escalation and de-escalation - world...

Escalation and De-escalation

Chung Min LEE Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore

NOT FOR CITATION ORDISTRIBUTION

Commission on Growth and Development Conference, April 10, 2007

http://images.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://www.galbadiax.com/ff8/missiles.jpg&imgrefurl=http://www.galbadiax.com/ff8/images.php&h=224&w=320&sz=13&tbnid=Lrd4PX8-n8a1cM:&tbnh=79&tbnw=113&hl=en&start=2&prev=/images?q=missiles&svnum=10&hl=en&lr=&rls=RNWE,RNWE:2004-43,RNWE:enhttp://images.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://newsimg.bbc.co.uk/media/images/41159000/jpg/_41159594_gaza-ap-203body.jpg&imgrefurl=http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4561620.stm&h=152&w=203&sz=8&tbnid=G0QsI6Sdrd4_NM:&tbnh=74&tbnw=99&hl=en&start=77&prev=/images?q=missiles&start=60&svnum=10&hl=en&lr=&rls=RNWE,RNWE:2004-43,RNWE:en&sa=Nhttp://images.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-images/Guardian/Pix/gallery/2003/12/29/sars.jpg&imgrefurl=http://www.guardian.co.uk/Guardian/gallery/image/0,8543,-10704826770,00.html&h=219&w=300&sz=30&hl=en&start=1&tbnid=4yu7e-Zmy3l2TM:&tbnh=81&tbnw=111&prev=/images?q=sars&svnum=10&hl=en&lr=&rls=RNWE,RNWE:2004-43,RNWE:enhttp://images.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://www.fugly-bali.org/images/bali-bombing.jpg&imgrefurl=http://www.fugly-bali.org/bombing.html&h=275&w=367&sz=44&hl=en&start=5&tbnid=YfayrsJ5wLHSkM:&tbnh=88&tbnw=118&prev=/images?q=bali+bombing+2002&svnum=10&hl=en&lr=&rls=RNWE,RNWE:2004-43,RNWE:enhttp://images.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://www.globalchange.com/images/ground_zero.jpg&imgrefurl=http://www.globalchange.com/terrorism.htm&h=253&w=330&sz=17&hl=ko&start=37&tbnid=LAHyr6G7k-7v-M:&tbnh=91&tbnw=119&prev=/images?q=terrorism&start=20&ndsp=20&svnum=10&hl=ko&lr=&sa=Nhttp://images.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://mandatemedia.typepad.com/photos/uncategorized/tsunami.gif&imgrefurl=http://www.blueoregon.com/2004/12/tsunami.html&h=231&w=250&sz=39&hl=ko&start=6&tbnid=7FyKmgrqEsp95M:&tbnh=103&tbnw=111&prev=/images?q=tsunami&svnum=10&hl=ko&lr=http://images.google.co.kr/imgres?imgurl=http://www.virtourist.com/asia/china/shanghai/imatges/01.jpg&imgrefurl=http://travelbug.travelogue-blog.com/blog.php/china/2006/04/28/my_shanghai_virtual_presentation_is_already_online&h=300&w=450&sz=22&hl=ko&start=6&um=1&tbnid=KB38obj1xfiqsM:&tbnh=85&tbnw=127&prev=/images?q=shanghai&svnum=10&um=1&hl=ko&newwindow=1&rlz=1T4GFRC_koSG210SG210&sa=Nhttp://images.google.co.kr/imgres?imgurl=http://www.ausaid.gov.au/budget2k/images/Image56.gif&imgrefurl=http://www.ausaid.gov.au/budget2k/statement.cfm&h=303&w=514&sz=6&hl=ko&start=8&um=1&tbnid=MVEBFppLOgCTDM:&tbnh=77&tbnw=131&prev=/images?q=asian+financial+crisis&svnum=10&um=1&hl=ko&newwindow=1&rlz=1T4GFRC_koSG210SG210

2

Globalizing Asia1.

