ernest dewayne jones, v. kevin chappell,...
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14-56373
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ERNEST DEWAYNE JONES,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v.
KEVIN CHAPPELL, Warden,
Respondent-Appellant.
On Appeal from the United States District Courtfor the Central District of California No. 09-CV-02158-CJC
The Honorable Cormac J. Carney, Judge
APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEF
KAMALA D. HARRISAttorney General of CaliforniaEDWARD C. DUMONTSolicitor GeneralGERALD A. ENGLERChief Assistant Attorney GeneralLANCE E. WINTERSSenior Assistant Attorney GeneralMICHAEL J. MONGANDeputy Solicitor GeneralA. SCOTT HAYWARDHERBERT S. TETEFDeputy Attorneys GeneralKEITH H. BORJONJAMES WILLIAM BILDERBACK IISupervising Deputy Attorneys General
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702Los Angeles, CA 90013Telephone: (213) 897-2049Email: [email protected]
Attorneys for Respondent-Appellant
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
i
Introduction ................................................................................................. 1Statement of Jurisdiction .............................................................................. 3Statement of the Issues ................................................................................. 4Statement of the Case................................................................................... 5
A. Trial and Conviction ................................................................ 5B. Direct Appeal ........................................................................... 6C. State Habeas Proceeding .......................................................... 7D. Federal Habeas Proceeding ...................................................... 8E. The District Court’s Order and Judgment .............................. 11
Summary of the Argument ......................................................................... 14Standard of Review .................................................................................... 19Argument ................................................................................................... 19
I. AEDPA Bars Relief on the Eighth Amendment ClaimPresented in Jones’s Habeas Petition, Which theCalifornia Supreme Court Reasonably Rejected on theMerits .................................................................................... 19
II. The District Court Erred in Granting Habeas ReliefBased on a New Theory That Has Not Been Exhausted ......... 24A. Jones Never Exhausted the “Arbitrariness” Theory ...... 24B. Exhaustion Is Not Excused under
§ 2254(b)(1)(B)(ii) ....................................................... 26C. The District Court’s Exhaustion Holding Sidesteps
the Basic Structure of Federal Habeas Jurisdiction ....... 31III. The Anti-Retroactivity Doctrine of Teague v. Lane Also
Bars Relief ............................................................................. 33A. The Arbitrariness Theory Is a “New Rule” under
Teague ......................................................................... 34
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B. The Arbitrariness Theory Is Not a “Substantive” or“Watershed” Rule ........................................................ 36
IV. California’s System for Reviewing Death Judgments IsConsistent with the Eighth Amendment ................................. 38A. The District Court’s Holding Is at Odds with
Settled Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence .................... 38B. The System for Reviewing Capital Sentences in
California Is Lengthy Because It Is Designed toAvoid Arbitrary Results, Not to Produce Them ........... 43
Conclusion ................................................................................................. 58Statement of Related Cases ........................................................................ 59
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
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iii
CASES
Allen v. Ornoski435 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2006) .................................... 15, 21, 22, 23, 38
Arrendondo v. Neven763 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2014) .......................................................... 25
Beard v. Banks542 U.S. 406 (2004) ................................................................... 17, 36
Bell v. State938 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) ........................................... 39
Bieghler v. State839 N.E.2d 691 (Ind. 2005) ................................................. 39, 42, 57
California v. Brown479 U.S. 538 (1987) ......................................................................... 40
Carey v. Saffold536 U.S. 214 (2002) ......................................................................... 31
Carroll v. State114 So. 3d 883, 889-890 (Fla. 2013) ................................................ 39
Chambers v. Bowersox157 F.3d 560 (8th Cir. 1998) ...................................................... 38, 39
Clark v. United States289 U.S. 1 (1933)............................................................................. 35
Coleman v. Thompson501 U.S. 722 (1991) ......................................................................... 32
Cullen v. Pinholster131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011) ............................................................... 23, 26
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Duckworth v. Serrano454 U.S. 1 (1981)............................................................................. 28
Dyer v. Calderon151 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1998) ............................................................ 35
Engle v. Isaac456 U.S. 107 (1982) ......................................................................... 28
Ex parte Bush695 So. 2d 138 (Ala. 1997) .............................................................. 39
Fierro v. Gomez77 F.3d 301 (9th Cir. 1996) .............................................................. 53
Foster v. Florida123 S. Ct. 470 (2002) ....................................................................... 22
Furman v. Georgia408 U.S. 238 (1972) ............................................................. 12, 40, 41
Graham v. Collins506 U.S. 461 (1993) ............................................................. 17, 34, 35
Gray v. Netherland518 U.S. 152 (1996) ................................................................... 25, 28
Greene v. Fisher132 S. Ct. 38 (2011) ......................................................................... 21
Gregg v. Georgia428 U.S. 153 (1976) ....................................................... 35, 40, 41, 42
Harrington v. Richter131 S. Ct. 770 (2011) ........................................................... 32, 47, 55
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Hill v. State962 S.W.2d 762 (Ark. 1998) ............................................................ 39
In re Clark5 Cal. 4th 750 (1993) ....................................................................... 27
In re Reno55 Cal. 4th 428 (2012) ................................................... 45, 46, 48, 49
Johnson v. Bredesen130 S. Ct. 541 (2009) ....................................................................... 22
Jones v. Tubman360 F. Supp. 1298 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) ........................................... 29, 30
Kennedy v. Louisiana554 U.S. 407 (2008) ......................................................................... 40
Knight v. Florida528 U.S. 990 (1999) ................................................................... 22, 39
Lackey v. Johnson83 F.3d 116 (5th Cir. 1996) .............................................................. 39
Lackey v. Texas514 U.S. 1045 (1995) ................................................................passim
Lambert v. Blodgett393 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2004) ............................................................ 19
Lee v. Stickman357 F.3d 338 (3d Cir. 2004) ............................................................. 29
Livaditis v. MartelNo. CV 96-2833-SVW (C.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2014) ..................... 26, 39
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McKenzie v. Day57 F.3d 1461 (9th Cir. 1995) .......................................... 22, 23, 38, 41
McKinney v. State992 P.2d 144 (Idaho 1999) ............................................................... 39
Morales v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab.168 Cal. App. 4th 729 (2008) ........................................................... 53
Morales v. Tilton465 F. Supp. 2d 972 (N.D. Cal. 2006) .............................................. 53
Noel v. Hall568 F.3d 743 (9th Cir. 2009) .............................................................. 4
Noltie v. Peterson9 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 1993) ................................................................ 28
People v. Anderson25 Cal. 4th 543 (2001) ............................................................... 20, 39
People v. Bryant60 Cal. 4th 335 (2014) ..................................................................... 47
People v. Emerson727 N.E.2d 302 (Ill. 2000) ............................................................... 39
People v. Jones29 Cal. 4th 1229 (2003) ....................................................... 5, 6, 7, 20
People v. Lucas60 Cal. 4th 153 (2014) ..................................................................... 47
People v. Ochoa26 Cal. 4th 398 (2001) ............................................................... 21, 43
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Phillips v. Vasquez56 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 1995) ............................................................ 30
Rohan v. Woodford334 F.3d 803 (9th Cir. 2003) ............................................................ 51
Rose v. Lundy455 U.S. 509 (1982) ............................................................. 15, 25, 31
Russell v. State849 So. 2d 95 (Miss. 2003) .............................................................. 39
Ryan v. Gonzales133 S. Ct. 696 (2013) ....................................................................... 51
Saffle v. Parks494 U.S. 484 (1990) ......................................................................... 37
Sawyer v. Smith497 U.S. 227 (1990) ................................................................... 17, 36
Schriro v. Summerlin542 U.S. 348 (2004) ................................................................... 36, 37
Sims v. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab.216 Cal. App. 4th 1059 (2013) ......................................................... 53
Smith v. Mahoney611 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2010) ...................................................... 34, 38
State v. Austin87 S.W. 3d 447 (Tenn. 2002) ........................................................... 39
State v. Moore591 N.W.2d 86 (Neb. 1999) ............................................................. 39
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State v. Smith931 P.2d 1272 (Mont. 1996) ................................................ 39, 42, 57
State v. Sparks68 So. 3d 435 (La. 2011).................................................................. 39
Sweet v. Cupp640 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1981) ............................................................ 28
Tamalani v. Stewart249 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2001) ............................................................ 27
Teague v. Lane489 U.S. 288 (1989) ..................................................................passim
Thompson v. McDonough517 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2008) ........................................................ 38
Turney v. Ohio273 U.S. 510 (1927) ......................................................................... 35
Whorton v. Bockting549 U.S. 406 (2007) ............................................................. 17, 33, 37
Wooten v. Kirkland540 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2008) .......................................................... 25
Wright v. Van Patten552 U.S. 120 (2008) ......................................................................... 21
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STATUTES
28 U.S.C.§ 1291 ................................................................................................ 4§ 2253(a)............................................................................................ 4§ 2254(a)............................................................................................ 3§ 2254(b) ......................................................................................... 30§ 2254(b)(1) ............................................................................... 24, 25§ 2254(b)(1)(A) ......................................................................... 15, 24§ 2254(b)(1)(B)(i) ............................................................................ 27§ 2254(b)(1)(B)(ii) ......................................................... 16, 26, 28, 29§ 2254(d) ..................................................................................passim§ 2254(d)(1) ..............................................................................passim
Cal. Gov. Code§ 68660 ............................................................................................ 46§ 68662 .............................................................................................. 7
Cal. Penal Code§ 1473 .............................................................................................. 27§ 1983 .............................................................................................. 53
Fla. Stat.§ 27.711 ........................................................................................... 45
Tex. Code Crim. P. art. 11.071§ 2A ................................................................................................. 45§ 4 .................................................................................................... 46
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Cal. Const. art. VI§ 11 .................................................................................................. 49§ 12 .................................................................................................. 49
U.S. Const. amend. VIII .................................................................passim
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COURT RULES
Cal. R. Ct. 8.630(b)(1)(A) ..................................................................... 45
Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2) .......................................................................... 4
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) ............................................................................... 3
Fla. R. App. P. 9.210(a)(5) .................................................................... 45
Fla. R. Crim. Proc. § 3.851(e)(1), (2) .................................................... 45
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Cal. Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice,Final Report ......................................................................... 53, 54, 57
Cal. Supreme Court Policies Regarding Cases Arising fromJudgments of Death, Policy 3, § 2-1 ................................................... 7
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INTRODUCTION
Ernest Jones was sentenced to death for the rape and murder of his
girlfriend’s mother. The California Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and
sentence and denied a state habeas petition. At trial, Jones admitted stabbing the
victim. No court has identified any error in either the guilt or the penalty phase of
Jones’s trial.
