eric voegelin on nazi political extremism
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Eric Voegelin on Nazi Political ExtremismAuthor(s): Clifford F. PorterSource: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 63, No. 1 (Jan., 2002), pp. 151-171Published by: University of Pennsylvania PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3654262
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8/19/2019 Eric Voegelin on Nazi Political Extremism
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r i c
Voegel in
o
N a z i
olitical
xtremism
Clifford
E
Porter
EricVoegelin (1901-1985) is notas well knownamonghistoriansas he is
among
political
theorists,
yet
he has
had
a
continuing
influence
on both Ger-
man
Social
Democratand
ChristianDemocrat
political
leaders.
His
early
life
is
very
much
a
reflection
of
both
the
intellectual
developments
and
the chaos
of
Germany
and
Austria
between the
wars.
Voegelin's
analysis
of
Nazism
is worth
revisiting
by
historians
because
it
delineated
the
Nazi
rationale
or
the Holo-
caust in the
early
1930s,
even
if
the Nazis themselves
had
yet
to
move
towards
mass
murder
arly
in
the
regime.
Voegelin
was
not
prescient
enough
to
predict
the
extent
of the
Holocaust,
but
he
understood
hat
the
ideological
rationale
of
Nazi violence was unlimited.Furthermore, is descriptionof politicalextrem-
ism
as
Gnosticism
in
1952
is
valid
for
explaining
why
an
individual
might
support
he Nazis
and then
voluntarily
commit
extraordinarily
icious
acts to
try
to
realize the
dream-worldof the
ThirdReich.
The
political,
economic,
and
social chaos
in
Austria
after
World
War
I was
the
catalyst
for
the
young
Eric
Voegelin's
studies
of
the
essence
of
ideologies
and
the
ideologists
who
promoted
hem
from
both the
left
and
right
wing.
As
National Socialism
grew,
so
did his
experiences
with
and
understanding
of
extremist
political
ideologies.
Contemporary
ntellectual
debates
between
neo-
Kantianandexistentialistmethodology,however,didnothelppenetrate o the
essential
causes
of
political
extremism.
His
experiences
n America
n the mid-
1920s
were essential for
his
development
away
from what
he characterized
s
narrow
methodological
provincialism
to
an
empiricism
open
to
philosophic
questions,
including spiritual
questions.
By
1938
he had
theorized
hat
ideolo-
gies
were
political
secular
religions
that substituted
he
state for
divine
reality.
Because
of
this
interpretation,
Voegelin's
approach
o totalitarianism
as
been
characterized
as an
outdated
ersatz
religion
model,
better suited
for the
Cold
War.'The ersatz
religion
model
worked
reasonably
well to describe
simi-
See,
for
example,
Dominick
LaCapra,
Representing
the
Holocaust:
History
Theory,
and
Trauma
(Ithaca,
N.Y.,
1994).
151
Copyright
2002
by
Journal
f the
History
of
Ideas,
Inc.
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8/19/2019 Eric Voegelin on Nazi Political Extremism
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152
Clifford
F Porter
larities
the
National Socialist
movement had
with
religions,
but
Voegelin
rec-
ognized
that t
did
not
penetrate
o the essence
of
ideologies.
His
understanding
of
ideologies
matured
after
World War
II
into his
theory
that
ideologies
were
Gnostic
quests
for absolute
certainty
hat
caused
alienation
from
reality.
Voegelin thoughtthatthe searchfor certaintyultimatelyrequiredexclud-
ing any
evidence
to the
contrary
of the
ideology;
therefore,
deologies
limited
the
individual's view
of
human
reality
to the
immediate
world.
Furthermore,
although
ideologies
are
founded on
a
kernel
of
truth-e.g.,
proletarians
are
sometimes
oppressed-ideologists
become
quickly
alienated
from
reality
as
a
consequence
of
their own
quest
for
certainty
about
meaning
in
existence.
The
consequences
of
alienationare that
ideologists
pursue
he
perceived
immanent
good
and
try
to
eliminate the
perceived
immanent
evil,
thereby
rationalizing
criminality
nd
even murder.Violence
s inherent o
extremist
olitical
deologies.
Background
and
Influences:
Weber,
Kraus,
University,
and
America
Eric
Voegelin
was born
in
1901
and
grew
up
in
Vienna.
After
the war
Austria was convulsed
by
political
and social
crises
ranging
from
attempted
reactionary
and
Communist
coups
to
constant
ood
shortages.
In
the first
post-
war election
Voegelin's
political
and
social
inclinations
ed
him to
vote for
the
Social
Democratic
Party SDP),
but he was
aggravated
by
the
uncompromising
Marxist
rhetoricof the
SDP
leadership.
n
this
atmosphere
Voegelin
began
his
long journey
toward
understandingdeologies,
butfirst he hadto workthrough
many
different
political
and
philosophic
problems
before
he
arrived
at an ad-
equate understanding.
The
intellectuals
that influenced
him
during
this
long
process
were
diverse,
but
they
shared
a
hostility
to
ideologies.
The
first
mportant
cademic
nfluence on
Voegelin
was
Max
Weber.2
We-
ber
encouraged
ntellektuelle
Rechtschaffenheit
intellectual
honesty)
with oth-
ers and
especially
with
oneself.
Weber
insisted on
following
an
ethic
of re-
sponsibility
or
one's
actions
(Verantwortungsethik),
ather
han
makingapolo-
gies
for
following
an
ethic of
good
intentions
(Gesinnungsethik).
The
latter,
Weber
feared,
was often used to
justify
bad
consequences
of well-intended
actions.3
These
simple principles helped
guide
the
young
Eric
Voegelin
away
from violent
ideological
movements.
Weber
also
was intenton
"scientifically"
understanding
ociety.
"Science"
(wissenschaft)
did
nothave
quite
the same
positivistic
implications
n German
as it did in eitherFrench or
English,
although
there
was
the
positivistic
ten-
dency
to
eliminate
any perceived
values
in scientific
work.4
The
impact
on
Voegelin
rather
straightforwardlympressed
on him
the need
to
be as honest
2
AutobiographicalReflections,
11-13.
3
Ibid.,
11.
4
Jiirgen
Gebhardt
nd
Barry
Cooper,
"Introduction,"
he
Collected
Works
f
Eric
Voegelin,
I,
On
the Form
of
the American
Mind,
tr.
Ruth
Hein
(Baton Rouge,
1995),
xii-xv.
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8/19/2019 Eric Voegelin on Nazi Political Extremism
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Voegelin's
nterpretations
f
Nazi
Extremism
153
with
himselfand n
his
studies s he
could
be. The
first
xample
of
this
was
his
quick
abandonment
f
Marxism
when
he
decided
it was
economically
untenable.5
Voegelin
followed
Weber's
methodology
of
comparative
knowledge
for
scientific
inquiry;
otherwise,
without
comparison
with
other
societies'
experi-
ences, abasis foranyresearchwas limitedto one's own realmof social experi-
ence. The
premise
of
Voegelin's comparative
research
was that
there
was
a
common
ground
of
human
experience
across
time and
space.
