Erica Espinosa* NON-DETAINED

Victor H. Gonzalez*

Maureen Sweeney, Esq.

University of Maryland, School of Law

Clinic Law Office, Suite 360

500 West Baltimore Street

Baltimore, MD 21201

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW

IMMIGRATION COURT

BALTIMORE, MARYLAND

____________________________________

)

In the Matter of: )

)

[Respondent] ) File No.: [A-Number]

)

)

In Removal Proceedings )

___________________________________ )

Immigration Judge Kessler Next Hearing: March 31, 2015, at 8:00 a.m.

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF

APPLICATIONS FOR WITHHOLDING OF REMOVAL

*Practicing pursuant to 8 C.F.R. S. 292.1(a)(2), 8 C.F.R. S. 1291.1(a)(2), and Maryland Rule 16

2

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW

IMMIGRATION COURT

BALTIMORE, MARYLAND

____________________________________

)

In the Matter of: )

)

[Respondent] ) File No.: [A-Number]

)

)

In Removal Proceedings )

___________________________________ )

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF

APPLICATIONS FOR WITHHOLDING OF REMOVAL

STATEMENT OF CASE

[Respondent] is a native and citizen of El Salvador who fled his country and entered the

United States without inspection in July 2000. He was placed in removal proceedings on the ba-

sis of a Notice to Appear dated August 23, 2007, and charged with being inadmissible as an alien

present without prior inspection or admission, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(I). Exh. 4,

Tab K, I-213, p. 74. Removal proceedings were later administratively closed on April 23, 2008,

at the request of the government when the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) granted

[Respondent] public interest parole status on the grounds that he was assisting the government as

an informant. Exh. 4, Tab K, I-213, p. 74.

When DHS decided that [Respondent] was “no longer useful as a confidential inform-

ant,” DHS moved to recalendar proceedings, and proceedings were recalendared in September

2011. Id. At that time, DHS lodged an additional charge of inadmissibility against [Respond-

3

ent], on the basis of his 2007 probation before judgment disposition for possession of a marijua-

na blunt.1 Tab R, Statement of Charges at 140.

On December 23, 2011, [Respondent] admitted the charges and conceded removability.

He requested relief in the form of withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. §1231(b)(3) and under

the Convention Against Torture (CAT), de novo review of his earlier application for Temporary

Protected Status (TPS), and, in the alternative, voluntary departure. Following an individual

hearing on April 17, 2012, the Immigration Judge (IJ) issued her decision on April 23, 2012,

denying TPS and withholding of removal under both 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) and the Convention

Against Torture, and granting voluntary departure. (I.J. decision at 14). [Respondent] timely

appealed that decision to the BIA, and on October 24, 2012, the Board dismissed his appeal on

the grounds that he had failed to establish eligibility for withholding of removal under either 8

U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) or the CAT. BIA Decision at 1. [Respondent] timely petitioned for review

at the Fourth Circuit, and on January 23, 2014, the Fourth Circuit held that former MS-13 mem-

bers share a common immutable characteristic that can serve as the basis for withholding of re-

moval. The Fourth Circuit remanded the case to BIA for further proceedings to determine [Re-

spondent’s] eligibility for withholding of removal. Martinez v. Holder, 740 F.3d 902 (4th Cir.

2014). The BIA on May 21, 2014 remanded the case to the Immigration Judge for consideration

1 Probation before judgment is not a conviction under Maryland State law, but meets the defini-

tion of conviction under 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(48)(A). E.g. Jones v. Baltimore City Police Dep’t,

606 A.2d 214, 216-17 (Md. 1991) (stating that the disposition of probation before judgment is

not a conviction). By lodging this criminal charge of inadmissibility, DHS subjected [Respond-

ent] to mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(A). It is worth noting that [Re-

spondent’s] offense, as a conviction for possession of 30 grams or less of marijuana, is not a

ground of removability under 8 U.S.C. 1227, but only a ground of inadmissibility. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(B)(i).

4

in light of Matter of M-E-V-G- and Matter of W-G-R. [Respondent] is scheduled for a merits

hearing on March 31, 2015.

[Respondent] is seeking withholding of removal under section 241(b)(3) of the INA and

in the alternative withholding under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).

STATEMENT OF FACTS

I. [Respondent’s] Personal Facts

At age 12, [Respondent], a native of San Miguel, El Salvador, lost his stepfather, the only

father figure he ever had. Exh. 3, I-589 Affidavit 3,4. After his stepfather died, [Respondent’s]

family struggled to make ends meet. “We were so poor that my mother had to turn off the lights

and the water. Sometimes, we didn’t have food to eat, and my mother sold her clothes to get us

something to eat.” Exhibit B, Affidavit of [Respondent’s Sister], at 6; see also Exhibit C, Affi-

davit of [Respondent’s Sister], at 10. [Respondent] became friends with a group of young men

when he was about 14, many of whom were 18-25 years old. (Transcript [hereinafter Tr.] 41);

Exh. 3, I-589 Affidavit, 4. Many of the other group members had lost family members and [Re-

spondent] felt a connection with them. Id. As [Respondent] explained:

At that time, I had lost my stepfather. He was like my father because he raised me since I

was little, and, and that was pretty much the same with the, the other members of the

group. They had gone through the same situation [indiscernible] lost a family member,

and we felt like we were part of a family. (Tr. 41).

According to [Respondent], “[W]hen I joined … we were a group of brothers, that we were

watching for each other, taking care for each other.” (Tr. 50). The group would hang out and

drink, play games, and go to parties together. (Tr. 42). The group was not affiliated with any

larger gang and did not have a name. (Tr. 41).

When [Respondent] was about 15 years old, deportees from the United States began to

arrive in El Salvador. The deportees met with [Respondent’s] group and told them that they were

5

part of the larger Mara Salvatrucha gang known as MS-13. (Tr.41-42). They told them that they

were already part of MS-13 and had no choice but to be initiated into MS-13. Id. They had an

initiation ritual called “The 13 Seconds” - a beating that lasted for 13 seconds. (Tr. 43). From

the moment he was beaten, [Respondent] was officially considered a member of MS-13. Exh.3,

I-589 Affidavit 5, 6.

As more deportees arrived, new gang rules were gradually instituted and new demands

were made on [Respondent] and other members. Exh. 3, I-589 Affidavit, 7. After initiation,

[Respondent] and the others had to get MS-13 tattoos. (Tr. 43). The gang leaders demanded that

all MS-13 members extort people to get money. (Tr. 50). [Respondent] refused to do this, as the

potential victims were members of the community whom he had known his entire life, and he

felt the actions were morally wrong. Exh.3, I-589 Affidavit, 8; Exh.4, Tab A, Resp. Suppl. Affi-

davit, 5. The deportees would also kill people. (Tr. 51). [Respondent] did not like this and re-

fused to get involved. (Tr. 71). Every time he refused to do what he was ordered, other gang

members beat him. (Tr. 50-51); Exh.4, Tab A, Resp. Suppl. Aff., 5. This happened approximate-

ly two or three times a month, because [Respondent] repeatedly refused to participate in extort-

ing money or hurting anyone in the community. (Tr. 50-51); Exh. 3, I-589 Affidavit, 5.

The local gang had weekly neighborhood meetings and larger monthly meetings with the

broader gang from around the entire country of El Salvador. (Tr. 46); Exh. 7, Resp. Suppl. Aff.,

4. At these meetings, gang leaders talked about “who was in the gang and who was not in the

gang.” (Tr. 45). When a member left, gang members felt that “the other gangs were laughing at

them and … they were not going to permit one of their members to leave them.” I-589 Affida-

vit, AR 565. As a result, the MS-13 leaders gave gang members the “green light” to kill anyone

who tried to leave the gang. (Tr. 46). The MS-13 leaders gave all of the gang members physical

6

descriptions of the individuals who had the “green light,” and told the gang members where they

lived or worked, so that gang members who did not know them could kill those individuals if

they saw them. (Tr. 46-47). It was commonly understood that death was the only way to leave

the gang. Exh.7, Resp. Suppl. Aff., 8. All members who tried to leave were treated the same

way.

Two of [Respondent’s] friends, nicknamed El Payaso and La Pantera (“the Panther”)

tried to leave the gang and were killed as a result. (Tr. 51); Exh. 4, Tab A, Resp. Suppl. Aff., 6.

Shortly after this, [Respondent] decided to leave the gang as well; he stopped going to the gang

meetings, apologized to his family for worrying them and putting them in danger, and began at-

tending church. (Tr. 52); Exh.4, Tab A, Resp. Suppl. Affl, 7. After this, he went to stay outside

of San Miguel with his grandmother to try and protect himself. Exh. 4, Tab A, Resp. Suppl. Aff.,

6. After a short time, however, his grandmother became scared for her safety and sent [Re-

spondent] back to San Miguel. Id.

One day, [Respondent] ran into one of the gang leaders, known as “Psycho”, who asked

him why he wasn’t going to meetings anymore. [Respondent] stated that he no longer wanted to

be in the gang. (Tr. 47). [Respondent] explained: “I told him that I didn’t want to, to be any, any

longer part of the gang, that I wanted to devote myself to my family, that I wanted to be some-

body different…” Id. Psycho told [Respondent] that there was “only one way out,” by which he

meant death. (Tr. 52); see Exh. 3, I-589 Affidavit. Psycho and the other gang members began to

beat [Respondent] and stabbed him with knives and bottles, leaving him for dead. (Tr. 52-53);

Exh. 4, Tab A, Resp. Suppl. Aff., 8; I-589 Affidavit, 9. His injuries were so grave that the doctor

told [Respondent] that it was a miracle that he was still alive because he had lost a lot of blood.

Exh. 3, I-589 Affidavit; Exh. 4, Tab I.; (Tr. 52). After he recovered, he went to live with a distant

7

relative in the town of Intipucá. Tr. 55-56. Approximately two months later, gang members

spotted [Respondent] and drove by and shot him using different types of guns. (Tr. 56) Exh. 4,

Tab A, Resp. Suppl. Aff., 10. [Respondent] had shotgun pellets and fragments in his body and

was hospitalized for 2-3 weeks. See Exh. 3, I-589 Affidavit; (Tr. 56-7). Again, [Respondent]

went into hiding and lived with various family members and friends. I-589 Affidavit, 12, Exh. 4,

Tab A, Resp. Suppl. Aff., 11; (Tr. 57). One day when [Respondent] was outside, some gang

members saw [Respondent] and stated shooting at him; fortunately, they did not hit him and he

was able to escape. (Tr. 84); Exh. 4, Tab A, Resp. Suppl. Aff., 2.

[Respondent] realized he needed to leave the country to be safe. See Exh. 3, I-589 Affi-

davit. Even today, gang members continue to ask his remaining family members about his

whereabouts. (“There are still some mareros [gang members] that are looking for him; because

there are more mareros today than there were before; those [members of MS-13]; … they ask me

about him every now and then”). Exhibit F, Affidavit of [Respondent’s Sister], at 37-38; see also

Exhibit D, Affidavit of [Respondent’s Mother], at 19; Exhibit E, Affidavit of [Witness], at 27.

Following his release for DHS detention, [Respondent] has been living predominantly

with his sister, [Respondent’s Sister]. In the very early morning hours of Friday, October 3,

2014, [Respondent’s Sister], was sleeping when a man broke into her home. When she woke up

and screamed, he fired two shots at her and fled. Tab PPP, Affidavit of [Respondent’s Sister], at

385. After they called, 911, detectives arrived and surveyed the area, finding that the suspect had

worn gloves and also did not steal anything from the home. Id. The detectives returned again on

October 6, 2014. They told [Respondent’s Sister] that they believed the person went to her home

to specifically kill someone, and they asked additional information from each of her family

members including [Respondent]. Id. [Respondent] was asked about who he was hanging out

8

with and if he was “dealing with gangs or doing bad things”. Tab PPP, Affidavit of [Respond-

ent’s Sister], at 386. The detectives were not able to ascertain a motive for the shooting. Since

that day, [Respondent’s Sister] has not heard anything further from the detectives nor has she

reached out to authorities for fear that further investigations may put her family in jeopardy. Id.

She fears that someone might be watching them and ready to retaliate if the police continue the

investigation. Id.

II. Country Conditions in El Salvador

A. MS-13 and other gangs in El Salvador target former members for reprisals and

assassination.

