Errors of a cult leaderMojahedin.ws

Research Bureau

Many are unanimous that Rajavi has made critical mistakes as a self-appointed leader leading Mojahedin Khalq Organization (MKO, MEK,

PMOI, NLA, NCRI) to the precipice of demise.

Table of contents

- An introduction

- Rajavi Cooperated with SAVAK

- Cloaking conversion of ranking members

- Opposition to ideological revision

- Rajavi’s position in the schism of 1975

- Hypocrisy of a Marxist-biased leader

- Inter-organizational defiance of a cult leader

- Rajavi’s defiant attitude for organizational promotion

- Rajavi’s ideological purges

An introduction

Today's man has undergone substantial changes compared to past centuries concerning his lifestyle, means of livelihood, manner of thinking, demands, expectations and the like. Modern economics, politics, ethics, institutions, governments, and leaders can hardly be comparable to their historical counterparts; rather they are highly distinct issues. Now, man challenges the past and its social organizations; makes an attempt to free himself from past attachments; bears no passivity; and refrains to submit to those leaders seeking to accomplish their own ambitious objectives. Rather, he is willing to find the logic behind all decisions made by leaders and submits just to the legitimate ones. Therefore, the role of hegemonic leaders seems to have been faded away and man chooses to be the master of his own destiny. Consequently, historical leaders come to be subject to criticism and many have lost their godlike and hallowed status.

Throughout history, leaders have served a twofold role. Some leaders have brought about fundamental positive changes in social and political structure of societies; on the contrary, many caused the disintegration of societies due to their corruption,

oppression and violence. Leaders come to power on the demand of masses, by means of political and military coup d’état, or through holding national referendum and legitimate elections. Thus, they can be classified as legitimate, corrupt and oppressive and those who force themselves unto the power to lead a hegemonic rule. Among them, the latter ones receive much criticism and have a variety of dissenters. The overall disagreement on their nature has its roots in the lack of a consensus over the appropriate style of leadership. Although fascists advocate the policies adopted by Hitler and Mussolini, democrats consider them to be against democracy and freedom. Likewise, Stalinists considered his dictatorship inevitable in that particular period when he reined the USSR. Quite the opposite, his opponents considered it a factor relevantly resulting in the development of an anti-communist trend in the world. Now years after the fall of the main communist camp, the communism-phobia is still dominating over the Western countries. Relatively, a leader has cons and pros even within his own party. Any made judgment on these leaders depends on some factors such as their ideological orientation, strategic objectives, and adopted tactics for the fulfillment of those objectives. In addition to ideological leaders, there are national and ethnic leaders who are judged by their extent of success in maintaining and safeguarding national interests, power of resistance against the invasion of invaders, and determination to preserve national sovereignty. Such leaders like Alexander the Great and many others are subject to different and even paradoxical judgments though many believe that personal traits and genius of leaders as well as their social support may guarantee their success.

Except for some ideological and cultic groups, hegemonic leadership is hardly submitted to in today's world. The above comments on the status of historical leaders hold true for ideological and cultic leaders as well; however, their paradoxical nature and activities put a stop to coming upon an accurate judgment on them. Of the most paradoxically active cultic leaders in our modern world is Masoud Rajavi who leads the globally blacklisted terrorist Mojahedin-e Khalq with its own proponent and opponents. He is a self-appointed leader who secured a godlike position for himself, a status nobody has permission to question and which is claimed to be devoid of any strategic, political, and ideological fault. However, his critics believe that he has been responsible for numerous deviations and challenges MKO has met. A passing look at his past career and the role he has played in different organizational phases may give us a better and deeper understanding of his true nature.

From among his critics, and even sympathizers, are many who are unanimous that Rajavi has made critical mistakes leading the organization to the precipice of demise. The mistakes made by Rajavi can be classified as those made in the early years of his seizing the power as the leader of MKO and those made after the victory of Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979. Unlike the internal idealist factions that travailed to stabilize post-revolution chaotic state, Rajavi made his first big mistake of resorting to armed struggle just to achieve his totalitarian ambitions. In fact, he was fighting against the development of democracy in Iran under the pretext of working to overcome social challenges. Many Mojahedin ex-members, observing the course of the changes made in Iran’s newly shaped society as well as within the organization, truly predicted that MKO would be converted into a religious cult as a result of Rajavi’s wrongdoings, heretical deviations, and strategic failures. Here the aim is to have a detailed study of personal, strategic, and ideological mistakes made by Rajavi especially in recent three decades based on the existing evidences and the statements made by a great number of the organization former members.

