensions. It encompassed inherent antagonism vis-à-vis public authorities. Furthermore, the
notion of abuse of the ‘people’ imbues corruption with overtones of a distinct morality stemming from
the ‘people’.
The ‘people’ also embodied citizens. Bakke (1999: 155) also observed this tendency and tied to the idea
that the nation encompasses the masses, not just the elites that emerged from the Enlightenment. The
discourse attacked the Hungarian authorities on the grounds of ignoring the citizens, their ‘natural’
rights and ‘the’ truth. This gave the discourse the power that comes with claims of campaigning for
‘natural’ and ‘universal’ concepts.
“Man was created to be free. And so were the nations. Yet, nations have not been
able to access this freedom for a long time. Millions of people have been longing for
it, consecrated their joys, work and lives to raise a flag that says: ‘Long live freedom!’.
But despite their work, this flag could not flutter above them. It often seemed that it
was not possible to break down the falsity, deception and plots of suppressors. It
seemed that it was impossible to fight egoism, self-love, to fight privileged families
and castes that arrogantly looked down at the people and their human rights.”
(Snn3)
“It is impossible for the administration to be honest when its aim is a domination of a
particular political current or a violent expansion of a dominant nationality. Such an
administration needs biased individuals whom use deception and trickery or violence
to counteract the simple and clear truth.” (Nrn12)
Media built on the legacy of the Enlightenment in attacking the legitimacy of the Hungarian governing
elites, pre-occupied with expansion of own power at the cost of neglecting its citizens. Public authorities
were presented as an archaic violent structure resisting modernisation and denying the ‘people’ their
natural national rights. Presenting corruption as a violation of ‘nature’ reflects the use of the rational
reason. Supporting the Movement and its agenda thus emerged as ‘rational’. The discourse
pathologised public authorities as irrational using the construct of corruption. It also normalised the
Slovak identity as that of the ‘people’ suffering the corruption of the powerful. Packaged as a rational
campaign for the universal truth, the Movement positioned themselves as protectors of the nation of
the ‘people’.
115
7.1.3 Corruption as a sin
The last facet of corruption is linked to its embeddedness in Christian morality in addition to popular,
associated with the ‘people’, morality. The two overlap. The movement leaders circulating the discourse
came from the ranks of representatives of the Catholic Church and Protestantism who formed the core
of small Slovak intelligentsia. The two newspapers spoke with a single voice on this issue. Its target
audience was the religious population of Upper Hungary.
Religion played an important role in Austria-Hungary. While Austria was overwhelmingly staunchly
Catholic reflecting the allegiances and beliefs of the Catholic Habsburg monarchy, Hungary was in the
later period influenced by Protestantism (Houlihan, 2015). Slovakia, then Upper Hungary, reflected the
tension. The majority of the population was Catholic, but pro-reform circles were fuelled by Protestants.
The educated classes themselves came from within the circles of the Catholic and Protestant Churches.
This is no surprise as it was these establishments that fought to preserve Slovak as the primary language
(Gluchman, 2007: viii). The majority of elementary schools were run by the two churches (Vesztróczy,
2015). Thus, church schools became incubators of nationally-minded intelligentsia.
The above is reflected in numerous references to the Bible and in the appreciation of corruption as a
breach of Christian morality.
“Strange is the political morality of Mr Zoltán Papp. This person gave his honest word
to accept money in return for remaining in silence… Who would in today’s anti-
Christian times remember the words and the deeds of Christ?! If this had been
remembered, Mr Papp would have known that he should not have given the seducer
and enticer his honest word, but should have rebuffed him clearly and shortly by
using Christ’s words: ‘Get you gone, devil!” (Nrn8).
The abundance of words that connote impurity, such as špina [filth] (Nh3: 3; Nrn7,8), bahno [mud] (Nh4)
and sviňstvo [slime] (Nh4) framed corruption as something repugnant, odious, abominable and, above
all, impure. Linking corruption with greedy conduct as noted earlier also points in this direction as
excessive behaviour was and still is in conflict with Christian austerity. This notion gains even more
salience given that it was the Protestant stream of the religious intelligentsia which took the lead in this
phase of the movement.
116
Finally, an overt use of the word sin with respect to corruption clearly positions corruption as a breach
of the divine law. God himself was on the side of the movement thereby stimulating the appeal and
power of the movement and its legitimacy.
7.1.4 Corruption as a weapon
As already touched upon above, the discourse targeted and sought to activate those disadvantaged by
‘magyarisation’. With the extension of the idea of a nation to the masses found in the Enlightenment
project, the rural peasant classes became critically important to political developments. This is reflected
in the emergence of voices claiming to speak on their behalf and clustered under the Movement. They
targeted petty nobility and intelligentsia emergent from rural peasant backgrounds dominant in Upper
Hungary. Vis-à-vis the changing world order, these social strata were vital as they held the right to vote.
In addition to their political capital, they could also supply necessary material, financial support and vital
networks for the Movement. The discourse mirrored and further reinforced self-identification of this
population as Slovaks. In promoting the ideals of the Movement, it tapped into sensitivities of a society
hungry for social and economic mobility and a greater share of power. However, the word ‘corruption’
itself was used relatively little. Instead, the discourse utilised the notion of abuse of power to elaborate
upon. This could be explained by delayed adoption of the foreign word ‘corruption’ into the Slovak
language, which was itself in the process of emergence.28
The Enlightenment not only provided room for the Slovak awakening discourse to develop but also
equipped it with the tools of challenging the authority of the unresponsive state dominated politically,
economically and socially by aristocracy and nobility (Henderson, 2002; Bakke, 1999). Accusing
governments in which Slovaks did not participate, as well as lower ranks of the administration, where
Slovaks did not play a substantial role, corruption was linked to failure to promote the common good of
Slovak citizens thereby breaching the ‘natural’ contract between the state and its citizens. The
Movement drew on the power of Enlightenment discourse, which it in turn reinforced.
The discourse, as circulated in the context of the nineteenth and early twentieth century Upper
Hungary, developed with an aim of empowering its users and the Slovak elites by discrediting and
delegitimising Hungarian politics and public administration. It sought to strike a wedge between citizens
and the central and local government dominated by Hungarian economic, political and social interests.
28 Slovak language was codified in 1848 following disputes over which dialect should constitute the literary language.
117
Following on from the above, the core function of the discourse was to attack the ruling elites on the
grounds of their selfishness and unresponsiveness to Slovak ‘people’, the citizens, and their interests.
Public officials associated with political, economic and social elites, that is to say those responsible for
the delivery of the common good were singled out for critique.
The above argument is strengthened by an approach of the studied newspapers to an incident of
corruption in 1903 in the camp of Prime Minister Khuen Herderváry who advocated universal suffrage.
The Movement was in favour of the idea for obvious reasons. The incident was downplayed by
accentuating the corruption of previous governments, notably governments perceived as active
promoters of ‘magyarisation’ policies, such as the Wekerle29 and the Bánffy cabinet (Nrn7).30 Fierce
critique was also directed at the unfavourably viewed opposition whom brought the case forward (Nrn7;
Nrn8). Moreover, in the aftermath of the resignation of the government, the Slovak media presented
this event as a result of unbearable pressures without a single mention of corruption (Nh1). The
language used to report on this incident was surprisingly mild and technical, limiting itself to a brief
description of events (Nrn12). The articles avoided the term and the concept of corruption and did not
link the events with the abuse of power or trampled common good of Slovaks.
It is also rather enlightening to notice the conspicuous silence regarding any involvement of Slovaks in
corruption. Anyone perceived as receptive of Slovaks and their demands and/or a Slovak could not be
corrupt precisely because corruption was construed as a matter inherent to opponents of Slovaks.
Nevertheless, with intensifying ‘magyarisation’ and an escalation of the awakening Movement, a
favourable image of government and public administration receded. Articles were increasingly saturated
with negative notions of corruption and rulers were presented universally as the foe of Slovaks in
mobilisation of ‘the’ political, economic and social Slovak interest represented by educated Slovak elites.
Corruption was wrapped in popular and Christian morality promoted under the auspices of ‘the’ rational
reason. In other words, the media furthered a particular interest as the universal common good by
employing the powerful notion of rationality.
By drawing on the idea of common good and reason betrayed by Hungarian rulers and their system of
public administration, media of the Movement pursued a disconnection of the voting Slovak public from
29 The Wekerle government introduced the so-called Apponyi laws which advanced ‘magyarisation’ at primary schools.30 Bánffy was a strong supporter of ‘magyarisation’. According to the Bánffy laws ratified in 1897, names of all villages, towns and cities had to be changed to Hungarian names. The same policy applied to surnames. In addition, ‘magyarisation’ of the education system became a part of the government programme.
118
Hungarian politics and power – from central government to local public authorities. Since Hungarian
ruling elites were presented as inherently egoistic, the way to resolve the issue of suppression of Slovaks
was installing Slovaks in the posts of public power. The discourse on corruption was a part and parcel of
the idea of Slovak self-government that the Movement pursued (Kirschbaum, 2007). Thus, it
campaigned for political support of its representatives among the public. To put it simply, the discourse
on corruption did not aim to fight corruption as much as it sought to fight corrupt Hungarian public and
political power and achieve a removal of current elites.
Therefore, discourse on corruption emerges as a political tool unleashed in the name of the people to
create influence in Upper Hungary. This confirms the findings of Cieger (2011) who argued corruption
constituted a powerful political weapon in this era. This view is further supported by Šoltés (2011) who
adds that the introduction of the topic of corruption into the public discourse signifies the process of
modernisation of the state from pre-modern to modern structures. This thesis takes this argument
further and refines it by providing more insight into the construction and nuances of the meanings of
corruption as a political tool.
Slovaks as citizens, whom the Enlightenment empowered, became at once inextricably involved in
power plays – as pursuers of power and influence but also as subjects of power – the power of reason.
The discourse on corruption subjected Slovaks to a particular understanding of corruption, of
themselves as Slovaks and of the public power. On the other hand, it equipped its users with tools to
challenge the public power. The potency of the discourse manifested itself after WWI in the foundation
of the interwar Czechoslovak democracy. A social, economic and political ‘levelling’ of the domestic
scene followed. At its heart was neutralisation of former elites in favour of Czechoslovak elites,
representing of the forces behind the Movement.
7.2 Interwar years: entrenching past truths
119
Following the end of WWI and the disintegration of Austria-Hungary, Slovaks joined Czechs in a new
national state with the assistance of the victorious allied forces. Interwar Czechoslovakia was caught
in a number of sweeping internal and external political, social and economic changes in the process
of shifting from feudalism to interwar democracy. It was faced with numerous economic and
political difficulties of a newly established state seeking to overthrow the past system. Political
competition for power was intense in the new fragile republic faced with territorial demands of the
former rulers. In addition, the battle for national recognition of Slovaks and their interest continued
to rage in the decades of Czech dominance. This background provided fertile grounds for Slovak
nationalism, which oversaw the removal of the politically inconvenient and untrustworthy
The press continued to be a powerful tool of influencing the public opinion and as such widely used by
political factions. Newspapers owned and run by political parties were the leading print media. The
discourse examined here is that of the two most powerful parties standing against each other for most
of the interwar period – the Agrarians publishing Slovenský Denník and the Slovak People’s Party which
later became Hlinka’ s Slovak People’s Party (referred to as HSPP therein) publishing Slovák. Pro-market
agrarians concerned themselves with countryside matters and appealed to rural-based middle-classes,
which were not plentiful in the Slovak part of the republic, as well as the lower classes of peasant
background. Nevertheless, most of its supporters came from the Czech lands. Agrarians were a stabile
part of governments throughout the period. The conservative HSPP drew their support from Catholics,
rural population, working class and middle classes dissatisfied by the centralist policies of Prague
governments. Unlike the agrarians, HSPP spent nearly the entire era in opposition. The rural segment
made up the majority of the population. Over 60 % of Slovaks worked in agriculture (Kirschbaum, 1995:
173) and only slightly over 20% of the population lived in cities (Bašovský cited in Johnston, 1981:36).
The rural population was critically important from a political perspective.
Interwar years saw some simplification of language used to talk about corruption. Sentence structures
and overall language became more blunt and straightforward compared to the flowery language of the
pre-war discourse. Latin disappeared completely. In addition, the discourse used technical terms
borrowed from the law and economics and supplied numerical evidence supporting accusations of
corruption that had not featured in texts on corruption before. This reflected the context of
modernisation, part of which was widening of the readership base as a result of general availability of
education. However, it retained a strong element of populistic rhetoric stemming from the ‘people’
tenet reflecting the core group for which the newspapers contested – the rural population.
120
Following the end of WWI and the disintegration of Austria-Hungary, Slovaks joined Czechs in a new
national state with the assistance of the victorious allied forces. Interwar Czechoslovakia was caught
in a number of sweeping internal and external political, social and economic changes in the process
of shifting from feudalism to interwar democracy. It was faced with numerous economic and
political difficulties of a newly established state seeking to overthrow the past system. Political
competition for power was intense in the new fragile republic faced with territorial demands of the
former rulers. In addition, the battle for national recognition of Slovaks and their interest continued
to rage in the decades of Czech dominance. This background provided fertile grounds for Slovak
nationalism, which oversaw the removal of the politically inconvenient and untrustworthy
7.2.1 New horizons?
Whereas corruption was decisively linked to the abuse of Slovaks and was discussed using rather strong
language in the earlier studied period, the first decades of the twentieth century saw a rise of an
inclination to talk about corruption by utilising a more restrained language. It matched the context of
the social, economic and political processes of modernisation which Czechoslovakia was undergoing.
The language was characterised by the use of rather neutral past tense, chronological order and succinct
news reporting style which constructed corruption as a breach of the law (Sld5; Sld15; Slov5; Slov9;
Slov20) rather than a moral failure. Corruption began to take more concrete contours as criminal
offenses of bribery, nepotism, favouritism, rent-seeking and fraud. Seemingly, it did not carry any or
very few and very faint nationalistic and moral (beyond legalistic morality) connotations, existential
overtones and emotive language of the earlier discourse matching the context of development in the
country.
The tendency to link corruption with the behaviour of the political rival for power outlived Austria-
Hungary and WWI. In Czechoslovakia, corruption pertained solely to the activities of political opponents.
Both examined sources provided compromising news about their competitors while being silent about
allegations of corruption in their own ranks or demeaning them as political tricks of the rival. It could be
thought of as providing more subtle cues to readers to question the competitors’ competence and
integrity vis-à-vis the interests of the public based on the economic logic, thereby changing reasoning
but not the concept of corruption itself.
The below fragment illustrates this trend.
“MP Kubicsko got a 3-month sentence. A strange ‘guardian of the poor’ was given
bribes of thousands…Trickery and deceit of MP Kubicsko was futile. It did no good to
Kubicsko because the charges of his activity in the land reform were too grave. As a
consequence, the east-Slovakian ‘guardian of the poor’ was sentenced to 3 months in
jail” (Slovd9).
The above excerpt from the Agrarian newspaper informed about corruption of a representative of the
Communist Party. The Party appealed to an increasing number of Slovaks and thus was a potent rival of
the Agrarians. An innovation of the interwar discourse rests with the introduction of a notion of criminal
punishment for corruption which goes hand in hand with crystallisation of corruption as a rather clearly
defined set of illicit activities.
121
“Strange names appeared side by side in the Fatra enterprise: MP Dr Mičura, Dr
Engliš, lawyer Dr Stránsky, etc. … It emerged that this enterprise, founded with the
starting capital of only 1 million crowns, is to receive a contract from the Ministry of
Defence worth 150 million crowns” (Slov19).
This discursive fragment from the HSPP publication accuses individuals connected to rival parties or
individuals linked to them of favouritism and nepotism. The following excerpts highlight this trend.
“Dr Alojz Rathauský, a leading official of the Czech People’s Party and an MP, was taken into
custody in regards of the bribery and party espionage affair Shenker… Dr Rathauský, an
advisor to the Ministry of Commerce is accused of receiving bribes from the firm Schenker…
[a detailed account of how the scandal unfolded follows].The prosecution claims that the
accused parties took 300,000 crowns in bribes each month from the import of Polish coal.
These parties are: Social Democrats, the agrarians, the Czech and German Trading Party and
the National Democrats” (Slov13).
It is worth noting that the involvement of private enterprise is downplayed. They are ascribed the
role of an object rather than a subject. This is also the case in the following article:
“The main defendant is Dr Navrátil whom according to the prosecution received
bribes of at least 850,000 crowns from construction firms Czech-Moravian Inc.,
Launna, Pittel & Brausewetter between 1928 and 1933 when he was the chief
technical advisor of the Brno regional authority…The prosecution describes the
beginnings of the affair and states that the costs to build the water reservoir were 83
million crowns. The local authority announced a competition for construction of the
reservoir wall. The received offers were opened in April of the same year. Navrátil
was in the commission. He was appointed to assess the offers. Out of 15 firms,
Navrátil chose 3 with the most suitable one being the consortium Czech-Moravian
Inc., Launna, Pittel & Brausewetter” (Slov10).
Unlike the earlier discourse, its interwar descendant brings to light the offer as well as the demand side
of corruption, albeit this is done sporadically. It is interesting to note that the demand side, where
mentioned, consists of Czech enterprises or those carrying German/Austrian and Jewish names, that is
to say groups with unfavourable reputations in interwar Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless, politicians and
public representatives remained the prime actors.
122
The elaboration of economic costs and/or illumination of the monetary side of corruption reveal a
discernible shift towards economic reasoning. Damage to the public interests thus revolved around the
monetary costs of profiteering by holders of public office in central government but also in regional
administration. Another change came with a presence of concrete details supporting accusations of
corruption. Again, this could be put down to the broader trends and modernisation in the society.
The ‘corruption card’ was more often used by the oppositional press. These articles appeared in the
centre of pages, featured large prominent headlines and were longer compared to the articles published
in the government press. In addition, the agrarian publications were silent on a number of reported
scandals in government ranks. These were reported by the oppositional press. This contributes to the
picture of corruption as a matter of predominantly holders of public power in elected offices. Indeed,
the power of the discourse emerged from the attack on the unchecked authority of the state and its
officials, in turn reinforcing power that created it. The interwar discourse reflects this. As the agrarians
were in the government, their media appear to have had less reason and grounds for talking about
corruption by the virtue of not being in the opposition. However, HSSP was the most influential party in
Slovakia, and thus an important local power player. This was merely concealed by the lack of centralised
governmental power.
7.2.2 Old wine in new bottles – corrupt enemy and national existence
Slovak national aspirations and the search for a suitable place for Slovaks in the new world order
were far from over in interwar Czechoslovakia. The battle for national recognition and equal
inclusion in elite circles resurfaced again following the disappointment of the internal organisation
of the new state. A renewal of the threat of ‘magyarisation’ was all too real vis-à-vis the external
pressure of ex-rulers. It provided fertile grounds for nourishment of the core tenets of the older
discourse. These complemented the economic understandings and brought back the pre-war
reasoning and appreciation of threatened common good with a renewed vigour. Far from the
muted language of the above approach to corruption, this undercurrent of the discourse was
characterised by the use of present and future tense, abundance of adjectives and emotionally
loaded expressions.
The following article elaborates on favouritism of rival parties by subtly linking them to
‘magyarisation’ thereby exploiting old grievances. Slovaks were projected as being disadvantaged
by individuals following interests of the pre-war foes.
123
“It is widely known about the oppositional Hungarian parties that they are not
interested in prosperity of towns but in the benefits of individuals. They always do
their best in awarding all public contracts to their own members irrespective of
whether it is good for the town or not. Social democrats are probably not aware of
such strategies. Otherwise they would not conduct themselves in the way they did on
the Friday municipal meeting. They voted against the matter of Dr Novák, whom was
already voted into the position of the town attorney. Some parties refuse to
recognize him, including the Hungarian parties. This is only about a Hungarian, or a
Jew, but not a Slovak, becoming a town attorney. Representatives of social
democrats watched this issue being discussed for hours. There was not enough time
to debate urgent matters of the citizens of Košice” (Slovd9).
This was much more than a mere account of an incident. The author overtly appealed to the truth about
Hungarians stemming from the experience of ‘magyarisation’ which was used effectively as a synonym
of corruption. By drawing on the common knowledge of corruption, the article accused the competing
party of colluding with the enemy, thus failing to serve and even jeopardising the Slovak common good.
This was a grave charge given that the memory of magyarisation was still fresh and the threat to the
nation was still alive.
The emotional and moral connotations of corruption are clearly present in the following elaboration on
the issue.
“MP Tománek lodged an interpellation regarding a robbery of millions by dirty deals with
wool. A working Slovak peasant, a craftsman and a labourer sigh: ‘It is easy to use other
people’s money’. The truth is that unheard-of corruption rules in the country and that many
sirs, whom loudly claimed themselves to be patriots, robbed the state and the people of
millions” (Slov1).
An overt recourse to the ‘people’ construct suggests a deep and continued embeddedness of corruption
as a moral failure to serve the ‘people’. It accused the corrupt government of betraying the interests of
the ‘people’ by greedily following their own enrichment. At the same time, the article again appealed to
the common knowledge of the rich and the powerful standing against the poor and the abused. The far
from ideal economic situation of rural Slovakia and the disparity between Czechs and Slovaks translated
into the construction of a contrast between the rich ‘sirs’ in Prague and the impoverished ‘people’. It
124
cemented the notion of disparity of interests and deepened the chasm between governors and the
governed skilfully construed by the earlier discourse. Furthermore, the author opted for words and
concepts charged with strong emotional undertones, such as robbing instead of more neutral defraud or
embezzlement. A Slovak peasant and craftsmen are referred to rather than simply a Slovak.
The theme is also visible in the following discussion of corruption which brings the news of a process of
allocation of land. The article entitled ‘Greediness of argaláši31 is bottomless!’ dictates the tone of the
article that goes on to argue:
“The agrarian masters would rather oblige bribing Hungarian and Jewish swindlers instead
of serving the interests of the Slovak land and the Slovak people” (Slov8).
Here, the corrupt agrarians were linked with interests of Hungarians and Jews, both negatively
perceived. The text continues with a description of several cases where the common interest came
second to the interests of the opponent serving the old enemy. This and similar articles constructed a
sense of urgency vis-à-vis the rival threatening to dwarf the ‘people’.
The governmental press also voiced similar concerns with respect to the rival HSPP.
“Clericalism is the strongest political poison, the most dangerous cancer on the body
of the state, the most fatal eradication of the nation. It poisons the people, it
destroys the state and murders the nation. The more injustice, improperness,
corruption and dirt in politics, the more fruitful clericalism is” (Slovd6).
HSPP was accused of thriving on corruption thereby killing the nation. The strong language and mention
of eradication of the nation echo the concerns of ‘magyarisation’ from before WW1. Furthermore, it
linked corruption with the issue of stability of the republic on which the existence of the Slovak nation
hinged in the turbulent interwar period. This theme emerged throughout the discourse with both sides
drawing on existential fears. The following fragment is yet another example of evocation of regress
towards the old harmful structures embodied by the notion of ‘Tartar conditions’ that insinuate a rather
primitive barbaric society:
“The behaviour of governmental parties is a serious matter. It undermines the trust of the
citizenry in the purity of public life… It is unconceivable to allow such a reprehensible bad
habit of wasting public money by giving it to non-existent companies and unknown
31 A pejorative term for the agrarians.
125
individuals to take root! It will bring about Tartar conditions, the order and responsibility
would be turned on its head and any civil servant could use public money in any way he
likes” (Slov16).
The article appealed overtly to the ‘people’ as citizens and the issue of a protection of their common
good by protecting the public finances from selfish parties in power.
Notwithstanding that the governmental press discussed corruption along these lines, it was the
opposition that put the fervent constructions into a fuller use. The primary targets were ruling elites.
This is reflected not only in the number of articles but also in their more concrete content. While the
governmental press provided rather vague and seemingly unfounded elaborations on corruption, the
oppositional contributions were more compelling. They included more detail about corruption and
evidence, rather than restricting themselves to broad descriptions.
On yet another level, the continued perception of corruption as a violation of Christian morals
manifested itself in a slightly alternated way. Whereas the developments in Austria-Hungary united
Catholics and Protestants in a joint effort to disentangle Slovaks from the burden of the Hungarian
suppression, the interwar years witnessed an opposition of the Catholics represented by HSPP and the
Protestants, favouring the agrarians. In addition, social democrats and communists promoting atheism
enriched the discourse as the Christian parties and newspapers extended corruption to incorporate the
wrongdoing of non-believers lacking Christian morals and values. Consecutively, both Protestans and
Catholics positioned themselves as guardians protecting the ‘people’ from the debaunched secular
outlooks of corrupt atheists. Expressions such as ‘moral degeneration’ (Slov, 1935d), ‘mud’ (Slov15),
‘dirt’ (Slov17) and manure (Slovd6) connoting sinful conduct and on the other hand mention of ‘purity’
attached to proper conduct permeated the discourse speaking to the Slovak rural and, above all,
staunchly Catholic, public.
7.2.3 Shaming the opponent - gaining the rural public
It was already mentioned here that the studied newspapers were the press tools of parties competing
for the vital segment of the Slovak voters – the rural population. Albeit urban population were
emerging, they were in the minority. This is reflected in the popularity of political parties pursuing the
interests of this segment, which had been decreasing throughout the era (Czech Statistical Office, 2008).
The earlier discourse shaped the idea of the Slovak nation and citizenry as embodied in the ‘people’ vis-
à-vis the corruption of Hungarian elites. As demonstrated throughout this section, the ‘people’ were
126
firmly placed at the heart of the interwar discourse too. The interwar discourse oscillated between the
old and the emergent way of formulating corruption, it retained its core characteristic as a political
weapon.
The new era brought a new tool to Slovaks – universal suffrage which effectively widened the
electorate.32 Not only was attendance at election open to all above the age of 21, participation was also
compulsory. The circulators of newspapers needed to appeal to the extended audience, which no longer
consisted of slim intelligentsia and low nobility, in language they could understand. The observation put
forward at the beginning of this section regarding the simplification of the language gains in importance
here. Media appealed to Slovaks by employing quintessentially Slovak truths. These used both economic
rationality that positioned corruption as monetary, but also moral and existential costs to citizens. This
knowledge about corruption, politics and Slovaks, presented itself as rational in mobilisation of the
electorate in the modern state. Its users, that is to say media, promoted themselves as defenders of the
nation against the selfish and immoral opponents. In doing so, they embraced the tensions and dangers
with which Czechoslovakia was faced and exploited Slovak existential fears and traumas of the recent
past. Furthermore, the word ‘corruption’ began to proliferate in the media discourse marking an
adoption of the word into Slovak vocabulary and thought. The old and the new thus supplemented each
other in media discourse appealing to Slovaks as citizens and their duty to protect the nation when it
came to casting their votes.
7.3 1991: At the doorstep of transformation
32 Universal suffrage extending the right to vote to men and women above the age of 21 was anchored in the Czechoslovak Constitution adopted in 1920.
127
Tearing down the Iron Curtain in 1989 marked a beginning of a turbulent era. In the late 80s and the
early 90s, Slovakia found itself again in the grip of sweeping fast-paced changes associated with the
transfer from state socialism and planned market economy to a free market democracy, from Soviet
political structures to western institutions. Further details can be found in the Chapter Four.
Four decades of communism in Czechoslovakia brought with it limited press coverage in terms of its
extent and themes covered. All official media were controlled by the Communist Party, and strict
censorship was applied on all means of mass communication. Corruption was discussed very little given
the strong tendency to project an overwhelmingly positive image of the state and was criticised only
sporadically as an ailment of capitalism (Kmeť, 2011). Given the censorship and the difficulties
connected with locating infrequent articles connected with corruption, this research skips the period
and focuses on the time of greater freedom of speech which returned following the events in 1989.
The sources studied here represent powers that unravelled shortly after the 1989 events, both left-wing
Pravda, the former official organ of the Communist Party now in private hands, and governmental
Národná obroda, somewhat right-wing, but rather muddled in political tendencies. It is surprising how
poor the discourse on corruption was in the initial stages of transformation.
The language used to talk about corruption was well suited to appeal to the general public of the early
1990s. The texts had an appealing story line structure, simple but sensational and emotional language,
containing catchy words such as ‘shocking’ and provocative neologism. For instance, the media coined a
name for one scandal as the ‘Tatragate’ (Prav2). ‘Supersale’ (Prav1) is another example of this
technique. The articles on the theme made a plentiful use of adjectives and colloquialisms. Direct
speech was a rather popular means of dramatising texts on corruption along with the use of the present
tense. Articles were introduced with attractive headlines such as:
“We are selling ourselves” (Prav3).
“Tatragate: uneasy truce” (Prav4).
“Tatragate – halftime of the affair” (Prav2).
The texts unfolded like a detective story and marked the beginning of popular investigative journalism in
Czechoslovakia. Opinionated stories, not reports, revealed opaque connections, voiced suspicions and
assumptions. Articles on corruption had a form of a sensational narration, rather than a factual report,
and were effortlessly accessible to the general public. It marks the transition from the renewed old
approach of talking about corruption to the current journalistic approach to reporting. This was also
reinforced with the newly emergent competitor – TV broadcasters. Grabbing readers’ attention was
crucial with increasing competition.
128
7.3.1 Corruption = fraudulent privatisation
The shifting world order left a distinctive imprint on the construction of corruption. Articles touching on
corruption were concerned exclusively with a new phenomenon – privatisation. Privatisation was one of
the most pronounced and palpable aspects of transformation that occupied so much media attention. It
encapsulates the changing relations in the society including the institutional frame, world views and in
the process of making the legislation framework. To be precise, constructions of corruption played
themselves out on the platform of big privatisation (for more detail on privatisation see Chapter Four).
The excerpt below indicates how corruption was conceptualised and linked to privatisation.
“To our great disappointment, we learnt from the investigation of the Tatragate scandal
that American businessman Šumichrast features on the governmental payroll in the role of
an advisor. Mr Čarnogurský33 junior was also employed as an adviser by the Ministry of
Finance. He confirmed this yesterday and also mentioned that he continues to advise to the
ministry. He [Mr Čarnogurský] gave us a recording of his meeting with Mr Lančarič, the
deputy prime minister, in which he cites from an internal document of the Attorney
General’s office. When the advisor of the deputy PM asked him about it, he said: ‘This is an
internal file which I received from Dr Závodná from the Attorney General’s office … She
handed it to me and said that I could have it so that I am familiar with the opinions of the
office’. Many entrepreneurs in Slovakia would welcome an access to such internal files.”
(Prav5).
Corruption indicated opaque and dense networks of economic and political elites ‘pulling the ropes’ in
the background of privatisation. It is the closeness and a paucity of a stringent dividing line between the
public and the private sector that constitutes the core of corruption mirroring the influence of IACD, but
also the tradition of the Enlightenment in which it is rooted. The interconnectedness of elites was an
attractive topic to discuss at the time of moving towards democracy after a period that placed a taboo
on such issues. The communist ideology was based on the idea of classless society. However, it is rather
unclear what corruption entailed. Here we see a certain reversal compared with the discourse of the
interwar years.
For the first time, media higlights private sector actors and attributes them with active roles. This focus
could be explained by the ideological background of Pravda. The governmental newspaper was
33 A businessman and the brother of a prominent politician, member of the government.
129
conspicuously silent on corruption with the only article published in the newspaper focused at rebuffing
the accusations targeted at the government. Albeit somewhat unfavourably viewed, representatives of
this sector were pardoned for their activities on the grounds of being private enterprises and thus
behaving according to the rules of the market (Prav4).
7.3.2 Stubborn heritage
As the private sector representatives were stripped of guilt and responsibility, these were necessarily
grounded with the other side, that is to say public officials, both elected and appointed. The quote
below demonstrates not only the old surviving tendency to transfer the blame on to public officials, but
also the survival of the moral dimension of corruption.
““Before Christmas, a debate ran in the Slovak media about the authenticity of a contract
which would give the American firm Tatra Mountains Corporations exclusive rights to draw
profits from our national parks … on conditions that are discriminative and degrading to us
… National heritage cannot be an object of such dealing not even if it promises a short-term
gain. From the historical perspective, it is our untouchable core … The shocking thing about
the Tatragate scandal is that those who assisted the foreign investors and will not be
stopped by anything in the pursuit of profit, feel that the position to which we elected them
entitles them to become the owners of the national heritage” (Prav2).
The reasons as to why corruption was taken to be wrong reveal a discernible revival of the core tenets
of the older discourse. The return of the ‘people’ and populist rhetoric comes as a little surprise against
the backdrop of the rise of nationalism in the late 1980s and early 1990s in Slovakia. Corruption and
national existence have been connected in the concept of corruption since the nineteenth century. The
harm inflicted on the nation took on the form of selling-off their ‘family silver’ in privatisation so as to
extract personal benefits. Albeit altered, the core dimension of corruption was maintained. It played on
the sensitive spot of the Slovak by elaborating on the notion of the national heritage – the material
symbol which personifies the nation. We can hardly find a more palpable demonstration of abusing the
common good than selling revered national assets. Public officials were projected as jeopardising the
national patrimony and, above all, the national pride. The latter was of particular importance in the
1990s which offered a new scope to Slovaks to ground themselves in the post-Cold War world. It came
with tensions with the Czech part of the country regarding the standing of Slovakia in Czechoslovakia.
130
With the above use of the ‘people’ construct came a line-drawing between ‘us’ (the ‘people’) and ‘them’
(public officials) perpetuating the discord sealed in the Slovak public memory. It painted a familiar
picture of a chasm between Slovaks and their governors. Selling assets unfavourably was viewed not
only as bad business but, above all, as disloyalty to, and ignorance of, the good of citizens. Media
bridged the past notions with the present problems in an emotionally driven attack on the perceived
traitors of the nation. Interestingly, the outsiders, such as foreign investors, were treated leniently.
Notwithstanding that they were classified as ‘them’, the role of Slovak figures within these companies
was highlighted. It is somewhat surprising that, at the time of growing disagreements between the two
parts of the country, the media discourse on corruption did not bear any anti-Czech imprints, the gaze
was turned inwards – into Slovak circles.
Slovak knowledge on corruption maintained the quintessentially Slovak moral underpinnings and
reasoning that pre-dated communism. However, the idea of corruption as a sin receded into background
following four decades of communist atheism and vis-à-vis the advancing neoliberalism.
As observed above, corruption was talked about by Pravda. Governmental Národná obroda was largely
silent on the issue, with only one article published denying oppositional accusations of corruption
(Nro1). The political orientation of Pravda is illuminating with respect to the way corruption was
sculpted. Left-wing Pravda was a fierce critic of the government at this time and the supporter of the
oppositional left-wing political spectrum. Pravda effectively shaped the old truths about corruption to fit
the new context of neoliberalism by making elements of the new ideology visible, for instance in its
lenient treatment of the private sector while retaining the old ‘people’ perspective. Together, they
imposed a distinct set of morals and expectations on the governors.
Corruption indeed retained its politicised nature and the core function as a tool challenging rivals for
power. It offered a tried and tested tool of attacking the legitimacy of government in seeking support for
an oppositional faction whose views corresponded with that of the paper. As such, the advent of the
new era that brought independent media also introduced an opaque, and less straightforward, use of
the discourse. However, it remained a useful tool of challenging the governing authority for the private
sector and their interests too.
The pre-war and inter-war legacy, deeply sealed into the Slovak knowledge about corruption, surfaced
again in a re-invented form fitting the realities of the transition. At this time, media challenged
131
government on the grounds of its ability to serve the common good in a rather emotional and moralistic
fashion tied to the ‘people’.
132
7.4 1998: Breakpoint
Following a period of relatively little concern about corruption (1989-1997), the late 1990s brought a
more pronounced recovery of media interest in the problem which would later develop on an
unprecedented level. The general elections in 1998 were vital in setting the future direction Slovakia
would take – drawing closer to the west by joining the EU and NATO, or, moving away from it and
abandoning the legacy of 1989. Pravda had changed hands compared to the situation in 1991 and was
not a tacit supporter of the governing party Movement for Democratic Slovakia (HZDS). The second
newspaper examined here is the fiercely oppositional privately owned pro-market SME. It was the latter
broadsheet in particular that actively engaged in the debate.
Pravda continued to employ a story-telling approach and obscurity to talk about corruption. However,
the discourse also absorbed technical economic language and revolved around concrete evidence in the
form of figures rather than using the purely general language of attractive story telling seen earlier in
the decade. The reporting style adopted a detached and factual manner compared to the opinionated
style of the early transition. Sophistication went hand in hand with unravelling transition, which was
necessarily reflected in the more experienced and informed public which had now been exposed to new
truths of the new ideology for nearly 10 years. In other words, the language suggests a strong influence
of IACD and neoliberalism at large. This approach was opted for by the newspaper SME in particular.
However, idioms such as ‘set the fox in charge of the chickens’ (SME1), formulations such as ‘put money
in their [government] pockets’ (SME1) also suggest an inclination to populistic rhetoric reminiscent of
the past. Using words loaded with negative connotations such as ‘shameless thieving of public property’
133
In 1998, Slovakia celebrated the fifth anniversary of its sovereignty following the ‘velvet divorce’
from the Czechs. Privatisation, along with other deep cutting structural and institutional changes,
was underway. Slovakia saw a rise of authoritarian tendencies embodied by two governments lead
by Vladimír Mečiar. For some critics, this period could be likened to the dark ages of modern Slovak
history. The domestic political situation was reflected in a setback on the international scene. The
Slovak membership in the EU and NATO stalled. Against this backdrop, the political opposition,
headed by pro-Western parties, entered the political scene deposing Mečiar in the crucial general
elections in September 1998. Fuller elaboration can be found in Chapter Four.
(SME2) or ‘manipulation of the electorate’ (SME1), are further examples of a clear manifestation of the
presence of the old legacies co-existing with technical legalistic language and economic rationale.
7.4.1 Source of corruption – public sector
Building upon the legacy of the early 1990s, corruption was again overwhelmingly concerned with
privatisation. It turned out to be a far from smooth transfer of property from public to private hands,
reflecting the bumpy transition at large. Selling public property and state firms, deeply under the market
price to individuals close to governmental circles, was at the heart of media stories. The exposure to
IACD gave firmer contours to corruption as was also observed elsewhere (Fialová, 2007).
Corruption crystallised as practices of clientelism, favouritism, nepotism, patronage, and fraud
employed so as to pursue one’s own benefits. It is important to reiterate that Pravda remained rather
silent in this period, merely touching on issues predominantly of competing parties of HZDS in the
government. The quotation below demonstrates the kind of activities corruption covered.
“An anonymous claim from Piešťany suggests that Manaz bought Villa Marianna from the
local spa dirt-cheap not for themselves, but for the director of the Slovak Property Fund…
Mrs Jenčovičová is a co-owner of Manaz and Alkop. She privatised a dozen properties via
these firms… Why did she focus on agriculture, forests and grassland? Some suggests that it
is because this is the stamping grounds of agriculture expert and huntsman Štefan Gavorník
[the husband of Jenčovičová’s friend], the director of the Slovak Propety Fund” (Prav6).
This excerpt alluded to favouritism and patronage in central public administration. It illustrates some of
the attractive features of texts on corruption – idioms and rhetorical questions. The former made the
text more appealing while the latter enhanced its persuasiveness. However, this style was on the
decrease in favour of a more straightforward reporting building on technical legalistic language
saturated with concrete details.
“According to our information, sixteen subjects were interested in the purchase of First
Newspaper Company [a sole distributor of Slovak press]. 97% of its shares were purchased
by indebted Danubia-print, closely connected to HZDS, for 410 million crowns. It will only
pay 190 million and the rest will be invested into the development of the First Newspaper
Company. A source close to the National Property Fund stated that the privatisation had
been blocked by the Union of the Workers of Slovakia [a political party, member of the then
134
coalition government] and only agreed with the sale when the Fund sold 10.23% of shares
in Slovnaft [the only oil refining company in Slovakia] in the total sum of 1.5 billion for 610
million to an unknown company Colorin from Žilina. This is alleged of being connected to
representatives of the Union. According to the same source, the Union intends to use the
proceeds of this self-enrichment for its electoral campaign” (SME3).
This fragment again constructed corruption as favouritism in a system that could be likened to ‘you
scratch my back, I’ll scratch yours’. It painted a picture of pervasive links of the political elites and a
muddle of the public sector, politics and private sector. Collusion of elites has been a stable theme in
discourse on corruption in Slovakia. The use of figures illustrates the conceptualisation of corruption
and its wrongness along the lines of economic reasoning of the market.
“A list provided by I. Mikloš confirms that Novofrukt, public enterprise Nové Zámky and
Krnča Quarries were privatised by the wife of a V. Vicen, an MP of HZDS. The book value of
Novofrukt was 369 million crowns but it was purchased for only 20 million crowns. The firm
Palžar is connected with Štefan Horský, the father-in-law of I. Hudec, the Minister of
Culture. Palžar also privatised Slovakopress [a leading publisher]. It was worth 370 million
crowns but it was sold for 150 million” (SME4).
This extract positioned corruption as nepotism and revolved around the monetary dimension of
corruption and interconnectedness of the public and the private sector. The notion of common good
was reconceptualised and now rested firmly with the public finance and their protection from private
self-interest of public officials.
“Ľ.Černák, the vice-chair of the Democratic Union [an oppositional political party], critiqued
the move of Slovenská sporiteľňa [one of the largest banks], the majority shareholder of
which is the Slovak Property Fund, from Bratislava to Banská Bystrica. According to him, the
bank should not act in a way that suits K. Konárik, an entrepreneur and an MP of HZDS and
his close friend I. Kiňa, the general manager of the bank. ‘The move cost half a billion Slovak
crowns. Havran villa was refurbished for this occasion. It is privately owned by Mr Kiňa, not
by the bank’ said Ľ.Černák” (SME5).
The painstaking elaboration on networks whereby personal relationships were clearly articulated in all
of the above fragments illuminates the greater precision and clarity of the discourse of the late 1990s
following the economic rationality and its focus.
135
Texts drew attention to public officials. Although the closeness of the private and the public sectors was
often associated with individuals holding high public posts in an arrangement of political capitalism (see
for example Staniszkis, 1991, Polanyi, 2002), it was the public dimension that the discourse
foregrounded by meticulous stating of networks connected to public positions. This argument is
cemented by the excerpt below, which constructs corruption in government as a fact:
“It is a common knowledge that only persons close to HZDS, Slovak National Party
and the Union of Workers [coalition parties] privatise” (SME6).
Thus, the blame rested with the public power holders. Indeed, selfishness incompatible with the notion
of the common good has been at the heart of corruption since the nineteenth century. However, the
contextual realities of the 1990s gave this idea a new varnish, that of corruption as the crime of
inefficiency.
In this time period, the media were overwhelmingly occupied with corruption in government but they
also recognised that corruption occurred on the lower levels of the system – in local and regional public
administration. Thus, the discourse turned its lens to petty corruption. Unlike corruption of governors,
this was discussed firmly within the bounds of bribery. Nevertheless, such concerns were rather rare,
with only two articles discussing the phenomena. Their structure was far from the appealing version of
texts on governmental corruption. Petty corruption was reduced to concise descriptions of events.
Attractive rhetorical mechanisms were absent. These articles were also short in length and given less
prominent positions in newspapers on the margins of pages. Unlike convoluted grand corruption, petty
corruption was portrayed as a straightforward transaction of money. Consistent with the primary focus
on the state and its administration of the Slovak discourse since the nineteenth century, these articles
also highlighted the public sector. Low and mid-ranking public officials and administrators were depicted
as receiving bribes from an entrepreneur, rather than the entrepreneur giving a bribe to the officers
(SME8). The second article lacked any reference to bribe givers (Prav7). To put it simply, the media
interest in the matter of corruption dropped where high public officials were not involved.
7.4.2 Good weapons never go out of fashion
The background of an unfavourable perception of Slovakia by international actors translated into a delay
in the EU accession process and reflected itself in the corruption discourse. It re-introduced the notion
of the dangers corruption posed to Slovaks. Corruption was argued to be an obstacle to democracy and
therefore Slovakia’s place in the Western world, in addition to posing a strain on its public budget. A
136
mere nine years after the collapse of state socialism, this was a formidable threat that revived the
recent past. SME argued that a questionable privatisation of a publishing company imperilled freedom.
Pravda featured an interview with a head of the German government who questioned the country’s
membership in international organisations (SME1; Prav5). In other words, the nation’s future and
wellbeing was once again jeopardised by the abusive government. The common good was under threat
of selfish governors.
A relatively clearly calculated financial cost of corruption reaching millions of Slovak crowns was also a
sensitive matter, particularly in the light of Slovakia’s history and vis-à-vis economic unevenness, high
unemployment, a stagnating economy and a looming recession at the end of the 1990s. Frequent
mentions of public officials, their relatives and close friends ‘filling their pockets’ at the time of
tightening belts, cemented the ruthless image of public officials.
Following the rules set by the antecedent discourse, a discussion of corruption was useful particularly to
the opposition to the government and, therefore, SME was more prolific than Pravda. It is rather telling
that although featured a handful of articles on corruption, they targeted a rival governing party while
presenting HZDS in the position of the disciplining body uncovering corruption. It was silent on a number
of corruption cases that surfaced in SME. In addition, articles published in Pravda lacked the directness
and simplicity of SME’s discussion of corruption. Pravda’s accounts of corruption were rather vague and
were short of the evidence that SME used to bolster its own reports. Its articles focused on narrating a
story about implicated actors rather than on corruption. This could be explained by the link of Pravda to
HZDS, thereby constraining its scope of discussing corruption. That Pravda was capable of such an
apparently factual approach as SME, could be demonstrated by its article on petty corruption discussed
above.
Above all, the strongest statements are found in the oppositional press.
“I. Mikloš considers this [an analysis of proceeds of privatisation] to be a proof of
unrestrained robbing of the state property under the auspices of the current government”
(SME2).
“’HZDS does no longer bother itself with maintaining the semblance of the public property
and takes and puts right into their pockets’ says F. Šebej [vice-chair of oppositional DS]”
(SME1).
137
Corruption survived as a tool of challenging those individuals and interests viewed as opposing to the
newspaper’s interests and world views, namely the governing structures. Media embellished their
negative image by the fashion in which statements about those suspected of corruption occurred, as
well as their content. Compared to the concrete statements of the accusations often featuring
documents, analyses and concrete figures, the reactions of the accused sounded rather hollow and
implausible. This point is exemplified by an explanation of a person under suspicion of corruption as to
why she oriented herself primarily at the sector of agriculture, where her close friend happened to hold
an influential positon. The reason - “’I said to myself that bread will always be important’” (Prav6)
arguably did little to dispel doubts. Similarly, unskilful or fuzzy explanations, unwillingness to comment
on accusations or weak and vague counter-accusations occurred throughout the articles. The texts did
not provide much support to these statements and, instead, left them hanging in the air thereby
allowing the reader to make sense of them him/herself.
7.4.3 Neoliberalism seeping through
The developments of the late 1990s provided grounds for nourishment of some of the fundamental
constructs of the earlier discourse. These were re-packaged to fit the new contexts. Notwithstanding the
inclusion of the notion of petty corruption, the discourse was overwhelmingly concerned with
government, thereby continuing the tendency to use corruption in a politicised manner. It is precisely
for this reason that the discourse did not deal with anti-corruption in a meaningful sense.
Media combined economic rationality with emotive language, linked to past sores, in their appeal to a
particular reason so as to encourage readers to challenge the unresponsive political representatives,
most notably the government, on the electoral front. SME in particular meshed together local truths and
IACD. Due to the neoliberal influence of western structures providing pressure on Slovakia, the ‘people’
began to take on the notions of the liberal market and democracy as being best served by this system. It
resonates with the argument put forward in Chapter Two regarding neoliberalism as the pinnacle of
human achievement. To put it differently, the interests of the free market democracy were becoming
associated with the interests of the ‘people’ jeopardised by the non-democratic strong government. The
traditional target of the Slovak discourse on corruption, that is to say governors torturing and supressing
the ‘people’, merged with the adversary of neoliberalism – the strong state. Corruption emerges as a
malleable concept with an extraordinary ability to re-invent itself in light of new knowledge and new
influences. With the advent of free independent media, the once straightforward battle between
138
various political factions via their media started to become more obscure and subtle and played out on
ideological lines and allegiances.
7.5 Mid 2010s: something old, something new and something borrowed
Narrations of corruption of five leading mainstream media are examined here. All newspapers are
privately owned by large domestic or international corporations and cover the mainstream political
spectrum.
Whereas corruption occurred in the Slovak discourse as a considerable problem prior to the 1990s, it
only recently reached the stage of such an acute severity that it is claimed to be one of its cardinal
problems. Since the fall of communism, corruption has undergone a process of emancipating itself. It
moved away from being merely a sub-theme of the awakening and nation-building discourse to a full-
blown issue and a theme of its own that receives much public and media attention. However, this does
not mean that the discourse had abandoned its past legacies.
The language of the current discourse in terms of vocabulary, sentence and text structures reflects the
influence of neoliberal rationality. Texts are chronologically structured and evidence-based. However,
there is a difference in the construction of petty and grand/political corruption. While texts concerned
with petty corruption observe the above outlined rationality and plainly informative style, those
discussing grand corruption also involve language that is more engaging, even sensational. These articles
feature direct quotes of protagonists, usually oppositional politicians revealing corruption in the
government, as well as citations of the antagonists, individuals in high public offices accused of
corruption. Articles discussing grand corruption use both present and past tense to dramatise the
narrative, an array of adjectives and emotionally toned words appear alongside neutral economistic and
legalistic expressions. All these components add more colour and richness to the narrative in
comparison to the plain accounts of petty corruption. The language of broadsheets is more neutral,
sterile and expert-like using legalistic terms and jargon of criminology, but this is not to say that it does
not include any of the above outlined attractive features. Notwithstanding, the broadsheets indeed
differ from tabloids in terms of appearing more objective by using restrained formal terminology; traces
139
In 2014, Slovakia was a member of the EU and the NATO as a manifestation of a reform path embarked upon in 1998. Part and parcel of the democratisation process was the implementation of anti-corruption institutions. Despite a number of mechanisms implemented in this period, corruption was believed to plague the society on all levels running from the very top to the bottom.
of a sensational approach, elements of dramatisation and words laden with emotions can also be found
in these articles.
7.5.1 Both sides of petty corruption
The most obvious change from previous discourses is the inclusion of petty corruption in terms of both
bribe-takers and bribe givers. After over a century of silence, petty bribe-giving - that is to say corruption
of the ‘people’ as opposed to corruption occurring in power circles - appears in media. Petty or
bureaucratic corruption refers exclusively to bribery. This is cemented by visual accompaniments of
these reports that often feature photos depicting euro banknotes.
Here we find a consistence with IACD, namely its stream which targets entrepreneurs, which also tends
to discuss corruption primarily along the lines of bribery. Bribery as a relatively simple exchange and a
straight-forward way of abusing power for private, mostly financial, gain, constitutes a convenient
departure point that helps to understand, conceptualise and introduce issues previously disregarded.
As argued before, the earlier discourse focused on bribe-takers in rare instances of discussing petty
corruption. It either did not mention petty bribe-givers, or concealed their role. The current discourse
pays an overt attention to both bribe-payers and bribe-takers as the quotations below demonstrate:
“He [Martin K.] was interested in purchasing land and in Bratislava Rača. He was interested
in decreasing the price for which he is alleged to have offered a bribe of 150 euro [to the
director-general of the Slovak Land Fund]” (Novyc15).
“Ladislav B., the chief advisor at the Land Register Department of the District Authority,
asked for bribes for providing services outside the scope of his position” (Novyc26).
“They offered a bribe to director of the land fund for plots in Rača.” (Prav25).
A very new type of concise factual reporting that does not provide the reader with a sense of a
story can be seen in the following statement:
“Policemen stopped a car. After detecting the presence of alcohol on the driver’s breath,
they asked for a bribe for not confiscating the driver’s license” (Novyc19).
140
The above examples epitomise the kind of language and linguistic structures that underpin the narration
of petty corruption, such as the prevalence of past tense, short sentences, simple sentence structures
and factually succinct descriptions limited to outlining who did what and what punishment ensued.
With respect to the content of petty corruption, bribes are portrayed as exchanged for permissions,
licenses and to avert penalties, most often as a result of breaking rules or to cover inconsistencies with a
formal norm/legal requirement. When it comes to discussing the involvement of SMEs, the matter is
most often linked to a debate of bribery as a problem rather than to concrete examples of corruption.
Only one article comments on bribery where a small firm was involved (Novyc33). Instances of paying
for favourable treatment in pursuing various tasks in interaction with public administration, such as a
purchase of land, an approving stance toward a building project, an illicit agreement between public
officials and an entrepreneur to cover deficiencies of a product, illustrate the range of activities that
involve bribery.
Public officials, as well as entrepreneurs and individuals of unspecified occupation, are portrayed as
eager actors in crimes of bribery. Whereas, in earlier periods, corruption was limited to the actions and
behaviours of the powerful, the current discourse not only reflects on corruption lower down the social
hierarchy, but also puts the ‘people’ into a pro-active role as perpetrators. This shift could be attributed
to the influence of IACD. An obvious question arises; how does this change the underlying
understanding of corruption? As the defining feature of corruption was a betrayal of the ‘people’, the
ease which they are now associated with the briber is peculiar. The shift from corruption as the matter
of prominent public/political power to corruption in which ‘ordinary’ Slovaks willingly participate,
appears to suggest the meanings of corruption underwent significant alterations.
Notwithstanding the above, petty corruption is not associated with moral connotations or seen as
inflicting costs on the society. Instead, the notion of costs is contained by the implicated parties in the
form of individual criminal punishment. As it is not of interest to pay attention to the moral dimension of
these acts, petty bribery emerges as not much more than a breach of the law. In other words, corruption
is legally, rather than morally wrong. This suggests a rather straightforward adoption of the international
paradigm wherein individuals are purely and solely portrayed as following their narrow self-interest
(Polzer, 2001; Gebel, 2012).
The above point is also reflected in the rather sterile reporting language, which makes little use of
adjectives in providing concise factually bland and, above all, dispassionate descriptions of events
141
limited to providing basic information. For instance, articles are silent on any background elaborations.
Also, it is not made clear in most cases how petty corruption was uncovered. In summary, there are no
stories, no heroes revealing corruption and no villains engaging in anti-society or anti-market
behaviours. Instead, there are merely simple accounts of individual incidents.
It suggests that the concept of corruption freed itself from past legacies and that the period of drawing
closer to the West, materialised in the Slovak membership in international organizations, offered a fresh
start to the discourse on corruption. The notion of active free individuals rather than passive objects
found its way into the discourse and reflected itself in the shedding of the taboo of petty corruption.
However, a different picture is revealed upon closer inspection.
7.5.1.1 National sport of bribe-giving
Some unease about labelling ‘the people’, bežný občan [an ordinary citizen] or bežný človek [an ordinary
person] as they are referred to by the media, as corrupt reveals itself in the appreciations of punishment
and importance of petty corruption:
“Last year, the police succeeded in accusing two people linked to a case of corruption in an
establishment carrying out MOTs and three in connection with corruption in the Slovak Land
Fund. But these are matters of pennies. Millions are involved elsewhere… [the article continues
with brief descriptions of governmental corruption scandals]” (Novyc11).
“According to him [the chair of Transparency International Slovakia], bribes of several
euros are punished by imprisonment more often than acts of corruption in public
procurement…” (Hospn19).
“Ordinary people are punished more severely. Courts punished bribe-givers more often
than bribe-takers (Prav22).
The prosecution of petty corruption in ‘ordinary citizens’ cases is juxtaposed here with grand and
political corruption and petty corruption of public officials and civil servants. It does so in a way that
implies unfairness. Petty bribe-giving is not constructed as a non-issue, but it is suggested that the
importance and the impact of corruption at this level is exaggerated and punished overly severely, while
the attention is shifted towards the public sector. Such statements come from experts, thereby lending
the issue of negligible importance of petty corruption considerable credence.