There is abundant evidence that the gangs target and attempt to kill members who leave

or try to leave the gang. See Tab RRR, Affidavit of Thomas Boerman, at 410; Exh. 4, Tab N;

Tab O, “No Place to Hide: Gang State and Clandestine Violence in El Salvador” [hereinafter

“No Place to Hide”]; Tab P; Tab Q. They take the decision of a member to leave the gang with-

out authorization to be an affront to the gang, an assault on its reputation and a sign of “disre-

spect.” Tab RRR, Affidavit of Thomas Boerman, at 406, 410. The affront is particularly serious

for a member who had previously been ritually initiated into the gang and gotten the gang’s tat-

toos. The gangs not only feel it imperative to punish such individuals, but they also leverage

their betrayal by subjecting them to especially horrific forms of violence as a conscious way of

furthering their larger strategy of terror. Id. at 410.

Furthermore, the nationwide geographic reach of MS-13 has strengthened over the years.

With the increase in law enforcement and anti-gang laws, gangs in El Salvador have adapted and

become more difficult to detect and more organized beyond their original neighborhoods. Tab

RRR, Affidavit of Thomas Boerman, at 396-400; Exh. 4, Tab N. Moreover, gangs have shifted

9

from defending a geographical area and become adept at uprooting and reinserting themselves

around the country in El Salvador. Exh. 4, Tab O, No Place to Hide, pg. 27.

Combined with the small size of El Salvador and its intense social interconnection, the

changes in the gangs have increased the danger for members who attempt to leave the gang and

made relocation unfeasible. Tab RRR, Affidavit of Thomas Boerman, at 410. “Gang members

seeking to withdraw from active gang life face the same threat of fatal retribution from their fel-

low members…[I]n the past it was difficult, but feasible, for a gang member to disassociate him-

self safely from a gang, [but] it is now virtually impossible.” Exh. 4, Tab O, No Place to Hide.

In recent years, gang violence has increased against those who have gone to the United States to

escape the gangs and been deported back to El Salvador. Exh. 4, Tab O, No Place to Hide, pg.

95.

Moreover, gang members with tattoos are particularly at risk when they attempt to leave

behind gang life. Exh. 4, Tab O, No Place to Hide, pg 34. Furthermore, tattoo removal is not

feasible. Tab RRR, Affidavit of Thomas Boerman, at 408-9. It is unlikely that tattoos will be re-

moved. Id. In addition to the danger from gang members, an individual found to have tattoos will

also face danger from police and others because they believe him to be related to the gang. Id. at

408. “In some cases [] abuses occur at the hands of officers as part of misdirected crack downs

on gangs; other times they are a result of corrupt police advancing their own criminal agendas.”

Id. at 409. Current or former gang members, particularly those with tattoos, are usually in ex-

treme danger due to threats from various groups. Id. The organization of the gangs means that

even if the police arrest several people, there are many other gang members willing to take their

place. Exh. 4, Tab O, No Place to Hide, pg. 36.

10

Although the government has made attempts to ameliorate the situation, corruption and

gangs run rampant in El Salvador. “Tragically, the situation has deteriorated since that time

[2010] and actually worsened with respect to the government’s ability to control gangs and to

protect the public.” Tab RRR, Affidavit of Thomas Boerman, at 398. Therefore, the public lacks

help from the police to control the gang situation and prevent future crimes. The police are una-

ble to protect their citizens, much less former gang members. “It is utterly unrealistic to con-

clude that a person likely to be perceived as a current or former gang members would be able to

safely navigate each of these threats, and any one of them puts them at high risk of egregious

physical harm, if not death.” Tab RRR, Affidavit of Thomas Boerman, at 411.

B. The Salvadoran police force and judiciary are corrupt, and often work in collu-

sion with the gangs they are tasked to defeat.

There is a high level of impunity for gang members in El Salvador because of an equally

high level of corruption in the policy and judiciary. In a striking and high-profile example, the

State Department reports that on October 10, 2013, a gang member, alleged to have mastermind-

ed the vicious murder of a witness, was absolved of all criminal charges. Tab KKK, El Salvador

2013 Human Rights Report (hereinafter “State Dept. report”), at 332. In a country where fewer

than five percent of all criminal charges result in convictions, a statistic attributed to the substan-

tial corruption throughout the Salvadoran judiciary, the absolution of a gang member charged

with murder is not surprising. Tab KKK, State Dept. report at 337. The lack of criminal prosecu-

tions is attributed to “corruption at all levels of the Policia Nacional Civil—PNC (National Po-

lice).” Tab RRR, Affidavit of Thomas Boerman, at 397. Similarly, the murder of a witness pre-

pared to testify against a criminal organization is rather banal. See Tab WW, Letter from Expert,

Elizabeth G. Kennedy (hereinafter “Kennedy Letter”), at 254 (noting Salvadorans who report

gang members to the police are deemed resisters to the gang’s rule, and subject to murder for de-

11

fying the gang’s law). However, in this instance the witness had been “shot between 25 and 28

times” while being held in a police detention center for his own protection. Tab KKK, State

Dept. report at 332. Of the fourteen police officers working at the detention center, nine were

arrested in connection to the murder. Tab KKK, State Dept. report at 254. Ironically, Salvadoran

“intelligence officials” had warned the police officers of potential threats against the witness’s

life, but it was two police officers who were ultimately detained for executing the witness (and

likely at the behest of the “exonerated” gang member). Tab KKK, State Dept. report at 254.

While this incident may be especially brazen, police corruption in El Salvador and even

cooperation between police officers and gang members are not isolated. Indeed, in another inci-

dent, fourteen police officers were arrested for collaborating with M-18 in allowing a group of

suspected gang members into a police station, where they shot to death a star prosecution wit-

ness. Tab HHH, Gang Informant at 294. Even worse, due to the corruption, “a significant per-

centage of police were (and still are) in collusion with gangs, terrified of them, and/or indifferent

toward the needs of the public, officers routinely avoided even entering gang-infested areas, or

fled when the gangs appeared.” Tab RRR, Affidavit of Thomas Boerman, at 397. Officers are

often given the names of perpetrators, however, no action is taken. Id.

Such perverse inversions of the role of police has left many Salvadorans without any re-

course to the demands of the gangs – when bus owners are extorted by gang members, they

know not to file charges with the police because the police will in turn report the bus owners to

the gangs, who may then burn the owners’ buses in response to the owners’ audacity in defying

their rule. Tab RRR, Affidavit of Thomas Boerman, at 410. The people have become reluctant to

report the extortion to the PNC. Tab RRR, Affidavit of Thomas Boerman, at 403. This in return

signals to the gangs that they can operate without police intervention. Id.

12

Police officers frequently accept bribes, both as an “alternative to arrests or citations,”

and to allow gangs free reign within their jurisdiction. Tab LLL, El Salvador Country Profile

(hereinafter “Country Profile”), at 360. These corrupt arrangements reach all the way to the po-

lice leadership, as many “high-level officials have been investigated in recent years for ties to

organized crime and drug trafficking.” Tab LLL, Country Profile, at 168. This intersection of

corruption, the purchase of exemption from the rule of law, criminality, and the employment of

police officers to perform murders and other crimes at the service of the gangs, has resulted in

Salvadoran police officers being viewed not as instruments of justice, but as coworkers of the

gang members they should be battling. Tab WW, Kennedy Letter, at 258-259.

Corruption and cooperation with criminal organizations is endemic to the security forces

of the Northern Triangle in Central America: security force members in Guatemala, Honduras,

and El Salvador have been accused of selling military-grade weapons, to “organized crime,

gangs, and narco-traffickers.” Tab NNN, El Salvador Soldiers ‘Selling Guns to Drug Gangs,’ at

372. Because of this high level of corruption of the security forces by the criminal organizations,

gangs such as MS-13 can arm themselves with military-grade weaponry, such as the 1,800 hand

grenades a group of Salvadoran soldiers attempted to sell to criminal buyers. Id.

Even the rather flimsy distinction between the police, who merely work for the gangs,

and the gang members themselves is beginning to fray. The past five years have seen members

of gangs infiltrate the police force, seeking to acquire weapons, uniforms, military intelligence,

and training. Tab DDD, Infiltration of Security Forces, at 280. While only sixteen police cadets

and 42 full-fledged police officers had been identified as having ties to MS-13 from 2009 to

2013, 26 police officers/gang members were caught in the first five months of 2014 alone. Tab

DDD, Infiltration of Security Forces, at 280-281.

13

C. Gangs like MS-13 control large portions of El Salvador.

The absolute control of territory by gangs in El Salvador is typical: MS-13 and M-18 are

the “de facto government in many parts of El Salvador,” and are the “most powerful actors in El

Salvador in all but a few areas.” Tab WW, Kennedy Letter, at 253-54. Tab RRR, Affidavit of

Thomas Boerman, at 401. FTI Consulting, a “global business advisory firm,” ranked El Salva-

dor as “very dangerous,” because “whole territories of the nation are outside El Salvador’s con-

trol and within cartels’ and gangs’ control.” Tab WW, Kennedy Letter, at 257. The near-

exclusive control of gangs in parts of El Salvador led the United States to cancel programs

providing disaster relief to six municipalities it deemed were entirely controlled by gangs. Tab

EEE, USA suspended help to municipalities of El Salvador dominated by “gangs,” at 282. Even

the former President of El Salvador, Maurico Funes, has acknowledged the Salvadoran govern-

ment now must compete with the gangs for territorial control of El Salvador – a contest that the

government has decidedly lost in the communities it has entirely abandoned to the gangs’ con-

trol. Tab XX, The “Maras” and the Weakness of the State (hereinafter “Former President’s Edi-

torial”), at 260. Funes admits the wholesale territorial control of communities by the gangs is not

a new phenomenon, but one that has been ongoing for decades. Tab XX, Former President’s Edi-

torial, at 260. These gangs exercise their control by maintaining a stronger security apparatus

than the Salvadoran government, imposing their own rule of law on residents within their territo-

ry, raising revenues through a progressive taxation scheme, and control the residents’ basic free-

dom of movement.

i. Gangs have a stronger security apparatus than the Salvadoran gov-

ernment.

Gangs in El Salvador simply have a stronger security apparatus than the Salvadoran

government’s capacities. Tab WW, Kennedy Letter, at 257. Their security apparatus is “stronger

14

than the national military’s and police’s,” due to the gangs’ “operating revenues of billions of

dollars and large weapon stockpiles.” Tab WW, Kennedy Letter, at 257. With such a drastic re-

versal in the balance of deadly force typical to a state, “El Salvador’s ability to protect its citizens

against organized crime is questionable.” Tab WW, Letter, at 257. Two asylum-seekers inter-

viewed by Elizabeth G. Kennedy shed light on this balance of military power: both told Kennedy

that if the gangs “want you, you can stay and die or you can flee.” Tab WW, Kennedy Letter, at

257. Tellingly, these two asylum-seekers were both police officers who fled El Salvador after

being targeted by the gangs because they realized the government they represented could not

protect them from the power of the gangs actually controlling much of the country.

The gangs instill this sense of fear and hopelessness in the government’s security ap-

paratus by imposing the violent strength of their security apparatus, both on civilians and the po-

lice. See Tab WW, Kennedy Letter, at 255; Tab CC, Gang Members are Armed Better than the

Salvadoran Police (hereinafter: “Gang Members are Armed Better”), at 277. In the first four

months of 2014, gangs had attacked Salvadoran police officers and soldiers over sixty times. Tab

CC, Gang Members are Better Armed, at 277. To start 2015, police officers were no safer, with

gang members killing a police officer every other day in January. Tab AAA, “Gangs Intensify

Attacks against PNC,” at 269.

This constant targeting leaves the Salvadoran police feeling “unprotected,” because

the gangs have more modern armaments and better tactical training than do the police officers.

Tab CC, Gang Members are Better Armed, at 277. In turn, the police officers’ rational reluctance

to wage war against the better armed gang members results in the Salvadoran public viewing the

police force as “‘too afraid to enter’” neighborhoods controlled by the gangs, effectively en-

15

sconcing the gangs as the sole purveyors of deadly force within the territory they control. Tab

WW, Kennedy Letter, at 255.

ii. Residents in gang-controlled El Salvador live under the rule of law as

imposed by the gangs, not under the Salvadoran government’s laws.

