Conference report Establishing rules for the telecommunications game The Thirteenth Annual Friedmann Conference on ‘The Global Telecommunica- tions Revolution’, School of Law, Columbia University, New York, 29 March 1985.

The thirteenth conference to com- memorate the late Wolfgang Fried- mann was opened by Leonard Marks, chairman of the Foreign Policy Asso- ciation and former director of the United States Information Agency. Referring to the role of communica- tions in economic development, the right to communicate, and the dispar- ity in abilities to communicate across the world, Mr Marks set out some of the important issues in telecom- munications. Three panels considered these issues.

The first panel addressed the prob- lem facing the 1985 WARC - access to orbital slots. Nandasiri Jasentuliyana, of Sri Lanka, deputy chief of the United Nations Outer Space Affairs Division, discussed the desires of de- veloping countries for guaranteed ac- cess and better planning, possibly a priori planning. Janice Obuchowski. legal assistant to the chairman of the FCC, explained the US position which, while guaranteeing access to satellite communications, would allow for the flexibility needed to accommo- date US objectives. Christopher Vizas, Executive Vice President of ORION Telecommunications, noted the widespread world support for a stricter planning system; he hoped that specifications would be rational and allow for flexible coordination, but questioned whether the USA would formally accept a rigid plan. He noted that even if the USA did accept such a plan, ‘it would never work’. Professor Stephen Gorove. editor of the Journal of Space Law, was mod- erator.

The second panel, entitled ‘Obsta- cles to direct broadcasting satellites’, explored copyright and programme content concerns, and was moderated by Michael Botein (Communications

Media Center). Gary Epstein of Latham, Watkins and Hills discussed practical difficulties facing US com- panies. Henry Geller, director of the Washington Center for Public Policy, cited problems in coming to an inter- national consensus on DBS regula- tion. Programming content regula- tion. he said, is often based on tradi- tional and cultural values and there- fore differs radically from country to country. An overview of attempts to come to a working international agreement was given by Vladimir Kopal, chief of the United Nations Outer Space Affairs Division.

Ideology

Yuri Kolossov, from the USSR Minis- try of Foreign Affairs, explained the ideological difficulties in direct satel- lite broadcasting. Use of the mass media for the purpose of ideological competition. he said, was not favoured by the Soviet Union, due to different conceptions of freedom of speech and the potential for serious conflicts between nations at gov- ernmental levels.

The Soviet proposal for control over programming content makes it illegal to transmit from satellites to other countries without the consent of the recipient country. This ‘prior consent’ policy imports very different princi- pies of regulation into space broad- casting than those applicable to short wave radio broadcasting. By compari- son, radio broadcasts such as the Voice of America, the Call of Israel, and Radio Free Europe have re- mained free from international regula- tion.

Justifying these differences in poli- cy, Mr Kolossov said, ‘Television is the most powerful means of mass

TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY December 1985

media. The social impact and influ- ence of its use cannot be compared to radio broadcasting.’ Mr Kolossov re- ferred to ‘subliminal techniques’ for imposing ideologies upon other na- tions utilized in visual broadcasts not available in radio.

Leonard Marks wondered whether it was possible for the Soviet Union to adhere to Article 19 of the Declara- tion of Human Rights in light of the Soviet proposal. ‘Is there freedom to communicate?‘. he asked. Mr Kolos- sov replied that ‘Freedom of informa- tion and expression is the business of each nation. I don’t believe it is very right [when speaking of the regulation of communication at the international level] to refer to the First Amendment of the Constitution saying that in [the USA] every person has a freedom of expression.’

Mr Kolossov believed that an agree- ment could be reached which would eliminate certain elements from inter- nationally broadcasted programmes - particularly those elements containing subversive propaganda and other socially harmful material which inter- fere with the internal affairs of other nations.

The final panel confronted the issue of, ‘Evaluating a need for internation- al regulation of transborder data flows’. Peter Robinson. from the Canadian Department of Communica- tions, discussed the difficulties in reg- ulating the flow of data. He said the most that could be done was to estab- lish a few ‘rules of the game’, not to establish regulation. Lucy Hummer, deputy assistant legal advisor at the Department of State, described US policy relying on principles of unres- tricted flow of information and com- petition. Voicing the viewpoint of American business, Cynthia Rich, Director of lnformatics at the US Council for International Business, seeing the need for an international agreement. recognized that the issue could be viewed either as a trade or a technical issue. Russell Pipe, editor of Transnationul Duta Report, equated transborder data flow to direct broad- casting, except for the distinction that media issues are not raised by trans- border data flows. In concluding, Mr Pipe called for a sorting out of the

351

‘bundles’ of issues under the heading, ‘transborder data flows’, in order to approach the problem more adequate- ly. Columbia University’s Professor Eli Noam was moderator.