When
Voegelin
studied
ancient or
non-Western
societies,
he
saw essential
similarities
in hu-
man
experience,
rather han
differences.
A
problematic
spect
ofWeber's
work,
however,
was
how
to
define
"value."
Weber's
emphasis
on
value-free science
meant
that
many
social
issues could
not
adequately
be
studied because
they
involved
values.
Voegelin began
to
understand hat
ethical
judgement
in
society required
a
foundation
of
values.
This issue would resurface n the late 1920s in Voegelin's study of political
science as a
subset of
constitutional
aw. The
problem
of
how
to
judge
value
was
not
philosophically
difficult for
Voegelin
because
the
underlying
premise
of
his
work was that
humanity
has
a
spiritual
as
well as
a
temporal
oundation.
The
Weberian
eliminationof values
severely
hindered
studying
political
phi-
losophy
or
ideologies,
and
it
took
Voegelin
several
years
to work
through
he
problem.
As he
put
it
50
years
later:
But of
course
so
far
as
science
is concerned
that
is a
very
precarious
position,
becausestudentsafter all wantto knowthereasons
why
they
should
conduct
themselves
in a
certain
manner;
and
when
the reasons
-that
is,
the
rational
order
of existence-are
excluded
from
consider-
ation,
emotions are liable
to
carryyou
away
into all
sorts
of
ideological
and
idealistic
adventures n which ends
become
more
fascinating
han
the means.6
Without
a
clear
science of
values or
ethics,
a
basis
for human
conduct
was
missing.
Furthermore,
ithoutsuch a science
of
values,
a
critique
of
the behav-
ior of
ideologists
is difficult. Weber was a
very
ethical
person,
so this was not
an
issue.
The
generation
after World
War
I,
however,
was
deeply
troubled,
lacking
social
or
political
stability
in
any
form,
paradigm,
zeitgeist,
or even a
Platonic noble
myth.
A
related and fundamental
question
remained,
which
Voegelin
witnessed
around him
academically,
socially,
and
politically:
why
did
intellectuals,
political
groups,
or factions
cling
to
philosophies
thatwere
demonstrably
alse-for
example,
Zionist
Jewish
conspiracies
or
the inevita-
bility
of the
proletarian
evolution?
5
Autobiographical
Reflections,
11.
6
Ibid.,
12.
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8/19/2019 Eric Voegelin on Nazi Political Extremism
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154
Clifford
F
Porter
The
Viennese
iconoclast,
drama
ritic,
and social
commentator,
Karl
Kraus,
reinforced
Voegelin's
emphasis
on the
pursuit
of truth
and intellectual
honesty.
Kraus's
scathing
commentary
on
contemporary
ntellectuals
and
ournalists
n
his
journal
Die
Fackel
was
essential for
Voegelin's
developing
understanding
of ideologies. Krausruthlesslyexposedthe artificialityandpretentiousnessof
much of
Viennese
literati
hrough
vicious
satire.7
He was
a
master
of
language
and
firmly
held that
how
a
person
used
language
represented
his or
her true
character.
The Viennese literati
had
corrupted
heir
professional
ethics
by
fail-
ing
to
report
the
complete
truth,
especially
during
the
war where
journalism
decayed
into
insulting
propaganda.
The literati
also
failed
as
leaders
of
culture,
which
was
perhaps
he
focus of Kraus's bitterest
attack,
because
without
cul-
tural
eadership
he
civilizationwould
decay.
If
honesty
n
language
were
used,
honesty
of
discourse
must
follow.
However
the
reverse
held true:
dishonest
use
of
language represented
dishonest intentionsand
contempt
for the audience,
thereby
preventing
ruth.8
Voegelin
concluded from
reading
Kraus
hat
ideologists
could
not
be
suc-
cessful without
destroying language
and truth.The
consequence
of
the
abuse
of
language
in
political
and
social
life
is that
the standards
of
thought
are so
lowered that
the
society
becomes
susceptible
to the
vulgar
propaganda
f the
National
Socialists.9
Wittgenstein
was also
profoundly
influenced
by
Kraus:
with
ethical
precision
in
language
it would
be
possible
to
truly
study philoso-
phy
and
prevent
deology.
0
Fifty
years
later
Voegelin
still
thought
a
thorough
analysis
of the success of theNazis was not
possible
without
studying
Kraus's
diagnosis
of Austrian
society
beginning
in the 1890s."
As
admirableas
Kraus was
a
critic of
society,
his
tactic
of
satirizing
his
enemies was
ineffective
against
the Nazis.
The
Nazis
twisted
language
and
appealed
to
people's
worst
instincts,
raising
terror
and
violence
to
an
alleged
spiritual
evel.
In
this
case,
the sword
was
mightier
than
the
pen.12
However,
once actual
events
usurped
atire,
hen
society
had
decayed
too
farto be
saved.'"
Kraus's words were
inadequate
o
influence
society,
and
the
effort to
change
behavior
by
demanding
honest
language
failed.
The
failure
of
language
was
a
manifestation
of a
deeper problem.
7
Carl E.
Schorske,
Fin-de-Siecle
Vienna:
Politics
and Culture
New
York,
1985),
363.
8
Kari
Grimstad,
Masks
of
the
Prophet:
The
Theatrical
World
f
Karl Kraus
Toronto,
1982).
9
Wilma Abeles
Iggers,
Karl
Kraus:
A Viennese
ritic
of
the
twentieth
century
(The
Hague,
1967),
32.
10
Allan Janik
and
Stephen
Toulmin,
Wittgenstein
Vienna
New
York,
1973),
93.
"
Autobiographical
Reflections,
18.
12
Kari
Grimstad,
Masks
of
the
Prophet:
The
Theatrical
World
f
Karl
Kraus,
228.
13
Krausdied
in
1936,
two
years
before
the
Anschluss.
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8/19/2019 Eric Voegelin on Nazi Political Extremism
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Voegelin's
nterpretations
f
Nazi
Extremism
155
Voegelin
adopted
Kraus's
analysis
that
the Nazis'
linguistic
vulgarity
and
use
of
pagan
symbols
indicated
heir rue
essence
as
criminal
barbarians.'4
Much
of
the
symbolism
in
the
propaganda
f the
Nazis was
designed
to
garner
mme-
diate
support
and
did
not
reflect the truenature
of
their
ideology.
But
what
was
or was not Nazi ideology was not entirelyclear at the time to many people,
including
Krausand
Voegelin.
It was still true that
many
Germans
responded
positively
to
the
propaganda.5
The academic
debatesof
the
1920s at the
University
of
Vienna,
were
domi-
nated
by
methodological
arguments
about
epistemology
and did
not
help
Voegelin
understand
he
ideologies.
All
academic
discussions,
or so it
appeared
to
Voegelin,
were
subsetsof
the
competing
arguments
between
the
neo-Kantian
Kultur-wissenschaft
ndthe
universalist
Geisteswissenschaften.'