142
The discourse effectively downplays petty corruption of the ‘people’ by shifting attention away from the
‘people’ as perpetrators of corruption and by using plain language. If all corruption was treated as
universally wrong, this should not occur.
A tension between projecting Slovaks as corrupt and lessening the importance of such activities, reflects
the friction between the old and the new – between Slovaks as victims and Slovaks as perpetrators of
corruption, and translates into normalising petty corruption as something that everybody does to the
extent corruption becomes a ‘national sport’ (Novyc1). This is cemented by the construction of ubiquity
of corruption in the country:
“90% of Slovaks consider corruption to be a normal occurrence in the country” (Prav13).
“Slovaks point out corrupt environment in the first survey of the European Union. 90% of
respondents think that corruption is spread very widely in Slovakia.” (Hospn2).
“One fifth of Slovaks have a direct experience with corruption, whereas the EU average is
not even one tenth” (SME19).
The effect is strengthened by the use of the voice of experts on corruption and the power of statistical
data to comment on the state of corruption in the country. Together, they cement the normality of
corruption rather than serve as a ‘wake-up call’ to Slovaks. There is very little will to shift corruption into
the realm of the abnormal. To put it bluntly, it may have adverse effects, it may be hurtful, but it is
normal.
Thus, media turn petty corruption into ‘the people’s activity’. Previously unthinkable behaviours of the
‘people’ underwent a process of ‘zľudovenie’ – becoming the endeavour of the ‘people’. Conceptualising
petty corruption in this way allows for its discussion without compromising the standing and the
reputation of the ‘people’ and Slovaks as a nation. Previously, labelling the ‘people’ as corrupt would
entail accusing them of not being good Slovaks. Media avert tainting the ‘people’ by creating a category
of petty corruption of less importance and little harm by lending it a sober detached language. This form
of bribery is therefore condoned rather than condemned.
It is intriguing that right-wing newspapers, the most pronounced promoters of the free market of the
Western kind, pay less attention to petty corruption. To them, petty corruption is not worth writing
about. On the other hand, Pravda and both tabloids publish articles concerned with petty corruption.
Furthermore, Hospodárske noviny is silent on the active role of entrepreneurs in bribery. It exhibits a
143
strong tendency to portray entrepreneurs as victims of corruption and corruption as an impediment to
entrepreneurs (Hospn13). It appears that neoliberalism that holds entrepreneurs as heroes, influences
strongly the local promoters of the liberal market and of entrepreneurship in that it impedes projection
of entrepreneurs as corrupt. Other newspapers studied here also somewhat downplay the role of
entrepreneurs. They are placed in the role of objects rather than active subjects thereby portrayed as
reacting to corruption, rather than inducing it:
“Krchňavý was a head of a mobile control crew [of a local customs authority] and he
received 5,000 euro from entrepreneur Gábriš between January 2011 and March 2012. He
promised not to uncover deficiencies with respect to mineral oils at the premises of a road
transportation company in Nemšová in return for the bribe”( Novyc33).
To reiterate, SMEs and the ‘people’ overlap to a great extent in media constructions when it comes to
petty bribery.
The only exception emerges with a case of bribery of entrepreneurs of Russian origin. Unlike the
portrayals of ‘ordinary’ Slovaks involved in corruption, these accounts provide more detail, depict the
entrepreneurs in leading roles, provide unflattering photographs of the entrepreneurs to construct a
rather negative image of them. These texts also highlight the costs of their wrongdoing to Slovaks in
terms of not contributing their ‘fair share’ to the national budget. This is reminiscent of the negative
appreciation of corruption seen in earlier discourse. However, these entrepreneurs are not Slovaks.
Even more importantly they are members of an unfavourably perceived group, certainly by media – the
Russians. Their activities can, thus, be constructed in this manner. Notwithstanding this assault is not as
ferocious as the critique traditionally reserved to public officials, it is considerably stronger than any
discussion of petty corruption of the ‘people’ which echoes the nineteenth century discourse.
Nevertheless, silencing and softening of the participation of Slovak entrepreneurs in corruption is telling
not only of the influence of IACD, which treats SMEs rather leniently, but also of the truths of the earlier
discourse regarding the ‘people’ and corruption. This is important as it draws responsibility and blame
over corruption in which SMEs are involved away from entrepreneurs and towards the public sector.
144
7.5.1.2 Not so benign bribe-taking
Notwithstanding the overall lenient approach to petty corruption, it emerges that petty corruption on
the side of low and mid-level public officials is treated somewhat less sympathetically than that of the
‘people’.
Headlines such as the examples below indicate whom articles on petty corruption put into the centre of
attention:
“Policemen asked for a bribe – they lost their uniforms and received punishment”
(Novyc19)
“Court punished an ex-customs officer for taking bribes” (Novyc9)
“Found guilty – a local revenue officer got seven years in jail!” (Novyc27)
“Court: Policemen gave driving licenses without driving tests in Zlaté Moravce” (Prav17)
“Fire service inspector accused of corruption was taken into custody” (Novyc6)
“Corruption case in Hodej: Mayor and three MPs surrendered their mandates” (Novyc28)
“Accused of corruption: Mayor of Hodejov and three members of local parliament
arrested” (Plus1)
The above captions put public officials and civil servants into the main roles as protagonists at the outset
of articles, thereby setting an overall tone of these entries. In contrast, headlines attributing bribe-givers
with a leading role as subjects are scarce, only two were noted in the studied period (Novyc7; Novyc11).
In addition, formulations such as “the defendant [a local tax authority official] asked for a reward of
10%” (Novyc27), “Ladislav B. [a councillor at a local authority] asked for bribes” (Novyc4) are prevalent
over statements which put the ‘people’ into the spotlight by attributing them with similarly active roles.
The only exception is the already mentioned case of the Russian entrepreneurs. In addition, punishment
of public officials is discussed, rather than that of bribe-givers. Again, this somewhat blurs the bribe-
giving side.
Another clue to societal perceptions of the greater weight of bribe-taking compared with bribe-giving
can be found in the legal punishment of these crimes. Whereas bribe-takers can be punished by
sentence of imprisonment of three to eight years, bribe-givers can only be imprisoned for up to three
years. It is the public power that maintains its position at the heart of corruption in line with IACD and
with the local truths about corruption. At the same time, the lower rate of punishment of public officials
145
and civil servants reveals resistance of the public sector, protecting itself vis-à-vis the overarching
discourse. To illustrate, out of 118 criminal court cases of corruption and 127 individuals convicted of
the crime of giving or taking a bribe in 2014, only 13 were members of the public sector (Government
Office of Slovakia, 2015). Bribing, rather than accepting a bribe, is punished more often. Public officials
were acquitted four times more often than others. This points to a considerable tension in the society.
Under the guidance of IACD, the current discourse brings the old-adversary of Slovaks – the public
administration back to life by putting them into a more pronounced role in petty corruption. It is even
seen as the source of the problem to which the bribe-giving side merely reacts. Nevertheless, the
discourse on petty corruption is discernibly milder compared to the fierce debates as seen in the
previous periods. The attitude towards petty corruption, both on the side of bribe-giving and bribe-
taking, is rather benevolent with the caveat of the discourse being somewhat more sensitive to the
public sector.
7.5.3 Grand and political corruption
Media constructions of petty corruption are vastly different from their appreciations of grand and
political corruption, that is to say corruption involving high-level public officials and civil servants in both
elected and appointed positions. At the core here is also politics. Thus, the media construct two distinct
strands of corruption. This is far from the understanding of all corruption as universally wrong that IACD
promoted.
This strand is constructed around powerful public-sector individuals, influential corporate interests and
large sums of money meshed together in a convoluted maze of public/private connections, ultimately
leading to government officials. This emerges as a rule to which there is no exception. Corruption takes
on the form of clientelism, favouritism, nepotism, rent-seeking, kickbacks and - to a lesser extent -
bribery in opaque handling of public money and suspicious allocations of public procurement contracts.
Texts utilise factual technical language borrowing vocabulary from the fields of economics and law,
thereby exposing the influence of the rationality of IACD. Unsurprisingly, this is particularly strong in
broadsheets, as tabloids are more inclined to simplify the language. Overall, texts on this form of
corruption are noticeably more comprehensive compared to the succinct reports of petty corruption.
They are longer and more elaborate, include more detail, depict the alleged parties as involved in a web
of claims, counter claims, accusations and denials, have dense and opaque links of politicians in high
public offices with representatives of private corporations, with transactions reaching millions of euros
146
and affairs spilling over the border of Slovakia. Narration of grand and political corruption spans series of
articles, rather than one-off stories as in the case of petty corruption. In addition, each of the studied
sources provides links to further articles on the particular affair or other grand and political corruption
scandals. This feature is largely missing with respect to petty corruption articles, thereby creating an
appearance of isolated infrequent instances. The media paint a rich picture of clandestine activities of
the powerful. These entries bring rather sensational accounts of incidents, even in broadsheets, that
tend to assume a more detached perspective informed by economic rationality and legal reasoning.
Articles concerned with grand corruption start in an engaging, rather than plainly informative way, as
the examples below of headlines demonstrate.
“MP Mičovský opened a scandal in national forests: They overpriced wood transportation
by 14 million euro?!” [Novyc16]
“Fico’s (prime minister) friend Výboh requested 18 million, says the former manager of
Stayer” (Hospn1)
“Fico’s advisor Výboh asked for money Pandur case, says witness” (SME13)
“Fico [PM]: Výboh is my personal friend” (Prav20)
“Secret meetings with Topolánek [prime minister of the Czech Republic]. Fico is mentioned
in a Czech corruption scandal” (Hospn2)
“Ex-adviser to Radičová defends himself and rebuffs the bribe in the Osrblie case” (Sme14)
“Ex-adviser to Radičová refuses he wanted a bribe for the Osrblie grant” (Prav15)
“Tunnels [siphoning off funds and resources] in healthcare were already here during the
first Fico’s government said Sulík [the leader of an oppositional party] (Hospn8)
“Scandal of Ján Počiatek: Tens of millions of euro for a fictional firm” (Plus3)
“Testimony: Fico’s friend did on want to see any mobiles during negotiations” (SME17)
Links to high public officials are usually illuminated, thereby highlighting the political dimension of
corruption. Starting entries on corruption in this manner, that is to say by highlighting high public
officials in elected posts, encourages readers to read these articles from this perspective. This provides a
clue that the past appreciations are alive and well. In addition, imagery that accompanies these articles
further illuminates and foregrounds the public sector by providing photos of high elected or, to a lesser
extent, appointed public officials. Visual attributes co-constructing articles only rarely feature
representatives of the private sector.
147
These entries include direct and indirect quotes of the involved parties and both past, as well as present
tense, thereby dramatising the narrative. This stands out particularly in comparison with the austere
reporting style seen in articles on petty corruption. Texts follow individual scandals into details, instead
of providing a summary as in the case of petty corruption. Often, these texts unfold like a political
debate between the government and the opposition, with much room dedicated to reactions and
stances of oppositional leaders, thereby enhancing the political dimension of corruption. It is important
to stress that more room is given to political opposition, and the voice of experts is largely missing.
The media delve into the background of actors involved in corruption which stands in a stark contrast
with the maintenance of anonymity of individuals discussed in connection to petty corruption.
“Hospitals were buying linear digital accelerators and all tenders were organised by one
firm – Pro Tender. According to Lucia Nicholsonova [an oppositional MP], the firm is linked
to Richard Raši, an MP of SMER [the governmental party] and ex-minister of healthcare via
one of the firm’s representatives.” (Hospn15).
“The public procurement contract of the National Motorway Company is overpriced and
‘carries all signs of corruption’ according to KDH [an oppositional party]. According to Zajac,
firm Paywell, which won the contract, is connected to fictional firm EVOCK Limited based in
Nicosia, Cyprus. It is interesting, that the HQ of this firm is in the same office as those of
many firms from the J&T group [connected to the governing party SMER]34” (Plus3).
“It emerged that the firm that won the public tender [for wood transportation] in Western
Slovak Region is personally connected with Maroš Kondrót, a Smer MP” [Novyc26].
No article fails to draw out connections to political representatives in public offices. Indeed, it is at the
heart of this strand of the discourse and it is what constitutes corruption – the closeness of the public
and the private power. It is important to stress that the political dimension of implicated individuals in
terms of their allegiance to the governing party/parties or personal connection to government officials,
is meticulously elaborated and clearly stated, therefore not allowing room for readers to downplay it or
to forget about it. In other words, the media put high public political officials in the limelight. Private
corporations appear in personal connections with political representatives rather than as operating on
their own accord. The articles are written from a perspective which puts public officials and civil servants
34 one of the most influential corporations in the country implicated in several scandals and suspected of being close to the governmental party SMER
148
linked to them into the active role, thus subjecting them to detailed scrutiny, while the private sector
representatives feature in the background as opportunistic actors at best. This presents continuity from
the discourse about privatisation and political capitalism. Above all, the calls for resignation of
individuals heading a relevant ministry or even of the Prime Minister suggest who is perceived as the
responsible party – the public sector. This goes hand in hand with the above observation of
foregrounding the role of public officials. Albeit corporate representatives receive explicit mentions,
they are somewhat neglected.
At the same time as providing the rich detailed accounts of the closeness of political and economic
elites, the media are not clear as to the activities of the involved individuals themselves. Little detail is
given of the roles played by public officials and their personal proceeds from corruption. Reports stop at
observations of overly expensive contracts and focus on elaborations of links between the public and
the private sector which reflects the difficulty of investigating corruption and a careful approach of
journalists in avoiding accusations of slander. Curiously, more information is provided about implicated
enterprises than about public officials or civil servants. For instance, registration addressses and
background owners attract attention. Their actions are also clearer. However, in spite of vagueness with
respect to the other side of corruption, articles illuminate public officials, mirroring the deep-seated
knowledge and inherent suspicion of public officials. It is enough to activate truths about governors as
corrupt. This instance also reveals what the media are interested in – not technicalities and details, but
rather impressive costs and the obscure breach of the fine line between the public and the private.
The economic rationality shaping the way in which corruption is talked about, is reflected in meticulous
calculations of financial losses to the public budget on which grand and political corruption is built:
“Corruption and mistakes of the government turned eurofunds into a great menace of the
national budget. This is the opinion of Miroslav Beblavý, an independent MP [in the
opposition], according to whom Brussels definitely decided not to refund more than 165
million euro and has already stopped payments amounting to further 413 million. ‘Instead
of an impulse that would lift the country up, frauds with eurofunds reach to the highest
departments of the governing power…’” (Hospn17).
In addition, evidence that articles commonly use is again of a numerical nature consisting of price
comparisons of procured services/products. Wasting public resources is at the heart of the entire
debate which projects the government as inefficient. Misallocation of public resources, due to
149
forwarding private rather than public interests, is the primary concern. Thus, the common good is firmly
positioned within the economic rationality. Further to the issue of a more lenient treatment of the
private sector side of corruption, the media contrast the private sector efficiency with the wastefulness
of the public sector, thereby contributing to the negative image of the government. As such, all media
studied here promote a neoliberal approach to understanding corruption and the world at large. This is
understandable given that they are owned by private corporations.
This notwithstanding, the media discourse does not keep strictly to IACD as the above technical
approach to corruption is complemented by local knowledge stemming from the past.
7.5.3.1 Immoral corruption
The technical and seemingly neutral language discussed above is permeated with populistic rhetoric,
catchy words and constructions saturated with emotive connotations. The quote below is an example of
this approach:
“This is a matter [a case of an overpriced public procurement in a state hospital] of the
entire system configured in such a way so as to financially benefit parasites all linked to one
party. A single day does not pass without the journalists uncovering a new affair”
(Hospn20).
The word ‘parasites’ is in a contrast to the aforementioned detached language. It evokes strongly
negative connotations.
“Ivan Uhliarik [an opposition MP] talks about megatunelling and megaprovisions… “It cannot be
possible for the predators from Košice to divide this prey worth of millions” (Prav32).
Words ‘megatunnelling’ and ‘megaprovisions’ serve to escalate accusations and to catch the attention of
the general readership. The metaphor of predators and the prey further cements this by alluding to
voracious government officials. It also provides a link to the rural past of Slovakia as continuing to
manifest itself at present.
“Počiatek’s ministry is stealing from motorways, the post, the railways without any
embarrassment. People from our country have to send around five billion euros to Cyprus for
nothing….They will not stop at anything. They are stealing in the healthcare, they are stealing at
150
the Ministry of Transportation, they are stealing profits from the roads which took our citizens
generations to build.” [Hospn7].
This fragment overtly employs the ‘people’ construct by accusing government officials of jeopardising
the fruits of the work of the ‘people’ linking back the present to the nineteenth century. The shameless
self-enrichment fortifies the image of greedy unprincipled governors. It alludes to the breach of moral
principles anchored in the ‘people’. This statement makes a rather forcible point of widespread
corruption by using enumeration and anaphora, thereby increasing the impact of the accusation.
Making a strong and a lasting impact with using powerful rhetoric is also the case of the article from
which the following statement is taken:
“Up until now, carriers transported one cubic metre of wood for €4.26. Now the large companies
that won the tender, transport and will transport for four years the same amount for €6.33. This
cannot be called anything else than stealing, said Mičovský [oppositional MP]” (Novyc26).
The original word used here – ‘rozkrádanie’ [stealing] has a more subtley negative connotation
compared to mere ‘stealing’ [kradnutie], as it refers to turning the public assets to personal thiefdoms.
This statement effectively accuses a public company of robbing the nation.
“According to him [an opposition MP], this case is a ‘disgusting corruption goulash’ into which
SMER added all the vices of public procurement” (SME31).
The adjective ‘disgusting’ used in the above statement is a strong word connoting negative emotions
and even repulsion. In addition, ‘corruption goulash’ is yet another example of popularising and
increasing attractiveness of these texts and the discourse.
“Another megascandal of Fico’s government: This is how they manage our wood” (Novyc24).
The last excerpt constructs the government as the ‘other’ by referring to the institution as ‘them’ whiles
positioning the nation, or in other words the ‘people’ and the media itself in which it occurred as ‘us’.
These quotes are indicative of the abundance of rhetorical devices and vivid descriptions enhancing the
appeal of articles and arousing readers’ imagination, national sentiments and the sense of betrayal of
the ‘people’. They illustrate the striking difference between the unembellished straightforward
language of petty corruption and the rich attractive language of political and grand corruption.
151
The media speak to the general public drawing on morality of the ‘peoples’ identity abused by
authorities and suffering under the selfish dictate of the powerful state. It is this that, to a great extent,
defines their existence and place in the world.
The above goes hand in hand with the construction of damage that grand and political corruption inflicts
on the ‘people’. These complement the rational perspective of IACD that elaborates on the financial
harm of corruption and adds a quintessentially Slovak substance to the vague mentions of corruption as
damaging democracy and wellbeing:
“SMER [the governing party] has been creating a system which supports corruption and
clientelism and shifts the democracy of the western kind away and towards oligarchy. A
small group of people are getting rich, while the majority of the population are becoming
poorer’ claimed Ľudovít Kaník, the leader of Slovak Democratic Christian Party – Democratic
Party [an opposition party]” (Hospn20).
The above circulates a familiar picture of the rich government against the poor nation. Interestingly,
corruption is still linked to danger. This is conceptualised as a slide from democracy to oligarchy which
carries adverse connotations of the era of socialism, as well as of Russia, a country perceived as the
greatest current threat by Slovaks (Krivý, 2016). The unstable situation in neighbouring Ukraine,
reminiscent of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1968, adds further nuance to
such construction of corruption which implies regression.
“The case of an overly expensive purchase of a CT machine is only a mere drop in the sea of
the money grabbed by individuals close to politicians or politicians themselves. Some
estimates mention one billion euro, which the state ‘loses’ in a single year. One does not
need to be a mathematical genius to appreciate the sum. Let us draw some comparisons.
Salary increases of doctors cost 19.3 million euro every year… They could be increased for
many years to come if it was not for the ‘disappeared’ billion every year...We can only
dream about what the country would look like without such thieving, corruption and
clientelism. The retired can forget about any rise in their pensions, doctors and nurses can
dream about dignified state hospitals” (Novyc29).
The juxtaposition of salaries of doctors and proceeds of grand and political corruption for individual
public officials also explicitly builds on the older theme of impoverishing Slovaks. Doctors and nurses are
viewed as critically important for the population, but severely under-paid, thereby not appreciated by
152
the governing structures. This is further enhanced by the insinuation of the impacts of corruption on the
retired, a vulnerable group of the population. In other words, this article projects reckless corrupt
officials jeopardising the common good in a rather emotional and personal fashion that goes beyond
mere calculations of money ‘disappeared’ from the public budget.
The power of the construct of harm to the nation, and above all to the ‘people’, is documented by an
observation that this element is found in all studied sources, broadsheets and tabloids alike. The
undertones of populism are thus not exclusive to tabloids only; they are a firm part of the discourse in
Slovakia.
It is important to stress here that petty corruption is devoid of any economic, moral, social or political
implications in terms of its consequences. Likewise, the private sector implicated in grand corruption
scandals is spared from fervent construction of corruption compromising the common good of Slovaks.
The overwhelming focus on government officials is further demonstrated by articles reacting to, and
constructing, realities of public protests against the implicated individuals in the public sector. These
shine a light on the public sector with the overarching demand being that of political resignations. The
private sector is ‘let off’ with a few critical and vague remarks which contrast with emotionally stirring
accounts of corruption of public officials.
7.5.3.2 Compromising government
Corruption continues to serve as an expedient political weapon of the opposition. This is reflected in the
composition of articles on the theme that rarely omit mentions of representatives of the political
opposition critiquing or even attacking government. Often, it is the opposition that is presented as the
investigators of grand corruption monitoring the government, the source of compromising evidence,
those pursuing answers from implicated officials, those accusing and demanding punishment, and those
organising motions of no confidence and public protests. In short, the opposition is placed in the role of
fighters against governmental corruption. The most inflamed statements and construction of corruption
come from oppositional figures. In turn, members of the opposition are given considerable space in
articles, while the accused side is reduced to reacting to accusations and attributed with a defensive
role. Furthermore, high public officials are restricted to offering a rather weak defence in reaction to
accusations. Denial or curious answers which lend plausibility to the rational accusations based on
calculations and other ‘hard evidence’ and damages the credibility of the accused:
153
“’I reserve the right to private, friendly get-togethers with people whom I feel good with
and with whom I like to have a glass of wine’ said Fico (PM implicated in a scandal)”
[Prav20].
“’What does the opposition think? That some guys from the US Ministry of Defence come
here with carrier bags and hand out bribes to the government of Slovakia?’ asked Fico. We
will be tough and we will not be stopped, said the PM. ‘If we followed what Matovič, Hlina
or Prochádzka say [oppsitional MPs], this country would simply conk and it would never be
possible to do anything around here’ added Fico” [Hospn11].
The latter quote is of particular interest, as it appeared in the economically-focused newspaper, thereby
ridiculing its author in the eyes of the readers. Nevertheless, similar reactions of the accused appear in
all studied newspapers. Such claims are not followed by any supportive statements. On the other hand,
accusations are given support in the form of further elaborations on suspicious activities. In addition, the
media present the input of the opposition on corruption incidents as rational, sophisticated and
informed:
“According to Dostál [an opposition MP], the government prioritised the interests of SMER
Democracy [the governing party], at the cost of the public interest. The leader of Civil
Conservative Party [an oppositional party] says that the claims of Mr Fico demonstrate the
desire of the government and other institutions of central administration to advance those
towns and cities that are under the control of SMER at the cost of other towns and cities in
Slovakia” (Prav35).
This is hardly surprising, given that media put themselves in the role of watchdogs of democracy.
As such, corruption still serves as a political tool of the opposition. The current discourse cements
governing political power as a precondition of corruption. There is no link between political opposition
and corruption. The political dimension of corruption is meticulously foregrounded as scandals in the
public sector are intimately intertwined with political power of the governing party/parties. In their
constructions, media implicitly and explicitly support the opposition. Thus, corruption is overtly
presented as highly politically charged matter. There is also another more obscure political aspect of the
discourse connected with the ideological underpinnings of the media. The tendency to politicise
corruption has been found to be present across Europe (Bågenholm and Charron, 2014), thereby
mirroring a much broader troubling trend in the use of the discourse.
154
It is worth pointing out that leaders of the oppositon who are granted with most space are the
promoters of neoliberal outlooks. The media studied here are grounded in the private sector and
inescapably marked with private sector interests and, as already pointed out, identified with
neoliberalism, albeit with slight differences between them. Their internalisation of neoliberal truths is
reflected in the media construction of corruption. Nevertheless, the neoliberal rationality behind the
wrongness of corruption based on calculations of costs vis-à-vis the ‘people’, to which the readers are
guided, is imbued with moral connotations and national sentiments. It is not merely economic
rationality that the discourse seeks to induce in readers in guiding them to disapprove of grand
corruption and supporting the holders of neoliberal truths.
The amalgamation of the local and the international presents an attractive and captivating narrative,
deeply embedded in the Slovak public conscious and subconscious. The media promote neoliberalism
wrapped in moral and emotional connotations stemming from the Slovak contextual realities. These
influences produce articles appealing to the general public when put together. Being popular and being
read are, indeed, crucial for private media enterprises. They are required not only to inform the public
and to monitor the society, but also to produce profit. Articles on corruption are not an exception.
Grand and political corruption attracts public attention as indicators of popularity of these articles; that
is to say views, shares and likes, suggest (see Appendix B-F). This stands in stark contrast to technical
austere entries on petty corruption which are little noticed. The public demand and the nature of these
articles reinforce each other. It is thus in the interest of media to produce attractive texts on corruption.
Furthermore, the strong state is taken to be bad news for the media, as experienced during 40 years of
Communism and autocratic governments following the collapse of the Iron Curtain. The interests of the
media are best served by neoliberalism which they, in turn, promote, whether consciously or not, by
attacking the inefficiency of the government and by concealing the role of the private sector. Thus, the
way media shape corruption is intimately intertwined with their world views and their interest. It
emerges that at the heart of the media discourse is first and foremost the matter of challenging the
strong state and its powerful representatives interwoven with the necessity to be attractive to readers,
hence drawing on and appealing to their ‘people’ identity.
7.5.4 Losing the sight of anti-corruption
Articles concerned specifically with anti-corruption are infrequent and tend to be linked to the
performance of Slovakia in international indices measuring corruption. Unsurprisingly, the attention is
geared towards the state of corruption in the country that could be best described as a deluge of
155
corruption rather than to anti-corruption itself. What resonates with the media is the unfavourable
international perception of Slovakia manifested in rankings:
“Our country reached the sixth worst in the ranking (CPI) in Europe” (SME33)
“The EU published a report on corruption in individual member states and Slovakia did not
fare well” (Novyc1)
“Corruption blossoms in Slovakia: We are losing the fight” [a reaction to the EU report on
corruption (Plus2)
The power of such indices to subject countries and their populations to the belief that they are corrupt
‘to the core’ is reflected in the lack of reflection and paucity of attention paid to positive aspects that the
indices highlight, such as improvement in the CPI 2015 ranks by 6 places from 2014 (Transparency
International, 2014; 2015). Instead, Slovakia is compared with developing countries. One headline reads,
“When it comes to corruption, we even managed to beat Botswana. And we are worst in the region”
(Hospn11). In other words, negative messages prevail. It could be opined that the above sensational
approach to how corrupt the country is, is more attractive. These statements are bolstered by numerical
evidence – a number of reported corruption cases, estimated amounts paid in bribes and so forth.
Shortly, the media reflect and re-iterate Slovakia as ridden with corruption. This goes hand in hand with
the elaboration of the unpunishable nature of corruption in Slovakia. These truths are given
considerable weight as they are presented as coming from experts. It is important to stress that the
pronunciation of the above entails relegating anti-corruption suggestions and directions to be taken to a
second-class interest.
Vis-à-vis such a detrimental perception of the country and its people, Slovak media handle the
accusations in a rather Slovak way. They circulate these truths while protecting the ‘people’ from the
unfavourable image which comes with them. This is done by resorting to the use of the third person
when discussing the topic. For instance, the sentence “Slovaks: Our state is corrupt” (Hospn2) appears
instead of, perhaps, ‘We are corrupt’, and the statement ‘This is how the police are bribed’ (Novyc13)
instead of ‘This is how we/people bribe the police’. The former is particularly telling as it transfers the
blame and responsibility onto the government and central public administration at large. The role of the
general public in contributing to the adverse situation is muted. Slovaks, including SMEs, either appear
in the background of corrupt exchanges or emerge as victims of the corrupt public sector. Victims only
participate in corruption out of necessity. It is telling that the only article that singles out petty
156
corruption for discussion in relation to the unfavourable results of surveys, frames bribes coming from
Slovaks as ‘rewards’ (Novyc13). The tendency to protect Slovaks vis-à-vis rampant corruption is also
manifested in explaining the lack of participation of Slovaks in uncovering corruption by institutional
deficit in the protection of whistle-blowers. Nevertheless, such attention is rather rare, with most
articles limited to discussion of the overall situation which is either linked to instances of grand and
political corruption through direct references in text or by links that appear alongside articles (see
Appendices B-F).
The above means that anti-corruption suggestions and recommendations are backgrounded as more
attention is paid to what is not working, rather than to what should be done. Where such directions for
future anti-corruption are present, they are rather vague and take the form of broad commentaries on
the need of institutional improvements. Furthermore, articles concerned with public protests against
corruption also highlight the accusations and demands of personal resignation as well as populistic
slogans, while demands of anti-corruption are not present or are relegated to brief remarks at the end
of articles (Hospn8; Novyc22; Novyc23). A comprehensive coherent and, above all, constructive anti-
corruption debate is missing in the media.
Texts specifically concerned with anti-corruption are rare. They discuss technical attributes of proposed
anti-corruption measures (Novyc31; Prav21; Prav36; Sme16) or blame the authors of proposed anti-
corruption instruments for the lack of quality (Hospn1; Hospn5; Novyc24; Prav16; Sme25; Sme34).
These texts are effectively the only attempts to circulate an anti-corruption agenda. Yet they fail to
attract the attention of readers. The articles are written using a legalistic language and avoiding any
moral or emotional connotations and overall lacking the attractiveness of the previous type of texts.
They represent a rather straightforward adoption of IACD in its reasoning and in the promotion of anti-
corruption solutions.
Indeed, it could be argued that anti-corruption has never been at the heart of the Slovak media
discourse on corruption. As such, the extent to which Slovak media embrace their role of promoting
anti-corruption is limited. For instance, it is curious that the instances of corruption, whether petty or
grand, are not linked to anti-corruption. Anti-corruption measures already at hand are little discussed
and the central message of corruption as harmful is employed in a rather selective manner as argued
earlier. Furthermore, media fail to translate the IACD message of importance of the public engagement
in anti-corruption by placing the responsibility for anti-corruption in the hands of political decision
makers in the government that they critique for being corrupt. This reduces the role of the public. It
157
constructs a rather schizophrenic image of governors as both saviours and villains. Nevertheless, as anti-
corruption is backgrounded, the primary concern of the media discourse emerges as that of removing
corrupt officials from power.
Overall, it is surprising how little attention anti-corruption receives and how media fail to popularise
anti-corruption. It is not anti-corruption that the discourse prioritises, but rather scandalous attractive
grand and political corruption. In other words, the media are busy pathologising the public sector to the
extent the central message of IACD is forgotten.
7.5.5 Workings of the media discourse in society
The overwhelming focus on the political dimension of grand corruption taps into the sensitivities of
Slovaks – grievances inflicted on the ‘people’ by selfish governors threading through the history of the
young nation and sealed deeply in their identity. In other words, the discourse appeals to a particular
reason of Slovaks as citizens that merges economic rationality and the ‘people’ morality. Together they
inform the public activity that the media discourse shapes and, in turn, makes possible. This is
constrained to electoral and protest activity targeted against public officials seeking their political
responsibility. Anti-corruption activity, along with anti-corruption mechanisms at the disposal of citizens,
is overlooked, thereby creating little space for anti-corruption activity.
A number of protests have taken place in recent years, starting with mass demonstrations following the
eruption of the largest grand corruption scandal in the history of Slovakia, the Gorilla affair, in 2012. This
surge of activity is often interpreted and heralded as the awakening of Slovaks and a manifestation of an
anti-corruption mood in society. However, all protests gradually ceased without achieving much on the
front of anti-corruption. In more positive cases, protests led to the resignations of the accused public
officials, as in the case of the entire government stepping down in 2012, the resignation of the speaker
and the deputy speaker of the parliament and the Minister of Health Care in 2014 among others.
Following resignations, the protest activity largely ceased. Some protests came to an end even without
achieving such closure. However, resignations were not followed by criminal punishment. In the history
of Slovakia, no high government official has received a criminal sentence. This is also true for
representatives of private corporations. At best, tokenistic punishment of low to mid-ranking
representatives from both sectors forms the ceiling of what has been, so far, possible. Yet, Slovakia has
not seen meaningful renewal of public discontent, and virtually no demands for fortifying anti-
corruption. The public fulfilled their role as constructed by media. Therefore, protests emerge as a
158
ventilation of anger against government or against particular individuals, and not activity against
corruption as such. Given its nature, the discourse only allows for attacking individuals and not the
system itself within which they function. It is, therefore, important not to confuse activity on grand
corruption with anti-corruption activity.
In addition to the above, the discourse does not make a meaningful activity against corporations
involved in political corruption possible. This is demonstrated by an attempt of staging a public protest
in 2014 that went largely unnoticed by the public.
The knowledge that media disseminate about corruption also empowers and encourages the public to
take action against those perceived as corrupt or rather their party on the electoral front. This goes
hand in hand with the effort to stop corruption by removing those in public office. Indeed, the public
drew political responsibility for officials. They withdrew electoral support for them. To illustrate the
point, support for the party implicated in the Gorilla scandal plummeted in 2012, and the party did not
reach the electoral threshold in the 2016 general elections. The current governing party, Direction -
Social Democracy, also recorded a decrease in support following a series of scandals during their 2012-
2016 single-party government. Removing the corrupt public officials from power is, indeed, part and
parcel of anti-corruption effort, but it is merely one fraction of it. Thus, IACD merged with the local
appreciations do incite the public into action, but only to some extent.
However, the media have little to say about anti-corruption which translates into a paucity of public
activity on this front. This claim is substantiated by the developments after the Gorilla scandal. Following
the affair, Direction – Social Democracy decisively won the general elections and formed the first single-
party government in the history of Slovakia, despite a poor track record on anti-corruption activity. The
party won again in 2016, again in spite of its scant engagement with anti-corruption and despite a
number of accusations of corruption. In addition, parties building their electoral campaigns on anti-
corruption failed to attract sufficient electoral support. Given the proclaimed concern among the public
with corruption, this begs explanation. However, it is in line with the media discourse failing to promote
anti-corruption and thus fuelling the overall passivity of the public vis-à-vis anti-corruption and
constraining their activity to expressing discontent.
In addition, the Slovak public is rather phlegmatic with respect to the civic engagement necessary for
promoting anti-corruption. The discourse grounds the responsibility for tackling corruption with
government officials as the highest decision maker. This is of little help here, as it transfers the task of
159
furthering anti-corruption into the hands of officials and silences the role of citizens in direct promotion
of anti-corruption. The role of citizens rests solely with removing corrupt officials from the office. The
lack of civic activity is reflected in low voter turnout at local, regional and general elections and at
referenda,35 even those directly concerned with grand corruption. Furthermore, the Global Corruption
Barometer suggests that only a quarter of Slovaks are willing to join or support an anti-corruption
organisation (Transparency International, 2013c). The lack of civic participation dovetails with the
history of troubled relations between governor and governed in Slovakia perpetuated by the discourse
on corruption. Indeed, erosion of the bond has been at the heart of the discourse on corruption ever
since it emerged in the nineteenth century. The current discourse further impedes greater involvement
of the public in public matters, in this case anti-corruption by constructing a chasm between the public
and their governors.
As to petty corruption, the media make possible such understanding of the phenomena which incites
limited activity on this front too. This is reflected in the lack of eagerness to report petty corruption in
Slovakia, illustrated by an insufficient use of the national anti-corruption hotline. Only 159 calls were
recorded in 2014 and only 53 calls in 2015 (Government Office of Slovakia, 2014). 36 It is worth
remembering that, according to Transparency International, every fifth Slovak had a direct recent
experience with corruption in 2014. The use of the hotline appears as alarmingly low in a country
believed to be riddled with corruption.
Low activity in reporting the phenomena could also be explained by poor protection of whistle-blowers.
However, new whistle-blowing laws entered into force in January 2015. Although formal adoption of
protection mechanisms does not necessarily translate into its full activation on the ground, it is worth
stressing that the number of reports dropped in 2015. Thus, legal protection alone is not sufficient in a
situation where the society does not recognise petty corruption as wrong.
The above is connected with a low number of recorded corruption incidents (see Table 3 below). These
figures are strikingly low given how widespread corruption is taken to be in Slovakia. Criminal charges
raised (see Table 3 below) are even rarer.
35 The 2010 referendum on withdrawal of immunity from prosecution for members of Parliament went unnoticed by the public with not even 23% Slovaks casting a vote. 36 The report does not detail what type of corruption was reported. However, based on annual Report of the Activity of the National Crime Agency which provides a brief summary of the kind of corruption cases reported and prosecuted, it appears that overwhelming majority are cases of petty corruption.
160
Table 3 Corruption indicators
Year Recorded cases Commencement of
prosecution
Prosecuted persons
2012 533 135 103
2013 370 94 104
2014 468 118 127
2015 367 94 116
Source: MH SR, 2013; 2014; 2015
Clerly, the existence of anti-corruption mechanisms is of little use where society is not prepared to use
them.
Lastly, the Slovak discourse and its manifestations on the ground illuminate ramifications of IACD’s
confusion regarding the public/private dichotomy. On the one hand, IACD attempts to reconcile the
public and the private, but on the other it strives to segregate them as they oppose each other. In
Slovakia, this contradiction results in a sharpening of the public/private divide. The discourse has put the
public and the private into an uncompromising opposition since the nineteenth century. It means that
the public interest is at odds with the interests of the holder of public power. In turn, individuals
representing the public power or, in other words, the state, are in tension with the private interests of
the ‘people’ amounting to the collective public interest. The notion of the irreconcilable nature of the
two underpinning the international demand for their strict segregation taps into the Slovak appreciation
of the public and the private. However, due to the international lack of clarity in implicitly demanding
accord between the two spheres, while explicitly pursuing their separation, the Slovak discourse ignores
the idea of bringing the public and the private together in a harmonious whole. The public and the
private are in tension and little room is created for their conciliation. Hence, anti-corruption based on
the principal agent framework can hardly take hold when the public and the private are torn apart. The
lack of public activity pursuing reconciliation, that is to say anti-corruption, is symptomatic of the
unresolved tension on the side of the IACD.
In sum, the Slovak media discourse makes narrow understandings of corruption and scope of action for
the general public possible. It fails to link corruption with anti-corruption and to raise awareness of anti-
corruption instruments, thereby reinforcing normalcy of petty corruption and normal action, vis-à-vis
political corruption, which only partially actuate the potential of the public activity. Above all, it is not
161
succeeding at inducing the truth about corruption as universally wrong. Slovak appreciations of
corruption are limited to individuals in public power which restricts a broader appreciation of
complexities of corruption and powers at work that perpetuate corruption beyond individuals.
7.5.5.1 Leniency towards private sector
The final piece of the jigsaw of corruption discourse in Slovakia is its power effects. It is now time to take
a look at whom passivity to corruption benefits. A fundamental element to consider here is that the
Slovak discourse evolved as a tool of gaining control of the ‘people’. Historicising the current discourse
in Slovakia revealed that this control was pursued by stimulating anti-governor sentiments by
constructing rulers/governors as corrupt.
The media set the public sector in the spotlight while acting towards corruption in the private sector in a
laxer manner. This corresponds with a discrepancy in punishment available for the public and private
sector actors. Notwithstanding that prosecution of high public officials is rare and punishment at the top
level effectively non-existent in the last three years, some extent of political responsibility exists. With
grand corruption being, by and large, synonymous with corruption, further ramifications for government
and the public sector at large include an unfavourable appearance in international anti-corruption
surveys. These can result in an imposition of international sanctions, such as the EU decision to halt
payment to Slovakia following the concerns of corruption in the country (European Commission, 2016).
The lack of prosecution for grand corruption necessarily applies to the private sector. There is very little
in terms of responsibility on this level as indirect punishment, as in the case of the public sector, does
not apply. While the discourse fulfils the role of attacking governor and drawing some, albeit limited,
responsibility, the private sector goes unpunished symbolically or otherwise. This insight dovetails with
concerns over the power of private corporations influencing public administration at the top level by
pulling ropes in the background (Gbúrová, 2012). Nevertheless, little evidence or scholarly research is
available on the topic, which highlights the acute need of investigation into this facet of contemporary
power relations in Slovakia.
Moving on to petty corruption, entrepreneurs are only occasionally punished (see Table 4 below).
162
Table 4 Prosecutions for corruption
Year Prosecuted private sector actors* Prosecuted individuals
total
2012 13 103
2013 14 104
2014 9 127
2015 6 116
* Owners or private enterprises and statutory representatives.
Source: Ministry of Economy of Slovakia, 2013; 2014; 2015
It appears that the structure benefitting most from the current discourse is the market, particularly its
large players. Indeed, it is the privately-owned media, some of which is in the hands of influential
corporations, which construct corruption and circulate it among the public.
Nevertheless, despite the local discourse relegating petty corruption to a second-class issue, it is petty,
rather than grand, corruption that is punished. Furthermore, the demand side of corruption, namely
the general public, is prosecuted more often than the offer side. This appears to be in tension with the
insights of the analysis. Certainly, more research is required into various aspects of power plays and
dynamics of corruption in Slovakia. From the perspective of this thesis, the peculiarity could be
explained by power structures working in such a way so as to maintain their position while exhibiting
some anti-corruption activity to the international and the local audiences. Notwithstanding the
disproportionate punishment of the general public, the cases of prosecution are rare. Only 127
individuals out of 461 investigated cases were charged in 2014, 103 out of 370 in 2013 and 104 out of
533 in 2012. Sentences are also relatively moderate, most often consisting of probation and fines. In this
light, prosecution for corruption in Slovakia appears somewhat tokenistic, cementing the arguments
made above.
Regarding the exposure to neoliberalism, the scrutiny of the Slovak constructions of corruption lends
credence to the arguments of IACD promoting and furthering the neoliberal agenda (see Gebel, 2012;
Brown and Cloke, 2004; Bedirghanoglu, 2007). In the Slovak context, this takes on the form of
privileging the private sector also observed on the level of the international discourse as argued in the
literature review (see Chapter Two).
163
7.5.6 The local media – promoter of anti-corruption?
IACD tasks free and independent media with promoting anti-corruption. When it comes to the Slovak
media, what might appear on the surface as fulfilling this duty, falls apart upon closer scrutiny. Media
circulate knowledge about corruption which blends together local legacies and complexities with IACD
that, together, do relatively little in terms of bolstering anti-corruption. This starts with a glaring
inconsistency between constructing petty and grand corruption and ends with the neglect of anti-
corruption.
As demonstrated throughout this chapter, since the conception of the nation, corruption has been used
in a specific manner in Slovakia. It has been continually aligned in media with malevolent behaviour of a
rival for influence embodied in the notion of harming the nation. It crystallised as a matter intimately
linked to the public power to the extent that public power became a predisposition to being corrupt.
This is further nurtured by IACD, given its preoccupation with the public sector. The once
straightforward employment of the discourse mobilising the public into expressing distrust to a
particular political party accused of corruption, corruption as discussed by media has been developing in
a more opaque manner since the 1990s and the arrival of media independent from political factions.
Vital elements of corruption as a tool of reducing the power of the rival still underpin how corruption is
talked about today, thereby revealing it continues to fulfil its original purpose. The current discourse is
used by bearers of the truths of neoliberalism in such a way so as to induce a subtle public support for
its ideals by constructing an unfavourable image of the state that is unwilling to promote the common
good through the market. The Slovak media take the neoliberal ideals and cloak them in the ‘people’
morality. However, as argued above, the media are focused on attacking the rival of the market – the
powerful state, rather than on promoting anti-corruption. It embraces the neoliberal truth of less state =
less corruption, more market = less corruption, without incorporating the vital element of anti-
corruption.
It has been argued that the focus on grand corruption not only targets the state and matches interests
of the private sector and media, but also fits into local narratives of corruption, thereby tapping into the
public knowledge on corruption and on governors. Media do not simply fulfil the role of the guard dogs
of democracy, they are also bound by market rationality as enterprises. Thus, they are not merely a
mouthpiece of IACD passively airing international views, but are also engaged actively in complex power
plays. Notwithstanding the above, it could be said that media appear to be doing a good job in
uncovering grand corruption. The issue is that they do not pay much attention to anti-corruption or to
164
promoting the public that could take on the role of the principal. Media promote such truths about
corruption and such rationality that channels concerns towards political dissatisfaction with governors,
rather than towards anti-corruption activity. It is, therefore, of limited use when it comes to countering
grand and political corruption, and even less so petty corruption.
The issue of silencing petty corruption is of particular interest here. Media are tasked with raising
awareness of the harmful nature of corruption thereby stirring society into its renouncement on all
fronts. Slovak media do not bolster the notion of promoting costs of corruption to prompt the rational
public into abandoning corruption. The strand of the discourse that deals with petty corruption does not
discuss costs, dangers and does not present petty corruption as wrong, whether economically or
morally. Media neither translate the message of costs of engaging in corruption in terms of being
punished, as retributions for public officials and civil servants are highlighted and corruption is overall
construed as little punished. It therefore fails to stigmatise those involved in corruption in society. This is
enhanced by the paucity of elaboration on how instances of petty corruption surfaced, thereby creating
awareness of the possibility of getting caught and thus repelling individuals from engaging in corruption.
The discourse does not circulate knowledge about available anti-corruption mechanisms at the disposal
of the general public and, indeed, SMEs. Rather, the public is discouraged by stories of whistle-blowers
losing their jobs while achieving nothing. Positive role models of members of the public or
entrepreneurs reporting, or challenging in other ways, corruption that could encourage and inspire
others are missing. Without such role models, it is difficult to follow a different path. In addition, private
sector-led, as well as civic, initiatives are underway in the society, but they do not receive much
attention in print media.
The discourse creates an identity of Slovaks and that of SMEs as sufferers of corruption which makes
action against petty corruption somewhat difficult. Instead, it entrenches petty corruption as a socially
accepted form of dealing with public administration. Furthermore, it constructs anti-corruption as a
matter of the government, dedicated central administration, NGOs and politicians, rather than as a
public endeavour. This is rather problematic given the secretive nature of corruption. Petty corruption,
given the limited scope and impact of individual acts of corruption, is unlikely to be revealed without
one of the involved parties willing to report it.
The above problematises the international assumption of the general public perceiving corruption as a
problem. IACD is concerned with equipping the public and SMEs with tools to combat corruption. It does
not provide for the lack of recognition of wrongness of corruption. Indeed, media are expected to raise
165
awareness of corruption as wrong but the Slovak media are not performing as expected. Simply, the
media do not construct petty corruption as costly or harmful, thereby not encouraging economic
rationality towards corruption among the public.
To sum up, IACD assumes that media fulfil their function and ingrain the tenets of anti-corruption in the
society and shape the society into behaving like the principal. Anti-corruption instruments consequently
build on these foundations presumed to be in existence. As such, IACD takes the existence of the
rational public, that reacts appropriately to incentive/punishment structures, for granted. However, it
could be posited that anti-corruption is faced with a ‘chicken and egg’ problem. What comes first – a
rational public that embraces anti-corruption, or anti-corruption that shapes the public to become
rational and dismiss corruption? As a rational public is essential to the operationalisation of anti-
corruption instruments, this is a vital point to address by IACD. It appears that IACD is reliant on the
rational public, at least in the sense of the ability to recognise corruption as harmful. This public is
provided with tools and instruments with which to fight corruption. Without the rational public, these
instruments are futile. The Slovak media do not sufficiently promote this core truth, thereby creating a
rather passive society that is not fully in line with the international assumptions.
7.5.7 IACD: Building a house before laying foundations
The investigation into the meanings of corruption confirmed the multifaceted rich world of divergent
meanings and activities that the term can cover. Whereas the scope and type of activities labelled as
corruption has grown over the studied period, the way they are talked about remained relatively
coherent.
The local media adopt, adapt, pick and choose elements of IACD that suit the context of media and of
Slovakia at large. The argument of superficial and instrumental adoption of anti-corruption in Slovakia
vis-à-vis a weak external pressure following its acceptation into international institutions (see Chapter
Three) can be refined in light of the analysis of the media discourse. It is not simply a matter of the
tokenistic adoption of anti-corruption in Slovakia at the time of heightened external pressure and its
abandonment when the pressure weakens. Nor is the issue of lagging anti-corruption sufficiently
explained by the lack of institutional capacity of individual states, their governments and their publics to
actuate anti-corruption. This stops at the observation and does not touch upon the why’s and how’s of
this limited capacity. Likewise, it is not enough to ground the responsibility and the blame of
166
malfunctioning anti-corruption with international actors for ignoring the local and imposing their
international truths and therefore failing to address local phenomena.
An apparent gap exists in critical reflection on the workings of IACD in the local context by relating the
insights of the international with the insights of the local. The penetration of IACD into the local realm is
not a matter of everything or nothing being received locally. Rather, it is a complex interaction which
meshes together the international and the local as this research shows. This thesis thus takes the
argument of the lack of coherence between the local and the international understandings a step
further.
At the heart of the argument pursued here is the issue of the neglect of the local agency. It is opined
here that IACD does not only ignore local agency in terms of creating its own appreciations of
corruption, it also overlooks local agency with respect to tailoring the supposedly universal truths
promoted by IACD. Indeed, the blind insistence on universality makes this possible. The failure of Slovak
media to install the desired rational public illuminates the issue inherent in building anti-corruption on
taken for granted economic rationality and in over reliance on free independent media to prepare the
grounds for international anti-corruption instruments. Free media are not a passive mouthpiece of IACD.
Media are not merely a watchdog of the society. They are also a part and parcel of local power plays and
not immune to the pursuance of selfinterest and own influence. The local media do not fulfil the task of
turning the society into being averse to corruption and into a follower the economic rationality. This is
due to in part being subject to public demand of sensation but also thanks to working with knowledge
that has been circulating in the society since the nineteenth century. The ramification of IACD’s
negligence of the media agency is the current media discourse on corruption in Slovakia shaping public
attitudes. It is media that is a part of the much broader societal discourse that is also to blame for a lack
of intolerance of grand and political corruption at the top but also for societal intolerance to petty
corruption lower down, in addition to a paucity of societal engagement with anti-corruption. Slovaks are
relegated to the position of onlookers waiting for change to come from elsewhere and not encouraged
to act themselves.
The above renders the punishment structures of anti-corruption of limited effectiveness. The costs and
risks associated with getting caught, that is to say imprisonment, confiscation of proceeds of corruption
and/or imposition of meaningful rather than tokenistic penalties, are low as the public is not willing to
exercise pressure on public authorities, that is to say the courts, but above all the government as the
167
ultimate authority. Slovaks fail to push for enforcement penalties for public officials and private sector
actors alike. The chances of getting caught when it comes to petty bribery are also low without the will
of the other side to report it. Transparency and oversight mechanisms uncovering grand corruption in
particular are of little use if they are not followed by meaningful sanctions. Transparency with respect to
petty corruption does not bear fruits when it is ignored or indeed the public is not aware of it.
Furthermore, the discourse prevents other activities that can increase the risks of getting caught. The
scope for interaction with the public sector in terms of advancing anti-corruption is minute. In addition,
activity with respect to petty corruption relying on the willingness of citizens to report corruption is also
curtailed.
The above leads to a situation where yet another anti-corruption mechanism fails to bear the desired
results. The role of indices, most notably Transparency International’s CPI, is not only to monitor
individual countries’ progress but also to stimulate a domestic drive to combat corruption so as to
improve the international image of their country. The Slovak discourse shifts blame for corruption to
those accused of political corruption, that is to say the government. As argued above, this is to be
resolved (at best) by withholding the support for government and removing the government. This does
not necessarily coincide with demand for anti-corruption to cleanse the country’s name. Purging the
country’s name is not essential as the adverse rankings only reflect negatively on the government,
rather than on the country on a whole.
The Slovak public fails, to a great extent, to fulfil their duties both in terms of prevention and
punishment as the principal in addition to failing to take action against petty corruption, thus reducing
the capacity of the principal (the state) to act. These manifest itself in the country lagging behind in
fighting corruption. Constant reminders of the pervasiveness of corruption coupled with a lack of
punishment of grand corruption feed public powerlessness vis-à-vis unpunishable grand corruption that
effectively justifies and excuses petty corruption. Grand and petty corruption feed on one another –
public officials continually accused of grand corruption have relatively little motivation to address the
issue. This is aggravated by the lack of public pressure coming from the bottom. On the other hand,
citizens are provided with some means of confronting the shortcomings of corruption in the system via
petty corruption. It could be said that maintaining the option of petty corruption for the ‘people’ suits
government as it allows citizens to deal with inefficiency of public administration, for which grand
corruption is partly responsible, while reducing the demand for anti-corruption among the public
thereby not being pushed into addressing grand corruption.
168
International anti-corruption cures do not find a responsive audience in Slovakia because the realities on
which the static principal-agent model is based are missing or are in short supply. Their lack is fostered
by the media. Over-reliance on these approaches vis-à-vis the complex nature of corruption across the
world is illustrated by the case of Slovakia and the complex interests of users of the discourse, in the
case of media, undermines anti-corruption. Furthermore, this analysis highlights the perils of construing
corruption from the perspective of economic rationality. The media discourse in Slovakia reflects the
richness of nuances of corruption that go beyond rational calculations of costs. Getting to grips with
what the society, in which corruption is seen as a problem, thinks of corruption is vital in designing
approaches of better capacity to address the matter than the current measures that exist in Slovakia. In
shorts, it’s as if IACD is seeking to build a house starting with the roof.
This observation dovetails with Miller and Rose’s (1990) assertion of the necessity to build structures
through which one can manage before starting to manage. IACD is failing to build to manage anti-
corruption because it has not set foundations for it. The research also highlights the implications of
grounding anti-corruption on realities which do not exist.
As such, the international and the local are both complicit when it comes to the slow progress of anti-
corruption. In the case of Slovakia carving out a space for itself within the global in the process of the
muddle of ‘international socialisation’, the international and national interact in complex ways whereby
the international reinforces the local knowledge on corruption which has some adverse effects for anti-
corruption. Indeed, this questions whether a longer exposure to the subtle pressure of IACD along the
lines of Pridham’s (2008) argument is the answer to the issue of the stubborn presence of corruption in
Slovakia.
In addition, this research illuminates the dark side of the notion of the local creating space for itself in
the internationalised space. Albeit the notion of the local finding room for itself sounds rather re-
assuring in that it questions the all-powerful uncompromising globalization. However, as demonstrated
here, this is not only for the best, but also for the worse.
7.5.8 Constructing entrepreneurs vis-à-vis corruption
Previous sections outlined various meanings of corruption in Slovakia by tracking how the notion
developed in the media and therefore in society. This section turns the lens to truths that the media and
the society construct about corruption and about SMEs, thereby shaping knowledge that individual
entrepreneurs can create about themselves vis-à-vis corruption. What follows in the last pages of this
169
chapter is a summary of the genealogical insights with the direct relevance teased out for enterprising
activity that is of central interest to this thesis. As such, this part addresses questions 3) and 4) set out in
the methodology, that is to say:
What are the forms of knowledge that the individual can establish about him/herself given the
overarching knowledge of corruption?
In what way does the self-technology provide an individual with a particular telos (goal,
direction) for life?
Answers to the above are essential to the exploration of how individuals internalise or not this
knowledge in understandings of their own roles as entrepreneurs. It is argued here that the discourse
ultimately constructs five core truths about entrepreneurs that navigate individual constructions of the
self and own enterprises.
