Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2004, pp. 243--249

Affirmative Action and the Searchfor Educational Equity

Faye J. Crosby∗University of California, Santa Cruz

Susan ClaytonThe College of Wooster

We discuss the ideas presented by Renner and Moore. We agree that it is a mistaketo justify affirmative action solely in terms of diversity, and we think it is vital tonote the continuing disparities in the educational opportunities afforded to Whitestudents and to other students. We believe that the views expressed by Renner andMoore present an opportunity to think critically about a number of issues relatedto affirmative action.

Renner and Moore (2004) have written a provocative and timely article. Interms of both specific points of information and general conceptualizations, the ar-ticle by Renner and Moore should help scholars and activists who wish to continuethe fight for social justice generally and for racial parity in particular. In clear andsuccinct language, they describe a problem that confronts American society. Theyshow, furthermore, how important it is—for economic and demographic reasonsas well as for reasons of justice—to address this problem.

In work that we have done, together and separately, over the last 15 years orso, we have presented theory and research that ally us to scholars like Renner andMoore. We have conducted empirical research that documents the need for affir-mative action (e.g., Crosby, 1982; Crosby, Clayton, Hemker, & Alksnis, 1986) andthat helps to explicate people’s reactions to affirmative action (e.g., Clayton, 1996;Elizondo & Crosby, in press; Golden, Hinkle, & Crosby, 2001; Ozawa, Crosby, &Crosby, 1996; Schmermund, Sellers, Mueller, & Crosby, 2001; Tougas, Crosby,Joly, & Pelchat, 1995; Truax, Wood, Wright, Cordova, & Crosby, 1998). In efforts

∗Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to F.J. Crosby, Psychology Depart-ment, University of California, Santa Cruz, Santa Cruz, CA 95064 [email: fjcrosby@ucsc.edu].

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to promote a firm understanding of affirmative action, we have also synthesizedwork done by other researchers (e.g., Clayton & Crosby, 1992; Crosby, 1994;Crosby & Blanchard, 1989; Crosby, Iyer, Clayton, & Downing, 2003; Tomasson,Crosby, & Herzberger, 1996).

From our perspective, Renner and Moore’s article is particularly valuable inthat it shows that ethnic minority students have made few gains since 1965 relativeto the gains made by White students. Especially impressive are the pictorial rep-resentations in the article (particularly Figure 2) that illustrate how “minority stu-dents . . . have not participated in the huge expansion of access to higher educationat the same rate as whites over the period of affirmative action.” In showing thepersistent gap between ethnic minority and majority students, Renner and Moorejoin the ranks of other scholars (e.g., Bell, 2004; Ogletree, 2004) who, 50 yearson, are calling attention to the limited long-term success of the Brown v. Board ofEducation.

Like others (e.g., Pincus, 2003) Renner and Moore make clear that reversediscrimination is a red herring. White applicants for university are mostly in com-petition with other White applicants and are not really in competition with appli-cants of color. A similar observation has been made by Bowen and Bok (1998)who demonstrated that racially sensitive admissions policies at 28 New Englandcolleges resulted in little change in a White applicant’s chance of success. Specif-ically, race-sensitive admissions policies meant that a White applicant’s chancesof being granted admission at the schools dropped—from 26.5% to 25%!

What is the implication of the stark racial disparities described by Rennerand Moore for the policy of affirmative action? They argue that scholars andactivists need to justify affirmative action on grounds other than diversity. Infact, the diversity argument, according to Renner and Moore, can undermine theeffectiveness of affirmative action.

Over the years, we too have called on scholars and activists to move beyondthe diversity argument. In an article published around the time that the SupremeCourt was hearing oral arguments in the cases of Gratz v Bollinger and Grutter vBollinger, for example, we state:

In the public debates about affirmative action, justification of the policy has rested ontwo planks: diversity and fairness (Tierney, 1997). Most educators who have entered thedebates have stressed affirmative action’s worth in terms of achieving diversity (Bowen& Bok, 1998). By focusing on diversity and ignoring issues of merit, the educators whoadvocate for affirmative action seem to talk past the public commentators who oppose thepolicy (Wachtel, 1999). . . . Focusing exclusively on diversity, the educators have ignoredthe issue of greatest relevance to critics: the issue of preference (Kendler, 2000).