Reducing
he
debate to its
base
level,
the
question
was whether
knowledge
was
a
priori
or
if
existence preceded essence. Hans Kelsen, one of Voegelin's professors in
Vienna,
used
a
priori
categories
for
the
logic
of
a
legal
system.
In
the semantics
used
at
the
time
Staatslehre
Political
Studies)
was
a
part
of
Rechtslehre
Legal
Studies).
Consequently,
anythingbeyond
Rechtslehre
could
notbe
considered
political
science and
"values"
as defined
by
Weber
and
in common
use,
and
were
not
considered
mportant
or
studying
political
or
legal
systems.
The
ques-
tion
in
terms
of
the
Pure
Theory
of Law
was whether
he activities
of
Commu-
nists
and,
later,
the
National Socialists were
legal.
Such a
question,
however,
hardly explains
why
ideologists
behaved
as
violently
as
they
did,
especially
against
innocent
people
when the Nazis madeit
technically
legal
after 1933.
Ideologists
claimed to
be
scientific,
and the
methodologies
of
neo-
Kantianism
and
existentialismdid not
easily
allow
a
challenge
of
the
values
of
the
ideologists.
So within
the
academic
community
in
which
Voegelin
was
working
there was
not an
adequate
foundation o
challenge
the
ideologies
as
unethical,
immoral,
or
simply
bad "values."
In fact
all
methodologies
within
the
intellectual
climate
tendedto
forbidvalue-based
or
metaphysical
question-
ing.
Neo-Kantianism
rejected
any
study
not
within
a
priori
categories,
such
as
Rechtslehre.
Heidegger rejected
value
judgments
because
a
priori
conscious-
ness
was
fallacious. Marxism
simply rejected
metaphysics
as
bourgeois
ab-
stractions.
These
intellectual aboos frustrated
Voegelin
throughout
his
life."
During
Voegelin's
studies
in
America
he
learned
how
to break
out
of
this
limited
debate
and
how to
find a betterbasis
for
analyzing politics
and
ideolo-
gies.
He studied
the
British and American common-sense
philosophic
tradi-
14
Voegelin
describedNazism's
appeal
in
part
as
pre-Christian
aganism
in
1940,
"Some
Problems
of
German
Hegemony,"
TheJournal
of
Politics,
3
(1941),
164.
15
E.g.,
see
the analysis of Nazi propagandan
Ian
Kershaw,The "HitlerMyth
":
Image
and
Reality
in
the
ThirdReich
(New
York,
1987).
16
JiirgenGebhardt nd
Barry
Cooper,
"Introduction."Onthe Form
of
the
AmericanMind,
xii-xv.
'7Eric
Voegelin,
New
Science
of
Politics
(Chicago,
1952),
21.
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156
Clifford
F
Porter
tion,
attending
he
seminars
of John
Dewey
and Alfred
North
Whitehead
and
reading
commentaries
n
America
by
writers
such
as
George
Santayana,
Alexis
de
Tocqueville,
and
William
James.
He also
experienced
his
open-ended
com-
mon-sense
philosophy
as
practicedby
his host
in
Wisconsin,
the labor
econo-
mist, JohnR. Commons.He also spenttimestudyingFrenchphilosophy,from
Bodinto
Bergson,
and
earned
o
appreciate
he Lucretian
oetry
of Paul
Valery.'8
These
experiences
caused
a
profoundchange
in his outlook.
The
methodologi-
cal
debates
of
Central
Europe
were no
longer
meaningful.
British
and
American
philosophers
were
asking metaphysicalquestions,
rather
han
seeking
method-
ological
answers abouthow
to determine
ruth
positivistically
in
a
precise
sys-
tem of
thought.19
oegelin,
therefore,
became
convinced
of the
basic
provincial-
ism of
German
academic
questions,
then
rejected
neo-Kantianism
and existen-
tialism for a
return
o
metaphysics
and
empiricism.
He
read
Heidegger's
Sein
undZeit in 1927,which was
creating
a sensationat thetime in AustriaandGer-
many,
and later
simply
stated
hatwhen he read
t,
"It
ust
ranoff."20
Heidegger
had
essentially
presented
a
closed
philosophy
by
offering
a
complete
answerto
the
fundamental
questions
of
human
consciousness-existence
precedes
es-
sence. To
Voegelin,
Heidegger
had
denied
the
open-ended
nature
of
existence.
As
Voegelin
furtheredhis own
studies
into
medieval
Christian
and
classi-
cal
philosophy,
he
came to
believe
that
consciousness
relied
on more
han
merely
external
objects;
t
was
consciousness
of
experiences
of
both
immanent
reality
and
of
spiritual
reality.2'
Although
he never
formally
became
a member of
a
Christian
denomination,
Voegelin
developed
an
understanding
f the Christian
and
classical ideas as
symbols
of
Divine
reality,
such
as
consciousness
orfaith.22
The
hostility
to
metaphysics
n
the academic
community,
he
believed,
prevented
philosophy
from
asking
transcendental r
spiritual
questions
about
human
ex-
istence
and
discarded
religious
and
metaphysical
symbolism
as
mere
supersti-
tion.23
He found
current
methodologies
limiting,
whereas
the
experiences
of
the
classical and Christian
philosophers
revealed
a
greater
breadth
of
human
experience.
Voegelin
concluded that
modern
philosophy
had
closed
itself
to
the
possibility
of
transcendent
eality
and
consequently
provided
little
guid-
ance for
recognizing
the Nationalist Socialists forwhat
they
were-immature
barbarians.
By
the
late
1920s
Voegelin
had
the foundation
o formulate
a
theory
of
ideologies.
His own work
was
disciplined
by
Weber's
and
Kraus's
influ-
ences,
and he
bypassed contemporary
methodologicalproblems
by
returning
to a
classical and Christian
understanding
f
metaphysics
and
empiricism.
'"
AutobiographicalReflections,
28-33.
'~
On
the Form
of
the American
Mind,
4-5.
20
Autobiographical
Reflections,
33.
21Ibid.,
70-74,
and Ellis
Sandoz,
The
Voegelinian
Revolution
Baton
Rouge,
1981),
51-53.
22
Autobiographical Reflections, 63.
23
E.g.,
Eric
Voegelin,
From
Enlightenment
o
Revolution,
d.
by
John
H.
Hallowell
(Durham,
N.C.,
1975),
25-27.
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8/19/2019 Eric Voegelin on Nazi Political Extremism
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Voegelin's
nterpretations
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Nazi
Extremism
157
Voegelin's
personal
experiences
at this time are
very
revealing
about
the
nature
of
ideologies-that
is,
he
experienced
the
consequences
of
ideological
thinking.Voegelin
very
much
enjoyed
discussing political
events
with his stu-
dents,
while
at the
same time
trying
often
in vain to
keep
their
minds
open
to
philosophic questions and to prevent them from falling into the closed
mindednessof an
ideological
system.