7.5.8.1 Positioning entrepreneurs vis-à-vis truths about corruption
Genealogical analysis brought to light the issue of dissimilar treatment of grand and political corruption
on the one hand and petty corruption on the other. As the former is foregrounded and constructed as
an immensely harmful phenomenon saturated with moral connotations, governors are blamed for an
unfavourable international image of Slovakia and overall state of the issue in the country. Petty
corruption that the majority of SMEs encounter in their day to day operations, is downplayed, which is a
crucial point here. It is maintained that the knowledge that the discourse circulates encourages such
attitudes towards corruption that create, rather than eliminate, space for engagement in the
phenomena. This is because it provides little encouragement to activate oneself vis-à-vis anti-corruption.
Firstly, the issue of the current definition of corruption, thus petty corruption too, as ‘abuse of power for
private gain’ is problematic. In light of the Slovak appreciation of corruption it becomes difficult to
conceptualise petty corruption drawing on this central concept. Governing power has been a
prerequisite to being corrupt, that is to say wrong and harmful for the nation, since the nineteenth
century. As the ‘people’ do not hold the kind of power requisite to corruption, the notion of its abuse
becomes futile, hence the dampening down of petty corruption. This leads into an initial difficulty of
imagining how one can be corrupt without holding the necessary power.
As SMEs are pillars of the economy, the ‘people’ are the pillar of the Slovak society. Entrepreneurialism
experienced a boom following the fall of the Iron Curtain with a large number of the ‘people’ finding
170
employment in starting their own businesses (see Chapter 5). Vis-à-vis the backdrop of neoliberalism,
the local discourse ‘slovakises’ SMEs by merging the ‘people’ with the concept of SMEs, wherein SMEs
emerge as inherently good. SMEs too are devoid of such power that begets corruption and their
involvement in petty corruption thus becomes blurred. For reasons elaborated throughout this chapter,
it is desirable to preserve this knowledge.
Following IACD, corruption is to be resolved by implementing institutional solutions. In other words,
individuals are directed to believe that it is not a solution or even a part of a solution to denounce
corruption themselves. It necessarily follows that codes of conduct or other internal mechanisms are not
mentioned in relation to corruption thereby cementing the truth of anti-corruption not being in the
hands of entrepreneurs at all. This runs contrary to IACD which firmly positions SMEs cognisant of the
dangers of corruption at the core of anti-corruption, implying that they themselves need to condemn
corruption in their own business and beyond it on local, regional and societal levels.
The media also pick up on the notion of SMEs as victims of corruption present in IACD (HN2, 3, 14). SMEs
are guided to create such truths about corruption that puts them in the position of the ones being
harmed rather than the ones being harmful themselves. Following from this, it is challenging to see
oneself as both a victim and a perpetrator at the same time. This is cemented by the lack of elaboration
on punishment for acts of corruption. The discourse rarely follows cases of petty corruption up to the
point of conviction and issuing punishment. There is little blame placed upon the shoulders of
entrepreneurs beyond broad claims of an apathetic society providing fertile grounds for corruption
(HN3) and of a lack of willingness to report corruption (HN2). It follows that there is little they can do
about the issue themselves. The discourse thus stimulates a sense of helplessness. Guilt and
responsibility are grounded purely with governors and their failure to resolve the matter is discussed at
length. There is a lack of stories encouraging entrepreneurs by providing inspiring stories of SMEs
actively combatting corruption. Nor does the discourse offer much appreciation and support for those
not paying bribes, thus not promoting transparent behaviour in this way. In addition, by backgrounding
the role of entrepreneurs, the media fails to shame the accused individual, thereby perpetuating the
notion of petty corruption as a tolerated practice.
The Slovak discourse reflects the tension within IACD regarding entrepreneurs as victims and
entrepreneurs as independent makers of their own decisions. Slovak SMEs are portrayed as devoid of
agency when it comes to on anti-corruption and at he same time as active actors in corruption, for
171
which they nevertheless cannot be blamed. It highlights the cracks in the IACD and demonstrates how
they can be exploited in local contexts in the case of Slovakia.
Secondly, media do not sufficiently stress the issue of the costs of corruption related to punishment or
indeed other costs that IACD portrays. Rather vague mention of corruption as an obstacle and as a
nuisance surface. However, it is unclear how corruption is harmful beyond disrupting competition. For
instance, the issue of public procurement being thoroughly corrupt thereby disadvantaging those SMEs
who do not pay bribes (HN2). Nevertheless, it does not further comment on the bribe-giving side, that is
to say entrepreneurs gaining advantage. In other words, it does not reprimand for engaging in
corruption.
Thirdly, petty corruption only refers to bribery. Other forms and faces of corruption are completely
silenced. The discourse leaves the door wide opened for other forms petty corruption might take. This is
particularly important as the legislation is also restricted to bribery with respect to petty corruption and
thus bribery is the only form of illicit behaviour that is prosecuted as petty corruption (Ministry of
Interior of Slovakia, 2012; 2013; 2014; 2015).
Fourthly, SMEs are encouraged to position themselves and their interests in antagonism with the
governor and the state. They are constructed in a tension with the public sector hampering smooth
functioning and prosperity of SMEs. Therefore, it facilitates questioning legislation enacted by
governors. Effectively, this aspect of the discourse navigates individuals to distrust the formal
regulations. This presents a considerable obstacle to anti-corruption as well, which is currently expected
to come from governors in the form of institutional as well as legislative adjustments.
The above creates such understandings of the self that allows for involvement in petty corruption
without facing a dilemma as to its moral, economic or legal wrongness on both an individual and societal
level. Indeed, the latter is a point raised by CSR scholars which holds that corruption is not only harmful
to individual enterprises, but for the society in which they operate at large. IACD does not pick up on this
notion. By failing to link petty corruption to detrimental effects to the economy or indeed society on the
whole, the discourse does not encourage individuals to link what they might be doing with harm. Even
when faced with petty corruption, the ‘people’ = SMEs are navigated to transfer attention to individuals
in the public sector as the source of petty corruption. IACD is complacent in this respect, for it
encourages the view of corruption as harmful first and foremost because it hurts private ventures
172
themselves. However, the Slovak discourse does not even draw on this idea and constructs corruption
as merely cumbersome. Notwithstanding that it is projected as an obstacle to growth and competition,
it is not connected with individual entrepreneurial success. In doing so it transfers attention to external
conditions for which the governor is responsible.
A perception of wrongness for whatever reason is a foundational element of action on the elemental
level of personal decision-making. Without the very recognition of corruption as a problem which goes
hand in hand with attaching negative meanings to it, we cannot expect individuals to act against it or at
least to disengage with it. This point strikes at the heart of the argued absence of the desired homo
economicus. Media as part and parcel of the society fail to create such conditions in which homo
economicus carries out calculations which then lead to abandoning corruption. On the other hand, the
media facilitate creation of homo economicus which guides SMEs to follow their self-interest in an
effective way, including corruption in the current environment. Furthermore, the human nature media
reflect and construct appears to be far more complex.
7.5.8.2 Constructing the Slovak entrepreneur
What the above discussion brings to the fore is the embeddedness of not only corruption but
consequently the entrepreneurial self vis-à-vis corruption in the Slovak context. This highlights the social
complexities of entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurs are not solely entrepreneurs as a bulk of studies on the
topic of corruption suggests (see Chapter Three). Instead, they are grounded in the socio-cultural fabrics
of societies in which they operate.
With respect to their conduct vis-à-vis corruption, the Slovak discourse provides the following simple
directions to entrepreneurs:
a) Suffering is a part of who you are.
b) The main thing is to survive.
c) The state is responsible for any difficulties you encounter along the way.
d) Everybody bribes.
e) Anything you do as an SME is good in itself.
a) Suffering is a part of who you are.
173
Being exposed to corruption has been part and parcel of Slovak experiences of government and
life of the ‘people’ since the formation of the nation. It is deeply embedded in the national
psyche, and its traces and influence can be found in the contemporary discourse on corruption.
Simply, suffering has become an indivisible element of being Slovak and consequently of being a
Slovak entrepreneur. It could be theorised that the very idea of life as suffering finds its roots in
Christianity and more specifically Catholicism that has been a prevalent religious system of belief
for most of the Slovak history. The discourse shapes individual knowledge of the self as that of
sufferer of the public sector and its abuses.
b) The main thing is to survive
However, the idea of suffering is not merely about perpetual agony. Stoicism, not succumbing to
hardships and survival against the odds, is a highly revered national trait. Perseverance topped
the list of core national characteristics as viewed by Slovaks (Timoracký et al, 2013). Indeed, it
could be argued that the existence of Slovakia is a little miracle in itself when viewed from the
perspective of the rapid twists and turns that Slovaks have faced and survived. Undergoing five
regimes in 100 years illustrates the point and explains the pride of the tenacious nature of
Slovaks (see Chapter Four). Likewise, Slovak SMEs endure an unfavourable environment marked
with corruption and challenging conditions created by the state, but they continue to operate.
The notion of silent endurance is tacitly present in the accounts depicting the challenging
conditions of Slovak SMEs.
The discourse navigates Slovak entrepreneurs into sustaining existence. There is a tendency to
silence involvement of SMEs in corruption with corruption. This leads to a conclusion that
entrepreneurs are not encouraged to disengage in corruption. It is up to governors to improve
the environment so that corruption becomes obsolete. This sits nicely with IACD that promotes
SMEs success as being inherently good for the economy and for society and thus their success is
a supreme and unquestionable goal. Success smoothly translates into survival in the Slovak
context.
c) The state is responsible for any difficulties you encounter along the way.
The Slovak discourse positions corruption of governors and their failure to tackle the matter as
an explanation for much of the broader performance issues in Slovakia. It has been mentioned
on a number of occasions throughout this part of the thesis that it is the public sector and
174
governors that are grounded with the blame for the pandemic of corruption in the country. This
is paired with insufficient law enforcement, bureaucracy and lack of state support listed along
with corruption as difficulties Slovak entrepreneurs encounter. Government emerges as an
immediate point of reference when it comes to pointing fingers at the guilty party. This is deeply
embedded in the local discourse and perpetuated by IACD. The discourse guides entrepreneurs
to place criticism and thus responsibility with the governor, thereby strengthening the guilt-free
approach to petty corruption. Entrepreneurs are directed to seek explanations for problems
they encounter solely outside of their own enterprise, their own behaviours and actions. Indeed,
this is not to reduce the role the governor plays and is to play in anti-corruption and in providing
an environment in which SMEs can flourish.
d) Everybody bribes
Corruption is portrayed as unavoidable and common place in the country. The omnipresence of
the phenomena creates the image of ‘everyone does it’ from the bottom through to the top. To
put it simply, the Slovak discourse dictates that corruption is a norm. This might appear as
somewhat in contradiction with the truth a). Indeed, this suggests a tension in the discourse
which is concerned on the one hand with meticulously presenting SMEs as victims and on the
other hand as engaged in corruption themselves which continues the already mentioned friction
of IACD carried over into the Slovak discourse.
e) Anything you do as an SME is good in itself
SMEs are constructed as inherently good by IACD. This is further reinforced in Slovakia by the
link to the ‘people’. The very existence of SMEs is good for the economy and good for society. It
appears that nothing SMEs do to survive can be construed of as harmful. This justifies self-
interests.
To sum up the picture the media paint of entepreneurs, it does little to put SMEs off corruption. It
navigates entrepreneurs to create such understandings of themselves as SMEs that deprive them of
agency when it comes to disengaging with corruption and sharpens their opposition to the state
implementing anti-corruption. It also validates a survivalist mind-set and narrow self-interest and at the
same time ingrains the belief that SMEs are innately good, which in turn means that any strategies they
need to deploy to survive are acceptable. Coupled with petty corruption constructed as a ‘national
sport’, this is highly ill-suited to tackle corruption.
175
These projections of reality which circulate in the society and among entrepreneurs are further
subjected to individual internalisations and interpretations which consequently guide individual
behaviours vis-à-vis corruption. The following chapter explores the individual constructions against the
background of the narration of corruption running on the societal level outlined here, thereby bringing
together the international, the local and the individual in a rich account of corruption in everyday life of
entrepreneurs in Slovakia.
7.6 Conclusion
Mapping out the contingencies and ruptures of the discourse on corruption in Slovakia revealed certain
continuities, as well as breaks resembling the idea of ‘path-dependent path-creation’ mentioned earlier.
The developments of the turbulent 19th century saw the rise of corruption as a tool of political, social
and cultural struggle for power. Corruption became established as sinful behaviours embodied by the
oppressive Hungarian public administration abusing the Slovak people. The discourse underwent some
softening in the interwar years. However, the Czech domination, the volatile international and domestic
situation combined with economic downturns meant that corruption remained tied to the idea of the
people’s foreign enemy – this time the Czechs. The notion of corruption as a sin survived, but the
phenomena also began to take a more concrete legal form as a breach of the law and more ‘neutral’
language.
The period of post-communism removed most of the religious undertones of corruption as a sin, but
retained some of the idea in a more subtle form that emphasised that abuse of the people was morally
wrong. A new approach to reporting that moved away from strongly opinionated story-telling came at
the dawn of free market democracy. It shaped corruption in the 1990s as an activity jeopardising the
people by ruthless following of individual interests of political elites playing itself out on the field of
privatisation. The notion of harming the ‘people’ took on the form of threatening democracy and the
free market vis-à-vis the international contexts of democratisation of the region. The most important
shift was that of a slow introduction of the concept of petty corruption as a major rupture in the
discourse since the nineteenth century.
The discontinuity manifests itself fully in the discourse of the mid 2010s which dedicates considerable
attention to petty bribery as petty corruption is defined. It is interesting to note that in order to
reconcile the notion of petty corruption with the contingencies of the nineteenth century, petty
corruption is cleared of any moral connotations and normalised as something that all Slovaks do. On the
176
other hand, grand and political corruption bears a distinctive imprint of the bygone eras. It refers to
morally charged abuse of the people by selfish and greedy individuals in the possession of public, more
specifically governmental, power.
As such, the curious outcome of the fusion of the international and the local discourses is a
conceptualisation of three strands of corruption discourse - petty corruption, grand corruption and anti-
corruption as an outgrowth of the old surviving legacies which have been shifted and altered under the
guidance of IACD. The three strands allow for silencing anti-corruption and petty corruption. The focus
of the discourse rests with the attack on the governing structures. This has been argued to have rather
adverse effects for the honourable aim of lowering corruption in the country.
It has been found that the international and the national interact in such a way that the local discourse
on the issue facilitates room for corruption rather than constrains it. The analysis highlights the core
issue with the international soft approach – its negligence of local agency on the one hand, and
allowance of enough room for it to play itself out on the other. It has been advanced that it is not
enough to elaborate upon the lack of fit between the international and the national and seek
explanations for continued corruption in the lack of external pressure, high politicisation, a lack of public
pressure and presence of institutional gaps with respect to anti-corruption, or rather their ignorance by
the local culture. Instead, a critical reflection on the effects of the international on the local grounds in
Slovakia and elsewhere is much needed to shed a new light on the stumbling anti-corruption. This allows
for a nuanced appreciation of complex processes behind the many manifestations of a lack of
effectiveness of anti-corruption from politicisation to lax public attitude towards corruption. The analysis
revealed that given that the main objective of the local discourse has been compromising the governing
structures, it fails to administer anti-corruption. The international discourse contributes to the
unfavourable state by overlooking the issue of the appreciation of corruption by the local society by
blindly insisting on the existence of universal foundations on which to build anti-corruption. Specifically,
IACD to a great extent relies on media to prepare the grounds. However, even free and independent
media are enmeshed in the complex web of local realities, power plays and legacies, which means that
these are struggling to deliver on the task.
Historicisation of the current discourse on the issue revealed the persistence of the original core
purpose of the discourse – that of disrupting ties between the governor and the governed, which is the
opposite of what anti-corruption strives for. Without recognising this crucial aspect of the discourse in
Slovakia, it will be arduous to achieve an improvement with the current tools and understandings.
177
178
CHAPTER EIGHT - INDIVIDUAL UNDERSTANDINGS AND REALITIES OF CORRUPTION IN SME SECTOR
This chapter brings together the insights of the broader discourse and individual SME conceptualisations
of corruption. It addresses the external conditions as internalised beliefs about the state that shape
individual narrations, the articulation corruption takes vis-à-vis these constructions and ways forward
incurbing corruption in SMEs by weaving the discussion of the internal and external, the individual and
the societal together. Albeit the majority of the chapter is concerned with SMEs that report engaging in
informal activities, the chapter also shines light on the minority that stays away from corruption, as this
may offer plausible alternative options to the current anti-corruption.
The above directly addresses the remainder of the research questions set out at the outset of the thesis:
2) How does the broad appreciation of corruption on societal level inform individual
entrepreneurs’ views on corruption?
There is little difference between the studied sectors. This is rather unexpected and surprising.
Agriculture and tourism were selected as diverse sectors guided by different regulations, of different
nature and tradition as argued in Chapter Four. Nevertheless, this is also a sign of a very compact and
coherent discourse circulating in the society.
8.1 Understanding of the state and operating environment
To appreciate the contact between public administration and entrepreneurs, we need to first take a
detailed look at how entrepreneurs construct the world around them. The interviewees focused
overwhelmingly on the role of the state – ranging from regulatory frameworks and the treatment of
SMEs by the public administration. Grasping this is essential to appreciating knowledge that shapes
individual behaviours when it comes to corruption.
Although the state occupies the forefront of SMEs’ concerns, there are other issues that contribute to
the arduous environment they perceive they operate in. Many ultimately lead to the state. These
include uneven business grounds for Slovak SMEs and Slovak medium and large enterprises when it
comes to availability of resources, their influence and the support that they receive from the state. The
customer base that does not appreciate Slovak produce, but rather is inclined to turn to foreign
products in both sectors, is hungry for discounts and motivated by low prices, not quality, is rather
immature in their consumer preferences and little informed. The issue of price sensitivity also discussed
179
by Vilčeková (2014) is not surprising given that the average monthly salary in Slovakia is 882 EUR, the
minimal wage is 380 EUR and that the purchasing power is rather low compared to the Czech Republic
and Poland, particularly outside the capital Bratislava. Foreign competitors not burdened by Slovak
regulations and the Slovak attitude of the state have also received plentiful mentions.
It is important to outline at the very beginning that the differences between the two sectors were
relatively limited. Albeit perceptions of entrepreneurs were tailored to the specific contexts of the
operations of their businesses in a particular sector, their appreciations of their operating environment
were rather homogenous across tourism and agriculture.
8.1.1 Unfavourable legislation and formal norms
Given the neoliberal background of the enterprising activity as currently conceived, it is hardly
unexpected that entrepreneurs elevate formal regulations pertinent to running a business to one of the
gravest problems of SMEs in Slovakia. Cumbersome and complex laws, plentiful rules and norms emerge
as an issue in the context of SMEs’ experiences of corruption in media too. Thus, media and personal
constructions are in line with each other fortifying an image of a much broader society-level discourse,
not merely media perspectives. Individual entrepreneurs subject themselves to the broader discourse as
they embrace the narration of the state as an obstructive element.
Entrepreneurs identify the legal environment as first and foremost excessive and prescriptive in both
sectors regulating every minor aspect of running a business. These include keeping an array of various
internal evidence in the form of documentation shaping everyday operations and the nature of each
business, including staff policies, accountancy and health & safety matters, as well as various
permissions.
Tourism enterprises deal with a cluster of norms regulating many aspects of their daily operation from
handling food, to welcoming guests, to handling waste. Tourism SMEs described themselves as
suffocating under heavy regulation.
“We have a rule about everything so that everything is under control… There is that non-
sense about disposal of kitchen waste which dictates how to get rid of it. That is not free.
They require such safety that I feel like if I were handling a biological bomb. Another
mountain of norms is about toilets. We have very detailed norms about how a restaurant
needs to be equipped. What kind of dust bins to have. It is laughable” (Ct).
180
“Our health & safety laws are too much. We need to protect ourselves but it is as if we
worked in an atomic power plant” (It).
“The state does not allow us to simply employ a part-time worker. I have to register him
with the social and health insurance agencies and I have to check them out as soon as they
leave” (Jt).
“You need a permission for everything in this state. Including putting up a sign” (At).
“We are bound by hundreds of laws, norms, local regulations, orders, directives. It is like a
maze. There is something lurking at every corner” (Nt).
In addition to equivalents of the above in the agricultural sector, agriculture SMEs touched upon what
they perceived as heavy-handed staff and animal welfare policies.
“I have to provide training for my employees, including me, every two years. Why? We do
this every day and this stuff does not change very much” (Ma).
“It is not enough to buy a certified truck. You also need a special permission for doing long-
haul transport... Drivers have to be re-trained every 2 years. So, the firm needs two
permissions for the same thing” (La).
“There are many administrative obstacles that complicate the lives of us farmers. For
example, if I want to sell honey on the Internet, I have to have a brick and mortar shop too
(Fa).”
“The rules for animal-rearing are getting tougher. The minimal size of pens increases. Pigs
have to have enough light and toys to play with. Ridiculous” (Ka).
All of the above is perceived as creating a highly regulated environment which is portrayed as
challenging at best and unviable at worst.
The scale of legal requirements is stressed and aggravated using similes such as the above example of
comparing a restaurant with a power plant, expressions such as ‘piles’ or ‘mountains’ of laws that
illustrate the size of legislative burden by giving it a material form. It is also telling that interviewees
refer to the entrepreneurial community as ‘us’. It is rather telling of how interviewees recognise this
view in others, thereby constructing a community and using this community to legitimate their views.
181
These constructions mean that it is entrepreneurs in the respective sectors at large who make these
statements, rather than mere individuals. An image of entrepreneurs as a community suffering under
heavy legislation is beginning to emerge.
The above also illuminates a tension between the need of the protection of health, safety, lives and
quality of products and services provided by the state and the freedom of the market. This reflects the
tensions between the ‘nanny state’ and the liberal market feeding into the past experiences of Slovaks
and re-casting the ruler and the ruled relations in new light. This is problematic as the state is tasked
with combatting corruption, hence the implementation of direct and a number of indirect mechanisms,
such as the duty to implement internal mechanisms to prevent legalisation of proceeds of criminal
activity, as well as tax and income reporting obligations that each firm has vis-à-vis the state. However,
these are viewed as inconvenient by entrepreneurs as they add to the administrative burden.
Paradoxically, IACD seeks to make life easier for entrepreneurs by freeing them from the need to engage
in corruption, also by simplifying legislation and reducing their formal duties. However, at the same time
it exposes entrepreneurs to further legal administrative duties related to anti-corruption. As anti-
corruption is structured today, the legislative route is unavoidable when it comes to implementing it
(see Chapter Two).
The number of local and national permissions and licenses necessary for running a business both in
agriculture and in tourism, as well as various certification processes in agriculture, are also viewed as
problematic. These range from licenses for starting a firm, for handling food, for growing certain crops,
gambling and permissions for the use of public space amongst others. The process includes a provision
of a variety of confirmations and certificates in what is described as a cumbersome procedure.
“It took weeks if not months of my life to put together operating guidelines, getting a
certificate of specialized skills since I didn’t study at a specialized school, providing all the
confirmations, an extract from the Crime Registry. Hygiene gave me a lot of grief. That was
the worst thing. I never dreamed of how many details you really have to provide. Down to
where and how food is prepared, confirmation of water quality, access to hot water, how
you dispose of waste. Everything” (Lt).
To further illustrate the burdensome nature of legislation, one participant described a need of
obtaining a confirmation of family relatedness for land transfer by way of gift (Aa). The
182
entrepreneurs went to considerable effort to elaborate on the ridiculousness, meticulousness and
above all complicatedness of norms and rules with which they are faced.
Legislation is not only detailed and omnipresent, it is also presented as unstable, fractioned and
contradictory at times.
“There is a lot of it and it changes often” (Ja).
“They [the state] are constantly putting new obstacles in our way. There is a change in
norms and regulations every year” (At).
The fragmentation of legislation appears as a problem especially in the tourism sector due to its multi-
sectorial nature.
“Our legislation is splintered. Every ministry has something to do with tourism” (Kt).
“Many laws from almost every sphere combine in tourism. It is difficult to keep up to date
because there is no system in it. One minister comes up with something and it does not
matter that it is in a contradiction to what another minister brought in three years ago” (Mt)
“We don’t have a law about hotels that would bring everything together. You really have to
look, ask what could be related to you” (Ot).
Intelligibility of legislation also came under criticism. Legalistic language, plentiful references in legal acts
to further acts, opaqueness of formulation and unclear meanings were found to be rather challenging to
‘normal people’ attempting and needing to get to grips with legal frameworks applicable to the
operation of their firms.
“You need three Master’s degrees to understand our laws, that is how they are written”
(Oa).
“A system has been created where special advisors and agencies earn a lot of money due to
the incomprehensibility of our laws because there is no way that a normal person can make
a head or a tail of it” (Fa).
Notwithstanding that the majority of entrepreneurs claimed that improved understanding comes with
practice, this was argued to take considerable time and to be far from certain. In other words, the
opacity and complexity of the legal system mean that one can never be certain about ‘getting it right’.
183
Albeit the study of the legislation itself and the contexts of its making is not of interest in this thesis, a
careful inference could be drawn regarding the past legacy of feudal Austria-Hungary, where the legal
tradition was vastly different from the mature democracies. The legislation was prescriptive and
imposed on the people, rather than serving them. It was a means of dominating through the elaborate
system of the law which was challenging to understand without education which was available to a lucky
few. The overtones of the past appear to be lingering up until the present. Legislation that is hard to
understand shifts power away from the people.
In addition, legislation is seen as inflexible, which is an issue in both sectors, as they are prone to
seasonality and external influences such as weather. Rigid employment policies in particular were put
forward as troublesome for they prevent flexible employment formats for seasonal workers. An issue of
the impossibility of trying out prospective employees, mainly in the tourism sector, was raised. This was
argued to be vital in the tourism sector as it allows the employer to access the conduct of the tested
individual vis-à-vis guests. Interviewees suggest that the complexity of the legislation is due to the laws
being prepared by bureaucrats who are out of touch with the reality of enterprising. However, a concern
has been voiced that the legislation is also distorted by corruption in governing circles.
Applications for grants guided by the legislation, whether coming from the Slovak public budget or
sourced from the EU were also portrayed as complicated in terms of the accompanying formal
documents and requirements as to the content of the applications themselves. These are more
pronounced for the agriculture sector given the EU’s commitment to foster its agriculture reflected in
the existence of the Common Agricultural Policy.
“It is unbelievably difficult with grants. In our system, advisors are profiting from the fact
that no one can understand anything. A normal person has no chance to make a sense of it/
There are masses of red tape wherever you look” (Fa).
“We have to run from an office to an office. For example, confirmations from the health and
social insurance authorities, extract from the Criminal record when you are applying for
a subsidy. Sometimes, you have to hand in the same documents to different authorities. It is
such a mess“(Dt).
Excessive taxation arose as another sore point in all interviews:
“We pay the toll duty, as well as road tax. You only get that in Slovakia” (Ba).
184
“We have high taxes and various compulsory contributions which are a great strain” (Ca).
A question lends itself here as to how entrepreneurs tackle problems stemming from the Slovak
legislation pertinent to their firms. All SMEs invest considerable effort in being up to date by studying
relevant literature, watching the news, searching on the Internet, discussing legislation with other
entrepreneurs online as well as with friends, acquaintances and family and to a lesser extent visiting
exhibitions and taking part in workshops and conferences. This appears to be an important element of
facilitating interaction with legal frameworks, as all interviewed entrepreneurs reported time constraints
and limited usefulness of professional organisations, as well as the inefficiency and unwillingness of the
public sector itself to provide information as the reason they do not utilise these options. Likewise, help
centres that do exist did not appear in conversations. Nevertheless, it was argued that keeping up to
date is beyond the capacities of individual entrepreneurs vis-à-vis the perpetually changing regulatory
landscape. As such, beside the above outlined approaches to keeping up to date, an array of informal
avenues of coping with uncertainties, obscurities and complexities of legal frameworks have been
voiced by participants. These will come under the spotlight later.
In sum, entrepreneurs understand the legislation in overwhelmingly negative terms. It is not merely
something that needs to be followed. Legislation is viewed as an obstacle to enterprise in both sectors
due to its extent, complexity and nature that dovetails with Krivý’s observation of the adverse
perception of the law in society (2016).
8.1.2 Impact of highly regulated environment
The above difficulties merge in a narrative of entrepreneurs constructing themselves as being hindered
by an ‘insane’ (Ha) and ‘unbearable’ formal environment (Et). The Slovak legal framework is blamed for
inflicting unendurable costs both in terms of time and finance. Various confirmations, certificates,
permissions and other formal requirements are usually not free to obtain and can take up considerable
time. Direct and indirect anti-corruption measures seeking greater transparency in public
administration and enterprise are a part of the problem. These include oversight mechanisms applied in
the public sectors, as well as tools monitoring the performance of individual SMEs.
“There are new norms coming out all the time that make production more expensive” (Ka).
“Unbelievable hours are spent running around public authorities and much money is spent
on checks, permissions and confirmations” (La).
185
“All confirmations cost something. Everything has to be certified by a notary. It does not
seem much. It is one euro here, two euros there but it is quite a lot when put together”
(Lt).
“Administrative burden is high. It robs us of time for actually doing business” (Kt).
“Daily evidence takes up a lot of time. Often I go to bed early in the morning” (Et)
Legislation is blamed for hampering firms’ success and growth as it channels precious resources into
bureaucracy. Entrepreneurs argued that this means that they cannot create employment opportunities,
cannot afford to modernise and actuate new business ideas. Above all papierovanie [paperwork related
to meeting formal rules] means that entrepreneurs struggle to dedicate as much time as they perceive is
necessary to their firm.
“Those laws do not guarantee quality or safety. They just complicate work. I cannot spend
as much time as I would like by being in the fields and mending machines, knowing about
everything that is going on in my firm, making sure everything is ready on time. Because I sit
by the computer writing internal guidelines about what we would do if terrorists attack. I
made that up but it is not that far from the truth. Or doing statements and stuff” (Ja).
The above nicely merges together the theme of obsolete and overly complex legislation and the damage
it causes to SMEs, together providing a telling picture of a mismatch and tension between the public and
the private, between the state and SMEs and between the laws and entrepreneurial success. This is in
line with the dominant neoliberal perspective on enterprising that argues for greater regulatory freedom
which is as observed above somewhat in tension with the institutional nature of anti-corruption
solutions.
In addition, costly formal requirements that are universal for all firms were seen as putting SMEs at a
disadvantage with large enterprises that have more resources. Participants felt that their large
competitors can employ specialists to deal with administration and have a greater financial capacity to
meet a number of expectations, such as replacing old with new technologies. Furthermore, large firms
in agriculture are in a stronger position when it comes to applying for grants as the minimal
requirements that applicants have to meet are suited to large applicants rather than SMEs. It was
suggested that it is unfair that large and small companies are subject to the same norms in terms of
186
equipment and tax duties. This strengthens the negative attitude towards the law that does disservice to
the SME community.
To add firmer contours to the above image, interviewees addressed requirements on new environment-
friendly technologies or measures enhancing animal welfare as “madness”, for they ignore that SMEs do
not hold the necessary resources to purchase them or implement them. Toys and greater space for pigs
in pigpens or more advanced trucks enhancing conditions for transported animals illustrate the case.
Furthermore, corruption of political and economic elites guides participants’ explanation for
unfavourable conditions reflecting on the potency of corruption as the answer to all that appears to
malfunction in the country. It seems that inherent distrust for the legislation means that every new
regulation has the capacity to be perceived negatively.
Regulations put Slovak SMEs into a challenging situation vis-à-vis their competitors from abroad where
different sets of rules apply. This was particularly the case in the agriculture sector struggling to compete
with cheap imports from countries where these products are not subject to strict Slovak rules and high
taxes, such as Poland (Ha; Ia; Ja). Tourism SMEs too expressed a concern over cheaper holidays abroad
that when merged with the appeal of exotic warm sea side resorts or, on the other hand, renowned
winter destinations, put Slovak tourism SMEs at a great disadvantage (At; Bt; Dt; Jt). In addition to this, it
was viewed as an issue that Slovaks prefer to travel abroad and stay in more luxurious hotels for the
price of Slovak mid-ranking accommodation. Entrepreneurs complained that they cannot lower prices
for the input costs are high due to red tape, minimum wage and various social and health insurance
payments, as well as the costs of regular mandatory re-training (At; Ba; Da; Ea; Ga).
Overall, the following excerpt encapsulates the impact that costly and inflexible legislation has on SMEs:
“It does not allow us to spread our wings. There are always barriers, restrictions, orders,
provisions about everything you can possibly think of. It is stopping us from growing” (Kt).
There are very few traces of a perception of the law and formal rules as good per se. This notion is
however implied in the IACD which constrains itself to the observation that SMEs cannot follow
legislative frameworks due to omnipresent corruption that makes rule-following unviable. In other
words, IACD assumes that the law is perceived positively and there is willingness to follow it. In Slovakia,
the legislation has a negative reputation. The law is imposed on entrepreneurs and the interviews
suggest little identification of entrepreneurs with the formal framework. Instead, participants expressed
187
an overwhelming dissatisfaction and suspicion regarding the legislation. Formal regulations were argued
to undermine Slovak SMEs vis-à-vis their large counterparts in the country and foreign competitors,
thereby jeopardising the legitimacy of these regulations. The regulations are constructed as unnatural
and consequently pathologised. This construction stems from the internalised notions of the virtue of
SMEs for the economy and society at large. The legislation thus runs against not only SMEs but above all
the common interest, wellbeing and prosperity of Slovaks.
As argued above, IACD and its recommendations for anti-corruption in the SME sector recognised the
law as an issue solely from the perspective of access to it. Hence, solutions consisting of awareness-
raising and education programmes, information centres and so forth are put forward. It does not touch
on the problem of the perception of the legislation as harmful. Anti-corruption institutionalised via the
legislation and regulation adds to the array of problems they cause in other areas. The matter of the
impact of regulations, specifically anti-corruption regulations that directly and indirectly increase the
burden on SMEs is not considered. This means that the assumption that anti-corruption is appreciated as
inherently good is out of place. In Slovakia, it appears to contribute to the problem, rather than to a
solution as it is a part and parcel of the burden to meet the formal requirements along with other
examples highlighted above. Anti-corruption takes its toll in day-to-day administration, as well as in the
process of applying for grants and subsidies, to the complexity to which anti-corruption adds.
We begin to appreciate the individual internalisations of the truths media circulate about the state as
the enemy.
8.1.3 Incompetent public administration
Closely associated with the regulation is the public administration as a set of executing institutions.
Public administration received rather unflattering projections.
Entrepreneurs conceive of public administration as rigid, unresponsive, ill-suited to support SMEs, and
above all preoccupied with the blind following of the regulations, rather than providing help and
assistance. It emerges as an inhumane machine contained in its own world tormenting people.
Reflecting the fragmented and complex legislation, the system administering it is seen as fractioned,
overly complicated and also incompetent, which turns obeying the law into a perplexing and exhausting
experience as the quotes below illustrate:
188
“The system is unnecessarily complicated. Instead of getting simpler, it is getting more
complicated. Digitalisation helped but it doesn’t solve all problems. I don’t like how
individual offices and authorities do not talk to one another. They could resolve things
much easier between themselves. We have to run from an office to an office to keep
everybody happy” (Dt).
“There are many bureaucrats and many authorities and nothing works properly… District
and regional offices are not far but it still takes time to get there. You can’t do everything on
the Internet. It is all disorganised” (Kt).
Mid and low-ranking public authorities, both elected and appointed, are projected as arbitrary. They
create an uncertain volatile environment saturated with insecurity, building on the picture of the
opaque and unclear legislation.
“They [public authorities] are like a state within a state. They create own rules. It is difficult
to prepare for what they might want” (Mt).
“Some people are strange. Take, for instance, our mayor. One day is sunny, the next day is
stormy with her. You never know whether you are going to go left or right. She said she
would do something one day but she never did it” (Jt).
“It can easily happen that a little bureaucrat does not like something and you are finished
[with your business]” (Aa).
“I wanted to have a booth at the square in the summer… The lady [at a local authority]
decided to dismiss my application apparently because of some formal flaws but I know that
the application was OK. She just didn’t want to pass it.” (Ha).
Participants construct themselves as exposed to erratic and inconsistent approachs of individuals in the
public administration creating considerable obstacles to running a business smoothly. In addition, public
officials are incompetent, which dovetails nicely with the nature and the extent of formal regulations:
“The best of the best is when they tell you one thing at one office, a different thing in
another one and both refuse to listen to what you have to say and just keep on rambling
about their own thing” (Ct).
189
Public administration is also slow. The ineffectiveness in the public sector is often contrasted with their
own effectiveness as a private firm, thereby reflecting the neoliberal reasoning behind the endeavour to
cut down the public sector, but also placing oneself as an SME in a superior position. Thus,
entrepreneurs project themselves in a highly positive light in a construction which turns them into
protagonists and the public administration into antagonists of the free market and of democracy. The
overt ‘othering’ of public officials, that is to say overtly distinguishing between ‘us’ – entrepreneurs and
the people and ‘them’ the state and therefore between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ (Huot et al, 2015) could be
seen across the interview and themes discussed.
“Everybody [in public administration] has masses of time for everything. If I managed my
firm this way, I would soon end up bankrupt. It is better to avoid them. But we must be in a
top form. Fast, perfect” (Ht).
“When I overlook something, I have a problem. When a bureaucrat forgets, it is OK. I missed
first two weeks of the summer season when I applied for a permission to have a booth.
They lost my application and I missed the beginning of the summer” (It).
Furthermore, the frustration of entrepreneurs with the public administration is escalated by unco-
operativeness of individuals employed in the public sector. They are portrayed as disinterested in
facilitating compliance with rules and absorbed in blind following of the law. Some participants put this
down to unwillingness to be flexible and helpful, as public officials “do not want to be disturbed by work
duties in their work time” (La) and “only want to do their eight hours of sitting around and shifting
papers, getting paid for doing as little as possible and close the door behind them at the end of the day”.
This somewhat resembles the picture assembled by the early discourse of freeloading public
administration disinterested in Slovaks and their problems (see section 7.1 and 7.2 in particular).
The media discourse re-iterating the primary role in and responsibility for corruption that puts the public
sector in the limelight and circulating a rather unflattering image of public administration fits well with
the above. Paradoxically, instead of incentivising a better service on the side of public administration,
the discourse encourages a careful approach and pressure on the side of public officials which
complicates running a business vis-à-vis the legislative burden borne by entrepreneurs. This translates
into the lack of service culture. Public officials at lower levels are not necessarily rapacious bribe-
extorting authorities, but rather apathetic disinterested and unapproachable bureaucrats.
190
The inaccessible employees of the public sector is marked by concerns of their unprofessional attitudes.
Their behaviour as described by entrepreneurs is rude, arrogant or superior.
“It is enough to come across an official who is not in a good mood to end up with nothing.
Or he acts like he is the cleverest in the world and treats you like an idiot who knows
nothing” (Ct).
“They [public officials] can be so unpleasant. It is probably no surprise. Their superiors are at
their necks all the time” (Ba).
“It happens that I turn up to see an official who is in a bad mood and only wishes for me to
go away. It is not enough that one must go there, but also has to bear this undignified
treatment from officials” (Na).
“There is nothing worse than coming to a public office and realising that you have to deal
with an angry lady official who only barks orders at you and has no will whatsoever to
actually help you” (Ba).
Combined with the deeply rooted adverse perception of the public sector not working in such a way so
as to serve Slovaks, the plethora of negative experiences foster old truths. It could be said that much of
the contact with the public administration creates situations which incite a particular transformation of
the self into being in tension with the public sector. To complete the picture, entrepreneurs highlight
that public officials are not always informed and aware of legal frameworks and procedures and thus are
incapable of providing support, guidance or merely advice.
“I can’t say that people in the offices do their job with eagerness and that they always know
what to do” (Ct).
The above has repercussion on the firms’ operations such as the case of a missed start of the summer
season but also on the psychological state of individuals causing stress and frustration. In addition,
complicated tasks of an administrative nature received a mention in relation to private family lives and
relationships of entrepreneurs that are adversely affected as the respondent argued that the time spent
on running the business, specifically its administrative side, reduces the time he can spend with family.
This introduces an array of issues not considered by IACD or corruption research, that is to say the
multiple identities and aspects of the life of entrepreneurs. This will receive further attention later in this
chapter. All these various faces of entrepreneurs collide in achieving a certain form of being, the one
191
outlined in the previous chapter. Entrepreneurs understand themselves as being harassed by the state
that in turn receives the blame for all that is considered wrong with enterprise in Slovakia. The themes
and the language used by entrepreneurs are consistent with the constructions circulated by the media,
confirming the double role of the media as reflectors and creators of societal discourses.
Entrepreneurs built a picture of being exposed to multiple economic, operational and psychological
pressures as a result of regulation and public administration, rather than corruption itself. It is curious
that these aspects of enterprise have not come under meaningful scrutiny which illuminates the extent
to which corruption is taken to be acontextual.
The above leads to the conclusion that the Slovak public administration has not been brought up to date
with the service culture found in the contexts of mature democracies as seen from the perspective of
entrepreneurs. They complain that public administration is not there to serve them, but rather to
command, ignore or at best to be unable to help. A picture of social hierarchy, wherein public officials
endowed with public power are above entrepreneurs in formal interaction, emerges. The story of
defenceless ‘people’ dominated by strong public administration comes back to life in these narrations
and is constructing the selves vis-à-vis the system. This is a strong social construction which most of the
interviewed entrepreneurs observe by subjecting themselves to public authorities and their power. As
put by one participant, “we shut up and keep up. We keep our heads down and do as we are told” (Oa).
This also encompasses being polite, submissive or persistent so as to ‘nag’ officials into activity and
acting like a victim so as to induce compassion instead of complaining, demanding their rights or
protesting.
A recent move towards digitalisation of public administration, so-called e-government, and merging of
public authorities under one roof to deliver public services more effectively are indeed seen in a positive
light, but this is not enough. It only allows for less direct contact without addressing the matter of
convoluted legislation which in turn nourishes the need for direct contact with public officials and civil
servants. It neither responds to the need for adjustment in the ethos of the entire public administration
and the need for building a positive image. In addition, merging several public authorities in one milieu
paradoxically increases the closeness between the public and the private and to some extent facilitates
room for bribery and other forms of informal activities which will be discussed later.
8.1.3.1 Meticulous inspections
192
Both tourism and agriculture are by their nature closely watched sectors, for they deal with food and
humans and therefore require a wide array of health and safety regulations and consequently controls.
Inspections controlling and enforcing the rules are a rather pronounced feature of experience with
public administration. Digitalisation of public administration and other means of cutting down the direct
personal contact with public administration mean that inspections are one of the last instances where
personal contact is still unavoidable. In addition, inspections take public officials to places where they
are not exposed to direct observation of colleagues. Therefore, the mutual monitoring that assures
transparency does not take place.
Following on from the above discussion, it should not come as a surprise that inspections are viewed
negatively. They are excessive, overly meticulous and unpredictable. Participants argued that it was
impossible to make sure everything is in line with norms due to the number and fast changing nature of
regulations.
“The complicated and inflexible legislation is a problem. It is an art to keep up to date with
laws and to keep them. Hospitality is bound by so many rules and these are not integrated.
The trouble is that it is like having a knife on the neck at all times” (It).
“Inspections are endless. From tax authorities, hygiene, the police, the firefighters,
commercial inspections and so on… It was easier in the past, there were not so many rules.
It was possible to keep an eye on everything. Now, I would need someone to just keep
everything up to date, someone who would be checking what has changed…It is too much
and it changes too often… Normal person has no chance to get it all right” (Ja).
“If they [inspectors] want to find something, they will. The laws are unclear and there are
many making it easy. And they are too detailed as well. It can be a total nonsense like a
missing bit of clothing. Or the insufficient slope of the floor by two degrees and similar
stuff” (Ba).
The latter illustrates the kind of deficiencies and the kind of issues on which inspections are focused.
These are portrayed as minor details, rather than dangerous conditions compromising the health and
safety of employees or customers. Further examples include a fine for a missing no-smoking sign, greater
weight of a portion of meat than listed in a menu, illegible receipts, missing copies of received invoices,
failure to issue a receipt and missing equipment in a hotel room.
193
It is telling that none of the interviewed entrepreneurs considered a received penalty to be an
appropriate punishment for their failure to meet the legal standards. Fines are considered to be as
unfair and overly harsh across the board which dovetails with the adverse perception of the formal rules
pertaining to SMEs. As such, inspections are not seen as a means of maintaining law and order, but
rather as contributing to the insecurity of running a business in Slovakia and as a source of additional
stress and pressure on entrepreneurs by interviewees and therefore further encouraging and inviting
individuals to recognize their role as that of casualties of the state.
The penalties in which most inspections result, are presented as a considerable cost to SMEs. At the
extreme end, they are projected as threatening the existence of SMEs.
“It [a fine] can ruin a small firm” (It).
“They are cruel. My friend closed his shop because it was too much for him. Too many
inspections, too many fines. He couldn’t take it anymore” (Ht).
“It is sinking us. Especially those fines. Every euro wasted in this way is a tragedy. Every
single fine hurt me personally. They all made me upset. Every time I ask myself why the hell
I am doing this at all. Why bother. You put your heart, your time, money, everything into it
and they come and take it away just like that” (Lt).
“Most small firms can’t afford to pay these ridiculous fines. You can get 2,000 euro if you
just forget a piece of paper. You feel the loss even when you are doing fairly well. All it takes
is a bad summer and a fine like that and a farmer can be in a serious trouble. Many have
gone bankrupt since I started” (Na).
Thus, fines pose a considerable threat, as entrepreneurs argue that they are disproportionately high in
addition to being futile and absurd. This introduces public administration as drastic and ruthless in
carrying out the law. The truth about the abusive public administration constructed by the Slovak
National Revival at the time of unfolding ‘magyarisation’ as harassing Slovaks still shapes the perception
of public administration today:
“It is all upside down. They [inspectors and inspections] should be here to make things safe
and stop money from leaking away. Instead they bully us for things that don’t matter and
great frauds happen anyway. One lady once noticed that a bed sheet was torn in the corner
194
and sewed up. According to her it was damaged linen and so against some ridiculous norm”
(D).
It is rather curious to take a close look at how entrepreneurs explain to themselves the nature of
inspections which are argued to be focused on administering penalties. Collecting resources in this
manner emerged as the raison d’être of inspections.
“Many authorities have to demonstrate their effectiveness in how many controls they
carried out and how many shortcomings they uncovered. So they come and look for what
they could fine for” (La).
“It is not about observing the law, it is all about buggering and collecting money through
fines” (Dt).
“It is just a way of collecting money easily. That pisses everyone off” (Aa).
Inspectors are portrayed as being forced or encouraged into administering fines, rather than finding
discrepancies so as to enrich themselves. An issue of internal order of a number of public authorities
ranging from the local police and tax authorities to district and regional offices that are given annual
targets for resources they have to collect from penalties, arose from interviews and was raised by key
informers from within the public sector. This feature adds to the perception of the state among
entrepreneurs as an extorting authority. It complements the construction of the legislation in a rather
bleak picture of relations between the public and the private sector.
These perceptions also mean that the issue of oversight is a troublesome matter. It is the public
authorities that are designated to maintain transparency, that is to say to vigilance and surveillance.
When public authorities fulfil these duties, this is not well received. It is viewed as an intrusion and as
abuse, rather than as maintenance of order.
8.1.3.2 Precious exceptions
Notwithstanding the above, professional, approachable and conducive public officials are also to be
found in public authorities and are highly praised. These represent fractures in the discourse.
“It is not like that with everyone [speaking about negative experience with contact with
public authorities]. There are also people here who understand what they are doing and are
helpful. That is honourable” (Ct).
195
“Some of them [public officials] are great people who really want to help” (La).
“There are good and bad people everywhere…There are public officials who are willing to
help” (It).
“There are people who do their work well even if they don’t know you. I really respect
them. It is a shame there aren’t more of them” (Bt).
Such positive ‘exceptions to the rule’ are much appreciated and put forward as an example of what
communication with the public sector should be like, especially given how troublesome and complicated
legislation is. That is to say that it should be flexible, polite, competent, efficient, understanding, willing
to help and, above all, humane in treating entrepreneurs not like numbers in the business register, but
human beings, as interviewees suggested. The latter fragment is particularly intriguing, as it begins to
address the issue of creating networks of contact persons. It highlights that encountering a competent
public official in interaction with public authorities is far from a certainty.
An approachable positive attitude of looking for ways to help instead of strictly following the dictate of
the law includes the willingness to search for exemptions, ways around a particular norm or smoothing a
procedure and resolving a problem rather than leaving it in the hands of entrepreneurs. These and
similar strategies are a danger vis-à-vis the pressure of transparency and fear of being accused of
misconduct. As one participant noticed, these ‘exceptions’ help, provided this is kept in silence. This is
because helping often entails going an extra mile which may and may not be based on personal
closeness. It is important to note that ‘help’ is framed in such ambiguous terms that those perceived as
helpful officials could be individuals who are willing to be of assistance in expectation for future favours,
rather than those doing their job within the legal rules.
However, where this is not the case, a positive attitude of public officials breaking the truth of the
system against ‘the people’ shows the possible avenue of future anti-corruption efforts. Where public
authorities cooperate, little room for informal activities of corruption are created. Old sores are not
triggered and thus the self-construction of entrepreneurs as victims does not take place. It is
questionable whether prescriptive codes of conduct for public sector employees that have already been
introduced in Slovakia have the capacity to improve the experience of contact with public
administration. Indeed, these are again binding sets of rules that nourish a strict rule-following culture,
reducing discretion of public officials on the one hand, but on the other cementing the rigidity and
inflexibility of the system which creates room for corruption. They are a double-edged sword.
196
8.2 SMEs versus the abusive state
The above discussion already touched upon the issue of a divide between the public administration, the
law and SMEs on the grounds of the former two being inefficient and unsupportive. However, the split is
far sharper, as interviewed entrepreneurs join the above themes with the leitmotiv of the ‘people’ – the
abusive state versus Slovaks. This is far more than a tension between the private and the public sector,
regulation and freedom. Rather, it strikes deeply at the heart of the Slovak identity vis-à-vis the state. In
addition, the media conceptualisation of the free market as the best means of serving the common good
of Slovaks mean that the old grievances are adopted in a rather straightforward fashion by SME owners
across the board in constructing themselves in opposition to the state.
To begin with, the state, or ‘those at the very top’ as referred to by entrepreneurs, are portrayed as
unsupportive of SMEs in terms of legislation, administrative support, the tax system and financial
support, but also by failing to create a favourable environment for SMEs in much broader terms, such as
institutionalising higher salaries to strengthen the demand for Slovak produce. The excerpts below are
indicative of how participants view the state and those who run it:
“There have been some superficial attempts, like for example with that law about tourism.
It was talked about a lot in terms of being a massive step forward. But when you look at it,
you will see that nothing changed for the better. Just because something is on the paper it
doesn’t mean that it works in practice. When you look at our taxes and contributions and
the whole system, you will see that the state support is looking very poor” (Mt).
“I would be so happy if the government stood on the side of small entrepreneurs and made
enterprising easier for us. But they only make it more difficult” (La).
“I think that the state neglects us. We are not important… Resources are not pumped into
agriculture, they are taken from it. It makes you sad to see the state in which our agriculture
is” (Fa).
“We pay income tax. And other taxes are high too. This money is not coming back to us…
The government gives us even more responsibilities all the time. I don’t think the state
supports me. It obstructs us. It is like the state doesn’t want us to keep going” (Jt).
“I have no certainty. Neither financial nor legal. The state does not give a damn about us.
We have to bear everything ourselves (Ft)”
197
“What support? There is no support. I am just a number that pays taxes. That is where the
interest of the state stops” (Et).
Again, entrepreneurs project themselves as a community – ‘us’ while the state is cemented as ‘them’.
This divide threads through all the narrations. The state is not only unhelpful, it is constructed as
opposed to the SME communities, that is to say groups of entrepreneurs in tourism and agriculture,
based on the experience of legislation and the public administration.
Here we arrive at another fact of the earlier discourse on corruption, that is to say the closeness and
mutual support among the powerful elites against the powerless ‘people’ transformed into powerless
entrepreneurs. This manifested itself particularly in the agriculture sector.
“There is next to no support. The state is focused on large enterprises. Automobile factories
and so on. They offer these companies tax relief, pay for roads for them, there is financial
support for each created job and so on… We are neglected. It is not as impressive when 250
small firms open compared to one large firm that can instantly employ 800 people… The
state is responsible. It does not listen to what we are saying here” (Ia).
“Politicians and the government have never been interested in ordinary people. They do all
they can to look great to the big ones. They are hand in hand with one another. Our laws
are made to suit the large corporation and little firms (Ga).
“Large farms are doing well here. The entire system of grants is made to suit them. They
[the government] give a bone to small entrepreneurs pro forma. The large firms can easily
access the grants and the state is taking a good care of them because they employ people,
renew their technologies. Looks good on paper. But it is much more complicated for us”
(Ka).
There is no clear boundary drawn between large Slovak firms and large foreign firms in the perception of
bigger business among entrepreneurs in both sectors. It appears that distinguishing between them is not
essential as they simply fall into the category of economic elites due to their sheer size. This follows the
earlier periods, particularly Austria-Hungary, interwar Czechoslovakia and the transitioning 1990s where
political and economic elites were either inseparable or closely connected (see sections 7.2; 7.2, 7.3).
There is a strong belief that the legal frameworks are not there to suit the ‘people’ or the SMEs, but
rather the state itself. Therefore, the regulations become not merely obtrusive, but exploitative, building
198
on the legacy of the older discourse and tapping into the notion of corruption of the powerful, including
using some of the rhetorical mechanisms and vocabulary reminiscent of the past.
“I had a part-time worker one summer. I am not employing them anymore, it is not worth it.
They also have to have a piece of paper that they are entitled to work with food. It is not
enough that I train them. They have to pass an exam and pay for it. Well, I have to pay for it.
It is fifty euros altogether. I bet someone has a nice income from it. Someone in the
government and their friends. Otherwise this regulation does not make any sense” (Lt).
“We [SMEs] are only good for paying taxes and ridiculous fines and feeding our political
crème de la crème. That is what our laws do – make sure that the greedy politicians have
cushy lives. I wish the state left me alone at the very least when it doesn’t want to help. It is
not normal what is happening in this country. How people are treated. Disgusting” (Bt).
The injustices inflicted on SMEs were raised during each interview.
“The state is a black hole – we keep giving and giving and giving and it is taking and taking
and taking more in taxes, in fees. Its appetite is bottomless. Of course, somebody has to
sponsor the villas and yachts in Monaco of our dear poor representatives” (Ca).
“Laws are not here to protect us. Or help us. They are here to squeeze us off as much as
possible. Only in Slovakia a person who earns 20,000 is considered a millionaire. But don’t
you think that the real millionaires pay taxes. They are hand in hand with politicians having
their hard-earned millions in Switzerland. So what does the law do? It screws normal
hardworking people. That is all. It is all about that” (Da).
“I bet it is so [a piece of legislation] only because it suits someone who is close to someone
in the government. How else would you explain that absurdity?” (Ba)
The previously discussed theme of convoluted legislation gains on much deeper and disturbing nuances,
signalling a drift between entrepreneurs and governors, as entrepreneurs self-identify themselves as the
‘people’ which carries with it experience of past offences and perceptions of the state. As already
argued in this chapter, IACD takes for granted that entrepreneurs want to follow the law because of its
inherent goodness. They only fail to do so due to the costs of observing the law in terms of punishment
of whistle-blowers or costs and time required to pursue justice. However, this research suggests that this
is not as simple in the case in Slovakia. Entrepreneurs portray themselves as being hurt by unfair
199
legislation. Legislation emerges as a tool of the powerful to pursue their interests. Identification with and
automatic observation of the law is a thorny matter in this environment. Removing the costs of
observing the law is only a partial solution.
