esmrm risk analysis on deployed operations...• joint analysis and lessons learned process italian...

ESMRM

RISK ANALYSIS

ON DEPLOYED

OPERATIONS

LTC. Antonino MIDOLOChief of FPE Doctrine & Studies [email protected]

ITALIAN ENGINEERS COMMAND

FP ENGINEERING SUPPORT CENTRE

MAIN TASKS

• Support FP Doctrine development• Develop FPE technical manuals• Conduct FP/FPE courses• Advising on FP/FPE matters• Develop research, experimentation and

test on FP/FPE materiel and equipment• Joint Analysis and Lessons learned

process

ITALIAN ENGINEERS COMMANDFP Engineering Support Centre

01 FEB 2016

AGENDA


1. BACKGROUND ON FORCE PROTECTION (FP)

2. THE AMMUNITION DEPOTS DESIGN

3. CASE STUDY

4. CONCLUSIONS

1

BACKGROUND ON FP


1. FP connections to ESMRM

2. Importance of ESMRM for FP

3. FP-ESMRM relationship

MINIMIZE VULNERABILITY FROM THREATS AND

HAZARDS ON OPERATIONS

• Contrast all form of threats• Preserve survivability• Prevent risks & hazards• Minimize uncertainty• Avoid fratricide fire

FORCE PROTECTION (FP)


ESMRMInvolvement

MINIMISE VULNERABILITIES FROM

THREATs & HAZARDS

FP ENGINEERING (FPE)

� Physical Protection� Field Fortification� Fire Protection� Environmental Protection� Military Search


ESMRMTechnical Support

Ammo DepotsDesign

2

THE AMMUNITION

DEPOTS DESIGN


1. Reference

2. Criteria

3. Model

4. Process

MAIN DOCTRINAL & LAW REFERENCES

• AJP-04 “Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine”• AJP 3.14 (A) “Allied Joint Doctrine for Force Protection”• AD 80-25 “ACO Force Protection Directive”• Bi-SC 85-1 “Capability Package Directive”• ATP 3.12.1 “Allied tactical Doctrine for Military Engineering”• ALP 16 “Explosives Safety and Munitions Risk Management (ESMRM) in

NATO Planning, Training, and Execution”• National publication PSE 3.14.1 “Military Base Protection in Operations”• National Law n. 131/2016 (adoption of AASTP 1-5 in NATO operations)


FP/FPE Documents ESMRM Documents

MAIN TECHNICAL REFERENCES• STANAG 2280 “Test procedures and classification of the effects of weapon on

structures” - ATP 3.12.1.8• STANAG 2953 “The identification of ammunitions” - AOP-2• STANAG 4123 “Determination of the classification of military ammunition and

explosives” - AASTP-3• STANAG 4440 “Manual of NATO safety principles for the storage of military

ammunition and explosives” - AASTP-1• STANAG 4442 “Application of risk analysis to the storage and transport of

military ammunition and explosives” - AASTP-4• STANAG 4657 “NATO “Guidelines for the storage, maintenance and transport

of ammunition on deployed missions or operations” - AASTP-5• STANAG 7141 “Joint NATO doctrine for environmental protection during NATO

led military activities”• National SOP FPE (Engineering Techniques and Procedures)• National SOP FE (Field Engineering Techniques and Procedures)


RestrictionsLimitations

Tempo

Standard & Design Criteria

OperationalRequirements

Site Information Requirements

Analysis

DrawingStatement of Works

Orders &Tasks

1 2 3

4

5

8

67

1- FEASIBILITY STUDY

2 - ON SITE RECCE3 - DESIGN PROCESS

BiddingProcess

AmmodepotDesigningProcess

FPE PROJECT MANAGEMENT

Mis

sion

Ana

lysi

sR

ealiz

atio

n


PHASE 1 - FEASIBILITY STUDY


PES LAY OUT (ESMRM)• Net Explosive Quantity (NEQ)• Hazard divisions – Compatibility Groups• Storage requirements• Hazardous areas• Field Distances - External Safety Distances• Barricades

PROTECTION MEASURES (FPE)• Physical & structural protections• Surveillance systems• Fire protection• Stand-off• Security procedures

TOOLS:• Technical manuals• AASTP 1-5• FP Model• FPE Standard• Technical Legislation

ESMRM RESTRICTIONS• Storage limitations• Initial Exposed Sites (ES)• Natural & mutual hazards

FPE RESTRICTIONS• Active security organization• Antiterrorism measures• FPE Materiel

PHASE 2 - ON SITE RECONNAISSANCE


VERIFY APPLICABILITY OF THE FEASIBILITY

STUDY

OBJECTIVES OF ANALYSIS• Size of storage area• Terrain• Weather conditions• Viability• Switching stations• Electrical supply lines• General security conditions

RESTRICTIONS• Site selection (free or imposed) • Operational & national caveats• Severe weather conditions • Host Nation regulations• Environment hazards

PHASE 3 – DESIGNING PROCESS

1 Analysis ofAmmunition


• ES characteristics• FP Model and ESMRM

comparison• Residual risk

evaluation• Final FD & ESD• Fire evaluations

4 AMMODEPOTphysical

protection measures (FPE)