He
was
rattled
afterone
lively
discussion
at
the
Volkshochschule,24
when
one
of
his better
students
old
him
that
it
would
be
a
true
shamethat
when
they-the
SDP--came
to
power,
they
would
have
to
kill
Voegelin.
The
ideological
logic
was
very straightforward;
he
SDP
politics
were
correct,
and
even
though
Professor
Voegelin
was a wonderful
and honest
intellect,
he
would be
dangerous
o
the
struggle.
The
logic
disturbed
Voegelin
greatly:
he
political
objectives
of the
ideologist
were more
mportant
han
honest
philosophic inquiry.
Thestudent
learly
understood
Voegelin's
critiques
of theSDP oranyother
narrow
deology.
But the
ideology
was
so
vitally important
o
society,
civiliza-
tion,
or the
proletariat
hat
any
undermining
riticism
had to
be eliminatedfor
the
ultimate
goal.
Implicitly,
if
not
explicitly,
the
student
understood
hat
the
intellectual
honesty
Voegelin
had learned
from
Weber
was
of
secondary
im-
portance,
or
even
dangerous,
o
ideological
goals.
Voegelin
concluded
that
ideologies
were
systems
of
thought
that
denied
intellectual
honesty,
rejected
metaphysics,
and
accepted
political
violence. Over
the
next
twenty years
Voegelin
first
challenged
the
ideologies'
claims
to
be
scientific,then he tried to
explain ideologies
as secular
political
religions.
Ide-
ologists
could
not
be
partners
n scientific
inquiry;
they
were
objects
of
in-
quiry.
Towards Political
Religions
Voegelin's
first
attempts
o
penetrate
o
the essence
of
National
Socialism
were two
books
published
in
1933
analyzing
race
theories-Rasse
und
Staat
and
Die
Rassenidee
in der
Geistesgeschichte.
He showed
that
National Social-
ist racismdeniedthe fundamental
umanity
of Jewsand other
races,
and,
based
on
his own
studies with
biology,
that National
Socialist
race
theory
was
not
science.
Voegelin
labeled this
abuse
of science
for
ideological
purposes
rather
than
to understand
eality
as
"scientism."25
The Nazi race idea had in fact little to do
with
biology
and
ethnography.
Rather,
Voegelin
believed
that
racism
was the
symbolic
expression
of the or-
dering principle
of
Germannationalism.
The elaborate
use
of scientific lan-
guage gave
comfort to
the
ideologists
that
they
were
actually engaged
in
sci-
24
This
was
the SDP
sponsored
college
for
urban
workers,
where
Voegelin
taught
rom1927
to
1938.
The
Austrian
SDP
was dominated
by
Marxism
at
the time.
25
From
Enlightenment
o
Revolution,
20-21.
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8/19/2019 Eric Voegelin on Nazi Political Extremism
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158
Clifford
E Porter
ence
seeking positive
truth.
Nonetheless,
no matter
how
elaborate
he
use
of
language
was,
it
still
denoted little or
nothing.26
In
the
introduction o
Die
Rassenidee
in der
Geistesgeschichte,
Voegelin
outlined the
dangerous
mplications
of modem
race
theories.
Although
he
did
not mentionNationalSocialismby name,it is obviously theobjectof his con-
tempt:
The fact
that
human
beings
are
physiologically
descended
from
each other
does
not
yet
make
a
human
history....
...
the
dangerous
hought
arises
that
the
historical
substance
could
be
arbitrarily enerated
by
diligent
clubs
for the
breeding
of
racially
pure
bodies....
It is
a
nightmare
o think hatwe should
recognize
the
people
whom
we follow and whom we allow to come nearus notby their ooks, their
words,
and their
gestures,
but
by
their
cranial
index
and
the
propor-
tional
measurements
of
their extremities.27
With
the
humanity
of Jews
and other
races
undermined
by
race
theory,
the
nightmare
ame true
ess
than 10
years
later.
Few
could
have
imagined
n
1933
that the
worst
possible
implications
of
National
Socialism
from
a
dream
could
become real.
Quite
clearly,
the
words
used
by
the
Nazis
had
real
consequences.
Voegelin
had
foreseen that the Nazis would establish
Aryan
breeding
farms
andcranialmeasurementsas SS enlistmentcriteria.
As
the discrimination
nd aws directed
against
he
Jews
increased,
Voegelin
publicly
predicted
n
the
Vienna Neue
Freie
Presse
(30
Nov.
1937)
that
should
anotherwar between
the
greatpowers
develop,
"total
war would
probably
be a
war of annihilation"
Vernichtungskrieg).28
udging
by
the
international
itua-
tion
in
late 1937-wars
in
Spain
and
China-there
were
no limits
to
warfare
between
peoples.
Wars
between states
were
previously
imited,
but
it
was
clear
by
1937 that all
citizens
would become
participants.
According
to
Voegelin,
the
next war would
be
a war
between
racially
defined
peoples
with no
logical
limits until
one
people
or
another
was
annihilated.
Having
demonstratedNational
Socialism's
false
claim
to
science
and
its
implicit logic
toward
violence,
Voegelin
had
yet
to
resolve
satisfactorilywhy
ideologies
were
believable to
so
many people
of
varying
ntelligence
and
socio-
economic class.
In his
next
attempt,
Der
Autoritaire
taat
(1936),
Voegelin
discussed
the
danger
of
ideologies
in the context
of
whether
or
notthe
Austrian
26
BarryCooper,
Eric
Voegelin
and
the Foundations
of
Modern
Political
Science
(Colum-
bia, Mo.,
1999),
41.
27
Eric
Voegelin,
The
History
of
the Race
Idea:
From
Ray
to
Carus,
tr.
Ruth
Hein
anded.
Klaus
Vondung
(Baton
Rouge,
1998),
23-25.
28
"Der
neue
Stil
des
Krieges,"
Neue Freie
Presse,
30
November
1937.
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8/19/2019 Eric Voegelin on Nazi Political Extremism
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Voegelin's
nterpretations
f
Nazi
Extremism
159
authoritarian
onstitution f 1934
was
an
adequate
defense
for
democracy gainst
either
Nazi or
Communist
deologies.
An
authoritarian
tate
was
certainly
bet-
ter than
the
totalitarian
egime
to
the north n
Germany.
Voegelin
also
demon-
strated
hat
Kelsen's
Pure
Theory
of
Law failed: its
absence
of values allowed
for the legal seizureof powerby groupsopenlyhostile to democracy.
Aside
from
ruining
his
personal
relationship
with
Kelsen,
Voegelin
theo-
rized that the
totalitarian
conception
of
the
state,
as
developed
by
the Nazi
Staatslehre
heorist
Carl
Schmitt,
broke
down
the
distinction
between
the
com-
munity
or
society
(Gesellschaft)
and the state.
The totalitarian
tate tried
to
controlor
lead the
community
directly
n
all
aspects
of
human
ife
based on
the
ideological
conception
of
human
reality.
That
such
control
of
all
of
society
proved
difficult for the
Nazis
is
not
the essential
observation,
but rather
hat he
totalitarian
deology
tried to
subordinate
he individual
to
the
party
and
the
state.29
The
Authoritarian
tate
on
the
other hand had
no
such
objective.