Rajavi Cooperated with SAVAK

There are some evidences that Masoud Rajavi cooperated with SAVAK (Pahlavi regime’s security and intelligence organization) deliberately while in prison following the mass arrests in 1970s, when majority of the organization’s leaders and members were arrested on terrorist charges. According to Lotfollah Meisami, an eyewitness of Rajavi’s interrogations, he snitched extra information to SAVAK agents to immune himself against further pressures if they could have access to unreleased information. Giving false or burned information on the part of political prisoners is justifiable but giving more irrelevant information implies that Rajavi submitted completely to SAVAK playing a passive role to stop being tortured by the horrible, notorious security organization of Pahlavi’s regime and to win their full trust. In this regard, Meisami refers to a case in which Rajavi gave details of how Mojahedin fighters would carry their weapon concealed in handbags:

He (Rajavi) in one of his interrogations even referred to a suitcase in which weapons were hidden. He did so to defend himself it in case it would be unveiled in future. The interrogators came to analyze that he was a man to invest on. 1

It happened at a time when Mojahedin were on a path of struggle with the regime and absolutely reprehended any cooperation with SAVAK and even those members suffering under the heavy pressure and torture avoided to establish friendly relations only to be relieved of sufferings. Thus, Rajavi’s intimate manner of conduct with SAVAK agents to win their attention was in no way justifiable. The statements made by Meisami imply that Rajavi did so to prove he had repented and to take a path of passivity while in prison:

Rajavi was on friendly terms with SAVAK to the point that other prisoners called him a fop. He pretended to be very knowledgeable and we did not know why he did so. 2

Another instance is Rajavi’s passivity to tensions created inside prisons. It seems he evaded to be engaged in clashes that provoked SAVAK further and thus aggravated the conditions which could even lead prisoners to the edge of execution. The indifference on the part of Rajavi confirms the claims made by MKO former members that he had a fully passive role when SAVAK was hunting down the organization that led to their mass arrests:

Rumors ran rampant that they executed political prisoners with untried. Rajavi and some other members withdrew and concluded not to mess with SAVAK agents; it was the start of a round of collaboration with SAVAK. 3

Rajavi demonstrated his goodwill to SAVAK in various ways one of which was demanding facilities the agents of a regime with whom others were engaged in a heavy battle. His demands implied his indifference to the course of events in the society, his alliance with regime forces, and also his weak, conservative mode. Meisami refers to some instances of Rajavi's demands in that critical period of the Iranian history:

When Rajavi came to Qasr prison, he smoked an expensive brand of cigarettes. Those arrested as demonstrators against the regime, would break into chanting 'down with Shah' in prison cells while some Mojahedin high ranks asked for TV. It was somehow a pulling out and they had quieted down to show their readiness to cooperate with SAVAK. 4

Other MKO former members have stated some cases in this regard too. For example, Mehdi Khoshhal who witnessed the conflict between Abbas Davari and Masoud Rajavi quotes Davari complaining about Rajavi's egocentric manner in the National Council of Resistance in its early years and says:

This buster (Masoud Rajavi) who thunders today is very cagey. He was never given a basting in prison. He played a trick of abstaining from food to become weak and so fainted whenever SAVAK agents came to interrogate him. However, he would draw details of Hanifnejad and other’s residence when they put him under pressure. 5

The cases mentioned indicate that they fail to be sheer follies and errors somebody might make, rather they are characteristic outcomes of a double-crosser. Neither has he the guts to suffer hardships of a freedom-fighter nor can he curb his egocentric, ambitious demands that he tries to accomplish on the expense of others. Many folded personality of Rajavi makes it hard to believe that it is his errors and mistakes that has steered the organization to the terminus of a terrorist cult.

Cloaking conversion of ranking members

Of the major strategic mistakes made by Rajavi is his issued order to conceal a number of the group members’ conversion to Marxism. Additionally, as underlined by eye witnesses and prison-mates, Rajavi himself has confessed to have been converted to Marxism but desisted to declare it to prevent negative consequences. A big bulk of deviation within the organization, at least after its schism in 1975, may be pertained to its adoption of a divisive and dual policy. Rajavi’s strategic turnabout may be the very same reason compelling him to insist on concealing the conversion of other members like Bahman Bazargani. Had Rajavi been a Muslim, he would not have allowed Marxist members like Bahman Bazargani to have their hold on the organization and, above all, ask them to show as true Muslim who even stood as others’ prayer leaders.

Many of Marxist members wanted to announce their strategic turnabout even before the declaration of Marxist wing manifesto. There are many statements made by imprisoned Mojahedin in this regard some of which may be mentioned here. All of them focus on Rajavi refusing to reveal the identity of Marxist members as well

as his own conversion from Islam to Marxism. It has to be pointed out that the formation of Marxist wing of Mojahedin has its roots in 1971 mass arrests. Marxist members justified that religious inclination rooted in Mojahedin was the reason they restricted them to make due decision in some events such kidnapping prince Shahram, Shah’s nephew. They further pointed out that ethical and ideological bonds of Mojahedin to Islamic rituals like that of saying daily prayers and the like reduced their organizational freedom. Finally they concluded that religion was the source of external challenges the organization was faced with so they had to fight against whatever hindering ethical and religious considerations.