Given this drastic disparity in force between the Salvadoran government and the bet-

ter armed gangs, it is unsurprising that gangs such as MS-13 are now the “primary enforcers of

justice in many parts of El Salvador.” Tab WW, Kennedy Letter, at 255. The central tenet to

abide by for Salvadorans under gang-rule is to respect the gang’s control. Tab WW, Kennedy

Letter, at 254. The gangs view any defiance to the gang’s control, including refusing to join or

leaving the gang, as an “antagonistic act in derogation of their ‘rule.’” Tab WW, Kennedy Letter,

at 255. Typical for their callous justice enforcement system, the penalty for defiance to the

gang’s rule is simply murder, although “it is not uncommon for the ‘offender’s’ family or friends

to also be murdered.” Tab WW, Kennedy Letter, at 255. Some residents within gang-governed

territory even respect the harsh judicial system imposed by the gang members more than the

feckless Salvadoran judicial system, because while the gangs’ “justice is not ideal, they are at

least willing to exert control,” while the corrupt government officials are renowned for not even

attempting to “exact justice.” Tab WW, Kennedy Letter, at 255.

iii. Gangs such as MS-13 are better able to raise revenue through taxes

on Salvadoran residents than the Salvadoran government is.

While the “Salvadoran government is frequently unable to collect taxes from citi-

zens,” the gangs, as the de facto rulers of many Salvadorans, are able to collect taxes “with regu-

larity” though a sophisticated system paralleling the revenue-collection system of a modern gov-

ernment. Tab WW, Kennedy Letter, at 255. The gangs’ extortion from residents within their do-

mains has been normalized from a crime into rent (renta) the residents pay in obeisance to the

16

gangs. Tab WW, Kennedy Letter, at 253. The rent payments further legitimize gangs’ control

within their territory because the residents are literally paying gangs for the simple privilege of

residing or operating a business in the gangs’ territory. These rent payments are organized into a

complicated, but progressive taxation scheme by the gangs that bases rent on factors such as

family size and income. Tab WW, Kennedy Letter, at 253 (noting a “single woman with three

children” making $150 per month is expected to pay $15 (or roughly 43% of her profit) per

week, while a “taxi driver with a wife and two children making $500 a month” may pay $100

(over 85% of his profit) per week). Different members of different professions even pay their

rent to gangs in different intervals, with teachers, paid monthly, paying rent every month, while a

vendor pays a weekly rent since vendors are paid weekly. Tab WW, Kennedy Letter, at 254. Fur-

ther, the gangs use a sophisticated intelligence network to determine which residents have for-

eign-based family members sending remittances home, and then collect some or all of the remit-

tances listed by financial services such as Western Union on illegally “obtained wire transfer

lists.” Tab WW, Kennedy Letter, at 254. This extensive taxation system reifies the gangs’ control

as residents regularly pay gang members, while the Salvadoran government is largely unable to

collect revenues from residents within gang territory.

iv. Gangs control the lives of Salvadorans within their territory, includ-

ing their freedom of travel.

MS-13 and M-18 are capable of restricting Salvadorans’ basic freedom of movement.

When the Salvadoran government attempted to pass legislation imposing sentences of up to ten

years for gang membership, MS-13 and M-18 demonstrated their discontent by stopping much of

the public transportation system in its tracks. Tab ZZ, Maras Paralyze Transport in El Salvador,

at 268. The two gangs were able to “shut down 40 percent to 60 percent of the public transport

bus service in El Salvador,” rendering many Salvadorans helpless as the gangs flexed their con-

17

trol over public transportation. Tab ZZ, Maras Paralyze Transport in El Salvador, at 268. For bus

drivers, in particular, gangs charge a regular tax for the privilege of traveling in the gang’s terri-

tory, with bus drivers complaining of being charged multiple taxes as their routes cross into dif-

ferent gangs’ territory. Tab RRR, Affidavit of Thomas Boerman 402. By both restricting resi-

dents’ ability to travel and taxing the bus operators, MS-13 and M-18 effectively control many

Salvadorans’ freedom of travel.

When the Salvadoran government attempted to pass legislation imposing sentences of up

to ten years on gang membership, MS-13 and M-18 demonstrated their discontent by stopping

much of the public transportation system in its tracks. Tab ZZ, Maras Paralyze Transport in El

Salvador, at 268. The two gangs were able to “shut down 40 percent to 60 percent of the public

transport bus service in El Salvador,” rendering many Salvadorans helpless as the gangs flexed

their control over public transportation. Tab ZZ, Maras Paralyze Transport in El Salvador, at

268. For buses, in particular, gangs charge a regular tax for the privilege of traveling in the

gang’s territory, with bus drivers complaining of being charged multiple taxes as their routes

cross into different gangs’ territory.

STATEMENT OF LAW

I. To be eligible for withholding of removal under section 241(b)(3) of the INA, a respond-

ent must show a clear probability of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,

membership in a particular social group or political opinion.

A showing of eligibility for withholding of removal requires that the respondent establish

that it is more likely than not that the alien would be subject to persecution if returned to the

country from which the respondent seeks withholding of removal. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480

U.S. F.3d 421, 423 (1987).

A. An applicant may be eligible for withholding as a member of a cognizable partic-

ular social group.

18

The BIA in Matter of Acosta held that members of a particular social group must share an

immutable characteristic. 19 I&N Dec. 211 (BIA 1985). In recent years, the Board has added

other requirements in what it describes as a process of “clarifying” the Acosta standard. Under

the current articulation of the BIA’s standard, a group is classified as a particular social group for

withholding of removal purposes, when the group is “(1) composed of members who share a

common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct within

the society in question.”2 See Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 237 (BIA 2014). There is no

regulatory process for establishing particular social groups. The definition of a particular social

group is given a “concrete meaning through a process of case-by-case adjudication.” Id.

i. Members of a particular social group must share a common, immutable

characteristic.

An immutable characteristic is “a characteristic that either is beyond the power of an in-

dividual to change or is so fundamental to individual identity or conscience that it ought not be

required to be changed.” Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 233 (BIA 1985). The BIA in Acosta

held that “the shared characteristic might be an innate one such as sex, color, or kinship ties, or

in some circumstances it might be a shared a past experience.” Martinez, F.3d at 911, citing

Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. at 233. The standard set forth in Matter of Acosta, and as incorporated in

Matter of M-E-V-G- is that “members of a particular social group would suffer significant harm

if asked to give up their group affiliation, either because it would be virtually impossible to do so

2 The Board originally described this requirement as “social visibility”. The 4th Circuit Court of

Appeals in its decision in this case noted in footnote number 4 that that court has “yet to affirm

the statutory authority for the ‘social visibility’ criterion.” Martinez v. Holder, 740 F.3d 902, 910

(4th Cir. 2014).

19

or because the basis of affiliation is fundamental to the members’ identities or consciences.” Id.

at 237-238.

The Fourth Circuit in this case held that the group of former members of a gang in El

Salvador is composed of members who share a common immutable characteristic, namely, hav-

ing repudiated gang membership and its attendant violence. Martinez, 740 F.3d at 911.

ii. A particular social group must be socially distinct within the society in

question.

The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) in Matter of M-E-V-G- renamed the criterion

of social visibility to social distinction. The BIA made it clear that the definition behind the new-

ly renamed social distinction does not significantly depart from the previous standard under so-

cial visibility. Matter of M-E-V-G-. 26 I&N Dec. at 240. The “definition of ‘social visibility’ has

emphasized the importance of ‘perception’ or ‘recognition’ in the concept of ‘particular social

group.’” Id. Social visibility is “the extent to which members of a society perceive those with the

characteristic in question as members of a social group.” Matter of E-A-G-, 24 I&N Dec. 594

(BIA 2008). The new standard clarifies that “social distinction” focuses on “social recognition”

and that the group “must be perceived as a group by society.” Matter of M-E-V-G-. 26 I&N Dec.

at 240.

The society in question must consider the group as distinct. Id. The social distinction

standard “considers whether those with a common immutable characteristic are set apart, or dis-

tinct, from other persons within the society in some significant way.” Id. at 238. The immutable

characteristic should “meaningfully distinguish” an individual from another in society who does

not posses the same immutable characteristic. Id. “Members of these factions generally under-

stand their own affiliation with the grouping, and other people in the particular society under-

stand that such a distinct group exists.” Id. at 236. Society’s perception that a group is distinct is

20

imperative; however “the perception of the applicant’s persecutors may be relevant, because it

can be indicative of whether society views the group as distinct.” Id. at 242. The court must look

at the particular society in question to determine whether that particular society considers the

group to be distinct. A group member is allowed to “hide their membership in the group to avoid

persecution,” without being deprived of protected status as a member of a particular social

group. Id. citing to Rivera-Barrientos v. Holder, 666 F.3d at 652. The social distinction test is

“whether the people of a given society would perceive a proposed group as sufficiently separate

or distinct.” Id. at 241.

The BIA in Matter of Fuentes held that former national police members could be a par-

ticular social group in certain circumstances. Matter of M-E-V-G-. 26 I&N Dec. at 239 citing

Matter of Fuentes, 19 I&N Dec. 658, 662 (BIA 1988). Although the BIA did not make a defini-

tive determination on whether former national police members were a particular social group in

those circumstances because the Respondent failed to establish a nexus, the case stands for the

proposition that mistreatment inflicted on a group can be one factor that indicates that the group

is socially distinct: “it is possible that mistreatment occurring because of such a status in appro-

priate circumstances could be found to be persecution on account of political opinion or mem-

bership in a particular social group.” Id. at 658 The fact that the national police in that case were

involved in a high-profile conflict with guerrillas and that the guerrillas were targeting former

members were appropriate factors to consider in whether former members constituted a group

that had distinction in that society at that time. Id.

iii. The particular social group must be defined with particularity.

In Matter of M-E-V-G-, the Board of Immigration Appeals held that in order for a group

to meet the particularity requirement, the group must be defined by certain characteristics that

21

provide a clear benchmark to determine who is a member of the group. Terms to describe the

group should be commonly accepted in the society. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. at 239.

Particularity mostly addresses the question of delineation or the need to put “outer limits” on the

definition of a particular social group. Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I&N Dec. 214. Additionally, the

group must be discrete, have definable boundaries and must not be amorphous, overbroad, dif-

fuse or subjective. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. at 239. In order to determine if the group

in question is discrete or amorphous, we must focus on societal considerations to make a deter-

mination. Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I&N Dec. at 214. Finally, the BIA in Matter of M-E-V-G- stated

that country conditions reports, expert witness testimony, and press accounts of discriminatory

laws and policies can be used to demonstrate that a group is particular. 26 I&N Dec. at 245.

Essential to establishing the particularity requirement is ensuring that a group is narrowly

defined within the given societal context. A group that is too broad or amorphous, according to

the society of which they are a part of is not particular. See Lizama v. Holder, 629 F.3d 440,

446–48 (4th Cir. 2011)(stating that wealth, Americanization, and opposition to gangs are all

amorphous characteristics and that a criminal record includes too large a spectrum); Matter of A-

M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I&N Dec. 69 (BIA 2007)(stating that the concepts of “wealth” and “affluen-

cy” are too amorphous and too subjective to establish particularity); Escobar v. Gonzales, 417

F.3d 363, 367–68 (3d Cir. 2005)(holding that poverty, homelessness and youth are far too vague

and all encompassing to be characteristics that set the perimeters for a protected group); Zelaya

v. Holder, 668 F.3d 159, 165–66 (4th Cir. 2012)(stating that simple opposition to gangs is an

amorphous characteristic that does not provide an adequate benchmark for determining group

membership). Also, a group lacking a unifying relationship or characteristic is not particular.

See Ochoa v. Gonzalez, 406 F. 3d at 1171 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that a social group of “business

22

owners in Colombia who rejected demands by narco-traffickers to participate in illegal activity”

lacked a unifying relationship or characteristic to narrow the diverse and disconnected group).

Courts have recognized former membership in of a variety of groups as a characteristic

sufficiently particular and defined to support recognition of a particular social group. See Gatimi

v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611 (7th Cir. 2009) (former members of Mungiki). Sepulveda v. Gonzales,

464 F.3d 770, 771-72 (7th Cir. 2006) (“former subordinates of the attorney general of Colom-

bia); Koudriachova v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 255, 262-63 (2d Cir. 2007) (former KGB agents).