Grand and political corruption and collusion of the governing and economic elites enters narrations and
complements constructions behind the reasoning of unfavourable regulations shaping operations of
SMEs. It is the public sector that finds itself in the limelight again. Corruption is used to explain
deficiencies of the legal system, unfavourable legislation, lack of direct and indirect state support and
simply everything that is viewed negatively in the operating environment of SMEs from an insufficient
network of motorways to poor promotion of Slovakia as a destination abroad, wrapped with the notion
of the ‘people’.
“Of course, it is not good that laws are created according to what financial groups want.
That is happening here. And so the laws are the way they are. Only these big groups are
doing well here. I am sure you noticed too that it happens under each government. This is
how big amounts disappear from the republic every year. Then they have to cut down
expenses. And they are cutting support for entrepreneurs” (Jt).
“Endless bleeding people who try to do something in this country. There is no other
explanation. All those obstacles they [the government] put in our way. Constant higher and
higher requirements on people for technologies, but prices are going down. They cover
around two thirds of inputs. Are they interested in this? No. They are only counting how
much money they will get out of every new rule. If it at least went into the public budget.
But it doesn’t, it gets lost… It is obvious how much stealing is going on. At ministries, in the
government. What a surprise that there isn’t any money despite us paying and paying! Like
idiots. But there is nothing else we can do” (Aa).
“All these rules and fees. You must stop to think about where it goes. It is a lot of money.
And do you see it anywhere? You even have to take toilet paper with you to hospital. Roads
are in disastrous condition. They haven’t even managed to build a motorway that would go
all the way to the east yet. So, where is the money we pay? In someone’s pocket” (Ft).
The heated and emotional depictions of the abusive state and suffering of the ‘people’ that SMEs adopt
is a powerful manifestation of the extent to which the societal discourse on corruption fuelled by media
200
is internalised by entrepreneurs. It is a useful ‘manual’ for making sense of the world around
entrepreneurs, of themselves and their work. It is equally important to making sense of oneself.
The meanings of corruption circulated in the society since the nineteenth century are alive and well in
individual perceptions of the world. This is further cemented by reactions to a question about corruption
where the first and it could be said automated response or internalised truth was linked to grand and
political corruption. None of the participants engaged with the matter of petty corruption when asked
about whether they see corruption as a problem. Instead, the question opened a floodgate for
expressing disenchantment with governors. This is not simply constrained to particular individuals in the
public sector. Instead it appears to be seen as an inherent feature of high public power and thus linked
with the legislation affecting entrepreneurs. To illustrate the narrations when explicitly asked about
corruption, high government officials are seen as misusing public money paid by the ‘people’ in taxes:
“It [political corruption] eats all the money I pay in taxes. These are not spent on better
infrastructure, hospitals, schools. Or on better public administration. They are lost forever.
This is what I am working hard for. So that Počiatek can go on yachts and Fico can drink
coke [references to a grand corruption scandal]” (Da).
“Corruption is a problem. Money is disappearing instead of being pumped into small firms.
Instead they end up somewhere in the Bahamas and politicians have villas in the Caribbean”
(Na).
“It [political and grand corruption] sucks money from the budget that are then missing and
so they suck it from us” (Bt).
“Only families and acquaintances of politicians profit in this system. It is the case with public
procurement, but also with letting J&T [a financial group] into the Tatras [a national park].
Ordinary people on the bottom are suffering, including us. It is not sustainable, it is
expensive, money is being spent in this way instead of going into motorways, healthcare,
but also into support for tourism and entrepreneurs… This is a problem” (Nt).
The above fragments reflect the merging of the international truths of corruption as wasting
precious resources and impeding development with the local knowledge of the state. These are
strongly linked to the lives and resources of individual entrepreneurs representing the ‘people’.
201
The issue of how public resources coming from taxes but also from a range of fees and fines are used, or
rather used against, or at least, not for the ‘people’, illuminates the problem of a deeply damaged
rapport between the state and entrepreneurs. The state emerges as predatory serving its interests
employing corruption and utilising the law to cover and finance its own corruption. It is worth pointing
out the vivid nature of these constructions of the powerful vs. the powerless, using words with strongly
negative connotations in painting the situation of SMEs and the ‘people’ as desperate. The
understandings of entrepreneurs are a manifestation of the neoliberal economic rationality in that the
narration revolves around money and money channelled away from serving the common good. At the
same time, powerful morality that carries the ‘people’ at the core continues to separate the governors
and the governed, entrepreneurs and the state and fortifies the old divides.
As such, the lack of support either through favourable laws and taxes or directly through grants is
escalated to open animosity by being linked to the notion of corruption and an exploitative state. Vis-à-
vis the truths about the state and rules, SMEs put themselves in the role of easy target of the voracious
state in line with the media construction and historic development of the discourse on corruption:
“The state doesn’t give a toss about us. You see how much we have to pay to the state. We
are just a source of excruciating taxes… A small farmer is someone in Austria. Here he is a
slave” (Ga).
“Normal people are an easy target of the state that never has enough” (Ha).
“They [government officials] need money to have enough for themselves. Small firms are
good milking cows. We pay taxes so that papaláši [bigwigs] have enough to give to their
friends and to themselves” (Lt).
Similarly, the resources collected from penalties portrayed as redundant and purposeful are seen as
‘keeping the system going’ (Lt) and as a means of financing private interests at the top levels of public
administration or unfavourably viewed groups in the society.
“If only it was good for something. But it isn’t. I am not too pleased about the fact that it
goes towards the dole of our co-citizens [the Roma community] and high salaries of MPs…
Plus it is spent on rewards, cars and fancy offices” (Gt).
The Roma community in Slovakia is burdened with the image of a group abusing the social welfare
system. The above and further references to them signal dissatisfaction with the way public resources
202
are used. Even more importantly, money paid in penalties is also believed to be channelled into the
‘pockets of people in the government’ (Ba). This supplements the matter of high taxes perceived as not
spent on vital public services and facilities and cements the image of a great injustice on the side of the
state that entrepreneurs are exposed to.
Another link to the ‘people’ rests in the elaborations of poverty transformed into scarcity of resources of
SMEs. This is juxtaposed with the wealth of the powerful. The struggling of the powerless SMEs is
stressed thereby projecting a difficult situation in which SMEs find themselves. The scarce financial
resources at the heart of narrations of entrepreneurs are made even scarcer due to legislation and
taxation, thereby introducing and fortifying the idea of the state impoverishing the ‘people’:
“Just look at X.37 They didn’t pay invoices, the owners built themselves large houses and the
firm went bankrupt. Now the state is re-structuring it because they are all friends with Y
[the CEO of X]. We will pay for it all. Small suppliers will get nothing in compensation and he
is laughing at them somewhere in Florida. This is normal in Slovakia. Those people who
work hard have enough for bare existence. If they are lucky… It has always been like that. In
communism, when Mečiar was here and now as well. Only names change. Slovakia is not a
normal country. Have a look at how small honest entrepreneurs live in England” (Ht).
“We [SMEs] are stuck in one place [because of the unhelpful state]. I have to say it is not
that bad with me. But I do work more and more instead of less and less as I am approaching
retirement. But I don’t have any more. The state won’t let me. It makes me sick looking at
the wealth of politicians who swear how well they run the country and how they are cleaner
than freshly fallen snow while stuffing their own pockets” (Jt).
Thus, the situation is seen as not normal, the attitude of the state is appreciated as not normal. The state
is malignant. This also sets the grounds for a range of behaviours and strategies to normalise the un-
normal conditions.
One participant nicely summarised the debate:
“This system is based on getting as much as possible from tax payers so that it can carry on.
They are always coming up with new and higher taxes, fees for even the air entrepreneurs
breathe. It is not working for us. It is against us. It is not bearable” (Lt).
37 A large construction company, the name of which has been removed to avoid charges of defamation.
203
The central message of entrepreneurs as victims of their rulers and legislation weaves through
interviews, dovetailing with IACD. Participants were silent on any criticism directed toward other
entrepreneurs or indeed themselves. It is reserved almost exclusively to the state as the principal
problem and the adversary of entrepreneurship on a small scale and to a much smaller extent to big
business. This illuminates the potency of the societal discourse on corruption circulating in the society
since the beginning of the nation.
To reiterate the point made earlier, corruption has become an easy answer and the government an
immediate scapegoat. This is not to reduce these issues to the point of triviality but rather to stress the
absence of other views on the matter such as past legacies, the lack of pressure from the electorate, the
lack of involvement of SMEs or other explanations. It offers a glimpse into the mind sets of ordinary
Slovaks that tend to seek reasons, for what they see as malfunctioning in the operating environment of
SMEs solely and exclusively in the external environment, specifically the state. The tension reaches back
into the very beginnings of the history of Slovaks as a nation which brings the nineteenth century back to
life, perpetuates the old grievances and injustices and it could be said that it defines what it entails to be
a Slovak, that is to say to be in a sharp opposition with the state. This cannot be explained simply by a
lived experience of communism as young entrepreneurs who did not directly experience communism
also express this view, thus demonstrating how vital this aspect is to the self-interpretation of the
interviewed entrepreneurs. In Western understanding, such division does not exist, for the public is
taken to be a crucial element of modern democracy. In Slovakia, entrepreneurs and the ‘people’ at large
are distanced from the state. This is due to the opposing morality that the ‘people’ and the state hold.
Arguably, the deeply ingrained feature of being Slovak that continues to sour the rapport between the
state and the ‘people’ will be difficult to eradicate by technocratic anti-corruption. It could even be said
that anti-corruption appears to contribute to the problem perpetuating distrust and suspicion. This could
be treated as a good sign as IACD implies that it is precisely the lack of trust that bolsters demand for
anti-corruption (see section 2.4). In Slovakia, this is not the response.
8.2.1 Perceptions of mid and low-ranking bureaucrats
Following on from the previous discussion and the media analysis, it should not come as a surprise that
government officials, that is to say ministers and top officials in the judiciary, the police and so forth,
rather than rank and file officials on lower levels of the public administration hierarchy, are viewed as
responsible for the legislative oppression of SMEs. Mid and low-level bureaucrats are seen as merely
‘doing their job’. Nevertheless, there is a distinct tension as to whether this is good or bad as understood
204
by entrepreneurs themselves vis-à-vis the difficulties faced by them. Therefore, bureaucrats are placed
somewhere in the middle between the profiteering rulers and suffering ‘people’.
On the one hand, they are referred to as ‘a pain in the bum’ (Fa, Dt) or even ‘swine’ at the more extreme
end of perceptions, as unresponsive of the ‘people’ and the problems they create for them. On the other
hand, entrepreneurs express a level of understanding for them as they are under constant pressure,
often work in poor conditions and are granted low salaries which is then reflected in the manner they
treat citizens. As one entrepreneur put it, public officials at this level “are also only people, not
monsters” (Gt).
The above is related to public officials that are not personally known by entrepreneurs. A rather different
view is taken on those who are. These individuals emerge first and foremost as friends and relatives who
are also employed in the public sector. They become unquestioningly classified as the ‘people’ detached
from the negative connotations that haunt public administration.
Individual understandings construct a tension between seeing bureaucrats as the ‘people’ without
power and subject to high-level public administration and as tied to inimical public administration. Low
and mid-ranking bureaucrats are inescapably linked to adversely perceived public administration, while
at the same time retaining some features of the ‘people’. This positioning is rather important in
interactions and in conceptualisation of petty corruption, specifically in what is seen as corruption and
what is not. To further complicate the matter, some traces of the notion of public service serving citizens
have found their way into entrepreneur’s understanding of the public administration, thereby somewhat
disrupting the pattern of public administration and the ‘people’ relations anchored in the historic
experience of Slovaks. Indeed, these constitute entrepreneurs’ demands for the introduction of a service
culture in the public sector.
This discussion illustrates the richness of the social world of entrepreneurs where not all bureaucrats are
bureaucrats and different levels of rapport and closeness between entrepreneurs and bureaucrats with
different dynamics at play. It is important to bear in mind that IACD treats all public officials in a
universal manner. This point will resurface again shortly and will be subjected to close scrutiny.
8.3 Formal cooperation among entrepreneurs
IACD recognises the difficult position of SMEs that lack leverage and power vis-à-vis larger enterprises in
Slovakia, this includes medium and large ventures, as well as the state in furthering their interests as
205
pointed out in Chapter Two. The way forward is suggested to be in formal cooperation of SMEs within
professional and sector-specific organisations. In other words, the power of numbers as SMEs constitute
the majority of enterprises in many countries, certainly in Europe and in Slovakia. It thus appears that
the approach to tackle unfavourable legislation including high taxes, unfavourable legal frameworks,
inspections, the general attitude of the state and other impediments is through cooperation that
furthers the interests of SMEs on a collective basis.
This is a rather difficult as IACD on the one hand promotes individualism and on the other encourages
cooperation, albeit with strong individualist overtones. It is hard to define this subtlety of Western
experiences and even harder to replicate it in other contexts. The problems inherent in the somewhat
contradictory and unresolved stance manifest themselves in the context of Slovak SMEs. Interviewed
entrepreneurs construct themselves strongly along the lines of individualism when it comes to
collaborating with other entrepreneurs which in turn impedes rather than fosters cooperation. This
appears to be minimal as entrepreneurs did not report any meaningful forms of formal cooperation and
collaboration. They are limited to informal forms, linked to informal behaviour and individual assistance
and help. This creates little scope for pursuance of a change or forwarding one’s interest collectively and
formally through a shared platform.
It is revealing that collective belonging to the ‘people’ and to the community of SMEs merges with
constructions of the individualism of interviewed entrepreneurs locked in their worlds. Belonging to
these interlinked groups is abstract rather than manifested in collective activities. ‘Us’ serves as merely a
guiding concept to constructions of the self vis-à-vis the state, not necessarily a platform for collective
action. It feeds into the collective memory of the ‘people’ as helpless masses that does not allow for
achievement of such a form of being that would be compatible with cooperation.
The reasoning behind the lack of any collective formal activity is telling of the embeddedness of
individualism in the specific context of Slovakia:
“Are you a member of some organisation?
No.
Why?
I don’t have time for pretty fluffy things. I have a business to run” (Na).
206
“Nobody cares about them [organisations of entrepreneurs]. You pay membership fees,
they send emails to you and that is it. They can do very little in real terms. I don’t have time
for it. Why? I mind my own stuff. I have enough on my own plate” (Ht).
“They [organisations] have little capacity. They are here. They say something to newspapers
every now and then. But there is no one to listen to them. I was a member in a local one but
I didn’t see much benefit for me. I don’t have time to get involved in that. I have a firm, I
have a second job, a child. Time is money. I have to be careful about how I spend it” (Lt).
“You sit around and talk and talk, talk and talk without ever reaching a conclusion. It is just a
loss of time. I don’t care for moans of others, I have enough of my own problems, about 100
things I need to do every day and worries about what is going to come tomorrow” (Ma).
Self-identification with the ‘people’ brings in the construct of powerlessness and the mentality of
subjection to the power of the state. It could be likened to martyrdom of Slovaks as an inbuilt trait of
what it entails to be Slovak. This leaves little room for coming together in an organised fashion which
implies power. It is uncomfortable and undesirable to have and exercise power when it comes to the
‘people’. Albeit suffering, entrepreneurs seem to somewhat indulge in the sense of powerlessness which
strips off duties and responsibilities towards enterprise and society. This means that the existing
organisations lack support of SMEs and that goes on to materielise as a perceived lack of a say. This
underpins the reasoning of entrepreneurs and entrenches individualism in a vicious circle.
Coupled with the ‘people’ rationality in the narrations of entrepreneurs is neoliberal rationality. The two
work together to justify passivity, that is to say not having time as one’s own firm and one’s own narrow
interest comes first on the list of priorities. Non-participation is viewed as saving time, resources and
energy for running an enterprise. The intense individualism further takes on the form of fierce
competition as yet another obstacle to encouraging cooperation, as entrepreneurs see other SMEs both
as fellow sufferers and rivals. Appropriation of the neoliberal and ‘people’ rationality appears to be
toxic in creating entrepreneurial selves. Non-participation emerges as a response to external challenges
to which a Slovak entrepreneur succumbs and not which he/she tackles. Above all, it also fortifies
external realities.
A minority see their role in changing their immediate environment rather than in pursuing a greater
societal and system change. However, they see themselves as unsupported in this endeavour. They
tend to return to passivity as recourse from the hostility or disinterest of other entrepreneurs, the
207
business environment and society on the whole to avoid the label ‘fool’. Those who venture outside the
accepted rules of behaviour are stigmatised. It is intriguing that this point was raised mainly by
entrepreneurs who had a work or study experience from abroad, disrupting the influence of
quintessentially Slovak truths. This was attained in mature democracies, most often the UK, the USA and
Germany, and to a lesser extent Austria. This will be further revisited later in the chapter.
The Slovak entrepreneurial community emerges as somewhat immature as entrepreneurial mind-sets
akin to Western ones on which IACD is built, have not fully developed. The entrenchment of
unwillingness to leave the enclosed safe individual spaces presents a great obstacle to pursuing anti-
corruption and to bettering the operating conditions for SMEs collectively among divided entrepreneurs.
Entrepreneurs have developed an elaborate set of informal practices to function in Slovakia that suit the
truths about SMEs and entrepreneurial selves circulating in the society and are effectively their
individual actuations.
8.4 Bribery
Vis-à-vis the endless obstacles to enterprise, petty corruption, specifically petty bribery, is constructed as
an approach to dealing with the adverse conditions. This feature of petty bribery as a coping strategy is
also recognised by the IACD. However, interviews cast a more nuanced light on the reasoning and
justification of petty bribery as necessary. Bribery is an activity through which individuals activate the
particular entrepreneurial selves to which the culture around invites them.
The influence of calculative rationality manifests itself again. It is adopted by interviewed entrepreneurs
to explain their behaviour, but above all to shape their attitude towards bribing. First of all, bribery saves
financial resources particularly in the context of inspections. This aspect of bribery does not emerge in
relation to other situations and contacts with public administration in such a pronounced manner.
““I try it [to give a bribe] when a fine is really huge. It makes sense” [Ja].
“Some are willing to forgive mistakes. Usually for a contribution of some sort. Or for a bottle
or two of wine. They have something out of it and I get away with a 20-euro bribe instead of
a 100-euro fine. Everyone is happy… Look at the police, they are waiting at each corner to
stop you for something. So they stopped me for nonsense, little speeding in a village… It
was for všimné of 30 euros and without a log in my file” (Aa).
208
Small payments given in direct personal exchange are often referred to as ‘všimné’. ‘Všimné’ translates
as a payment to ‘be noticed by a public official/civil servant’ and effectively serves the purpose of
softening the impact and importance of a bribe.
Simply, paying a bribe is cheaper than paying a fine. Paying a bribe instead of paying a fine is also seen
as a means of avoiding other difficulties besides a financial loss, such as a confiscation of driving licence.
In addition, it is conceptualised as good not only for the entrepreneur, but also for the involved public
official, who walks away with a slightly improved personal budget. On the contrary, paying a fine is a
waste as no one benefits from it. In effect, passing a bribe turns a faceless public authority into a human
being, one of the ‘people’, thus establishing a rapport between a public official and an entrepreneur.
Acceptance of a bribe by a public official is not seen as negative in the sense that they are extorting
money from hard-working entrepreneurs. On the contrary, the incorruptible officials are referred to as
‘idiots’, ‘arrogant’ and even ‘robbers’, embodying the state and destroying small enterprises while those
accepting a bribe are treated more leniently as cooperative, understanding or at the very least as not
causing problems. Through the act of offering a bribe and its acceptance, the involved parties enter into
tried and tested waters of attacking the oppressive state. Entrepreneurs avert certain costs. On the
other side of the exchange, public officials improve their salaries. This silent and delicate contract
presents a subtle form of combatting the state that appears to be deeply rooted in the culture.
This is fortified by the argument of the state either stealing or wasting public resources. It also brings to
the fore the matter of bribery encompassing not only monetary transactions but also exchanges of
goods.
As the participants effectively put themselves in the position of being harassed by unreasonable and
exploitative legislation and public administration, rather than into someone who broke a rule or indeed
endangered others, this effectively legitimates giving a bribe.
“Sometimes, they [inspectors] can be talked into a všimné... It is a great relief. Fines are
really high here. It would aggravate you if you got fined for a missing signature on the toilet
cleaning schedule, wouldn’t it? That is what they wanted to fine me for. In the end, it was a
50-euro všimné” (Ct).
IACD does not recognise that bribery may occur in situations in which the pursued effect is not obtaining
a permit, speeding up an application or similar instances of incentivising public administration to
function more effectively for the individual and to ‘get things done’ (UN, 2012). Slovak SMEs are also
209
willing to pay a bribe for averting the law. The approach of IACD constructing corruption as too costly
and inefficient emerges as inapplicable in the context of Slovakia where bribery saves money for the
individual in the immediate term, as far as interviewees believe.
This fits the theory of corruption functioning as grease in highly regulated environments (Dreher and
Gassebner, 2013). It is perpetuated by the legislation, the system of public administration and the
unwillingness to further a change. Reiterating calculations of costs and benefits as the basis of the
enterprising rationale provides entrepreneurs with a hallmark of legitimacy. Individual calculative
rationality, with which IACD works, foregrounds self-interest and constrains the consideration of wider
or long-term impacts of bribery. At the same time, the reluctance of IACD to project SMEs as wrongdoers
cements understandings of the self that prohibit such self-awareness.
As such, bribery is not constructed as breaking the law but as a way of coping with superfluous norms,
partly as a matter of convenience. It is thus not so much a rational shortcut taken when one is faced with
imperfect information (Stiglitz, 2012), but rather a means of coping with a large amount of information
and the unresponsive state. Neither is it viewed as immoral, as was the case of grand and political
corruption, thereby dovetailing nicely with the media constructions of corruption. Rather, bribery is an
adequate response to unjust legislation and strict inspections motivated to impose penalties:
“It is good when I can do this, I can help myself a little bit”(Aa)
“We have to struggle on, to never give up. And try what is possible to do to help oneself…
Bribes are a blessing. A little light in the darkness” (Ot).
The above has for some an important implication for the very fundamental tenet of anti-corruption.
Getting the public interest in line with the private interest via anti-corruption does not make much
sense, as the two sides are ‘naturally’ opposing. As the state is not seen as serving the ‘people’, but
rather itself, a use of the public office for private gain on the petty scale is not problematic, as the only
harm is imposed on the state:
“It doesn’t hurt anyone to disobey the rules a little bit. The state gets what it deserves!” (Ht)
In addition, interviewed entrepreneurs appreciate themselves as not only entrepreneurs, but also
parents, siblings and children, thereby creating a dense network of social relations and associated
responsibilities for the kin. Therefore, paying a bribe directly translates into providing for the family,
210
thereby linking bribe-giving with social obligations and moral justification. It embeds SMEs in the social
fabric of society in which they operate. Such issues go unrecognised by IACD.
IACD tends to project public officials as demanding bribes and SMEs as having little other choice than
paying it. However, Slovak entrepreneurs describe themselves as the instigators of bribery. A consistent
approach to initiating an informal exchange starts with an uncovering of a shortcoming, followed by a
proposal of ‘another way of solving it’ from an entrepreneur. This is either accepted or rejected by a
public official. It was said to be rather rare for the motion to come from the other side. The entire
situation is described as open and fluid, as well as obscure. It requires careful testing of the waters based
on feelings of entrepreneurs about the particular situation, their perception of the involved official/s and
the behaviour of officials that is either seen as open to compromise or not. This is a rather complex and
subtle interaction based on far more than a rational, that is to say calculative, assessment. The decision
whether to enter into bribery is declared to be based on a feeling at the particular moment. Arguably,
perfectly rational homo economicus would enter such a deal every time in the given context of Slovakia.
IACD is too restrictive and reliant on homo economicus in its approach to corruption.
In addition, entrepreneurs did not even see public officials as intentionally looking for deficiencies so as
to extract a bribe as argued earlier. Some participants suggested that job positions or promotion hinge
on meeting the allocated target thereby pushing public officials into penalising “for virtually anything”.
Therefore, public officials are portrayed as forced or encouraged into seeking out reasons to penalise.
Such dynamics do not conform to the IACD’s comprehension of petty bribery. A calculative mind-set
building on the past experience in Slovakia fosters a far more active attitude than currently
acknowledged.
Petty bribery in public offices is rather rare in narrations of entrepreneurs. This is linked with awareness
of transparency mechanisms and reduced privacy within public authorities, thereby suggesting the
success of anti-corruption to some extent. Most instances of passing a bribe occurred outside of the
physical premises of public authorities, underpinning the specific dynamics of situations in which bribery
occurs that IACD does not consider.
Entrepreneurs are rather creative in passing a bribe. It means that the existent oversight transparency
measures such as cameras on police cars or inspectors from different districts carrying out controls are
too late. In the case of inspections in the premises of the firm, this is not enough to stop petty bribery
from occurring particularly due to the privacy of one’s own enterprise that lends entrepreneurs a sense
211
of security and control. In the case of being stopped by the police, the cameras prove inefficient as
participants in the exchange simply arrange themselves in such a way so as to conceal the transaction,
for instance to turn their backs to the camera or slip the bribe into documents the police require for
inspection. In public authorities, a mediator is used to facilitate a bribe. An intermediary connects an
entrepreneur with an acquaintance in a public office. A mediator guarantees safety and privacy in
communication with an unknown public official. As such, places greatly shape bribery. IACD silences this
spatial aspect of bribe giving in favour of universal conceptualisations.
The above also illuminates the difficulties of combatting corruption stemming from unwillingness of the
involved parties to report an incident and to stay away from bribery and from not appreciating petty
corruption as wrong (see section 7.5.1). Without this, corruption is extremely difficult to uncover.
Another anti-corruption institution, that of agent provocateur, could be more efficient. However, there
appears to be a considerable amount of cautiousness on the side of entrepreneurs. In addition, the use
of the agent raises further side effects, specifically, fear that can be damaging as will be discussed later.
8.5.1 Bribery in applying for grants and subsidies
Accessing public finances in a transparent manner is a precarious task as entrepreneurs argue that it is
uncertain and that a well-prepared project is not enough to secure a grant/subsidy. Indeed, the EU has
expressed its concerns regarding the allocation of EU grants and subsidies on the merit of the quality
(European Commission, 2014). Corruption in this area appears in both sectors. Tourism and agriculture
differ in terms of frequency of applying for public grants with the agricultural SMEs being more involved.
This mirrors the greater state involvement in the sector.
Entrepreneurs are persuaded that it is vitally important to strengthen an application by means of paying
a ‘commission’ to a well-connected individual in the public sector or by ensuring a protection by a známy
[a friend/acquaintance/relative]. The latter will be discussed in more detail in the section dedicated to
favour-doing as it features different dynamics, rationales and forms of exchanges compared to bribery.
Applying for grants is viewed as a laborious process that includes extensive red tape and places high
expectations on proposals. Some entrepreneurs tackle the latter by using services of specialist
companies and others seek help from within their circles in terms of composing an application.
Disillusionment is strong when applications fail to deliver on expected outcome despite considerable
time, effort and resources invested in preparing it. A lack of success often translates into unwillingness to
try again or to seeking how to avoid a rejection. The latter is of interest here. For this reason, ‘back-up’
212
strategies to support applications are employed. They are put in place to avert the resources expended
on applying being rendered futile, as applications are turned down on the basis of minor formal mistakes
or due to a lack of available funds. Albeit it is not certain that an application fails without paying a
commission, these serve as a guarantee that it will not be rejected.
It is telling that a failure to secure a grant is never explained as due to the quality of the application, but
rather put down to corruption in the public sector, namely grand and political corruption, rather than
petty corruption of other SMEs. It is interesting to note that entrepreneurs are silent on the impact of
such informal activities on their part on other SMEs. Whereas grand corruption is seen as sucking up
resources of small enterprises, petty corruption in obtaining grants is not appreciated from the
perspective of putting other small firms at a disadvantage. When done by themselves, corruption in
public funding is neither appreciated as contributing to the situation that entrepreneurs themselves
complain about – that is to say failing to achieve on the basis of a well-prepared project. Likewise, SMEs
that obtain public funding by the means of bribery are not blamed.
In addition, extracting benefits in this way emerges not simply as a means of increasing individual
resources by rational calculating entrepreneurs pursuing narrow self-interest. It is also a technique of
getting something out from the selfish state, to which small firms are entitled. In other words, petty
corruption in public funding is about getting what entrepreneurs believe belongs to them both
economically and morally. This is reinforced by the rational calculative mind-set (see section 2.3)
strengthened and justified by media (see section 7.5) that excuses or at least fails to shame the
involvement of SMEs in petty bribery. These understandings dictate that it is viable and desirable to pay
a provision, that is to say to lose a percentage from the received sum, argued to be around 10%. After
all, a successful SME still acquired funding, even if this is lessened by the sum of a provision. The
overriding message is that one needs to learn to play by the rules otherwise they risk being put at a
disadvantage from others willing to employ informal strategies.
Whereas ‘všimné’ is a rather personal exchange, provisions are much more impersonal in their nature
suggesting an established and organised shady ecosystem with public funding with its own distinct rules
that are observed.
8.5.2 From gifts to bribes to expression of thankfulness
Bribes tend to be constructed as clear anonymous payments to a stranger in a position of public power
by entrepreneurs. It is a simple transaction mostly in return for turning a blind eye to an uncovered
213
deficiency or in return for a service/social good in strengthening one’s application or supporting one’s
matter. However, whereas some bribes are given in a rather straightforward manner, as in the case of
public funding, others are more intricate. The former hinges on private gain of both the public official
and the entrepreneur engaged in the act thereby fitting relatively well with IACD. In other cases, bribes
serve a function that is less concerned with enriching a public official or the entrepreneur and more of
circumventing the system and building a rapport between members of the ‘people’ with the concept of
‘gain’ being somewhat muted.
“Winning against the system makes me so happy. Through a contact or through všimné. It is
the best feeling ever” (Aa).
“I am always so pleased when someone manages a good trick (on the state). When they
manage to get a little money from the state or don’t give something to the state” (Na).
“They are happy, I am happy. I help them, they help me. Just as it should be between
normal people. It is not just paying them, it is about understanding” (Bt).
Therefore, the dynamics involved in these situations are different and the meanings, as well as the
action of giving/receiving a bribe itself vary. A bribe is not always a bribe even when it is conceived of as
a bribe. Bribing is highly contextual which IACD and the Slovak anti-corruption fail to capture.
The fine line between bribes and gifts has been discussed in the literature review (see Chapter Two).
Gifts are given at the time of visiting an office with a purpose of getting a particular task done, but also
following a realisation of a service as an expression of thankfulness for completing a task and as an
appreciation of the way a matter was handled. The first scenario includes traces of incentivising a public
official to be cooperative. Gifts of small value, such as alcohol, flowers, chocolate and so forth that are in
line with the formally recognised institution of a gift (see Chapter Four) are given to encourage a helpful
and accommodating approach of a public official. In other words, they are given with an intention to
bring a public official on one’s side, to break the stereotypical power arrangement so as to facilitate
interaction and handling of one’s matters.
“Some are willing to help. In return for a little something. A bottle of spirit or so” (Ba).
“If I need something faster, I take a bottle of something to say thank you (Bt).
214
There is also an element of an immediate gain on both sides. It introduces the matter of a differential
treatment, thereby disadvantaging those who do not bear gifts. Thereby such gift-giving to a great
extent conforms to the idea of a bribe, and it is understood as such by SMEs. It should not come as a
surprise that such a strategy is not opted for in situations when a public official is personally known to an
entrepreneur or in the case of prior positive experience with a public official within the bounds of
legitimate conduct. In other words, where it is not necessary to bring a public official on to the side of
the ‘people’, no gifts or bribes occur.
Gifts are also handed to public officials both from the position of a ‘známy’ or merely a grateful citizen
following a resolution of a matter. They are not constructed as given in order to ensure a smooth
cooperation in the future, but rather to express gratefulness for resolving past matters. These are not
understood as bribes.
“I take coffee to them [public officials] to say thank you. So that they know I appreciate their
work. It is a nice thing to do, we are not machines. It is kind of like between friends. Even
when they are not really your friends. But they know you and so you are nice to them and
they are nice to you” (Ka).
“Sometimes I give flowers, a bottle. That always cheers them up. And I am happy too when I
see I made their day. This makes public administration more humane” (Et).
Nevertheless, gifts also cement informal relationships between entrepreneurs and public officials. Again,
this is precarious as the boundary between culturally appropriate gift-giving and bribery, and between
merely showing gratitude and influencing the future behaviour of the public official vis-à-vis the giver
becomes blurred.
The above demonstrates several shades that exchanges between public officials and entrepreneurs take,
thereby blurring what might appear as a clear boundary between a bribe and not a bribe. It also
problematizes the notion of what constitutes a private gain. Is giving a £ 20 bottle of cognac or a
bouquet of flowers the same as giving a £ 20 bribe? Polese (2008) argues bribery does not necessarily
have to take the form of monetary exchange, albeit this is the dominant view of bribery. Instead, he
maintains gifts or intangible service could also be construed as a form of bribery.
Indeed, one could opine that the difference rests in timing. While bribes always come before providing a
service, a gift usually comes after. However, it is worth asking whether gifts set the grounds for future
215
unequal treatment. The clear linearity of bribe-giving as maintained in the IACD simplifies the
convoluted realities on the ground, in addition to ignoring the multiple faces and directions of informal
activities. This translates into a provision of a considerable space for exchanges to unfold unchecked.
8.5.3 Gaining agency
Bribery mitigates insecurity. Rather than taking power away from entrepreneurs as IACD reiterates,
corruption becomes a tool of gaining control. Bribes do not only save precious time and reduce pressure
inflicted on entrepreneurs by the state, it is also a means of grasping power in interactions with the
public administration. The entrepreneurial identity constructed in the opposition to the state is activated
through bribery as entrepreneurs do their best to protect themselves.
This is what Jauregiu refers to as the ‘provisional agency’, that is to say the capacity to obtain a social
good and better future (2014). To put it differently, bribery shifts the power balance in favour of the
‘people’. It is a way for entrepreneurs to create greater stability and predictability of their lives and
businesses. It is through bribery that entrepreneurs activate themselves as agents and claim back some
power over their lives from the state. A bribe is not lost capital as IACD suggests, but rather an
investment in stability and security. In their eyes, attempting to persuade entrepreneurs to give up
corruption means that they are being put in a weaker and above all dependent position towards the
state.
It is through bribery that entrepreneurs become creators of their own destiny rather than being at the
mercy of the state. This does not entail rebelling against the system or indeed taking up anti-corruption
that, as IACD suggests, places power in one’s hands. Rather, the Slovak approach to what is perceived to
be unbearable conditions is to covertly achieve certain alleviation for oneself while on the surface
maintaining the façade of obeying the rules and following the laws. Effectively, by bribing, entrepreneurs
actuate themselves as good Slovaks. They do not combat the state in an open battle but in covert
personal miniature wars that play themselves out on the platform of everyday realities of running an
SME. This is because it makes little sense to entrepreneurs to lodge a complaint regarding an unfair
penalty or an inexplicable bureaucratic decision to decline an application, when the expected response
of public administration is that public officials just follow the law. The issue of reluctance to forward
one’s interest collectively has already been addressed. This is cemented by entrepreneurs’ passivity
towards the matter of change in conditions for better. The state always wins. Entrepreneurs take
matters into their own hands in a different way:
216
“It is only fair that we do this. How else do you function in this mess? Slovakia is not about
cleaning up the mess. It is about finding your place in this shit” (Ca).
“I think it is just. Otherwise, we would be totally at the mercy of the state. Justice is not for
the normal people, so we compensate this way” (Et).
Anti-corruption removes this option. Indeed, the theory of corruption ‘greasing the wheels’ has already
been highlighted. In addition, Méon and Weill (2008) also suggest that corruption may compensate for
and increase efficiency of extremely ineffective institutional arrangements and increase efficiency in
countries with poor governance, which to some extent matches the issue faced by SMEs in Slovakia.
What this concept does not recognise is the above point of perpetuation of a faulty system. As such,
petty corruption is both sand and grease in the wheels of entrepreneurship.
8.5.4 Bribery as a universal evil?
IACD treats bribes universally as wasted resources. It hurts competitiveness and thus jeopardises the
success of SMEs (see Chapter Three). As observed earlier, entrepreneurs appreciate corruption as a
means of saving time and money. Having saved or gained resources allows for an introduction of a new
service or a product, modernise production, adopt environment-friendly technologies and so forth. In
other words, access to informal patterns of doing business can enhance efficiency and competitiveness
of SMEs in some way in the immediate sense.
The argument that corruption hurts competitiveness of an enterprise is not straightforward on yet
another level. First of all, in the context where neither customers nor business partners are concerned
about business integrity, engaging in bribery does not carry the danger of being perceived negatively by
crucial stakeholders, thereby impinging on a business’s attractiveness and ultimately performance. Even
tourism is focused on the domestic market and thus the influence of possibly more scrupulous foreign
visitors is not sufficient enough. Domestic tourists are more sensitive to price than to transparency
issues of their chosen service providers. The same could be said about consumers of agricultural goods.
Secondly, in the heavily regulated context of Slovakia where SMEs are faced with competition from less
regulated countries, bribery can help to mitigate the disadvantages stemming from being subject to the
Slovak regulation. Implicitly the international model is based on competition within countries and
assumes that international competition is either not important or comes from countries with no
corruption. Ironically, increased competition does little to counteract bribery. On the contrary, it
217
legitimates and further reinforces the phenomenon. Finally, resources spent on bribing are far from
wasted capital, thus further challenging the black and white understanding of bribery as simply harmful.
However, it is a different matter when looked at from the perspective of grand and political corruption
that depletes scarce resources that could be invested elsewhere in society, including in SMEs, as
entrepreneurs argue. Also, it could be postulated that bribery in public funding means that the resources
do not necessarily go to the most capable SMEs in terms of innovation, growth prospects or other
indicators of prosperous business. Likewise, being exposed to the necessities of doing business in
Slovakia as interviewees put it, is in itself debilitating in the international context. As such, corruption
with relevance to successful business looks different when looked at from the macro and the micro
perspective which needs to be taken into account when appealing to SMEs with anti-corruption
messages.
8.5.5 Well-accepted practice of bribery
As argued throughout this section, bribery is not perceived as harmful or wrongful inasmuch as it is a
‘people’ activity. Even participants, who labelled corruption as morally wrong and reported to not
engage in it, struggled to conceive of the ‘people’ as corrupt and as breaching morals. IACD encourages
this by its lenient treatment of SMEs and petty corruption overall. It appears that even if the activity
itself might be viewed in adverse terms, individuals doing it are not. Consequently, instances of petty
corruption are not reported. This reflects infrequent reporting on corruption at large in Slovakia (see
Chapter Five).
It is not surprising that individuals engaged in bribery on both sides are not willing to blow the whistle as
the arrangement suits both sides. As far as entrepreneurs are concerned, petty bribery is a viable
alternative to overcoming hurdles. As to public officials, although their perspectives are not explored
here, it can be assumed that it supplements their relatively low salaries in low and mid-ranking positions.
However, even in situations when a tacit offer of a bribe is refused by either side, this is not taken any
further. The reasons as to why do not encompass disbelief that the state would tackle the matter
accordingly or indeed fear of repercussions. Instead, entrepreneurs are not taking any action because
they do not want to implicate minor public officials and cause any hardship to them. The discourse
attaches individuals with the ‘people’ identity so strongly that participants recognise it in others and
therefore sympathise. However, this also means that it becomes difficult to report instances of petty
corruption as this carries with it a subtle notion of betrayal which stretches beyond the immediate
218
community. There appears to be a level of loyalty to an abstract community of the ‘people’. This is
further combined with a belief that petty bribery is an everyday phenomenon and that it is grand and
political corruption that matters.
The above is cemented by the way interviewees engaging in bribery in particular communicate their
views to the interviewer. This is permeated with formulations such as ‘you know’, ‘you know how it
goes’, ‘I am sure you have been in that situation’, ‘you know how people help themselves around here’
and ‘surely others have already told you about this stuff, you know it all’. These seek to build an
understanding between the discussants regarding bribery as something that everybody does and
everybody knows about, including the researcher. Above all, it reflects the tendency to enclose the
researcher in the lives of the ‘people’, in everydayness and normality of bribery. This connection appears
to be vital in order to discuss the matter with Slovak SMEs in a more open manner for which a large-
scale survey does not allow and thus tend to reflect the ‘official’ truths so as not to stand out and not to
expose oneself to criticism.
8.5.6 Fear, distrust and transparency
It has been argued above that corruption occurring at the premises of public authorities is rather scarce.
A close look at the reasoning of entrepreneurs suggests that this appears to be due to the current
culture of transparency. Participants do not engage in bribery as “you never know who is watching” (Bt)
and because “even walls have ears” (Ka). Likewise, some entrepreneurs mentioned that attempting to
bribe a public official during an inspection is not as easy as it used to be as public officials fear possible
consequences. They are also seen as being forced to penalise, therefore making a bribe not an option. A
presence of agent provocateur is also among the main concerns as to why inspectors are afraid in
accepting a bribe. Nevertheless, the fear of being watched is less prominent in the context of
inspections.
From the perspective of reducing the scope for bribery, it might be opined that this is a direction to take.
However, as maintained throughout this chapter, excessive inspections prompted by the allocated
quota, present a considerable burden on entrepreneurs. Furthermore, inspections provide grounds for a
perpetuation of adverse perception of public administration and the state and disseminate fear, distrust
and frustration where corruption is not an option as the system itself has not changed.
When it comes to institutionalising an omnipresent gaze, it could also appear that it is an appropriate
approach to curbing corruption as it reduces the willingness of public officials to accept a bribe at least
219
to some extent. However, this is due to fear, rather than identification with anti-corruption. Similarly,
entrepreneurs prone to corruption decide to stay away from corruption not because they see corruption
as wrong for their business or society, but out of fear. Fear goes hand in hand with distrust:
“You cannot trust anyone these days. All there is left is fear abut what happens when
inspectors turn up next time”(Lt)
“It is awful, everyone is terrified of their own shadows. There is no trust” (Ca).
Notwithstanding that transparency measures somewhat curtail room for corruption, they also lead to
frustration among entrepreneurs. It is questionable how appropriate it is to spread fear among the
population that is already in an inimical mood vis-à-vis the state as it feeds the image of entrepreneurs
as defenceless victims of the state.
Furthermore, the notion of oversight carries with it negative connotations of the recent past. The
communist regime was characterised by meticulous monitoring of citizens using informants to reveal
‘the enemies of socialism’. Transparency is not constructed by individuals as a means of controlling the
state as IACD suggest but rather as a means of controlling the ‘people’ and is looked at with unease.
Transparency and monitoring aiming to reduce the discretion of public officials translate into rigidity and
prescriptiveness of public administration and of legislation. The obscurity of the regulation becomes
even more troublesome when public officials are not willing or cannot help entrepreneurs in tackling it.
“They [public officials] are scared to even move an inch from the outlined way of doing
things to make life easier for us”.
The dictate of transparency aggravates the grievances of dealing with public administration and further
contributes to the already damaged perceptions of the state and public administration and the broken
rapport between entrepreneurs and the state. Vis-à-vis the reiteration of grand and political corruption
as unpunishable, anti-corruption becomes yet another tool of oppressing the ‘people’. Above all, it
infuses fear and distrust that is far from the healthy mistrust promoted by IACD.
Transparency neither eradicates corruption completely as entrepreneurs and public officials alike adapt
to the changed conditions by becoming craftier and more cautious. Therefore, anti-corruption as
conceptualised today is destined to be merely catching up with the will and determination of SMEs to
engage in informal means of getting things done especially against the backdrop of toleration of petty
corruption in Slovakia. On the other hand, transparency encourages entrepreneurs to seek out other
220
ways of getting help through a range of informal mechanisms including bribery, but above all personal
networks, as the room for bribery grows increasingly smaller.
8.6 Bribery-averse SMEs: Morality as a deterrent of corruption
It is intriguing to take a look at those interviewees who actively avoid bribery for reasons other than fear
of getting caught and punishment, thereby effectively resisting the societal discourse on petty
corruption. This minority fails to internalise the truths about petty corruption circulating in the society in
the process of self-transformation, thus creating an alternative telos for life.
Unlike IACD’s focus on constructing bribery as futile, costly and economically irrational behaviour, these
entrepreneurs do not choose to abstain from giving bribes for economic reasons. Rather, their reasoning
is firmly tied to the notion of morality and goodness revealing a rather different rationale and
understanding of enterprise. As such, bribe-giving to them is something dirty, filthy and above all
harmful as the quotes below demonstrate.
“I avoid bribing. I believe it has no place in any enterprise… Enterprise should be about
doing something good for oneself, for my environment, for the society. Bribes taint this…
I firmly believe that morality should be protected. It is not only about making profit… It is
about all of us existing together, helping each other. To behave like decent people.
Money should not be the priority as they are now. Life, people, the environment all
come second to money” (It).
This is rather reminiscent of the older discourse on corruption explicitly charged with Christian morality,
but applied to petty affairs of the ‘people’ rather than to the affairs of rulers. It signals an important
break with the use of the discourse.
“It is sleazy to give money to someone like that to do me a favour. It is wrong and low,
primitive… People should not pay to bureaucrats. That is morally wrong. Paying a bribe is
supporting this perverse system that is set so that it sucks on the ordinary folk. That is
sick. It is a sign of a sick society where everything is upside down. I would much rather
pay a fine than betray my morals. That is all. I have nothing else out of being honest”
(Kt).
This fragment is particularly interesting. It constructs an individual decision to pay a bribe or not as a
matter of self-respect stemming from upholding one’s morals and being an honest person and an honest
221
entrepreneur simply for the sake of one’s own perception, as these qualities are not respected,
rewarded or supported by the society. In other words, the decision not to engage in bribery is not built
on a drive for profit as IACD implicitly and explicitly maintains. This is of secondary interest. Interviewees
touch upon the issue of doing good to society and maintaining their moral integrity as a priority rather
than doing well in an economic sense. However, being honest and doing well as a business go hand in
hand as the CSR suggest, but the order of priorities is altered. It is worth pointing out that IACD appears
to be barking up the wrong tree by seeking to encourage SMEs to avoid corruption in the name of
growth. Rather, self-vigilance with respect to moral integrity plays a central role in individual
construction of corruption-averse selves.
These understandings also exhibit starkly different perceptions of oneself in the society. A majority of
entrepreneurs who do not shy away from paying bribes see themselves as individuals and their own
interest as paramount. This group positions themselves as being an integral part of the Slovak society for
which they are concerned in addition to their own issues, own business, own prosperity and the matters
of their closest community. These entrepreneurs do not isolate themselves in their small worlds vis-à-vis
the media tendency to paint a calamitous picture of corruption and the state. It neither resembles the
IACD image of society as composed of selfish individuals collectively pursuing their self-interest.
These individuals are guided by particular truths about environmental, social and economic
sustainability that defy the dominant approaches within IACD. The above-mentioned prioritising of
betterment of society and environment and self-satisfaction stemming from being honest and moral
arising from the rural background underpinning Slovak experience illustrates this divergent knowledge.
Furthermore, the urgency and criticality of personal survival, which will be addressed shortly, recedes
into the background in narrations of these interviewees revealing another failure to accommodate the
societal discourse nourished by IACD. It is this concern that pushes entrepreneurs into bribing. Without
the worry of and fear for existence and the survival of their own business, the rationale for bribing
drops. The main objective is not merely to survive, but to produce good quality services/products and to
nurture the society. This could be attributed to the experience of working/studying abroad, thus being
exposed to other discourses, other truths about life and enterprise than those circulating in Slovakia.
However, this does not appear to be the case for individuals that carried out low-skilled jobs abroad.
Not only do these individual holders of alternative truths have a direct and personal exposure to foreign
conditions, they also congregate in cities, most importantly and unsurprisingly in the capital Bratislava. It
222
follows that the above is particularly pronounced in tourism enterprises as agricultural SMEs are located
outside of the capital. Bratislava as a capital city is considerably different from the remainder of the
country, as it is wealthier, attracts jobs, investment and it is at the fore front of change and trends in
Slovakia. Nevertheless, even in the context of economically, socially and culturally more advanced
capital, entrepreneurs feel isolated. It is therefore not unexpected that the spill over effect of this
thinking into the rest of the country appears to be minimal.
Again, this thesis raises more questions for further investigation, some of which will be indicated in the
conclusions.
One could raise a point that these entrepreneurs could become, indeed are, the source of action against
corruption in Slovakia. However, as noted earlier even they do not engage in anti-corruption when it
comes to reporting the phenomena or supporting and circulating anti-corruption messages.
Furthermore, given the tolerance to petty corruption in Slovakia, those not taking part are somewhat
ostracised as the odd ones out. Isolating them reduces their capacity to ignite a change.
8.7 Favour-doing and informal networks
It has been opined on several occasions that IACD, as well as the local discourse reduce petty corruption
to bribery. Accordingly, petty bribery is conceived of as somewhat illicit, albeit given the negative
perception of the legal system, this carries little weight in the eyes of the ‘people’. However, a range of
favour-doing activities and informal networking do not fall into the category of corruption. In other
words, getting things done via známy [an acquaintance] is not understood as wrong in any sense. This is
reflected in the paucity of legal framework that would capture the phenomena of reciprocal assistance
that can overlap with the notion of corruption.
The anonymity highlighted in the constructions of petty bribery is replaced with a sense of familiarity,
closeness and tacit obligation to help svojím [own people]. This help is tied into complex mutual social
ties that emerge as an automated response to encountering a difficulty. It is through favour-doing that
entrepreneurs activate the collectivist self and their agency stemming from being a part of a group. It is
strengthened by the transparency culture which makes bribing somewhat more-risky and used mostly
only where necessary, that is to say to avert fines and to facilitate public grants/subsidies. Other issues
are tackled via an extensive and intricate web of informal networks. Ledeneva (1998) observed similar
trends in the context of Russia where bribery constituted a measure of last resort, rather than the first
response to an encountered difficulty.
223
In the narrations of entrepreneurs, social and familial ‘help outs’ are not treated as illicit but as normal in
the cultural context of Slovakia. Individuals close to entrepreneurs ranging from friends and relatives to
acquaintances are reported to provide help in numerous areas. These immediate and direct networks
are further expanded by známi známich [acquaintances of acquaintances]. Thus, we can talk about
primary and secondary contacts engaged in a dense web of social connections. Primary networks are
constituted by those directly known to entrepreneurs, whereas secondary contacts denote mediated
networks where a direct contact acts as an intermediary. In this way, networks stretch from local to
regional level and in some instances to the central national level. Nevertheless, the local links, both
primary and secondary, are the strongest which is reflected in the majority of favours being local or at
most at the district level. Contacts reaching into regional and central public administration are rarer.
Známi in public administration help to attain permissions, licences and certificates and help to smooth
out the process of applications so as to avoid unnecessary complications imposed by the complex
legislation or volatile public officials. Helping entrepreneurs to get in line with formal rules often by
bypassing the law or actively breaking the law present another use of these networks. Networks
essentially fulfil the same function as bribery in the sense that they mitigate the effects of the adverse
state and broader unfavourable environment.
To illustrate the above, one participant elaborated on how a friend from school employed at a local
police station helped him to bring the formal documentation for his vehicle up to date in a way which
was not compatible with the formal guidelines. This saved the entrepreneur time, money and reduced
stress and pressure:
“Things would probably get resolved anyway but at the cost of complications that would
drag it on and on. A mummy on maternity leave might have time for it, but for us
entrepreneurs these are priceless minutes and hours that we can use in a better way than
wrestling with the authorities about who is right. You know what I mean” (Dt).
This excerpt also touches upon a matter which is not explored here in greater depth and that is a rather
stronger inclination to informal activities and petty corruption among male entrepreneurs. This reflects
the reality of entrepreneurship as a male-driven activity in Slovakia with only one in three entrepreneurs
being a woman (Ministry of Labour of Slovakia, 2014).
Another example is a case of an entrepreneur having an informal agreement facilitated by a relative in
the police department which ensured that the firms vehicles (buses) belonging to the entrepreneur
224
would not be stopped for either random controls or minor offences (not wearing a seat belt or not
having day lights in operation) in the particular district. Another interviewee mentioned a similar
arrangement with the local police regarding overlooking the use of his farm vehicles on public roads on
weekends and holidays, thereby bypassing the legal requirement not allowing tractors and trucks on
roads at the mentioned times.
Connections are exploited not only in order to overcome red tape or the law in everyday encounters.
They also emerge in instances of securing public funding where well-positioned individuals in the public
sector support or push for an application to be accepted. A mention of gaining access to public
procurement on the local level, namely providing a school with fresh produce, was also obtained via
networks. It is notable that funding and public procurement is granted not on the basis of an objective
appreciation of quality, capacity or price of projects or procured services/goods, but rather on subjective
assessment of what is good for a friend, but also for the community as seen from the perspective of
entrepreneurs. This takes us back to the notion of SMEs as inherently good for the society and above all
the community within which they function. The two aspects are interlinked in compensating for the
wrong system ill-treating the ‘people’. This facet of running a business is more prominent in agriculture
due to a greater scope for the state involvement and a number of subsidies/grants available to this
sector.
The absence of a straightforward and clearly intended reward in return for a favour problematizes the
definition of corruption as abuse of power for private gain as the quote below illustrating this line of
argument demonstrates:
“Do you reward these friends or friends of friends in some way?
It is about helping friends. Everyone once finds themselves in a situation when they need to
be helped.” (Na).
The notion of private gain is precarious with respect to favour-doing. Helping a friend does not entail any
direct and immediate monetary benefit as in the case of bribery. Inappropriateness and senselessness of
paying anything to ‘známi’ in return for a favour documents this.
“There will be situation when I can show my gratefulness. We all stick together here” (Jt).
“I will help him too when he needs it” (Bt).
225
“We all help each other around here. When a známy needs help, I help them and the other
way around (La).
This means that such activities cannot be conceived of as corruption. They are seen as normal between
friends and the family, as something that everybody would do to help their kin. This resembles a deeply
ingrained inclination to support members of one’s own group rather than a calculative rational and
direct exchange of a favour for a favour and obscures the idea of corruption as means of pursuing
private gain. In other words, the definition of corruption of abuse of power for private gain fails to
accommodate this facet of informal behaviour. It could be opined that favours are offered and given in
return for non-material gains, such as self-esteem, social status, friendship or future favour. However,
this is difficult to capture conceptually and therefore strengthens the point.
The above are social practices interwoven into social relations of individual entrepreneurs as friends,
children, parents, uncles and so forth, that is to say into their social roles that stretch beyond
occupation. It is vital to stress that entrepreneurs do not live in an isolated world of entrepreneurship.
Instead, interviewed individuals construct themselves as bearing a number of other social roles that
shape the way they engage in getting things done. In other words, entrepreneurial selves collide with
their social selves and another set of obligations. Favour-doing is not merely about getting things done. It
is intimately tied up with taking on and carrying out various social roles that are underpinned by the
obligation to provide help to známy.
“Of course they help me. They are my friends. Wouldn’t you help a friend? If friends and
family don’t help, you are totally alone” (Gt).
“It is normal. Families work like that. You help me when I need it, I help you when you need
it. It would be weird if it wasn’t like that” (Ka).
This brings to attention a paucity of reflection on the richness of lives that entrepreneurs lead that
cannot be disassociated from their social contexts. Above all, giving a helping hand also serves an
important role of protecting themselves and the group or community to which they belong from adverse
external influences of most importantly the state, but also of fierce competition. Entrepreneurs
recognise this in themselves and in others. This is not what the media and societal corruption discourse
contributes to, partly because petty corruption does not feature in it prominently. These are elements of
another discourse running in the society, that of the ‘people’.
226
Such traits as described above are often categorised as collectivism with which Slovakia is associated
(Kolman et al, 2003; Achim, 2016). However, rather than talking about collectivism, the situation in
Slovakia resembles ‘collectivist individualism’ wherein a collective of individuals help each other to
pursue their individual interests that feed into the collective interests of the group. The group emerges
as an individual in the society and in turn the individual becomes firmly embedded in the group.