Our article contributes to the debate over affirmative action by emphasizing merit. Weargue that affirmative action is a policy that is entirely consistent with the American meri-tocratic ideal (Crosby et al., 2003, p. 94).

The problem with the diversity argument, say Renner and Moore, is that iteliminates the criterion of racial equity. The legal position based on diversity is

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that “race may be used to achieve diversity under limited circumstances, not thatrace must be used whenever there are persistent effects of past and present dis-crimination” (Renner & Moore, 2004). Paradoxically, diversity as a philosophyis similar to colorblindness in that it ignores the historical experiences and so-ciocultural significance associated with specific ethnicities. A diversity criteriondirects attention away from the continuing reality of discrimination, and impliesthat it is the multiplicity of ethnicities rather than the status of any particular ethnicgroup that is of value. The success of diversity is evaluated not in terms of whetherminority groups’ disadvantage has been removed but in terms of whether (mostlyWhite) students are receiving an enhanced education.

By highlighting the shortcomings both of affirmative action as a policy and ofthe legal arguments used to support it, Renner and Moore’s article should serve asa springboard for discussions of some vexing issues. Four issues seem particularlyworth noting.

First, there is the question of whether affirmative action is a policy that tilts infavor of ethnic minorities or is a genuinely neutral policy. We have conceptualizedaffirmative action as a neutral policy whereby monitoring of outcomes allows usto detect processes, including face-neutral processes, that (often unintentionally)put people of color at a disadvantage. Like Jencks (1998), we have questionedthe reliance on gating mechanisms that do little to predict actual performanceon the job or in school but that serve to eliminate applicants of color. We have citedthe SATs, even the SAT IIs, as such a mechanism, noting that the 200-point gapbetween majority and underrepresented students sounds quite dramatic but resultsin only a half a grade difference in grade point averages of students at the Universityof California (Crosby, Clayton, Downing, & Iyer, 2004). If traditional admissionscriteria truly assess merit objectively, then affirmative action policies that reducethe impact of these criteria do privilege minority applicants over White applicants.But if, as we argue, these criteria are themselves biased, then affirmative actionsimply corrects for imperfections (that favor Whites) in the existing policies andprocedures.

Renner and Moore are less convinced. “Since every single educational policyand practice cannot be truly race neutral in terms of its outcomes,” say Rennerand Moore, “such as legacy admissions, it is the balance that is key to equity.” Or,a little later: “the total set of admission standards, procedures, and policies thatgovern overall access to higher education, still favor whites. Their effect more thanoffsets the limited impact of admission procedures that supports minorities.”

Where does the truth lie? With many different affirmative action plans inplace, affirmative action may sometimes accord privilege while at other timesit actually removes the hitherto invisible privilege of Whites. Discussions of af-firmative action should be more conscious of the differences between programsat specific institutions, and look for the best practices in terms of effectiveness,fairness, and acceptability to those affected.

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The second issue provoked by the Renner and Moore analysis concerns thepossible pernicious effects of the Grutter v Bollinger and Gratz v Bollinger de-cisions. In both decisions, the Supreme Court declared that the state has a com-pelling interest in having diverse student bodies. Like Renner and Moore, wethink that much is lost if liberals seek to justify affirmative action solely in termsof diversity. But we also believe that the defense of the University of Michigan wasmore or less pre-determined by the importance of the Bakke decision and by thejudicial principle of stare decisis. In American jurisprudence, precedent trumpsinnovation. Having read the 1954 decision in Brown v Board of Education ofTopeka, we do not know how the counsel for the University of Michigancould have used the decision in Brown as precedence (Smith & Crosby,in press). Thus, while agreeing with Renner and Moore that diversity should notbe the only, or even the major, justification for affirmative action, we believethat diversity might be an effective argument alongside what we call the meritargument.

Given what we know about system justification (Jost, 1995; Kay, Jimenez,& Jost, 2002) there may be a strategic advantage in emphasizing diversity andeven more advantage in showing how diversity benefits White students. Researchsuggests that some Whites react to affirmative action policies on the basis of howthe policies will affect Whites and are not concerned with the policies’ impact onBlacks (Lowery, 2004). Diversity may, thus, provide the best argument to appealto Whites. Finally, we also consider diversity to be a valid argument (Gurin, 1999;Gurin, Dey, Hurtado, & Gurin, 2002), a point that Renner and Moore do notcontest.