On federal habeas review, the district court entered a partial final judgment
vacating Jones’s capital sentence, on the ground that California’s system of post-
conviction review in capital cases violates the federal Constitution. The court
based its ruling on a novel Eighth Amendment theory that Jones himself never
advanced, either in the state courts or in his federal habeas petition: that system-
wide “dysfunction” in California’s post-conviction process would render an
execution in this case unconstitutionally “arbitrary” and strip it of any penological
purpose. The court’s order is improper for several threshold procedural reasons.
In any event, its “arbitrariness” theory lacks any legal support.
In framing its ruling, the district court relied largely on policy studies, law
review articles, and statistics that it found or created on its own. It reasoned that
California’s review process for capital cases had become “inordinately and
unnecessarily delayed”; that different cases took different amounts of time to reach
final resolution; that the passage of time and the intervention of other factors, such
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as death in prison, led to some sentences never being carried out; and that, when all
these factors were combined, the State in the end would likely execute “only an
arbitrarily selected few of those sentenced to death.” ER 26-27. The court
concluded that long-delayed, “unpredictable,” and “arbitrary” executions would
not serve the deterrent or retributive purposes necessary to make capital
punishment permissible under the Constitution. Holding California
constitutionally responsible for all these perceived flaws, the court ruled that it
would violate the Eighth Amendment for the State to execute Jones.
That ruling is fundamentally misguided. California provides capital
defendants with substantial opportunities to challenge their convictions—and
resources for doing so—for the precise purpose of ensuring that the death penalty
will not be “arbitrarily” imposed. Providing that sort of careful, individualized
review through direct appeal and state habeas proceedings takes time. The exact
course of each case depends on its particular circumstances, and no Eighth
Amendment precedent requires the State to force every case to conform to some
schedule designed to ensure greater speed. Presumably California could make its
review system faster and more uniform on average by, for example, imposing
severe time limits, page limits, or resource constraints of the sort faced by capital
defendants in some other States. The State can scarcely be faulted under the
Eighth Amendment, however, for having instead made procedural choices
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designed to provide more protection for the profound personal and governmental
interests at stake in capital cases.
There has long been healthy public debate over whether to impose the death
penalty at all—and, if it is to be imposed, over how best to balance important
interests in accuracy, finality, and timeliness in a way that is fiscally manageable
and fair to capital defendants, to the public, and to the victims of terrible crimes
and their families. In 2012, California voters considered and rejected
Proposition 34, which would have ended capital punishment in the State.
Policymakers have enacted and will continue to consider proposals for reforming
the litigation process. There is, however, no legal basis for the district court’s
conclusion that the time often required to work through California’s current system
of thorough review, combined with the fact that some cases move faster than
others, creates a “dysfunctional” system under which those executions that do take
place are “arbitrary” and lack penological purpose. The court mistook its policy
critique as a proper basis for legal judgment. Its decision should be reversed.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The district court had jurisdiction over Jones’s habeas petition under
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). On July 25, 2014, the district court entered final judgment on
Claim 27 of Jones’s first amended petition pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(b), after finding that there was “no just reason for delay in the entry
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of this judgment until final determination on the remaining claims in this matter.”
ER 1. Respondent-Appellant Warden Kevin Chappell (California or the State)
filed a notice of appeal on August 21, 2014. ER 94.1 This Court has jurisdiction
over the State’s appeal under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a), so long as the district
court properly entered a partial final judgment. See Noel v. Hall, 568 F.3d 743,
747 (9th Cir. 2009). Under the particular circumstances of this case, the district
court permissibly determined that it was appropriate to enter a partial judgment so
as to permit an immediate appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Whether relief on the Eighth Amendment delay claim that Jones
presented to the state courts and in his federal habeas petition is barred under 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d).
2. Whether the district court erred in granting relief based on a novel
Eighth Amendment theory that Jones never exhausted in the state courts.
3. Whether the theory on which the district court granted relief is a “new
rule” that may not be applied retroactively on federal collateral review under
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
1 Acting Warden Kelly Mitchell has succeeded Warden Chappell as Jones’scustodian at San Quentin State Prison. She should be substituted as the namedrespondent-appellant. See Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2).
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4. Whether California’s system of post-conviction judicial review in capital
cases renders those executions that are ultimately carried out arbitrary or devoid of
penological purpose in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Trial and Conviction
In 1995, Jones was tried for the rape and murder of Julia Miller, the mother of
his girlfriend. See People v. Jones, 29 Cal. 4th 1229, 1238-1242 (2003); ER 15.
Miller was found dead in her house, bound and gagged, with two kitchen knives
sticking out of her neck and pieces of three other knives on or around her body.
Jones, 29 Cal. 4th at 1238. In addition to the wounds in her neck, she had fourteen
stab wounds in her abdomen, one in her vagina, and one in the middle of her chest
that penetrated to her spine. Id. at 1239. Early the next morning, Jones led police
on a chase in the victim’s station wagon. Id. When the pursuit ended after forty
minutes, Jones shot himself in the chest with a rifle. Id. Jones’s DNA matched
that of ejaculate found in Miller’s body. Id. at 1239-1240. Jones testified at his
trial, admitting that he had repeatedly stabbed the victim. Id. at 1242.
The jury convicted Jones of first degree murder and rape, while acquitting on
charges of burglary and robbery. Id. at 1237. The jury found true the special
circumstance allegation that the murder was committed in the commission of the
rape. Id. It also found true the allegations that Jones personally used a deadly
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weapon to commit the crimes and that Jones had served a prior prison term. Id.
After hearing aggravating and mitigating evidence, the jury set Jones’s penalty at
death. See id. at 1237, 1242-1244.
B. Direct Appeal
Jones pursued an automatic direct appeal to the California Supreme Court.
He filed his opening brief, which presented 20 separate claims for relief, on June
19, 2001. See Cal. S. Ct. Docket (No. S046117).2 In his eighteenth claim, Jones
argued that “the extraordinary delay between sentence and execution” that he
anticipated would “render[] the imposition of the death penalty cruel and unusual.”
ER 144-145. This is generally known as a “Lackey” claim. See Lackey v. Texas,
514 U.S. 1045, 1045 (1995) (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari). As Jones
described the claim, it had two components: first, “that delay in itself,” and
accompanying “uncertainty” about the execution, would subject him to “physical
conditions” and “emotional and mental anguish” amounting to cruel and unusual
punishment (ER 145, 154-155); and second that, as a result of the delay, “the
actual carrying out of his execution” would violate the Eighth Amendment because
it “would serve no legitimate penological ends” (ER 155-156).
2 The California Supreme Court docket can be searched by visitinghttp://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search.cfm?dist=0.
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Briefing was completed on February 26, 2002. See Cal. S. Ct. Docket (No.
S046117). On March 17, 2003, the California Supreme Court unanimously
affirmed Jones’s conviction and sentence. See 29 Cal. 4th at 1238.3 In particular,
the Court held that Jones’s Lackey claim was “untenable”: “If the appeal results in
reversal of the death judgment, he has suffered no conceivable prejudice, while if
the judgment is affirmed, the delay has prolonged his life.” Id. at 1267 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
C. State Habeas Proceeding
Pursuant to a state statutory requirement and the Court’s internal policies, the
California Supreme Court appointed habeas counsel for Jones on October 20, 2000,
while his direct appeal was still pending. See Cal. Gov. Code § 68662; California
Supreme Court Policies Regarding Cases Arising from Judgments of Death,
Policy 3, § 2-1. Jones filed his initial state habeas petition in the California
Supreme Court on October 21, 2002. ER 15. The petition presented 27 separate
grounds for relief. Briefing was completed on December 8, 2003, and the
California Supreme Court issued a summary order denying the petition on March
3 Justice Kennard concurred, disagreeing with the Court’s analysis of oneissue related to Jones’s conviction, but agreeing that the conviction and sentenceshould be affirmed. See 29 Cal. 4th at 1268-1269.
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16, 2009. ER 81. The order stated that each of the 27 claims was denied on the
merits, and noted that certain claims were also procedurally barred. Id.4
D. Federal Habeas Proceeding
On March 10, 2010, Jones filed a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
ER 137. In Claim 27, Jones alleged that his “execution following a long period of
confinement under a sentence of death” would violate the Eighth Amendment.
ER 138. He argued, as he had in state court, both that the period of delay in his
case “would constitute cruel and unusual punishment because of the physical and
psychological suffering inflicted on petitioner” during that period and that, because
of that delay, “the state has no legitimate penological interest (deterrent or
retributive) in executing petitioner.” ER 141-142.
Jones’s federal habeas petition was fully briefed by January 27, 2014.
ER 170. On April 10, 2014, the district court sua sponte issued a five-page order
noting that it was “extremely troubled by the long delays in execution of sentence
in this and other California death penalty cases.” ER 132. The court asserted that
the State’s “strong interest in expeditiously exercising its sovereign power to
enforce the criminal law” had “been utterly stymied for two reasons.” ER 133-134
(internal quotation marks omitted). “First, in California, the state and federal
4 The California Supreme Court also issued an order denying a secondhabeas petition that Jones had filed on October 16, 2007. See Cal. S. Ct. Docket(No. S159235).
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procedures for litigating, post-conviction, a capital defendant’s Constitutional
claims are especially protracted and fraught with delay.” ER 134. “Second, all
California executions have been indefinitely stayed while the courts resolve the
Constitutionality of California’s lethal injection protocol.” Id. As a result, “both
petitioner and the State must labor under the grave uncertainty of not knowing
whether petitioner’s execution will ever, in fact, be carried out.” ER 134-135. The
court expressed a belief that “this state of affairs is intolerable, for both petitioner
and the State, and that petitioner may have a claim that his death sentence is
arbitrarily inflicted and unusually cruel because of the inordinate delay and
unpredictability of the federal and state appellate process.” ER 135.
The district court set a briefing schedule under which the parties were given
until June 9, 2014, to file simultaneous briefs discussing the court’s concerns, with
responsive briefs due 45 days later and reply briefs due 30 days after that. Id. On
April 14, 2014, the district court issued a further order that reaffirmed the briefing
schedule and required Jones to
serve and file an amendment to his operative petition for writof habeas corpus alleging [a] claim that the long delay inexecution of sentence in his case, coupled with the graveuncertainty of not knowing whether his execution will ever, infact, be carried out, renders his death sentenceunconstitutional.
ER 131.
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Shortly thereafter, Jones amended Claim 27 of his petition to address, for the
first time, California’s lack of an execution protocol as a consequence of ongoing
legal challenges. ER 123-124. He alleged that the lack of a protocol “renders it
gravely uncertain when or whether” his execution will take place. ER 116. He
continued to argue that “[c]arrying out [his] sentence after this extraordinary delay
violates the Eighth Amendment,” because of his physical and psychological
suffering during the delay and because the delay “drastically diminished” the
deterrent and retributive effect of the punishment. ER 125-126.