Together, the members protect the group from the whims and insatiable hunger of the state, and partly
from other groups. Therefore, labelling a society collectivist or individualist appears as an
oversimplification. The two are not opposites. Rather, they complement one another.
Sisenner (2001) refers to these phenomena broadly as solidarity networks which encompass very
different dynamics from bribery. She goes on to argue that the tacit obligation of mutual assistance that
is very distinct from just passing a bribe invalidates the dominant appreciation of corruption as abuse of
power. The above dovetails with the findings of Hofstede’s model (2016) that suggest that neither
collectivism, nor individualism are pronounced. It is argued here that this existence between the two
inclinations is reflected in the ‘collectivist individualism’.
Favour-doing blurs the boundary between the public and the private even more than petty bribery. The
dividing line is porous with the public and the private sides of public officials overlapping and interacting
with each other. Public officials whom are known either directly or indirectly are no longer seen as public
officials but rather as approachable individuals in public offices, one of the ‘people’. The black and white
conceptualisation of the public and the private sector, of the public and private identities of public
officials that are to be firmly separated as IACD maintains and on which anti-corruption hinges, are here
meshed together. These individuals are friends or relatives rather than simply public officials, with the
former being decisive in shaping relations between them and entrepreneurs.
“They are my family. Of course they help me when I need it. And I help them when they
need it. Why would they not want to help? Everybody knows the state sucks, so you help
those that you can” (Ia).
“People compensate this way when the state doesn’t care. I use it too. Family, známi,
friends. We help one another. We are all on the same boat” (At)
They are the ‘people’ and they are on the side of entrepreneurs which makes them stand out from the
grey template of a stereotypical public official. Where cooperative, helpful, congenial and
accommodating ‘people’-friendly public administration is not a norm, networks and bribery serve to
227
compensate for the shortcomings of the system and its ethos, as well as for the perilous regulation.
Where such connections are not established, the private and the public exist in mutual tension following
the historic experience of public administration and paradoxically fuelled by the current anti-corruption.
In other words, small cohesive communities effectively act as a buffer smoothing the inefficiencies and
disinterest of the state, as well as difficulties caused by public policies vis-à-vis entrepreneurs.
This discussion also highlights the existence of a parallel system that co-exists with the formal
institutions and the current lack of existence of a social contract between citizens and government.
When the social contract which implies loyalty of the government to those who have entrusted power to
it and vice versa is slow in emergence, Slovak entrepreneurs feel closer to their communities than to the
government. It is their local community/group where their loyalties are found. When government
cannot be trusted to look after SMEs and the ‘people’ as has been the case of Slovakia since the dawn of
the nation, the alternative system of tightly knit communities/groups compensating for the lack of the
formal support gains the upper hand. This turns the quintessentially western concept of the society,
government and the arrangement between citizens and the state which underpins anti-corruption on its
head. Insisting on forging loyalty with the abstract others and the state through anti-corruption makes
little sense where this system is not imbued in the minds of the population, in social and cultural norms
that navigate individual behaviours. The central message of IACD that corruption is bad because it
damages the public good by compromising the state’s capacity to protect citizens and treat them in an
equal fashion is of little use in Slovakia, where support and protection is expected to come first and
foremost from own people. There is little reason for Slovaks to be loyal to the state on the basis of their
trust that the state can protect their interests, thereby giving up corruption and informal activities.
The findings illuminate the problem of the lack of a perfectly rational homo economicus among
entrepreneurs and thus a misfit between anti-corruption and activities on the ground. The reciprocity of
favour-doing does not fit easily with the selfish determination to solely follow one’s interests.
The above raises a question as to whether the current definition of corruption and consequently anti-
corruption tools accommodate this facet of informal behaviours and whether indeed favour-doing
belongs to the category of activities labelled as corrupt. The complexity of human interactions brings to
light issues inherent in attempting to reduce the human world to simple definitions. Albeit the current
world order deems such approachs as unavoidable, it is worth pointing out its limitations and the
urgency of re-visiting them.
228
8.7.1 Anonymity of cities vs familiarity in peripheries
Little difference has been observed between the tourism and the agriculture sectors overall. However, as
agricultural SMEs are due to their very nature rural-based and absent in urban environments, the issue
of favour-doing is more pronounced here. This is not to say that tourism SMEs do not engage in such
activities, but rather that not all tourism SMEs function in rural settings, thereby this facet of running an
enterprise appears as omnipresent in agriculture but not so in tourism.
Rural-based entrepreneurs in peripheries, that is to say small towns and villages in the context of
Slovakia, have wider and denser networks compared to their counterparts from cities, most notably
SMEs based in the capital. The quote below nicely encapsulates this:
“It is still possible to do things this way is small towns because we know each other. We
care. There is no anonymity where there is everyone just for themselves” (Na).
Entrepreneurs in agriculture in particular paint a vivid image of closeness of members of communities
within which they function. This links to the stream of academic literature concerned with place-based
entrepreneurship and socially embedded economic activity (Jack and Anderson, 2002), wherein rural
settings exhibit a stronger sense of community and feature strong informal personalised relationships
between community members (Havnes and Senneseth, 2001; Atterton, 2016). This is facilitated by a
great spatial proximity and small size of communities where everyone knows everyone. Indeed, public
officials are inescapably part of these groups. In addition, it could be argued that individuals with a more
open attitude and will to explore alternatives are drawn to cities, thereby not disrupting favour-doing.
The following quotes demonstrate the interconnectedness of members of a community which IACD
casts aside.
“Some families have been living here for a century… I went to school with the mayor. The
head of the regional police is the man with whom I grew up, he was my neighbour. We got
up to all sorts of mischief. Since they are holding these functions, all of us entrepreneurs are
more content… They are our people” (Ja).
“He is a great man [the mayor]. He comes to the pub, speaks with us, finds out what is going
on… He helped me to get funding for fodder a few years ago. His son works at the ministry
(Ka).
229
“My parents know some people at the local and district authorities… Those people that I
know always help me through the people they know. A classic Slovak situation” (Ha).
Physical closeness combined with the distance from administrative centres translates into less formal
oversight allowing for firm connections that link the private and the public facet of public officials and
create space for carrying out favours. Distance creates greater room for discretion to local authorities.
The oversight of administrative centres in scattered communities is somewhat weaker in the context of
local and district settings. This grows stronger with a greater proximity, thereby regional and central
national authorities are argued to be aloof and disconnected and the networks reaching to these levels
of public administration are fewer and weaker. This notwithstanding, exceptions can be found in the
form of rare personal connections to individuals in these offices.
Albeit entrepreneurs based in cities are also part of networks, these are not as dense and closely-knit as
the social webs of their counterparts from rural areas. The anonymity and individualism of cities appear
to limit the scope of individuals known in person and also the room for these individuals to carry out
favours.
The above fits into the line of argument that strong socio-cultural norms rather than national
institutional environments are characteristic for rural settings (Vaillant and Lafuente, 2007). This includes
superficial compliance which in its nature is more reminiscent of seeking compromises or even
circumventing the formal rules. The issue of protection is particularly interesting as it takes us back to
the adverse perceptions of the state and national institutional frameworks that beget the need for local
communities to contain themselves in order to cope. On this note, Johnston and Lionais (2004) advance
that rural communities offer socio-cultural sources for entrepreneurs in their dealings with a restrictive
institutional environment. It is further supported by the theory of gemeinschaft and gesellschaft as
abstract categories of rurality and urbanity, wherein gemeinschaft refers to personal interaction
characterized by closeness and emotions, and gesellschaft is linked to an impersonal system
underpinned by self-interest and individualism (Christenson, 1984; Tonnies, 1940). Simply, rural ways of
life and rural communities leave a distinct imprint on enterprising activity, shaping its response to the
formal institutional frameworks.
Reflecting the closeness of the public and the private, but also underpinning the functioning of rural-
based enterprises, the interviewees revealed a close association between wellbeing of their firms and
the local community. Thus, helping entrepreneurs is perceived as essentially good for the community.
230
“We have to help ourselves to exist. That is good for everyone. For example, I have fresh
fruit of good quality. Locals come and buy it from me, not from Tesco. Money stays in the
region, the state has something from it too. I employ local people” (Da).
“The state does not know or care about what we need. Anti-flood defences, new
pavements. We have to provide it all and so it is good when we support each other” (Bt).
This feeds on the strong construction of entrepreneurship as a positive activity as already discussed. In
turn, they do favours for other members also fostering the local space in the context of rural enterprise.
A sense of self-sufficiency and the duty to promote and protect a local community is strongly
pronounced in the individual constructions of the self as a part and parcel of a group. There arises a
clash of formal national institutions, of which anti-corruption is a part, with local social norms of
reciprocity that are present to some extent in urban space, but are significantly stronger in rural
locations.
The above discussion illuminates the need to spatially, as well culturally and socially embed SMEs.
Indeed, the calls for doing so are becoming stronger with much scholarly literature pointing to the
contextual sensitivities of SME sectors across countries (Lavioe and Chamlee-Wright, 2001; Morrison,
2006). However, IACD has so far not brought this vital element shaping entrepreneurial behaviours to
consideration as reflected in the insensitive anti-corruption policies that conflict with local norms and
rules. Strength and outreach of networks depending on the physical settings of SMEs is an important
feature of enterprise in Slovakia, both rural where it helps to overcome the external obstacles posed by
a highly regulated environment, and urban, where the lack of networks leads to frustration.
8.8 Civic and political passivity
An overwhelming trend of a lack of activity amongst entrepreneurs vis-à-vis corruption in their
communities or on the national scale manifests itself in interviews in terms of formal engagement in
anti-corruption activities and in public matters in general. This is passivity towards corruption and anti-
corruption but also passivity towards cooperation among entrepreneurs in civic or professional
organisations pursuing their interests.
The unwillingness of entrepreneurs to report petty corruption has already been touched upon. Passivity
also takes the form of the lack of activity towards grand and political corruption, such as through
participation in protests, online petitions and so forth. None of participants was active in any way
231
towards uncovering grand corruption affairs. Notwithstanding sporadic public protests, such individual
attitudes reflect the passivity of the limited activity of the Slovak society as pointed out in the previous
chapter. Interviewees argue that this was due to their own inability to make change with respect to the
problem, thereby revealing the perception of the self as powerless. This is fuelled by the lack of criminal
ramifications for the suspected individuals or generally a lack of thorough investigation of these cases.
The belief that they are powerlessness vis-à-vis this type of corruption fits nicely with the media
constructions of responsibility for tackling the matter as grounded with the state. It also sits well with
the idea of the ‘people’ as defenceless towards the greediness of rulers.
The above is taken to the extreme of abstaining from casting a vote in elections. Only one interviewee
regularly attends elections, but only local ballots; as this has direct relevance for his firm and therefore it
is important to place the right people in the leading position. However, on the national level,
interviewees expressed a high level of disenchantment with the current political scene, in part due to
their corruptibility. A common argument is put forward that it does not matter who is in the government
as nothing ever changes in Slovakia and therefore it is pointless to attend elections.
“What is the point in voting? They [politicians] are all the same” (Ht).
“I probably won’t vote. Why? They all disappointed me. Governments keep changing, but
everything else stays the same. Every government has only taken care of their interests. For
us, life stays the same. Or gets worse” (Gt).
This is in part a result of politicised use of corruption in Slovakia, where the opposition routinely accuses
the government, and the media fortify these constructions as argued previously. It is also a
manifestation of their experience of unceasing pressure from the side of the state, the lack of
improvement in regulative environment and support for SMEs. On the other hand, this attitude could be
seen as an active, albeit, silent protest against the current political scene, culture and governors as
Huneeus (1998) suggested.
This view is adopted not only by the older generation of entrepreneurs following dismay over the
transition period and its unfulfilled promises. It is also embraced by entrepreneurs under 30 years of age
who did not fully experience communism or transition due to their age. Both entrepreneurs who have
never lived abroad and individuals with experience of living outside Slovakia endorse this truth. Passivity
or silent activity, as argued above, thus runs across ages and experiences. This is troublesome as the
only meaningful activity towards corruption in Slovakia unfolds on the electoral front. Unwillingness to
232
participate among entrepreneurs which fits into the trend of low attendance at elections in Slovakia is
alarming. It reduces the power and the impact of this form of action against corruption and prevents
other forms of activity against corruption and for anti-corruption from emerging. None of the
participants mentioned membership or support for any anti-corruption organisation. It also means that
interviewed entrepreneurs are largely inactive in pursuing the interests of SMEs in the selected sectors
on this or any other front.
Given the paucity of will to act to change the unfavourable environment, an obvious question emerges
from where do entrepreneurs expect solutions to these problems to come? They are to emerge from the
government, albeit it is unclear where a good government should come from, and from the EU, anti-
corruption NGOs and above all the future generations. This is a common belief that in order for anything
to change in Slovakia, a change of the entire nation is required. Such a resignation in favour of an
attitude that could be best described as ‘time will heal everything’ is particularly interesting in the
younger generation of entrepreneurs, who have often have experience of living abroad. One interviewee
confessed she attempted to change her surroundings, attitudes of people around her and doing business
only to be faced with lethargy, misunderstanding or rejection which in turn smothered her activity (Gt).
Passivity and/or resistance to change emerge as a life strategy among entrepreneurs. This is
troublesome as IACD relies on civic activity and on entrepreneurs to fuel change from within, as well as
on the top-down approach.
This discussion brings to the fore the problem of the mind-sets of entrepreneurs. This trait was observed
by Fibich (1996) in the Czech Republic in the 1990s to the extent he argued that Czechs retain the
totalitarian mindset even though they live in democracy. The totalitarian mindset, as Montuori (2005)
put it, is characterised precisely by survivalist tendencies, self-preservation avoidance of self-
responsibility, lack of critical exploration of the self and others in the group and a black and white view
of the world which comes through strongly in interviews with those prone to corruption. However, there
has certainly been progress. Entrepreneurs narrate what could be termed a post-communist mindset
which embraces some of the values and attitudes found in mature democracies. This notwithstanding,
the democratic mind-sets on which free market democracy and necessarily anti-corruption are built is
not in place in Slovakia, which is reflected in the continued engagement of entrepreneurs in corruption
and their passivity towards pursuance of a change of their operating environment. These are the missing
foundations without which anti-corruption as conceived today cannot take deeper roots.
233
8.9 Good or bad?
The black and white IACD encourages us to ask whether bribery and informal activities are good or bad.
It has already been argued earlier being that it is both good and bad, an enabler and an inhibitor,
depending on the angle one takes.
It is good that SMEs in the current context of a highly-regulated Slovak environment have the means to
deal with difficulties at their disposal. It is bad for those who are not lucky enough to have helpful známi
and those who are not willing or able to bribe. However, it is worth reiterating that the entrepreneurs
who don’t bribe for the former reason, don’t see this as being a disadvantage. On the contrary,
individuals who are not able to bribe because of un-bribable public officials see this as a problem. It
could also be said that SMEs that not willing to provide commissions for receiving a public grant/subsidy
are at a disadvantage to those who do, as these resources are largely beyond their reach. Nevertheless,
this does not appear to be a matter of affordability, but rather of choosing not to engage in this way or
not having the necessary connections. Corruption can both open access to resources and swallow
finance. It can both waste and save time. It can facilitate greater cohesion in a community, but also
disrupt the society at large. Corruption could be seen as good in terms of immediate resolution of some
of the pressing issues SMEs are faced with today, while it is questionable what this means in terms of
long-term future.
One can sympathise with the predicaments of running SMEs in Slovakia and with the strategies
entrepreneurs develop to overcome them or to reduce their impact. However, by participating in bribery
and by carrying out informal activities, entrepreneurs effectively help to maintain the status quo. As
bribery and informal activities provide entrepreneurs with means to compensate for what they see as
being in a short supply, that is to say favourable legal frameworks, supportive attitude of the state and
efficient public administration, it reduces the motivation and the desire for a change and contributes to
the entrenchment of collective individualism, to fragmentation among SMEs and society at large and the
vicious circle of corruption. This dovetails with Ledeneva’s conclusions (1998) about informal exchanges
keeping communism alive by assisting in correcting supply deficits. Petty corruption and informal
activities could be argued to keep the current system in place as it corrects for some of its shortcomings
sufficiently enough to stop entrepreneurs from challenging it.
234
As such, the neoliberal vision of the world combined with the perceived pervasiveness of the state does
not breed transparency in Slovakia. Instead, it perpetuates bribery and favour-doing as tried and tested
strategies of combatting the state:
“This is how we survive against the odds. We have always done it this way” (Oa).
Venturing out of the old certainties that these constructions provide is proving a difficult task. The
nation-old discourse provides individuals with directions for life which makes it difficult to shed. They
make it challenging to imagine anything else, thereby proving their potency. In addition, Slovaks
underwent five regime changes in the short space of one century which all brought disappointment and
dismay instead of promised prosperity. The last change, that is to say the shift from communism to
democracy accompanied by assurances of brighter prospects and better quality of life for everyone,
proved a failure to deliver on the high expectations of many as expressed throughout the interviews.
Entrepreneurs who started their businesses in the 1990s argue that conditions for enterprise in Slovakia
now are worse than 20 years ago. The younger generation and those who started business the twenty-
first century, compare the conditions in Slovakia with the situation in mature Western democracies to
arrive at the conclusion that Slovakia lags behind.
However, all this does not amount to a call for a change. It appears that entrepreneurs to a great extent
follow the logic of ‘better the devil you know’ given the historic experience of changes. Notwithstanding,
they see their operating environment as challenging or even hostile, they know how to deal with the
obstacles it poses.
The above leads to a connected question: Is anti-corruption effective? It appears to be lowering the
scope for bribery on the one hand. On the other, it reduces the tools available to SMEs in the challenging
environment. It also entrenches collectivist individualism thereby obstructing cooperation among SMEs
but also across the society. Above all, there is little desire to abstain from corruption among SMEs
resulting in ever more elaborate ways of doing corruption.
235
Overall, it could be posited that the discourse favours and promotes the market as it creates space for
SMEs to follow their interests, for better and for worse. Upon its arrival in Slovakia, IACD becomes
embedded in the intricate fabric of local understandings of corruption and local interests down to the
individual level of SMEs. When the international merges with the national, it provides a stamp of
legitimacy for engaging in corruption and favour-doing and even re-casts these activities and the SMEs
attitudes towards them as ethically, morally and economically condoned. The current discourse provides
entrepreneurs with such goals for their lives and their enterprising activities that create ample space for
corruption and informal behaviours to flourish. The anti-corruption in place falls largely short of
addressing them when faced with creativity and desire of entrepreneurs to continue engaging in them.
8.10 Heroic SMEs and survival as the top concern
The effect of the homo economicus paradigm discussed at length in the literature review (see Chapter
Two) manifests itself in the most pronounced manner when it comes to justifying bribery. To remind the
reader, at the core of the concept is the idea of human beings as rational pursuers of their own interest
236
Inviting corruption
To wrap up the personal experience, it could be simply stated that the system of public administration and governance invites and inspires informal behaviors and corruption. Its complexity, obscurity and imposing nature activate a response which channels informal behaviors in an over-riding endeavor to achieve one’s ends against the odds and against the will of the state and the powerful individuals running it.
Unfortunately, our bid for the tender was disqualified on the grounds of a technicality and the appeal lodged following the disqualification was disregarded. This was due to the Public Control Body allegedly receiving the latter after the deadline for appeals and our failure to put down a minimum deposit. Again, the latter illuminates the constraints placed on the ‘people’ which I acutely felt and constructed myself in accordance with the dominant discourse.. The very symbolism of having to deliver a payment to a control body in order for it to act on an appeal against the public sector reflects not only the institutional gaps in Slovakia, but above all the power arrangement between the state and the citizens, between the law and the ‘people’. As to the issue itself, the letter was posted in such a way that allowed ample time for its delivery. Given the context of corruption as the convenient answer to problems faced, it necessarily arose when seeking out answers as to the reason behind our disqualification. However, this may have been merely due to a failure of the Slovak post or incompetence of the bureaucracy. Indeed, it could merely be put down to the strictness and firmness of formal regulations. Nevertheless, vis-à-vis the opacity of the public matters, the suspicion is difficult to dismiss even when I am aware of the above and the impacts of the ‘people’ identity on my understandings. This accentuates the power of the construct that entrepreneurs, who are not granted with the access to a more analytical way of thinking and power arrangements constructed by other discourses, submit to and in turn actively use to construct themselves. It also stresses the importance of being able to engage with other discourses and other meanings and above all the criticality of making these alternative meanings a part and parcel of the discourse on corruption accessible to the general public on daily basis.
who act and take decisions according to careful calculations. Narrow self-interest is the only and the
ultimate goal, that is to say the success of own enterprise in this context.
This rationality is internalised to the extent that survival, rather than success, becomes paramount to
business operations and lives of entrepreneurs closely intertwined with their businesses. Bribery is thus
justified on the grounds of rational efficiency and necessity. Bribery is cheaper than taking a formal licit
route, relatively safe and thus an affordable, viable and effective means of pursuing one’s own interest.
It is perfectly rational, following the calculative logic, to engage in petty corruption. This is encouraged
and cemented by IACD and the local discourse. Bribing equals a more efficient operation of SMEs, it can
prevent losing resources or avoid difficulties in contact with the public administration. Bribery can save
time and help to concentrate efforts. Furthermore, neoliberal rationality is encouraged by the appeal of
being in charge, taking control. In Slovakia, gaining control over one’s business and life by lowering the
influence of the state is achieved with the help of corruption. Therefore, appealing to one’s sense of
independence is not the way forward when it comes to anti-corruption. On the contrary, it cements and
further justifies petty corruption. A greater control smoothly translates into certainty in a volatile
environment. Entrepreneurs are guided by short term economic rationality orientated towards survival,
there are no long-term considerations regarding paying bribes that IACD holds as the most damaging.
Indeed, these issues are not circulated by media.
A survivalist mentality of ‘just to be happy enough’ rather than succeeding pervades individual
constructions of the self, that couples with fear of losing everything which is equal to losing the
business. This is an imprint of the challenging past that left little room for development of an
entrepreneurial class akin to the Western middle classes. Entrepreneurship was not allowed to develop
organically with all the subtleties of enterprise. Rather, it was artificially stimulated as in the recent wave
of privatisation or earlier ‘aryanisation’ (see section 5.3).
Overall, the Slovak experience with enterprise is relatively short in both sectors. Tourism only emerged
prominently during communism, which ruled out meaningful private small-scale enterprise. Agriculture,
albeit an old industry, was not in Slovak hands to start with and later on agriculture was run on the
pattern of large collective farms. SMEs in the sector only began to make their way forward in the 1990s.
This boils down to an overarching Slovak vision that is rather black and white – death or survival. The
issue of entrepreneurship as a coping strategy during the period of communism also continues to be a
shaping force behind the current survivalist mentality. Corruption has been woven into the fabric of
enterprise in Slovakia long ago (see sections 5.2 and 5.3).
237
Furthermore, the concept of homo economicus legitimates self-interest as such. It is not up to an
individual to behave in a certain way but rather on the structures shaping their behaviour to constrain
self-interest within the bounds of what is deemed as appropriate. This fits with the international and
local unease to shame SMEs and the tendency to treat the private sector with leniency. This manifests
itself in views on petty bribery as legitimate because it is good for a firm as it helps to keep SMEs in
operation. This is reinforced by the idea that SMEs are inherently good found in both IACD and the local
discourse. Slovak entrepreneurs see survival of their firms as well as other small enterprises as good for
the economy and good for the society, as a functioning firm is a source of taxes, employment but also a
provider or good quality local goods and services and employment. The inherent value of SMEs for the
society is particularly pronounced in agriculture, where food self-sufficiency of Slovakia is a strong
theme following its rural traditions. Here we can appreciate the influence of other discourses circulating
in the society, namely that of economic, social, political and environmental sustainability used by
entrepreneurs to construct and explain themselves and their behaviours vis-à-vis corruption.
The necessity of survival of Slovak SMEs dictates that it is appropriate to utilise bribery to cope with
fierce competition. Indeed, small enterprises are seen as a necessary counterweight to large
corporations and even better in many respects, particularly when it comes to local sustainability.
Corruption is condoned because it mitigates against foreign competition, as again Slovak SMEs are good
for Slovakia, while their foreign competitors are not. Participants see themselves as being left alone in
coping with external challenges and abandoned by the state, which entitles them to reach for any
means that help to offset formal constraints. Entrepreneurs merge neoliberal rationality with the
‘people’ morality. In other words, ends justify means. Bribery is viewed as a form of protection against
the rapacious state. Entrepreneurs effectively portray themselves as Slovak heroes fighting the state in a
quintessentially Slovak way. It is nicely described in a contemporary Slovak novel against the backdrop
of the Soviet invasion in 1968:
“Living up to our reputation as a nation of peace-loving doves …. our resistance took a very
distinctive form. Rather than real, hardcore stuff, we put up a dovelike, symbolic fight”
(Krištúfek, 2014).
Instead of protesting against what they perceive as unbearable conditions, Slovak entrepreneurs
continue to run their businesses and carry out cunning, but quiet and undercover miniature protests of
undermining the state whenever they can in their small ways. IACD insistence on the concept of SMEs as
238
heroes of the free market helps to sustain these views as it facilitates the desirability of combatting the
strong state and allows very little room for envisaging one’s conduct as an SME as wrongful.
Self survival comes above all else and the broad neoliberal discourse creates and reinforces this mind-
set. This also casts doubts over the appropriateness of the construction of the ultimate goal of SMEs,
that is to say growth that IACD employs. In Slovakia, entrepreneurs are busy surviving. It is the survival
that is their telos for enterprise and life. Appealing to them through the language of growth misses the
point.
Based on the analysis laid out here, Slovak entrepreneurs resist IACD as they exhibit signgs of adjusting
its truths. These stem from the cultural, social, economic and historic contexts of environment in which
they socialise and operate as enterprises. At the same time, they are subject to the power of the local
discourse contingent on past developments. Again, they alter these in adiditon to eding IACD to produce
their own appreciations of corruption. These are the manifestation of their power and their agency to
determine their course of thinking and acting on corruption within the local and international structure.
This could be applauded on the grounds of disrupting the international hegemony. However, its
produces negative effects. Broad solutions presented in the forthcoming chapter aim to re-shape the
media discourse and consequently individual understandings of corruption. Effectively, they strive to
ingraine such understandings of corruption in individual that would encourage them to see corruption
as a negative phenomenon. To put it crudely, it weaponises insights of this research into the minds of
SMEs in Slovakia to create a more effective discourse on corruption.
Turning the lens to corruption-averse SMEs, the internalisation of the truth of SMEs as heroes takes
form without the validation of petty corruption as an adequate practice. This is due to the incorporation
of the construct of morality which dictates that in addition to surviving or doing well, a firm must also do
good. The latter is incompatible with corruption that hurts individuals and society. The survival element
is also muted in these perceptions as running a firm is not the only option of earning a livelihood.
Whereas the majority of entrepreneurs presented their enterprise as critical to their lives revealing a
strong personal, emotional and economic attachment to enterprises without which interviewees cannot
imagine their lives, a more placid attitude emerges from narrations of participants averse to bribery.
Their firm is one of many options available to them as opposed to the only one in the case of the former.
It effectively reduces the pressure and stress flowing from the constant fear of losing a firm. In addition,
providing the basics for survival is not perceived as enough. These entrepreneurs pursue a greater
fulfilment in their entrepreneurial careers and lives that is associated in their narrations with being
239
virtuous. A richer appreciation of the world as a result of exposure to other ways of thinking and living
stands in a contrast to the narrowness of the survivalist mentality.
240
CHAPTER NINE - CONCLUDING REMARKS
The overarching goal of this thesis was to gain deeper and more nuanced understandings of the
discourse of corruption in Slovakia against the background of influential IACD. Anti-corruption indicators
and various reports suggest that something has not gone according to the expectations of promoters of
anti-corruption. However, it is not enough to state, as do many studies, that corruption is still persistent
and to conclude that this is down to a weak institutional structure in Slovakia. It is precisely this outlook
that has led to the introduction of more institutional regulations according to the western blue print of
democracy. This undermines the mission to arrive at the point of having a well-functioning free market
democracy where corruption is kept to a minimum.
Time has come to go deeper into the local context to tease out why institutions are not working and
how it is that their functioning is subverted. To understand the institutions and their perceived lack of
effectiveness, the very fabric of the society which those institutions govern must be examined. The
problem of the first president of Czechoslovakia, Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk, continues to persist in
Slovakia. As early as 1920, he observed that it was difficult to have a democracy without democrats.
We now live in a highly internationalised world. This is reflected in the spread and influence of IACD. As
such, it cannot be overlooked or underestimated. On the other hand, its power should not be taken
deterministically either. Individual countries and societies are not coerced into a word by word adoption
of the international concept. Instead, they are encouraged and incentivised to join the discourse. This
means that there is a scope for the local to infiltrate the international meanings with their own
elements. As such, this research took both the local and the international into consideration when
assessing the present discourse on corruption in Slovakia.
This doctoral project scrutinised media discourse which facilitated insights into corruption in Slovakia,
particularly when set in the context of broader trends in society, thereby addressing the first research
question How have media constructions of corruption developed in Slovakia given its specific historical
and social contexts and IACD?
With respect to the subquestion What is being represented as a truth/norm about corruption and the
governor-governed relation given the history of Slovakia and the influence of anti-corruption discourse? ,
it was found that IACD and local appreciations of the phenomena are meshed together in a curious
241
blend of narratives. The media encourage a passive attitude towards grand and political corruption,
while enabling petty corruption. This is a lethal mix as the two facets of the phenomena reinforce each
other in a vicious circle leading to a slow and partial uptake of anti-corruption mechanisms by the
population of Slovakia. Petty corruption is condoned as activities of little importance and weight, or even
justified as necessary. The harmful effects and the nature of corruption are restricted to grand and
political corruption. As such, the media channel public frustration and perceptions of corruption towards
the state.
Turning to the subquestion How did events, conditions, institutions and discourses support these
reifications of corruption?, it was argued that the representations of corruption outlines above are in
place because the discourse on corruption has, since the conception of the nation, been used by the
media to attack their perceived political, economic and ideological rivals for influence in the society. The
paradigm has crystallised against the backdrop of foreign domination of Slovakia which ended only
recently with the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989 and the Slovak ascension to sovereignty in 1993. IACD
reinforces these ‘idea of subjugation of the people to the state, even though it is now in the hands of
Slovaks, due to its neoliberal preoccupation with the state. It follows that media discourses reduce anti-
corruption to a secondary concern. Instead, corruption serves as a means of attacking the state.
Answering the next subquestion, What is omitted, what is foregrounded and what is backgrounded in
media constructions? What alternatives/other explanations are ignored?, revealed that the Slovak media
discourse fails significantly fails to inform the public about available avenues of action with respect to
anti-corruption. The media foreground grand corruption and the role of the political opposition in
tackling it, rather than the potential role of the citizenry. Petty corruption receives little attention.
Overall, lethargy towards corruption is cemented, which is at odds with the idea of active, empowered
citizens, outraged at corruption around whom IACD builds its anti-corruption tools. To put it differently,
Slovakia is missing democrats of the Western kind.
The last point How do media discourses reflect societal realities of corruption? is tied the analysis of
media to the trends within the society. A broad correspondence was established. The media discourse
fosters passivity towards anti-corruption which is reflected in the lack of anti-corruption activity in
Slovakia. Instead of supporting anti-corruption, the public, as the media, is concerned with removing
those in top governmental positions accused of corruption from power which is expected to resolve the
242
issue of corruption. The media also cement passivity towards petty corruption, the importance of which
they reduce. This is reflected in a society that is reluctant to report instances of petty corruption and
consequently in the small number of petty corruption cases brought to court and individuals prosecuted.
The second set of research questions is related to how the broad appreciation of corruption on a
societal level informs individual entrepreneurs’ views of corruption as encapsulated by the question
How does the broad appreciation of corruption on the societal level inform individual entrepreneurs’
views on corruption? The objective of collecting and scrutinising interview material was achieved with
the caveat of only incorporating the perspectives of Western and central Slovakian SMEs. Beginning with
the first of the subquestions, In what way does the broad discourse on corruption provide an individual
with a particular telos (goal, direction) for life?, the interviews revealed that where the discourse is
adopted, it guides individuals to create such a telos for life that is governed by the idea of a survival vis-à-
vis the allpowerful state with an insatiable appetite for resources and drive to exploit its people.
Searching for answers to the subquestion What are the forms of knowledge that the individual can
establish about him/herself given the overarching knowledge of corruption?, exposed the strong
tendency of individuals to see themselves as powerless, while the state, specifically its top
representatives, is seen as all powerful. This goes hand in hand with a duty to fight the enemy, which is
the state. Powerlessness translates directly to the appreciation of petty corruption as a necessary means
of survival in the current Slovak climate, while the idea that the principal duty of any ‘ordinary’ Slovak is
to battle the state provides justification for petty corruption on moral grounds. Furthermore, as SMEs are
portrayed as inherently ‘good’ by the media, individual entrepreneurs tend to believe petty corruption to
be a legitimate tool of survival for SMEs. Petty corruption is not condemned in society and ‘ordinary’
Slovaks are stripped of guilt. However, the research also uncovered resistance to the dominant
appreciation of corruption in Slovakia. A small minority of interviewed SMEs rejected this telos in favour
of a more action-based and responsible view of entrepreneurs. These participants did not see themelves
as passive objects in their interactions with the public sector to the same extent as the majority of those
interviewed. This made much less room for the concept of necessity for survival to thrive, but preserved
traces of victimhood of SMEs and their reduced power vis-à-vis the state.
Following on from the above, pursuing answers to the question In what ways does an individual identify
or not with the telos in constructing the self? showed that the majority of interviewed entrepreneurs
identified with the telos outlined above. The narrations of powerlessness take the form of being
243
harassed by the state for money, while having few or no avenues to counteract this insatiable thirst for
more power and resources embodied by political representatives in top public sector roles. Individuals
describe themselves as victims. The already discussed group of resistant SMEs makes reduced use of the
concept of victimhood. The limited identification with the idea of powerlessness in the face of a
diabolical state translates into more space for a different morality, one that reduced the
appropropriatness of petty corruption. Yet, even these participants failed decisively to condemn acts of
petty corruption.
Asking How is the self activated in daily encounters with the public administration? brought to life the
self as constructed by the discourse and ingrained in indviduals. It is activated by uncooperative
behaviour on the side of public officials in the low and middle levels of public administration. An
administration of a penalty, or presenting enterpreneurs with the complexities of processes within the
sector, also activates the sense of victimhood of SMEs and of the ferociousness of the predatory state
blind to their needs and suffering. These can be triggered by daily administrative routines dictated by
formal norms and the laws of the tourism and agricultural sectors in Slovakia, resulting in feelings of
frustration, anxiety or anger. In the case of the already discussed minority, interaction with the public
sector also brought similar feelings and awakened the sense of having less power that the state, but
with less acuteness.
Finally, we arrive at the apex of the research questions by asking How does the discourse shape
individual conduct of entrepreneurs? Participating SMEs combined all the previously discussed
constructs, tensions and dynamics of the private-public sector interactions in searching for an easier
and, in the short term, cheaper way of resolving daily difficulties. They reach for petty corruption,
including bribery and favour-doing, in order to save time or money, or alleviate tension and stress they
feel when dealing with the public administration. They feel this is appropriate as corruption is widely
accepted in the society. The enterpreneurs who did not appropriate the ‘truths’ of the discourse
circulated by the media to the same extent proved unwilling to engage in petty corruption. To them, it
was not an option or it was an avenue they pursued as the last resort and, in these cases, it was
accompanied by remourse. In addition, all SMEs also exhibit a level of lethargy when it comes to being
active on the anti-corruption front.
The above findings throw light on the limited functioning of anti-corruption mechanisms in Slovakia. As
the media tolerate petty corruption and guide public frustration towards grand and potitical corruption,
244
SMEs have a relatively free hand when it comes to engaging in corruption. Furthermore, the voices of
those individuals who resist this discourse and are averse to petty corruption are effectively ‘suffocated’.
The voices of those who defy the truths imposed by the dominant discourse are isolated as their
perception of petty corruption as immoral does not fit with that of their environment.
This research reveals an acute need of paying close attention to the ways media construct anti-
corruption. At the moment, Slovak media do not shape SMEs or the population into becoming
transmitters of anti-corruption. There is little guidance in the form of societal discourses to turn to when
it comes to not engaging in corruption.
On the whole, IACD malfunctions in Slovakia because it allows for corruption to be perpetuated due to
the paucity of elemental foundations on which anti-corruption is built which are not present in Slovakia.
The democratic and empowered individualistic entrepreneurial mind-sets are not in place and therefore
anti-corruption is struggling to take hold. In order for anti-corruption as conceived today to start bringing
fruits, there first needs to be ground-laying work of shifting meanings of corruption, of the individual, of
SMEs and the state in the society. Western institutional solutions are of little use where Western minds,
beliefs and attitudes are not ingrained. In addition, it is paramount to recognise the specificities of
Slovakia in laying these foundations. It is vital to accept differences and work with them, rather than to
ignore them.
This research also showed that when it comes to corruption, Slovak entrepreneurs are far from the
predictable homines economici. Instead they come with a richness of their social and cultural
backgrounds, complex nature, internal conflicts, varied goals in life and an array of feelings which all
impact on how they view and conduct themselves vis-à-vis corruption. The decision to engage or not in
corruption is thus not simply about calculating the costs versus the benefits of a particular cause of
action. Anti-corruption must embrace this complexity if it aspires to lower corruption by shaping
individual perspectives. Universal blanket solutions to corruption are proving ill-equipped to tackle
phenomena on the ground. This calls for their replacement with a more tailored individual approach to
countries struggling with corruption.
The international-local interaction is a complex process. Receiving IACD in Slovakia resembles the path-
creation path-dependency notion in that IACD catalyses some new avenues of talking and thinking about
corruption, while also following a path set out in the past. For instance, although petty corruption
features in the public discourse of corruption today, it is constrained by the views on corruption
245
assembled in the past and cemented by current power structures. Slovakia shapes new paths ahead
when it comes to corruption, but these are built on already existent foundations. Without
acknowledging the foundations, we can only go so far with anti-corruption. Being unaware of much of
the nuance behind individual and collective beliefs about corruption also translates into unexpected side
effects of current anti-corruption, such as the perpetuation of deep and unconstructive distrust among
entrepreneurs towards the state. Indeed, given the richness and complexity of human realities, it is
unfeasible to construct the perfect anti-corruption strategy. What a society can do is to strive to improve
from the current state of matters.
9.1 Contributions
This thesis constitutes a first step in the in-depth study of corruption in Slovakia and provides another
dimension to the superficial picture of corruption that we have to date. It is widely believed that
pervasive corruption is down to the relatively recent experience of communism. However, this research
shows that the foundations of the phenomena are much deeper than that. The society grew out of
resistance with the state which is crucial to the understanding of corruption. Undoing these legacies will
take more than an institutional makeover. On a greater scale, the project adds to the growing research
on genealogy on corruption in the context of a country and a region previously unexplored in this way.
It is the first work that addresses the paucity of knowledge at the micro scale of how tourism and
agricultural enterprises engage with corruption. Earlier studies into the matter tended to assume that
the local understanding of corruption correponded with the international ones thereby constraining
their insights into the phenomenon in non-Western societies. Furthermore, there has been a preference
for large-scale quantitative research that produces limited insights into the nuances of understanding
and practising corruption. This thesis is the first work to relate the insights of research into corruption in
the enterprenuerial sector, setting them in a context of nationally specific cultural and historic features.
This research is also also the first to investigate in depth the construction of corruption by the media,
and the workings of that construction in the society and on individuals. It thus compiles a fuller and a
richer picture of the circulation of knowledge about corruption in the Slovak tourism and agriculture
sectors. The thesis went on to elaborate alternative solutions to tackle corruption, in addition to
institutional-based measures which have emerged from previous research. The historic lense in
particular allowed corruption in the twenty first century to be seen in perspective of ongoing
developments in Slovakia, making it possible for the first time to identify why the current anti-corruption
approaches failed to deliver on the high hopes of IACD.
246
The thesis also advances our knowledge of mechanisms through which corruption circulates in Slovakia
and in SMEs, rather than stopping at the observation that the issue is widespread. It reveals how
corruption unfolds against the current power structures in the society and how IACD is a part and parcel
of these processes. It is one of the first attempts to uncovering the workings of IACD in a society
grappling with corruption and the first to take the research down to the level of individuals and SMEs.
This research is also one of very few contributions in terms of corruption in agriculture and tourism.
I show how IACD that seeks to navigate individual attitudes and views actually works in individual SMEs.
Furthermore, this work incorporates a personal lived experience of interacting with the Slovak public
administration as a small enterprise. Such insights are rare in academic literature. Observing others
indeed has its firm place in anthropology and ethnography, but personal accounts of living and
experiencing these situations with own body and mind expand this knowledge even further.
Overall, this doctoral thesis adds to the body of literature challenging the monolithic view on corruption
as promoted by IACD by revealing the intricacies corruption has in the particular context of Slovakia in
the mid 2010s.
This project also furthers research on corruption on methodological grounds. I merge the inquiry into
the structure of corruption knowledge in a society by utilising genealogy with exploring how individuals
appropriate this knowledge in their own lives by drawing on governmentality. The latter is a novelty in
the field of corruption research. What is more, its use to study individual agency is also relatively new in
Foucaldian-inspired research. Governmentality tends to be used to explore structure rather than to
study how the structure is internalised by individuals. Foucault has been critiqued on numerous
occasions for dismissing agency while focusing on the structure. He moved towards the exploration of
individual agency towards the end of his life and much of this perspective was not taken further. This is
also partly due to scarcity of application of these tool kits by the ensuing generation of scholars when
looking at discourses from the perspectives of individuals. Therefore, this research shows how it is
possible to use Foucault to look at not only structure, but also agency within the structure.
9.2 Where to next?
Petty corruption and informal activities are an integral part of a vicious circle driven by extreme self-
preservation. In order to break it, it will be necessary to penetrate much deeper into the problem. The
current anti-corruption approach seeks to heal the symptoms of a broken-down society, rather than the
illness itself.
247
To begin with, the issue of informal networks employed to get things done is not covered by the notion
of corruption at the moment. It is important to establish whether these activities are viewed as harmful
or not and thus whether they need to be addressed. If they are to be tackled, it will be vital to re-assess
the definition of corruption, specifically its concept of pursuit of private gain. The remainder of this
section follows the assumption that it would be beneficial to curb the scope for informal favour-doing, as
well as for bribery for reasons highlighted earlier.
9.2.1 Institutional solutions
The narrations of participants are perpetuated with notions of what ‘should’ the public administration be
like and do in order for them to move away from engaging in bribery and to some extent in other
informal activities. The entire system of public administration at all levels needs to be reconstructed with
the purpose of appealing to the citizens and their sense of what the state should do, that is to say
protect and promote the ‘people’s’ interests effectively. In the case of SMEs, this entails a meaningful
support for the sectors, flexibility, approachability and above all the introduction of a service culture.
With a system of taxes, legal frameworks, norms and standards that are seen as supportive of SMEs,
rather than designed in such a way so as to extract resources, the rationale for carrying out bribery and
informal behaviours would decrease. Indeed, this is where institutional solutions, such as better
enforcement of justice for those in the position of public power and improved access to justice for SMEs,
reduction of the red tape and increased effectiveness of the public administration that IACD puts
forward come into the picture. Simplification, clarification, greater consistency and compactness, greater
durability of regulations, as well as scrapping or lowering the court fees to make justice more accessible
and enhancing effectiveness of courts constitute a mammoth task. A greater coordination of duties that
SMEs have vis-à-vis the state, removal of duplicate tasks, shortening of waiting times and a centralised
system informing SMEs directly of changes in the regulatory environment could improve the awareness
of SMEs and simplify their interaction with the public sector to some extent. This is an indirect way of
lowering corruption through enhancing governance that IACD promotes.
It is hardly surprising that the calls for a more effective public administration among SMEs largely follow
the neoliberal narration, hence the argument of SMEs furthering the interests of the market. However,
what SMEs appear to prefer is not necessarily less state, more market approach, but rather a perspective
of social democracy which fits the context of post-communist Slovakia and the experience, memory and
expectation of entrepreneurs from the state to protect them.
248
9.2.2 Re-casting history and shifting mind-sets
Rather than designing elaborate structures to curb bribery, it is important to take a look at why
entrepreneurs resort to corruption and reduce the scope for corruption by reducing the need for it. It is
unarguable that institutional fixes would improve the current situation. Nevertheless, this is not enough
to reduce willingness to engage in corruption. It is rather unlikely that all entreprising conditions in the
country will be according to the expectations of every SME owner. When a gap emerges between what
entrepreneurs think their environment should be like and the actual conditions and when a regulation is
viewed negatively by entrepreneurs, a response follows that is often geared towards informal behaviours
on the part of the entrepreneurs.
Shaping individual thinking about the matter, thereby shaping individual choices is a way forward. IACD
attempts to do this on the basis of human nature as homo economicus and its automated responses.
However, humans are far more complex than IACD recognises as they make decisions often based on far
more than rational calculations. Entrepreneurs are sometimes guided by rational calculations, which are
nevertheless also bound by their context, but also by emotions and the informal rules of the social world
within which they operate that forge alliances and responsibilities, as we as rivalries. Human experience
is wider than the narrow economic vision. Policies that do not take account of wide human experience
are bound to fail as they do not take into account the hatred of the state, the family closeness that takes
priority over the greater good, close friends whom entrepreneurs are prepared to support even if it is to
their detriment, the pre-occupation with survival and fear of what tomorrow holds. To guide individuals,
we need to gain a deep understanding of their worlds and their beliefs. Ignoring this translates into an
arduous task that IACD is pursuing – building anti-corruption without a corruption-averse population.
In the context of Slovakia, it is vital to appreciate the embeddedness of corruption in the damaged
governor-governed relations. It is a great paradox of Slovakia that the state is seen as the enemy and at
the same time it is so close to people that we can talk about intimate proximity. Notwithstanding the
country underwent rapid institutional development, the particular democratic liberal mind-sets with
which IACD works are not instilled in Slovaks. Institutions are not in line with elemental attitudes towards
the state. Slovaks embody what could be termed a post-communist mind-set which embraces some of
the values and attitudes found in mature democracies, but reconciles them with past legacies. The
problem of the first president of Czechoslovakia, Masaryk, and the first post-communist president Havel,
that is to say having a democracy without democrats, is still alive today. This is in part because
democratisation efforts, of which IACD is a part, have overlooked the necessity of ingraining a particular
249
mind-set and instead moved straight to institutional solutions hoping to induce a particular mentality
along the way. This is proving to be ill-informed as SMEs after two decades of on-going transition do not
conform to the democratic attitudes of the free market.
It is vital to re-shape the image of the state and its administration. The public sector needs to shed its
reputation of an exploiter of the ‘people’. The crucial element of enhancing the rapport between SMEs
and the state should constitute an integral element, rather than a consequence of improved institutional
environment. Forging a sense of having a stake in the state is crucial to stimulating civic activity
necessary for anti-corruption already in place to be taken up by SMEs. In other words, there is a need to
shape Slovak entrepreneurs into being the kind of citizens who can take and use the current citizen-
based approach to anti-corruption. Again, this takes us back to the perils of having a democracy without
democrats. It also highlights the importance of placing entrepreneurs in a social context of a country in
which they operate.
This brings us to a much bigger concern – the need to revisit a national history that acts as a great
shaping force to national identity. Much of it fits with and perpetuates the survivalist mentality of victims
in entrepreneurs.
In the UK, there has been a trend of recasting and reshaping a national history to suit contemporary
issues, such as gender equality, but also civic matters, as the many history documentaries aired and
books published testify. Slovakia has not reached this stage yet. Critical scrutiny and re-telling of its
history which would be fit for the realities of the twenty-first century are challenges that lay ahead. This
is encapsulated in the opening quote of the thesis. A nation that does not scrutinise its history is
immature and cannot proceed in its development. The fast changes of past 25 years silenced the
importance of building national self-perception that would fit into the system of Western democracy.
Slovakia needs to delve deep into what Slovak-ness stemming from history entails in order to craft space
for itself within the international realm. It is intimately linked to fostering Slovak democratic minds
essential to building a free market democracy. This could be done by subtle public campaigns or by
utilising the outlets of popular culture, such as films, documentaries and books, to shift mind-sets
through altering the understandings of oneself, the nation and its place.
Media also have a role to play in the way they present information to the general public. Adjusting the
reporting to encourage public activity on corruption on all levels and across various forms of corruption,
shifting attention to anti-corruption, rather than corruption of government and de-politicising the
250
discourse are necessary steps forward. On a much bigger scale, there is also scope for media to actively
engage in turning Slovaks into democrats. They can assist in laying the requite foundations of democracy
– democratic mind-sets.
This research demonstrates the need to abandon the simplistic perception of democracy.
Notwithstanding it is firmly positioned as the pinnacle to which the countries across the world should
aspire, it is necessary to open the notion up to pluralism as Montuori asserts (2005). Democracy, free
market and anti-corruption could be seen an umbrella terms of many different forms of its ideas as a
result of applying them in local conditions. This will allow for more effective guiding strategies for
Slovakia sensitive to local issues and discourses. Without understanding this and without tailoring anti-
corruption, it is unlikely to achieve more than it has done so far. In other words, striving for a mirror
image of Western democracy in Slovakia should recede to pursuing a functioning democracy of Eastern
European kind that acknowledges and works with differences to attain a decrease in corruption. It is
important to remind the reader that Slovakia was only 23 years old at the time this thesis was written.
This is not to excuse the current issues, but rather to set them in a perspective and to caution against
overly optimismistic and excessive expectations. These processes indeed require time, as well as careful
and sensitive treatment shaping the path to democracy.
9.2.3 Rethinking corruption and individual responsibilisation
Another step in recasting individual attitudes is a reconceptualization of the definition of corruption to
translate the message of ‘petty’ activities as harmful to the SME community in Slovakia. Notwithstanding
the damaging nature of petty corruption has been recognised in literature (see for example Jalan, 2005;
Black, 2007), Harrison (2007) noticed that there is a great tendency to use an all-encompassing term
corruption. In Slovakia, this is linked to grand and political corruption. In turn, petty corruption is
somewhat side-lined in public and entrepreneurial understandings. Petty corruption too is a crucial
element of the vicious circle of corruption in Slovakia and needs to be recognised as such. This task
could be achieved by incorporating the moral dimension of corruption as harming the ‘people’, recasting
the notion of private gain and adjusting the idea of public power as a prerequisite to being corrupt.
Indeed, labelling favour-doing and help-outs as outright corruption may cause more damage than do
good, as they have developed as survival strategies. This goes hand in hand with shifting mind-sets in a
way that is sensitive to local complexities.
251
Here we arrive at the idea of individual responsibilisation and encouragement of individuals to
appreciate the consequences of their activities for themselves in the first instance, but also for others,
namely for the ‘people’. It thus appeals to the emotional and moral, rather than economic dimension of
individual constructions of the self vis-à-vis corruption. Installing individual responsibility is associated
with dismantling the survivalist mentality of victims discussed previously. Victims have very little power
and therefore responsibility for self and others. On the contrary, an active agent is endowed with rights,
but also duties and responsibilities as an individual. This argument is linked to the preceding discussion
of ingraining democratic mind-sets in the society.
The approach of personal responsibilisation offers an alternative way of addressing the secretive
activities that are hard to uncover. As pointed out, transparency as the way forward has its severe
limitations. It deepens the chasm between the governor and the governed, between entrepreneurs and
the system of public administration and spreads fear and distrust. These in turn fuel survivalist mentality
and further fragment the SME community. Fear and distrust drive corruption deeper into hiding and
inspire new creative ways of passing a bribe on and of exploiting other informal avenues of getting things
done. SMEs are rather creative in finding reasons, excuses, explanations and justifications for their
behaviours when it comes to anything perceived as unfavourable in the regulatory and business
environment. It is hardly feasible to expect everything in the external environment will conform to
everybody’s ideal. For this reason, transparency measures are destined to be merely catching up with
the creativity and willingness of SMEs to further their interests. The threat of criminal punishment and
transparency are of limited effectiveness given the secretive nature of these activities that are contained,
covered up and protected by communities themselves, partly due to the belief in their inherent value for
the community. This image, in addition to presenting SMEs as victims should make way for a more
balanced entrepreneurial identity as sufferers and active agents, as well as introducing the possibility of
SME activities being harmful. However, it needs to be challenged in a careful manner, so as not to
alienate SME owners.
Instilling the society with the notions of responsible enterprise, which is lacking now, can foster a society
capable of providing pressure on SMEs to promote their moral integrity. Currently, there are very few
expectations of SMEs to avoid corruption. This applies to both customers and business partners. Media
can be crucial in fostering SME attitudes towards the matter and public attitudes towards enterprise by
crafting a different entrepreneurial integrity based on the Slovak notion of morality of the ‘people’. This
will require a departure from the dominant CSR narrative that stresses doing well over doing good.
252
What Slovakia needs are anti-corruption heroes from the ranks of SMEs and the ‘people’, that is to say
‘ordinary’ Slovaks. In the studied periods, this role was taken up by anti-corruption non-govermental
organizations, politicians or influential private sector actors, most recently ESET, one of the most
successful Slovak IT companies. This is indeed laudable and the importance of these actions should not
be diminished. Nevertheless, activity needs to spill over onto the broader society, rather than stay in the
hands of a few players. As this thesis was completed, another grand corruption scandal rocked the
government. However, this time it was an employee at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who blew the
whistle. This action was followed by a rather different dynamic in the rather de-politicised (indeed not
completely devoid of politics) response of the public. Slovak students abroad expressed their
encouragement by an open letter to the responsible ministers demanding an acknowledgment of
responsibility. The ramifications of this step were yet to be seen at the time the thesis was completed.
Nevertheless, the example shows a different direction in which anti-corruption can be taken.
With respect to grand and political corruption, the discourse must undergo reconceptualization to
encourage the involvement of the general public, including SMEs, in anti-corruption. Reiterating the
image of corrupt governors abusing the ‘people’ in the way in which it is currently done does not create
much room for public activity. It strengthens victimhood and victims have a limited agency. Slovak
entrepreneurs believe that they have a relatively small stake in the state. Also, when governors are seen
as inherently corrupt, this legitimates petty corruption of victims of grand corruption. Moving away from
this paradigm also means a meaningful incorporation of the private sector into the discourse to
stimulate a public demand for responsibilisation of private sector actors, as well as their counterparts in
the public sector. To clear the governing circles of corruption as much as possible, the public pressure
has an indispensable role to play which takes us back to the problem of engaging the public and SMEs as
active agents in the debate and anti-corruption activities. To put it simply, responsibilisation as an
element of a democratic mind-set turns powerless and duty-less victims into responsible active citizens.
It is necessary to dispense a word of warning. The issues discussed here are complex. They are a few
pieces of an intricate puzzle of the social world of corruption in Slovakia. Its pieces are inextricably
interlinked, but also subtle and difficult to discern. The curious side effects of the current approach to
anti-corruption illuminate the importance and power of unforeseen consequences. This is also
necessarily the case with solutions, or at least their foundations, laid down here.
The above is not an exhaustive account by any means of how to proceed with tackling corruption in
Slovakia. Nevertheless, it draws broad contours of possible directions, illuminates vital problems that
253
need to be addressed and areas to be considered that have been neglected by IACD and Slovak attempts
at curbing corruption. Cooperation of experts and practitioners alike will prove vital to transcending the
meanings of and attitudes towards corruption among SMEs and in the society at large.
9.3 Reflections and limitations
Perhaps the most obvious limitation of this study in the field dominated by large-scale quantitative
research is the number of interviewed enterprises – 30 in total in two sectors. It is important to reiterate
that data saturation was reached rather quickly, suggesting a considerable consistency in
entrepreneurial perceptions in the selected sectors. Insights developed here serve as a jumping off point
for further investigation. Also, the thesis focuses ‘only’ on tourism and agriculture and micro and small
businesses.