One of the early activists of MKO, Mohammad Mehdi Jafari, collects his observations in a book called “An internal look at MKO”. Although many members are referred to in his statements, but the main focus is on Rajavi having the leading role in the organization’s dualistic relations. He believes that a number of members like Rajavi who joined the organization after its formation were Marxist. Though he refers not directly to Marxist leaning of Rajavi and other members, but expounding on such matters like stopping saying prayers and being highly affected by philosophy of Marxism confirms that they walked on an anti-religion path. In this regard, he writes:

Those who joined the organization later on, such as Masoud Rajavi, Musa Khiabani, etc never declared overtly to be Marxist and even pretended to be anti-Marxism; however, they were so influenced by Marxism that legitimized some forbidden actions in Islam. For example, they asked some members not express publicly their Marxist conversion and to pretend performing daily rituals. 6

He further refers to some points affirmed by other former members too such as Bahman Bazargani’s conversion to Marxism and Rajavi’s refusal to reveal it. This action resulted in the development of ideological discord within MKO. In this regard, it is said:

It is said that Masoud Rajavi knew Bahman Bazargani was no longer a Muslim but a Marxist and communist. He advised Bazargani to continue to say his prayers and also lead others' prayer to conceal his conversion. 7

Dr. Karim Rastegar, an early member of MKO, believes that many years before the schism of Marxism wing, a number of members in Qasr prison had already

adopted Marxist ideology. He refers to Masoud Rajavi among other members and writes:

In late 1971, I was sent to cell number 3 in Qasr prison. Many MKO high-ranking members like Reza Bakeri, Bahman Bazargani, Mehdi Khosroshahi, Musa Khiabani, and Masoud Rajavi were there. There were heated ideological discussions there and some members expressed their beliefs. In other word, they said that they no longer believed in Islam and were Marxist. 8

He also adds that one of the interrogators of SAVAK (Pahlavi’s regime's security and intelligence organization) was well aware that Rajavi was a Marxist and called him a Marxist in front of others:

One night Rasouli, a SAVAK interrogator, came to our cell. As usual, every one was silent and motionless. He told me “stand over there Osqof”. I knew this name was not recorded in my dossier and wondered how he had come to know that. Then he addressed Masoud Rajavi calling him a damned communist. Then he told Rajavi “we know you are all Marxist”. We did not understand what he meant by that. It happened coincident with the arrest of Khalil Dezfuli through whom the information had been leaked to SAVAK. But we did not know that. 9

He also considers Rajavi to be more at fault than Taqi Shahram (the guerrilla fighter blamed for the organization's 1975 schism) in the organizational schism:

I think Rajavi was more responsible for this adversity than Shahram since Shahram was performing his evolutionary responsibility in cleansing members’ mind off the bourgeoisie thoughts, but Rajavi, playing a pro-Islamist, endorsed the rupture by keeping silent. In fact he betrayed his own ideology. 10

Lotfollah Meisami, being Rajavi’s intimate in prison and team-houses, is a reliable witness who can well disclos aspects of Rajavi’s dual behavior. He explains the causes behind the ideological shift of the organization and the passive role some members like Rajavi’s played in unveiling the identity of Marxist members:

Bahman Bazargani had already talked about his ideological problems with Masoud Rajavi, Musa Khiabani, and some other members saying that he was no longer a Muslim and could not perform related rituals since he considered

it to be an act of insincerity. Masoud Rajavi asked him to say his prayers for three more years and to cease talking about it further. Interestingly, he was forced to lead others’ prayers too. Zein-al Abedin Haqani told me parts of the fact when I was sent to the prison in Shiraz, Bahram told me all about it after I was set free. 11

He points out that in spring 1975 in Qasr prison, Parviz Yaqubi was asked to try Rajavi for his refusal to reveal the beliefs of Marxist members.

In 1974, I was arrested for the third time. Losing the sight of my eye and being in solitary confinement for 16 months, I was sent to Qasr prison. There I met Parviz Yaqubi and told him to try Masoud since if in Qasr prison he informed us that Bahman was a Marxist, we would try to find a solution. He should not have made such a mistake. 12

Rajavi asked Bazargani to hide his ideological turnabout for three yeas. The reason might have been an attempt by Rajavi to hang on an opportunity to announce the organization’s total ideological shift to Marxism. Although there is no clear reason why Rajavi insisted on disguising the ideological identity of members, however, he was well aware of the fact that religious beliefs could secure social support for the organization without which it could never survive. Furthermore, he knew that improvement of any organizational doctrine depended on restoration of Islamic values and putting Marxist ideology into discard. Therefore, he hides members’ as well as his own Marxist conversion. Now the question is whether Rajavi did so to keep the integration of the organization and prevent its split or he was concerned about his own organizational status and hegemonic rule. A brief look at the evidences on Rajavi’s narcissism well answers this question. Therefore, such events can not be ignored easily as accidentally made mistakes of Rajavi.

Opposition to ideological revision

The crushing coup over the body of the organization following the mass arrests in 1971 as well as the ideological schism of MKO in 1975 were two alarming incidents that could well help its leaders to start a thorough analysis of strategic and ideological failures so as to make revisions to overcome further encountered challenges. Although the former incident gave the warning and made the remnant cadres and the Central Council to seat analyzing the past errors, yet, as their analyses failed to be accurate and precise, it added more pile of errors to those

already leading the organization to a serious state. The role of Masoud Rajavi in all these deteriorating process is known to have been critical. However, the failure in the identification of the main source of impasse within the organization intensified the crises and resulted in the ideological schism of MKO into two wings of Marxist and non-Marxist in 1975.