On June 9, 2014, the parties filed simultaneous opening briefs. ER 171. On
June 11, the court advanced the schedule, making responsive briefs due on July 3
and reply briefs due on July 18. ER 96. The court set a hearing for August 4,
2014. Id. Attached to the June 11 order was a chart, which purported to describe
“the case status of 496 individuals sentenced to death in California between 1978
and 1997.” ER 97. The court encouraged the parties to “address the chart and the
troubling issues it raises . . . .” Id. Shortly after the parties filed their responsive
briefs, the district court again amended the briefing schedule, eliminating reply
briefs and advancing the hearing date to July 16. ER 95.
When counsel arrived for that hearing, court staff distributed copies of a final,
signed order “declaring California’s death penalty system unconstitutional and
vacating petitioner’s death sentence.” See ER 2. The court then took the bench
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and invited comments. See ER 51. During the hearing, the court summarized its
rationale for issuing the order:
The way I’m looking at it is it’s a huge problem. It’s been aproblem for a while. And they haven’t fixed it and they’re notgoing to fix it. And I just feel I have—not trying to preach,that’s the last thing I’m trying to do—but I have a solemnobligation to defend and protect the Constitution. And when Ilook at the statistics, I have at least convinced myself thatthere is a constitutional problem right now. And it’s not goingto be fixed and no one is fixing it, and I can’t be passive orsilent.
ER 54. The hearing concluded at 10:10 a.m., and the district court entered its order
fifteen minutes later. ER 34, 172.
E. The District Court’s Order and Judgment
The district court’s order purports to grant relief on Claim 27, as amended at
the direction of the court. The order distinguishes between two different types of
constitutional challenges regarding delay preceding execution. It notes that, “in
previous instances where federal courts have been presented claims of
unconstitutional delay preceding execution, they have generally appeared in the
context of claims brought by inmates in whose individual cases the delay was
extraordinary. See, e.g., Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045 . . . .” ER 24 n.19. The
court then construes amended Claim 27 as raising a different claim: “that [Jones’s]
execution would be arbitrary and serve no penological purpose because of system-
wide dysfunction in the post-conviction review process.” Id. (emphasis added).
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In analyzing this distinct claim based on “system-wide dysfunction,” the
district court first discusses the “delay” at “each stage of the post-conviction
review process,” based on information gleaned from policy studies, law review
articles, and statistics compiled by the court itself. ER 8; see ER 3-15. Its order
concludes that this “delay” is “[i]nordinate and unpredictable,” and that “the State
itself is to blame.” ER 18, 23. As a result, the order reasons, “a sentence of death
in California is a sentence of life imprisonment with the remote possibility of
death,” a possibility that will be realized “for an arbitrarily selected few of the 748
inmates currently on Death Row.” ER 18. For such an inmate, the court
concludes, “selection for execution . . . will depend upon a factor largely outside
[his] control, and wholly divorced from the penological purposes the State sought
to achieve by sentencing him to death in the first instance: how quickly [he]
proceeds through the State’s dysfunctional post-conviction review process.”
ER 18-19.
Next, the court’s order holds that this “arbitrariness” violates the Eighth
Amendment. “For Mr. Jones to be executed in such a system . . . would offend the
most fundamental of constitutional protections—that the government shall not be
permitted to arbitrarily inflict the ultimate punishment of death.” ER 20 (citing
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 293 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring)). The
court also concludes that “[t]he systemic delay and dysfunction that result in the
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arbitrary execution of California’s Death Row inmates give rise to a further
constitutional problem,” in that “the execution of a death sentence is so infrequent,
and the delays preceding it so extraordinary, that the death penalty is deprived of
any deterrent or retributive effect it might once have had.” ER 20-21.
Finally, the order rejects the State’s threshold arguments against granting
relief based on this new “arbitrariness” theory. First, it holds that Jones is excused
from the normal requirement that a federal habeas petitioner must exhaust his
claims in state court. ER 27-28. The court reasons that “[s]pecial circumstances
clearly exist such that Mr. Jones need not return to the California Supreme Court to
exhaust his claim,” because exhaustion “would require Mr. Jones to have his claim
resolved by the very system he has established is dysfunctional and incapable of
protecting his constitutional rights.” ER 28. Second, the order holds that relief is
not barred by the anti-retroactivity doctrine of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288
(1989), because the arbitrariness theory on which it is granting relief is “not [a]
new” rule. ER 28-29.
At the conclusion of the July 16, 2014, hearing, the district court discussed its
belief that its Eighth Amendment holding should be appealed immediately. “I feel
strongly I should certify this and it should go to the circuit as quickly as possible. I
don’t want to hold this up for me to resolve the other claims.” ER 77. The court
told the parties that it
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would appreciate if you could submit a proposed partialjudgment with the certification. And it sounds to me like youcan agree on what the wording of that should be so you canget to the circuit quicker rather than later. . . . So if you couldsubmit a partial judgment granting petitioner’s claim 27 andvacating his death sentence. And then the certification, thatthere is no just reason for the delay. Resolving theconstitutionality of California’s administration of the deathpenalty system is of paramount importance to the state, topetitioner, to jurors, taxpayers, and the families of the victims.And I don’t believe waiting is in anybody’s interest, especiallygiven my view that the constitutional problem is only going toget worse. [¶] And if you could run it by the attorney generaland make sure that they are comfortable with it and thensubmit it, and I’ll sign it.
ER 78-79.
On July 25, 2014, as requested, the parties submitted a stipulated form of
partial final judgment on Jones’s Claim 27, granting the claim and vacating Jones’s
death sentence. See D. Ct. Dkt. No. 123. The court entered the judgment the same
day. ER 1.5 On August 21, 2014, the State filed a timely notice of appeal. ER 94.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I. Jones never presented any court with a claim that system-wide
“dysfunction” would render his execution “arbitrary,” the theory on which the
district court granted relief. He did present a claim alleging that anticipated delay
in his case following the pronouncement of his death sentence would create an
5 The remaining claims in the first amended petition have not yet beenadjudicated. The district court indicated that a decision on the remaining issues“could be rendered by the end of the year.” ER 19.
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Eighth Amendment violation. But that claim, which the California Supreme Court
rejected, cannot provide Jones with a basis for federal habeas relief. The
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) bars federal
habeas relief for any claim adjudicated on the merits in state court, except where
the state court’s decision was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application
of, clearly established Federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The Supreme Court
“has never held that execution after a long tenure on death row is cruel and unusual
punishment,” and the California Supreme Court’s ruling here was not contrary to
clearly established federal law. Allen v. Ornoski, 435 F.3d 946, 959 (9th Cir.
2006).
II. The district court’s arbitrariness theory cannot support federal habeas
relief because no claim raising it has ever been presented to the state courts.
A. Exhaustion of state remedies is a prerequisite to any claim
advanced by a state prisoner in a federal habeas petition. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(b)(1)(A); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515 (1982). Here, the arbitrariness
theory was first injected into this case by the district court, more than four years
after Jones filed his federal habeas petition. Jones could seek to present this new
claim by filing a habeas petition in the California Supreme Court, but he has not
yet done so.
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B. The district court erred when it excused Jones from exhausting a
claim based on the arbitrariness theory under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B)(ii), which
addresses situations where the state process is “ineffective to protect the rights of
the applicant.” This exception applies only in extraordinary circumstances, where
presentation of a claim to the state courts would be “futile,” or the claim has
already been presented to the state courts and they have failed to resolve it despite
inordinate delay. Jones’s case does not fall into either category. The California
Supreme Court provides effective state collateral review, and Jones never
presented that court with any claim that system-wide dysfunction made executions
arbitrary or eliminated their penological purpose.
C. By granting relief based on this novel theory before the state courts
had any opportunity to address it, the district court improperly ignored the
principles of federal-state comity that animate the exhaustion requirement, and
allowed Jones to circumvent the deferential standard of review that Congress has
prescribed for federal habeas cases.
III. In any event, the anti-retroactivity doctrine announced in Teague v. Lane,
489 U.S. 288 (1989), bars the district court from granting relief on its arbitrariness
theory. That doctrine forbids federal courts from applying new rules retroactively
on collateral review unless the rule is substantive or qualifies as a “watershed” rule
of criminal procedure.
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A. The arbitrariness theory is a “new rule” for Teague purposes
because it was not dictated by precedent existing at the time Jones’s conviction
became final in 2003. See Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 467 (1993). So far as
the State is aware, the district court’s order in this case was the first time that any
court adopted this theory. There is no merit to the district court’s holding that the
arbitrariness theory is an old rule because it is rooted in “basic notions of due
process and fair punishment.” ER 28. The Supreme Court has repeatedly warned
against treating a specific, novel application of a general principle as an old rule.
See, e.g., Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 414 (2004); Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227,
236 (1990).
B. Nor does the arbitrariness theory satisfy either of the Teague
exceptions. It is procedural in nature, not substantive. And it is not a “watershed”
rule, because it has nothing to do with the accuracy of the underlying conviction
and does not alter any existing “bedrock procedural elements” that exist to protect
the fairness of criminal proceedings. See Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 418
(2007).
IV. Even putting aside the district court’s error in analyzing these threshold
issues, the court’s arbitrariness theory lacks merit.
A. The district court’s holding is at odds with settled law. Courts
routinely reject claims that delay between the date on which a particular capital
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defendant is sentenced and the date of his execution violates the Eighth
Amendment. The argument that variations in the length of the post-conviction
review process for different capital defendants make the entire system
unconstitutional is weaker still. Post-conviction review is designed to avoid
arbitrariness and error in capital cases. Requiring it to proceed in some lockstep
fashion, rather than based on the unique circumstances of each case, could itself
raise arbitrariness concerns. Nor does the fact that a rational review process takes
time make a constitutionally significant difference in the deterrent or retributive
effects of a death sentence when it is ultimately carried out.
B. The factual premise of the district court’s holding is also deeply
flawed. California’s system for post-conviction review in capital cases is lengthy
because it is designed to avoid arbitrary results. In light of the profound
importance of ensuring that the ultimate criminal sanction is imposed only on
individuals who have been convicted and sentenced in full accordance with the law,
California provides capital defendants with substantial opportunities to challenge
their convictions and sentences, and resources for doing so, and the California
Supreme Court carefully reviews every capital case. Indeed, a significant number
of capital defendants obtain some form of relief. This process is necessarily time-
intensive, and the length of the process varies as a result of the nature of each case
and choices made by each defendant. Variation in the length of each review
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process does not, however, render executions in California unconstitutionally
arbitrary or purposeless, as the district court concluded. Although there is surely
room for policy debate over the death penalty and how best to review capital
sentences, the district court erred when it found a constitutional violation based on
its own policy critique of California’s system.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews de novo a district court’s decision to grant or deny habeas
relief to a state prisoner. Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 964 (9th Cir. 2004).