Cruz-Navarro v. INS, 232 F.3d 1024, 1029 (9th Cir. 2000) (former members of the police or mil-

itary); Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 178 (3rd Cir. 2003) (former status as child soldier);

Velarde v. INS, 140 F.3d 1305, 1311–13 (9th Cir.1998) (former bodyguards); Chanco v. INS, 82

F.3d 298, 302–03 (9th Cir.1996) (former military officer); and Velasquez-Velasquez v. I.N.S., 53

Fed.Appx 359 (6th Cir. 2002) (former soldier). Applicants are required, of course, to prove as a

factual matter that they actually belong to the group in order to establish eligibility.

Two Circuit Courts that have considered the issue have found that former gang member-

ship was sufficiently particular to support recognition of a particular social group. In its pub-

lished decision in this case, Martinez v. Holder, the Fourth Circuit pointed out in a footnote that

the Seventh Circuit distinguished the particularity of the class of former gang members from the

class of non-associated and disaffiliated gang members in the Ninth Circuit case of Arteaga v.

Mukasey. Martinez v. Holder, 740 F.3d at 902. Indeed, in Arteaga, the Ninth Circuit had stated

that the category of non-associated or disaffiliated persons in this context was far too unspecific

and amorphous to be called a social group. 511 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 2007). The Petitioner in that

case had been disassociated from the gang for some time but testified that he was “still a gang

member”, thus making his social group amorphous. Id. at 945. The Seventh Circuit in Ramos v.

23

Holder, however, found that the respondent, a former member of the Mara Salvatrucha gang,

was part of a group that was neither unspecific nor amorphous. 589 F.3d at 431. The Court relied

on the “external criterion,” or how the country would perceive the group, and determined that

current members of gangs in El Salvador are “specific, well recognized, [and] notorious”. Id. The

court then went on to say that former members of the gang were neither “unspecific nor amor-

phous”. Id. In Urbina-Mejia v. Holder, the Sixth Circuit likewise held that the Board had erred in

finding that the respondent there, also a former gang member, was not a part of a particular so-

cial group. 597 F 3d. at 367 (6th Cir. 2010).3

iv. In case-by-case determinations, two courts of appeals have recognized

former gang members as a particular social group while the BIA declined

to do so due to insufficient evidence.

In its decision in this case, the Fourth Circuit held that former gang membership is an

immutable characteristic for purposes of a particular social group. Martinez v. Holder, 740 F.3d

at 902. In a footnote, the court went on to briefly consider whether the group had sufficient par-

ticularity and social visibility to be cognizable. It noted that the Seventh Circuit had found the

class of former gang members to be sufficiently particular (in contrast to the group of inactive

gang members from the Ninth Circuit Arteaga case), and stated that “assuming without deciding

[that social visibility] is valid, [] we note that the BIA did not consider that issue at all and the IJ

failed to provide a sufficient explanation for why the group of former gang members is insuffi-

ciently socially visible for § 1231(b)(3) purposes.” Id.

The Seventh Circuit held in Ramos v. Holder that specifically tattooed, former Salvador-

an gang members were a particular social group. Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426 (7th Cir. 2009);

3 The respondents in both and Urbina-Mejia were ultimately barred from withholding for com-

mitting serious nonpolitical crimes before entering the U.S., but the courts recognized their par-

ticular social groups.

24

see also, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Notification of Ramos v. Holder: Former

Gang Membership as a Potential Particular Social Group in the Seventh Circuit Memorandum,

March 2, 2010.). In Ramos the petitioner was a Salvadoran man who joined the MS-13 gang at

an early age (14 years old) and then separated from the gang and fled to the United States at 23

years old. Id. He feared if he were to return to El Salvador the gang would kill him.4 The Sev-

enth Circuit recognized his particular social group.

In Urbina-Mejia v. Holder, the Sixth Circuit held that BIA erred in finding that the peti-

tioner was not a member of a particular social group. The court held that the petitioner “was a

member of the particular group of former gang members.” 597 F.3d 362 (6th Cir. 2010). The

court did not deny his claim because of lack of a particular social group, though it did deny the

petitioner’s claim because he failed to establish that “he had not committed any serious nonpolit-

ical crimes while a member of the gang before coming to the United States” Id. 5

In the Matter of W-G-R-, the BIA addressed a proposed former gang member particular

social group. It concluded in that case that “the respondent did not establish that former mem-

bers of the Mara 18 gang in El Salvador who have renounced their gang membership” was a par-

ticular social group. 26 I&N Dec. 222 (BIA 2014). However, the BIA made that determination

based on the evidence provided by the respondent in that case. Id. The respondent in Matter of

W-G-R- only provided “scant evidence that Salvadoran society considers former gang members

4 The Seventh Circuit did not consider social visibility, because it had dismissed social visibility

as an element before Benitez Ramos. 5 It is worth noting that the First Circuit, in Cantarero v. Holder, deferred to a BIA decision re-

jecting former gang members as a particular social group on grounds that the group did not share

an immutable characteristic that could be recognized for these purposes. 734 F.3d 82, 87 (1st

Cir. 2013). The Ninth Circuit held similarly in Arteaga v. Mukasey. 511 F.3d 940, 945 (9th Cir.

2007). However, these cases are not controlling on this Court, given the Fourth Circuit’s deci-

sion in this case on the question of immutability.

25

who have renounced their gang membership as a distinct social group.” Id. The BIA held that

“former gang members who have renounced their gang membership” was not adequately defined

and required further specificity to meet the particularity standard. Id. at 221.

The cognizability of a particular social group is determined on a case-by-case basis, and

must be determined on the basis of the evidence in the record in each case. Matter of M-E-V-G-,

26 I&N Dec. at 251. Where sufficient, “evidence such as country conditions reports, expert wit-

ness testimony, and press accounts of discriminatory laws and policies, historical animosities,

and the like may establish that a group exists and is perceived as ‘distinct’ or ‘other’ in a particu-

lar society.” Matter of M-E-V-G-. 26 I&N Dec. at 244. The Board has stated that there is no

“blanket rejection of all factual scenarios involving gangs.” Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. at

251; see also, Pirir-Boc v. Holder, 750 F.3d 1077, 1083-84 (9th Cir. 2014). A decision must be

made on a case-by-case basis as to whether the society in question recognizes the members of the

group as distinctive in some way. Id. at 1084. “The BIA may not reject a group solely because it

had previously found a similar group… to lack social distinction or particularity, especially

where… it is presented with evidence showing that the proposed group may in fact be recog-

nized by the relevant society.” Id. Former gang members may still be considered a particular so-

cial group if sufficient evidence on the record indicates that society considers former gang mem-

bers as a distinct social group. Matter of W-G-R-. 26 I&N Dec. at 222.

B. An applicant may be eligible for withholding of removal because of persecution

on the basis of political opinion.

Individuals who hold a well-founded fear of persecution on account of a political opinion

are eligible for withholding of removal under INA § 241(b)(3). The persecution must be “on ac-

count of the victim’s political opinion, not the persecutor’s.” INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S.

26

478, 482 (1992). The victim’s political opinion can be either expressly stated or the persecutors

can impute the political opinion to the victim. See Id. at 482-483.

An opinion is deemed a political opinion if it is based on “an ideal or conviction” relating

to the “exercise of rights and privileges.” Saldarriaga v. Gonzales, 402 F.3d 461, 466 (4th Cir.

2005) (noting “actions motivated by an employment interest” do not qualify as a political opin-

ion); see Chang v. INS, 119 F.3d 1055, 1063 n.5 (3rd Cir. 1997) (quoting Black’s Law Diction-

ary for the definition of “political”).

When a governing authority persecutes an individual and there is no “legitimate basis”

for the persecution, the most rational conjecture is that the persecution is politically motivated

Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509, 516-17 (9th Cir. 1985). “[E]vidence of verbal or openly

expressive behavior by the applicant in furtherance of a cause” is the most obvious form of

demonstrating a political opinion. Saldarriaga v. Gonzales, 402 F.3d at 466. However, the Sal-

darriaga court found that “[l]ess overtly symbolic acts may also reflect a political opinion.” Id.

(citing Briones v. INS, 175 F.3d 727, 728-29 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (holding an individual

known to have provided information to the government against insurgents in the Philippines had

a political opinion imputed to him by the insurgents, demonstrated by the insurgents sending the

respondent death threats).

In Menghesha v. Gonzales, a member of the Ethiopian government’s security detail was

accused by the Ethiopian government of “being ‘in sympathy’ with the opposition” after he

failed to arrest individuals protesting in opposition to the Ethiopian government. 450 F.3d 142,

145 (4th Cir. 2006). After the respondent learned the government had discovered he had also

alerted opposition members before an investigation, the respondent fled for the United States. Id.

The Fourth Circuit emphasized that the respondent could have held a well-founded fear of perse-

27

cution on account of the government’s imputing to him a political opinion of “being ‘in sympa-

thy’ with the opposition,” and therefore the BIA and Immigration Judge erred by not inquiring

further after determining one reason for the fear was fear of governmental prosecution. Id. at

148. (holding the BIA had failed to properly apply the mixed motive standard, but remanding so

the BIA could apply the proper standard).

C. An applicant for withholding of removal must have suffered past persecution or

fear future persecution.

If an applicant is determined to have suffered past persecution, the presumption exists

that the applicant’s life or freedom would be threatened in the future in their country of removal

where the original claim is based. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(1)(i). This presumption can only be re-

butted by DHS showing by a preponderance of the evidence that there has been a fundamental

change in circumstances, so that the applicant’s life or freedom would not be threatened on ac-

count of the protected ground or if the applicant could be reasonably expected to relocate to an-

other part of the country of removal to avoid future threat to life or freedom. 8 C.F.R. §§

208.16(b)(1)(i)(A)–(B).

D. An applicant for withholding of removal must be persecuted on account of the

protected ground.

An applicant for withholding must establish that the threat of persecution he faces (as

well as any past persecution he has already suffered) was or will be inflicted on account of one of

the protected grounds in the statute. INA § 241(b)(3). In other words, there must be a nexus be-

tween the applicant’s persecution and membership in a particular social group. 8 C.F.R. §

1208.13(b)(2)(i)(A). Persecution occurs on account of a protected ground where the ground is

“at least one central reason” for the feared persecution. INA 208(b)(1)(B)(i). The Respondent

does not need to show that the feared ground is “‘the central reason or even a dominant central

28

reason’ for his persecution, [but] he must demonstrate that these ties are more than “an ‘inci-

dental, tangential, superficial, or subordinate’ reason” for his persecution. Crespin-Valladares v.

Holder, 632 F.3d at 127 (quoting Quinteros Mendoza v. Holder, 556 F.3d 159, 164 (4th Cir.

2009)).

E. The applicant must not be subject to any bar to withholding.

An applicant will not be eligible for withholding of removal if he or she has assisted in

Nazi persecution or engaged in genocide; has persecuted another person; has been convicted by a

final judgment of a particularly serious crime and therefore represents a danger to the community

to the United States; is considered to have committed a serious non-political crime outside the

United States; or represents a danger to the security of the United States. See section 241(b)(3) of

the INA; 8 CFR § 208.16 and 1208.16.

II. Withholding Under the Convention Against Torture.

Article 3 of the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT) states that in order to

qualify for the CAT, there must be “substantial grounds for believing that [the applicant] would

be in danger of being subjected to torture.” Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhu-

man or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Par. 18, 1988, art. 3, G.A. Res. 39/46, Annex, 39

U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 51, U.N. A/39/51 (1984). The applicant must demonstrate that he or she

more likely than not would be tortured if removed to another country. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17(a). Ar-

ticle 3 of the United Nations Convention Against Torture also states that in order to make a de-

termination, “the competent authorities shall take into account all relevant considerations includ-

ing, where applicable, the existence in the State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, fla-

grant or mass violations of human rights.” Id. The competent authorities shall also take into ac-

count evidence of past torture, country conditions, and whether the applicant could relocate to a

29

part of the country where he or she is unlikely to be tortured. Suarez-Valenzuela v. Holder, 714

F.3d 245 (4th Cir. 2013). citing 8 C.F.R. §1208.16(c)(3).