Its
goal
was
to
defend
the
state from
ideological
assault.
If the
authoritarian
tate
could
defend
itself
successfully,
then there existed
the
very
real
possibility
that
a
maturedemocratic radition
could
develop
to
resist
ideologies
on
its
own.3"
The
appeal
of
ideologies
was not addressed
n
DerAutoritiire
Staat and
the
question
remained
why
the Nazis hated he Jews
so
much.
Voegelin
concluded
thatthe
Nazis
made the
Jews the Satanic
figure
that
any
millenarian
movement
needs. The
Nazis
inherited
his
tradition
rom
the
lingering
anti-Semitic
sub-
cultureof Central-East
Europe,
buttheir
ideology
changed
it intothe
symbol-
ism of
good
versus
evil
manifested
as
Aryan
versus
Semite.
It is
logical
that
with sucha
religious
mindset
he
destruction
f
evil could
become
a
political
goal.31
Voegelin's
last
effort
to
understand
he
appeal
of
ideologies
before
the
war
was Die
Politischen
Religionen
(1938).
He furthered
his
understanding
hat
totalitarian
deologists
were
in
the
same tradition
as
the
many
millenarian
per-
versions
of
Christianity
nd
political
religions
of
ancient
Egypt.32
ie
Politischen
Religionen
is
an
emotional and
polemical
work. All
of
Voegelin's
principles
are
evident
from the
first few
pages.
First
and
foremost,
ideologies
were
at
their basis
nothing
more than
temporal,
secular
attempts
o
createa
religious
community
to
answer
humanity's
fundamentally piritual
needs.
Second,
po-
litical
religions
denied
divine
reality,perverted
emporal
reality,
and
attempted
to
enforce their
visions
of
reality
on the
rest
of
the
society.
Consequently,
29
Der
Autoritaire taat,
10-11.
30
Ibid.,
281-83.
'
Cooper,
"Introduction,"
olitical
Religions,
xxi; and,
Gregor
Sebba,
"Prelude
and varia-
tions
on
the Theme of Eric
Voegelin,"
Eric
Voegelin
s
Thought:
A Critical
Appraisal,
ed. Ellis
Sandoz
(Durham,
N.C.,
1982),
12.
32
Eric
Voegelin,
Political
Religions,
Introduced
y BarryCooper,
trans.
T.J.
DiNapoli
and
E.S.
Easterly
III,
Toronto
Studies
in
Theology,
23
(1986), orig.
Die Politischen
Religionen
(Stockholm,
1939).
The first effort
to
distribute
n Vienna
in
1938
was
obstructed
by
the
Nazi
Anschluss.
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8/19/2019 Eric Voegelin on Nazi Political Extremism
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160
Clifford
F
Porter
Voegelin
unreservedly
argues
that the
basis
for
a renewal
of
philosophy
and
political
society requires
a
spiritual
religious
foundation,
whether
it
is
within
the
traditional
churches
or
not. His
reasons
for this
are
simply
that
humanity
must be
in
balance with
its
spiritual
and
physical
existence
and
that the
denial
of the spiritualaspecthas causedmanyerrors n modem philosophy.33
Voegelin
used
empirical
evidence
on two levels
to
make
his
argument.
The
first is
simply
thatthe
consequences
of
ideologies
are obvious
in the terror
he
Nazis
caused.
Secondly,
and far more
profoundly,
Voegelin
argued
that
the
basis of
human
spirituality
s within
the
soul and
is
accessible
to
everyone
by
looking
within
one's
self.34
Man
experiences
his
existence
as a creature
and therefore
as doubtful.
Somewhere
in
the
depths,
at
the umbilicus
of
the
soul,
there
where
it
touchesthe cosmos, it strains.This is the
place
of those stimuliwhich
are
inadequately
eferred o as
"feelings"
and
which
are
therefore
eas-
ily
confused
with
similarly
named,
superficial
movements
of
the
soul.35
Religious
experiences
are
real and
they
are evident
throughout
history
in
the
various
symbols
every
culturehas used to describe
them.
Furthermore,
ithout
recognizing
the
foundation
of these
experiences
as evidence
of
divine
reality,
the
individual
cannot
recognize
the
breadth
of
reality
and
will
attempt
o
create
false
images
to account
for the
missing
spirituality
producing
alienation
or
a
deformationof
reality.
Othersare
granted
only
scant
glimpses
of
reality,
perhaps
only
one:
of
nature,
a
great person,
his
Volk,
humanity.
What is seen
becomes
for
him
the
Realissimum,
he
metareality;
t
takes
the
place
of
God and
therefore
conceals from him
all
else,
even-and
above
all-God.36
Not
only
does this
passage
demonstrate
Voegelin's
spiritual
philosophy,
t
also introduces
ew
terms
o
convey
his
meaning
more
accurately.
Realissimum
and
metareality
areused to
signify
a
concept
of
reality
hat s
changed
fromand
fails to
incorporate
all
human
experiences.)
With
spiritual
reality
denied or
obscured,
something
must take
its
place
to
respond
to
the
human
need
to
ex-
press
the
feeling
of
being
created.37
Voegelin
argues
that
modem
philosophy
had
gradually
attributed o
the state the
redemptive
power
that
belongs
to God.
33
Ibid.,
3.
34
This
is
clearly
the
influence
of his classical
and
Christian
studies,
but
Voegelin
never
specifically
indicated
what
influenced
him
towards
hese
conclusions
or
when
he
accepted
hem.
35
bid.,
10.
36
bid.,
12-13.
37
Ibid.,
11.
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8/19/2019 Eric Voegelin on Nazi Political Extremism
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Voegelin's
nterpretations
f
Nazi
Extremism
161
"It
was
Hegel
who
proposed
the
theory
that
the
Volk
as the State
was the
spirit
in
its
immediate
reality
and
therefore
he absolute
power
on
earth.""38
he
indi-
vidual
becomes
subsumed
by
this
apparatus
nd
gains
his own
meaning
only
by
being
a
part
of
the State.
Unlike a secularthinkerwho mightattributehe desire for salvationeither
to
culture or to
human
psychology
in the
face
of
death,
Voegelin
takes
the
experience
as real
evidence of the
existence
of the soul
in
essentially
the
same
way
Socrates did 2300
years
earlier
in the Phaedo.
The real
experiences
of
divine
reality
are
expressed
in
complex
and
confusing
sets of
symbolic
lan-
guage
and
concepts
formed
by
historical
and cultural
circumstances.
The com-
plexity
of
symbols
creates
confusion,
but there
are still
only
two
kinds of
reli-
gion:
The spiritual
religions,
which find the Realissimum n the Weltgrund,
shouldbe
termed
or
us "world-transcendent
eligions;"
ll
others,
which
locate the
divine
in
partial
hings
of
the
world,
should
be
called
"world-
immanent
religions."39
The
latterare the
political
religions
which
have served
as the
foundations
or
totalitarian
deology.