Factual findings and credibility determinations made by the district court in the
context of granting or denying the petition are reviewed for clear error. Id.
ARGUMENT
I. AEDPA BARS RELIEF ON THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIMPRESENTED IN JONES’S HABEAS PETITION, WHICH THE CALIFORNIASUPREME COURT REASONABLY REJECTED ON THE MERITS
The district court’s analysis of Claim 27 in Jones’s first amended petition
should have been straightforward. Amended Claim 27 presented the same
underlying Eighth Amendment claim that Jones previously advanced on direct
appeal in state court, and that the California Supreme Court rejected. Because the
state court’s decision was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, any
United States Supreme Court precedent, a federal court may not grant relief on the
claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
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Amended Claim 27 alleged that it would violate the Eighth Amendment for
the State to execute Jones following a lengthy period of confinement, because long
delay and accompanying uncertainty about the date of execution would cause
“physical and psychological suffering” amounting to cruel and unusual
punishment, and because execution after such delay would serve no legitimate
penological purpose. ER 125-127. That claim has become known as a Lackey
claim, after the case in which Justice Stevens identified it as a “novel” theory
“which would benefit from . . . further study.” Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1045 (Stevens,
J., respecting the denial of certiorari).
The Lackey claim described in amended Claim 27 largely mirrors the claim
that the California Supreme Court squarely rejected when Jones’s case was on
direct appeal. Jones, 29 Cal. 4th at 1267. The state Supreme Court held that the
“argument that ‘one under judgment of death suffers cruel and unusual punishment
by the inherent delays in resolving his appeal is untenable. If the appeal results in
reversal of the death judgment, he has suffered no conceivable prejudice, while if
the judgment is affirmed, the delay has prolonged his life.’” Jones, 29 Cal. 4th at
1267 (quoting People v. Anderson, 25 Cal. 4th 543, 606 (2001)) (alteration
omitted).6
6 The California Supreme Court has also expressly rejected the relatedargument that delay in an individual case might prevent an execution from serving
(continued…)
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Jones may not obtain federal habeas relief based on his Lackey claim in light
of the California Supreme Court’s decision rejecting it on the merits. As relevant
here, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) bars relitigation of any claim adjudicated on the merits
in state court unless the state court’s ruling “resulted in a decision that was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(1). Section 2254(d)(1) “requires federal courts to focus on what a state
court knew and did, and to measure state-court decisions against [the Supreme]
Court’s precedents as of the time the state court renders its decision.” Greene v.
Fisher, 132 S. Ct. 38, 44 (2011) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
“Clearly established federal law” is limited to holdings of the United States
Supreme Court that provided a “clear answer.” Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S.
120, 126 (2008).
The United States Supreme Court has never addressed a claim that delay
between capital sentencing and execution violates the Eighth Amendment—either
on the theory that the defendant suffers as he awaits execution or on the theory that
delay eliminates the penological purpose of the death penalty. See generally Allen
(…continued)any deterrent or retributive purpose. See People v. Ochoa, 26 Cal. 4th 398, 463(2001).
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v. Ornoski, 435 F.3d 946, 958 (9th Cir. 2006) (“The Supreme Court has never held
that execution after a long tenure on death row is cruel and unusual punishment.”).
Accordingly, a habeas petitioner cannot “credibly claim that there is any clearly
established law, as determined by the Supreme Court, which would support” such
a claim. Id. at 959.7 Although Justice Breyer and Justice Stevens have
occasionally authored opinions respecting the denial of certiorari urging the Court
to consider a Lackey claim, those opinions only underscore that the full Court has
never addressed the issue.8
The lack of United States Supreme Court precedent supporting Jones’s
Lackey claim is dispositive under § 2254(d)(1), but it bears mentioning that other
federal and state courts have consistently reached the same result as the California
Supreme Court. In McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461 (9th Cir. 1995), this Court held
that a Lackey claim was unlikely to succeed on the merits. See id. at 1467, opinion
aff’d and adopted, 57 F.3d 1493, 1494 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc). The Court noted
7 Allen involved a request for permission to present a Lackey claim in asecond or successive habeas petition. This Court denied the request, but then notedthat even were it “to reach the merits of [the] claim,” it would deny relief becausethe Supreme Court had never addressed the issue. 435 F.3d at 958.
8 See, e.g., Johnson v. Bredesen, 130 S. Ct. 541, 542-544 (2009) (Stevens, J.,respecting the denial of certiorari); Foster v. Florida, 123 S. Ct. 470, 471-472(2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari). But see, e.g., Knight v.Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 990 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari)(review not necessary because no legal support for Lackey claim).
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that “[t]he delay has been caused by the fact that McKenzie has availed himself of
procedures our law provides to ensure that executions are carried out only in
appropriate circumstances,” and the Court refused to “conclude that delays caused
by satisfying the Eighth Amendment themselves violate it.” Id. at 1466-1467.
“Numerous other federal and state courts have rejected Lackey claims.” Allen, 435
F.3d at 959 (collecting cases from four federal courts of appeals and seven state
courts of last resort). The State is not aware of a single case where a court in the
United States has granted relief based on a Lackey claim.
Finally, as Jones has acknowledged, his amended Claim 27 introduced new
factual allegations in support of the Lackey claim, including allegations that
California’s lack of a lethal injection protocol exacerbated the uncertainty
surrounding his execution.9 But those new factual allegations do not alter the
inquiry under § 2254(d). The deferential standard of § 2254(d)(1) must be applied
based on “the record that was before the state court.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.
Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011). The federal courts “are precluded from considering”
additional facts alleged for the first time in federal court. Id. at 1402 n.11.10
9 See ER 116, 123-124; see also D. Ct. Dkt. No. 113 at 2 (Jones’s replybrief) (acknowledging that amended Claim 27 “significantly expanded” the“factual bases” for the Lackey claim).
10 The State construes amended Claim 27 as presenting only a standardLackey claim. Jones himself described the claim as contending that “the
(continued…)
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II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING HABEAS RELIEF BASED ONA NEW THEORY THAT HAS NOT BEEN EXHAUSTED
Rather than concluding its analysis by recognizing that the claim Jones
actually asserted had been permissibly rejected by the state courts, the district court
granted relief based on a novel “arbitrariness” theory that is analytically distinct
from the Lackey claim that Jones himself presented. Because Jones never
advanced an arbitrariness theory in state court, it was inappropriate for the district
court to reach the issue. Jones must “exhaust[] the remedies available in the courts
of the State” before he may obtain federal habeas relief on this theory. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(b)(1)(A). No exception relieves Jones of that obligation.
A. Jones Never Exhausted the “Arbitrariness” Theory
Section 2254(b)(1) provides that:
[a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custodypursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless itappears that—
(A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts ofthe State; or(B)(i) there is an absence of available State corrective process; or
(…continued)extraordinarily leng[th]y delay in execution of sentence in Mr. Jones’s case,coupled with the grave uncertainty of not knowing whether his execution will everbe carried out, renders his death sentence unconstitutional.” ER 116 (emphasisadded). Should this Court conclude, to the contrary, that amended Claim 27 raiseda new and distinct Eighth Amendment theory along the lines on which the districtcourt granted relief, that claim still fails for reasons discussed in Parts II throughIV below.
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(ii) circumstances exist that render such process ineffective toprotect the rights of the applicant.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). To satisfy the exhaustion requirement, a petitioner must
“‘fairly present’ his federal claims to each appropriate state court.” Wooten v.
Kirkland, 540 F.3d 1019, 1025 (9th Cir. 2008); see Lundy, 455 U.S. at 515. A
claim has been “fairly present[ed]” only if the petitioner presented “to the state
courts both the operative facts and the federal legal theories that animate the
claim.” Arrendondo v. Neven, 763 F.3d 1122, 1138 (9th Cir. 2014); see Gray v.
Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-163 (1996).
Here, Jones raised a Lackey claim in the state courts, but he never presented
those courts with the separate Eighth Amendment claim on which the district court
ultimately granted relief. As the district court itself recognized, the two claims
involve different legal theories. A Lackey claim contends that the Eighth
Amendment has been violated because “the delay was extraordinary” in an
inmate’s “individual case[].” ER 24 n.19. In contrast, the claim on which the
district court granted relief is that Jones’s “execution would be arbitrary and serve
no penological purpose because of system-wide dysfunction in the post-conviction
review process.” Id. (emphasis added).11
11 If this Court concludes that the theory on which the district court grantedrelief is the equivalent of a Lackey delay claim, then relief on that theory is barredby § 2254(d)(1) for the reasons identified above: the state court’s decision
(continued…)
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Jones never presented to the state courts a claim that California’s system of
post-conviction review in death penalty cases violates the Eighth Amendment
because only an “arbitrarily” selected few of those on Death Row are actually
executed, or because “system-wide dysfunction” eliminates any penological
purpose of the death penalty. Nor did he present to the state court operative facts
that would animate such a claim. Jones presented only a typical Lackey claim,
citing Justice Stevens’s opinion in Lackey and focusing on the delay that Jones
expected to face in his individual case. See ER 144, 152, 155. As the district court
correctly acknowledged, Jones has never exhausted an “arbitrariness” claim. See
ER 27-28, 55.12
B. Exhaustion Is Not Excused under § 2254(b)(1)(B)(ii)
The district court held that Jones was excused from exhausting the
arbitrariness claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B)(ii), which addresses situations
(…continued)rejecting the claim was not contrary to clearly established federal law, and federalcourts may not consider additional evidence in support of the claim that was notbefore the state court. See Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1402 n.11; cf. Livaditis v.Martel, No. CV 96-2833-SVW, at 4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2014) (holding that thesystemic theory adopted by the district court in this case is “the equivalent of” aLackey claim).
12 Although the district court attributed the arbitrariness theory to Claim 27of Jones’s amended petition (see ER 15-16, 24 n.19), even as amended, Claim 27does not describe any theory of a constitutional violation based on system-widedysfunction leading to “arbitrariness” in executions (see ER 116-129).
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where the state corrective process is “ineffective to protect the rights of the
applicant.” See ER 27-28.13 That was error. California maintains an effective
system for collateral review of convictions and sentences, and there is no
indication that system would not be effective in Jones’s individual case.
Jones may exhaust his state court remedies by filing a habeas petition in the
California Supreme Court seeking to raise a claim based on the arbitrariness
theory. See Cal. Penal Code § 1473; In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750, 774-775, 797-799
(1993) (successive habeas petition permissible if petitioner establishes that delay
was justified or that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would otherwise occur).