Section 1208.18(a)(1) of Title 8 of the C.F.R. defines torture as:

Any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally in-

flicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or her or a third person in-

formation or a confession, punishing him or her for an act he or she or a third person has

committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or her or

a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or

suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a

public official or other person acting in an official capacity.

Section 1208.18(a) adds that it is the burden of the respondent to prove he will be tor-

tured by or with the acquiescence of a public official. This “requires that the public official, prior

to the activity constituting torture, have awareness of such activity and thereafter breach his or

her legal responsibility to intervene to prevent such activity.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(7). The

Fourth Circuit has rejected the BIA’s willful acceptance standard and held that “willful blindness

can satisfy the acquiescence component of 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1).” Suarez-Valenzuela at 246.

The willful blindness standard is met when “government officials acquiesce to torture when they

have actual knowledge of or ‘turn a blind eye to torture.’” Id. citing Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F. 3d

1196 (9th Cir. 2003).

Furthermore, the Second Circuit in De La Rosa v. Holder held that it was not clear “why

the preventative efforts of some government actors should foreclose the possibility of govern-

ment acquiescence, as a matter of law under the CAT.” 598 F.3d 110 (2nd Cir. 2010). The court

further held:

Where a government contains officials that would be complicit in torture, and that gov-

ernment, on the whole, is admittedly incapable of actually preventing that torture, the fact

that some officials take action to prevent the torture would seem neither inconsistent with

a finding of government acquiescence nor necessarily responsive to the question of

whether torture would be inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acqui-

escence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.

Id. citing Article 1, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (CAT); see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.18.

30

The Ninth Circuit in Madrigal v. Holder held that in order to determine whether officials

would acquiesce in torture, “require[s] examining the efficacy of the government’s efforts to stop

the… violence, and both are affected by the degree of corruption that exists in… government.”

716 F.3d 509 (9th Cir. 2013). In addition, “if public officials at the state and local level… would

acquiesce in any torture… this satisfies CAT’s requirement that a public official acquiesce in the

torture, even if the federal government… would not similarly acquiescence.” Id. at 510.

While the Fourth Circuit held in Lizama v. Holder that efforts made by the government to

correct a problem such as gang violence, are relevant to whether a public official has acquiesced

to torture, the holding did not directly address the effect of widespread corruption among local

officials, including the local police forcesl. Lizama v. Holder, 629 F.3d 440, 450 (4th Cir. 2011).

citing Amilcar-Orellana v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 86, 92 (1st Cir. 2008).

Furthermore, country conditions alone can be sufficient to grant relief under CAT. The

Ninth Circuit held, “that the Board abused its discretion in failing to recognize that country con-

ditions alone can play a decisive role in granting relief under the Convention.” Kamalthas v. INS,

251 F.3d 1279, 1280 (9th Cir. 2001).

ANALYSIS

I. This Court found [Respondent] to be credible.

Based on his testimony in the earlier proceedings, the Court found [Respondent] to be credi-

ble despite some minor inconsistencies in his testimony. (I.J. at 12).

II. [Respondent] is eligible for withholding of removal under INA §241(b)(3).

A. [Respondent] has been persecuted as a member of the cognizable particular so-

cial group of former members of a gang in El Salvador.

i. Former MS-13 members share common immutable characteristics.

31

In earlier proceedings in this case, the Fourth Circuit held that former gang members

share a common immutable characteristic. Martinez, 740 F.3d at 911. Former gang members

thus satisfy the first of the BIA’s requirements for a particular social group.

ii. Former MS-13 members are recognized by Salvadoran society as a dis-

tinct group.

Although the Fourth Circuit has not yet ruled on the appropriateness of the BIA’s particu-

lar social group criterion of social distinction, [Respondent’s] proposed group still meets the

standard. Former gang members from El Salvador are identifiable and have considerable social

significance as a group (both to the gangs themselves and to Salvadoran society). Salvadoran so-

ciety, the government, the police and citizens recognize former gang members as a distinct group

and treat them differently because they are members of that group. Former gang members take

great pains to hide this identity in El Salvador, precisely because of the social and security con-

sequences it carries, but being a former gang member is highly significant in Salvadoran society.

The Salvadoran government itself recognizes that former gang members are a distinct

group with distinct needs and has programs specifically geared to reintegrating members of this

group into society. In fact, the government instituted a nationwide policy for the reintegration of

former gang members that was known as “Mano Extendida” or “Extended Hand” (a play on the

name of the much better funded government anti-gang policy of “Mano Dura” or “Iron Fist”).

Tab UU, El Salvador: Gang Violence – December 2012, Law Library of Congress, 2012-008435

at 240; Tab VV, El Salvador Country Profile, Security Sector Reform Resource Center, at 249;

Tab LL, Ex Gang Members under Threat: Death Sentence at 197. César Funes, then Secretary of

Youth, described the program as “a work plan for these young men [gang members who want to

leave the gang], which is designed by specialists so that it can provide the necessary aspect for

32

achieving true rehabilitation.” Id. “President Saca has also said, the gang members who want to

leave MS, there is the ‘extended hand’ plan.” Id. The “Extended Hand” plan is aimed solely at

former gang members who desire to rehabilitate. This government program, carefully designed

by specialists and implemented nationally, is targeted at exactly the particular social group pro-

posed here – former members of a Salvadoran gang. It is strong evidence that the group exists

and has social significance in El Salvador. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. at 244 (identifying

evidence of government policies regarding a group as potential evidence of social distinction).

The national police likewise recognize and address former gang members as a group with

distinct characteristics. “The director of the National Civil Police, Ricardo Menesses, comment-

ed that the institution is supporting first hand the reintegration and rehabilitation of the [ex]gang

members.” Tab LL, Ex Gang Members under Threat: Death Sentence at 189. When gang mem-

bers join reintegration or rehabilitation programs, they become former gang members. Former

gang members hide their association with the groups out of fear of persecution. Id. At 185. The

police also recognize that former gang members are murdered specifically because they are for-

mer members of the gang. Tab MM, Former Gang Member Shot and Killed at 198. For exam-

ple, in the case of the murder of one former gang member, Francisco Orellana Ovidio Rivera, the

police attributed his murder directly to the fact that “he retired from the gang to which he be-

longed.” Id. Police see former gang members as a source of information into the intricacies of

gangs. Tab LL, Ex Gang Members under Threat: Death Sentence at 182.

The prisons in El Salvador also recognize former gang members as a group. Authorities

in Sonsonate allowed a prison to be used as a venue for former gang members to hold a press

conference. Tab RR, Former gang members hand over contraband at 233. The event involved

former gang members in prison turning in contraband, such as guns and handmade weapons.

33

Furthermore the Project of Special Parks of Labor Integration and Culture of Peace, another

training program created by the Salvadoran government for former gang members, according to

Hannah Stone, from the Christian Science Monitor, potentially “will give tens of thousands of

former gang members the opportunity to rejoin the labor market.” Tab HH, Building on Success

at 173. The program will initially have 500 participants, but will eventually reach 50,000 -

70,000 participants. Id. The participants of the program will be able to get training and opportu-

nities to work with participating companies. Id. at 174. The program is a big commitment and

will cost $20 million. Id. These programs are funded and created by the Salvadoran government.

The Salvadoran government also has a program to provide incentives to companies that

hire ex-gang members. Id. at 175. Two organizations, Rio Grande, a preserved food company,

and League Central America, a textiles producer, have been employing former gang members for

over three years with support from the government. Id. at 174. The League Central America has

tracked that there are 30 ex-gang members on staff, and Rio Grande has approximately 250 for-

mer gang members on staff and 100 other former gang members in rehabilitation workshops. Id.

However, these two companies are not the norm for accepting former gang members as employ-

ees; “the government was having difficulty finding companies to take part in the program.” Id. at

175. By offering incentives to companies who hire former gang members, the Salvadoran gov-

ernment s is proving that former gang members are perceived in El Salvador as socially distinct.

Another initiative supported by the Mayor of Ilopango helps former gang members re-

ceive job training. Tab SS, Former Gang-Members Join Labor Training in El Salvador at 228.

The government’s creation and support of these programs aimed at former gang members

demonstrates that former gang members are socially distinct in Salvadoran society.

34

Non-governmental organizations in El Salvador also recognize former gangs members as

a distinct group in need of support and attention. Tab RRR, Affidavit of Thomas Boerman, at

411 (describing the efforts of programs designed to retrain and reintegrate former gang mem-

bers). Former gang members have been the center of a study at the Foundation of Economic Co-

operation and Community Development of El Salvador (CORDES) and Foundation for the Ap-

plication and Study of Law (FESPAD). Id. The study revealed that former gang members do not

completely see themselves reintegrating back into society. Id. Nelson Flores, the program coor-

dinator for public safety and criminal justice of FESPAD stated that “for this reason we are look-

ing on the creation of other types of projects that help them reach a complete reinsertion, and we

are also looking for funding to replicate this initiative in other cities.” Id. In addition, another

organization, Love Link, located in San Salvador, hopes to open a factory and/or various shoe

stores in El Salvador with the Metamorphosis logo that “represent the men from the prisons in-

cluding the gang members who have renounced their participation in gangs.” Tab KK, Future

Plans Project Metamorphosis at 180. Most recently in February 2015, the article “Former gang

members in El Salvador find new life in chicken farming,” introduces a new rehabilitation pro-

gram for former gang members that helps them “clean up their act, and change their behavior

through an unlikely activity, chicken farming. It’s a way for former gang members to learn a new

set of skills and get a fresh start.” Tab JJ, Former gang members in El Salvador find new life

179.

Another organization in El Salvador known as Antidrug Foundation of El Salvador start-

ed a project focused specifically on the rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-gang members. Tab

OO, FUNDASALVA at 208. The program offers psychological help and tattoo removal. Id. at

210. The program is aimed toward young former gang members. Id. at 208. A psychotherapist

35

and the director of the program, Wilber Lopez, stated that young former gang members share

common characteristics. Id. The program helped 121 former gang members obtain jobs and 79

former gang members remove tattoos. The former gang members included individuals from San

Salvador, La Libertad, Sonsonate, Santa Ana and San Miguel. Id. Project Metamorphosis has

already built one of the envisioned shoe factories. There, “70 former gang members and prison-

ers… have been given a second chance.” Tab GG, Salvador’s ex-gang members tell of long,

hard road ahead at 172. A number of organizations in El Salvador recognize former gang mem-

bers as a distinct group in Salvadoran society and have developed programs specifically for

them.

Salvadoran society in general also recognizes former gang members as a particular group.

Due to the “social stigma of being an ex-gang member,” the chances of a former gang member

getting a job in El Salvador are slim. Id. Former gang members really never have an opportunity.

“No one hires ex-convicts or [ex]gang members.” Refusing to hire former gang members is one

way that Salvadoran society distinguishes them from other individuals. Id. However, Solutions,

an alliance of five local Salvadoran non-governmental organizations and the U.S. Agency for

International Development is offering a jobs training program specifically to former gang mem-

bers. Id. at 170. Former gang members “will be trained as electricians and technicians.” Id. By

offering specifically former gang members the distinct possibility to be trained as electricians

and technicians, these organizations are treating former gang members differently than other

members in society.

All the previously mentioned organizations, government and non-government programs

are designed specifically for former gang members in Salvadoran society evidencing that the

group of former gang members exists and is perceived to be socially distinct in El Salvador. [Re-

36

spondent] has demonstrated that former gang members are a recognized as socially distinct

group in El Salvador.

iii. The group of former Salvadoran gang members has sufficient particular-

ity.

[Respondent] is part of a social group that meets the particularity component of the BIA’s

formulation of particular social group. To determine whether a particular social group has the

requisite particularity, the BIA requires that the group be discrete and have definable boundaries

that are not amorphous, overbroad, diffuse or subjective. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. at

239. The terms used to describe the group must provide a clear benchmark to determine who is a

member of the group and must be commonly accepted in the society. Id. Also, the particularity

must be defined within the context of the society and can be demonstrated using country condi-

tions, reports, expert witness testimony and press accounts of discriminatory laws and policies.

Matter of W-G-R-, I&N Dec. at 214. Matter of M-E-V-G-, I&N Dec. at 245.

The group of former gang members is defined by two characteristic features – full mem-

bership in a gang followed by repudiation of or departure from the gang. Membership in a gang

in El Salvador is specific and had defined boundaries for who is within the group and who is not.