In any case, the organization achieved partial recovery from the 1971 coup due to the social support it had broadened among different factions and classes of religious and bourgeois as well as the capability of some Central Council members like Ahmad Rezaee. However, it took the organization no long to suffer its schism in 1975. It is said that from the blow of 1971 onwards, the policy of the organization turned out to be in apparent contradiction to the religious principles established by the early Mojahedin leading to substantial discrepancies not accounted for by the newly formed leading cadre. Also, there are some evidences that a number of high-rankings had converted to Marxism prior to the mass arrests.

The members’ false perception of the true nature of Islam as well as leaders’ negligence in conceptualizing Islamic principles resulted in the repulsion of Islamic orders and conversion to Marxism on the part of a great number of Mojahedin. As Abrahamian puts into words:

According to the Marxist Mojahedin, their ‘political consciousness' had been raised once they began to study systematically ‘dialectical materialism', especially the works of Marx, Lenin, and Mao Tse-tung. Hence, they claimed, Marxism had revealed to them the fallacies of Islam. 13

The Marxist Mojahedin were neither raw recruits nor ideological simpletons. On the contrary, among them were many surviving intellectuals of the early Mojahedin like Taqi Shahram, Bahram Aram, and Vahid Afrakhteh whose conversion led to the domination of Marxist ideology over the organization. However, Rajavi issued an order to keep their conversion secret. Consequently, converted members maintained their presence and activities in the organization following a dual policy.

The majority of those observing Rajavi’s performance indicate that his passivity, negligence, and indifference caused some problematic members such as Taqi Shahram, Bahram Aram enter the central committee while they were known to be Marxist. Mohammad Mehdi Jafari, an eyewitness, states:

They [Shahram and Aram] concealed their Marxist inclination as they joined the organization and when the top leaders of the organization were arrested and executed, they started to declare their conversion to Marxism openly. Some revisionists such as Aram, Shahram, and Afrakhteh dared to express their opposition to Islam and conversion to Marxism due to the weak personality of top officials like Masoud Rajavi and Masoud Bazargani. 14

There were some intellectual members warning Rajavi against the forthcoming crises even before the declaration of the Marxists wing’s manifesto in which the ideological position of Mojahedin had been explained; however, Rajavi acted indifferently and even accused those members of having dogmatic views, hence paving the way for the occurrence of the great schism of 1975. One of those members was Dr. Karim Rastegar who repeatedly notified Rajavi that how risky the ideological metamorphosis could be but he paid no heed. Even when Rajavi was convinced that Taqi Shahram, the guerrilla fighter blamed for the 1975 schism, was about to expand Marxist views within the organization, he told Karim Rastegar that the world of politics necessitated it to ignore some issues; otherwise, they would be blamed for their past mistakes. Yet again, Rastegar insisted on his viewpoints and asked Rajavi for preventive measures but he said:

Shut up! We are a political group. In a political group, withdrawal means suicide. You will be dismissed if I hear you tell other members that the organization is ideologically problematic. You have to either obey my words or quit the organization. 15

Lotfollah Meisami, an MKO former member, expounds on the fact that Rajavi resorted to a variety of methods to prevent ideological revision of organizational principles and preserved the dialectical and dualistic policy of MKO. For instance, he asked critics and dissident members to work individually on their viewpoints. Evidently, they failed to come to a valid conclusion on their own. Then, suffering from isolation, they were compelled to ignore their ideology and conform to the group’s set of beliefs.

Rajavi deliberately kept silent up to the declaration of the manifesto of schism. Then, he promised to revise the organizational principles of MKO having another look at Islamic doctrines. However, after the victory of Islamic revolution in Iran, as Rastegar asserts, he broke his promise and moved on his past career to synthesize Islam and Marxism to form a dialectical ideology to achieve his primary objective of assuming an egocentric political power.

Rajavi’s position in the schism of 1975

The ideological schism of MKO in 1975, when actually the leaders of the group were in Pahlavi’s notorious prisons, resulted in different reactions on the part of Mojahedin. The serious errors of Rajavi after the separation of Marxist wing following its declared manifesto was elaborated on and those aware of the course of events in that particular period of time were unanimous that the main mistake made by Rajavi was issuing his twelve-point statement that was considered to be the position taken by all non-Marxist Mojahedin about the schism. It stated that Mojahedin would consider the converted members as their strategic allies and openly revealed their opposition to religious members. It happened at a time when all MKO remnants except Rajavi insisted on reviewing and revising the organizational principles and ideological errors of MKO under the impact of Marxism. Karim Rastegar, an ex-member, elaborates on the impacts of this event saying that after the Marxist wing’s manifesto, Rajavi adopted a dual mannerism of keeping unwavering inclination to the left while role-played a devoted religious inside the prison.