The Twin Faces of Asia2.

Tipping Point Clusters3.

Rising China, Normalized Japan4.

Korean Futures and Summary5.

3

Globalizing Asia1.

5

1. Great Power Competitionand Cooperation

2. Unprecedented Capabilitiesand Vulnerabilities

3. Declining Conflicts andHybrid Threats

4. Sustained Growth andResource Competition

5. Good Governance andFailed States

6

AcceleratingUndercurrents

The Other Side ofAsias Rise

Potent Mix of High-LowThreats and Challenges

19th Century Images 20th Century Institutions 21st Century Demands

7

Block ABlock AEast AsiaEast Asia1850s 1850s 1950s1950s

Block BBlock BEast AsiaEast Asia1950s 1950s 1970s1970s

Block CBlock CEast AsiaEast Asia1980s 1980s 1990s1990s

Block DBlock DEast AsiaEast Asia2000 2000 2030?2030?

Cooperation Collaboration Co-existence Competition Collision Conflict Chaos

100 Years ofConflict

DynasticDecay

FailedStates

DysfunctionalPolitical Systems

8

EconomicStagnation

and Poverty

Collapse ofEast Asian Order

Collapse ofEast Asian Order

100100

The Lost 100 YearsThe Lost 100 Years

Collapse of QingDynasty

Rise and Fall ofMeiji Japan

Partitioning of Korea

Coming of theCold War

Endemic Poverty

Violent SocialChanges

Weak States

Value VacuumFailed Asian ModelFailed Asian Model

Western Colonialism and Japanese Imperialism

9

1840sOpium Wars

1868 MeijiRestoration

1895 Sino-JapaneseWar

1905 Russo-Japanese War

1910-1945 JapaneseImperialism

1941-1945Pacific TheaterWorld War II

1945-1949 Postwarand PRC

1945-1950KoreanPartitionand Korean War

1910 Yi DynastyCollapse1911 Qing DynastyCollapse

War Casualties:30 million

Natural Disasters:26 million

Famines:30 million

10

Wars: 4,212,000 +

Genocide: 3,746,600 +

Famine: 31,200,000+

Diseases: 3,000,000 +

Other: 500,000 +

Total: 43,904,600

Total Dead in World War II: 72,000,000 (World-wide)

11

TransformativeLeadership

Access to WorldMarkets

StrategicConsequences of

Failure

SelectivelyTargeted

Market Intervention

Asias Third Way

12

1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

13

Rise of East Asia

NewEconomic

Pivot

SelectiveMilitaryBuildup

PartialDemocratic

Reforms

Social/CulturalChange

The Twin Faces of Asia

JACIKs Choices

JACIKs: Japan, ASEAN, China, India and Korea

14

The Twin Faces of Asia2.

0%

50%

100%

W Eur Americas CEE/FSU Asia Sub Afr ME/N Afr Free

PartlyFree

NotFree

Freedom in the World 2006

Free

Partly Free

Not Free

16

FREE PARTLY FREE NOT FREERegionsFreedom

Western Europe

Americas

CEE/FSU

Asia-Pacific

Sub-Saharan Africa

Middle East/North Africa

24 (96%) 1 (4%) 024 (68%)13 (48%)16 (41%)11 (23%)1 (6%)

9 (26%)7 (26%)

12 (31%)23 (48%)6 (33%)

2 (6%)7 (26%)11 (28%)14 (29%)11 (61%)

Source: Freedom H

ouse, Freedom in the W

orld 2006

According to Human Security Report 05:

17

Armed conflicts since early 90shave declined by more than 40%

From 1991-2004, 28 armed struggles for self-determination

started or restarted; 43 containedor ended

Number of genocides andpoliticides dropped by 80%between high point in 1988

and 2001

International crises that oftentriggers wars, declined by

more than 70% between 1991and 2003

Dollar value of intl arms transfersfell by 33% between 1990-2003;

global military expenditureand troop levels have dropped

Number of refugees have droppedby some 45% between 1992-2003

as more wars have ended

In East Asia, Southeast Asia and Oceania, decline in both number and deadliness of armed conflicts started in mid-1970sPeriod of massive external involvement in regions conflicts dropped sharply and coincided with unparalleled economic growth in the world

18

But is this necessarily so in the next 20-30 years?