The State might well oppose any such petition by arguing, for example, that it is
procedurally barred in the circumstances of Jones’s case. But “[t]he fact that a
procedural bar may preclude” Jones from presenting this new Eighth Amendment
theory to the California Supreme Court “in no way nullifies the fact that he had an
adequate state remedy that has not been exhausted.” Tamalani v. Stewart, 249
F.3d 895, 899 n.2 (9th Cir. 2001).14
13 Neither Jones nor the district court took the position that this casequalified for the other exception to the exhaustion requirement, for cases where“there is an absence of available State corrective process,” which is plainlyinapplicable here. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B)(i).
14 Exhaustion is excused only where, unlike here, “it is clear that the habeaspetitioner’s claims are now procedurally barred under state law”—in which casethe federal court would consider whether there is a basis for excusing the
(continued…)
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The relief available in California is not “ineffective” within the meaning of
§ 2254(b)(1)(B)(ii). Courts have applied that exception only in extraordinary
circumstances, generally falling into two categories. First, the exception may
apply if the state “corrective process is so clearly deficient as to render futile any
effort to obtain relief.” Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981). The Supreme
Court has never itself identified any circumstance that warranted a finding of
futility. Some courts of appeals have found futility where the state’s highest court
recently addressed the same legal issue and resolved it adversely to the petitioner,
see, e.g., Sweet v. Cupp, 640 F.2d 233, 236 (9th Cir. 1981) (collecting cases), but it
is debatable whether those cases remain good law.15 Even if they do, they would
not excuse the exhaustion requirement here. The California Supreme Court has
(…continued)procedural default. Gray, 518 U.S. at 161-162 (emphasis added) (internalquotation marks and alterations omitted).
15 The year after Sweet, the United States Supreme Court, while addressing arelated issue in the context of procedural default, stated that “[i]f a defendantperceives a constitutional claim and believes it may find favor in the federal courts,he may not bypass the state courts simply because he thinks they will beunsympathetic to the claim.” Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 130 (1982). In light ofEngle, this Court has questioned whether the rule adopted in Sweet remains goodlaw. See, e.g., Noltie v. Peterson, 9 F.3d 802, 805 (9th Cir. 1993).
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never addressed the novel Eighth Amendment theory adopted by the district
court.16
Second, some federal courts of appeals have applied § 2254(b)(1)(B)(ii) in
cases involving inordinate delay after prisoners presented their legal claims to the
state courts. In Lee v. Stickman, 357 F.3d 338, 342 (3d Cir. 2004), for example,
the Third Circuit excused the exhaustion requirement because the prisoner’s state
habeas petition had been pending for almost eight years without the state court
reaching the merits of his claims. The prisoners in those cases properly presented
their legal claims first to the state courts, which at least had an opportunity to act.
This case is on an entirely different footing. Jones never presented a claim based
on the arbitrariness theory to the California courts.
The two cases cited by the district court in support of its exhaustion holding
(see ER 28) actually illustrate why exhaustion is required here. In Jones v.
Tubman, 360 F. Supp. 1298, 1300 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), the court noted the general
rule that “exhaustion is not mandated [either] where the state consideration would
be . . . futile or where state procedures do not provide swift review of the
petitioner’s claims.” But it then denied the habeas petition because, as here, the
16 In People v. Seumanu, Cal. S. Ct. No. S093803, the parties recently filedsupplemental briefs addressing the “arbitrariness” theory. The California SupremeCourt has not yet scheduled argument in that case.
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record did not “warrant a finding that the exhaustion doctrine is inapplicable”
under either exception. Id.
In Phillips v. Vasquez, 56 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 1995), this Court allowed a
prisoner to challenge the constitutionality of his conviction in a federal habeas
petition a decade after the state supreme court upheld the conviction but reversed
the prisoner’s death sentence. The prisoner was later resentenced to death, and his
state appeal as to that sentence was still pending ten years after the conviction was
affirmed. Id. at 1032. The prisoner filed a federal habeas petition that challenged
only the constitutionality of his conviction. Id. This Court rejected the argument
that the petition could not proceed until the state supreme court had resolved the
pending appeal as to his sentence, noting that “[c]omity concerns in this case are
practically nonexistent since the state has had a full and fair opportunity to review
the validity of Phillips’ conviction and its decision regarding that conviction is
final.” Id. at 1036. In this context, the Court stated that “extraordinary delay in the
state courts can render state corrective processes ‘ineffective’ within the meaning
of section 2254(b).” Id. at 1035. The district court quoted this statement (ER 28),
but ignored that Phillips underscores the requirement for a prisoner to present each
claim to the state courts before seeking federal habeas relief on that claim.
Finally, the district court’s assertion that exhaustion may be excused because
California’s post-conviction review system is “dysfunctional and incapable”
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(ER 28) cannot be squared with the facts of this case. Every legal claim that Jones
has presented to the California Supreme Court—a total of 20 on direct appeal and
27 on state habeas—has been adjudicated after careful consideration. To date, the
district court has found no substantive fault with the state court’s resolution of any
claim. The time consumed by the process is not surprising given the number and
scope of Jones’s claims; the particular importance of careful review in capital
cases; and the fact that neither the parties nor the courts have unlimited resources.
C. The District Court’s Exhaustion Holding Sidesteps the BasicStructure of Federal Habeas Jurisdiction
The exhaustion doctrine protects the interests of state sovereigns in our
federal system. Exhaustion “serves AEDPA’s goal of promoting comity, finality,
and federalism, by giving state courts the first opportunity to review the claim, and
to correct any constitutional violation in the first instance.” Carey v. Saffold, 536
U.S. 214, 220 (2002) (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted).
Federal courts apply the exhaustion doctrine “[b]ecause it would be unseemly in
our dual system of government for a federal district court to upset a state court
conviction without an opportunity to the state courts to correct a constitutional
violation.” Lundy, 455 U.S. at 518 (internal quotation marks omitted). That
concern is surely at its apex where, as here, the asserted violation rests on a novel
theory attacking the structure and performance of the state system itself.
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By framing and then granting relief on a novel Eighth Amendment theory, the
district court deprived the California courts of “the first opportunity to address and
correct alleged violations of [Jones’s] federal rights.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501
U.S. 722, 731 (1991). It also circumvented the deferential standard of review that
Congress created for federal habeas actions under AEDPA. That standard, the
exhaustion requirement, and the procedural bar doctrine, all “complement[]” each
other “to ensure that state proceedings are the central process.” Harrington v.
Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 787 (2011) (emphasis added). A state prisoner must
satisfy AEDPA’s deferential standard by showing “that the state court’s ruling on
the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there
was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any
possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Id. at 786-787. But by excusing
exhaustion, the district court sidestepped this “basic structure of federal habeas
jurisdiction.” Id. at 787; see ER 28 n.23 (“Because there is no underlying state
court ruling on the merits of Mr. Jones’s claim of arbitrariness in California’s death
penalty system, the Court does not consider the claim under AEDPA’s deferential
standard of review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).”).
A decision from this Court sustaining the district court’s rationale for
excusing exhaustion would severely undermine the exhaustion requirement for all
California capital defendants. The district court excused Jones from exhausting the
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arbitrariness theory because exhaustion “would require Mr. Jones to have his claim
resolved” by a California system of post-conviction review in capital cases that the
district court viewed as “dysfunctional and incapable of protecting [Jones’s]
constitutional rights.” ER 28. This rationale would apparently apply to any new
constitutional theory raised by any California inmate who has been sentenced to
death. No capital defendant would need to present any federal claim before the
California Supreme Court before raising it on federal habeas review. There is no
basis for any such result.
III. THE ANTI-RETROACTIVITY DOCTRINE OF TEAGUE v. LANE ALSO BARSRELIEF
Even if this Court were to overlook Jones’s failure to exhaust the
“arbitrariness” theory, the anti-retroactivity doctrine announced in Teague v. Lane,
489 U.S. 288 (1989), would bar him from obtaining relief based on that theory.
Under Teague, a “new rule applies retroactively in a collateral proceeding only if
(1) the rule is substantive or (2) the rule is a watershed rule of criminal procedure
implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.”
Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 416 (2007) (internal quotation marks and
alteration omitted). Because the district court’s arbitrariness theory is a new
procedural rule that does not qualify for “watershed” status, the court could not
announce or apply it in this federal habeas proceeding.
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A. The Arbitrariness Theory Is a “New Rule” under Teague
“A holding constitutes a ‘new rule’ within the meaning of Teague if it breaks
new ground, imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government, or
was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction
became final.” Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 467 (1993) (internal quotation
marks and alteration omitted). Put differently, a claim in a habeas petition seeks to
invoke a “new rule” unless “all reasonable jurists would have deemed themselves
compelled to accept [the] claim” at the time the petitioner’s conviction became
final. Id. at 477. Under these standards, the district court’s arbitrariness theory is a
new rule. The court’s order in this case is the first time any court has held that
perceived delay or arbitrariness in the absolute or relative pace of a State’s post-
conviction review process for capital defendants violates the Eighth Amendment.
Cf. ER 24 n.19 (noting that courts addressing claims of unconstitutional delay have
typically focused on the delay in individual cases). Certainly no reasonable jurist
would have felt compelled by precedent to accept such a theory when Jones’s
conviction became final in 2003.17
17 Cf. Smith v. Mahoney, 611 F.3d 978, 998-999 (9th Cir. 2010) (Lackeyclaim sought a “new rule” because “a state court considering Smith’s EighthAmendment claim at the time his conviction became final would not have feltcompelled by existing precedent to conclude that the rule sought was required bythe Constitution.”).
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The district court reasoned that its theory was “inherent in the most basic
notions of due process and fair punishment embedded in the core of the Eighth
Amendment.” ER 28. It cited, however, only concurring and plurality opinions
that stand at most for the general proposition that States may not use “sentencing
procedures that create[] a substantial risk that” the death penalty will be imposed
“in an arbitrary and capricious manner.” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188
(1976) (plurality opinion). Those opinions say nothing about the problem
perceived by the district court here—alleged arbitrariness in the pace at which
California conducts post-conviction review. Nothing in them would have
“compelled” “all reasonable jurists” to accept the district court’s theory when
Jones’s conviction became final in 2003. Graham, 506 U.S. at 477. Nor would
any other precedent that existed at that time, or any case that has been decided
since.18
18 The district court also cited Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 970, 984 (9th Cir.1998) (en banc). Dyer involved the rule that juror bias may be inferred based onthe circumstances in extraordinary cases. The Court noted that this rule had beenaccepted in the common law as far back as 1610, and that the Supreme Court hadtaken it for granted in Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1933), and Turney v.Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927). See Dyer, 151 F.3d at 984. This extensive “pedigree”doomed the argument that implied bias was a “new rule” under Teague. Id. Thenovel Eighth Amendment theory embraced by the district court here has no suchheritage.