An interesting point is that while siding with the non-Marxist wing, Rajavi took a different position toward the leaders of Marxist wing, i.e. Taqi Shahram, Bahram Aram and against truthful leaders opposed to Marxist wing like Majid Sharif Vaqefi and Morteza Samadieh Labaf. According to Rastegar, Rajavi made an attempt to hide his personal errors and stabilize his leadership over the organization by concealing the truth and labeling the former leaders as traitors as agents: 

The leaders inside prison, and Rajavi in particular, tried to acquit themselves of accusations and after the terror of Sharif Vaqefi and Samadieh for a long time overturned the truth calling them traitors and introduced the leftist Vahid Afrakhteh as a hero. For instance, they quoted falsely of committee members that Vahid Afrakhteh has turned to a mythical figure under torture. 16

 A more interesting point is that his appreciation of some problematic members like Vahid Afrakhteh intensified the crises and increased the doubt of religious members in Rajavi thus making the ground for his increasingly parting with them. In addition, Rajavi took an antagonist position against religious forces inside prison and worsened the conditions:  

The behaviors of Masoud inside prison resulted in marginalization of religious forces. Evidently, appropriate reactions could prevent conflicts and detachments. The organization leadership tried to conceal the realities for five months calling us extremists and compromisers while everyone was well aware of the reality. It was no longer possible for us to bear lies and labels given to the religious members Muslims. Our complaint to the conditions resulted in our total boycott. Nobody dared to communicate with us. Some were so heated that even would kill us if they were allowed to. The news of our boycott by organization leaked to SAVAK and they regarded it a precious opportunity. 17

 On the other hand, there is the status and position of Marxist wing. Although they took an overall defensive position regarding the ideological schism, their position is preferred to that of Rajavi that was dualistic and divisive. However, many are unanimous that the main reason of ideological schism of MKO was the dualistic and eclectic viewpoints of the early founders of MKO toward Islam rather than the effect of Marxists therein. Torab Haqshenas, a key figure of MKO in that period of time abroad, refers to significant points on the differences between inside as well as outside looking at the ideological schism of Mojahedin and the divisive position of Rajavi in this regard, saying:  

In my opinion, the ideological schism had a principle that was neglected and it was the fact that we should not lie to ourselves. It is correct that we made some mistakes and acknowledged it in 1979 and criticized it, but the main point was that we should not lie to people. When we came to the point that our guide was no longer ideologically religious and it was of no effect to help us in struggle, we had to say it clearly to all people even if it resulted in our losing of many facilities and separation of many members. 18

 However, it does not mean that religion was incapable to offer solutions for the challenges of MKO. It is another issue and needs to be investigated in depth. As he says, the hypocrisy and duality of Mojahedin, their eclectic ideology, lack of knowledge on religious precepts and refraining to take a clear position in this regard resulted in the occurrence of schism. In fact, the twelve-point statement of Rajavi issued inside prison was a summary of his real intention and ideas. Shahsavandi, a member of MKO sentenced to death by the order of the Marxist wing’s central committee clarifies the effects of this statement in escalation of inter-organizational tensions and conflicts inside prison:  

These twelve articles defined the identity of MKO to the point that members and sympathizers had to recognize it as the basics of their activities word by word with no addition or omission and to transfer it to other prisons and those active outside. 19

 The significance of this statement lies in the fact that according to Shahsavandi, it had a decisive role in the future events like that of June 1981: 

These twelve articles were in fact the manifesto of Mr. Rajavi against the Marxist drift inside organization. It was a manifesto that led to the revival and reorganization of MKO and worked as infrastructure of activities after the victory of Iranian revolution. 20

 Also, he elaborates on the key role of Rajavi in the development of the statement:

 The essence and core of this issue is related to Masoud Rajavi and it was mainly for this reason that he tried to stabilize his leadership and bring his role to light. 21

 Reviewing the points of this statement and the mistakes made by Rajavi in this regard requires another discussion of its own. 

Hypocrisy of a Marxist-biased leader

 The errors of Rajavi concerning the ideological schism of 1954 and its consequences are countless. His twelve-point statement issued while in the prison indicates Rajavi’s position taking toward leftist faction and Marxists as well as his offensive attitude towards religiously inclined forces that can be considered as one of his main errors. In addition, his keeping silent on the events occurred in MKO and the issue of the Marxist wing manifesto for almost one and a half year led to the intensification of the challenges between Rajavi and non-Marxist forces.

The significance of this issue arises from the fact that hiding the internal schism of MKO and conversion of a great deal of members to Marxism made religious forces think that Mojahedin leadership considered them nothing but instruments for achieving his objectives. There are evidences that Rajavi made his utmost attempt to conceal the schism of the organization and hide it though religious forces had the right to know to where their political and social activities were drifting them.

Another mistake made by Rajavi in this particular phase was coining the term leftist opportunist to refer to the converted Mojahedin. In fact he did so to have least contact and tension with Marxist trends and stabilize his status as their strategic ally. In this regard, Shahsavandi says:   

Leftist opportunist trend is the label Mr. Masoud Rajavi gave to the intra organizational Marxist trend and called it as such. 22

 Hence, in his twelve-point declaration he asserted that he distinguished between the Mojahedin Marxists and other Marxist groups and considered them the strategic ally of Mojahedin as did previously. On the other hand, this moderately taken position was restricted only those in prison and there was no trace of the reaction against Marxist Mojahedin active in the world outside. Even when the liberation movement published Rajavi’s statement outside, Mojahedin declared that it was not acceptable for them and that it had to be revised. They kept this position up to late 1979 when Rajavi took a position against the separated wing.