19

Global TradeRegimes

GDP Growth

Energy Demands

ReligiousFundamentalism

Governance:

MilitaryModernization

Acquisition ofWMD

AsymmetricalCapabilities

Democratization

Failing (ed)States

War on Terrorism

EthnicRivalries/Disputes

DemographicPressures

2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050

Short-Term Drivers Mid-Term Drivers Long Term Drivers

East Asiais Home to All

of TheseDrivers andChallenges

Globalization: ThreatSpectrums:

20Are negative trends inevitable? Can they be curtailed? Are Strategic U-Turns Possible?

or

or

or

or

21

Resurgent Rivalries-Cold War constraints lifted with greater emphasis on enhancing

national capabilities-Weakening utility of alliances

-Lack of enduring multilateral CSBMs

Rising China

ResurgentJapan

IndependentUnified Korea

Emerging India

RetrenchingAmerica?

Sino-Centric Hierarchy-Bandwaggoning by Asian powers

-Ebbing of U.S. hegemony anddisplacement by a Sinified regional

order

Institutional Cooperation-Compelling economic interests thatcould mitigate outstanding security

threats-Retention of retrenched alliances

with the U.S.

Return to classical BOP struggles difficult to imagine But neither is the region moving rapidly Much less a Sino-centric regional security system towards regional integration/cooperation

- Significant reduction in the threat of major wars in post-ColdWar era

- Rise of India, a resurgent Japanserve as strategic counter-weights to China (not to mentionthat the U.S. is still dominantsecurity actor)

- Bandwaggoning with China veryuncleardifferent from moreaccommodative strategies

A Struggle B

etween These Tw

o Worlds?

22

Rise of East Asia

NewEconomic

Pivot

SelectiveMilitaryBuildup

PartialDemocratic

Reforms

Social/CulturalChange

The Twin Faces of Asia

JACIKs Choices

JACIKs: Japan, ASEAN, China, India and Korea

23

Tipping Point Clusters3.

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

35000

40000

45000

1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006

China

Taiwan

Japan

India

Pakistan

SK

NK

27

Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, 2005Note: Chinas defense budget is estimated at around$65-85 billion by US DoD and intelligence community

Fastest growth by ChinaIncremental Catch-up by India

China/Japan defense spendinggap is narrowing

28

RMA/Asymmetrical Systems

Land to Air/Naval/Space Platforms

Complex Crises

Growing Economic Capabilities

2nd Nuclear Age is NotInevitable But

Selective Power Projection

Capabilities-basedDefense Planning

DefenseBudgets

- Hedging strategies and military capabilities will dominate the 21st century battle space- Network-centric platforms will assume increasing importance than weapons systems

29

Iran

India/Pakistan

North Korea

Syria

The AQ Khan nuclear network isdefunct but its

aftershocks continue

CHINA

RUSSIA

Three Worst Case Scenarios:

1. North Korea and Iran go nuclear2. Fissile materials are transferred

to terrorist groups (e.g., Al Qaeda)3. Coalition or alliance between

Iran + North Korea + Narco-Cartel + Terrorist groups

Preventing these scenarios isthe central counter-proliferation challenge

Libya

Egypt

No longerWMDthreat

As of 9 Oct. 2006NK is nuclearWeapon State

30

China: N, C, B, MN: NuclearC: ChemicalB: BiologicalM: Missiles North Korea: N, C, B, M

(Suspected of Plutonium and HEU weaponsprograms)South Korea: C, B, M(Suspected of nuclear weapons program in 70s,revelation that it pursued limited tests from late90s)

Japan: no WMD (but has high concentration ofMOX and robust civil space program)