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The Supreme Court has repeatedly warned against the mode of analysis
employed by the district court here: treating cases that articulate general legal
principles as established precedent for a narrow rule never actually adopted by the
Court. Even where an earlier rule, “conceived of at a high level of generality,”
might “be thought to support” a later, narrow rule, the later rule is “new” unless the
earlier one “mandate[s]” its adoption. Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 414, 416
(2004). Indeed, Teague “would be meaningless if applied at this level of
generality.” Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 236 (1990).
B. The Arbitrariness Theory Is Not a “Substantive” or“Watershed” Rule
The arbitrariness theory does not satisfy either exception to Teague’s bar on
the retroactive application of new rules on collateral review. First, the theory is
not a “substantive” rule. “Substantive” rules include “decisions that narrow the
scope of a criminal statute by interpreting its terms, as well as constitutional
determinations that place particular conduct or persons covered by the statute
beyond the State’s power to punish.” Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351-352
(2004) (internal citations omitted) (collecting cases). Such rules are applied
retroactively “because they necessarily carry a significant risk that a defendant
stands convicted of an act that the law does not make criminal or faces a
punishment that the law cannot impose upon him.” Id. at 352 (internal quotation
marks omitted). The arbitrariness theory does not narrow the scope of criminal
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liability. Nor does it create any risk that Jones is innocent of murder, or suggest
that California is without power to impose the death penalty. This theory turns
entirely on criticism of the procedures by which California offers post-conviction
review to Jones and other prisoners who have been sentenced to death. Cf. id. at
353-355 (rule regarding the permissible methods for imposing a death sentence is
procedural, not substantive).
Second, while the district court’s arbitrariness theory would of course have
radical consequences and involve a dramatic change in the law, for Teague
purposes it would not qualify as a “‘watershed rule[] of criminal procedure’
implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.”
Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990). The Supreme Court has recognized that
“[t]his exception is extremely narrow,” and has “rejected every claim that a new
rule satisfied the requirements for watershed status.” Bockting, 549 U.S. at 417-
418 (internal quotation marks omitted) (collecting cases). A new “watershed” rule
would have to (1) “be necessary to prevent an impermissibly large risk of an
inaccurate conviction” and (2) “alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural
elements essential to the fairness of the proceeding.” Id. at 418 (internal quotation
marks omitted). The arbitrariness theory does not satisfy either requirement. It
focuses only on the pace at which the State carries out post-conviction review in
different cases.
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IV. CALIFORNIA’S SYSTEM FOR REVIEWING DEATH JUDGMENTS ISCONSISTENT WITH THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
Even putting aside procedural doctrines that barred the district court from
granting relief to Jones based on the court’s arbitrariness theory, the theory itself
lacks merit. The court’s constitutional holding is incorrect as a matter of Eighth
Amendment doctrine, and in any event its factual premise is deeply flawed.
A. The District Court’s Holding Is at Odds with Settled EighthAmendment Jurisprudence
The district court’s holding lacks any legal support. Courts have routinely
and emphatically rejected claims made in particular cases that delays in post-
conviction review violated the Eighth Amendment. The district court’s novel
theory, based on differences in the pace of review in different cases, has no greater
merit.
1. As discussed in Part I above, federal and state courts have consistently
rejected claims that delay in the review of an individual capital defendant’s
conviction or sentence violates the Eighth Amendment. This Court has repeatedly
cast doubt on Lackey claims or rejected them outright. See Smith v. Mahoney, 611
F.3d 978, 998 (9th Cir. 2010); Allen, 435 F.3d at 958; McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1470.
So far as the State is aware, every other federal court of appeals and state court of
last resort to address the issue has also rejected this type of claim. See, e.g.,
Thompson v. McDonough, 517 F.3d 1279, 1283-1284 (11th Cir. 2008); Chambers
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v. Bowersox, 157 F.3d 560, 568-570 (8th Cir. 1998); Lackey v. Johnson, 83 F.3d
116, 117 (5th Cir. 1996); Carroll v. State, 114 So. 3d 883, 889-890 (Fla. 2013);
State v. Sparks, 68 So. 3d 435, 492-493 (La. 2011); Bieghler v. State, 839 N.E.2d
691, 696-698 (Ind. 2005); Russell v. State, 849 So. 2d 95, 144-145 (Miss. 2003);
State v. Austin, 87 S.W. 3d 447, 485-486 (Tenn. 2002); People v. Anderson, 25
Cal. 4th at 606; People v. Emerson, 727 N.E.2d 302, 345 (Ill. 2000); State v.
Moore, 591 N.W.2d 86, 93-95 (Neb. 1999); McKinney v. State, 992 P.2d 144, 151-
152 (Idaho 1999); Hill v. State, 962 S.W.2d 762, 767 (Ark. 1998); Ex parte Bush,
695 So. 2d 138, 139-140 (Ala. 1997); State v. Smith, 931 P.2d 1272, 1288 (Mont.
1996); Bell v. State, 938 S.W.2d 35, 52-53 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).19
To the extent one conceives of the theory on which the district court granted
relief as the functional equivalent of a Lackey claim, the theory cannot be squared
with this uniform body of Eighth Amendment precedent. Cf. Livaditis v. Martel,
No. CV 96-2833-SVW, at 4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2014) (“Habeas petitioners have
been raising the equivalent of a ‘Jones’ claim for many years, when they were
commonly known as ‘Lackey claims.’”).
19 See also Knight, 528 U.S. 990 (Thomas, J., concurring in denial ofcertiorari) (“I am unaware of any support in the American constitutional traditionor in this Court’s precedent for the proposition that a defendant can avail himselfof the panoply of appellate and collateral procedures and then complain when hisexecution is delayed.”).
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2. The district court sought to avoid this conclusion by describing its theory
as one of unconstitutional “arbitrariness” across cases, based on “system-wide
dysfunction in the post-conviction review process.” ER 24 n.19. That new theory
lacks legal support.
The district court cited concurring opinions in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238 (1972), a case that produced no majority opinion. Furman, however,
addressed a fundamentally different issue: arbitrariness in the selection of who is
sentenced to death. The Supreme Court has subsequently described Furman as
holding that the death penalty may “not be imposed under sentencing procedures
that created a substantial risk that it would be inflicted in an arbitrary and
capricious manner.” Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188 (plurality opinion); see also Kennedy
v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 436 (2008); California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 541
(1987).
Thus, the various concurring opinions cited by the district court all focus on
perceived arbitrariness in imposing the death penalty at the sentencing stage in
capital cases. Justice White voiced concern that there was “no meaningful basis
for distinguishing the few cases in which” a death sentence “is imposed from the
many cases in which it is not.” Furman, 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
Justice Stewart stated that the Eighth Amendment does not permit the “sentence of
death [to be] imposed” in a “wanton[] and . . . freakish[]” manner. Id. at 310
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(Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Brennan focused on the death penalty being
“inflicted arbitrarily” among the cases where it is a “legally available” sentence. Id.
at 293 (Brennan, J., concurring). And Justice Douglas traced the history of the
Eighth Amendment and found that it was aimed at forbidding the imposition of
“arbitrary and discriminatory penalties.” Id. at 242 (Douglas, J. concurring).
None of these opinions in Furman, nor any opinion of the Supreme Court
since then, suggests that individual death sentences imposed in a proper, non-
arbitrary fashion, can become collectively unconstitutional on the theory that post-
conviction judicial review takes longer in some cases than in others. That is for
good reason. Once a sentence of death has been imposed, post-conviction review
is designed to ensure that the sentence was not imposed in an arbitrary fashion. At
common law, “executions could be carried out on the dawn following the
pronouncement of sentence.” McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1467. Evolving standards,
however, have led to systems that “provide death row inmates with ample
opportunities to contest their convictions and sentences . . . in recognition of the
fact that the common law practice of imposing swift and certain executions could
result in arbitrariness and error.” Id. (citing Furman and Gregg). Each case is
unique, and the length of this post-conviction review process necessarily varies. A
lockstep post-conviction review process resulting in “swift and certain” executions
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would undermine, not advance, the interest in avoiding arbitrary imposition of the
death penalty. See id.
3. The district court was also incorrect when it identified, as “a further
constitutional problem with the State’s administration of its death penalty system,”
that “the death penalty is deprived of any deterrent or retributive effect it might
have once had.” ER 20-21.
There has long been active debate over the deterrent value of the death
penalty. But the Supreme Court has observed that “[t]he value of capital
punishment as a deterrent of crime is a complex factual issue the resolution of
which properly rests with the legislatures, which can evaluate the results of
statistical studies in terms of their own local conditions and with a flexibility of
approach that is not available to the courts.” Gregg, 428 U.S. at 186. Once a State
has concluded that capital punishment is justified in some cases, the argument that
“the passage of time renders the death sentence an ineffective deterrent . . . is a
matter for the legislature.” Bieghler, 839 N.E.2d at 698; see Smith, 931 P.2d at
1288 (argument that delay reduced deterrent effect “should be presented to the
Montana Legislature, not to this Court”). And there is no basis for a court to
conclude that even a lengthy judicial review process eliminates all deterrent effect.
As capital defendants would no doubt agree, the prospect of execution, even if
deferred, makes a capital sentence significantly more severe than any other.
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The district court’s conclusion that delay in California’s post-conviction
review process eliminates any retributive effect is similarly unpersuasive. An
individual who is put to death by the State suffers a form of retribution
qualitatively different from, and more severe than, any other. That fact does not
change with the passage of time. Indeed, there is a sense in which the degree of
deliberation that precedes an execution underscores the point that the basis for the
State’s action is a thoroughly considered social decision to impose the ultimate
penalty in collective retribution for especially heinous crimes. Cf. Ochoa, 26 Cal.
4th at 463 (“Nazi war criminals and church bombers motivated by racial hatred
have been prosecuted for murders committed decades earlier.”). Retribution is in
large part about imposing a particular punishment that is deemed appropriate for a
particular bad act. That calculus does not change merely because of the passage of
time.
B. The System for Reviewing Capital Sentences in California IsLengthy Because It Is Designed to Avoid Arbitrary Results, Notto Produce Them
California’s system for carefully reviewing capital convictions and sentences
takes time. It might be hastened if the State had no resource constraints, or less
interest in ensuring the accuracy and legality of its judgments in capital cases.
Neither observation, however, makes the State’s system “dysfunctional” or
“incapable,” or renders executions “arbitrary.” ER 2-3, 28. The time it takes to
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review and implement a capital sentence in California results from the interaction
of legal rules, procedural protections, and practical accommodations that are
designed to protect individual and government interests of surpassing importance.
There is nothing “arbitrary” about a system that takes whatever time is necessary to
protect those interests. Rather, California’s system recognizes the profound
importance of providing careful judicial review before carrying out a capital
sentence.
1. As the district court observed, “the execution of an individual carries
with it the solemn obligation of the government to ensure that the punishment is
not arbitrarily imposed and that it furthers the interests of society.” ER 16.