National
Socialism
was not
the
first
political
religion,
however.
Voegelin
makes the bold claim
that the first
political
religion
in
human
history
was
the
Egyptian
cult created
by
the PharaohAkhenatonin
approximately
1376
Bc.
Using
the
comparative
approach
earned
from
Weber,
Voegelin
argues
that
Akhenaton
changed
the ancient
religious
structure
o
makehimself the
direct
conduit
of
meaning
from the
gods
to the
people
of
Egypt.
After
Akhenaton's
death
the
Egyptians
returned
airly
quickly
to
their
old
gods
in no
small
part
because
the
people
had
to
rely
on the
Pharaoh-i.e.,
a
man-to
participate
n
a
meaningful
religiousexperience.40
Having
used
the
comparative
approach
o demonstrate
hat
political
reli-
gions
were
not
new
in
human
history,Voegelin
outlined
the essential
elements
of a
religious
structureandthe
parallel
within
contemporary
political
move-
ments.
Just
as
every religion
has its
own
hierarchy
and
ecclesiastical
officials,
faith
and the
apocalypse
also have
their
essential
role.
The
political
religion,
for
example,
offers itself as
the
good,
and there
is
an
evil,
or
anti-good.
In
the
case of
Germany
he Jews were the
embodiment
of evil.
The
relationship
between
the
ideologist
and the
ideology
is also
very
reli-
gious.
Belonging
to the Christian
eligious
community,
ecclesia,
is
symbolized
as a
mystic
union with the
body
of
Christ,
unio
mystica.
On
the
other
hand,
a
38 bid.,
8.
39
bid.,
14.
40
Ibid.,
17-28.
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162
Clifford
E
Porter
political
religion
also
offers
purpose
and
salvation,
but
only
withinthe
tempo-
ral
community.
The
ideologist
enjoys
a
mystical
connection
with
the
ideologi-
cal
community,
giving
a
purpose
to
existence.
The
ideological
community
n-
carnates
he source
of
meaning,
offering
salvation,
replacing
God
as the con-
duitfor salvation.Thus,the ideologists' positionentailsthatthe state controls
everything ust
as a
church determines
religious practices;
n
a
political
reli-
gion
public
policy
replaces
theology.
Consequently,
he
ideological
commu-
nity
becomes
clearly
totalitarian fter it controls
the
state.
The
historical
development
of the idea
that the
community
has
purported
divine
qualities
s
traced
by
Voegelin
to Joachim
of
Flora
n the
thirteenth
en-
tury.41
Yet it takes
centuriesfor the
cultural
development
of
the
symbolism
of
the
temporal
community
to
replace
God
completely
as
the
spiritual
basis of
human
existence.
By
the
seventeenth
century
Hobbes's
Leviathan
became
the
mediatorbetweenGod andman,as Akhenatonwas forEgypt.Again, the indi-
vidual
finds
meaning
and salvation not
in
an
individual
relationship
or under-
standing
of
existence but
strictly
in
terms
of
how the
individual
fits into
the
state.
The
historical
development
required
or
the
religious/political
symbols
of
the
temporal
community
or
state to
replace
God
is
long
and
complex.
As
Voegelin
recounts this
process,
beginning
with Joachim
and
the
millenarian
traditionsof the
Reformation
mixed
with the scientific
revolution,
it
leads
to
the
creationof
the
symbols
of
scientism,
where
"scientific
philosophies"
offer
the
knowledge
of how to achievesalvationwithoutRevelation.42Sciencethus
gains
the status
of Revelation.
Challenging
science is difficult because
science
contains
powerful
sym-
bols
that offer
definitive answers about
human
existence.
But
the
scientism of
the
political
religion
has dubiousclaims
to
truth,
which
Voegelin
demonstrated
in
Rasse und Staat and Die
Rassenidee
in
der
Geistesgeschichte.
The
most
bothersome
aspect
of
scientism is that
it obscures
truth
n the
name
of
science.
The
question
remains:
why
did otherwise
ntelligent
people
accept
the
dubious
claims
of
scientism
and
ignore
the
weaknesses
in
their
ideological
theories?
Voegelin
continues,
Since the
myth
[ideology]
is not
justified
by
supernatural
evelation
and
scientific criticism cannot stand
its
ground,
there
develops
in
the
second
phase
a new
conception
of
truth-Rosenberg's
concept
of
so-
called
organic
truth.The
theory
is then further
developed
into the
in-
terpretation,
hat that which
promotes
the
existence
of
the
organically
closed
temporalcommunity
of a
people
is
true.43
41
Ibid.,
44-45.
42
Ibid.,
59.
43
Ibid.,
63.
Rosenberg
was
the
chief
philosopher
of
National
Socialism.
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Voegelin's
nterpretations
f
Nazi
Extremism
163
Truth
becomes
malleableand
dependent
on the
political
goals
that
the
ideology
has
established,
which
Kraushad satirized
earlier.
The
purveyor
of
truth s
the
party
or the
state with
its
ultimate
arbiter
being
the
leader;
in the case of
the
ThirdReich, the leaderis the Fiihrerplaying the identicalrole of Akhenaton
and
acting
as the
conduit of
meaning
to the
Volk.
Voegelin
concludes
the main
body
of
discussion
with the
evidence
of
the
poetry
of Gerhard
Schumann's
Lieder
vom
Reich
(1935),
which illuminates
all of
the
religious
symbolism
of
the
ideology:
Lost
myself
and found the
Volk,
he
Reich.
The
Fiihrer
Slaves
that we
are,
make
us free
Millions
bowed
down before
him
in
silence
Redeemed. The
Heavens flamed
pale
as
morning.
The
sun
grew.
And with it
grew
the
Reich.
The
deed was
good,
if
you
reddened
t with
blood.'
The
symbolism
is
painfully
obvious,
disturbing,
and
came
from
an
otherwise
well-educatedman.
Religious
symbolism
includes an "anti-idea"or Satanicfoe that
opposes
the
good
offered
by
the
ideology.
In the
case of
the
Third
Reich,
the Jews are
the
anti-idea.
Voegelin
states
very early
in
the
book
that the
danger
to
other
people
is
very
real:
The
mechanicalmeans of
killing
were
therefore
nvented
not
by
acci-
dent,
but
rather
by
the
spirit
hathas become
the
State,
n order o
trans-
form
the
personal
orm of
courage
nto the
impersonal.
This
homicidal
urge
is
directed
against
an
abstract
oe,
not
against
a
person.45
The
danger
o
the Jews as
an
abstract
oe
was
imminent.
By
1938
Voegelin
had
outlined
he
logic
of
ideological
violence,
and
there
was
no
reason
why
the
National
Socialists would
stop.
Theory
was translated
nto
practice,
and
physi-
cal
attackson
Jews accelerated
as
Hitler
grew
moresecure
in
power.
(That
the
Nazis
required
several
years
before
they
actually
formulated
he idea of
the
Holocaust and
that
they
triedto
keep
it a secret
testify
to the
resistance
of
tradi-
tional cultural
morality
to
murder.