Taiwan: C, B, M (believed to have pursued minimal nuclear research program in 70s-80sbut cancelled due to U.S. pressure)

Indonesia: C

Thailand: C

Vietnam: C, B

Myanmar: C

Pakistan: N, C, B, M

India: N, C, B, M

Iran: N*, C, B, M(Currently believed to bepursuing nuclear weaponsprogram)

Russia: N, C, B, M U.S.: N, C, B, M

Sources: Federation of American Scientists, Carnegie Endowment, CNI

Red: DeclaredYellow: New BreakoutPink: Potential BreakoutBlue: Virtual

http://images.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://www.bugbog.com/images/maps/asia_map.jpg&imgrefurl=http://www.bugbog.com/maps/asia/asia_map.html&h=496&w=643&sz=64&tbnid=YgR6hNyRc2q0eM:&tbnh=104&tbnw=135&hl=en&start=7&prev=/images?q=asia+map&svnum=10&hl=en&lr=&rls=RNWE,RNWE:2004-43,RNWE:en&sa=G

Country Nuclear Biological ChemicalRussia W W? W

China W W? W?

Israel W R W

United States W W

France W

U.K. W

India W R? R?Pakistan W R? R?North Korea W W WIran R? R? W?Egypt W? W

Syria R? W

Sudan W?

31

Source: The Decliing Missile Threat: 2005, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

95% of WMD in the United States and Russia

Acutely Failed States in Asia 2006

103.197.3 96.5 96.3 95.4 94.4 92.4 90.3

80

85

90

95

100

105

Pakis

tan

North

Korea

Myan

mar

Bang

lades

h

Nepa

l

Uzbe

kistan

Sri L

anka

Kyrgy

stan

Countries

Failu

re S

core

s

Series1

32Source: Freedom House, Freedom Index 2006

Two failed states with nuclear weapons (NK and Pakistan) Ability to maintain command/control of WMD assets in both countries in the

event of potentially volatile political transitions (particularly in the latter)

Mid-Range Failed States in Asia 2006

89.2 87.9 87.9 87.7 87.1 86.1 85 82.5 79.2 78.6 74.9 71.9 70.4 66.1

0

20

40

60

80

100

Indon

esia

Bhuta

n

Laos

Tajisk

istan

Russ

iaTu

rkmen

istan

Camb

odia

China

Philip

pines

Vietna

mTh

ailan

dKa

zaks

than

India

Malay

sia

Countries

Failu

re S

core

s

Series1

33Source: Freedom House, Freedom Index 2006

Asias sustained economic growth is NOT automatic Huge challenges stemming from rapid growth Human security needs are going to sky rocket in the next 2-3 decades

34

East/Southeast Asia Population Trends: 1950, 2005 and 2050

0

250

500

750

1000

1250

1500

1750

2000

2250

2500

1950 2005 2050m

illio

nsSource: East/Southeast Asia Population Trends: Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision and World Urbanization Prospects: The 2003 Revision, http://esa.un.org/unpp

4. Asia4. Asias Demographic Crisiss Demographic Crisis

Country Population1950

Population2005

Population2050

China 554,760,000 1,315,844,000 1,392,307,000

Japan 83,625,000 128,085,000 112,198,000

South Korea 18,859,000 47,817,000 44,629,000

North Korea 10,815,000 22,488,000 24,192,000

Indonesia 79,538,000 222,781,000 284,640,000

Malaysia 6,110,000 25,347,000 38,924,000

Vietnam 27,367,000 84,238,000 116,654,000

Philippines 19,996,000 83,054,000 127,068,000

Thailand 19,626,000 64,233,000 74,594,000

Myanmar 17,832,000 50,519,000 63,657,000

Laos 1,755,000 5,924, 000 11,586, 000

Cambodia 4,346, 000 14,071,000 25,972,000

Singapore 1,022,000 4,326,000 5,213,000

TOTAL est. 841,305,000 2,062,803,000 2,310,048,000

Declining Human ResourcePool in Japan and S. Korea

UnparalleledSocial Welfare Demands

35

Rising China, Normalized Japan4.