The coming event during the Iranian revolution clarified the dual and divisive stance of Rajavi. The arrest of Taqi Shahram, leader of the Marxist wing, after the victory of the Iranian revolution, and the position of MKO in this regard stating that revolutionary courts lacked the legitimacy to put him into trial and it was only Mojahedin that were qualified of trying him implied the fact that Mojahedin were under the effect of a luring attraction toward Marxist division, a fear that had already filled the early ranking cadres like Majid Sharif Vaqefi and Samadieh. There are evidences that Marxist Mojahedin collaborated with SAVAK; Rajavi was well informed of it but preferred to say nothing.  However, Rajavi’s unquestionable slant on Marxism and to follow the steps of the leftist revolutionary guerrillas emerged after the victory of the Iranian revolution. Rajavi even asked the family of Sharif Vaqefi to forgive Taqi Shahram who assassinated their son in order to save him from execution which is well reflected in the existing documents and statements of the organization. It was in a condition when Shahram was accused of doing intra-organizational clearance and preparing the background for the arrest of religious forces in late 1977 and even was tangled with the leader of Marxist wing and was subject to organizational purges. 

It is not far from logic and reason if it is said that SAVAK had a role in making some high rankings of MKO declare their hidden ideology openly and remove the Qur’anic verse from their emblem. 23

 

In fact, the antagonist position of Rajavi toward non-Marxist forces led to his opposition to all those supporting the clerical leadership. Although his activities can be considered an organizational error resulting in the exile of MKO from Iran, the consequent events showed that he did so to stabilize his egocentric leadership over MKO and cared not the least about keeping the integration of MKO and hence he preferred Marxists to religious forces. He was unaware that his opposition to religious forces that constituted the most trustworthy members of MKO would result in his parting with Marxist trends too. On the one hand, he lost his religious followers as well as his position among leftist groups due to his ambitious and egocentric activities.  

Inter-organizational defiance of a cult leader

As already elaborated on, irreparable damages to Mojahedin Khalq Organization (MKO) under Rajavi’s lead had their roots mainly in his flaws and characteristics like his arrogance, egotism, ambitiousness, narcissism, etc. They are so inherently rooted in him that even organizational instructions and indoctrinations succeeded not in changing his attitude and to convince him take a different approach.

Here the aim is to review his ambition to submit members and as he calls it exploit organizational hierarchy that turned to a principle in his initiated ideological revolution and gave him the pretext to make internal purges. The open-minded and impartial readers may raise the question why, despite the existence of more experienced members who were more intimately related to MKO founders, Rajavi assumed power while he was less qualified and had revealed signs of weakness in some phases like the interrogations conducted by SAVAK (Pahlavi’s notorious security agency) in prison. There is no doubt that Rajavi had some qualifications and enjoyed an open and active mind and was good in lectures and theoretical discussions; however, they made MKO founders more concerned rather than pleased. In addition to factors referred to at which Rajavi grabbed to attain a high rank in the organization, there are other factors contributing to his organizational promotion.

In fact, if we consider the ideological revolution of Rajavi as an instrument at his hands to fulfill his ambitious objectives, we have to take his role as an MKO member into consideration to find out how he managed to usurp the leadership of Mojahedin after the mass arrests of 1971 despite the presence of more qualified

cadres. This is a question posed by many remnants of MKO answered in different ways with regard to various factors. According to an MKO former member:

There is a point to be noted: Rajavi was one of those not to go a long way in the organization recruitment. MKO leaders were affected by his youth and foray and soon entered him in the central cadre. I think he was the youngest member of the central cadre of the organization in 1971. 24

As his intimates state, Rajavi lost his popularity in a phase of his imprisonment due to his anti-revolutionary and anti-value characteristics and activities. Taking a look at the events of 1971 and mass arrests reveals that he used all possible means to eliminate more qualified cadres. In addition, he made an attempt to indoctrinate founders and leaders with the idea that he had the required potentiality to shoulder major responsibilities. From a professional point of view, he was rightful in competing with others to prove his qualifications; however, in a revolutionary

organization, blowing the organization for achieving personal ambitions is considered an anti-value phenomenon.

There are many evidences that Rajavi was always after questioning and criticizing cadres and leaders to make them passive and give them a feeling of inferiority to obtain organizational rise. Even in some cases he openly declared his objective in competing against other cadres and eliminating them from the organization scene. In a condition that his activities can affect MKO founders like Asqar Badizadagan, its influence on lower cadres seems inevitable. As Meisami puts into words:

Masoud [Rajavi] acted in a way that made all cadres including Asqar [Badizadegan] subject to inferiority. As Behrooz stated, he acted in a way that Asqar [Badizadegan] even left teaching chemistry and function of explosives. 25

Or when the organization decides to make contact with Al-Fatah (a Palestinian organization) to exchange experience and military training, Rajavi considers himself the most qualified member, even more qualified than the organization founder, Hanifnejad, and says:

I have the qualification to write a letter to Palestinians. 26

Lotfollah Meisami refers to the same event in more details and writes:

Rajavi went to Palestine as a translator and refrained to pass the instructional phase and there made all cadres (Badizadegan, Bakeri, and Torab Haqshenas) feel inferiority. When members decided to write an article for Palestinians, Rajavi said he is the one who could write it and made other members passive. Asqar [Badizadegan] who was a chemical engineer left teaching the formula of explosives to members under the influence of Rajavi. 27

It has to be pointed out that Rajavi pursued his egocentric activities in a condition when the organization founders and Hanifnejad in particular put a great deal of significance on ethical principles and considered anti-value features of members destructive. The reasons why they blinked at Rajavi’s violations may constitute the subject of other articles.