Given how sensitive and precarious researching corruption is, it came as no surprise when this project
did not go according to plan. The collected interview material comes from Western and central Slovakia,
leaving out the Eastern part of the country. This was due to difficulties with securing interviews in
Eastern Slovakia. With only one interview secured in East Slovakia, it was felt that the time spent
travelling would not justify the material gained.
This doctoral project only includes SMEs owned by individuals who identify themselves as Slovaks.
However, Slovakia is more heterogeneous when it comes to its ethnical make–up. It was not possible to
include perspectives of Hungarian or German Slovaks, nor Roma or Ruthenians for the following
reasons. Firstly, I lack the detailed knowledge requisite to embark on this challenge and it was felt this
could not be easily gained during the course of my doctoral degree. Secondly, I do not have language
abilities essential to do this. As language is viewed as a mirror to the worlds of those who speak it, it is of
utmost importance to speak the language of individuals we are trying to understand. Again, this could
not be mastered in the space of several years. In addition to time constraints, incorporating this variety
in one thesis in sufficient depth was unfeasible. Differences between the groups stem from deeply
ingrained social and cultural characteristics. Therefore, investigation of each of the groups named here
would require venturing deep into their discourses and experiences.
The context of Slovakia made it challenging not only to gain access to entrepreneurs in the first place,
but also to encourage them to talk about the matter. Much of this has been covered in the section
6.2.2.1. The unfeasibility of recording the interviews gave rise to difficulties with recording the data. This
was done by taking as precise notes as possible, recording word by word formulations of participants to
254
the greatest possible extent. Upon finishing each interview, I transcribed the handwritten notes on
laptop while still having the interview in fresh memory. This allowed me to fill some gaps in the notes.
However, this approach came at the cost of losing some of the depth, as it was impossible to capture all
that had been said in the way it had been said. Furthermore, writing down meant that little attention
could be paid to other non-verbal facets of expression, such as tone of voice, body language and so
forth. This highlights the difficulties of researching corruption and the reasons behind favouring a
survey-approach to collecting data.
Moving on to the material collected, as is the case with any interview data, the issue of taking what
participants say at face value emerged here. The problem of being selective in talking about events,
exaggeration and so forth necessarily emerge when complex human beings are the source of study. On
the other hand, it could be argued that it is not the precise details, but rather the perceptions of events
and their portrayal to the external audience that is of interest here. Therefore, personal accounts of
corruption and enterprise offer a glimpse into the mindsets of entrepreneurs that is more useful for the
purposes of this kind of research. Indeed, it is at the very heart of postmodern scholarship that refuses
objective truths and objective descriptions of corruption, the state, enterprise and Slovakia. The use of
gatekeepers personally known to me carried with it a possibility of similarity of the interviewed SMEs.
However, in the Slovak cultural context and given the delicate nature of the research topic, this
approach was seen as unavoidable.
This research focused at phenomena that occur at the intersection of the public and the private sectors.
However, several instances of corruption incidents between private sector actors emerged in the
narrations. These included bribery, as we all as favour doing. Private to private corruption is finding its
way into IACD and therefore will necessarily have to be looked at by scholars in due time in detail.
Likewise, an issue of sexual corruption wherein women trade sex for jobs in the public sector arose. This
is intriguing as the way we think and talk about corruption today leaves out this form of exchange. It
could be linked to corruption being dominated by masculine perspectives. It also presents an avenue for
additional and novel research that would begin to significantly re-shape what corruption means.
It could be argued that given the focus of this study on Slovakia and its specificities on which it
elaborates in great length, its insights are not of much use outside of the context of the country. Indeed,
this is a valid point to raise. It is not within the scope of my knowledge to establish its applicability and
usefulness in other situations. For this purpose, I laid out a detailed summary of contextual realities of
255
Slovakia so as to facilitate the assessment of the extent of applicability of this study to SMEs and other
CEE societies and beyond.
Lastly, the most notable manifestation of the personal and educational background of myself as the
researcher (see section 6.4), is the assertion of the necessity to re-tell Slovakia’s history which is
connected with the idea of shifting minds. It stands in contrast to the earlier observation of the need for
institutional adjustments and changes in the narration of corruption and entrepreneurialism. Indeed,
these are seen as a part and parcel of a much deeper shift in values and attitudes in the country that is
democracy (of a sort) without democrats. In addition, the very idea of a subtle shaping of public views
on corruption is quintessentially Western reflecting my education gained at UK institutions and my life in
the UK.
9.4 Future directions
Several gaps pointing to the need for further research in a number of areas were identified during the
course of this project. To begin with, it was mentioned earlier in this chapter that the research only
included entrepreneurs from Western and central Slovakia. East of Slovakia is the poorest region of the
country. Furthermore, it is insufficiently connected to the most prosperous and advanced Western
regions due to a missing motorway connection. As most employment opportunities are in the West, it
tends to attract the more agency-full individuals. Also, Eastern Slovakia is marked with slightly different
cultural influences. To illustrate the point, the region lies on the boundary between the Western and
Eastern churches. What this means in terms of entrepreneurial mind-sets and the ways businesses are
run in this part of the country, as well as the applicability of findings of this research, is to be explored.
In addition to the above, only entrepreneurs who identified themselves as ethnical Slovaks were
interviewed, due to reasons highlighted in the preceding section. This left out a large community of
Hungarians in addition to Czechs, Ruthenians and the Roma, to only name the most significant groups.
They all have their distinct experiences with the state, with the Slovak government and their own
narration of history which have not been captured in this or, to the best of my knowledge, in any
another study. Nevertheless, they contribute to the mosaic of enterprise and corruption in Slovakia and
as such remit attention.
256
This thesis incorporated perspectives of micro and small enterprises in tourism and agriculture. Again, to
gain a fuller picture of enterprising vis-à-vis corruption in Slovakia, it would be beneficial to look at
medium and large enterprises, as well as firms in other sectors.
The varied experience of entrepreneurs with and without a particular work or study experience abroad
was not taken into consideration at the outset of the research. Nuances only unravelled throughout the
data collection and initial analysis. Therefore, the study has a limited capacity to explore in detail what
it is in particular that changed individual perspectives on corruption and how. This point requires further
attention.
Within the discourse tradition, this research paves the path for investigations of current discourses
circulating in the society by a range of actors from the state, the anti-corruption NGOs and media to
SMEs, corporations and the other pieces of the puzzle forming society. Relating the current truths to the
past patterns holds promise for illuminating insights into the intricacies of the phenomenon.
Much understanding comes from comparisons. Many opportunities lend themselves in the region of the
former Eastern Bloc which collides to some extent with the bygone empire of Austria-Hungary. To start
with, the Czech Republic with which Slovakia shares much of its historic trajectory, societal roots and
institutional foundations, offers a unique platform for studying commonalities and differences between
the two countries. The historic perspective has much to offer to contribute to the understandings of
paths that Slovaks and Czechs took following the ‘Velvet divorce’ and the dynamics of corruption in CEE.
This research also revealed a scope for an investigation into emotions such as anger, frustration, fear,
but also satisfaction when it comes to corruption. This area is currently understudied. Moving away from
emotions, further psychological perspectives on corruption would be enlightening and much needed.
The media and their role in furthering anti-corruption are little addressed by scholars. Influential as
media are, their agency in shaping corruption also calls for academic scrutiny. The phenomenon of the
early twenty-first century, that is to say social media, and their representations of corruption also call for
a close scrutiny.
Moving away from corruption itself, Slovak mind-sets need to be explored in more depth with relevance
to enterprise, but also to democracy, civil society and corruption. This will require cooperation among
scholars from a number of fields ranging from sociology and anthropology to psychology and economics.
Inner worlds of humans unfolding against the backdrop of shared history and culture are a convoluted
257
maze full of contingencies, disruptions and unexpected side effects. ‘The’ perfect knowledge of ‘the’
Slovak mind is an unattainable goal. This notwithstanding, we should strive to understand it more. This is
critical to designing strategies to deal with corruption, the perception of the state and of SMEs, but also
on a much deeper level ways of reshaping world views and attitudes of Slovaks.
The above introduces a picture of a far more time and resource-consuming approach to corruption than
simplistic institutional anti-corruption at our disposal today. It comes as no surprise that when faced
with the richness and intricacies of corruption and the multiple contexts around it, IACD opts for the
easier route. Nevertheless, this approach can only go so far. It is becoming clear that the task ahead is
much greater.
258
APPENDIX A A list of the collected media material
PRE-WW1 ERA
N á rodnie noviny
Národnie noviny (1903) ‘Pravota Nessiho’, Národnie noviny, 10 January, p. 4. Nrn1
Národnie noviny (1903) ‘Nitriansky politický proces’, Národnie noviny, 10 February, pp. 1-2. Nrn2
Národnie noviny (1903) ‘Disciplinárny súd’, 11 June, p. 1. Nrn3
Národnie noviny (1903) ‘Z bežných vecí’, Národnie noviny, 13 June, p. 3. Nrn4
Národnie noviny (1903) ‘Dopisy’, Národnie noviny, 28 July, p. 3. Nrn5
Národnie noviny (1903) ‘Domáce správy’, Národnie noviny, 1 August, p. 2. Nrn6
Národnie noviny (1903) ‘Panamissima!’, Národnie noviny, 6 August, p. 1. Nrn7
Národnie noviny (1903) ‘Po shromaždení’, Národnie noviny, 8 August, p. 1. Nrn8
Národnie noviny (1903) ‘Z bežných vecí’, Národnie noviny, 8 August, p. 2. Nrn9
Národnie noviny (1903) ‘Politická úvaha’, Národnie noviny, 27 August, p. 1. Nrn10
Národnie noviny (1903) ‘Nová vláda’, Národnie noviny, 5 November, p. 1. Nrn11
Národnie noviny (1907) ‘Podkupná administrácia’, Národnie noviny, 8 January, p. 2. Nrn12
Národnie noviny (1907) ‘Nie už podnecovanie, ale vraždenie’, Národnie noviny, 15 January, p.1. Nrn13
Národnie noviny (1907) ‘Domáce zprávy’, Národnie noviny, 17 January, p. 2. Nrn14
Národnie noviny (1907) ‘Domáce správy’, Národnie noviny, 5 February, p. 2. Nrn15
Národnie noviny (1907) ‘Naozaj?’, Národnie noviny, 20 June, p. 1. Nrn16
Národnie noviny (1907) ‘Nepotizmus’, Národnie noviny, 6 July, p. 3. Nrn17
Národnie noviny (1907) ‘Vysťahovaleckí agenti’, Národnie noviny, 13 July, p. 1. Nrn18
Národnie noviny (1912) ‘Mravná spustlosť’, Národnie noviny, 28 February, pp. 1-2. Nrn19
N á rodn ý hl á snik
Národný hlásnik (1903) ‘Čo nového doma’, Národný hlásnik, 20 August, pp.256-257. Nh1
Národný hlásnik (1903) ‘Čo nového doma’, Národný hlásnik, 5 August, pp. 239-242. Nh2
Národný hlásnik (1907) ‘Čo nového doma?’, Národný hlásnik, 5 February, p.3. Nh3
Národný hlásnik (1907) ‘Čo nového doma?’, Národný hlásnik, 5 March, pp. 2-3. Nh4
Národný hlásnik (1912) ‘Slováci, držme spolu!’, Národný hlásnik, 7 June, p. 1. Nh5
Národný hlásnik (1912) ‘Ťažká obžaloba’, Národný hlásnik, 27 September, p. 1. Nh6
259
Slovenskje národnje novini
Slovenskje národnje novini (1848) ‘Pojednavateľ’, Slovenskje národnje novini, 11 May, p.1012. Snn1
Slovenskje národnje novini (1848) ‘Pojednavateľ’, Slovenskje národnje novini, 18 May, p.1008. Snn2
Slovenskje národnje novini (1848) ‘Sloboda a slobodní národ’, Slovenskje národnje novini, 28 April, 1121-
1122. Snn3
INTERWAR YEARS
Slov á k
Slovák (1921) ‘Švindlerstvo s vlnou’, Slovák, 12 June, p. 1. Slov1
Slovák (1921) ‘Drzosť, dotieravosť a či bezočivosť Ústredného Družstva’, Slovák, 3 July, p. 1. Slov2
Slovák (1928) ‘čo sa skrýva za rentičkovou aférou?’, Slovák, 4 January, p. 1. Slov3
Slovák (1928) ‘Dôjde k ďalšiemu zavieraniu v afére Bednárika’, Slovák, 18 February, p. 2. Slov4
Slovák (1928) ‘Tajomník podkarpatských priemyselníkov obvinený z úplatkárstva’, Slovák, 13 March, p.2.
Slov5
Slovák (1928) ‘Mičurácki rozkolníci’, Slovák, 18 April, p.1. Slov6
Slovák (1928) ‘Dozvuky bratislavskej pasovej aféry’, Slovák, 16 June, p. 2. Slov7
Slovák (1928) ‘Nenásytnosť argalášov nezná hraníc!’, Slovák, 11 November, p. 2. Slov8
Slovák (1933) ‘Dve korupčné aféry a vyše 60 zatknutých’, Slovák, 17 January, p.3. Slov9
Slovák (1933) ‘200.000-korunové agrárne honoráre’, Slovák, 9 February, p. 2. Slov10
Slovák (1933) ‘Dr. Soukup: V čSR neexistujú korupčné aféry’, Slovák, 15 February, p. 3. Slov11
260
Slovák (1933) ‘Lidácky poslanec dr. Rathauský zatknutý v súvislosti s úplatkárskou a špionážnou aférou’,
Slovák,13 March, p. 3. Slov12
Slovák (1933) ‘Len 54 Kčs za m2 nájomného platí poštová správa v Ružomberku’, Slovák , 3 September,
p.3. Slov13
Slovák (1933) ‘Novobanská panama pred súd’, Slovák, 17 October, p.3. Slov14
Slovák (1935) ‘Za očistu’, Slovák, 14 March, p.1. Slov15
Slovák (1935) ‘Proti najšpinavšej stranníckej korupcii’, Slovák, 14 March, pp. 1-2. Slov16
Slovák (1935) ‘Ako sa vykľulo z ľudáckeho korupčníctva socialistické úžerníctvo’, Slovák, 23 August, p.3.
Slov17
Slovák (1935) ‘Aféra protiplynvých masiek v parlamente’, Slovák, 13 November, p.3. Slov18
Slovák (1935) ‘Aféra protiplynových masiek neprestáva’, Slovák, 20 November, p.3. Slov19
Slovák (1935) ‘To je process!’, Slovák, 11 December, p.3. Slov20
Slovensk ý denn í k
Slovenský denník (1921) ‘Hlasy novín’, Slovenský denník, 30 January, p. 3. Slovd1
Slovenský denník (1921) ‘Ako nažívame’, Slovenský denník, 22 February, pp.2-3. Slovd2
Slovenský denník (1921) ‘Hlasy novín’, Slovenský denník, 21 May, p. 1 Slovd2
Slovenský denník (1921) ‘Neprístojnosti maďarských politikov v Košiciach’, Slovenský denník, 26 May, p.
3. Slovd3
Slovenský denník (1921) ‘Ako gazdovať neslobodno’, Slovenský denník, 28 May, p. 1. Slovd4
Slovenský denník (1921) ‘Klerikalizmus’, Slovenský denník, 22 June, p. 1. Slovd5
Slovenský denník (1921) ‘Koburg predsa podplácal?’, Slovenský denník, 5 October, p. 4. Slovd6
Slovenský denník (1921) ‘Platené intervencie u štátnych úradov?’, Slovenský denník, 16 November, p. 2.
Slovd7
Slovenský denník (1928) ‘Posl. Kubicsko dostal 3 mesiace’, Slovenský denník, 25 January, p.3. Slovd8
Slovenský denník (1928) ‘Divná politika čs. Soc. Demokratov v Košiciach’, Slovenský denník, 26 June, p.4.
Slovd9
Slovenský denník (1928) ‘Hospodárstvo mesta Bardejova’, Slovenský denník, 26 June, p. 2. Slovd10
Slovenský denník (1928) ‘Politika odstřelování’, Slovenský denník, 25 August, p. 1. Slovd11
Slovenský denník (1928) ‘Príčiny demisia dra Engliša’, Slovenský denník, 20 July, p. 1. Slovd12
261
Slovenský denník (1928) ‘Ako sa rozdrapujú socialistickí panamisti’, Slovenský denník, 25 November, p. 4.
Slovd13
Slovenský denník (1935) ‘Dr. Vančo prijal 100,000 korún za záhadného prameňa’, Slovenský denník, 10
May, p. 1. Slovd14
Slovenský denník (1935) ‘Prepúšťanie a zatýkanie v úplatkárskych aférach’, Slovenský denník, 23 March,
p. 2. Slovd15
Slovenský denník (1935) ‘Dr. Vančo si odsedí 10 dní’, Slovenský denník, 3 August, p. 1. Slovd16
1991
Pravda
Pravda (1991) ‘Rakúske Monte Carlo na Slovensku?’, Pravda, 5 January, p. 5. Prav1
Pravda (1991) ‘Polčas aféry Tatragate’, Pravda, 9 January, p.3. Prav2
Pravda (1991) ‘Predávame sami seba’, Pravda, 19 January, p.3. Prav3
Pravda (1991) ‘Tatragate: nepokojné prímerie (s dymovnicami), Pravda, 24 January, p.5. Prav4
Pravda (1991) ‘Drzí majú prednosť, hoci aj s ručeným obmedzením’, Pravda, 12 March, p.2. Prav5.
N á rodn á obroda
Kunik, J. (1991) ‘Podnikatelia alebo paraziti?’, Národná obroda, 30 March, p. 2. Nro1
1998
Pravda
Pravda (1998) ‘Cena priateľstva’, Pravda, 7 May, pp. 1-2. Prav6
Pravda (1998) ‘Slovenská cesta privatizácie v réžii HZDS’, Pravda, 29 May, p. 1. Prav7
Pravda (1998) ‘Škandál okolo SDK: Úplatky novinárom’, Pravda, 29 May, p. 2. Prav8
Pravda (1998) ‘Demokracia prvoradá’, 13 May, Pravda, pp. 1; 3. Prav9
Pravda (1998) ‘Dzurinda o podplácaní novinárov: Aféra stale neutícha’, Pravda, 30 May, p. 2. Prav10
Pravda (1998) ‘Privatizačný kolotoč v ZRS: Kult robotníkov’, Pravda, 3 June, pp. 1; 4. Prav11
262
Sme
Sme (1998) ‘Privatizácia PNS je ďalší krok k manipulácii volieb’, Sme, 28 February, p. 2. Sme1
Sme (1998) ‘Privatizáciou pod cenu prišiel Fond národného majetku za tri roky o 54 miliárd korún’, Sme,
4 April, p. 2. Sme2
Sme (1998) ‘FNM pri privatizácii hrubo ignoroval zákon’, Sme, 27 February, p. 1. Sme3
Sme (1998) ‘Zoznam I. Mikloša hovorí, známi a príbuzní politikov sa podieľali na privatizácii’, Sme, 24
June, pp. 1-2. Sme4
Sme (1998) ‘Pripravuje sa tunelovanie Slovenskej spotiteľne, tvrdí podpredseda DU Černák’, Sme, 16
January, p. 1. Sme5
Sme (1998) ‘Ditribučnú sieť PNS sprivatizovala a.s. Danubiaprint, ktorá je blízka HZDS’, Sme, 25 February,
p. 1. Sme6
Sme (1998) ‘Dzurinda vyslovil ďalšie podozrenie z tunelovania ŽSR a podal podnet na Generálnu
prokuratúru’, Sme, 4 April, p. 3. Sme7
Sme (1998) ‘Colník a podnikateľ poškodili štát o 32 mil.’, Sme, 30 January, p. 3. Sme8
Sme (1998) ‘V Slovenskej sporiteľni sa netuneluje’, Sme, 17 January, p. 2. Sme9
Sme (1998) ‘Tunelovanie železníc’, Sme, 20 February, p.2. Sme10
Sme (1998) ‘Podľa Dzurindu je privatizácia PNS účelová’, Sme, 26 February, p. 3. Sme11
Sme (1998) ‘Šéf Nafty Gbely odmietol možnosť tunelovania firmy niektorou dcérskou sspoločnosťou’,
Sme, 29 May, p. 1,3. Sme12
MID 2010s
Hospod á rske noviny
Im (2015) ‘Hlina sa zameria na Širokého hotel. Pri ňom sídli aj firma z kauzy CT’, Hospodárske noviny, 19
January, Available at: http://dennik.hnonline.sk/slovensko/589819-hlina-sa-zameria-na-sirokeho-hotel-
pri-nom-sidli-aj-firma-z-kauzy-ct, [3 March 2015]. Hospn1
Jančovič, D. (2014) ‘Slovensko sa musí prebudiť. Bez reforiem nás prevalcuje Ázia’, Hospodárske noviny,
6 November, Available at: http://finweb.hnonline.sk/tema-tyzdna/530595-slovensko-sa-musi-prebudit-
bez-reforiem-nas-prevalcuje-azia, [3 March 2015]. Hospn2
263
Kapsdorfer, E. (2014) ‘Slováci: Náš štát je skorumpovaný’, Hospodárske noviny, 4 February, Available at:
http://dennik.hnonline.sk/ekonomika-a-firmy/541862-slovaci-nas-stat-je-skorumpovany, [3 March
2015]. Hospn3
Kováč, P. (2014) ‘Opozícia ticho toleruje Ficovi priateľa Výboha’, Hospodárske noviny, 8 July, Available at:
http://dennik.hnonline.sk/slovensko/581064-opozicia-ticho-toleruje-ficovi-priatela-vyboha, [3 March
2015]. Hospn4
Kušnírová, M. (2014) ‘Štát prikáže firmám, ako riešiť úplatky. Tie vidia byrokraciu’, Hospodárske noviny,
23 December, Available at: http://dennik.hnonline.sk/ekonomika-a-firmy/573195-stat-prikaze-firmam-
ako-riesit-uplatky-tie-vidia-byrokraciu, [3 March 2015]. Hospn5
Red (2014) ‘Antikampaň pokračuje. Fico vytiahol na Kisku pokuty. Ten hovorí o uplácaní’, Hospodárske
noviny, 20 March, Available at: http://dennik.hnonline.sk/slovensko/587047-antikampan-pokracuje-fico-
vytiahol-na-kisku-pokuty-ten-hovori-o-podplacani, [3 March 2015]. Hospn6
Red (2014) ‘Ficov priateľ Výboh si pýtal 18 miliónov, tvrdí bývalý manažér Steyeru’, Hospodárske noviny,
10 November, Available at: http://dennik.hnonline.sk/ekonomika-a-firmy/510575-ficov-priatel-vyboh-si-
pytal-18-milionov-tvrdi-byvaly-manazer-steyeru, [3 March 2015]. Hospn7
Red (2014) ‘Rozkrádanie musí skončiť. Hlina bude protestovať na Silvestra pred hotelom J&T’,
Hospodárske noviny, 12 December, Available at: http://dennik.hnonline.sk/slovensko/554601-
rozkradanie-musi-skoncit-hlina-bude-protestovat-na-silvestra-pred-hotelom-j-t, [3 March 2015].
Hospn8
Red (2014) ‘Tajné stretnutia Fica s Topolánkom. Fica Spomínajú v českej korupčnej kauze’, Hospodárske
noviny, 2 July, Available at: http://dennik.hnonline.sk/slovensko/509038-tajne-stretnutia-s-topolankom-
fica-spominaju-v-ceskej-korupcnej-kauze, [3 March 2015]. Hospn9
Red (2014) ‘Zakladateľ Esetu: Korupcia je ako rakovina, idem proti nej bojovať‘, Hospodárske noviny, 11
July, Available at: http://dennik.hnonline.sk/ekonomika-a-firmy/541953-zakladatel-esetu-korupcia-je-
ako-rakovina-idem-proti-nej-bojovat, [3 March 2015]. Hospn10
264
SITA (2014) ‘Voľby ohrozila korupcia. Polícia obvinila päť ľudí’, Hospodárske noviny, 16 November,
Available at: http://dennik.hnonline.sk/slovensko/581528-volby-ohrozila-korupcia-policia-obvinilia-pat-
ludi, [3 March 2015]. Hospn11
SITA (2015) ‘Fico: Ak by sme sa riadili Matovičom či Prochádzkom, tak Slovensko zdochne’, Hospodárske
noviny, 21 January, Available at: http://dennik.hnonline.sk/slovensko/530984-fico-ak-by-sme-sa-riadili-
matovicom-ci-prochazkom-tak-slovensko-zdochne, [3 March 2015]. Hospn12
TASR (2014) ‘Polícia obvinila 13 ľudí z korupcie. Má byť medzi nimi aj bývalý hokejový reprezentant’,
Hospodárske noviny, 3 February, Available at: http://dennik.hnonline.sk/slovensko/543219-policia-
obvinila-trinast-ludi-z-korupcie-ma-byt-medzi-nimi-aj-byvaly-hokejovy-reprezentant, [3 March 2015].
Hospn13
TASR (2014) ‘Dane, odvody a korupcia. Biznismeni popisovali svoje problémy Kiskovi’, Hospodárske
noviny, 16 December, Available at: http://dennik.hnonline.sk/ekonomika-a-firmy/571508-dane-odvody-
a-korupcia-biznismeni-popisovali-svoje-problemy-kiskovi. Hospn14
TASR (2014) ‘Škandály počas volieb: Hackerský útok aj korupcia’, Hospodárske noviny, 16 November,
Available at: http://dennik.hnonline.sk/slovensko/528862-skandaly-pocas-volieb-hackersky-utok-aj-
korupcia, [3 March 2015]. Hospn15
TASR (2014) ‘Tunely v zdravotníctve tu boli už za prvej Ficovej vlády, vyhlásil Sulík’, Hospodárske noviny,
28 November, Available at: http://dennik.hnonline.sk/slovensko/555500-tunely-v-zdravotnictve-tu-boli-
uz-za-prvej-ficovej-vlady-vyhlasil-sulik, [3 March 2015]. Hospn16
TASR (2014) ‘V korupcii sme predbehli aj Botswanu a sme najhorší v regióne’, Hospodárske noviny, 3
December, Available at: http://dennik.hnonline.sk/svet/556544-v-korupcii-sme-predbehli-aj-botswanu-
a-sme-najhorsi-v-regione-mapa, [3 March 2015]. Hospn17
TASR and STL (2014) ‘Chyby vlády a korupcia. Slovensko podľa Beblavého prišlo o 165 miliónov z
Bruselu’, Hospodárske noviny, 3 September, Available at: http://dennik.hnonline.sk/ekonomika-a-
firmy/550176-chyby-vlady-a-korupcia-slovensko-podla-beblaveho-prislo-o-165-milionov-z-bruselu, [3
March 2015]. Hospn18
265
TASR and STL (2014) ‘Radičovej exporadca dostal podmienku. Za kauzu Osrblie’, Hospodárske noviny, 12
August, Available at: http://dennik.hnonline.sk/slovensko/503667-radicovej-exporadca-dostal-
podmienku-za-kauzu-osrblie, [3 March 2015]. Hospn19
TASR and STL (2014) ‘Uplácanie na Slovensku ostáva takmer bez trestu‘, Hospodárske noviny, 14 August,
Available at: http://dennik.hnonline.sk/slovensko/581367-uplacanie-na-slovensku-ostava-takmer-bez-
trestu, [3 March 2015]. Hospn20
TASR (2014) ‘Opozícia bude odvolávať Fica. Termín mu určili na sobotu večer’, Hospodárske noviny, 7
November, Available at: http://dennik.hnonline.sk/slovensko/532610-opozicia-bude-odvolavat-fica-
termin-im-urcili-na-sobotu-vecer, [3 March 2015]. Hospn2
Nov ý č as
Nový čas (2014) ‘Nelichotivá správa o úplatkárstve v EÚ: V rebríčku korupcie dopadlo Slovensko
katastrofálne’, Nový čas , 4 February, Available at: http://www.cas.sk/clanok/272072/nelichotiva-
sprava-o-uplatkarstve-v-eu-v-rebricku-korupcie-dopadlo-slovensko-katastrofalne/, [1 March 2015].
Novyc1
Nový čas (2014) ‘Bývalý reprezentant je v poriadnej kaši! Čo hovorí Pucher na obvinenie z korupcie’,
Nový čas, 4 February, Available at: http://www.cas.sk/clanok/306983/byvaly-reprezentant-je-v-
poriadnej-kasi-co-hovori-pucher-na-obvinenie-z-korupcie/, [1 March 2015]. Novyc2
Nový čas (2014) ‘Hasiča obvinili z korupcie, hrozí mu väzenie až 12 rokov!’, Nový čas, 3 April, Available
at:
http://www.cas.sk/clanok/277631/hasica-obvinili-z-korupcie-hrozi-mu-vazenie-az-na-12-rokov/, [1
March 2015]. Novyc3
Nový čas (2014) ‘Úradníka z katastrálneho odboru obvinili z prijímania úplatkov!’, Nový čas, 25 April,
Available at:
http://www.cas.sk/clanok/279656/uradnika-z-katastralneho-odboru-obvinili-z-prijimania-uplatku/, [1
March 2015]. Novyc4
Nový čas (2014) ‘Dvaja bývalí colníci a podnikateľ priznali korupciu, dostali tresty!’, Nový čas, 7 May,
Available at:
266
http://www.cas.sk/clanok/280723/dvaja-byvali-colnici-a-podnikatel-priznali-korupciu-dostali-tresty/, [1
March 2015]. Novyc5
Nový čas (2014) ‘Daniarka potopila Sergeja a Alexandra na súde: Salmanovci ma podplácali’, Nový čas,
22 May, Available at: http://www.cas.sk/clanok/282124/daniarka-potopila-sergeja-a-alexandra-na-sude-
salmanovovci-ma-podplacali/, [1 March 2015]. Novyc6
Nový čas (2014) ‘Hasičského inšpektora obvineného z korupcie vzali do vyšetrovacej väzby’, Nový čas, 12
June, Available at: http://www.cas.sk/clanok/284257/hasicskeho-inspektora-obvineneho-z-korupcie-
vzali-do-vysetrovacej-vazby/, [1 March 2015]. Novyc7
Nový čas (2014) ‘Premiér Fico vyšiel s pravdou von: Priznal tajné schôdzky s Výbohom a Topolánkom’,
Nový čas, 2 July, Available at: http://www.cas.sk/clanok/286265/premier-fico-vysiel-s-pravdou-von-
priznal-tajne-schodzky-s-vybohom-a-topolankom/, [1 March 2015]. Novyc8
Nový čas (2014) ‘Kauza nákupu obrnených vozidiel: Český lobista zaplieta do korupcie Fica’, Nový čas, 2
July, Available at: http://www.cas.sk/clanok/286165/kauza-nakupu-obrnenych-vozidiel-cesky-lobista-
zaplieta-do-korupcie-fica/, [1 March 2015]. Novyc9
Nový čas (2014) ‘Súd potrestal bývalú colníčku za branie úplatkov, pozrite sa ako!’, Nový čas, 14 July,
Available at:
http://www.cas.sk/clanok/287351/sud-potrestal-byvalu-colnicku-za-branie-uplatkov-pozrite-sa-ako/, [1
March 2015]. Novyc10
Nový čas (2014) ‘Špecializovaný trestný súd v Pezinku: Prokurátora obžalovaného z korupcie oslobodili’,
Nový čas, 31 July, Available at: http://www.cas.sk/clanok/289077/specializovany-trestny-sud-v-pezinku-
prokuratora-obzalovaneho-z-korupcie-oslobodili/, [1 March 2015]. Novyc11
Nový čas (2014) ‘Bratislavčan sa chcel zbaviť pút, ponákal úplatok policajtovi: Za neuvážený čin bol
potrestaný!’, Nový čas, 8 August, Available at: http://www.cas.sk/clanok/289924/bratislavcan-sa-chcel-
zbavit-put-ponukal-uplatok-policajtovi-za-neuvazeny-cin-bol-potrestany/, [1 March 2015]. Novyc12
Nový čas (2014) ‘Odsúdený za nepriamu korupciu v kauze Osrblie: Exporadva Radičovej dostal rok
podmienky!’, Nový čas, 13 August, Available at: http://www.cas.sk/clanok/290280/odsudeny-za-
267
nepriamu-korupciu-v-kauze-osrblie-exporadca-radicovej-dostal-rok-podmienky/, [1 March 2015].
Novyc13
Nový čas (2014) ‘Veľký prieskum korupcie na Slovensku: Takto sa podplácajú policajti a lekári’, Nový čas,
4 September, Available at: http://www.cas.sk/clanok/292369/velky-prieskum-korupcie-na-slovensku-
takto-sa-podplacaju-policajti-a-lekari/, [1 March 2015]. Novyc14
Nový čas (2014) ‘Ministerstvo obhajuje nákup lietadiel: Tender na Spartany je nespochybniteľný’, Nový
čas, 24 November, Available at: http://www.cas.sk/clanok/297329/ministerstvo-obhajuje-nakup-
lietadiel-tender-na-spartany-je-nespochybnitelny/, [1 March 2015]. Novyc15
Nový čas (2014) ‘Šéf talianskeho dodávateľa má ísť do basy: Spartany kúpime od firmy z korupčnej
aféry’, Nový čas, 23 October, Available at: http://www.cas.sk/clanok/297226/sef-talianskeho-
dodavatela-ma-ist-do-basy-spartany-kupime-od-firmy-z-korupcnej-afery/, [1 March 2015]. Novyc16
Nový čas (2014) ‘Poslanec Mičovský otvoril škandál v štátnych lesoch: Odvoz dreva predražili o 14
milónov eur?!’, Nový čas, 30 October, Available at: http://www.cas.sk/clanok/297934/poslanec-
micovsky-otvoril-skandal-v-statnych-lesoch-odvoz-dreva-predrazili-o-14-milionov-eur/, [1 March 2015].
Novyc17
Nový čas (2014) ‘Fico o návrhu na jeho odvolane: Divadielko strán na prahu zvoliteľnosti’, Nový čas, 8
November, Available at: http://www.cas.sk/clanok/298888/fico-o-navrhu-na-jeho-odvolanie-divadielko-
stran-na-prahu-zvolitelnosti/, [1 March 2015]. Novyc18
Nový čas (2014) ‘Nekonečné odvolávanie premiéra pokračuje: Fico sa v pléne objavuje len sporadicky’,
Nový čas, 10 November, Available at: http://www.cas.sk/clanok/298987/nekonecne-odvolavanie-
premiera-pokracuje-fico-sa-v-plene-objavuje-len-sporadicky/, [1 March 2015]. Novyc19
Nový čas (2014) ‘Obvinili šiestich mužov z korupcie na STK a pozemkovom úrade’, Nový čas, 13
November, Available at: http://www.cas.sk/clanok/299338/obvinili-siestich-muzov-z-korupcie-na-stk-a-
pozemkovom-fonde/, [ 5 March 2015]. Novyc20
Nový čas (2014) ‘Expolicajta súdia za korupciu pri vybavovaní skúšky na vysokej škole’, Nový čas, 21
November Available at: http://www.cas.sk/clanok/300076/expolicajta-sudia-za-korupciu-pri-
vybavovani-skusky-na-vysokej-skole/, [1 March 2015]. Novyc21
268
Nový čas (2014) ‘Tisícky ľudí vyšli na protest proti Ficovej vláde: Prestaňte kradnúť’, Nový čas, 26
November, Available at: http://www.cas.sk/clanok/300553/tisicky-ludi-vysli-na-protest-proti-ficovej-
vlade-prestante-kradnut/, [1 March 2015]. Novyc22
Nový čas (2014) ‘Rozhorčení ľudia na ďalšom proteste proti korupcii: Dosť bolo Smeru!Fico do basy!’, 28
November, Nový čas, Available at: http://www.cas.sk/clanok/300883/rozhorceni-ludia-na-dalsom-
proteste-proti-korupcii-dost-bolo-smeru-fico-do-basy/, [1 March 2015]. Novyc23
Nový čas (2014) ‘Fico svojsky bojuje proti korupcii: Schránkové firmy chce umlčať deravým zákonom’,
Nový čas, 1 December, Available at: http://www.cas.sk/clanok/301007/fico-svojsky-bojuje-proti-
korupcii-schrankove-firmy-chce-umlcat-deravym-zakonom/, [1 March 2015]. Novyc24
Nový čas (2014) ‘Ďalší megaškandál Ficovej vlády: Takto šafária s naším drevom’, Nový čas, 2 December,
Available at: http://www.cas.sk/clanok/301128/dalsi-megaskandal-ficovej-vlady-takto-safaria-s-nasim-
drevom/, [1 March 2015]. Novyc25
Nový čas (2014) ‘Je rozhodnuté! Salmanovci už poznajú svoje tresty’, Nový čas, 3 December, Available
at:
http://www.cas.sk/clanok/301302/je-rozhodnute-salmanovci-uz-poznaju-svoje-tresty/, [1 March 2015].
Novyc26
Nový čas (2014) ‘Štátne lesy podali na Mičovského trestné oznámenie: Odkryl šafárenie s drevom, na
krku má žalobu’, Nový čas, 11 December, Available at: http://www.cas.sk/clanok/302002/statne-lesy-
podali-na-micovskeho-trestne-oznamenie-odkryl-safarenie-s-drevom-na-krku-ma-zalobu/, [1 March
2015]. Novyc27
Nový čas (2015) ‘Uznaný vinným: Daňovák Salmanovcov dostal 7 rokov natvrdo’, Nový čas, 16
December, Available at: http://www.cas.sk/clanok/302472/uznany-vinnym-danovak-salmanovcov-
dostal-7-rokov-natvrdo/, [1 March 2015]. Novyc28
Nový čas (2015) ‘Korupčná kauza Hodejova: Starosta a traja poslanci sa vzdali mandátov, sú na
slobode!’, Nový čas, 30 January, Available at: http://www.cas.sk/clanok/306580/korupcna-kauza-
hodejova-starosta-a-traja-poslanci-sa-vzdali-mandatov-su-na-slobode/, [1 March 2015]. Novyc29
269
Nový čas (2015) ‘Chobotnica korupcie: Peniaze daňových poplatníkov nemiznú iba pri ‘veľkých’ kauzách’,
Nový čas, 8 January, Available at: http://zivot.cas.sk/clanok/19170/chobotnica-korupcie-peniaze-
danovych-poplatnikov-nemiznu-iba-pri-velkych-kauzach, [1 March 2015]. Novyc30
Nový čas (2015) ‘Podnikateľ Miroslav Trnka chce zatočiť s korupciou: Máme systémovú chybu
spoločnosti’, Nový čas, 9 January, Available at: http://zivot.cas.sk/clanok/19183/podnikatel-miroslav-
trnka-chce-zatocit-s-korupciou-mame-systemovu-chybu-v-spolocnosti, [1 March 2015]. Novyc31
Nový čas (2015) ‘Obrovský záťah: Bývalý hokejový reprezentant má byť obvinený v korupčnej kauze’,
Nový čas, 3 February, Available at: http://www.cas.sk/clanok/306932/obrovsky-zatah-byvaly-hokejovy-
reprezentant-ma-byt-obvineny-v-korupcnej-kauze/, [1 March 2015]. Novyc32
Nový čas (2015) ‘Bývalý hokejista René Pucher: Táto škola mu poriadne zavarila’, Nový čas, 5 February,
Available at: http://www.cas.sk/clanok/307141/byvaly-hokejista-rene-pucher-tato-skola-mu-poriadne-
zavarila/, [1 March 2015]. Novyc33
Nový čas (2015) ‘Policajti si vypýtali úplatok: Prišli o uniformy a dostali trest!’, Nový čas, 8 February,
Available at:
http://www.cas.sk/clanok/307424/policajti-si-vypytali-uplatok-prisli-o-uniformy-a-dostali-trest/, [1
March 2015]. Novyc34
Nový čas (2015) ‘Krušné chvíle ministra hospodárstva: Pavlisa odvolávajú už 6 hodín’, Nový čas, 18
February, Available at: http://www.cas.sk/clanok/308433/krusne-chvile-ministra-hospodarstva-pavlisa-
uz-odvolavaju-takmer-sest-hodin/, [1 March 2015]. Novyc35
Plus Jeden De ň
Pem (2015) ‘Obvinení z korupcie: Zatkli starostu Hodejova a troch poslancov’, Plus Jeden Deň, 28
January, Available at: http://www.pluska.sk/krimi/domace-krimi/obvineni-z-korupcie-zatkli-starostu-
hodejova-troch-poslancov.html, [5 November 2016]. Plus1
Plus Jeden Deň (2014) ‘Korupcia na Slovensku prekvitá: Boj s ňou prehrávame na celej čiare’, Plus Jeden
Deň, 4 December, Available at: http://www.pluska.sk/spravy/z-domova/korupcia-slovensku-prekvita-
boj-nou-prehravame-plnej-ciare.html, [5 November 2016]. Plus2
270
Plus Jeden Deň (2014) ‘Škandál Jána Počiatka: Desiatky miliónov eur pre schránkovú firmu’, Plus Jeden
Deň, 25 November 2016, Available at: http://www.pluska.sk/spravy/z-domova/skandal-jana-pociatka-
desiatky-milionov-eur-schrankovu-firmu.html, [5 November 2016]. Plus3
TARS (2014) ‘Brocka nezaháľa, Trnavu čaká protikorupčný audit’, Plus Jeden Deň, 17 January, Available
at: http://www.pluska.sk/regiony/zapadne-slovensko/brocka-nezahala-trnavu-caka-protikorupcny-
audit.html, [5 November 2016]. Plus4
TASR and SITA (2015) ‘Korupčný škandál: V obvinení lieta aj známy bývalý hokejista’, Plus Jeden Deň, 3
February, Available at: http://www.pluska.sk/spravy/z-domova/korupcny-skandal-obvineni-lieta-aj-
znamy-byvaly-hokejista.html, [5 November 2016]. Plus5
SITA (2014) ‘Komunálne voľby: Polícia odhalila korupciu, stíha 7 ľudí’, Plus Jeden Deň, November 2014,
Available at: http://www.pluska.sk/spravy/z-domova/komunalne-volby-policia-odhalila-korupciu-stiha-
sedem-ludi.html?utm_source=Pluska-2014&utm_medium=citajteviac&utm_campaign=vb2014, [5
November 2016]. Plus6
Pravda
Kováč, P. (2014) ‘Hlásiť korupciu už nemá byť rizikom’, Pravda, 28 March, Available at:
http://spravy.pravda.sk/domace/clanok/312903-kalinak-o-ochrane-oznamovatela-korupcie-bude-
rozhodovat-sud-a-prokurator/, [2 March 2015]. Prav12
Krbatová, L. and Trebulová, J. (2014) ‘Až 90 percent Slovákov si myslí, že korupcia je bežný jav’, Pravda, 3
February, Available at: http://spravy.pravda.sk/svet/clanok/307324-prva-sprava-o-korupcii-v-eu-je-to-
rozsireny-a-zhorsujuci-sa-problem/, [2 March 2015]. Prav13
Pravda and SITA (2015) ‘Protikorupčný záťah: Obvinený vraj bude aj bývalý hokejista Pucher’, Pravda, 3
February, Available at: http://spravy.pravda.sk/domace/clanok/344453-protikorupcny-zatah-obvineny-
vraj-bude-aj-byvaly-hokejovy-reprezentant/, [2 March 2015]. Prav14
SITA (2014) ‘Exporadca Radičovej odmieta, že chcel úplatok za dotáciu Osrblia’, Pravda, 11 February,
Available at: http://spravy.pravda.sk/domace/clanok/308227-exporadca-radicovej-odmieta-ze-chcel-
uplatok-za-dotaciu-osrblia/, [2 March 2015]. Prav15
271
SITA (2014) ‘Prieskum: Vláde sa nedarí riešiť rómsku problematiku, ani korupciu’, Pravda, 11 February,
Available at: http://spravy.pravda.sk/domace/clanok/308167-prieskum-vlade-sa-nedari-riesit-romsku-
problematiku-ani-korupciu/, [2 March 2015]. Prav16
SITA (2014) ‘Súd: V Zlatých Moravciach dávali policajti vodičský bez skúšok’, Pravda, 24 February,
Available at: http://spravy.pravda.sk/domace/clanok/309660-sud-v-zlatych-moravciach-davali-policajti-
vodicsky-bez-skusok/, [2 March 2015]. Prav17
SITA (2014) ‘V kauze Gorila vyšetrujú ďalšie úplatky’, Pravda, 17 March, Available at:
http://spravy.pravda.sk/domace/clanok/311794-v-kauze-gorila-vysetruju-dalsie-uplatky/, [2 March
2015]. Prav18
SITA (2014) ‘Vajda si pýtal peniaze za volebné hlasy. Obvinili ho z korupcie.’, Pravda, 10 April, Available
at: http://spravy.pravda.sk/domace/clanok/314323-vajda-chcel-zarobit-na-volbach-do-
europarlamentu/, [2 March 2015]. Prav19
SITA (2014) ‘Fico: Výboh je môj osobný priateľ’, Pravda, 2 July, Available at:
http://spravy.pravda.sk/domace/clanok/322780-fico-vyboh-je-moj-osobny-priatel/, [2 March 2015].
Prav20
SITA and Pravda (2014) ‘Korupciu možno nahlásiť už aj na webe’, Pravda, 11 July, Available at:
http://spravy.pravda.sk/domace/clanok/323648-korupciu-mozno-nahlasit-uz-aj-na-webe/, [21 March
2015]. Prav21
SITA (2014) ‘Korupcia sa u nás trestá len výnimočne, tvrdí Transparency’, Pravda, 14 July, Available at:
http://spravy.pravda.sk/domace/clanok/326899-korupcia-sa-u-nas-tresta-len-vynimocne-tvrdi-
transparency/, [2 March 2015]. Prav22
SITA (2014) ‘Bratislava rieši dva podnety upozorňujúce na možnú korupciu’, Pravda, 3 October, Available
at: http://spravy.pravda.sk/regiony/clanok/331943-bratislava-riesi-dva-podnety-upozornujuce-na-
moznu-korupciu/, [2 March 2015]. Prav23
SITA (2014) ‘RegioJet zatiaľ nemá licenciu na autobusovú linku, viní z toho kraje’, Pravda, 12 November,
Available at: http://spravy.pravda.sk/ekonomika/clanok/336122-regiojet-chce-jazdit-autobusmi-z-
bratislavy-do-b-bystrice-zatal-nemoze/, [2 March 2015]. Prav24
272
SITA (2014) ‘Riaditeľke pozemkového fondu núkali úplatok za parcely v Rači’, Pravda, 13 November,
Available at: http://spravy.pravda.sk/domace/clanok/336219-riaditelke-pozemkoveho-fondu-nukali-
uplatok-za-parcely-v-raci/, [2 March 2015]. Prav25
SITA and Pravda (2014) ‘Za volebnú korupciu hrozí päťročné väzenie’, Pravda, 14 November, Available
at: http://spravy.pravda.sk/komunalne-volby-2014/clanok/336305-za-volebnu-korupciu-hrozi-patrocne-
vazenie/, [2 March 2015]. Prav26
SITA (2014) ‘Za hlas ponúkli mäso či tabak. Polícia stíha za volebnú korupciu sedem ľudí’, Pravda, 23
November, Available at: http://spravy.pravda.sk/komunalne-volby-2014/clanok/337213-za-hlas-ponukli-
maso-ci-tabak-policia-stiha-za-volebnu-korupciu-sedem-ludi/, [2 March 2015]. Prav27
SITA (2014) ‘Najmenej korupcie má Škandinávia, Slovensko sa zlepšilo’, Pravda, 3 December, Available
at: http://spravy.pravda.sk/svet/clanok/338365-najmenej-korupcie-je-v-skandinavii-slovensko-si-
mierne-polepsilo/, [2 March 2015]. Prav28
SITA (2014) ‘Salmanovci sú vinní z korupcie, rozhodol súd’, Pravda, 3 December, Available at:
http://spravy.pravda.sk/domace/clanok/338335-salmanovovci-su-vinni-z-korupcie-rozhodol-sud/, [2
March 2015]. Prav29
SITA (2014) ‘Slovensko sa zlepšilo v boji proti korupcii’, Pravda, 3 December, Available at:
http://spravy.pravda.sk/ekonomika/clanok/338340-slovensko-sa-zlepsilo-v-boji-proti-korupcii/, [2
March 2015]. Prav30
Stupnňan, I. (2014) ‘Za ohlásenie korupcie má byť odmena’, Pravda, 17 July, Available at:
http://spravy.pravda.sk/domace/clanok/324197-za-ohlasenie-korupcie-ma-byt-odmena/, [2 March
2015]. Prav31
SITA (2014) ‘Opozícia chce pre kauzu predraženého CT preveriť tendre firmy’, Pravda, 4 November,
Available at: http://spravy.pravda.sk/domace/clanok/335228-opozicia-chce-pre-kauzu-predrazeneho-ct-
preverit-tendre-firmy/, [1 March 2015]. Prav32
SITA (2014) ‘V kauze odvozu dreva podali opoziční poslanci trestné oznámenie’, Pravda, 23 December,
Available at: http://spravy.pravda.sk/domace/clanok/340445-v-kauze-odvozu-dreva-podali-opozicni-
poslanci-trestne-oznamenie/, [2 March 2015]. Prav33
273
SITA (2014) ‘Oznamovatelia korupcie majú byť od nového roka chránení’, Pravda, 27 December,
Available at: http://spravy.pravda.sk/domace/clanok/340728-oznamovatelia-korupcie-maju-byt-od-
noveho-roka-chraneni/, [2 March 2015]. Prav34
SITA (2014) ‘Fico nebude musieť vysvetlovať slová o peniazoch pre Chomu’, Pravda, 21 October,
Available at: http://spravy.pravda.sk/domace/clanok/333821-fico-nebude-musiet-vysvetlovat-slova-o-
peniazoch-pre-chomu/, [5 November 2016]. Prav35
SU and ABA (2014) ‘Za oznámenie korupcie sľubujú odmenu aj ochranu’, Pravda, 17 October, Available
at: http://spravy.pravda.sk/domace/clanok/333391-za-ohlasenie-korupcie-slubuju-odmenu-aj-ochranu/,
[2 March 2015]. Prav36
Žragvčáková, E. (2015) ‘RegioJet nasadí diaľkové autobusy napriek nesúhlasu’, Pravda, 7 January,
Available at: http://spravy.pravda.sk/ekonomika/clanok/341653-autobusy-regiojet-budu-jazdit-z-
bratislavy-do-b-bystrice/, [2 March 2015]. Prav37
SME
Burčík, M. (2014) ‘Ficov poradca Výboh pýtal peniaze v kauze Pandur, tvrdí svedok’, SME, 18 September,
Available at: http://domov.sme.sk/c/7389872/ficov-poradca-vyboh-pytal-peniaze-v-kauze-pandur-tvrdi-
svedok.html, [5 March 2015]. Sme13
Burčík, M. (2014) ‘Radičovej poradca sa bárni, úplatok pri dostavbe Osrblia odmieta’, SME, 11 February,
Available at: http://domov.sme.sk/c/7098954/radicovej-exporadca-sa-brani-uplatok-pri-dostavbe-
osrblia-odmieta.html, [4 March 2015]. Sme14
Burčík, M. (2014) ‘Radičovej človek je vinný z korupcie’, SME, 12 August, Available at:
http://domov.sme.sk/c/7329105/radicovej-clovek-je-vinny-z-korupcie.html, [4 March 2015]. SME15
Burčík, M. (2014) ‘Oznamovateľov korupcie plánujú chrániť a odmeniť’, SME, 27 March, Available at:
http://domov.sme.sk/c/7150510/oznamovatelov-korupcie-planuju-chranit-a-odmenit.html, [5 March
2015]. Sme16
Burčík, M. (2014) ‘Výpoveď: Ficov priateľ na rokovaní nechcel vidieť mobily’, SME, 18 September,
Available at: http://domov.sme.sk/c/7389947/vypoved-ficov-priatel-na-rokovani-nechcel-vidiet-
mobily.html, [5 March 2015]. Sme17
274
Burčík, M. and Pažítková, M. (2014) ‘Korupcia sa dotkla Fica, český lobista ho spomína v Výbohom‘, SME,
1 July, Available at: http://domov.sme.sk/c/7264123/korupcia-sa-dotkla-fica-cesky-lobista-ho-spominal-
s-vybohom.html, [4 March 2015]. Sme18
Folentová, V. (2014) ‘Brusel hodnotil korupciu, Slovensko nedopadlo dobre’, SME, 3 February, Available
at: http://ekonomika.sme.sk/c/7088979/brusel-hodnotil-korupciu-slovensko-nedopadlo-dobre.html, [ 3
March 2015]. Sme19
Hojčušová, M. (2015) ‘Bývalého nitrianskeho podžupana navrhli obžalovať z machinácie’, SME, 7
January, Available at: http://nasanitra.sme.sk/c/7577607/byvaleho-nitrianskeho-podzupana-navrhli-
obzalovat-z-machinacie.html, [4 March 2015]. Sme20
Kern, M. (2014) ‘Schránkový zákon sa dá obísť. Smer tvrdí, že ho sprísni o štvrť roka’, SME, 3 December.
Available at: http://ekonomika.sme.sk/c/7528018/schrankovy-zakon-sa-da-obist-smer-tvrdi-ze-ho-
sprisni-o-stvrt-roka.html, [4 March 2015]. Sme21
Krempaský, J. (2015) ‘RegioJet nedostal licenciu na autobus, tak spustil kampaň proti župám’, SME, 2
January, Available at: http://ekonomika.sme.sk/c/7571288/regiojet-nedostal-licenciu-na-autobus-tak-
spustil-kampan-proti-zupam.html, [5 March 2015]. Sme22
Kremský, P. (2015) ‘Nemajú tu čo hľadať, hovorí primátor Nitry Dvonč o autobusoch RegioJetu’, SME, 13
November, Available at: http://ekonomika.sme.sk/c/7492451/nemaju-tu-co-hladat-hovori-primator-
nitry-dvonc-o-autobusoch-regiojetu.html, [5 March 2015]. Sme23
Kremský, P. (2014) ‘Výber hasičov Počiatek preverí, Cargo zvažuje novú súťaž’, SME, 28 April, Available
at: http://ekonomika.sme.sk/c/7185462/vyber-hasicov-pociatek-preveri-cargo-zvazuje-novu-sutaz.html,
[5 March 2015]. Sme24
Mikušovič, D. (2014) ‘Kritici poslali Harabinovi na znak korupcie bonbonieru’, SME, 18 May. Available at:
http://domov.sme.sk/c/7206612/kritici-poslali-harabinovi-na-znak-korupcie-bonbonieru.html, [4 March
2015]. Sme25
275
Mojžišová, Ľ. (2014) ‘V Zvolene riešia podozrenie z korupcie’, SME, 15 November, Available at:
http://naszvolen.sme.sk/c/7496063/vo-zvolene-riesia-podozrenie-z-korupcie.html, [4 March 2015].