36

Deng Xiaopings Reforms

Joseph Nye: Soft power is when youre able to achieve your objectives by attractionBUT, Chinas rise is not limited to soft power this is the key concern that is expressedby the United States, Japan, and other Asian countries

1. For the first time since 1949, Chinas faces no natural adversary along its borders2. Chinas key strategic concerns lies in managing the Taiwan Question and the Korean

Question3. It is a de facto G-9 power no major international issue today can be

discussed or solved without Chinese participation or at the very least, support4. Pragmatic enunciation of Chinas Peaceful Rise linkages with the world system

that are (a) pervasive, (b) multi-layered, and (c) virtually impossible to de-link.

1. Post-Orthodox, Resurgent China2. Enlarged Strategic Footprint in Asia3. Rising Nationalism, Pro-Active Foreign Policy4. De Facto Veto Power Over Major Issues

in Asia-Pacific

37

Chinas Rise, American Decline?

Many regional states are pursuing hedging strategies in order to exploit fully economicbenefits from Chinas rise but to also retain their security ties with the U.S.

What are the contending and contrasting views within Asia about Chinas rise?

The China MarketAsian investments account for lions share of the$60 billion in FDI that flows into China annually

China is a major trading country but hasnt yetbecome a major trading power (President Hu)

- Rising Chinese nationalism

- Territorial claims (South China Seas)

- Military modernization

Three Main Concerns

U.S. still regarded as the least distrusted great power in the Asia-Pacific

Growing de-facto Taiwanese independence?US-China strategic competitionRise in Sino-Japanese tensionsNorth Korean implosion?Sustained domestic turmoil in China owing to pockets of domestic upheaval?Chinese moves in the South China SeasEnhanced energy competition (especially in South China Seas)Accommodating each others rise (China and India)

38

Predominance of the China Factorrather than China Threatvirtually

every major contingency hasChinese footprints

Unprecedented opportunitiesand challenges posed by

the cumulative rise of China

Chinese actions are situation-specific and unlikely to frontally

challenge regional states

But neither is the Peaceful Riseof China not without key

strategic concerns

Constructive power managementis going to become increasingly important

39

ImperialModel

Post-1945Model

NormalModel

Rich Country,Strong Army

Rich Country,Strong Army

Generation I:ImportedSystem

Generation I:ImportedSystem

Generation II:Imposed SystemGeneration II:

Imposed System

Generation III:Self-Generated

System

Generation III:Self-Generated

System

Primacy ofEconomic Power

Primacy ofEconomic Power

SoftenedHard PowerSoftened

Hard Power

Knowledge Systems National Goals

The need for a New Paradigm that creates value, builds trust, and forges new alliances

40

Persistent Mistrust

Sino-JapanesePerceptions Unchanged

Mirror Imaging

Anxieties on Chinas Rise

Views on U.S.

Public-Elite Discontinuity

Chinas Views of SK: Favorable 64%, Unfavorable 18%

Japans Views of SK: Favorable 56%, Unfavorable 43%

Unified Korea: 71% of Japanese Say Not in Near Future

Unified Korea: 39% of Chinese Say Sometime Soon

India: 70% believe ties with U.S. improving, 75% supportnuclear deal with U.S.

Yasukuni Shrine: 78% of Chinese oppose it, 52% of Japanesesupport it

Source: The Pew Global Attitudes Project, Publics of Asian Powers HoldNegative Views of One Another, 21 September 2006

Regional Snap ShotsMajor Issues

Japan

Russia

India

Chin

a

Go

od

Bad

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Major Countries

Perceptions

Perceptions on China's Growing Military Power

Good

Bad

41


0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

India Russia Japan China

Major Countries

Perceptions on China's Rising Economic Power

Good Thing

Bad Thing

42


Sino-Japanese Views of North Korea

51%

31%

3%

97%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

120%

1 2China and Japan

Vie

ws

on N

orth K

ore

a

43

Favorable Unfavorable


44

Source: Nikkei Poll, December 23-25, 2005

45Cabinet Office Poll, released December 26, 2005 70% average rating for U.S.