Rajavi’s defiant attitude for organizational promotion

One of the levers utilized by Rajavi to raise his status in MKO was humiliating other cadres and claiming to be of a higher degree of qualification compared to them. In this regard, Lotfollah Meisami, an ex-member, refers to some cases in which Rajavi strived to justify his failures and lack of success in achieving organizational promotion:

Rajavi returned from Palestine much irate and was critical of the members already in Palestine. Soon we found out that it was all for organizational promotion. 28

In some other cases Rajavi grabbed at questioning the qualification of cadres. When he failed to maintain the public confidence in prison and gained a single vote in the election of the central committee, he made an attempt to compensate his failure by means of obstructive activities. As Meismai puts into words:

Rajavi carried out some obstructive activities in dealing with the elect central cadre and repeatedly stated that they could not do anything while he could do so or said that he could receive and send outside messages from inside the prison and finally made them passive and assumed most responsibilities. I could not believe that these issues were so significant and deserved someone’s crying for them. 29

Another lever at the hands of Rajavi to eliminate his rivals was accusing and labeling others, a commonly practiced approach of MKO after the leadership of Rajavi. In fact, all dissidents were to be eliminated:

In fact, all those refraining to be blind obedient to Rajavi and those who wanted to reflect on his statements were accused and labeled. 30

Rajavi utilized various approaches in furthering his objectives; whenever he was in a higher position, made use of offensive and invasive behavior. Yet, if necessary, he refrained to scruple about crying and attracting the pity of others. In fact, Rajavi used whatever means necessary to accomplish his egocentric activities. According to Meisami:

One aspect of Masoud’s personality was his egotism and another one his feeling of inferiority. Whenever he had to give up his egotism, he changed his behavior and grabbed at crying… For instance, when he gained no vote in Qasr prison in 1972 and found a hostile atmosphere around tried to

modify his approach to some extent but after a while followed his past path. 31

Another point to be noted is that at the time being, Rajavi grabs at the same approaches to further his ambitious objectives. Also, he prevents the presence of qualified and experienced members in organizational sessions and decision makings. Meisami quotes from Saeed Mohsen, of the early founders, on the way Rajavi asked founders not to invite more qualified members compared to him and writes:

Saeed Mohsen told me: “When we were taking strategic measures, I suggested Mehdi Firuzian’s and you (Lotfi) to come to central cadre but Rajavi said that their coming would solve no problem. 32

Later on, in Shah prisons, Rajavi and a number of his intimates, now forming the central cadre of MKO, managed to isolate and eliminate MKO qualified members. Ezzat Shahi, a remnant Mojahed, writes in his memories:

When I entered political prison, Rajavi and his intimates talked against me. They did so in dealing with all new comers. For instance, they falsely stated that he is a serious member and warned all not to make contact with them. 33

In fact, the blow of 1971 to the organization prepared the ground for Rajavi to exercise his egocentric activities. The extent to which this subject has been referred to in MKO former members’ memoirs reveals the significance of this issue.

Rajavi’s ideological purges

Besides approaches applied by Rajavi to purge qualified, old veterans while in Pahlavi’s jails, he devised whatever plots afterward to exclude the remnants of MKO’s early central cadre and intimates of Hanifnejad. Soon after the victory of Iranian revolution, they criticized Rajavi for his egotistic, ambitious, and totalitarian ideals in a statement issued in an Iranian newspaper, Keyhan. Instead of giving a convincing answer to the criticisms, Rajavi took a hostile stance and asserted that they were no longer MKO members while he had introduced them as the official representatives of the organization abroad a few weeks before. Finally, they published a book entitled “The process of separation” and therein they openly

declared their separation from the organization and Rajavi. In this regard, Mohammad Mehdi Jafari states:

As far as I remember, I think in 1981, Mr. Raisi Toosi and his friends detached MKO and even wrote some articles in Keyhan paper disclosing the feats done by the organization and then published a book entitled “The process of separation”. 34

He further refers to ungenerous attitudes of Rajavi in expelling a particular group of three, as they were close comrades of Hanifnejad, from MKO:

The way organization dealt with those three and Reza in particular was very ungenerous. The organization even claimed that he has never been a fighter and that he had been studying in the Europe in years before the victory of the revolution while Reza Raisi Toosi was one of the early founders of MKO. Keyhan paper referred to this issue, too; yet it was denied by Mojahedin officially. Reza and his friends were among those who bravely stood against those members that perverted from Islam in the Europe and issued a long and detailed statement on it. 35

In this regard, Anne singleton, a European member of MKO who had contact with them in the Europe introduces Raisi as follows:

Reza Raisi was one of the close friends of Mohammad Hanif-Nezhad. He had been in close contact with the Mojahedin since its inception and had escaped from Iran when they were being attacked in the early 70s. He took up residence in London, studying a PhD. in politics. Then, about two years before the 1979 revolution, Raisi started an organisation named Committee in Support of the Mojahedin. 36