That the resistance
was
eventually
over-
come
demonstrates
he
power
of the
ideology.)
44 bid.,
71-74.
45
bid.,
8.
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8/19/2019 Eric Voegelin on Nazi Political Extremism
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164
Clifford
E
Porter
Gnosticism
Political
Religions
worked
well
to
describe
Nazi
symbolism,
because
the
Nazis
used
a
variety
of
Christianand
Pagan symbols
for
propaganda
nd for
a
vaguemetaphysicalappealto the massesandto themselves.46 utwith therise
of
Communist
otalitarianism
nd East
European
oups
by
Stalin's
regime,
de-
scribing
Marxist
deology
as
a
political religion
or
manifestation
of
pre-Chris-
tian
pagan symbolism
did not
hold.
Throughout
he
1940s
Voegelin
struggled
to
better
understand
deologies,
but
first
he
had to
escape
the
Third Reich to
find
refuge
in Britain
or the
United States.
In
1938
the
Anschluss
forced
Voegelin
to flee
Europe.
The
Anschluss
was
not
opposed by
the
West-Italy,
Britain,
and
France--despite
Mussolini's
ef-
forts at
oint
action
and
to
Voegelin's
intensedissatisfaction.
Voegelin
believed
the West would
stop
the Anschluss in order to
prevent
a Germanrevanchist
threat
directed
against
Czechoslovakia.
He was so
angry
at the
West's
geopo-
litical
miscalculation hat
he
contemplated
oining
the
Nazis
as
German
roops
entered Vienna. He
described himself
as
taking
several
hours
to
calm
down
before
deciding
his
best
option
was to
flee.47
It
is
very peculiar
hat
Voegelin
would even
contemplate oining
the
Nazis
even in a
state
of
"fury,"
as he
described
t.
He wrote
many
anti-Nazi
books
and
articles,
and
clearly
expressed
his
opposition
to
narrow
deologies,
especially
vulgar
ones
that
used
brutality
as
others
might
play
sports.48
Even
in
fury
there
mustbe some rationalefor action.
Voegelin's
fatherwas a Nazi
sympathizer
and an
admirer
of
Hitler
and
would
perhaps
prevent
his
arrest
or
a
short
time.
All
that
can be
discerned s
that
by
becoming
a
Nazi,
Voegelin
would
survive
in
the
short term and avoid the
fate of
many
other
victims.
However,
it was a
state of
mind that
evaporated
within
a few hours
and
he
planned
his
escape.
When the Nazis
occupied
Austria
Voegelin,
along
with
many
others,
was
immediately
fired from
the
University
of
Vienna and
the
Volkshochschule
e-
cause of his
open
anti-Nazism. The Austrian
government
offices
were
not
taken
over
immediatelyby
Nazis,
so
Voegelin prepared
or a
legal
exit visa
to
Switzerlandwiththe
help
of
well-placed
relatives,
andfrom therehe would
go
to
Harvard or
a
term to
tutor in
political
science.
Before
leaving, Voegelin
went
to
see
his
father,
smashed
a
portrait
of Hitler
on
the
floor,
then
left;
he
never
saw his father
again.
By
the
time his
papers
were
in
order
and
he
boarded
a train
for
Switzerland,
he
Gestapo
was
literally
on
the
way
to arrest
him.49
46
Eric
Voegelin,
"SomeProblems
of
German
Hegemony,"
TheJournal
of
Politics,
3
(1941 ,
164.
47
Autobiographical
Reflections,
42-43.
48
Voegelinhadpublishedmanyarticles n both VienneseandGermannewspaperscriticiz-
ing
the
intellectual
pretensions
of
National Socialism.
49
Cooper,
Eric
Voegelin,
16-18.
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Voegelin's
nterpretations
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Extremism
165
Once
Voegelin
arrived n
Switzerland,
his
trip
was held
up
by
the Ameri-
can
vice-consul.
The
official
theorized
hat
if
Voegelin
was
not
Jewish,
Catho-
lic,
or
a
Socialist,
his
only
reason for
fleeing
the Nazis
was because
he was
a
criminal.50
Arrivingin America,Voegelin discoveredmany otherEuropean migres
from
Hitler's
Europe
centered
n
New
England.
These
emigres
were
often
bit-
ter
about
heir
light
anddid
not like their
new
American
urroundings.
oegelin
always
liked
America but
found
the
cosmopolitan
academic
circles
of
New
England
to
be
provincial.
So he
moved to
the
University
of
Alabama
in
Bir-
mingham,
then to
Louisiana
State
University
at Baton
Rouge,
where
he
re-
mained until
1958.51
Once
in
the
United
States
Voegelin
wrote
several
articles
and
papers
re-
stating
his
fundamental
understanding
f
events.
In 1940
he
tried to describe
NationalSocialism's success as in
part
dueto the medievalsubstratum f pre-
Christian
paganism
that ran
throughout
Germany.52
He
furthered
his
work
on
the
history
of
ideas
fromthe
"supposed
onstitutionalism
f Plato
and
Aristotle,
through
the
dubious
constitutionalism
of the Middle
Ages,
into
the
splendid
constitutionalism
of the
modem
period.""53
ut
this
model
was
not
entirely
sat-
isfying.
Furthermore,
oegelin
realized
hat
Political
Religions
only adequately
described
Nazism,
but it
failed
o
penetrate
o
the essence
of
ideologies
n
general.
Voegelin
observed
that the Nazis
were
emotionally
tribal
because
"[t]ribalism
s the
answer to
immaturity
because
it
permits
man
to remain
m-
maturewith the sanctionof his
group."54
ut therewere
consequences
for im-
maturity:
good
Germans who
got
emotionally
drunk
on
the
harangues
of
the
savior...andwho
shrank
back
in horror
when the
program
..
was
trans-
lated into
political
action.55
Abandoning
his
earlier
conjecture
about
the nature
of
"pre-Christian
agan-
ism,"
Voegelin
refined
his
views,
describing
Nazi
symbolism
as a
mix of im-
manent
pagan
tribalismwithin the
symbols
of
Christianity.56
Voegelin's
analysis
evolved
in the late
1940s,
when
he
realizedthat
this
explanation
did not
adequately
lluminate
he
ideological
motivations
of Com-
munism
or
Positivism.
According
o
Voegelin,
the latter
also
exhibited
an
ideo-
logical
limiting
of
philosophy
and science
to
temporal
reality-in
this
case
quantifiable
aws
describinghumanity.
50
AutobiographicalReflections,
44.
5
Ibid.,
57-58; and,
Cooper,
Eric
Voegelin,
21.
52
"Some
Problemsof German
Hegemony,"
164
53
Autobiographical
Reflections,
63.
54
Voegelin,
From
Enlightenment
o
Revolution,
97.
55
bid.,
145.
56
bid.,
97.
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166
Clifford
E
Porter
...
The
climax of this
is the
magic
dream
of
creating
he
Superman,
he
man-made
Being
that
will
succeed
the
sorry
creature
of
God's
making.