46

Korean Futures5.

47

Cold WarTemplate

-Stability-Status Quo

-Deterrence andDefense-ReactiveAlliance-Limited

unit-level change

Unification TunnelTemplate

-AcceleratedChange in NK

-PotentialVolatility inTransition

-post-unificationbenchmarks

Post-Cold WarTemplate

-SKs NorthernPolicy

-Post-KISTransition in NK-North KoreasWMD strategy

-Non-linearScenarios

1950-1990 6-2000 Summit 2006 +?

Managing the Status QuoHas Shifted to Managing Accelerated Change

48

North KoreasStrategic Paths

Status Quoand Cascading

Failures- Cosmetic reforms

- Transfer of power toKJIs son

-Breakdown in6 Party Talks

-Freeze in S-N ties- Tensions with China

- Impasse in normalizationwith Japan

Reform andEconomic

Liberalization- North Korean Perestroika

-Adoption of structuraleconomic reforms-Gradual political

change-Genuine reconciliation

with South Korea- Progress in 6 Party Talks

Redefining regime and state goals Costs associated with genuine reforms Diminishing returns from constant

brinkmanship Need to make Strategic Choices but

overwhelming regime constraints

Buying time in order to securesmooth post-KJI succession

Libyan Option is unlikelyin the North Korean context

Sustain status quo as longas feasible

Can Kim Jong Il transfer power to hisson? Will be unprecedented feat

Phase Transition 5Chaos and

Near Civil War

Phase Transition 4Rapid Regime CollapseBut Volatile Transition

Phase Transition 3Rapid Regime Collapse

With Limited PowerVacuum

Phase Transition 2Hybrid

Transition

Phase Transition 1Regime

Consolidation

49

D + 1

50

Avoiding Asian Zugwang6.

51

1. ChinasComprehensiveRise

Unified KoreasStrategic Choices

3. Resurgence of India1. Highly dependent upon strategic choices and disposition of China2. A U.S. withdrawal or substantially footprint would be key sufficient condition3. Managing long-term volatilities in KP and TS critical4. Preventing North Korean and Iranian breakout is crucial

ASEANsStrategic Choices

2. Japan as aNormal Country

Considered an Out-of-Area power by NEAsia during the ColdWar. But today, Indias strategic footprint hascritical implications forNE Asian and broaderregional security andstability

Unparalleled benefits butRisks coupled with growingdilemmas for Chinasneighboring powers In search of identity

still trying to fit in Asia135 years after Meiji Restoration

52

Traditional Requirements:

1. Collection2. Analysis 3. Counter Intelligence4. Cover Operations

New ChallengesLinear Early Warning

Increasingly Insufficient

Omni-Directional ThreatSpectrums

Greater Need for Coordinated Intelligence

Extracting Maximum ValueFrom OSINT

Key Constraints

New Environments:Limited Ability

To PreventHybrid Conflicts

Difficult to SustainLong-Term

Political Consensus

BudgetaryCommitment

Questionable inDemocracies

Nimble Intel CapComplex Intelligence

Requirements

Linearity Driven Intelligence versus Complexity Intelligence

53

UnparalleledDemands

30% isDisruptive

A New AsianModel

Post-Revolutionary

Crisis Awareness

54

1. Dislocations and

Discontinuities

4. Transitionsand

Transformations

2. Sensitivitiesand

Vulnerabilities

3. Reengineeringand

Reconstitution

InternalizingNon-linearFutures

Building In-TimeCapacities

Highly AdaptiveOrganizations

DiversifiedManagementSkills

Dem

ands

Requirements

escalation and de-escalation - world...

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