The third issue that is highlighted for us as we read Renner and Moore’s articleconcerns the chasm between liberal and conservative interpretations of the sets ofstatistics. Like Renner and Moore, we attribute Whites’ relative educational gainsto structural factors that facilitate White success and impede the success of others.Renner and Moore produce a list of nine circumstances that confer advantage toWhite students, starting with prepaid tax-exempt tuition plans that benefit affluentfamilies. We find the list totally persuasive. But we also wonder if scholars on thepolitical right would be as persuaded as we are. They might, instead, point to thepersistent gap between Whites and others and then proclaim, “See! The problemlies in the minorities; try as we might, we cannot make progress.”

What explains these differences in perspective? Why are Whites so focusedon the (incorrect) perception that people of color (rather than other Whites) havesomehow robbed them of scarce resources—such as admission to selective collegesand universities? Could it be that Whites’ reactivity to the presumed theft of placesby people of color derives from the persistent racist assumption that people ofcolor have no place at selective universities? Similarly, could it be that Whites’relative insensitivity to inter-White competition springs from the continuing racist

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presumption that White people more or less automatically merit a place at selectiveuniversities?

In making a public argument for affirmative action, we need to be aware ofthe impact of ideology on perceptions of the policy. When the media highlighta particular ideological interpretation, or when White frustration over job lossfinds a racist explanation appealing, it is not enough for us to argue that affirma-tive action is needed. People in structurally advantaged groups gain self-esteemfrom ideologies that justify their groups’ advantage as a function of innate groupdifferences; thus the desire to retain social dominance may drive opposition toaffirmative action (e.g. Federico & Sidanius, 2002). Political conservatives aremore likely than liberals to make dispositional attributions for social disadvantage(Cozzarelli, Wilkinson, & Tagler, 2001; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway,2003; Zucker & Wiener, 1993). Proponents of affirmative action need to provideevidence that structural, not personological, explanations account for the White-Black differences in achievement and to demonstrate that White losses are due toeconomic factors and not to reverse discrimination.

The final issue we want to highlight concerns one statement made in themiddle of the Renner and Moore article: “When the numerical effects outlinedat the start of this paper no longer exist, affirmative action will no longer beneeded.” We disagree. Affirmative action is primarily a monitoring system. Evenafter progress has been made, more progress will be necessary. We know fromsocial identity theory that people will break into groups on the slightest provo-cation, often using visible markers as a way of assorting themselves (e.g., Tajfel,1982). The mechanism of in-group preference, furthermore, means that peoplewill always have a tendency to favor those in their own group and to undervaluethose in the out-group. People at the top of any hierarchy will—often quite outof awareness—engage in behaviors that perpetuate structural imbalances. When-ever jobs are advertised by word of mouth, for example, people like the alreadyemployed enjoy real, if hidden, advance. Discrimination is thus a constant fact ofsocial life, not the aberration of some usually underdeveloped or mean individ-uals. So monitoring will always be needed. “Good intentions and pure motivesare not enough to ensure the successful operation of democracy. . . . Thomas Jef-ferson observed that the price of democracy is eternal vigilance” (Crosby, 2004,p. 239).

In closing, we would like to end where we began. Renner and Moore’sarticle serves as an excellent reminder that those who support racial equalityin education cannot assume the goal has been achieved, or even that affirma-tive action programs can be relied upon to reach the goal. The statistics theypresent in bold relief are statistics that everyone should know. Equally laudatory isRenner and Moore’s insistence on moving beyond the diversity justification. Weare pleased that the article has appeared and are grateful to have had the chance tocomment.

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FAYE CROSBY is professor of psychology at the University of California, SantaCruz. She is a feminist social psychologist specializing in issues of social justiceand affirmative action. She is also a past president of SPSSI.

SUSAN CLAYTON is professor of social psychology at the College of Wooster,in Wooster, Ohio. She has published a number of articles on affirmative actionand is coauthor (with Faye Crosby) of Justice, Gender, and Affirmative Action(University of Michigan Press). Clayton also writes about other topics relevant tosocial justice and identity, particularly environmental issues.