Jafari also expounds on Rajavi’s mischievous adoption of the same tactics for the removal of other early members of the organization including Meisami and Mohammad Gorgani, who were experienced veterans of the organization and would criticized Rajavi’s totalitarianism and egocentrism:

I was not in prison but I heard the news that the organization had boycotted people like the engineer Meisami and Mohammad Gorgani because they had adopted a clear position toward ideological deviation and drift to Marxism and opposed to “peaceful coexistence” of the rival sides and believed in self-criticism. But the imprisoned rankings like Massoud Rajavi and Musa Khiabani

did not concurred with any criticism and moved on their own way although they bragged of observing criticisms. 37

As it was mentioned before, these mechanisms were common in all phases of Rajavi’s hegemony over the organization. Parviz Yaqoubi, one of the earliest members, as well as Saeed Shahsavandi, a member of the organization’s central cadre up to late 1985, are other victims of Rajavi’s inflexibility in his views who were expelled or Rajavi claimed their expulsion despite their voluntary separation from the organization. Anne singleton refers to Parviz Yaqoubi and writes:

Parviz Yaqoubi, a member of the former Central Committee, was in Paris and married to Ashraf Rajavi’s (nee Rabii) sister. He refused to accept the marriage and Ideological Revolution and refused also to keep quiet about his objections. He was put on trial in a court, which Rajavi concocted and headed, and was condemned. He was 'convicted' for not taking the side of the revolution, but rather taking the side of Khomeini. Masoud in this court on one occasion refused to accept that Yaqoubi has the normal rights of a court and said this is not a court rather it is a learning session for others to listen and take note. Of course, only selected people were present. Yaqoubi was placed under severe hardship. He was isolated, his financial support from the organisation was cut and he was evicted from his home as an example to others. 38

In fact, the ideological revolution of Rajavi can be considered the final phase of extending his political purges in MKO. Expelling Ali Zarkesh, his trial and sentencing to execution, his exile to Camp Ashraf, and plotting his death in the operation Eternal Light (Forouq-e Javidan) is another instance of Rajavi’s misusing power to eliminate all members who were much more qualified than him. Also, there are a great number of MKO members who were killed after the declaration of the ideological revolution due to their disagreement and criticism. However, their exact number is unknown but a handful of them have been mentioned in Human Rights Watch report or have been referred to by eyewitnesses.

Still much remains untold of methods applied by Rajavi to purge the dissidents as well as the parameters and factors paving the way for him to achieve his egocentric objectives which have to be investigated in depth. It is up to conscience of readers to judge if these cruel acts have been deliberately planed and put into practice or regarded as common errors of Rajavi, something far beyond reality. However, the fact is that according to many early members like Meisami, things could be

different if Rajavi had assumed a peaceful mannerism, goodwill, tolerance, and sincerity.

Still there are people who believe Rajavi’s grave errors can be compensated if he will resign and let more qualified people accede to the leadership. It really requires honesty and courage, which Rajavi lacks, to sacrifice oneself for the legitimate causes of a political organization and apologize for the errors made before an authorized court regardless of personal and organizational prejudices.

References

1. Ethical comedown of a Mojahed, Journal of The way of Mojahed

2. ibid

3. ibid

4. ibid

5. Khoshhal, Mehdi, Fighting Dictatorship.

6. An interview with Dr. Mohammad Mehdi Jafari on MKO.

7. ibid

8. An interview with Dr. Karim Rastegar on 20 June.

9. ibid

10. ibid

11. Meisami, Lotfollah, Those who went

12. ibid

13. Abrahamian, Ervand. The Iranian Mojahedin, New Haven and London,

Yale University Press, p. 146

14. Meisami, Lotfollah; Those who went away.

15. An interview with Dr. Karim Rastegar, Cheshmandaz Weekly, No. 21.

16. ibid

17. ibid

18. Torab Haqshenas

19. Saeed Shahsavandi interview with the voice of Iran, part 38.

20. ibid

21. ibid, part 40.

22. ibid, part 38.

23. Rohani, Hamid, The movement of Imam Khomeini, p.663.

24. The memoirs of Dr. Mohammad Mehdi Jafari: MKO from inside, Negah-e

Emruz publication, 2002, p.48.

25.The memoirs of Lotfollah Meisami, vol. 2, 2002, Tehran, p.75.

26. ibid.

27. Meisami, Lotfollah, Degeneration of a Mojahed, No. 32.

28. ibid

29. ibid.

30. ibid.

31. Meisami, Lotfollah, The memoirs of Lotfollah Meisami, 2002, Tehran,

p.75.

32. ibid.

33. Motahhari, Ezzat, The memoirs of Ezzat Shahi (Motahhari), 2005, Tehran,

p.42.

34.Dr. Mohammad Mehdi Jafari’s interview with Seyed Qasem Yahosseini,

MKO from inside, Negah-e Emrooz publication, 2002, p.48.

35.ibid, p.78.

36. Singleton, Anne, Saddam’s private army, Iran-Interlink, 2003.

37.Dr. Mohammad Mehdi Jafari’s interview with Seyed Qasem Yahosseini,

MKO from inside, Negah-e Emrouz publication, 2002, p.84.

38.Singleton, Anne, Saddam’s private army, Iran-Interlink, 2003.