The keynote address, given by Richard Colino (Director General of INTELSAT) focused on current de- velopments in US policy affecting INTELSAT.

Since President Reagan determined that ‘separate’ international satellites are in the US national interest and formally endorsed the idea of allowing privately-owned US satellite com- panies to compete with INTELSAT. three issues have become apparent: INTELSAT’s ability to compete; overconsumption of strategic orbital slots by private systems; and foreign policy ramifications of discontinuing multilateral commitments to other INTELSAT nations.

INTELSAT’s ability to compete and to continue to operate as it has in the past is doubtful, Mr Colino said. As INTELSAT is a cooperative, he pointed out, it is operated to break even. not make a profit. Costs are spread throughout the membership with a rate averaging structure. Usage rates for the system are not distance sensitive, as are domestic and interna- tional long distance telephone rates, but are uniform for all transmissions. In order to compete with private US companies, INTELSAT needs pricing flexibility which is not legally provided for in INTELSAT’s structure. ‘If IN- TELSAT is forced to compete, many of the marginal programs will whither away’. Mr Colino stated, referring to many necessary and beneficial services of little commercial advantage.

Second, competition will cause several different satellite systems to be developed, wasting valuable orbital slots on satellites with redundant func- tions. While INTELSAT efficiently coordinates its satellites for all of its members, independent systems could use up all the key slots in the geosta- tionary orbit. This is of great concern to developing countries, which may not now be capable of establishing their own systems, but may want to in the future. Latecomers. in essence, will be wholly dependent on other systems. ‘People in developing coun-

352

tries see the deregulatory fervor of the United States putting up ten separate satellite systems. They’re afraid pri- vate companies will take up more of the space’, said Mr Colino.

Lastly, a unilateral pronouncement of US policy undermining INTELSAT could change one of the keystone achievements of US foreign policy. INTELSAT could. as it has in the past. be a positive force at WARC. However, with the proposed policy of the Reagan administration. other na- tions will be forced to protect their interests in ways likely to be inconsis- tent with private sector objectives.

Mr Colino also discussed the recent controversy over the possibility that the Soviet Union may join INTEL- SAT. Having returned from Moscow recently. Mr Colino said. ‘It was part of a liaison trip. We talked about INTELSAT for about one minute and

then went on to talk about technical things of mutual interest. I asked them, “Are you planning to join IN- TELSAT?” They responded as they have for the last five years under the past director general. “We have it under study.“’ Mr Colino said he would like to see a merger of INTERSPUTNIK. the Eastern-bloc satellite system, with INTELSAT. However, he added that he was dis- appointed by reactions of US officials. whose immediate reaction to any proposed linkage of the Soviet Union and INTELSAT was worry over tech- nology transfer. ‘Since US technology is regulated before it is transferred to INTELSAT’, Mr Colino pointed out. ‘this is a non-issue’.

James Hunter Elm Grove, WI, USA

Book review Confronting network power MISREGULATING TELEVISION

Network Dominance and the FCC

by Stanley M. Besen, Thomas G. Krattenmaker, A. Richard Metzger, Jr and John FL Woodbury

University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1984, 202 pp

The rise of US television in the late 1940s led the Federal Communica- tions Commission (FCC) to devise an allocation system in lYS2. The US television system has been stuck with the 1952 plan ever since; under the plan only three US networks have flourished: ABC, CBS and NBC - the Big Three. Having spawned the trio, the FCC has attempted to control their market power. A series of in- quiries into the Big Three networks followed from 1955 to 1970, at which time the FCC fixed a dozen or so rules to monitor them. After this stage the federal Department of Justice’s Anti- trust Division - an ally of the FCC -

took over by launching complaints against ABC, CBS and NBC, claiming that they had monopolized prime-time television. (The Department of Jus- tice’s complaints were settled in 1981 by a consent decree.)

Meanwhile the FCC, following the details of the Department of Justice’s antitrust proceedings, launched the FCC Network Inquiry in 1977. The subsequent report, New Televisiorl Networks (1980). appeared in two hefty volumes. The authors of Misreg- d&q Television were deeply in- volved in this report: S. Besen and T.G. Krattenmaker were codirectors; A.R. Metzger, Jr, was principal coun- sel, and J.R. Woodbury senior staff economist to the Inquiry. Rather than echo their earlier reports, the authors’ intention in this volume is ‘to explore comprehensively the premises that consistently underlie the federal gov- ernment’s regulatory approach to tele- vision networks during the past three decades’ (p 2). The authors have succeeded brilliantly and have pro- vided us with a well-argued case.

TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY December 1985