6 Induced risks from

environment to PES-ES and vice versa

• Fire protectionequipment &firefighting procedures

• Precautions guidelines• Signs• Support plants• Access control

2 Identification of necessary

PES

3 AMMODEPOTDesigning

FP MODEL• Threat Assessment• Vulnerability

Assessment• Risk Assessment• Risk Management• FPE Designing

5 Analysis ofSafety Distances

(ESMRM)

3

CASE STUDY


“A FPE Officers training with real

implications”

Task : design a munition depot in order to storage thecombat munitions day of supply and integrate itssafety measures into a FPE masterplan

FPE ASSUMPTIONS


FSB Site assigned

Host Nation (HN) Barracks

Site assessment:• Part of a HN military barracks• Civilian houses and a main traffic road close

to the external site’s perimeter• Military accommodations and facilities close

to the internal site’s perimeter• Outer access control provided by HN• Perimeter fence only in the northern side


HYPOTHESIZED FSB ZONING

Main gate

Secondary gate

STANDARD AND CONSTRAINS


STANDARD:• STANAG 4657 “NATO “Guidelines for the storage, maintenance and

transport of ammunition on deployed missions or operations” - AASTP-5• National SOP FPE (FP Engineering Techniques and Procedures)

CONSTRAINS:• Site imposed by HN• High temperatures• Possible sand storms• Torrential rains AND…:

• Lessons Learned• Other similar projects realized in

operations


AMMO DEPOT DESIGNING

2 AMMO DEPOTS EACH WITH 10 CONTAINERS

(1 available for future storages)

AMMO DEPOT ONE

AMMO DEPOT TWO

MAX QUANTITY IN CONTAINER: 180 KG

REFERENCE NEQ:

250(table 2-3 of the AASTP-5)

ES ANALYSIS (OUTSIDE FSB)


Ammunition Depot Area

Exposed Sites

MilitaryAccommodation

Building

MilitaryStorages

Civilian Houses

HN HQ

Farmhouses

BarracksTraining Compounds

Fuel Installation

HighTrafficRoad

Distances (meters)50

50

100110

180

200

45

200

220

35


ES ANALYSIS (INSIDE FSB)


Distances (meters)


AMMO DEPOT PROTECTIONS


FIELD DISTANCES CRITERIA

REFERENCES:FD1-FD4-FD8

(table 2-2 of theAASTP-5)


FIELD DISTANCES EVALUATION

REFERENCES FD1-FD4-FD8 (table 2-3 of the

AASTP-5)

REFERENCE NEQ:

250(table 2-3 of the AASTP-5)

50 M 100 M



ES ANALYSIS (SAFETY ARCS OUTSIDE FSB)

150 M

NORTHERN AREA

50 M 100 M



150 M

SOUTHERN AREA

ES ANALYSIS (SAFETY ARCS OUTSIDE FSB)


50 M 100 M 150 M

ES ANALYSIS (SAFETY ARC INSIDE FSB)


INNER AREA

Forbidden

building/area

Additional

Barriers

X


FSB ESMRM RISKS MITIGATIONS (SOLUTION 1)


New Semi

Hardened

Additional

Barriers

FSB ESMRM RISKS MITIGATION IMPROVEMENT (SOLUTION 2)


OUTER FSB ESMRM RISKS MITIGATION IMPROVEMENT

1) Interdict using of houses and road insideyellow arc (accommodations in ALPHA &BRAVO areas)

2) Realize a road bypass for civilian localpopulation in area ALPHA

3) Support HN to relocate homeless in new houses

• High costs• Difficult to carry

out within locals• HN acceptance• Command level

residual riskacceptance

4

CONCLUSIONS


1. Gaps and implications in the operational

evaluations

2. Improvement and integration within

staff procedures in operations

AASTP-5

• field distances doesn’t consider assets protection andfatalities/injuries from flying glass/materiel

• risk management:� suggests to evaluate risk mitigations with earth barriers or

natural barricades�doesn’t give indications about it (standard, tools, methods of

calculation, …)


1. What are the gaps into ESMRM?

ESO

• needs knowledge, experience and properly training on explosivesto prepare the explosive safety case

• employment not only during operational phase


• Gammy Risk Management• Different knowledge – different evaluations• Engineer/EOD SMEs constant support to ESO (if

available on site)

1. What consequences?

• What kind of explosive training is needed?• Is ESO to be an Engineer task (i.e. like EOD)?

ESMRMRisk Analysis

FP MODEL

ESMRM Explosive Safety

Site Plan

FP Officer(FP Woking

Group)

ExplosiveSafety Officer

(ExplosiveSafety Board)

Develop and Implement FP Controls and

Measures(FP PLANNING)

2. What implications in the operational evaluations?


ESMRM IS NOT A STAND ALONE PROCESS

FPO

ESO

EPO

Environmental Baseline Studies


Site Plan

FP Plans

ES

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

THREATS

PES

NATURAL ENVIRONMENT

HAZARDS


2. What implications in the operational evaluations?

FPO

ESO

EPO

Environmental Baseline Studies


Site Plan

FP Plans

ES

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

THREATS

PES

NATURAL ENVIRONMENT

HAZARDS

FPWG

FPWG


3. How we could improve and integrate the ESMRM

process within staff procedures in operations?