California’s system of post-conviction review in capital cases is designed to ensure
that the ultimate criminal sanction is imposed only on individuals who have been
convicted and sentenced in full accordance with the law, and that the sanction is
carried out through a method that complies with legal and constitutional guarantees.
The State properly provides capital defendants with opportunities and resources for
challenging their convictions. And the California Supreme Court carefully reviews
those challenges in every capital case.
The State’s strong interest in ensuring accurate and just outcomes in capital
cases is reflected in the fact that its post-conviction review process is, in important
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respects, more robust and more generous to defendants than the process in some
other States that impose the death penalty. For example:
Payment for appointed counsel. Counsel appointed in state habeasproceedings in California frequently earn more than $130,000 from theState for their work on a single case, and sometimes earn more than$200,000. See In re Reno, 55 Cal. 4th 428, 456 n.9 (2012). In contrast,habeas counsel in Texas are entitled to no more than $25,000 from theState in compensation and expenses combined; more may be availablefrom local government. Tex. Code Crim. P. art. 11.071, § 2A(a). InFlorida, habeas counsel are entitled to capped fees that total only $84,000,including for the time spent filing a petition for certiorari in the U.S.Supreme Court. Fla. Stat. § 27.711(4)(a)-(h).
Length of filings. The California Rules of Court allow capital defendantsto file opening briefs on direct appeal that include up to 102,000 words, orapproximately 408 pages at 250 words per page. See Cal. R. Ct.8.630(b)(1)(A). In Florida, the rules impose a 50-page limit. Fla. R. App.P. 9.210(a)(5).20 There is no page limit on initial habeas petitions inCalifornia, nor any limit on the number of claims a capital defendant mayraise. See In re Reno, 55 Cal. 4th at 457 n.11. Second or subsequentpetitions in California may be 50 pages. Id. at 516. In Florida, the ruleslimit capital defendants to 75 pages for a first petition and 25 pages forsuccessive petitions. Fla. R. Crim. P. § 3.851(e)(1), (2).
Resources for investigation on habeas. California currently pre-authorizes habeas counsel to spend up to $50,000 investigating a habeaspetition. Habeas attorneys in Florida are allotted no more than $15,000for the purpose of “paying for investigative services” and another $15,000for “miscellaneous expenses”; those allotments are only available with thecourt’s approval. See In re Reno, 55 Cal. 4th at 457 n.10; Fla. Stat.§ 27.711(5)-(6).
20 In practice, some briefs filed by capital defendants in Florida exceed thestated page limits. See, e.g., Initial Br. of Appellant, Smith v. Florida, No. SC11-1076, available at http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/flsupct/SC11-1076/11-1076_ini.pdf (62 pages).
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Time for filing habeas petition. California currently permits capitaldefendants to file a habeas petition within 36 months of the date whenhabeas counsel is appointed. Texas generally requires a petition to befiled within 180 days after counsel is appointed. See In re Reno, 55 Cal.4th at 457 n.12; Tex. Code Crim. P. art. 11.071, § 4(a).
Capital defendants typically take full advantage of these protections, as of
course they are entitled to do. This case is no exception. Jones is represented by
the Habeas Corpus Resource Center, an entity created and funded by the State. See
Cal. Gov. Code § 68660 et seq. On direct appeal, Jones filed a 255-page brief in
the California Supreme Court, presenting 20 separate grounds for relief. In his
state habeas proceeding, Jones filed a petition totaling 427 pages and presenting 27
claims for relief, followed by a 370-page reply to the State’s informal response.
As a result of this robust system of post-conviction review, and the vigorous
challenges mounted by capital defendants through state-funded counsel, a
significant number of capital defendants obtain some relief from the California
Supreme Court. Since California reinstated the death penalty in 1977, its highest
court has granted relief in more than 110 different decisions in capital cases—
including more than 30 decisions granting relief from a conviction on direct appeal,
more than 60 decisions granting relief from a death sentence on direct appeal, and
at least 18 decisions granting relief from a conviction or sentence in a state habeas
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proceeding.21 The district court discounted the relevance of decisions issued
between 1979 and 1986 (see ER 4 n.5), but even if those decisions are ignored, the
California Supreme Court has granted relief to capital defendants in more than 60
different decisions since 1987.
This process for reviewing capital cases is not quick or casual—nor should it
be. The California Supreme Court carefully reviews every capital case on direct
appeal. Its opinions often exceed 100 pages, identifying errors where they exist
and assessing whether they were prejudicial. See, e.g., People v. Bryant, 60 Cal.
4th 335 (2014); People v. Lucas, 60 Cal. 4th 153 (2014). The court gives similar
attention to habeas petitions in capital cases. It typically rules on the merits of
every claim presented in a capital habeas petition, and also reviews whether any
claims are procedurally barred. Although the district court criticized the fact that
many of these rulings are made without discussion in summary dispositions, the
United States Supreme Court has endorsed this sensible practice. See Richter, 131
S. Ct. at 784 (“The issuance of summary dispositions in many collateral attack
cases can enable a state judiciary to concentrate its resources on the cases where
opinions are most needed.”).
21 There was never an evidentiary hearing that led to presentation oradversarial testing of these data—or, for that matter, the district court’s data. TheState can lodge citations for the referenced decisions with the Court upon request.
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The conclusions drawn by the district court from its review of this system are
unsupported. That California’s post-conviction review process is lengthy does not
mean that the process serves no purpose. That the length of time involved varies
across individual cases does not mean that this variance is arbitrary. No two cases
are the same. The pace of post-conviction review for any particular capital
defendant will depend on myriad case-specific factors, including the factual and
legal complexity of the case; the number and nature of the claims presented by the
defendant on direct appeal and state habeas; the number of extensions requested
and received by the parties; the availability of qualified counsel; whether the
defendant exercises his right to obtain new counsel on state habeas; intervening
factual and legal developments; and so forth. Each of these factors can prolong the
review process in a particular capital case, as compared with another, different
capital case. In every case, however, the delay occasioned by these factors serves
purposes of great importance: affording capital defendants a fair chance to frame
and present challenges to their convictions and sentences, and then ensuring
careful review of every legal challenge to a capital defendant’s conviction or
sentence. See, e.g., In re Reno, 55 Cal. 4th at 456 (California’s post-conviction
review process is designed to ensure that the capital defendant “has had ample
opportunity to raise all meritorious claims, the adversarial process has operated
correctly, and both this court and society can be confident that, before a person is
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put to death, the judgment that he or she is guilty of the crimes and deserves the
ultimate punishment is valid and supportable.”).
2. The district court found fault with several California laws and policies
that it described as prolonging the State’s system for post-conviction review for
capital defendants. As with any public program, there is certainly room for debate
over how best to structure this system, and, in doing so, how to balance competing
state priorities. But the district court failed to recognize that the policies it assailed
do serve important interests and, in all events, do not render California executions
either purposeless or arbitrary.
For example, the district court faulted the State for failing to alter the
requirement that death penalty appeals must be heard by the California Supreme
Court rather than the state’s intermediate courts of appeal. See ER 26. This issue
has been raised, as a policy matter, by the California Supreme Court itself.22 To
date, however, California has decided as a matter of state constitutional law that
such appeals must proceed directly to its highest court. See Cal. Const. art. VI,
§§ 11(a), 12(d). The voters reaffirmed that constitutional judgment in 1984, when
they approved a proposition that enabled the Supreme Court to transfer cases to the
22 See News Release, Supreme Court Proposes Amendments to Constitutionin Death Penalty Appeals, Nov. 19, 2007, available athttp://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/NR76-07.PDF.
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courts of appeal, but expressly withheld transfer authority for capital cases. Ballot
Pamphlet, General Election 28-29 (Nov. 6, 1998).23 Although that proposition was
intended to “establish greater court efficiency” at a time when “the business
transacted by the California Supreme Court ha[d] nearly doubled” during the
preceding decade, its proponents emphasized that “[t]his proposition does nothing
to change the Supreme Court’s mandate to hear death penalty cases.” Id. at 31; see
id. at 29. There is room to debate the policy merits of that decision, but there is no
basis for finding it to be constitutionally unreasonable.
The district court also criticized the State for delays related to the
appointment of counsel at the direct appeal and habeas stages. ER 8-12. Perhaps
California could reduce those delays by relaxing its requirements for the
qualifications of appointed counsel. Any such reduction, however, could be in
tension with the interests of indigent defendants in obtaining experienced counsel
who will vigorously represent them, or of society in ensuring that the defendants’
convictions and death sentences are reviewed through an effective adversarial
process. Similarly, while California already compensates capital counsel at higher
rates than many other States, see supra p. 45, perhaps it could speed the
appointment process by substantially increasing compensation. But that sort of
23 Available at http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/1984g.pdf.
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policy decision is not made in a vacuum—the State cannot devote unlimited
resources to death penalty representation, any more than to other public
responsibilities. The State’s current level of support for post-conviction
representation is sufficient under the Constitution.24
As the district court noted, critics of the policy choices made by California in
structuring its post-conviction review process have included members of the
California Supreme Court. For example, then-Chief Justice Ronald George argued
in 2008 that “[t]he existing system for handling capital appeals in California is
dysfunctional and needs reform.” Ronald M. George, Reform Death Penalty
Appeals, L.A. Times, Jan. 7, 2008. Such statements are evidence of an active
policy debate, not of a constitutional violation. Chief Justice George’s statement,
for example, was made in the context of a newspaper essay urging the legislature
and voters to authorize the California Supreme Court to transfer capital cases to
courts of appeal.
In short, there are certainly policy options that might be suggested to quicken
the pace of California’s post-conviction review process. The balance the State has
struck in providing ample scope for review, subject to existing resource constraints,
24 Indeed, the Constitution does not require the State to provide counsel forcollateral review proceedings at all. See, e.g., Rohan v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 803,810 (9th Cir. 2003) (collecting cases), abrogated on other grounds, Ryan v.Gonzales, 133 S. Ct. 696 (2013).
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makes its review process lengthier than some possible alternatives, but more robust
than others in seeking to protect both defendants’ rights and the public interest in
the careful and fair administration of capital punishment. Nothing about the
particular choices made by the State renders its process arbitrary or purposeless, as
the district court held.
3. Nor was the district court correct when it suggested that the State bears
sole responsibility for the duration of post-conviction review for capital defendants.
ER 23.
First, much of the delay results from choices made by capital defendants and
their counsel. Counsel, of course, owe their clients a duty of zealous
representation. As a practical matter, counsel often request numerous extensions,
file briefs and petitions on the last possible day, and present dozens of claims to the
California Supreme Court. For example, on direct appeal, Jones obtained seven
separate extensions of time for his opening brief, totaling over 400 days. See Cal.