Sme26
SITA (2014) ‘Exriaditeľ daniarov dostal za úplatok od Salmanovcov sedem rokov’, SME, 15 December,
Available at: http://domov.sme.sk/c/7549033/exriaditel-daniarov-dostal-za-uplatok-od-salmanovcov-
sedem-rokov.html, [4 March 2015]. Sme27
SITA (2014) ‘Z volebnej korupcie obvinili päť ľudí zo Zvolena a Žarnovice’, SME, 16 November, Available
at: http://domov.sme.sk/c/7497958/z-volebnej-korupcie-obvinili-pat-ludi-zo-zvolena-a-zarnovice.html,
[4 March 2015]. Sme28
SITA and TASR (2014) ‘Odhalili dva prípady volebnej korupcie’, SME, 30 October, Available at:
http://domov.sme.sk/c/7467893/odhalili-dva-pripady-volebnej-korupcie.html, [5 March 2015]. Sme29
TASR (2014) ‘Korupcia je u nás takmer beztrestná, ukazuje analýza Transparency’, SME, 14 August,
Available at: http://domov.sme.sk/c/7332745/korupcia-je-u-nas-takmer-beztrestna-ukazuje-analyza-
transparency.html, [4 March 2015]. Sme30
SITA (2014) ‘V kauze odvozu dreva podali opoziční poslanci trestné oznámenie’, SME, 23 December,
Available at: http://ekonomika.sme.sk/c/7560705/v-kauze-odvozu-dreva-podali-opozicni-poslanci-
trestne-oznamenie.html, [5 March 2015]. Sme31
Šnídl, V. (2014) ‘Výboh hovoril na sÚde o vzťahu s Ficom aj nákupe Pandurov’, SME, 4 September,
Available at: http://domov.sme.sk/c/7367520/vyboh-hovoril-na-sude-o-vztahu-s-ficom-aj-nakupe-
pandurov.html, [5 March 2015]. Sme32
Onuferová, M. (2014) ‘V rebríčku vnímania korupcie je Slovensko šieste najhoršie v EÚ’, SME, 3
December, Available at: http://ekonomika.sme.sk/c/7527167/v-rebricku-vnimania-korupcie-je-
slovensko-sieste-najhorsie-v-eu.html, [4 March 2015]. Sme33
Vražda, D. (2014) ‘Oznamovatelia korupcie o prácu prichádzajú bežne’, SME, 19 October, Available at:
http://domov.sme.sk/c/7447373/oznamovatelia-korupcie-o-pracu-prichadzaju-bezne.html, [5 March
2015]. Sme34
276
APPENDIX B Popularity and positioning of analysed newspaper articles published in mid 2010s in Hospodárske noviny
Title Published Code Views Shares Likes Comments Links Hlina sa zameria na Širokého hotel. Pri ňom sídli aj firma z kauzy CT
19/1/2015 Hospn1 37 0 N/A 0 Politics, grand and political corruption
Slovensko sa musí prebudiť. Bez reforiem nás prevalcuje Ázia.
6/11/2014 Hospn2 4,872 1 225 0 A ladder of richest men in Slovakia, grand and political corruption
Slováci: Náš štát je skorumpovaný
1/2/2014 Hospn3 3,808 1 0 1 Corruption indicators
Opozícia ticho toleruje Ficovi priateľa Výboha
8/7/2014 Hospn4 2,206 2 0 Political and grand corruption
Štát prikáže firmám, ako riešiť úplatky. Tie vidia byrokraciu.
23/12/2014 Hospn5 2,632 9 0 9 Bribery of public officials, grand and political corruption, skill set of Slovak managers
Antikampaň pokračuje. Fico vytiahol na Kisku pokuty. Ten hovorí o uplácaní.
20/3/2014 Hospn6 11,042 1 188 0 Presidential campaign, politics
277
Title Published Code Views Shares Likes Comments Links Ficov priateľ Výboh si pýtal 18 miliónov, tvrdí bývalý manažér Steyeru
10/11/2014 Hospn7 7,948 1 166 Political and grand corruption
Rozkrádanie musí skončiť. Hlina bude protestovať na Silvestra pred hotelom J&T
12/12/2014 Hospn8 8,463 1 627 0 Opposition criticizing the government, anti-corruption public protests
Tajné stretnutia Fica s Topolánkom. Fica Spomínajú v českej korupčnej kauze
2/7/2014 Hospn9 3,868 2 280 0 Grand and political corruption
Zakladateľ Esetu: Korupcia je ako rakovina, idem proti nej bojovať
11/7/2014 Hospn10 9,393 10 1,700 0 Eset, Trnka
Voľby ohrozila korupcia. Polícia obvinila päť ľudí.
16/11/2014 Hospn11 610 0 0 0 Communal election
Fico: Ak by sme sa riadili Matovičom či Prochádzkom, tak Slovensko zdochne.
21/1/2015 Hospn12 11,395 163 0 Bickering between politicians
278
Title Published Code Views Shares Likes Comments Links Polícia obvinila 13 ľudí z korupcie. Má byť medzi nimi aj bývalý hokejový reprezentant
3/2/2015 Hospn13 1,660 0 0 0 Grand and political corruption
Dane, odvody a korupcia. Biznismeni popisovali svoje problémy Kiskovi
16/12/2014 Hospn14 1,512 0 0 3 Problems encountered by the SME sector
Škandály počas volieb: Hackerský útok aj korupcia.
16/11/2014 Hospn15 1,121 1 0 0 Communal elections
Tunely v zdravotníctve tu boli už za prvej Ficovej vlády, vyhlásil Sulík.
28/11/2014 Hospn16 2,245 0 73 10 Opposition criticism of the government, political and grand corruption.
V korupcii sme predbehli aj Botswanu a sme najhorší v regióne
3/12/2014 Hospn17 12,160 5 1,400 0 Broad corruption
Chyby vlády a korupcia. Slovensko podľa Beblavého prišlo o 165 miliónov z Bruselu
3/9/2014 Hospn18 590 0 17 0 Grand and political corruption, government
279
Title Published Code Views Shares Likes Comments Links Radičovej exporadca dostal podmienku. Za kauzu Osrblie.
12/8/2014 Hospn19 491 0 0 0 Political and grand corruption
Uplácanie na Slovensku ostáva takmer bez trestu
14/08/2014 Hospn20 343 0 0 0 Corruption indicators, grand and political corruption
Opozícia bude odvolávať Fica. Termín mu určili na sobotu večer
7/11/2014 Hospn21 10,449 4 105 18 Politics, grand and political corruption
280
APPENDIX C Popularity and positioning of analysed newspaper articles published in mid 2010s in Nový čas
Title Published Code Views Shares Likes Comments Links Nelichotivá správa o úplatkárstve v EÚ: V rebríčku korupcie dopadlo Slovensko katastrofálne
4/2/2014 Novyc1 N/A 380 N/A 53 Corruption indicators, problems of Slovakia
Bývalý reprezentant je v poriadnej kaši! Čo hovorí Pucher na obvinenie z korupcie
4/2/2015 Novyc2 N/A 1 N/A 2 Grand and political corruption
Hasiča obvinili z korupcie, hrozí mu väzenie až 12 rokov!
3/4/2014 Novyc3 N/A 9 N/A 7 Petty corruption
Úradníka z katastrálneho odboru obvinili z prijímania úplatkov!
25/4/2014 Novyc4 N/A 6 N/A 0 Petty crime
Dvaja bývalí colníci a podnikateľ priznali korupciu, dostali tresty!
7/5/2014 Novyc5 N/A 6 N/A 1 Petty crime, shocking deaths
Daniarka potopila Sergeja a Alexandra na súde: Salmanovci ma podplácali
22/5/2014 Novyc6 N/A 2 N/A 8 More on the case
Hasičského inšpektora obvineného z korupcie vzali do vyšetrovacej väzby
12/6/2014 Novyc7 N/A 4 N/A 1 Petty corruption, other petty crime
281
Title Published Code Views Shares Likes Comments Links Premiér Fico vyšiel s pravdou von: Priznal tajné schôdzky s Výbohom a Topolánkom
2/07/2014 Novyc8 N/A 9 N/A 21 The case, grand and political corruption
Kauza nákupu obrnených vozidiel: Český lobista zaplieta do korupcie Fica
2/7/2014 Novyc9 N/A 112 N/A 10 Grand and political corruption, politics
Súd potrestal bývalú colníčku za branie úplatkov, pozrite sa ako!
14/7/2014 Novyc10 N/A 8 N/A 11 Petty corruption, public sector
Špecializovaný trestný súd v Pezinku: Prokurátora obžalovaného z korupcie oslobodili
31/7/2014 Novyc11 N/A 48 N/A 6 Corruption in the public sector
Bratislavčan sa chcel zbaviť pút, ponákal úplatok policajtovi: Za neuvážený čin bol potrestaný!
8/8/2014 Novyc12 N/A 1 N/A 4 Petty crime
Odsúdený za nepriamu korupciu v kauze Osrblie: Exporadva Radičovej dostal rok podmienky!
13/08/2014 Novyc13 N/A 1 N/A 11 The case, politics
Veľký prieskum korupcie na Slovensku: Takto sa podplácajú policajti a lekári
4/9/2014 Novyc14 N/A 137 N/A 22 Petty corruption
Kauza nákupu obrnených vozidiel: Český lobista zaplieta do korupcie Fica
2/7/2014 Novyc9 N/A 112 N/A 10 Grand and political corruption, politics
282
Title Published Code Views Shares Likes Comments LinksSúd potrestal bývalú colníčku za branie úplatkov, pozrite sa ako!
14/7/2014 Novyc10 N/A 8 N/A 11 Petty corruption, public sector
Špecializovaný trestný súd v Pezinku: Prokurátora obžalovaného z korupcie oslobodili
31/7/2014 Novyc11 N/A 48 N/A 6 Corruption in the public sector
Bratislavčan sa chcel zbaviť pút, ponákal úplatok policajtovi: Za neuvážený čin bol potrestaný!
8/8/2014 Novyc12 N/A 1 N/A 4 Petty crime
Odsúdený za nepriamu korupciu v kauze Osrblie: Exporadva Radičovej dostal rok podmienky!
13/08/2014 Novyc13 N/A 1 N/A 11 The case, politics
Veľký prieskum korupcie na Slovensku: Takto sa podplácajú policajti a lekári
4/9/2014 Novyc14 N/A 137 N/A 22 Petty corruption
283
Title Published Code Views Shares Likes Comments Links Ministerstvo obhajuje nákup lietadiel: Tender na Spartany je nespochybniteľný
24/10/2014 Novyc15 N/A 0 N/A 13 Politics, public procurement, grand and political corruption, more on the case
Šéf talianskeho dodávateľa má ísť do basy: Spartany kúpime od firmy z korupčnej aféry
23/10/2014 Novyc16 N/A 4 N/A 16 Grand and political corruption, more on the case, politics
Poslanec Mičovský otvoril škandál v štátnych lesoch: Odvoz dreva predražili o 14 milónov eur?!
30/10/2014 Novyc17 N/A 21 N/A 9 The case, politics, grand and political corruption
Fico o návrhu na jeho odvolane: Divadielko strán na prahu zvoliteľnosti
8/11/2014 Novyc18 N/A 66 N/A 81 Grand and political corruption, politics, more on the story
Nekonečné odvolávanie premiéra pokračuje: Fico sa v pléne objavuje len sporadicky
10/11/2014 Novyc19 N/A 2 N/A 49 Politics, grand and political corruption, more on the story
Obvinili šiestich mužov z korupcie na STK a pozemkovom úrade
13/11/2014 Novyc20 N/A 0 N/A 14 Anti-corruption, petty corruption, public sector
284
Title Published Code Views Shares Likes Comments Links Expolicajta súdia za korupciu pri vybavovaní skúšky na vysokej škole
21/11/2014 Novyc21 N/A 2 N/A 3 Petty corruption
Tisícky ľudí vyšli na protest proti Ficovej vláde: Prestaňte kradnúť
26/11/2014 Novyc22 N/A 126 N/A 34 Political and grand corruption, politics
Rozhorčení ľudia na ďalšom proteste proti korupcii: Dosť bolo Smeru!Fico do basy!
28/11/2014 Novyc23 N/A 20 N/A 127 Politics, political and grand corruption,
Fico svojsky bojuje proti korupcii: Schránkové firmy chce umlčať deravým zákonom
1/12/2014 Novyc24 N/A 2 N/A 47 Politics, corruption indicators
Ďalší megaškandál Ficovej vlády: Takto šafária s naším drevom
2/12/2014 Novyc25 N/A 2,300 N/A 207 Politics, grand and political corruption
Je rozhodnuté! Salmanovci už poznajú svoje tresty
3/12/2014 Novyc26 N/A 2 N/A 19 The case, public sector
Štátne lesy podali na Mičovského trestné oznámenie: Odkryl šafárenie s drevom, na krku má žalobu
11/12/2014 Novyc27 N/A 6 N/A 29 The case, grand and political corruption, politics
285
Title Published Code Views Shares Likes Commens Links Uznaný vinným: Daňovák Salmanovcov dostal 7 rokov natvrdo
16/12/2014 Novyc28 N/A 0 N/A 9 The case
Korupčná kauza Hodejova: Starosta a traja poslanci sa vzdali mandátov, sú na slobode!
30/1/2015 Novyc29 N/A 6 N/A 4 The case, anti-corruption, politics
Chobotnica korupcie: Peniaze daňových poplatníkov nemiznú iba pri ‘veľkých’ kauzách
8/1/2015 Novyc30 N/A 4 N/A 36 Corruption indicators, grand and political corruption
Podnikateľ Miroslav Trnka chce zatočiť s korupciou: Máme systémovú chybu spoločnosti
9/1/2015 Novyc31 N/A 3 N/A 24 Grand and political corruption
Obrovský záťah: Bývalý hokejový reprezentant má byť obvinený v korupčnej kauze!
3/2/2015 Novyc32 N/A 147 N/A 10 Public sector, politics, the case
Bývalý hokejista René Pucher: Táto škola mu poriadne zavarila
5/02/2015 Novyc33 N/A 3 N/A 6 Public sector, politics, the case
Policajti si vypýtali úplatok: Prišli o uniformy a dostali trest!
8/2/2015 Novyc34 N/A 723 N/A 25 Petty corruption
Krušné chvíle ministra hospodárstva: Pavlisa odvolávajú už 6 hodín
18/2/2015 Novyc35 N/A 1 N/A 15 Political and grand corruption, politics
286
APPENDIX D Popularity and positioning of analysed newspaper articles published in mid 2010s in Plus Jeden Deň
Title Published Code Shares Views Likes Comments LinksKorupčný škandál: V obvinení lieta aj známy bývalý hokejista
3/2/2015 Plus1 N/A N/A 11 1 FIFA corruption, CZE ice hockey corruption, grand and political corruption, public officials scandals
Korupcia na Slovensku prekvitá: Boj s ňou prehrávame na celej čiare
4/12/2014 Plus2 N/A N/A 3 2 Ditto
Brocka nezaháľa, Trnavu čaká protikorupčný audit
17/1/2015 Plus3 N/A N/A 244 1 Ditto
Komunálne voľby: Polícia odhalila korupciu, stíha 7 ľudí
23/11/2014 Plus4 N/A N/A 0 0 Communal election
Škandál Jána Počiatka: Desiatky miliónov eur pre schránkovú firmu
25/11/2014 Plus5 N/A N/A 1,700 25 Political scandals, grand and political corruption
Obvinení z korupcie: Zatkli starostu Hodejova a troch poslancov
28/1/2015 Plus6 N/A N/A 9 3 FIFA corruption, CZE ice-hockey corruption, Political and grand corruption, public officials scandals
287
APPENDIX E Popularity and positioning of analysed newspaper articles published in mid 2010s in Pravda
Title Published Code Views Shares Likes Comments Links
Hlásiť korupciu už nemá byť rizikom
28/3/2014 Prav12 N/A 0 0 9 Anti-corruption
Až 90 percent Slovákov si myslí, že korupcia je bežný jav
3/2/2014 Prav13 N/A 0 22 30 Corruption indicators, grand and political corruption
Protikorupčný záťah: Obvinený vraj bude aj bývalý hokejista Pucher
3/2/2015 Prav14 N/A 0 6 6 More on the case, politics
Exporadca Radičovej odmieta, že chcel úplatok za dotáciu Osrblia
11/2/2014 Prav15 N/A 0 1 8 More on the case, politics, grand and political corruption
Prieskum: Vláde sa nedarí riešiť rómsku problematiku, ani korupciu
11/2/2014 Prav16 n/a 0 10 19 Problems of the public sector, corruption indicators
Súd: V Zlatých Moravciach dávali policajti vodičský bez skúšok
24/2/2014 Prav17 N/A 0 1 2 Petty corruption
288
Title Published Code Views Shares Likes Comments Links
V kauze Gorila vyšetrujú ďalšie úplatky
17/3/2014 Prav18 N/A 0 12 19 The case, grand and political c.
Vajda si pýtal peniaze za volebné hlasy. Obvinili ho z korupcie.
10/4/2014 Prav19 N/A 0 3 26 Elections
Fico: Výboh je môj osobný priateľ
2/7/2014 Prav20 N/A 0 4 86 Political and grand corruption
Korupciu možno nahlásiť už aj na webe
11/7/2014 Prav21 N/A 2 9 6 Corruption public procurement, broad corruption
Korupcia sa u nás trestá len výnimočne, tvrdí Transparency
14/8/2014 Prav22 N/A 0 5 9 Anti-corruption, grand and political corruption
Bratislava rieši dva podnety upozorňujúce na možnú korupciu
3/10/2014 Prav23 N/A 0 0 3 N/A
RegioJet zatiaľ nemá licenciu na autobusovú linku, viní z toho kraje
12/11/2014 Prav24 N/A 0 1 5 More on the story, grand and political corruption
289
Title Published Code Views Shares Likes Comments Links
Riaditeľke pozemkového fondu núkali úplatok za parcely v Rači
13/11/2014 Prav25 N/A 0 0 2 Petty corruption
Za volebnú korupciu hrozí päťročné väzenie
14/11/2014 Ptav26 N/A 0 0 2 Elections
Za hlas ponúkli mäso či tabak. Polícia stíha za volebnú korupciu sedem ľudí
23/11/2014 Prav27 N/A 0 4 7 Elections
Najmenej korupcie má Škandinávia, Slovensko sa zlepšilo
3/12/2014 Prav28 N/A 0 12 3 Corruption indicators, grand and political corruption
Salmanovci sú vinní z korupcie, rozhodol súd
3/12/2014 Prav29 N/A 0 0 4 More on the case
Slovensko sa zlepšilo v boji proti korupcii
3/12/2014 Prav30 N/A 0 2 20 Corruption indicators
Za ohlásenie korupcie má byť odmena
17/7/2014 Prav31 N/A 1 198 9 Anti-corruption, corruption indicators
290
Title Published Code Views Shares Likes Comments
Links
Opozícia chce pre kauzu predraženého CT preveriť tendre firmy
4/11/2014 Prav32 N/A 1 0 26 More on the case, politics, grand and political corruption
V kauze odvozu dreva podali opoziční poslanci trestné oznámenie
23/12/2014 Prav33 N/A 0 1 17 More on the case, politics, grand and political corruption
Oznamovatelia korupcie majú byť od nového roka chránení
27/12/2014 Prav34 N/A 0 4 8 Anti-corruption
Fico nebude musieť vysvetlovať slová o peniazoch pre Chomu’
21/10/2014 Prav35 N/A 0 58 42 Grand and political corruption, politics
Za oznámenie korupcie sľubujú odmenu aj ochranu
17/10/2014 Prav36 N/A 2 31 15 Anti-corruption
RegioJet nasadí diaľkové autobusy napriek nesúhlasu
7/1/2015 Prav37 N/A 0 6 39 Public sector vs. private sector, grand and political corruption
291
APPENDIX F Popularity and positioning of analysed newspaper articles published in mid 2010s in Sme
Title Published Code Views Shares Likes Comments LinksFicov poradca Výboh pýtal peniaze v kauze Pandur, tvrdí svedok
18/9/2014 Sme13 N/A N/A 57 50 More on the case, politics, grand and political corruption
Radičovej poradca sa bráni, úplatok pri dostavbe Osrblia odmieta
11/2/2014 Sme14 N/A N/A 1 24 More on the case, politics, grand and political corruption
Radičovej človek je vinný z korupcie
12/8/2014 Sme15 N/A N/A 9 0 More on the case, politics, grand and political corruption
Oznamovateľov korupcie plánujú chrániť a odmeniť
27/3/2014 Sme16 N/A N/A 31 0 N/A
Výpoveď: Ficov priateľ na rokovaní nechcel vidieť mobily
18/9/2014 Sme17 N/A N/A 9 25 More on the case, politics, grand and political corruption
Korupcia sa dotkla Fica, český lobista ho spomína v Výbohom
1/7/2014 SME18 N/A N/A 869 136 More on the case, politics, grand and political corruption
Brusel hodnotil korupciu, Slovensko nedopadlo dobre
3/2/2014 Sme19 N/A N/A 649 129 Corruption indicators, grand and political corruption, negative impact on Slovakia
292
293
Title Published Code Views Shares Likes Comments
Links
Bývalého nitrianskeho podžupana navrhli obžalovať z machinácie
7/1/2015 Sme20 N/A N/A 17 10 Grand and political corruption
Schránkový zákon sa dá obísť. Smer tvrdí, že ho sprísni o štvrť roka
3/12/2014 Sme21 n/a n/a 0 38 Institutional deficit, grand and political corruption
RegioJet nedostal licenciu na autobus, tak spustil kampaň proti župám
2/1/2015 Sme22 n/a n/a 0 198 More on the story, ineffective state, grand and political corruption
Nemajú tu čo hľadať, hovorí primátor Nitry Dvonč o autobusoch RegioJetu
13/1/2015 Sme23 n/a n/a 0 69 More on the story, ineffective state, grand and political corruption
Výber hasičov Počiatek preverí, Cargo zvažuje novú súťaž
28/4/2014 Sme24 n/a n/a 0 1 Public procurement grand and political corruption, politics
Kritici poslali Harabinovi na znak korupcie bonbonieru
18/5/2014 Sme25 N/A N/A 320 0 Grand and political corruption
V Zvolene riešia podozrenie z korupcie’
15/11/2014 Sme26 N/A N/A 0 0 Elections
Exriaditeľ daniarov dostal za úplatok od Salmanovcov sedem rokov
15/12/2014 Sme27 N/A N/A 0 0 N/A
Title Published Code Views Shares Likes Comments
Links
Z volebnej korupcie obvinili päť ľudí zo Zvolena a Žarnovice
16/11/2014 Sme28 N/A N/A 1 0 N/A
Odhalili dva prípady
30/10/2014 Sme29 N/A N/A 5 0 Elections
APPENDIX G Interview schedule for semi-structured interviews
First tell me about your self. What is your experience with running this and any other small
businesses?
How would you characterize the business environment in your sector? What is it like running a
business in tourism/agriculture in Slovakia – what do you consider are the main challenges?
What are the particular challenges of running a small business in your sector in Slovakia?
How does the state treat small and medium enterprises?
How would you describe Slovak public administration system and its functioning? What are its
strengths and weaknesses.
What is your experience when it comes to dealing with public administration? What behavior do
you usually encounter when you come in contact with a public administrator with respect to
your business? How did you learn to deal effectively with public administrators?
What is your opinion of the current rules and norms (legislation) that apply to your business? Is
it easy or difficult to comply? How do they impact on the small firms in your sector? Do they
pose any particular challenges for your business? Which, if any, specific regulations or rules pose
major problems for you.? Is it always clear to you what needs to be done?
How do you know/gain the knowledge about what needs to be done in terms of dealing with
legislation and rules?
How would you describe the role of the central/local public administration with respect to your
complying efforts with norms?
What do you most struggle with in your contact with central/local public administration offices?
Do you have any means of making life easier for yourself with respect to public administration?
(If answers to previous questions point in the direction of unfavourable experience dealing with
public administration). How do you overcome obstructions? What kind of efforts do public
administrators make to help you overcome obstacles? Do they make you aware of how to
overcome obstacles?
Do you think corruption is a problem in Slovakia?
294
APPENDIX H Overview of the SME sampleTOURISM
Code Location * Gender Role Urban/
Rural
Description No. of Employees Founded Length of interview
At Banska Bystrica, Central Slovakia
F Owner Urban Hotel 4 + seasonal workers 2012 50 minutes
Bt Trnava, Western Slovakia
M Owner Urban Guest house 1 + seasonal workers 1996 45 minutes
Ct Piestany,Western Slovakia
M Owner Urban Restaurants (2) 8 2005 50 minutes
Dt Trencin, Western Slovakia
M Owner Rural Guest house (primary) + pastoral farm (beef and pork)
3+ seasonal workers 2007 60 minutes
Et Zilina,Western Slovakia
M Owner Urban Café & Bar Self-employed 2013 70 minutes
Ft Banska Stiavnica, Cental Slovakia
M Owner Rural Coach transport 2 2001 50 minutes
Gt Nitra, Western Slovakia
F Owner Urban Guest house 1 + seasonal workers 2007 45 minutes
Ht Trencin, Western Slovakia
M Owner Urban Taxi service Self-employed 2010 60 minutes
295
Code Location Gender Role Urban/Rural
Desription No. of employees Founded Length of interview
It Nitra, Western Slovakia
F Owner Urban Restaurant 3 + seasonal workers 2009 40 minutes
Jt Bratislava, Western Slovakia
M Owner Urban (capital)
Hotel 3 + seasonal workers 1998 55 minutes
Kt Zilina, Western Slovakia
M Owner Rural Guesthouse & Camping 1 + seasonal workers 2008 60 minutes
Lm Zvolen, Central Slovakia
F Owner Urban Fast Food Self-employed 2011 45 minutes
Mn Liptovsky Mikulas, Central Slovakia
M Owner Urban Guesthouse 2 + seasonal workers 1999 55 minutes
Nt Bratislava, Western Slovakia
F Owner Urban (capital)
Hostel 1 2008 60 minutes
Op Galanta, Western Slovakia
M Owner Urban Hotel 2 + seasonal workers 2013 55 minutes
296
AGRICULTURE
Code Location * Gender Role Urban/
Rural
Description No. of employees Founded Length of interview
Aa Ruzomberok, Central Slovakia
M Owner Rural Pastoral farm – beef (primary) & guest house
13 2000 45 minutes
Ba Myjava, Western Slovakia
M Owner Rural Vineyard 2 + seasonal workers 2005 60 minutes
Ca Lozorno, Western Slovakia
M Owner Rural Arable farm (grains) 1 + seasonal workers 2010 55 minutes
Da Dunajska Streda, Western Slovakia
M Owner Rural Arable farm (fruit) 3 + seasonal workers 2004 45 minutes
Ea Zilina, Western Slovakia
M Owner Rural Pastoral farm (beef) 5 1997 50 minutes
Fa Banska Bystrica, Central Slovakia
M Owner Rural Arable (fruit and vegetables) & bee farm
1 + seasonal workers 2011 65 minutes
Gs Lucenec,Central Slovakia
M Owner Rural Dairy farm 1 + seasonal workers 2000 50 minutes
Ha Nitra,Western Slovakia
F Owner Rural Arable farm (vegetables) 1 + seasonal workers 2009 60 minutes
297
Code Location Gender Role Rural/Urban
Description No. of employees Funded Length of interview
Ia Modra, Western Slovakia
M Owner Rural Vineyard 3 + seasonal workers 2006 55 minutes
Ja Vrable, Western Slovakia
M Owner Rural Arable farm (grains) 2 +seasonal workers 1996 70 minutes
Ka Puchov, Western Slovakia
M Owner Rural Pastoral farm (pig) 3 1993 60 minutes
La Zvolen, Central Slovakia
M Owner Rural Pastoral farm (dairy) 2 2000 50 minutes
Ma Trnava, Western Slovakia
M Owner Rural Arable farm (grains & poppy seeds)
Self-employed + seasonal workers
2011 60 minutes
Na Topolcany, Western Slovakia
M Owner Rural Arable farm (vegetables) 2 + seasonal workers 2006 55 minutes
Oa Trnava, Western Slovakia
M Owner Rural Arable farm (grains & vegetables)
2 2002 60 minutes
*To ensure anonymity, the exact locations of interviewed enterprises are not disclosed. Interviews are spatially placed within a district
298
APPENDIX I Ethical Approval
299
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J.A. (2000) ‘Political losers as a barrier to economic development’, The
American Economic Review, vol. 90, no. 2, pp. 126-130.
Achim, M.V. (2016) ‘Cultural dimension of corruption: A cross-country survey’, International Atlantic
Economic Society, vol. 22, no. 3, pp. 333-435.
Adamkovičová, B. (2005) ‘Trendy slovenského poľnohospodárstva po vstupe do Európskej únie’,
Medzinárodné vzťahy, vol. 3, no.1, pp. 75-82.
Ades, A. and Di Tella, R. (1999) ‘Rents, competition, and corruption’, The American Economic Review,
vol. 89, no. 4, pp. 982-993.
Adeyeye, A. (2011) ‘Universal standards in CSR: Are we prepared?’, Corporate Governance, vol. 11, no. 1,
pp. 107-119.
Aguinins, H. and Glavas, A. (2012) ‘What we know and don’t know about corporate social responsibility:
a review and research agenda’, Journal of Management, vol. 38, no. 4, pp. 932-968.
Aidt TS (2003) ‘Economic analysis of corruption: A survey’, Economic Journal, vol. 113, no. 491, F632-
F652.
Allcock, J.B. (1986) ‘Yugoslavia’s tourist trade: Pot of gold or pig in a poke?’, Annals of Tourism Research,
vol. 13, no. 4, pp. 565-588.
Almond, G. (1991) ‘Capitalism and democracy’, PS: Political Science and Politics, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 467-
474.
Andersen, N.A. (2003) Discourse analytical strategies: Understanding Foucault, Kosselleck, Laclau,
Luhmann, Bristol: The Policy Press.
Anderson, A.R. and Warren, L. (2011) ‘The entrepreneur as hero and jester: Enacting the entrepreneurial
discourse’, International Small Business Journal, vol. 29, no. 6, pp. 589-609.
Angen, M.J. (2000) ‘Evaluating interpretative inquiry: Reviewing the validity debate and opening the
dialogue’, Qualitative Health Research, vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 378-395.
300
Anokhin, S. and Schulze, W.S. (2009) ‘Entrepreneurship, innovation, and corruption’, Journal of Business
Venturing, vol. 24, no. 5, pp. 465-476.
Appel, H. and Gould, J. (2000) ‘Identity politics and economic reform: Examining industry. State relations
in the Czech and Slovak Republics’, Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 52, no. 1, pp. 111-131.
Argandoña, A. (2003) ‘Private to private corruption’, Journal of Business Ethics, vol. 47, no. 1, pp. 253-
267.
Åslund, A. (2013) How capitalism was built: The transformation of Central and Eastern Europe, Russia,
the Caucasus, and Central Asia, 2nd edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Atterton, J. (2016) ‘Invigorating the new rural economy’, in Schucksmith, M. and Brown, D.L. (eds)
Routledge International Handbook of Rural Studies, pp. 165-180.
Audretsch, D.B. and Thurik, A.R. (2000) ‘Capitalism and democracy in the 21st century: From the
managed to the entrepreneurial economy’, Evolutionary Economics, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 17-34.
Auerbach, C. and Silverstein, L.B. (2003) Qualitative data: An introduction to coding and analysis, New
York: New York University Press.
Babbie, E.R. (2013) The basics of social research, Boston: Cengage Learning.
Baer, J. (2001) ‘Boxing and politics in Slovakia: ‘Meciarism’ roots, theory, practice’, Democratization, vol.
8, no. 2, pp. 97-116.
Bågenholm, A. and Charron, N. (2014) ‘Do politics in Europe benefit from politicising corruption’, West
European Politics, vol. 37, no. 4-5, pp. 903-931.
Bakke, E. (1999) Doomed to failure?: The Czechoslovak nation project and the Slovak autonomist
reaction 1918-1938, doctoral thesis, University of Oslo, Available at:
http://folk.uio.no/stveb1/Doomed_to_failure_links.html, [Accessed 28 December 2016].
Baláž, V. (2007a) ‘Regional polarization under transition: The case of Slovakia’, European Planning
Studies, vol. 15, no. 5, pp. 587-602.
301
Baláž, V. (2007b) ‘The economic performance of the Slovak tourism businesses’, in Thomas, R. and
Augustyn, M. (eds) Tourism in the new Europe: Perspectives on SME policies and practices, Oxford:
Elsevier, pp. 29- 46.
Baldwin, D.A. (1995) ‘Security studies and the end of the Cold War’, World Politics, vol. 48, no. 1, pp.
117-141.
Banerjee, S.B. (2008) ‘Corporate social responsibility: The good, the bad and the ugly’, Critical Sociology,
vol. 34, no. 1, pp. 51-79.
Bartlová, A. (2010) Túžby, projeky a realita: Slovensko v medzivojnovom období [Desires, projects and the
reality: Slovakia in the interwar era], Bratislava: Historický Ústav SAV.
Bassnett- McGuire, S. (1980) Translation studies, London: Methuen.
Bassnett, S. and Lefevere, A. eds, (1990) Translation, history and culture, London: Frances Pinter.
Bateman, M. (2000) ‘Neo-liberalism, SME development and the role of business support centres in the
transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe’, Small Business Economics, vol. 14, no. 4, pp. 275-
298.
Batory, A. (2012) ‘Why do anti-corruption laws fail in Central Eastern Europe? A target compliance
perspective’, Regulation & Governance, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 66-82.
Bauhr M and Nasiritousi N (2012) ‘Resisting transparency: Corruption, legitimacy, and the quality of
global environmental policies’, Global Environmental Politics, vol. 12, no. 4, pp. 9-29.
Bebbington, J., Larrinaga, C. and Moneva, M.J. (2008) ‘Corporate social reporting and reputation risk
management’, Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 337-361.
Beblavý, M. (2009) ‘The role of structural reforms in active labour market policy in anti-corruption in
Slovakia’, Staroňonvá, K. and Sičáková-Beblavá, E. (eds) Corruption and anti-corruption measures in
Central and Eastern Europe, Bratislava: NISPAcee, pp. 207-224.
Bechara, A., Damasio, H. and Damasio, A.R. (2000) ‘Emotion, decision making and the orbitofrontal
cortex’, Cerebral Cortex, vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 295-307.
302
Bedirhanoğlu, P. (2007) ‘The neoliberal discourse on corruption as a means of consent-building:
reflections from post-crisis Turkey’, Third World Quarterly, vol. 28, no. 7, pp. 1239-1254.
Benáček, V. (1997) ‘Private entrepreneurship and small business in the transformation of the Czech
Republic’, in Grabher, G. and Stark, D. (eds) Restructuring networks in post-socialism: Legacies, linkages,
and localities, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.209-241.
Beneš, V. (1973) ‘Czechoslovak democracy and its problems 1918-1920’, in Mamatey, V.S. and Luža, R.
(eds) A history of the Czechoslovak Republic 1918-1948, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 39-98.
Benfoddová, M., Bussard, A. and Markuš, M. (2000) The problem of corruption in small and medium
enterprises in Slovakia, Available: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACK413.pdf, [15 June 2012].
Bereghazyova, G. (2012) Perceived informal barriers among small and medium enterprises to tourism
development in Slovakia, unpublished MSc dissertation, University of Exeter.
Berend, I.T. and Ránki, G. (1967) ‘Economic factors in nationalism: The example of Hungary at the
beginning of the twentieth century’, Austrian History Year Book, vol. 3, pp. 163-188.
Berger, A.N. and Frame, W.S. (2007) ‘Small business credit scoring and credit availability’, Journal of
Small Business Management, vol. 45, no. 1, pp. 5-22.
Berger, P. (1986) The capitalist revolution, New York: Basic Books.
Berglund, K. and Johansson, W. (2007) ‘Constructions of entrepreneurship: a discourse analysis of
academic publications’, Enterprise and Innovation, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 77-102.
Bergmann, H. (2005) ‘Entrepreneurial attitudes’, Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsgeographie, vol. 49, pp. 185-
199.
Bernard, H.R. (2011) Research methods in anthropology: Qualitative and Quantitative approaches, 5th
edition, New York: Rowman Altamira.
Best, J. (2007) ‘Why economy is often exception to politics as usual’, Theory, Culture & Society, vol. 24,
no. 4, pp. 83-105.
303
Bezemer, D.J. (2002) ‘Credit markets for agriculture in the Czech Republic’, Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 54,
no. 8, pp. 1301-1317.
Biersteker, T. J. (1980) ‘The illusion of state power: transnational corporations and the neutralization of
host-country legislation’, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 17, no.3, pp. 207-221.
Black, W. (2007) ‘Corruption kills’, in Pontell, H.N. and Geis, G. (eds) International handbook of white-
collar and corporate crime, pp. 439-455, New York: Springer.
Bohatá, M. and Mládek, J. (1999) ‘The development of the Czech SME sector’, Journal of Business
Venturing, vol. 14, no. 5, pp. 461-473.
Boswell, C. (2009) The political uses of expert knowledge: Immigration policy and social research,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Boswell, C., Geddes, A. and Scholten, P. (2011) ‘The role of narratives in migration policy-making: a
research framework’, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 1-11.
Börzel, T. (2005) ‘Europenization: How the European Union interacts with its member states’, in Bulmer,
S. and Lequesne, C. (eds) The member states of the European Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Börzel, T.A., Hofmann, T., Panke, D. and Sprungk, C. (2010) ‘Obstinate and inefficient: why member states
do not comply with European law’, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 43, no. 11, pp. 1363-1390.
Bracking, S. and Ivanov, K. (2007) ‘Conclusion’, in Bracking, S. (ed.) Corruption and development: The
anti-corruption campaigns, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 295-303.
Branco, M.C. and Delgado, C. (2012) ‘Business, social responsibility, and corruption’, Public Affairs, vol.
12, no. 4, pp. 357-365.
Bratsis, P. (2003) Corrupt compared to what? : Greece, capitalists interests, and the specular purity of the
state: discussion paper, London School of Economics and Political Science.
Bridoux, J. and Gebel, A. (2012) ‘Flexibility versus inflexibility: discursive discrepancy in US democracy
promotion and anti-corruption policies’, Third World Quarterly, vol. 33, no. 10, pp. 1945-196.
304
Brown, E. and Cloke, J. (2004) ‘Neoliberal reform, governance and corruption in the South: assessing the
international anti-corruption crusade’, Antipode, vol. 36, no. 2, pp. 272-294.
Brown, E. and Cloke, J. (2005) ‘Neoliberal reform, governance and corruption in Central America:
Exploring the Nicaraguan case’, Political Geograhy, vol 24, no. 5m pp. 601-630.
Brown, E. and Cloke, J. (2011) ‘Critical perspectives on corruption: An overview’, Critical perspective on
international business, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 116-124.
Brown, E., Cloke, J. and Sohail, M. (2004) ‘Key myths about corruption’, paper presented at the
Development Studies Association Annual Conference, London, 6 November, Available at:
https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/dspace-jspui/handle/2134/3962, [11 February 2014].
Brunetti, A. and Weder, B. (2003) ‘A free press is bad news for corruption’, Journal of Public Economics,
vol. 87, no. 7-8, pp. 1801-1824.
Bruni, A., Gherardi, S. and Poggio, B. (2004) ‘Entrepreneur-mentality, gender and the study of women
entrepreneurs’, Journal of Organizational Change Management, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 256-268.
Bruszt, L. (2002) ‘Making markets and eastern enlargement: Diverging convergence?’, West European
Politics, vol. 25, no. 2, pp. 121-140.
Bryman, A. (2012) Social Research Methods, 4th edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bukovansky, M. (2002) ‘Corruption is bad: Normative dimensions of the anti-corruption movement’,
Australian National University working paper series no. 2002/5, Canberra.
Bukovansky, M. (2006) ‘The hollowness of anti-corruption discourse’, Review of International Political
Economy, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 181-209.
Bunn, M. (2009) ‘Corruption and nuclear proliferation’, in Rotberg, R.I. (ed.) Corruption, global security
and world order, Baltimore: Brookings Institution Press, pp. 124 - 166.
Bushman, R.M., Piotroski, J.D. and Smith, A.J. (2004) ‘What determines corporate transparency?’,
Journal of Accounting Research, vol. 42, no. 2, pp. 207-252.
Butler, J. (2001) ‘What is critique?: An essay on Foucault’s virtue’, Ingram, D. (ed.) The political, pp. 121-
226, Oxford: Blackwell.
305
Bútorová, Z. ed., (1998) Democracy and discontent in Slovakia: A public opinion profile of a country in
transition, Bratislava: Institute for Public Affairs.
Camaj, L. (2013) ‘The media’s role in fighting corruption’, The International Journal of Press/Politics, vol.
18, no. 1, pp. 21-42.
Cao, D. (2007) Translating law, Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.
Carothers, T. (2002) ‘The end of the transition paradigm’, Journal of Democracy, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 5-21.
Carr, I. and Outhwaite, O. (2008) ‘Investigating corruption in international business’, The Surrey Law
Working Papers 02/2008, Guildford.
Carr, P. and Beaver, G. (2002) ‘The enterprise culture: understanding a misunderstood concept’,
Strategic Change, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 105-113.
Castells, M. (2000) ‘The network society’, in Held, D. and McGrew, A. (eds) The global transformations
reader, Oxford/Malden: Blackwell Publishers, pp. 76-81.
Chrastinová, Z., Stanková, M. and Belešová, S. (2013) ‘Malé a rodinné farmy na Slovensku a v krajinách
EU’, Ekonomika poľnohospodárstva, vol. 13, no. 4, pp. 53-68.
Cieger, A. (2011) ‘Stará a nová korupcia: Voľby v Uhorsku 1967-1918’, Forum Historiae, vol. 5, no. 2, pp.
38-59.
Christensen, J. (2011) ‘The looting continues: Tax havens and corruption’, Critical Perspectives in
International Business, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 177-196.
Christenson, J.A. (1984) ‘Gemeischaft and gesellschaft: Testing the spatial and communal hypotheses’,
Social Forces, vol. 63, no. 1, pp. 160-168.
Chudek, M. and Henrich, J. (2011) ‘Culture-gene coevolution, norm-psychology and the emergence of
human prosociality’,Trends in Cognitive Sciences, vol. 15, no. 5, pp. 218-226.
Clark, G. (2009) Recession, recovery and reinvestment: the role of local economic leadership in a global
crisis, OECD: Paris.
306
Clayton, R. and Pontusson, J. (1998) ‘Welfare-state retrenchment revisited: Entitlement cuts, public
sector restructuring, and inegalitarian trends in advanced capitalist societies’, World Politics, vol. 51, no.
1, pp. 67-98.
Copp, C.B. and Ivy, R.L. (2001) ‘Networking trends of small tourism business in post-socialist Slovakia’,
Journal of Small Business Management, vol. 39, no. 4, pp. 345-353.
Coronel, S. (2009) ‘Corruption and the watchdog role of the news media’, in Norris, P. (ed.) Public
sentinel: News media & governance reform, Washington DC: World Bank, pp.11-136.
Council of Europe (1990) Convention on laundering, search, seizure and confiscation of the proceeds
from crime CETS no. 141, Available at: http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulezVous.asp?
NT=141&CM=8&DF=&CL=ENG, [16 February 2014].
Council of Europe (2008) Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament,
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Available at:
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52008DC0394, [10 November 2014].
Cox, K.R. (1997) Spaces of globalization: Reasserting the power of the local, New York: The Guilford
Press.
Cull, R. and Xu, C.L. (2005) ‘Institutions, ownership, and finance: The determinants of profit
reinvestment among Chinese firms’, Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 77, no. 1, pp. 117-146.
Czech Statistical Office (2008) Výsledky voleb v Československu, Available at:
https://www.czso.cz/documents/10180/20536128/422008k03.pdf/, [28 December 2016].
Dahlstedt, M. and Hertzberg, F. (2012) ‘Schooling entrepreneurs: Entrepreneurship, governmentality
and education policy in Sweden at the turn of the millennium’, Journal of Pedagogy, vol. 3, no. 2, pp.
242-262.
Darden, K. and Grzymala-Busse, A. (2006) ‘The great divide: Literacy, nationalism, and the communist
collapse’, World Politics, vol. 59, no. 1, pp. 83-115.
Deacon, B. and Hulse, M. (1997) ‘The making of post-communist social policy: The role of international
agencies’, Journal of Social Policy, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 43-62.
307
Deegan-Krause, K. and Haughton, T. (2009) ‘Toward a more useful conceptualization of populism: Types and degrees of populist appeals in the case of Slovakia, Politics & Policy, vol. 37, no. 4, pp. 821 – 841.
Deelmann, T. and Loos, P. (2002) ‘Trust economy: Aspects of reputation and trust building for SMEs in e-
business’, 8th Americas Conference on Information Systems.
Deleuze, G. (1988) Foucault, London: Athlone.
Demirgüç-Kunt, A. and Maksimovic, V. (1998) ‘Law, finance and firm growth’, Journal of Finance, vol. 53,
no. 6, pp. 2107-2137.
De Ridder, E. (2009) ‘EU fighting corruption in the Czech Republic and Slovakia: Where did it go wrong?’,
Journal of Contemporary European Research, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 61-81.
Dervis, K. (1994) Slovakia: Restructuring for recovery, Washington: The International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank.
Devinney, T.M. (2009) ‘Is the socially responsible corporation a myth?: The good, the bad, and the ugly
of corporate social responsibility’, Academy of Management Perspectives, vol. 23, no. 2, pp. 44-56.
Diamond, P. and Vartiainen, H. eds, (2007) Behavioural economics and its application, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press.
Dimitrova, A. and Steunenberg, B. (2004) ‘The end of history of enlargement of the beginning of a new
research agenda’, in Dimitrova, A. (ed.) Driven to change: the European Union’s Eastern enlargement
viewed from the East, Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp. 162-179.
Di Puppo, L. (2010) ‘Anti-corruption interventions in Georgia’, Global Crime, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 220-236.
Doane, D. (2005) ‘The myth of CSR: The problem with assuming that companies can do well while also
doing good is that markets don’t really work that way’, Stanford Social Innovation Review, vol. 3, pp. 23-
29.
Dobbin, F., Simmons, B. and Garret, G. (2007) ‘The global diffusion of public policies: Social
constructions, coercion, competition or learning?’, Annual Review of Sociology, vol. 33, pp. 449-472.
Doornbos, M. (2010) ‘Good governance: the rise and decline of a policy metaphor?’, The Journal of
Development Studies, vol. 37, no. 6, pp. 93-108.
308
Dornbusch, R. (1998) ‘After Asia: new directions for the international financial system’, paper presented
at Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Conference Series, Boston, June, Available at:
https://www.bostonfed.org/economic/conf/conf42/con42_10.pdf, [11 February 2014].
Dorn, W.A. and Fulton, A. (1997) ‘Securing compliance with disarmament treaties’, Global Governance,
vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 17-40.
Douglas, M. (2001) ‘Culture as explanation: Cultural Concerns’, in Smelser, N.J. andBatles, P.B. (eds)
International encyclopedia of the social & behavioural sciences, volume V, Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Drakopoulou Dodd, S. and Anderson, A.R. (2007) ’Mumpsimus and the mything of the individualistic
entrepreneur’, International Small Business Journal, vol. 25, no. 4, pp. 341-360.
Dreher, A. and Gassebner, M. (2013) ‘Greasing the wheels?: The impact of regulations and corruption in
firm entry’, Public Choice, vol. 155, no. 3-4, pp. 413-432.
Dries, L., Reardon, T. and Swinnen, J.F.M (2004) ‘The rapid rise of supermarkets in Central and Eastern
Europe: Implications for the agrifood sectors and rural development’, Development Policy Review, vol.
22, no. 5, pp. 525-556.
Earle, J.S. and Sakova, Z. (2000) ‘Business start-ups or disguised unemployment?: Evidence on the
chapter of self-employment from transition economies’, Labour Economics, vol. 7, no. 5, pp. 575-601.
Ebner, A. (2006) ‘Schumpeterian entrepreneurship revisited: Historical specificity and the phases of
capitalist development’, Journal of the History of Economic Thought, vol. 28, no. 3, pp. 315-332.
Edwards, R. (1994) ‘From distance? Globalization, time-space compression and distance education’,
Open Learning: The Journal of Open and Distance Learning, vol. 9, no. 3, pp.9-17.
European Commission (2012) Position of the commission services on the development of the partnership
agreement and programmes in Slovakia for the period 2014-2020, Available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/what/future/pdf/partnership/sk_position_paper.pdf, [11 August
2014].
European Commission (2013) SME performance review, Available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sme/facts-figures-analysis/performance-review/index_en.htm,
[8 August 2014].
309
European Commission (2014) Agriculture and rural development, Available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/simplification/index_en.htm, [11 November 2014].
European Commission (2016) Evaluations of the 2007-2013 programming period, Available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/policy/evaluations/ec/2007-2013/, [20 June 2017].
Evans, M. and Davies, J. (1999) ‘Understanding policy transfer: A multi-level, multi-disciplinary
perspective’, Public Administration, vol. 77, no. 2, pp. 361-385.
Everett, J. (2006) ‘The global fight against corruption: A Foucaltian, virtues-ethics framing’, Journal of
Business Ethics, vol. 65, no. 1, pp. 1-12.
Fairclough, N. (1995) Media discourse, London: Edward Arnold.
Falkner, G. and Treib, O. (2008) ‘Three worlds of compliance or four?: The EU-15 compared to new
member states’, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 46, no. 3, pp. 293-313.
Fawn, R. and Hochman, J. (2010) Historical dictionary of the Czech state, Lanham: Scarecrow Press.
Fell, D. (2005) ‘Political and media liberalization and political corruption in Taiwan’, The China Quarterly,
vol. 184, pp. 875-893.
Fialová, Z. (2007) Korupcia vo verejnej diskusii 1996-2007, Bratislava: Transparency International
Slovensko.
Fibich, J. (1996) ‘The post-communist mentality’, Perspectives, Summer 1995.
Fineman, S. (1998) ‘The natural environment, organization and ethics’, in Parker, A. (ed.) Ethics and
organizations, pp. 238-252, London: Sage.
Fischer, F. (2003) Reframing public policy, discoursive politics and deliberative practices, Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Fiske, S. and Taylor, S.E. (2012) Social cognition: From brains to culture, 2nd edition, London: Sage.
Fletcher, D.E. (2006) ‘Entrepreneurial processes and the social construction of opportunity’,
Entrepreneurship & Regional Development, vol. 18, no. 5, pp. 421-440.
310
Flyvbjerg, B. (1993) ‘Aristotle, Foucault and progressive phronesis’, in Winkler, E. and Coombs, J. (eds)
Applied ethics, pp. 11-27, Cambridge: Blackwell.
Foucault, M. (1974) Dits et Écrits, vol. 2, Paris: Gallimard.
Foucault, M. (1977) Surveiller et punir, translated by Sheridan, A., New York: Vintage Books.
Foucault, M. (1978) L’histoire de la sexualité, vol. 1, translated by Hurley, R., New York: Random House.
Foucault, M. (1980) Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, London: Harvester
Wheatsheaf.
Foucault, M. (1982) ‘The subject and power’, Critical Inquiry, vol. 8, no. 4, pp. 777-795.
Foucault, M. (1984) ‘The ethic of care of for the self as a practice of freedom: An interview with Michel
Foucault on January 20, Philosophy & Social Criticism, vol. 12, no. 2-3, pp. 112-131.
Foucault, M. (1987) ‘The ethic of care for the self as a practice of freedom’, an interview with Michel
Foucault on January 20, 1984’, conducted by Fornet –Betancourt, R., Becker, H., Gomez-Müller, A. and
Gauthier, J.D., Philosophy & Social Criticism, vol. 12, no. 2-3, pp.112-131.
Foucault, M. (1988) ‘Technologies of the self’, in Martin, L.H., Gutman, H. and Hutton, P.H. (eds)
Technologies of the self: A seminar with Michel Foucault, pp. 16-49, Amherst: University of
Massachusetts Press.
Foucault, M. (2008) Naissance de la biolopolique, translated by Burchell, D., Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Frank, M.W. (1998) ‘Schumpeter on entrepreneurs and innovation: A reappraisal’, Journal of the History
of Economic Thoughts, vol. 20, no. 4, pp. 505-516.
Franc, M. and Knapík, J. (2013) Volný čas v českých zemích 1957-1967, Prague: Academia.
Freire-Gibb, L.C. (2014) ‘Entrepreneurship within urban and rural areas: Creative people and social
networks’, Regional Studies, vol. 48, no. 1, pp. 139-153.
Frith, C.D. and Wolpert, D.M. (2004) The neuroscience of social interaction: Decoding, imitating, and
influencing the actions of others, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
311
Fultz, E. and Ruck, M. (2001) ‘Pension reform in central and eastern Europe: Emerging issues and
patterns’, International Labour Review, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 19-43.
Furutan, M. (2009) ‘Corruption in Slovakia: Ethical issues from a systematic point of view’, Journal of
Academic and Business Ethics, vol. 3, pp. 1-10.
Gadowska, K. (2010) ‘National and international anti-corruption efforts: The case of Poland’, Global
Crime, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 178-209.
Gal, S. (2005) ‘Language ideologies compared: Metaphors of public/private’, Journal of Linguistic
Anthropology, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 23-37.
Galtung, F. (2006) ‘Measuring the immesurable: Boundaries and functions of (macro) corruption
indices’, in Sampford, C, Shacklock, A., Connors, C. and Galtung, F. (eds) Measuring corruption, pp. 101-
130, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing.
Gbúrová, M. (2012) ‘K problematike deformít v súčasnej demokracii’, in Dobiaš, D., Eštok, G., Onufrák, A.
and Bzdilová, R. (eds) Sloboda, rovnosť, poriadok: Kam kráčaš demokracia?, Košice: Univerzita Pavla
Jozefa Šafárika, pp. 7-25.
Gebel, A. (2012) ‘Human nature and morality in the anti-corruption discourse of Transparency
International, Public Administration and Development, vol. 32, no. 1, pp. 109-128.
Geddes, A. (2001) ‘Migration policy in an integrating Europe’, paper presented at European Community
Studies Association, Madison, 31 May – 3 June.
Geddes, A. and Taylor, A. (2013) ‘How EU capacity bargains strengthen states: Migration and border
security in South-East Europe’, West European Politics, vol. 36, no. 1, pp. 51-70.
Gephart, M. (2015) ‘Contested meanings in the anti-corruption discourse: International and local
narratives’, Critical Policy Studies, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 119-138.
Gephart, M. (2016) ‘Local embedding of international discourse: Chile and the international and
transnational anti-corruption campaign’, International Relations, vol. 30, no. 1, pp. 49-77.
Gherardi, S. (2003) ‘Gender citizenship in organizations’, in Jeffcut, P. (ed.) The foundations of
management knowledge, London: Routledge, pp. 231-253.
312
Gluchman, V. (2007) Kontexty a podoby morálky nedávnej minulosti [Faces and contexts of morality of
recent past], Prešov: Filozofická fakulta Prešovskej univerzity.
Godard, B. (1989) ‘Theorizing feminist discourse/translation’, in Bassnett, S. and Lefevere, A. (eds)
Translation, history and culture, London: Frances Pinter, pp. 87-96.
Goel, R.K. and Nelson, M.A. (2005) ‘Economic freedom versus political freedom: Cross-country
influences on corruption’, Australian Economic Papers, vol. 44, no. 2, pp. 121-133.
Gong, T. and Wu, A.M. (2012) ‘Does increased civil service pay deter corruption? Evidence from China’,
Review of Public Personnel Administration, vol. 26, pp. 1-13.
Gopinath, C. (2008) ‘Recognizing and justifying private corruption’, Journal of Business Ethics, vol. 82, no.
3, pp. 747-754.
Goss, D. (2005) ‘Schumpeter’s legacy?: Interaction and emotions in the sociology of entrepreneurship’,
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 205-218.
Government Office of Slovakia (2013) Inovačná stratégia SR na roky 2014-2020, Available at:
https://lt.justice.gov.sk/Attachment/Vlastn%C3%BD%20materi%C3%A1l_doc.pdf?instEID=-
1&attEID=51522&docEID=287000&matEID=5788&langEID=1&tStamp=20130102100012757, [8 August
2014].
Government Office of Slovakia (2014) Štatistika podozrení, ktoré boli nahlásené na Antikorupčnú linku
vlády SR, Available at: http://www.vlada.gov.sk/statistika-podozreni-ktore-boli-nahlasene-na-
antikorupcnu-linku-uradu-vlady-sr/, [11 November 2014].
Grbich, C. (1999) Qualitative research in health: an introduction, London: Sage.
Grosh, B. and Somolekae, G. (1996) ‘Mighty oaks from little acorns: Can microenterprise serve as the
seedbed of industrialization?’, World Development, vol. 24, no. 12, pp. 1879-1890.