Initiation is ritualized and considered definitive. Tab RRR, Affidavit of Thomas Boerman, at

410. New members are sent through an initiation called “13 Seconds” where the recruit is beat-

en by current members of the gang for that amount of time. (Tr. 43). Additionally, the members

are made to get the tattoos specific to their gang and gang culture. Tab RRR, Affidavit of Thom-

as Boerman, at 410; (Tr. 43-44); Exh. 4, Tab H, Tattoos at 45-48. These tattoos are distinct in

that they are specific to the gangs and can appear all over one’s body including the face and

neck. Id. at 409. They literally provide a recognizable, physical sign of full gang membership on

the individual’s body. RRR, Affidavit of Thomas Boerman, at 413,

37

Definitive departure from the gang is also recognizable and definite. Turning one’s back

on the gang is marked by changes in lifestyle and activities, as well as changes in who an indi-

vidual associates with and often where he lives. (Tr. 47-57); see Exh. 3 I-589 Affidavit. The

gang, for its part, sees the unauthorized departure of a full member as a sign of the most pro-

found disrespect and responds definitively, often with a death sentence or “green light” to kill the

member who attempts to leave. RRR, Affidavit of Thomas Boerman, at 410, 414.

Gangs, police and civilians are constantly aware of individuals within their community

and what their association is with the gangs. Gangs in El Salvador are able to determine who is

an active gang member and who is a former gang member using interrogative measures and so-

phisticated communication networks. Tab RRR, Affidavit of Thomas Boerman, at 413. Gang

members are “keenly aware of who resides in areas under their control”, making it difficult for a

person to pass through a city or town incognito. Id. Once an unknown individual enters a gang’s

controlled territory, these individuals are subject to inspections by the gangs to discern whether

or not the person has prior gang status or affiliation. Id. Gangs typically interrogate these indi-

viduals while simultaneously checking to see whether or not these individuals have any gang tat-

toos. Id. at 412. If determined that the individual had prior but not current gang affiliations, the

gangs then use their strong, interconnected network in El Salvador to find out whether or not the

individual left with permission. Id.

Also, residents living in El Salvador are able to determine who a former gang member is

due to the close-knit community structure of each individual city or town and indeed the whole

country, which is only the size of Massachusetts. Tab RRR, Affidavit of Thomas Boerman, at

411. In El Salvador, community life is dominated by “high population density”, “overlapping

family-social networks”, “frequent social interaction”, and a “fixation on immigration”. Id. The

38

tight-knit structure of these towns make it nearly impossible for an individual to return to their

previous community without residents realizing they’ve returned. Id. Similarly, relocating to a

new community will immediately lead to interrogation by gang members, police and residents as

to who they are and what they are doing in their community. Id. As a result, an individual’s at-

tempt to return, relocate, or hide in any given location will ultimately be undermined by the in-

terconnected community and country’s family social network. Id. at 398, 413.

It is evident that the community is aware of who is a former gang member because many

individuals will not assist them in order to avoid persecution by association. When [Respondent]

attempted to hide with his grandmother to avoid gang retaliation, she decided after a few weeks

that the risk was too much for her and sent him back to his hometown of San Miguel. Exh. 4,

Tab A, Resp. Suppl. Aff., 6. Former gang members returning to El Salvador from the USA also

have this problem, often finding that when they try and seek help from relatives they are denied

because of their gang tattoos and “the stigma that was created … around tattooed individuals

who were considered the worst of the worst.” Tab PP, Transnational gangs: The Central Ameri-

can migrant crisis’ La Connection, at 217.

The numerous organizations identified, supra, in the discussion of social distinction have

missions and programs directed toward assisting former gang members; it stands to reason that

these Salvadoran organizations are able to identify with enough precision the individuals for

whom their services are intended.

Thus, the clear characteristics of both attaining full membership in a gang and of leaving

the gang provide benchmarks within Salvadoran society for determining who a former gang

member is.

39

I. [Respondent] has suffered past persecution and holds a well-founded fear of future per-

secution on account of a political opinion that has been imputed to him by MS-13.

A. MS-13 is the de facto government in much of El Salvador as evidenced by its

near-exclusive exercise of governmental functions.

The government of El Salvador has been decimated at the local and national levels by

gangs, including MS-13. See Tab XX, Former President’s Editorial, at 260 (admitting the gov-

ernment has abandoned swathes of El Salvador to the rule of gangs). Instead of the Salvadoran

government, MS-13 and other gangs are the de facto governing bodies in many communities.

Tab RRR, Affidavit of Thomas Boerman, at 401. Tab WW, Kennedy Letter, at 255. These

gangs demonstrate their territorial control by the near-exclusive exercise of governmental func-

tion within their domains: they possess a near monopoly on the use of deadly force, establish

their own version of rule of law, use modern taxation methods to fund their governance, and con-

trol the residents’ fundamental freedom of movement.

i. Gangs in El Salvador, such as MS-13, have a stronger security apparatus

than the Salvadoran government and maintain a near-monopoly on dead-

ly force within their territories.

Gangs in El Salvador have been able to acquire and control territory from the Salvadoran

government in large part because their security apparatuses are significantly “stronger than the

national military’s and police’s.” Tab WW, Letter, at 55. While the Salvadoran government is

crippled by limited resources and corruption of its security apparatus, the gangs have billions of

dollars in operating revenue, large stockpiles of military-grade weapons obtained from corrupted

members of the Salvadoran military and police, and international networks linking them to other

transnational criminal organizations. See Tab WW, Kennedy Letter, at 257. At an individual lev-

el, Salvadoran police officers not coopted by the gangs are frequently murdered by the better

armed, militarily trained gangs, resulting in an atmosphere of fear where officers fear to enter

40

territory controlled by the gangs and flee El Salvador when the gangs individually target them

for death. See Tab CCC, Gang Members are Armed Better, at 277; Tab WW, Kennedy Letter, at

257 (describing two former police officers’ testimony that if the gangs “want you, you can stay

and die or you can flee”); see also Tab AAA, Gangs Intensify Attacks against PNC, at 269 (not-

ing a Salvadoran police officer was killed every other day to start January, 2015). With the stra-

tegic advantage of a greater capacity and desire to wield violent force than the government,

gangs such as MS-13 have been able to push the Salvadoran government out of entire regions

and installed themselves as the rulers of these territories. And, following the usurpation of the

Salvadoran government’s rightful governing role, the gangs have expanded their services to

crudely parallel those offered by a legitimate government. Respondent’s expert explains the sit-

uation in this way:

Central American organized criminal groups have now effectively rendered the state and

its agents (e.g., police, courts, prisons) irrelevant in major respects, and are therefore able

to act as de facto governments in many areas because they have so thoroughly under-

mined the state’s capacity to fulfill basic functions of governance. Within this “govern-

mental void,” gangs, narcotics traffickers and other organized criminal groups operate

with virtual impunity and, as during the civil wars, anyone who interferes with or opposes

their efforts to establish political control is subjected to predictable acts of intimidation,

terror and brutality.

Tab RRR, Affidavit of Thomas Boerman, at 401-2.

1. Gangs in El Salvador, not the national government, establish the

rule of law for many Salvadoran residents.

Along with physical control of territories, gangs like MS-13 have begun enforcing

their own rule of law, supplanting the Salvadoran government’s role as lawmaker. The central

rule imposed by gangs tyrannizing parts of El Salvador requires their residents to always respect

the gang, a rule typically enforced by killing anyone who dares to resist the gangs’ control. See

Tab WW, Kennedy Letter, at 254. Strikingly, some residents prefer the brutal rule of law im-

41

posed by the gangs over the nonexistent rule of law purported to be enforced by the Salvadoran

government but in actuality left devoid of meaning as the Salvadoran police cannot enforce the

law in the territory controlled by the gangs. See Tab WW, Kennedy Letter, at 255.

2. Gangs, such as MS-13, utilize complicated taxation schemes to fund

their governance of Salvadoran communities they control.

Gangs like MS-13 enforce a complex, progressive taxation scheme to raise revenue

from the residents within their territory. Tab WW, Kennedy Letter, at 253 (describing a taxation

scheme based on profession and family size). Payment of these taxes to the gang are so normal-

ized that residents refer to them as rent – demonstrative of the banal nature of this form of reve-

nue-raising. In contrast, the Salvadoran government often is unable to collect any taxation from

residents in much of El Salvador; these residents’ taxes instead go to support the gang governing

them. See Tab WW, Kennedy Letter, at 255. Once more, the feckless Salvadoran government is

unable to enforce its governance throughout much of El Salvador, while the gangs ably apply

themselves to their roles as the governing political entity in their territory.

ii. MS-13 punishes individuals who have left the gang because it sees their

departure as an affront to MS-13’s political control and power.

The fundamental rule of law imposed by the gangs and central to life in the parts of

El Salvador ruled by gangs is to afford the ruling gang respect. See Tab WW, Kennedy Letter, at

254 (“First and foremost is the desire [for the gangs’] control to be respected. They thus demand

this ‘respect’ by making residents so afraid of them that they will not challenge or report them.”).

Because any act against the gang is viewed as an act disrespecting the gang’s control over the

populace, the gang views acts like a former member leaving the gang as “a repudiation of their

power and a defiance of their order.” Tab WW, Kennedy Letter, at 254.

The gang must punish the defiant individual for the indirect damage to the gang’s

reputation as the governing power. Tab WW, Kennedy Letter, at 254. Hence, individuals who

42

have left MS-13 are at an “extremely high and predictable risk for violent and lethal reprisals”

meted out by the gang because the individual has disrespected the gang’s notion of control. Tab

RRR, Affidavit of Thomas Boerman, at 398; Tab WW, Kennedy Letter, at 254.

B. MS-13 imputed to [Respondent] a political opinion of resisting MS-13’s legiti-

mate rule because he left the gang.

MS-13 views former members of the gang, such as [Respondent], as defectors who have

defied the gang’s control by leaving its ranks. As [Respondent] testified, MS-13 does not allow

members to leave the gang, because MS-13 does not want others to sense the organization is

weak. Exh. 3, I-589 Affidavit. During weekly meetings, local MS-13 leaders would provide the

physical descriptions of former gang members to be murdered because they had left the gang.

(Tr. 46-47). The local leaders were worried that others “were laughing at them,” weakening their

fear-based control over their territory. Exh. 3, I-589 Affidavit. Thus, the gang leaders targeting of

former MS-13 members is based on what others think of the gang, and not with mere internal

discipline of its members. This revealing insight into MS-13’s targeting of [Respondent] is con-

sistent with the country conditions in El Salvador. Former gang members are regularly targeted

for leaving the gang without MS-13’s consent, and MS-13 targets these former members because

they view the act of leaving the gang as disrespecting the gangs’ control. Exh. 4, Tab O, No

Place to Hide; Tab RRR, Affidavit of Thomas Boerman, at 406. Thus, MS-13 kills former gang

members to “preserve their reputation,” of attacking anyone who dares to challenge their authori-

ty. Tab RRR, Affidavit of Thomas Boerman, at 406. Because MS-13 views former members as

individuals who threaten the gang’s control by not following its orders, the gang then targets

these malcontents for death to prevent their control from being lessened.

C. [Respondent] has suffered past persecution by being stabbed, shot, and threat-

ened for having left MS-13 and he is entitled to the presumption of future threat

of harm.

43

A death threat qualifies as persecution. Li v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 171, 177 (4th Cir.

2005). It follows that actual attempts on a person’s life would also qualify. Further, the Fourth

Circuit found that where a man and his family submitted unrebutted evidence of threats against

himself and his family by the MS-13 gang, their fear of persecution was objectively reasonable.

Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117 (4th Cir. 2011) (also citing MS-13’s “penchant for

extracting vengeance”). Moreover, although MS-13 affects the population of El Salvador as a

whole, the Fourth Circuit found where a “series of targeted and persistent threats” directed at

someone exists, the general conditions are “beside the point.” Id. at 127. Here, [Respondent]

suffered past persecution in the multiple attacks he suffered at the hands of MS-13 after he quit

the gang, stopped attending meetings and informed the leader that he was leaving the gang. See

Exh. 3, I-589 Affidavit. [Respondent] was, on separate occasions, stabbed, shot, and shot at. See

Exh. 3, I-589 Affidavit; Exh. 4, Tab C; Exh. 4, Tab E; Exh. 4, Tab F (affidavits corroborating the

attacks on [Respondent]). These attacks constitute persecution.