S. Ct. Docket (No. S046117). In his habeas proceeding, Jones filed his petition on
the last day permitted, and then obtained seven separate extensions for his reply
brief, totaling over 200 days. See Cal. S. Ct. Docket (No. S110791). Defendants
may also engage a new attorney for habeas proceedings, requiring time for new
counsel to master a complex case. The State does not question the right of capital
defendants and their counsel to make these decisions, but they can significantly
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prolong the process of review. The State cannot be held constitutionally
responsible for the resulting delay.
Capital defendants and their counsel have also succeeded in suspending all
executions in California by challenging the State’s methods of execution.25 It is
their right to bring such challenges, and California is committed to ensuring that
executions are carried out only in accordance with the Eighth Amendment and
other applicable law. But these challenges, too, have contributed to the
“unpredictable period of delay preceding . . . actual execution” described and
criticized by the district court. ER 2.
Second, much of the time consumed by post-conviction review occurs in the
federal court system. The state commission report relied on by the district court,
for example, found an average time of 22 months between the filing of a state
habeas petition and the decision of the California Supreme Court on that petition.
See California Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice, Final Report 123
25 See, e.g., Fierro v. Gomez, 77 F.3d 301 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. granted andjudgment vacated, 519 U.S. 918 (1996) (§ 1983 challenge to California’s use of thegas chamber); Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (§ 1983challenge to California’s lethal injection protocol); Morales v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr.& Rehab., 168 Cal. App. 4th 729 (2008) (challenge to amended lethal injectionprotocol under California’s Administrative Procedures Act); Sims v. Dep’t of Corr.& Rehab., 216 Cal. App. 4th 1059 (2013) (Administrative Procedures Actchallenge to lethal injection protocol promulgated in 2010).
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(“Commission Report”).26 In contrast, it found an average time of 74 months
between the filing of a federal habeas petition and the grant or denial of relief by a
federal district court, and noted that another 50 months, on average, are consumed
by federal appellate review (including a petition for en banc review and a petition
for certiorari). See id. at 123, 137. Even the data set relied on by the district court
confirms this point.27 For example, in several of the capital cases identified by the
district court, the defendants have awaited a decision in federal court for a period
three times longer than their entire state adjudicative process.28
This case further illustrates the point. As of this writing, Jones’s federal
habeas petition has been pending before the federal district court for more than
four and one-half years. The district court has now prolonged the process by first
ordering Jones to amend his petition, and then granting relief based on a novel
26 Available at http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/CCFAJFinalReport.pdf.27 Some of the data cited by the court are open to question. For example, the
court expressly declined to include cases for the years 1979 to 1986,notwithstanding that many death penalty cases were adjudicated to finality by theCalifornia Supreme Court during that period. ER 4-5 n.5. The court also decidednot to include data related to death sentences handed down since 1997 (see id.),although dozens of those cases were litigated to conclusion in state court in arelatively expeditious manner. Finally, the court excluded from its considerationthe numerous capital cases in which the California Supreme Court granted relief asto either conviction or sentence: well over 100 cases from 1979 through mid-2014.
28 This is true for at least the following capital defendants listed in theappendix to the district court’s order: Oscar Gates, John Brown, Patrick Gordon,Andre Burton, Denny Mickle, Horace Kelly, Curtis Price, Troy Ashmus, DavidBreaux, George Wharton, Kenneth Clair, and Michael Hill. See ER 32-33, 35-37.
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theory originated by the court itself. The court has yet to rule on the remaining
claims raised by Jones. See ER 19.
The district court suggested that the State is responsible for delays in the
federal courts, in part because the California Supreme Court often denies state
habeas relief without explaining its rationale. ER 13 n.14. That assertion is
puzzling. Requiring lengthy published opinions for each habeas petition brought
by a capital defendant would add still more time to the state review process, which
the district court otherwise criticized as too lengthy. That is one reason the United
States Supreme Court has expressly approved of state courts using summary
dispositions. See Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784. In any event, when a claim is
summarily denied on the merits in state court, AEDPA authorizes a federal court to
grant habeas relief only if there is no argument or theory that could have supported
the state court’s decision. See id. With state counsel present to explain why there
is at least one theory under which a state decision cannot be said to be factually
unreasonable or to contravene some specific holding of the United States Supreme
Court, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), it should not be inordinately time-consuming for
the federal courts to discharge this important but limited responsibility under
AEDPA.
Similarly, the district court held the State constitutionally responsible for
delays in federal court because of the time sometimes required for a capital
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defendant to file an exhaustion petition with the California Supreme Court. ER 14.
The exhaustion doctrine is a matter of federal law, based on comity and federalism,
and applies only if a capital defendant wishes to seek federal review of a claim not
previously presented to the state courts. The time necessary to allow the state
courts to consider such claims is not a period of “delay” that should be charged to
the State’s account for purposes of the Eighth Amendment.
The federal courts have an important role in providing final, collateral review
of state convictions and sentences. If it takes time for them to perform that review
properly, then that is time well spent—especially in capital cases. The personal
and government interests at stake in any such case warrant whatever amount of
time it takes to do the job right. But the fact that careful judicial review takes time
is no basis for concluding that executions conducted after review in individual
cases has run its course would be “arbitrary” in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
4. At bottom, the district court’s order amounts to a policy critique of
California’s post-conviction review system. That system, and the desirability of
capital punishment generally, have long been topics of public debate, in California
and elsewhere. Members of the California Supreme Court have suggested
modifications to the post-conviction review process. See supra n.22. The state
Senate created a commission to study the death penalty and suggest improvements,
see Cal. Sen. Res. No. 44 (2004), and its report suggested revisions to the post-
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conviction review process, including some revisions that are discussed in the
district court’s order. See, e.g., Commission Report at 147-149. In 2012, State
voters considered, but rejected, a proposal to eliminate the death penalty
altogether.29 Many of the policy considerations discussed by the district court were
presented in ballot materials considered by voters.30
But this policy debate is far beyond the proper scope of federal collateral
review of an individual state capital sentence. As courts in other jurisdictions have
routinely held, the sort of policy arguments advanced in the district court’s order
“should be presented to the . . . Legislature.” Smith, 931 P.2d at 1288; see Bieghler,
839 N.E.2d at 698. For the time being, the judgment of California voters remains
that capital punishment should be imposed in appropriate cases. The State’s
system for implementing that judgment does not become unconstitutional because
the process of careful post-conviction review, designed to ensure that each case in
which the penalty is imposed is indeed an appropriate one, takes time.
29 See California Secretary of State, Statewide Summary by County for StateBallot Measures, at 102, available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2012-general/ssov/ballot-measures-summary-by-county.pdf.
30 See Arguments in Favor of Proposition 34, available athttp://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2012/general/pdf/34-arg-rebuttals.pdf.
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CONCLUSION
The judgment of the district court should be reversed.
Dated: December 1, 2014 Respectfully submitted,
KAMALA D. HARRISAttorney General of CaliforniaEDWARD C. DUMONTSolicitor GeneralGERALD A. ENGLERChief Assistant Attorney GeneralLANCE E. WINTERSSenior Assistant Attorney GeneralMICHAEL J. MONGANDeputy Solicitor GeneralA. SCOTT HAYWARDHERBERT S. TETEFDeputy Attorneys GeneralKEITH H. BORJONSupervising Deputy Attorney General
S/ James William Bilderback IIJAMES WILLIAM BILDERBACK IISupervising Deputy Attorney GeneralAttorneys for Respondent-Appellant
LA2014614196
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STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES
Pursuant to Ninth Circuit Rule 28-2.6(c), Appellant notes that in
Andrews v. Chappell, Nos. 09-99012, 09-99013, the petitioner-appellant
recently moved for permission to file a supplemental brief presenting an
argument based on the district court’s decision in this case, and the Court
requested a response. The State believes that the issue is not properly
presented in Andrews, but is filing a response noting the pendency of this
case and setting out an abbreviated version of the arguments advanced in
this brief.
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I certify that: (check (x) appropriate option(s))
X 1. Pursuant to Fed.R.App.P. 32(a)(7)(C) and Ninth Circuit Rule 32-1, the attached opening brief is
XProportionately spaced, has a typeface of 14 points or more and contains 13,941 words(opening, answering and the second and third briefs filed in cross-appeals must not exceed14,000 words; reply briefs must not exceed 7,000 words)
or isMonospaced, has 10.5 or fewer characters per inch and contains ____ words or ___ lines oftext (opening, answering, and the second and third briefs filed in cross-appeals must not exceed14,000 words or 1,300 lines of text; reply briefs must not exceed 7,000 words or 650 lines oftext).
2. The attached brief is not subject to the type-volume limitations of Fed.R.App.P. 32(a(7)(B)because
This brief complies with Fed.R.App.P 32(a)(1)-(7) and is a principal brief of no more than 30pages or a reply brief of no more than 15 pages.
orThis brief complies with a page or size-volume limitation established by separate court orderdated ______________ and is
Proportionately spaced, has a typeface of 14 points or more and contains ______________words,
or isMonospaced, has 10.5 or fewer characters per inch and contains __ pages or __ words or __lines of text.
3. Briefs in Capital Cases.This brief is being filed in a capital case pursuant to the type-volume limitations set forth at CircuitRule 32-4 and is
Proportionately spaced, has a typeface of 14 points or more and contains ______________words (opening, answering and the second and third briefs filed in cross-appeals must notexceed 21,000 words; reply briefs must not exceed 9,800 words).
or is
Monospaced, has 10.5 or fewer characters per inch and contains __ words or __ lines of text(opening, answering, and the second and third briefs filed in cross-appeals must not exceed 75pages or 1,950 lines of text; reply briefs must not exceed 35 pages or 910 lines of text).
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4. Amicus Briefs.
Pursuant to Fed.R.App.P 29(d) and 9th Cir.R. 32-1, the attached amicus brief is proportionallyspaced, has a typeface of 14 points or more and contains 7,000 words or less,
or isMonospaced, has 10.5 or few characters per inch and contains not more than either 7,000words or 650 lines of text,
or isNot subject to the type-volume limitations because it is an amicus brief of no more than 15pages and complies with Fed.R.App.P. 32 (a)(1)(5).
December 1, 2014 S/ James William Bilderback II
Dated James William Bilderback IISupervising Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Case Name: Ernest Dewayne Jones v. KevinChappell, Warden
No. 14-56373
I hereby certify that on December 1, 2014, I electronically filed the following documents withthe Clerk of the Court by using the CM/ECF system:
APPELLANT’S OPENING BRIEFEXCERPTS OF RECORD VOLUME I OF II
EXCERPTS OF RECORD VOLUME II OF III certify that all participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users and that service will beaccomplished by the CM/ECF system.I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California the foregoing is trueand correct and that this declaration was executed on December 1, 2014, at Los Angeles,California.
Sandra Fan s/ Sandra FanDeclarant Signature
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