Grznár, M. and Szabo, Ľ. (2012) ‘Disparities in the utilisation of production factors in the agriculture of
Slovakia and of the European Union’, Agricultural Economics, vol. 58, no. 2, pp. 49-55.
Grabher, G. and Stark, D. eds, (1997) Restructuring networks in post-socialism: Legacies, inkages and
localities, New York: Oxford University Press.
313
Granovetter, M. (1985) ‘Economic action and social structure: The problem of embeddedness’, American
Journal of Sociology, vol. 91, no. 3, pp. 481-510.
Grzymala-Busse, A. (2008) ‘Beyond clientelism: incumbent state capture and state formation’,
Comparative Political Studies, vol. 41, no. 4-5, pp. 638-673.
Guba, E.G. (1981) ‘Criteria for assessing the trustworthiness of naturalistic inquiries’, Educational
Technology Research and Development, vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 75-91.
Gupta, V.K., Turban D.B., Wasti, S.A. and Sikdar, A. (2005) ‘The role of gender stereotypes in perceptions
of entrepreneurs and intentions to become an entrepreneur’, Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, vol.
33, no. 2, pp. 397-417.
Haas, P.M. (1992) ‘Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy coordination’,
International Organization, vol. 46, no. 1, pp. 1-35.
Hackett, R.A. and Carroll, W.K. (2006) ‘Introduction: Beyond the media’s democratic deficit?’, in Hackett,
R.A. and Carroll, W.K. (eds) Remaking media: The struggle to democratize public communication,
London: Routledge, pp. 1-18.
Hall, C.M. and Williams, A.M. (2008) Tourism and innovation, London: Routledge.
Hall, D.R. (2001) ‘Tourism and development I communist and post-communist societies’, in Harrison
(ed.) Tourism and the less developed world: Issues and case studies, pp. 91-108.
Hall, J., Matios, S., Sheehan, L. and Silvestre, B. (2012) ‘Entrepreneurship and innovation: At the base of
the pyramid: a recipe for inclusive growth or social exclusion?’, Journal of Management Studies, vol. 49,
no. 4, pp. 785-812.
Haller, D. and Shore, C. (2005) ‘Introduction - Sharp practice: Anthropology and the study of corruption’,
in Haller, D. and Shore, C. (eds) Corruption: Anthropological Perspectives, Pluto Press, pp. 1-28,
Hallon, Ľ. (2003) ‘Podnikanie pred rokom 1918’, Hospodárske noviny, 24 January.
Hallon, Ľ. (2011) ‘”Prosím Ťa drahý priateľu, keby si sa potom v ministerskej rade zasadil za to, aby sa
spojenému ústavu dostalo toho, čo potrebuje.”: Korupcia a klientelizmus v politike Milana Hodžu’,
Forum Historiae, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 252-265.
314
Hamilton, E. (2014) ‘Entrepreneurial narrative identity and gender: A double epistemological shift’,
Journal of Small Business Management, vol. 52, no. 4, pp. 703-712.
Hansen, H.K (2011) ‘Managing corruption risks’, Review of International Political Economy, vol. 18, no. 2,
pp. 251-275.
Hansen, H.K. (2010) ‘Governing integrity and peddling knowledge in the corruption’, paper presented at
International Studies Association Annual Convention, 17-20 February, New Orleans.
Hansen, H.K. (2012) ‘The power of performance indices in the global politics of anti-corruption’, Journal
of International Relations and Development, vol. 158, no. 4, pp. 506-531.
Hlavinka, J. (2011) ‘Korupcia v procese arizácie podnikového majetku’, Forum Historiae, vol. 5, no. 2, pp.
113-134.
Hamm, P. King, L.P. and Stuckler, D. (2012) ‘Mass privatization, state capacity, and economic growth in
post-communist countries’, American Sociologial Review, vol. 77, no. 2, pp. 295-324.
Harris, E. (2004) ‘Europenization of Slovakia’, Comparative European Politics, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 185-211.
Harris, Z. (1952) ‘Discourse Analysis’, Language, vol. 28, no. 1, pp. 1-30.
Harrison, E. (2007) ‘Corruption’, Development in Practice, vol. 17, no. 4-5, pp. 672-678.
Harvey, D. (2000) ‘Time-space compression and the postmodern condition’, in Held, D. and McGrew, A.
(eds) The global transformations reader, Oxford/Malden: Blackwell Publishers, pp. 82-91.
Hasty, J. (2005) ‘The pleasures of corruption: Desire and discipline in Ghanian political culture’, Cultural
Anthropology, vol. 20, no.2, pp. 271-301.
Haufler, V. (2013) A public role for the private sector: industry self-regulation in a global economy,
Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Havnes, P.A. and Senneseth, K. (2001) ‘A panel study of firm growth among SMEs in networks’, Small
Business Economics, vol. 16, no. 4, pp. 293-302.
Hayton, J.C., George, G. and Zahra, S.A. (2002) ‘National culture and entrepreneurship: A review of
behavioral research’, Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, vol. 26, no. 4, pp. 33-52.
315
Held, D. (1997) ‘Globalization and cosmopolitan democracy’, Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice,
vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 309-314.
Henderson, K. (2002) Escape from invisibility, London: Routledge.
Héritier, A. and Eckert, S. (2008) ‘New modes of governance in the shadow of hierarchy: self-regulation
by industry in Europe’, Journal of Public Policy, vol. 28, no. 1, pp. 113-138.
Heywood, P. (1997) ‘Political corruption: Problems and perspectives’, Political Studies, vol. 45, no. 3, pp.
417-435.
Hindess, B. (2005) ‘Investigating international anti-corruption’, Third World Quarterly, vol. 26, no. 8, pp.
1389-1398.
Hirst, P. and Thompson, G. (1995) Globalization in question, Cambridge: Polity Press.
Hjorth, D. and Johannisson, B. (2003) ‘Conceptualizing the opening phase of a regional development as
the enactment of a collective identity’, Concept and Transformation, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 69-92.
Hofstede, G.H. (1980) Culture’s consequences, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.
Holmes, L. (2006) Rotten states? : Corruption, post-communism and neoliberalism, Durham: Duke
University Press.
Holzinger, K. and Knill, C. (2005) ‘Causes and conditions of cross-national policy convergence’, Journal of
European Public Policy, vol. 12, no. 5, pp. 775-796.
Honer, A. (2004) ‘Life-world analysis in ethnography’, in Flick, U., Von Kardoff, E. and Steinke, I. (eds) A
companion to qualitative research, London: Sage, pp. 113-117.
HORECA (2010) Komuniké profesionálov z odvetvia cestovného ruchu, Available at:
http://www.hotelblog.sk/data/file/2010/KOMUNIK%C3%89%20PROFESION%C3%81LOV%20CESTOVN
%C3%89HO%20RUCHU%20%C2%B4Tv%C3%A1rou%20k%20zmene%C2%B4.pdf, [11 August 2014].
Houlihan, P.J. (2015) Catholicism and the Great War: Religion and everyday life in Germany and Austria-
Hungary 1914 – 1922, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
316
Hudek, A. (2011) ‘Between Czechs and Hungarians: Construting Slovak national identity from 19 th
century to present’, History Compass, vol. 9, no. 4, pp. 257-268.
Hughes, H.L. and Allen, D. (2009) ‘Central and Eastern Europe and EU accession 2004: Views of the
impact on tourism’, Tourism and Hospitality Research, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 185-198.
Huneeus, C. (1998) ‘Malastar y desencanto en Chile: Legados del autorismo y costos de la transición’,
Corporación Tiempo 2000 working paper no. 63, Santiago.
Huot, S., Bobadilla, A., Bailliard, A. and Rudman, D.L. (2015) ‘Constructing undesirables: A critical
discourse analysis of “othering” within the Protecting Canada’s Immigration System Act’, International
Migration, vol. 54, no. 2, pp. 131-143.
Hyde-Price, A.G.V. (1996) The international politics of East Central Europe, Manchester: Manchester
University Press.
International Monetary Fund (1998) ‘The Asian Crisis: Causes and cures’, Finance and Development, vol.
35, no. 2.
International Monetary Fund (2012) IMF country report no. 12/178, Available at:
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2012/cr12178.pdf, [07 July 2014].
Ivanov, K.S. (2007) ‘The limits of a global campaign against corruption’, in Bracking, S. (ed.) Corruption
and development: the anti-corruption campaigns, London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 28-45.
Jacoby, W. (2001) ‘Tutors and pupils: International organizations, Central European elites, and wester
model’, Governance, vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 169-200.
Jack, S.L. and Anderson, A.R. (2002) ‘The effects of embeddedness on the entrepreneurial process’,
Journal of Business Venturing, vol. 17, no. 5, pp. 467-487.
Jackson, T. (2009) Prosperity without growth?, Oxon: Earthscan.
Jalan, B. (2005) The future of India: Politics, economics and governance, New Delhi: Penguin Books.
Jauregiu, B. (2014) ‘Provisional agency in India: Jugaad and legitimation of corruption’, American
Ethnologist, vol. 41, no. 1, pp. 76-91.
317
Jensen, M.C. (1983) ‘Organization theory and methodology’, The Accounting Review, vol. 58 no.2, pp.
319-339.
Johannisson, B. (1998) Entrepreneurship as a collective phenomenon, Lyon: Rent XII.
Johansson, A.W. (2004) ‘Narrating the entrepreneur’, International Small Business Journal, vol. 22, no. 3,
pp. 273-293.
Johnston, O. (1981) ‘Urbanization and the formation of a Slovak intelligentsia’, in Hitchens (ed.) Studies
in East European social history, Leiden: E.J. Brill, pp. 27-61
Johnston M (1998) Fighting systematic corruption: Social foundations for institutional reform, in
Robinson M (ed.) Corruption and Development, London: Frank Cass, pp. 85-104.
Johnstone, H. and Lionais, D. (2004) ‘Depleted communities and community business entrepreneurship:
Resolving space through place’, Entrepreneurship and Regional Development, vol. 16, no. 3, pp. 217-233.
Jones, C. and Spicer, A. (2005) ‘The sublime object of entrepreneurship’, Organization, vol. 12, no. 2, pp.
223-246.
Jones, O. and Conway, S. (2000) ‘The social embeddedness of entrepreneurs: A reading of against the
odds’, Aston Business School Research Paper Series RP0023, Birmingham.
Joseph, J. (2009) ‘Governmentality of what? Populations, states and international organisations’, Global
Society, vol. 23, no. 4, pp. 413-427.
Kagan, R. (2004) ‘America’s crisis of legitimacy’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 83, no. 2, pp. 65-87.
Kahneman,D. (2003) ‘Maps of bounded rationality: Psychology for behavioural economics’, The
American Economic Review, vol. 93, no. 5, pp. 1449-1475.
Kamenec, I. (2011) ‘The Slovak state, 1939-1945’, in Teich, M, Kováč, D. and Brown, M.D. (eds) Slovakia
in history, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.175-192.
Karklins, R. (2005) The system made me do it: corruption in post-communist societies, New York: M.E.
Sharpe, Inc.
318
Kartal, M. (2014) ‘Accounting for the bad apples: The EU’s impact on national corruption before and
after accession’, Journal of European Policy, vol. 26, no. 6, pp. 941-959.
Kaser, M.C. ed., (1985) The economic history of Eastern Europe 1919-1975, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Kaufmann, D., Pradhan, S. and Ryterman, R. (1998) ‘New frontiers in diagnosing and combating
corruption’, World Bank Research Paper Series PREMnotes no. 7, Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
Kay, A. (2008) ‘Economism and public policy’, Kennett, P. (ed.) Governance, globalization and public
policy, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, pp. 19-34.
Kazda, R., Zemanovičová, D. and Pirošík, V. (2002) Riziká korupcie v systéme poľnohospodárskeh politiky
na Slovensku, Bratislava: Konzervatívny inštitút M.R. Štefánika.
Kendal, G. and Wickham, G. (1999) Using Foucault’s methods, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
Khanal, R. (2000) ‘Strategies in combatting corruption’, in Khanal, R. (ed.) Transparency and
accountability against corruption in Nepal, Kathmandu: Modern Printing Press, pp. 1-18.
Kharkhordin, O. (1997) ‘Reveal and dissimulate: A genealogy of private life in Soviet Russia’, in
Weintraub, J. and Kumar, K. (eds) Public and private in thought and practice: perspectives on a grand
dichotomy, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, pp. 333-364.
Kilduff, M. and Mehra, A. (1997) ‘Postmodernism and organizational research’, Academy of
Management Review, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 453-481.
Kirchbaum, S. (1995) A history of Slovakia: The struggle for survival, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Kirschbaum, S. (2007) Historical dictionary of Slovakia, 2nd edition, Lanham: Scarecrow Press.
Kitschelt, H. (2003) ‘Accounting for outcomes of postcommunist regime diversity: What counts as a good
cause’, in Ekiert, G. and Hanson, S. (eds) Capitalism and democracy in Central and Eastern Europe:
Assessing the legacy of communist rule, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 49-88.
Klitgaard, R. (1998) International cooperation against corruption, Available at:
http://www.icgg.org/downloads/contribution02_klitgaard.pdf, [10 November 2014].
319
Kmeť, N. (2011) ‘ ”V rozpore so socialistickou morálkou vyžadujú niektorí pracovníci rôzne úplatky za
vybavovanie vecí a zabezpečovanie úloh, ktoré patria k ich povinnostiam.”: Vedenie komunistickej strany
as jeho prejavy o korupcii’, Forum Historiae, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 266-284.
Kocka, J. (1995) ‘The middle classes in Europe’, The Journal of Modern History, vol. 67, no. 4, pp. 783-
806.
Kolman, L., Noorderhaven, N.G., Hofstede, G. and Dienes, E. (2003) ‘Cross-cultural differences in Central
Europe’, Journal of Managerial Psychology, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 76-88.
König, T. (2008) ‘Analysing the process of EU legislative decision-making’, European Union Politics, vol. 9,
no. 1, pp. 145-165.
Kopecký, P. and Mudde, C. (2000) ‘What has Eastern Europe taught us about the democratisation
literature (and vice versa)?’, European Journal of Political Research, vol. 37, no. 4, pp. 517-539.
Kováč, D. (2006) Dejepis 4, Bratislava: Orbis Pictus Istropolitana.
Kováč, D., Kratochvíl, V., Kamenec, I. and Tkadlečková, H. (2012) Dejepis pre 9. ročník ZŠ a 4. Ročník
gymnázia s osemročným štúdiom, Bratislava: Orbis Pictus Istropolitana.
Kováčová, E. (2012) ‘Kontrolný systém verejnej správy Slovenskej republiky’, Politické vedy, vol. 3, pp.
73-99.
Krajčovičová, N. (2009) Slovensko na ceste ku demokracii, Bratislava: Historický ústav SAV.
Krasnovský, B., Bednárová, M. and Ulrichová, B. (2011), Dejepis pre 8. ročník základnej školy a 3. Ročník
gymnázia s osemročným štúdiom, Martin: Vydavateľstvo Matice slovenskej.
Krastev, I. (2000) ‘The strange (re)discovery of corruption’, in Dahrendorf, R. and Soros, G. (eds) The
paradoxes of unintended consequences, Budapest: Central European University Press, pp. 23-42.
Krastev, I. (2004) Shifting obsessions, Budapest: Central European University Press.
Krause, K.D. (2003) ‘Slovakia’s second transition’, Journal of Democracy, vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 65-79.
Krištúfek, P. (2014) The house of the deaf man, Cardigan: Parthian Books.
320
Krivý, V. (2016) ‘Národná hrdosť a súvisiace postoje’, Slovenský národopis, vol. 64, no. 1, pp. 47-59.
Kučerová, J. (2012) ‘Environmental management and accommodation facilities in Slovakia’, in Leslie, D.
(ed.) Tourism enterprises and the sustainability agenda across Europe, pp. 121-134, Farnham: Ashgate.
Kvale, S. and Brinkmann, S. (2009) InterViews, London: Sage Publications.
Laffont, J.J. and Martimort, D. (2002) The theory of incentives: The principal-agent problem. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Lambsdorf, J.G. (2002) ‘Making corrupt deals: contracting in the shadow of the law’, Journal of Economic
Behaviour & Organization, vol. 48, no. 3, pp. 221-241
Lambsdorf, J.G. (2006) ‘Measuring corruption – the validity and precision of subjective indicators (CPI)’,
in Sampford, C., Shacklock, A., Connors, C. and Galtung, F. (ed.) Measuring corruption, pp. 81-100,
Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing.
Langlois, R.N. (2002) ‘Schumpeter and the obsolescence of the entrepreneur’, Economic Working Papers
of the University of Connecticut, Storrs.
Larmour, P. (2006) ‘Culture and corruption in the Pacific Islands: some conceptual issues and findings
from studies of National Integrity Systems’, paper presented at the European Consortium for Political
Research, Nicosia, 25-28 April.
Larner, W. and Walters, W. (2004) ‘Introduction: Global governmentality’, in Larner, W. and Walters, W.
(eds) Global governmentality, Oxon: Routledge, pp. 1-20.
Lavioe, D. and Chamlee-Wright, E. (2001) Culture and enterprise: The development, representation, and
morality of business, New York: Routledge.
Lazíková, J. and Bandlerová, A. (no date) Družstvo ako forma podnikania v poľnohospodárstve v
podmienkach Slovenska [Coop-farm as a form of enterprise in agriculture in Slovakia], Available at:
http://bandlerova.weby.uniag.sk/files/rackova/PDF/Laz-Ban.pdf, [8 August 2014].
Lechler, T. (2001) ‘Social interaction: A determinant of entrepreneurial team venture success’, Small
Business Economics, vol. 16, no. 4, pp. 263-278.
Ledeneva, A. (1998) Russia’s economy of favours, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
321
Ledeneva, A. (2009) ‘Corruption in postcommunist societies in Europe: A re-examination’, Perspectives
on European Politics and Society, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 69-86.
Lee, S.M. and Peterson, S.J. (2000) ‘Culture, entrepreneurial orientation and global competitiveness’,
Journal of World Business, vol. 35, no. 4, pp. 401-416.
Leff, C.S. (1988) National conflict in Czechoslovakia: The making and remaking of a state, 1918-1987,
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Lehrer, J. (2009) The decisive moment, Edinburgh: Canongate Books.
Leibbrandt, A., Gneezy, U. and List, J.A. (2013) ‘Rise and fall of competitiveness in individualistic and
collectivistic societies’, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 110, no. 23, pp. 9305-9308.
Leitch, C.M., Hills, F.M. and Harrison, R.T. (2010) ‘The philosophy and practice of interpretivist research
in entrepreneurship: Quality, validation, and trust’, Organizational Research Methods, vol. 13, no. 1, pp.
67-84.
Levine, R. (2005) ‘Does firm size matter for growth and poverty alleviation?’, paper presented at the
Brookings Blum Roundtable: The private sector in the fight against global poverty, Washington DC, 4
August.
Levin, M. and Satarov, G. (2000) ‘Corruption and institutions in Russia’, European Journal of Political
Economy, vol. 16, no.1, pp. 113-132.
Lewis, P. (2006) ‘The quest for invisibility: Female entrepreneurs and the masculine norm of
entrepreneurship’, Gender, Work & Organization, vol.13, no. 5, pp. 453-469.
Lincoln, Y.S. and Guba, E. (1985) Naturalistic enquiry, Newbury Park/London: Sage Publications.
Lindsted, C. and Naurin, D. (2010) Transparency against corruption, Available at:
http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/digitalAssets/1358/1358046_transparency-against-corruption-_accepted-
version.pdf, [Accessed 27 December 2016].
Lipták, Ľ. (1960) Ovládnutie slovenskeho priemyslu nemeckým kapitálom, Bratislava: Vydavateľstvo
Slovenskej Akadémie vied.
322
Ljunggren, E. and Alsos, G.A. (2001) ‘Media expressions of entrepreneurs: Frequency, content and
appearance of male and female entrepreneurs’, paper presented at the Babson-Kauffman
Entrepreneurship Research Conference, Jönköping, June.
Loecher, U. (2000) ‘Small and medium-sized enterprises: Delimitation and the European definition on
the areas of industrial business’, European Business Review, vol. 12, no. 5, pp. 261-264.
Löwenheim, O. (2008) ‘Examining the state: a Foucauldian perspective in international “governance
indicators”’, Third World Quarterly, vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 255-274.
MacLeod, C. and Durrheim, K. (2002) ‘Foucauldian feminism: The implications of governmentality’,
Journal of the Theory of Social Behaviour, vol. 32, no. 1, pp. 41-60.
Mallon, M. and Cohen, L. (2001) ‘Time for a change?: Women’s accounts of the move from
organizational careers to self-employment’, British Journal of Management, vol. 12, no. 3, pp. 217-230.
Marangos, J. (2002) ‘The political economy of shock therapy’, Journal of Economic Surveys, vol. 16, no. 1,
pp. 41-76.
Margolis, J.D. and Walsh, J.P. (2001) People and profits?: The search for a link between company’s social
and financial performance, New Jersey: Mahwah.
Marquette, H. (2001) ‘Corruption, democracy and the World Bank’, Crime, Law and Social Change, vol.
36, no. 4, pp. 395-47.
Marshall, C. and Rossman, G.B. (2006) Designing qualitative research, 4th edition, London: Sage.
Mayes, R., Pini, B. and McDonald, P. (2013) ‘Corporate social responsibility and the parameters of
dialogue with vulnerable others’, Organization, vol. 20, no. 6, pp. 840-859.
Mazar, N. and Aggarwal, P. (2011) ‘Greasing the palm: Can collectivism promote bribery?’, Psychological
Science, vol. 22, no. 7, pp. 843-848.
McDermott, G. and Mejstrik, M. (1993) ‘The role of small firms in Czechoslovak manufacturing’, in Acs, Z.
and Audretsch, B. (eds) Small firms and entrepreneurship: An-East-West perspective, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, pp.155-181.
Mearsheimer, J.J. (1995) ‘A realist reply’, International Security, vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 82-93.
323
Méon, P.G. and Weill, L. (2008) ‘Is corruption an efficient grease?’, Bank of Finland Discussion Paper 20,
Helsinki.
Merry, S.E. (2009) Human rights & gender violence: Translating international law into local justice,
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Ministry of Economy of Slovakia (2012) Analýza stavu malého a stredného podnikania, Bratislava:
Ministry of Economy of Slovakia.
Ministry of Economy of Slovakia (no date) Etický kód štátneho zamestnanca, Available at:
http://www.minv.sk/?eticky-kodex-statneho-zamestnanca, [07 July 2014].
Mikuš, M. (2011) ‘Civil society building, “advanced liberal” governmentality and the state in Serbia’, QEH
working paper series no. 190, London, Available at:
http://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/30860153/qehwps190.pdf?
AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAJ56TQJRTWSMTNPEA&Expires=1392210090&Signature=j3U4IXNZdu4X%2Fenwd
%2FGtXIjKU6U%3D&response-content-disposition=inline, [12 February 2014].
Miller, G.J. (2005) ‘The political evolution of principal-agent models’, Annual Review of Political Science,
vol.8, pp. 203-225.
Miller, P. and Rose, N. (1990) ‘Governing economic life’, Economy and Society, vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 1-31.
Miller, W.L., Grodeland, A.B. and Koshechkina, T. Y. (2001) A culture of corruption?: Coping with
government in post-communist Europe, Budapest: Central European University Press.
Ministry of Interior of Slovakia (2012) Informácia o činnosti útvarov národnej kriminálnej agentúry
Prezídia Policajného Zboru za rok 2012, Available at: www.minv.sk/?policia&subor=175117, [5
November 2016].
Ministry of Interior of Slovakia (2013) Informácia o činnosti útvarov národnej kriminálnej agentúry
Prezídia Policajného Zboru za rok 2013, Available at:
http://www.minv.sk/swift_data/source/policia/naka_opr/opr/Informacia%20o%20cinnosti%20externa
%202013u.pdf , [5 November 2016].
Ministry of Interior of Slovakia (2014) Informácia o činnosti útvarov národnej kriminálnej agentúry
Prezídia Policajného Zboru za rok 2014, Available at:
324
http://www.minv.sk/swift_data/source/policia/naka_opr/opr/Informacia%20o%20cinnosti%20NAKA
%20P%20PZ%20za%20rok%202014.pdf, [5 November 2016].
Ministry of Interior of Slovakia (2015) Informácia o činnosti útvarov národnej kriminálnej agentúry
Prezídia Policajného Zboru za rok 2015 , Available at:
http://www.minv.sk/swift_data/source/policia/naka_opr/opr/Informacia_o_cinnosti_NAKA_P_PZ_za_ro
k%202015.pdf, [5 November 2016].
Ministry of Labour of Slovakia (2013) Správa o poľnohospodárstve a potravinárstve v Slovenskej
republike za rok 2012, Available at: http://www.vuepp.sk/dokumenty/zelena/zelena2013.pdf, [8 August
2014].
Ministry of Labour of Slovakia (2014) National Strategy for Gender Equality in the Slovak Republic.
Bratislava: Ministry of Labour of Slovakia.
Mir, R., Banerjee, S.B. and Mir, A. (2008) ‘Hegemony and its discontents: a critical analysis of
organizational knowledge transfer’, Critical Perspectives on International Business, vol. 4, no. 2/3, pp.
203-227.
Montuori, A. (2005) ‘How to make enemies and influence people: Anatomy of the anti-pluralist
totalitarian mindset’, Futures, vol. 37, pp. 18-38.
Morris, M.H., Miyasaki, N.N., Watters, C.E. and Coombes. S.M. (2006) ‘The dilemma of growth:
Understanding venture size choices of women entrepreneurs’, Journal of Small Business Management,
vo. 44, no. 2, pp. 221-244.
Morrison, A. (2006) ‘A contextualisation of entrepreneurship’, International Journal of Entrepreneurial
Behaviour & Research, vol. 12, no. 4, pp. 192-209.
Moulton, S. and Wise, C. (2010) ‘Shifting boundaries between the public and private sectors: Implication
from the economic crisis’, Public Administration Review, vol. 70, no. 3, pp. 349-360.
Mueller, S.L. and Thomas, A.S. (2001) ‘Culture and entrepreneurial potential: A nine country study of
locus of control and innovativeness’, Journal of Business Venturing, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 51-75.
Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (2006) ‘Corruption: diagnosis and treatment’, Journal of Democracy, vol. 17, no. 3,
pp. 86-99.
325
Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (2013) ‘Controlling corruption through collective action’, Journal of Democracy, vol.
24. no.1, pp. 101-115.
Nadesan, M.H. (2002) ‘Engineering the entrepreneurial infant: Brain science, infant development toys,
and governmentality’, Cultural Studies, vol. 16. No. 3, pp. 401-432.
Nedelsky, N. (2001) Defining the sovereign community: The Czech and Slovak republics, Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press.
Neumann, I.B. and Sending, O.J. (2007) ‘The international as governmentality’, Journal of International
Studies, vol. 35, no. 3, pp. 677-701.
Nicholson, L. and Anderson, A.R. (2005) ‘News and nuances of the entrepreneurial myth and metaphor:
Linguistic games in entrepreneurial sense-making and sense-giving’, Theory and Practice, vol. 29, no. 2,
pp. 153-172.
Nijkamp, P. (2003) ‘Entrepreneurship in a modern network economy’, Regional Studies, vol. 37, no. 4,
pp. 395-405.
Nove, A. (1977) The Soviet Economic System, London: George Allen & Unwin.
O’Laughlin, B. (2008) ‘Governing capital? Corporate social responsibility and the limits of regulation’,
Development and Change, vol. 39, no. 6, pp. 945-957.
OECD (2000) The Bologna Charter on SME policies.
OECD (2004) ‘Promoting entrepreneurship and innovative SMEs in a global economy’, 2nd Ministerial
Conference on SMEs, 3-5 June, Istanbul, Turkey.
OECD (2011) Convention in combatting bribery of foreign public officials in international business
transactions, Available at:
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/ConvCombatBribery_ENG.pdf, [13 February 2014].
OECD (2014) CleanGovBiz: Integrity in practice, Available at:
http://www.oecd.org/cleangovbiz/49693613.pdf, [13 February 2014].
326
OECD, UNODC and World Bank (2013) Anti-corruption ethics and compliance handbook for business,
Available at: http://www.oecd.org/corruption/Anti-CorruptionEthicsComplianceHandbook.pdf, [16 July
2017].
Ogbor, J.O. (2000) ‘Mythicizing and reification in entrepreneurial discourse: Ideology-critique of
entrepreneurial studies’, Journal of Management Studies, vol. 37, no. 5, pp. 605-635.
Olejárová, M. (2007) SME`s internationalization process in the context of Slovak republic: qualitative
approach, unpublished MSc thesis, Autonomous University of Barcelona:
http://idem.uab.es/olejarova.pdf, [03 May 2012].
Olivier de Sardan, J.P. (1999) ‘A moral economy of corruption in Africa?’, The Journal of Modern African
Studies, vol. 37, no.1, pp. 25-52.
Oltenau, T. (2011) ‘Korupcia: dedičstvo štátneho socializmu?’, Forum Historiae, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 285-
289.
Said, E. (2003) Orientalism, London: Penguin.
Owen, J.M. (2002) ‘The foreign imposition of domestic institutions’, International Organization, vol. 56,
no. 2, pp. 375-409.
Painter-Morland, M. (2010) ‘Questioning corporate codes of ethics’, Business Ethics: A European Review,
vol. 19, no. 3, pp. 265-279.
Patton, M.Q. (1999) ‘Enhancing the quality and credibility of qualitative analysis’, Health Services
Research, vol. 34, no. 5, pp.1189-1208.
Pavarala, V. and Malik, K. (2010) ‘Religions, ethics and attitudes towards corruption: A study of
perspectives in India’, Religions and Development Programme Working paper no. 53, Birmingham.
Pavlínek, P. (1995) ‘Regional development and the disintegration of Czechoslovakia’, Geoforum, vol. 26,
no. 4, pp. 351-372.
Pawelke, A. (2010) ‘A diagnosis of corruption in Slovakia’, ERCAS working paper no. 13, Berlin, Available
at:
327
http://www.againstcorruption.eu/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/WP-13-Diagnosis-of-Corruption-in-
Slovakia-new.pdf, [07 June 2013].
Pechova, A. (2012) ‘Legitimizing discourses in the framework of European integration: the politics of
euro adoption in the Czech Republic and Slovakia’, Review of International Economy, vol. 19, no. 5, pp.
779-807.
Perren, L. and Jennings, P.L. (2005) ‘Government discourses on entrepreneurship: Issues of
legitimization, subjugation, and power’, Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 173-
184.
Persson, A., Rothstein, B. and Teorell, J. (2013) ‘Why anti-corruption reforms fail: Systemic corruption as
a collective action problem’, Governance, vol. 26, no. 3, pp. 449-471.
Petrovic, M. (2013) The democratic transition of post-communist Europe: In the shadow of communist
differences and an uneven EUropenisation, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Pickles, J. And Smith, A. eds, (1998) Theorizing transition: The political economy of post-communist
transformations, London: Routledge.
Pillow, W. (2010) ‘Confession, catharsis, or cure? Rethinking the uses o reflexivity as methodological
power in qualitative research’, International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education, vol. 16, no. 2,
pp. 175-196.
Pinillos, M.J. and Reyes, L. (2011) ‘Relationship between individualist-collectivist culture and
entrepreneurial activity: Evidence from Global Entrepreneurship Monitor data’, Small Business
Economics, vol. 37, no. 1, pp. 23-37.
Piperopoulos, P. (2012) ‘Ethnic female business owners: More female or more ethnic entrepreneurs’,
Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development, vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 192-208.
Polanyi, K. (2002) The great transformation: The political and economic origins of our time, Boston:
Beacon Press.
Poláš, M. (2015) ‘Predajnosť tlače: Noviny zrýchlili pád’, Trend, 12 May.
328
Polese, A. (2008) ‘If I receive it, it is a gift, if I demand it, then it is a bribe: On the local meaning of
economic transactions in post-soviet Ukraine’, Anthropology in Action, vol. 60, no.14, pp. 47-60.
Pollitt, C. (2012) ‘40 years of public management reform’, Policy & Politics 40th Anniversary Conference,
Bristol, 19 September, Available at:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Linz3QykVbQ, [05 December 2013].
Polzer, T. (2001) ‘Corruption: deconstructing the World Bank discourse’, LSE International Development
Working Papers Series no.1-18, London.
Popper, K. R. (1990) ‘Interview with K.R. Popper’, Moscow News, 25 November - 2 December.
Porter, T. and Webb, M. (2007) ‘The role of the OECD in the orchestration of global knowledge
networks’, paper presented at the Canadian Political Science Association annual meetings, Saskatoon, 30
May.
Power, M. (1994) The audit explosion, London: Demos.
Pridham, G. (2008) ‘The EU’s political conditionality and post-accession tendencies: Comparisons from
Slovakia and Latvia’, Journal of Common Market Studies, vo. 43, no. 2, pp. 365-387.
Pridham, G. and Vanhanen, T. eds, (1994) Democratization in Eastern Europe: Domestic and
international perspectives, London: Routledge.
Průcha, V. (1995) ‘Economic development and relations, 1918-1989’, in Musil, J. (ed.) The end of
Czechoslovakia, Budapest: Central European University Press, pp. 40-76.
Průcha, (2004) Hospodářské a sociální dejiny Československa 1928-1992, Část 1 1918-1945 [Part 1 1918-
1945], Brno: Doplnek.
Pyysiäinen, J. and Vesala, K.M. (2013) ‘Activating farmers: Uses of entrepreneurship discourse in the
rhetoric of policy implementers’, Discourse & Communication, vol. 7, no.1, pp. 55-73.
Rabinow, P. and Rose, N. (2003) ‘Foucault today’, in Rabinow P. and Rose, N. (eds) The essential
Foucault: selections from the essential works of Foucault, 1954-1984, New York: New Press, pp. vii-xxxv.
Radaelli, C.M. (2000) ‘Policy transfer in the European Union: Institutional isomorphism as a source of
legitimacy’, Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 25-43.
329
Radu, M. and Redien-Collot, R. (2008) ‘The social representation of entrepreneurs in the French press:
desirable and feasible models?’, International Small Business Journal, vol. 26, no. 3. pp. 259-298.
Rajan, R.G. and Zingales, L. (1998) ‘Which capitalism? Lessons from the East Asian Crisis’, Journal of
Applied Corporate Finance, vol. 11, p no. 3, pp. 40-48.
Reed, S.J. (2012) ‘Erecting closets and outing ourselves: Uncomfortable reflexivity and community-based
research’, Journal of Community Psychology, vol. 40, no. 1, pp. 11-26.
Rehn, A. and Taalas, S. (2004) ‘Crime and assumptions in entrepreneurship’, in Hjorth, D. and Steyaert,
C. (eds) Narrative and discursive approaches in entrepreneurship: A second movements in
entrepreneurship book, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 144-159.
Rose-Ackerman, S. (1997) The role of the World Bank in controlling corruption, Available at:
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/591/, [11 February 2014].
Rose-Ackerman, S. (2001) ‘Trust and honesty in post-socialist societies’, Kyklos, vol. 54, no. 2-3, pp. 415-
444.
Rose-Ackerman, S. and Truex, R. (2012) Corruption and reform, Yale Law & Economic Research Paper no.
444, Available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2007152, [12 February 2014].
Rudolph, R.L. (1976) Banking and industrialization in Austria-Hungary: The role of banks in the
industrialization of the Czech crownlands 1973-1914, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ruud, A.E. (2000) ‘Corruption as everyday practice. The public-private divide in local Indian society’,
Forum for Development Studies, vol. 2, no. 2, pp.271-394.
Sabatier, P.A. (1987) ‘Knowledge, policy-oriented learning, and policy change: An advocacy coalition
framework’, Science Communication, vol. 8, no. 4, pp. 649-692.
Sajó, A. (1998) ‘Corruption, clientelism and the future of constitutional state in Eastern Europe’, East
European Constitutional Review, vol. 7, no. 37, pp. 37-46.
Sajó, A. (2003) ‘From corruption to exportion: Conceptualization of post-communist corruption’, Crime,
Law and Social Change, vol. 40, no. 2, pp. 171-194.
330
Sampson, S. (2005) ‘Integrity warriors: Global morality and the anti-corruption movement in the
Balkans’, in Haller, D. and Shore, C. (eds) Corruption: Anthropological perspectives, London: Pluto Press,
pp. 103-130.
Sampson, S. (2010) ‘The anti-corruption industry – from movement to institution’, Global Crime, vol. 11,
no. 2, pp. 261-278.
Sandholtz, S. and Taagepera, R. (2005) ‘Corruption, culture and communism’, International Review of
Sociology, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 109-131.
Sandholtz, W. and Koetzle, W. (2000) ‘Accounting for corruption: Economic structure, democracy, and
trade’, International Studies Quarterly, vol. 44, pp.31-50.
Saunders, M., Lewis, P. and Thornhill, A. (2009) Research Methods for Business Students, 5th edition,
Harlow: Pearson Education.
Saunders, M.N.K and Thornhill, A. (2011) ‘Researching sensitive issues without sensitising: Using a
concurrent mixed methods design to research trust and distrust’, Journal of Multiple Research
Approaches, vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 334-350.
Schimmelfennig, F. (2000) ‘International socialization in the new Europe: Rational action in an
institutional environment’, European Journal of International Relations, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 109-139.
Schimmelfennig, F. and Sedelmeier, U. (2002) ‘Theorizing EU enlargement: Research focus, hypotheses,
and the state of research, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 9, no. 4, pp. 500-528.
Schimmelfennig, F. and Sedelmeier, U. (2004) ‘Governance by conditionality: EU rule transfer to the
candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe’, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 11, no. 4, pp.
661-679.
Schimmelfennig, F. and Sedelmeier, U. (2005) ‘Conclusions: The impact of the EU on the accession
countries’, in Schimmelfennig, F. and Sedelmeier, U. (eds) The europenization of central and Eastern
Europe, New York: Cornell Press, pp. 210-228.
Schmidt, L.H. (1990) Det sociale selv, Århus: Århus: Universitetsforlag.
Schmidt, L.H. and Kristensen, J.E. (1985) Foucault’s Blik, Århus: Modtryk.
331
Schnell, I. and Sofer, M. (2003) ‘Embedding entrepreneurship in social structure: Israeli-Arab
entrepreneurship’, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, vol. 27, no. 2, pp. 300-318.
Schultz, H. and Kubů, E. (2006) ‘Economic nationalism in East Central Europe’, paper presented at XIV.
International Economic History Congress, Helsinki, 9 June.
Schulze, M.S. and Wolf, N. (2009) ‘Economic nationalism an economic stagnation: The Austro-Hungarian
empire in the late nineteenth century’, CESinfo working paper series 2813, Munich.
Schwarcz, P., Bandlerová, A. and Schwarczová, L. (2013) ‘Selected issues of the agricultural land market
in the Slovak Republic’, Journal of Central European Agriculture, vol. 14, no. 3, pp. 1102-1115.
Seale, C. (1999) The quality of qualitative research, London: Sage.
Seelos, C. an Mair, J. (20056) ‘Social entrepreneurship: Creating new business models to serve the poor’,
Business Horizons, vol. 48, np. 3, pp. 241-246.
Semančík, M. (2014) Interview, 13 January, Available: http://www.sppk.sk/?
pl=90&article=2336&PHPSESSID=4e247cbee4703fa9a16b0a1fd3f4a19d, [11 August 2014].
Shiv, B. and Fedorikhin, A. (1999) ‘Heart and mind in conflict: The interplay of affect and cognition in
consumer decision making’, Journal of Consumer Research, vol. 26, no. 3, pp. 278-292.
Sičáková-Beblavá, E., Beblavý, M., Kollár, M. and Lovrantová, K. (2001) Slamené či oceľová putá,
Bratislava: Univerzita Komenského.
Siemens, L. (2012) ‘Embedding small business and entrepreneurship training within the rural context’,
The International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Innovation, vol. 13, no. 3, pp. 165-178.
Slovak Business Agency (2010) Správa o stave malého a stredného podnikania v Slovenskej republike v
roku 2010, Available at: http://www.sbagency.sk/sites/default/files/stav_msp_2010.pdf, 8 August
2014].
Slovak Business Agency (2012) Správa o stave malého a stredného podnikania v Slovenskej republike v
roku 2012, Available at:
http://www.sbagency.sk/sites/default/files/stav_msp_2012_sk.pdf, [07 July 2014].
Smith, A.D. (1986) The ethnic origins of nations, Malden: Blackwell.
332
Spangenberg, J.H. (2010) ‘The growth discourse, growth policy and sustainable development: two
thought experiments’, Journal of Cleaner Production, vol. 18, no. 6, pp. 561-566.
Sparling, R. (2013) ‘Sunlightis the best disinfectant? Etienne de la Boetie on corruption and
transparency’, European Journal of Political Theory, vol. 12, no. 4, pp. 483-509/
SPPK (no date) Stanovy SPPK (Status of SPPK), Available at: http://www.sppk.sk/?pl=14, [8 August 2014].
Staniszkis, J. (1991) The dynamics of the breakthrough in Eastern Europe, Berkeley: University of
California Press.
Stapenhurst, R. (2000) ‘The media’s role in curbing corruption’, World Bank Institute Working Paper
21024, Washington D.C.
Staroňová, K. (2008) ‘Nástroje intervencie vo verejnej politike s cieľom znižovania, in Sičáková-Beblavá,
E. and Beblavý, M. (eds) Jedenásť statočných: Prípadové štúdie protikorupčných nástrojov na Slovensku,
Bratislava: Transparency International Slovensko and Ústav verejnej politiky FSEV UK, pp. 8-30.
Stevenson, L. (1990) ‘Some methodological problems associated with researching women
entrepreneurs’, Journal of Business Ethics, vol. 9, no. 4-5, pp. 439-446.
Stigler, G. (1984) ‘Economics: the imperial science?’, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, vol. 86, no. 3,
pp. 301-313.
Stiglitz, J.E. (2012) The price of inequality, New York: W.W. Norton & Company.
Stone, D. (2004) ‘Transfer agents and global networks in the “transnationalization” of policy’, Journal of
European Public Policy, vol. 11, no. 3, pp. 545-566.
Strang, D. and Macy, M.W. (2001) ‘In search of excellence: Fads, success stories, and adaptive
emulation’, American Journal of Sociology, vol. 107, no. 1, pp. 147-182.
Streiner, D.L. and Sidani, S. eds, (2010) When research goes off the rails: Why it happens and what you
can do about it, New York: Guildford Press.
Suphachalasai, S. (2005) ‘Bureacratic corruption and mass media’, Environmental Economy and Policy
Research Discussion Paper no. 05.2005, Washington DC, Available at:
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=722403, [18 June 2017].
333
Svejnar, J. (2000) ‘Explaining Czechoslovakia’s dissolution: Assessing economic performance before and
after the breakup’, in Kraus, M. and Stanger, A. (eds) Irreconcilable differences?: Explaining
Czechoslovakia’s dissolution, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, pp. 183-198.
Swain, N. (1999) ‘Agricultural restitution and co-operative transformation in the Czech Republic, Hungary
and Slovakia’, Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 51, no. 7, pp. 119-1219.
Swedberg, R. (1991) Joseph A. Schumpeter: His life and work, New York: Polity Press.
Swinnen, J.F.M. and Vranken, L. (no date) Review of the transitional restrictions maintained by new
mumber states on the acquisition of agricultural real estate, Available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/capital/docs/study_en.pdf, [11 August 2014].
Šatníková, S. (2012) Introducing anti-corruption policies in companies: Theory and practice from Slovakia,
Available at: http://www.transparency.sk/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/Anti-corruption-policies-in-
companies_Satnikova.pdf, [Accessed 27 December 2016].
Širá, E. (2013) Analýza postavenia poľnohospodárstva v ekonomike vybraných, Available at:
https://www.pulib.sk/web/kniznica/elpub/dokument/Kotulic20/subor/Sira.pdf, [8 August 2014].
Šoltés, P. (2011) ‘Medzi verejným blahom a osobným prospechom: Arény korupcie a jej reflexia v
uhorskom diskurze v prvej polovici “dlhého” 19. storočia’, Forum Historiae, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 14-37.
Špulerová, J., Dobrovodská, M., Lieskovský, J., Bača, A., Halabuk, A., Kohút, F., Mojsej, M., Kenderessy, P.,
Piscová, V., Barančok, P., Gerhátová, K., Krajčí, J., Boltižiar, M. (2011) ‘Inventory and classification of
historical structures of the agricultural landscape in Slovakia’, Ekológia, vol. 30, no. 2, pp. 157-170.
Statistical Office of Slovakia (2010) Farm structure census, Available at:
http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/ess/ess_test_folder/World_Census_Agriculture/
Country_info_2010/Reports/Reports_4/SVK_ENG_SVK_REP_2010.pdf, [11 November 2014].
Statistical Office of Slovakia (2013a) Návštevníci v ubytovacích zariadeniach cestovnťho ruchu (Vistors in
tourism accommodation facilities, Available: http://portal.statistics.sk/showdoc.do?docid=67349, [11
August 2014].
334
Statistical Office of Slovakia (2013b) Satelitný účet cestovného ruchu v Slovenskej republike, Available:
http://portal.statistics.sk/files/Sekcie/sek_600/satelitny-ucet-cestovneho-ruchu-sr-2013.pdf, [11 August
2014].
Tanzi, V. (1998) Corruption around the world: causes, consequences, scope and cures, IMF working paper
no. 98/63.
Teichova, A. (1988) The Czechoslovak economy 1918-1980, London: Routledge.
Temple, B. and Young, A. (2004) ‘Qualitative research and translation dilemmas’, Qualitative Research,
vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 161-178.
Theobald, R. (1999) ‘So what really is the problem about corruption?’, Third World Quarterly, vol. 20, no.
3, pp. 491-502.
Thielemann, E.R. (2001) ‘The “soft” europenisation of migration policy: European integration and
domestic policy change’, paper presented at the ECSA Seventh Biennial International Conference,
Madison, 31 May – 2 June.
Timmermans, A. and Scholten, P. (2006) ‘The political flow of wisdom: Science institutions as policy
venues in Netherlands’, in Baumgartner, F.R., Green-Pedersen, C. and Jones, B. (eds) Comparative
studies of policy agendas, Oxon: Routledge, pp. 146-160.
Timoracký, M., Gyarfášová, O. and Bátora, J. (2013) Branding Slovenska: Od ideového konceptu k
posolstvám a komunikácii, Bratislava: MZVaEZ.
Tkáč, M. (1997) Hospodárske súvislosti slovenskej štátnosti, Bratislava: Print Service.
Tonge, J. (2001) ‘A review of small business literature Part 1: Defining the small business’, Manchester
Metropolitan University Business School Working Paper Series no. 25, Manchester, Available at:
http://www.ribm.mmu.ac.uk/wps/papers/01-18.pdf, [10 November 2014].
Tonnies, F. (1940) Fundamental concepts of sociology: Gemeinschaft und gesselschaft, New York:
American Book Company.
Tonoyan, V. (2005) ‘The dark side of trust: corruption and entrepreneurship- a cross-national
comparison between emerging and mature market economies’, in Höhmann H.H. and Welter F. (eds)
335
Trust and entrepreneurship: A West-East perspective, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, pp.
39-58.
Tonoyan, V., Strohmeyer, R., Habib, M. and Perlitz, M. (2010) ‘Corruption and entrepreneurship: How
formal and informal institutions shape small firm behaviour in transition and mature market economies’,
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, vol. 34, no. 5, pp. 803-831.
Transparency International (1998) 1998 Corruption Perceptions Index, Available at:
http://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/1998_corruption_perceptions_index, [11 November
2014].
Transparency International (1999) 1999 Corruption Perceptions Index, Available at:
http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/cpi_1999, [11 November 2014].
Transparency International (2000) 2000 Corruption Perceptions Index, Available at:
http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/cpi_2000, [11 November 2014].
Transparency International (2001) 2001 Corruption Perceptions Index, Available at:
http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/cpi_2001/0/, [11 November 2014].
Transparency International (2002) 2002 Corruption Perceptions Index, Available at:
http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/cpi_2002/0/, [11 November 2014].
Transparency International (2003) 2003 Corruption Perceptions Index, Available at:
http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/cpi_2003/0/, [11 November 2014].
Transparency International (2004) 2004 Corruption Perceptions Index, Available at:
http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/cpi_2004/0/, [11 November 2014].
Transparency International (2005) 2005 Corruption Perceptions Index, Available at:
http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/cpi_2005/0/, [11 November 2014].
Transparency International (2006) 2006 Corruption Perceptions Index, Available at:
http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/cpi_2006/0/, [11 November 2014].
Transparency International (2007) 2007 Corruption Perceptions Index, Available at:
http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/cpi_2007/0/, [11 November 2014].
336
Transparency International (2008b) 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index, Available at:
http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/cpi_2008/0/, [11 November 2014].
Transparency International (2009) 2009 Corruption Perceptions Index, Available at:
http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/cpi_2009/0/, [11 November 2014].
Transparency International (2010) 2010 Corruption Perceptions Index, Available at:
http://www.transparency.org/cpi2010 , [11 November 2014].
Transparency International (2011) 2011 Corruption Perceptions Index, Available at:
http://www.transparency.org/cpi2011 , [11 November 2014].
Transparency International (2012a) 2012 Corruption Perceptions Index, Available at:
http://www.transparency.org/cpi2012, [11 November 2014].
Transparency International (2012b) National integrity system assessment: Slovak Republic, Bratislava:
Slovakia.
Transparency International (2013a) Business principles for countering bribery, Berlin: TI.
Transparency International (2013b) 2013 Corruption Perceptions Index, Available at:
http://www.transparency.org/cpi2013 , [11 November 2014].
Transparency International (2013c) Global Corruption Barometer 2013, Available at:
http://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/country/?country=afghanistan, [5 November 2016].
Transparency International (2014) 2014 Corruption Perceptions Index, Available at:
https://www.transparency.org/cpi2014, [10 April 2016].
Transparency International (2015) 2015 Corruption Perceptions Index, Available at:
https://www.transparency.org/cpi2015/, [10 April 2015].
Tripp, D. (1985) ‘Case study generalization: an agenda for action’, British Educational Research Journal,
vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 33-43.
Ucbasaran, D. (2008) ‘The fine “science” of entrepreneurial decision-making’, Journal of Management
Studies, vol. 45, no. 1, pp. 221-237.
337
Udehn, L. (1996) The limits of public choice: A sociological critique of the economic theory of politics,
London: Routledge.
UNECE (2009) Share of agriculture on GDP, Available at:
http://w3.unece.org/pxweb/quickstatistics/readtable.asp?qs_id=6&lang=1. [11 November 2014].
United Nations (2013) Global Compact: a guide for anti-corruption risk assessment, UN: New York.
UNIDO and UNODC (2012) Corruption prevention to foster small and medium-sized enterprise
development, UN: Vienna.
UNODC (2004) United Nations Convention against Corruption, Available at:
http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-50026_E.pdf, [03
September 2013].
USAID (2007) Booklet of standardized small and medium enterprises definitions, Available at:
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADM845.pdf, [17 October 2014].
Vaillant, Y. and Lafuente, E. (2007) ‘Do different institutional frameworks condition the influence of local
fear or failure and entrepreneurial examples over entrepreneurial activity?’, Entrepreneurship and
Regional Development, vol. 19, no. 4, pp. 313-337.
Vachudova, M.A. (2009) ‘Corruption and compliance in the EU’s post-communist members and
candidates’, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 47, no. 1, pp. 43-62.
Vallentin, S. and Murillo, D. (2012) ‘Governmentality and the politics of CSR’, Organization, vol. 19, no. 6,
pp. 825-843.
Vesztróczy, Z. (2015) ‘Modernizácia a/alebo maďarizácia’, Acta historica Neosoliensia, vol. 18, pp. 214-
235.
Vilčeková, L. (2014) ‘Slovak consumers’ attitudes toward foreign versus domestic brands’, Journal of
Marketing Management, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 33-42.
Vlach, J. and Ursíny, D. (2007) Ako dobre a správne verejne obstarávať, Available at:
http://transparency.sk/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/. akoobstaravatfinal.pdf, [11 November 2014].
338
Vogel, D.J. (2005) ‘Is there a market for virtue?: The business case for corporate social responsibility’,
California Management Review, vol. 47, no. 3, pp. 315-326.
Vörös, L. (2011) ‘Úvod: Korupcia ako historický fenomén’, Forum Historiae, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 1-13.
Vos, E., Yeh, A.J, Carter, S. and Tagg, S. (2007) ‘The happy story of small business financing’, Journal of
Banking & Finance, vol. 31, no. 9, pp. 2648-2672.
Walters, E.G. (1988) The other Europe: Eastern Europe to 1945, New York: Syracuse University Press.
Warren, M.E. (1974) ‘Governmental secrecy: corruption’s ally’, American Bar Association Journal, vol.
60, no. 5, pp. 550-552.
Warren, M.E. (2004) ‘What does corruption mean in a democracy’, American Journal of Political Science,
vol. 48, no. 2, pp. 328-343.
Waterman, R.W. and Meier, K.J. (1998) ‘Principal-agent models: An expansion?’, Journal of Public
Administration Research and Theory, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 173-202.
Wedel, J.R. (2012) ‘Rethinking corruption in an age of ambiguity’, Annual Review of Law and Social
Science, vol. 8, pp. 453-498.
Weedon, C. (1987) Feminist practice and poststructuralist theory, Cambridge: Blackwell.
Weiss, L. (2005) ‘The state-augmenting effects of globalization’, New Political Economy, vol. 10, no. 3,
pp. 345-353.
Wennekers, A.R.M., Uhlaner, L.M. and Thurik, A.R. (2002) ‘Entrepreneurship and its conditions: A macro
perspective’, International Journal of Entrepreneurship Education, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 25-64.
Westen, D. (2007) The political brain: the role of emotion in deciding the fate of the nation, New York:
Public Affairs.
Williams, A.M. (2013) ‘Mobilities and sustainable tourism: Path-creating or path-dependent
relationships?’, Journal of Sustainable Tourism, vol. 21, no. 4, pp. 511-531.
Williams, A.M. and Baláž, V. (1999) ‘Privatisation in Central Europe: Different legacies, methods, and
outcomes’, Environment and planning C: Government and policy, vol. 17, no. 6, pp. 731-751.
339
Williams, A.M. and Baláž, V. (2000) ‘Privatisation and the development of tourism in the Czech Republic
and Slovakia: Property rights, firm performance, and recombinant property’, Environment and Planning
A, vol. 32, no. 4, pp. 715-734.
Williams, A.M. and Baláž (2001) ‘From collective provision to commodification of tourism?’, Annals of
Tourism Research, vol. 28, no. 1, pp. 27-49.
Williams, J.W. and Beare, M.E. (1999) ‘The business of bribery: Globalization, economic liberalization,
and the “problem” of corruption’, Crime, Law & Social Change, vol. 32, no. 2, pp. 115-146.
Wilson, B.M. (1998) Costa Rica: politics, economics and democracy, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Witsoe, J. (2011) ‘Corruption as power: Caste and the political imagination of the postcolonial state’,
American Ethnologist, vol. 38, no. 1, pp. 3-85.
Withers, C.W.J. (2007) Placing the Enlightenment, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Wolf, S. (2010) ‘Assessing Eastern Europe’s anti-corruption performance: views from the Council of
Europe, OECD, and Transparency International’, Global Crime, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 99-121.
Wolf, S. (2010) ‘Assessing Eastern Europe’s anti-corruption performance: views from the Council of
Europe, OECD, and Transparency International’, Global Crime, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 99-121, [23 March
2014].
World Bank (2011) Governance and anti-corruption, Available at:
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/WBI/EXTWBIGOVANTCOR/0,,menuPK:1740542~pagePK:6
4168427~piPK:64168435~theSitePK:1740530,00.html, [10 February 2014].
World Bank (2013) World development report, Washington DC: World Bank.
Zemko, M. (2011) ‘Politické funkcie a lojality ako zdroj nekriminálnej korupcie v demokracii a diktatúre’,
Forum Histariae, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 82-95
340
341