[Respondent’s] confirmed past persecution results in the presumption that he will be per-

secuted in the future. Furthermore, the danger caused by gangs has not improved in El Salvador

since [Respondent] fled, and DHS would be unable to show that there has been any fundamental

change in circumstances. See Exh. 4, Tab N; Exh. 4, Tab O, No Place to Hide; Exh. 4, Tab Q.

Additionally, relocation is not a feasible option in this case. [Respondent] attempted at the time

to relocate to other parts of El Salvador. This proved futile, as the gang spotted him in Intipucá

and subsequently shot him in a drive-by shooting. Moreover, literature shows that gangs in El

Salvador have become more organized and broader, not less. See Exh. 4, Tab N, pg. 2).

Furthermore, the evidence shows that to this day, members of MS-13 continue to ask Re-

spondent’s sister, who still lives in El Salvador, about [Respondent]. They continue to seek him

44

to kill him. See Exhibit 4, Tab F, Affidavit of [Respondent’s Sister], p. 37 (stating that she

knows Respondent would be killed if he returned to El Salvador because, “there are still some

mareros that are looking for him; because there are more mareros today than there were before;

those [members of MS-13]; I base my answer on the fact that they ask me about him every now

and then”). See also, Exhibit 4, Tab D, Affidavit of [Respondent’s Mother] Exhibit 4, Tab E,

Affidavit of [Witness]. Additionally, it is important to understand that individual gang members

are not the issue. MS-13 is so well structured that the gang as a whole has taken up the cause for

retribution and persecution of the [Respondent] as a member who abandoned their ranks. See

Exhibit 4, Tab F. Affidavit of [Respondent’s Sister]; Exhibit 4, Tab O, No Place to Hide, pg.

105). [Respondent’s] attempt to leave MS-13, the fact that they targeted him for that reason,

their repeated attempts to take his life afterwards, MS-13’s high level of organization, and, most

importantly, the fact that they continue to ask after him, compel the conclusion that it is more

likely than not that [Respondent] will be persecuted on account of his being a former member of

MS-13 if he is deported to El Salvador.

D. The persecution [Respondent] suffered was on account of one or both of these

protected grounds.

The persecution Respondent suffered in this case (three violent attempts on his life) is

directly tied to his becoming a former member of MS-13, that is, to his leaving the gang. When

he became a former gang member, the remaining members of the gang imputed to him a political

opinion of opposition to the gang’s control. The persecution he suffered was thus on account of

one or both of the protected grounds of his membership in the group of former gang members or

of the anti-gang political opinion that was imputed to him by MS-13.

No one in the MS-13 gang ever attempted to kill Respondent until he quit the gang and

stopped attending meetings. See Exh. 3, I-589 Affidavit. The gang leadership became aware

45

that he had made a deliberate decision to renounce gang life when Respondent directly and per-

sonally informed his gang leader, “Psycho,” that he no longer wanted to be part of the gang. Tr.

at 52. In equally direct response to this information, “Psycho” told Respondent the consequences

of that decision, that there was “only way to get out,” that is, death. See Exh. 3, I-589 Affidavit.

The causal link between these two events cannot plausibly be doubted. Respondent made his

decision to leave the gang clear, and as a result, MS-13 members targeted Respondent through

multiple attacks on his life. The second attempt on Respondent’s life occurred after he tried to

relocate to a town an hour and a half away from his home. The gang members who attacked him

and left him for dead there, whom he did not know, told him they were attacking him because he

had been given a “green light” by MS-13 (slang for the gang’s death sentence). Tr. at 53. The

evidence is clear that this past persecution was tied to Respondent being a former gang member.

Respondent’s understanding and testimony regarding the causal relationship between

these events is corroborated by extensive country conditions evidence in the record. Dr. Boer-

man concluded that Respondent would be “at extremely high and predictable risk for violent and

lethal reprisals” because he left the gang without its authorization. Tab RRR, Affidavit of Thom-

as Boerman, at 414. Background literature corroborates that gang membership is a lifetime

commitment and that leaving a gang safely without authorization is “virtually impossible.” See

Exhibit 4, Tab O, No Place to Hide, at 103. Further, homicides in El Salvador are regularly at-

tributed to gangs exacting revenge on former members. See Exhibit 4, Tab Q, p. 137 (newspaper

article interviewing police investigator stating that murder of 19-year-old boy was thought to be

because the boy left a gang two weeks earlier).

The Court in its earlier decision in this case acknowledged that MS-13 targeted the Re-

spondent and did not mention or challenge the evidence showing that the gang has a practice of

46

targeting former members. The Court, however, held that MS-13 appeared to target Respondent

“to enforce the gang’s rules and to maintain its membership by making defection unattractive,”

not because the Respondent was a member of the group of former gang members.

These two motivations for persecuting the Respondent cannot be divorced from one another. In

other words, one depends on the other: to enforce the gang’s rules and to make defection unat-

tractive, the gang targeted the Respondent because he was a former gang member. See Crespin-

Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d at 127 (the feared ground does not have to be the central or dom-

inant reason for persecution, but must be more than “an ‘incidental, tangential, superficial, or

subordinate’ reason” for persecution.).

There is no suggestion that Respondent was singled out among former members to serve

as an aid to MS-13 in enforcing its rules. To the contrary, the evidence shows that MS-13 has a

widespread practice of targeting former members for persecution, torture and murder, and that

Respondent was targeted as part of this widespread practice. Tab RRR, Affidavit of Thomas

Boerman, at 410; Exhibit 4, Tab O at 103 (…it is “virtually impossible” for gang members to

disassociate themselves from a gang). See also Exhibit 4, Tab O at 109 (“those gang members

who leave the gang and migrate to the United States face very serious threats to their safety if

they are deported back to El Salvador”); Exhibit 4, Tab O at 129 (“In the same way that gang

members who try to leave a gang are targeted by fellow gang members, members who return to

El Salvador are considered potential traitors and are targeted if they do not rejoin the gang.”);

Exhibit 4, Tab Q (stating that a Salvadoran police investigator looking into the murder of a 19-

year-old believed the boy was murdered because he had left a gang two weeks earlier).

The Court’s earlier decision represents a fundamental misunderstanding and distortion of

the nexus requirement. Nowhere is there a requirement that a persecutor cannot derive some

47

practical benefit from its persecution, nor an indication that such a benefit would negate the im-

permissibility of persecution inflicted on a protected group. In fact, it is not surprising that most

persecutors have what they believe to be logical reasons for engaging in persecution, and that

they are trying to achieve something through the persecution.

For example, in the classic case of political persecution, persecutors are generally trying

to discourage opposition political activity and make it unattractive. Li Wu Lin v. INS, 238 F.3d

239 (3d Cir. 2011) (finding applicant eligible for relief where he attended pro-democracy pro-

tests in China six days prior to the Tiananmen Square massacre, which sought to suppress politi-

cal opposition). Surely this is of practical benefit to the persecuting government. In the case of

religious persecution, persecutors are generally trying to suppress the exercise of a disfavored

religion. Matter of Chen, 20 I. & N. Dec. 16 (BIA 1989) (finding that the respondent was reli-

giously persecuted as the son of a Christian minister where the Red Guards sought to suppress

the Christian faith in the wake of the Cultural Revolution). Similarly, where young women are

targeted for female genital mutilation, the persecutors are generally trying to control the wom-

en’s sexuality in ways they believe appropriate. In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (finding the

applicant entitled to relief due to threat of FGM where the tribe’s cultural traditions required

FGM before marriage). Likewise, where family members of a particular individual are persecut-

ed, it is often for the specific purpose of affecting or punishing the behavior of that individual.

Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117 (4th Cir. 2011) (applicant entitled to relief if one

central reason for MS-13’s targeting him was because of his family relationship, despite the fact

that persecution may have also served the purpose of intimidating him out of cooperating with

police). None of these practical benefits justifies the persecution of members of the protected

48

group or changes the fact that they were targeted because of a protected ground; and none of

them defeats the nexus between the persecution and the protected group.

If the Court were to accept this logic, protected individuals would never be able to estab-

lish nexus where their group was persecuted for any demonstrable purpose, not matter how rep-

rehensible. This is clearly not the intent of the INA or of the Geneva Convention on which it is

based. Rather, our humanitarian law is based on the firm principle that persecution for certain

reasons is unacceptable, even if that persecution should serve some practical benefit to the perse-

cutor.

The fact that MS-13 might have derived some benefit from persecuting the Respondent

(and other former members) does not change the fact that one central reason he was targeted is

that he was a member of the cognizable and protected particular social group of former gang

members. Another reason is that the gang attributed to him an anti-gang political opinion. He

thus suffered persecution on account of a protected ground.

E. [Respondent] is not subject to any bars to withholding of removal.

[Respondent] is not subject to any of the bars from relief, and is therefore eligible to re-

ceive withholding of removal under INA § 241(b)(3). [Respondent] has not assisted in nazi per-

secution or engaged in genocide. He has not engaged in the persecution of others. [Respondent]

has not been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime and therefore does not

represent a danger to the community to the United States. He does not represent a danger to the

security of the United States.

In addition, [Respondent] did not commit a serious non-political crime outside of the

United States. Although, [Respondent] was a member of MS-13, he did not join voluntarily. [Re-

spondent] did not believe he and the others had any possibility of deciding against becoming part

49

of MS-13.6 Tr. 42. In fact, once [Respondent] observed the violent and criminal nature of the

new MS-13 leadership, he chose to disassociate himself from the gang, even though he knew he

would receive the “green light,” which identified him as a target for current gang members to

kill. Tr. 52.; Exh. 4, Tab A, Resp. Suppl. Aff. The most fundamental voluntary association that

[Respondent] made was therefore with former gang members, those who chose to leave a gang, a

common, immutable characteristic that [Respondent] cannot and should not be asked to change.

[Respondent’s] credible testimony in this case, that he joined7 a relatively benign neighborhood

group that was only later absorbed by MS-13 and that he did not engage in any serious criminal

activity, addresses the Board’s concerns with “rewarding” criminality.

III. [Respondent] Qualifies for Withholding Under the Convention Against Torture.

The country conditions in El Salvador have further deteriorated since [Respondent] originally

requested protection under CAT. According to country conditions expert, Thomas Boerman,

Ph.D., “tragically, the situation has deteriorated since that time [2010] and actually worsened

with respect to the government’s ability to control gangs and to protect the public.” Tab RRR,

Affidavit of Thomas Boerman, at 398. [Respondent] renews his request for withholding under

6 Country conditions evidence shows that [Respondent’s] experience being absorbed into MS-13

was not unusual: “Youth gangs…existed in Central American cities, but they tended to be small-

er, more diverse and tied to a particular neighborhood, without the regional presence or organiza-

tion that U.S. gangs had begun to attain. In 1996, changes to U.S. immigration laws dramatically

expanded the crime-related deportability grounds for non-citizens…[and] resulted in the deporta-

tion of thousands of Salvadorans who had lived in the U.S. for many years. Some of those thou-

sands were gang members and their arrival in El Salvador served as a catalyst for the develop-

ment of a U.S.-style gang culture there. [T]he experience of having lived in the U.S. and having

been associated with U.S. gangs gave deported gang members a certain stature among Salvador-

an youth that permitted them to wield particular influence and replicate U.S. gang structures in

Salvadoran neighborhoods.” Exh. 4, Tab O, No Place to Hide. 7 See Tr. 54. Testimony stating that [Respondent] refused to commit the crimes that the leaders

asked him to carry out); and Tr. 91. (“Q: Did you commit any crimes while in MS-13? [Re-

spondent]: No. Q: Did you ever hurt someone not in MS-13? [Respondent]: No.”).

50

CAT due to the continued deterioration of conditions in El Salvador, particularly with regard to

police corruption and gang violence.

Furthermore, [Respondent] meets the requirements for CAT. [Respondent] more likely than

not would be tortured if retuned to El Salvador due to police acquiescence to torture. In Mr.

Boerman’s expert opinion, “[Respondent] would be at high and predictable risk of egregious

physical harm and death if returned to El Salvador, and that it is utterly unrealistic to believe that

Salvadoran government would be able or willing to afford him even a modicum of protection

against these threats.” Id. As a former MS-13 member who left without the gang’s authorization,

he is at direct risk of being subjected to the most horrific physical mistreatment. Id. at 410. All

the country conditions, and expert testimony demonstrate that [Respondent] meets the burden for

CAT.