This is
the
great
dream
that
first
appeared
maginatively
n the
works
of
Condorcet,
Comte,
Marx,
Nietzsche
and later
pragmatically
n the
CommunistandNationalSocialist
movements.57
He
also
realized
that his
own
quest
to discover the
meaning
of
history
through
a
study
of
ideas
presumed
o
limit
human
experience
strictly
to
the movement
of
ideas.
But,
history
is,
in
part,
unknowable
or
many
reasons,
not the least
of
which
is that
much
of
human
experience
ies
before
us.
Also,
ideas
are
symbols
of
experience;
they
are not
independent
objects.
As
symbols,
ideas
represent
experiences
people
have
had
throughouthistory."8
Voegelin
discovered how
to tie
together
his
observations
and
analysis
of
National Socialism while
studying
Gnosticism n ancient,medieval,and mod-
em
forms. As
the search for
certainty,
Gnosticism
became
for
Voegelin
the
model for
diagnosing
modem,
mass,
ideological
movements.
Ideologies
are
modem
Gnostic
speculations
of the
meaning
of existence.
All
ideologists
claim
to
provide
definitive
and absolute
understanding
nd
knowledge-i.e.,
gnosis-
of the
meaning
of
existence. Gnostic
speculations
are
not new.
Throughout
human
history
people
have
attempted
o break
rom
the fundamental
ncertain-
ties
of
existence
to
find salvation from
that
uncertainty.
Furthermore
modern
Gnostic
ideologists
seek this salvation
through
he
state
as a
substitute
or di-
vine
reality;
the statecomes to
represent
all of human
reality
and
through
ts
perfection
he
Gnostic
ideologists
achieve
salvation-in
other
words,
the foun-
dations
for
totalitarianism re laid. The drive
for
certainty,
however,
requires
a
limited
understanding
f human
experience
and
leads
to
an alienation
rom
the
fullness
of both
Divine and
temporalreality.
This
alienation
requires
more
ex-
planation.
It
was
obvious
to
Voegelin
that
many
ideologies
paralleled
eligious
move-
ments. A
religious
quest
for
answers,
however,
is
inadequate
to
explain
all
ideological
movements;
or
example,
Marx
viewed
any
religious
or
metaphysical
speculation
or
feelings
as
mere
bourgeois
abstractions.59
n TheNew Science
of
Politics
(1952)
and
later
Voegelin
no
longer
described
deologies
as
religious
quests;
rather,
he
argues
that
ideologists
sought
certainty
o
escape
the uncer-
tainty
of humanexistence.
According
to
Voegelin,
the
Christian
response
to
uncertainty
was
the
symbol
of
faith
elaborated
by
St.
Paul
in Heb. 11:1: "Now
faith is the substance of
things hoped
for,
the evidence
of
things
not
seen."60
57 bid.,
301-3
58 Voegelinian
Revolution,
109.
5
See, e.g., KarlMarx,"EconomicandPhilosophicManuscripts f 1844,"EngelsReader,
ed.
RobertC. Tucker
New
York,
1978'),
92.
60
Eric
Voegelin,
The
New
Science
of
Politics
(Chicago,
1952),
122.
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Voegelin's
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f
Nazi
Extremism
167
Faith,
however,
does
not
definitively
solve or
end
uncertainty.
According
to
Voegelin,
Marx
rejected
aith
and instead
found
certainty
hrough
his
scien-
tific
discovery
of the
process
of
history;
the
Nazis,
by
contrast,
ound
it
in
the
scientific
explanation
of
Race.
Voegelin
thus concludes
that
Gnosticism as
a
counterexistentialdream
world can
perhaps
be
made
intelligible
as the
extreme
expression
of an
experience
which
is
uni-
versally
human,
that
is,
of
a
horrorof
existence
and
a desire
to
escape
from it.61
Voegelin
further
oncluded hatthe
attempt
o
break
away
from
the
fundamen-
tal
fact
of
uncertainty
equires
a
limiting
of
the
sphere
of
human
experience
to
merely temporal
experience.
In
short,
God
does not offer
a
salvation
from
un-
certainty,most
painfully
manifested
by
death. Onthe otherhand,Gnostic ide-
ologists
limit
the
horizonof all
reality-particularly
of
human
consciousness-
so
that
certainty
can be discovered.
Developing
a
position
he elaborateddecades
earlier,
Voegelin
argued
hat
limiting
human
experience
to
temporalreality
leads
to
a limited
understanding
of
human
consciousness and
prevents
the
recognition
of
reality.
Ideological
explanations
of
reality
are therefore deformations
of
reality
when
they
seek
certainty
xclusively
within
the
temporal phere
of
existence.
Thus
Heidegger's
and
Marx's assertion that
existence
precedes
essence
may
give
a
definitive
explanation
of the
development
of consciousness, but it was at the price of
ignoring
the
spiritual
and
unknown
part
of
reality.
Such
a deformation
of
real-
ity
has
serious
consequences.
Thus,
Socrates
was
right
o
proclaim
hathe knew
thathe knew
nothing
and
therebypreserved
openness
to
philosophic
questions.
The
Gnostic
urge
is a
consistent
occurrence
throughout
human
history.
Voegelin
had read about
many
movements
in ancient
and
medieval
eras
that
were
describedas Gnostic
by
current
cholars,
and he
realized
the
connection
with
modem
Gnosticism while
reading
Hans Urs
von
Balthasar's
Prometheus
(1937).
Another
influence
was,
Ferdinand
Christian
Baur's
1835
work,
Die
christliche
Gnosis;
oder die christliche
Religionsphilosophie
nihrer
geschicht-
lichen
Entwicklung.
t
described
common forms
of
Gnosticism
in
history,
in-
cluding
strandsof Gnosticism
in
Hegel
and
Schelling.62
Still,
a
theory
of
the
movementof ideas fails
to
explain
any
connection
or
influence
from
one
Gnos-
tic
movement
to
another
over the
span
of
millennia.
For
example,
it did not
make sense that Marx and Hitler
were
directly
influenced
by
reading
about
ancient Gnosticism. He
came to believe
that the
answer
to
understanding
he
appeal
of Gnosticism ies
in humanconsciousness.
Thus,
Voegelin
was able to
61
Ibid., 167.
62
Autobiographical
Reflections,
66. Gilles
Quispel
considered
t "obvious"
hat
Jung
was
a
gnostic.
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8/19/2019 Eric Voegelin on Nazi Political Extremism
19/22
168
Clifford
F
Porter
understand
why
ideologies only
sometimes
appear
imilar
o
religions
and
why
Gnosticism is a
consistent
phenomenon hroughout
history.
Gnosticism
has
often
penetrated
nto Christian
ymbolism
because
Chris-
tianity
expanded
both
spiritually
and
politically,
and
many
Christians
were not
satisfied with thetenuousbondof Faith. AncientGnosticism s commonlyun-
derstood to be an
early
form of Christian
heresy
of
the second
century