A. [Respondent] more likely than not would be tortured if returned to El Salvador.

Former gang members, those who are consider to have defied the gang, in El Salvador

can expect a slow death by gang members for defying them. Miguel Angel Tobar, (hereinafter

“El Niño”), a former gang member, who was testifying against police officers and gang mem-

bers, knew that his defiance would lead to his death. Tab HHH, Gang Informant at 294. Accord-

ing to a message from the national MS-13 leadership, “El Niño” “caused bad feelings among the

leadership, who didn’t like the gang’s internal business in the public eye.” Tab III, The Death

Foretold Informant at 305. “El Niño” knew that he would be killed, everyone knew he would be

killed, even the gang truce negotiator, Raul Mijango, said there was no way to resolve “El Ni-

ño’s” case, “there’s no solution.” Id. “El Niño” defied their MS-13 established general rules and

as a result there was not solution; people knew he would be murdered. Id.

51

Since “El Niño” knew that the gang would torture him for defying the gang, “El Niño”

bought a gun so that the gang members would be forced to shoot him. He stated, “he wanted to

avoid being dismembered, tortured, or strangled.” Tab HHH, Gang Informant at 294. “El Niño”

knew that traitors are murdered; when “El Niño” was a gang member, he tortured a traitor, “El

Caballo” who defied the gang by switching gangs, “played the role of a Barrio 18 gang member

when it was convenient and an MS13 gang member when it suited him.” Id. at 295. “El Caballo”

was tortured to death. Id. “El Caballo died without arms; without legs; without tattoos. And

when he didn’t have any of those left, they still managed to torture him for a few more

minutes… They took El Caballo’s heart out.” Id.

Another former gang member, Francisco Orellana Ovidio Rivera, was also killed “be-

cause he retired from the gang to which he belonged.” Tab MM, Former Gang Member Shot at

198. Mr. Orellana was considered defiant by the gang because he left the gang. Tab JJJ, UN-

HCR Report, at 314.

Since [Respondent] is considered a former gang member, defiant to the MS-13 rules,

[Respondent] will more likely than not be tortured if returned to El Salvador. On repeated occa-

sions, MS-13 members have attempted to kill [Respondent]. Gang members continue to ask

about [Respondent’s] whereabouts. See Exhibit 4, Tab F, Affidavit of [Respondent’s Sister], p.

37; see also Exhibit 4, Tab D, Affidavit of [Respondent’s Mother]; Exhibit 4, Tab E, Affidavit of

[Witness]. More than a decade has elapsed since the initial threats, and the threats against [Re-

spondent] have not ceased. It is more likely than not that [Respondent] will be tortured and then

killed if he were to return to El Salvador. [Respondent] also provided evidence of country condi-

tions and expert testimony that the El Salvadoran Government, including the police are willfully

52

blind of the danger and does nothing to protect him from the MS-13 members. Tab RRR, Affi-

davit of Thomas Boerman, at 415.

[Respondent] fears torture for defying MS-13. According to country conditions expert,

Thomas Boerman, Ph.D., “[Respondent] to be at high and predictable risk of egregious physical

harm and death if returned to El Salvador.” Tab RRR, Affidavit of Thomas Boerman, at 390.

[Respondent] is considered a gang defiant by MS-13 members since he decided to abandon the

gang. The gangs respond to defiance with violence. The MS-13 members have already have

demonstrated their capability to cause torture. The MS-13 members are known for killing and

harming individuals who are defiant to one of their orders. [Respondent] is a gang defiant and

will more likely than not be tortured and then killed. Tab JJJ, UNHCR Report, at 314. Not only

is [Respondent] is considered a gang defiant; he is also a former gang member with knowledge

of the gang. Tab RRR, Affidavit of Thomas Boerman, at 410.

B. Corruption in the police in El Salvador and police collusion with the MS-13

demonstrate that public officials acquiesce in and even facilitate torture.

Police corruption is an ongoing problem in El Salvador in the police, judiciary and other

levels of the government. Tab RRR, Affidavit of Thomas Boerman, at 397-8, 405. The federal

government has made attempts to stop the corruption in El Salvador. According the Former Pres-

ident Mauricio Funes, these attempts have failed and police corruption is rampant. “The Maras

and the Weakness of the State”, at 260. Although, the government has made attempts to correct

police corruption, this does not preclude acquiescence. The government has not been effective in

stopping violence. The gang truce that was intended to lower murder rates, rather the truce has

only fortified the gangs. Id. at 261. Tab RRR, Affidavit of Thomas Boerman, at 403. The corrup-

tion in the police force has not ceased. Id. at 397-8. “Moreover, in the same report the State De-

partment acknowledges that the judiciary is inefficient, corrupt and prone to outside interfer-

53

ence.” Id. at 399. The government’s efforts have been unsuccessful due to continued corruption.

“For now, the Salvadoran government characterizes itself as being in a “state of war” with

gangs, and acknowledges it is losing the battle.” Id. at 400.

Former President of Salvador, Mauricio Funes has recognized the severity of police cor-

ruption in El Salvador. Tab LLL, El Salvador Country at 363. In order to further their criminal

activities, gangs regularly buy off the police. Id. at 361. According to the International Security

Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT), “PNC officers in urban areas frequently accept bribes as an al-

ternative to arrests or citations, and Maras have been known to establish ‘arrangements’ with lo-

cal police departments, making regular payments in exchange for license to operate in their

neighborhoods.” Id. ISSAT concedes that the police in El Salvador are “plagued by corruption

and criminal penetration at many levels” Id. Corruption is at all levels of the police force in El

Salvador. High-ranking officials from the PNC leadership were investigated for helping orga-

nized crime and drug trafficking. Id. The police have facilitated and provided protection to

gangs. Tab MMM, Operation Chameleon, at 368-69. In El Tamarindo, the brother of a gang

member, Daniel Quezada, reportedly has control over the police. Id. at 370. The Salvadoran ar-

my is not clear of corruption, either. Six soldiers were found to have stolen 1,800 weapons to sell

to criminal organizations. Tab NNN, El Salvador Soldiers, at 372. The police force is inundated

with corruption. The police willingly choose to look the other way and accept bribes from the

gangs in El Salvador, knowing the danger citizens run with the gangs. Tab RRR, Affidavit of

Thomas Boerman, at 405. “In some cases… abuses occur at the hands of officers as… a result of

corrupt police advancing their own criminal agendas.” Id at 409. Although, the Salvadoran gov-

ernment has made efforts to eliminate corruption, the efforts made by the Salvadoran have been

insufficient. Police corruption is still a severe problem in El Salvador. Id. at 400. These measures

54

to stop corruption do not eliminate the possibility of police acquiescence. The continued corrup-

tion shows that police turn a blind eye to torture.

Recently, in El Salvador, a former gang member, “El Niño,” under witness protection for

the Salvadoran government, was killed by gang members while living in one of El Salvador’s

most peaceful cities and while police were supposed to be protecting him. Tab III, The Death

Foretold at 304. “El Niño” was going to testify at the trial against two policemen. Id. The police

made “El Niño” leave his town of Atiquizaya “because those same authorities were convinced

that the gang leader ‘Chepe Furia,’ who was imprisoned…had infiltrated that municipality’s po-

lice.” Id. at 301. “El Niño” was going to testify against police who were from the town of

Atiquizaya and those corrupt police were believed to still have connections outside of prison. Id.

Witness Protection believed that it was too dangerous for “El Niño” to stay in the same town. Id.

The police initially protected “El Niño,” however, sooner than later stopped providing

with any protection. Id. at 302. “Not one policeman or prosecutor or judge or Justice Ministry

official did anything to ensure that El Niño would again receive protection… All the police…

knew that El Niño would wind up dead. They said this as though as it didn’t represent any failure

on their part.” Id. at 304. The police knew about the danger “El Niño” faced and did nothing to

protect him. The police knew the risks “El Niño,” faced, but chose to ignore them. Everyone

knew he would be murdered, but no one did anything about it. Id. at 305. It was the police’s duty

was to protect “El Niño,” but the police willfully failed to protect him. The police, prior to “El

Niño” being murdered was aware that the gangs were going to murder him, however, since the

police did nothing to protect “El Niño,” the police breached their responsibility to intervene to

prevent from “El Niño” being murdered.

55

It is openly known that in El Salvador those who defy the gang, such as leaving the gang,

will face consequences by the gang. Tab RRR, Affidavit of Thomas Boerman, at 410. It is argu-

able that the police actually knew that “El Niño” would be murdered. Either way, the police

turned a blind eye to torture. Although, the court tried to address the issue of corruption within

the police force by pressing charges, these preventative efforts should not foreclose the possibil-

ity of government acquiescence. Although the federal government was not responsible for “El

Niño’s” protection, the police, a public officer acquiesced to torture. Ultimately, the police were

incapable of actually preventing that torture against “El Niño.”

It was clear that the police saw “El Niño” as “someone who was destined to die.” Tab

HHH, Gang Informant at 297. Although “El Niño” was no longer in the gang, “the police hated

him partly because he had been a gang member. He talked like a gang member, and he caused

problems like a gang member.” Id. at 298. However, “El Niño” was no longer a gang member,

he was now a former gang member. The police failed to acknowledge, although they knew, that

there was any difference between “El Niño” and current gang members. Id. Once the police

breached their legal responsibility and failed to provide “El Niño” with protection after they

knew that “El Niño” would be tortured, the police acquiesced to torture.

The police in El Salvador choose to collude with the gangs. Tab DDD, “Infiltration of

Security Forces” at 280. Tab RRR, Affidavit of Thomas Boerman, at 414. The police know of

the danger to the people (even cause it sometimes by giving the gang information), but willfully

ignore it. Id. at 399. The police are corrupt and work for the gangs, turning a willfully blind eye

to torture committed by the gangs. Id. at 397. Even where a central government makes efforts to

eradicate torture, the collusion of corrupt local officials in torture can constitute acquiescence on

56

the part of government officials. De la Rosa v. Holder, 598 F.3d 110 (2nd Cir. 2010); Madrigal

v. Holder, 716 F.3d 509 (9th Cir. 2013).

C. [Respondent] would not be able to avoid the torture by relocating to a new area

in El Salvador.

[Respondent] is not able to relocate to another city in El Salvador. [Respondent] made

unsuccessful attempts to go to other cities, including to Intipucá, to escape the MS-13 members.

(Tr. 52, 55-56); Exh. 4, Tab A, Resp. Suppl. Aff., 7. The MS-13 members located [Respondent]

at each place where [Respondent] went to hide. (Tr. 52, 57, 84); See Exh. 3, I-589 Affidavit 12;

Exh. 4, Tab A, Resp. Suppl. Aff., 2,11. As a result, [Respondent] realized he needed to leave the

country to be safe. See Exh. 3, I-589 Affidavit. The MS-13 members will be able to find [Re-

spondent] in any city in El Salvador due to their large organization and connections across the

country with other members and the police. (Tr. 45-7). Tab RRR, Affidavit of Thomas Boerman,

at 413. They already attempted on various occasions in different cities to kill [Respondent]. [Re-

spondent] will not be able to avoid torture by relocating to a new city in El Salvador.

CONCLUSION

Wherefore, [Respondent] requests that he be granted Withholding of Removal under INA

§241(b)(3).. In the alternative, he requests that he be granted relief under the Convention Against

Torture.

57

Respectfully Submitted,

_________________________

Erica Espinosa*

University of Maryland,

School of Law

Clinic Law Office, Suite 360

500 West Baltimore Street

Baltimore, MD 21201

Phone: (410) 706-2013

_________________________

Victor H. Gonzalez*

University of Maryland,

School of Law

Clinic Law Office, Suite 360

500 West Baltimore Street

Baltimore, MD 21201

Phone: (410) 706-2013

_________________________

Maureen A. Sweeney

University of Maryland,

School of Law

Clinic Law Office, Suite 360

500 West Baltimore Street

Baltimore, MD 21201

Phone: (410) 706-3922

*Practicing pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 292.1(a)(2), 8 C.F.R. § 1291.1(a)(2), and Maryland Rule 16