ethnic diversity and political instability in black africa

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DOI: 10.1177/001041407600900201 1976; 9; 139 Comparative Political Studies

Walter L. Barrows Ethnic Diversity and Political Instability in Black Africa

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ETHNIC DIVERSITY AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY

IN BLACK AFRICA

WALTER L. BARROWS Boston University

vents in Black Africa during the past decade have drawn attention to two features of African politics: (1) growing instability, manifested

y a rash of military coups dktat as well as by assassinations, civil wars, ogroms, secessionist at tempts, riots, and numerous otlier forms of disorder; nd (2) growing tribalism or related kinds of group consciousness that llegedly detract from national unity and that, it is commonly assumed, mtribute to tlie strife now plaguing the continent. It is this key ;sumption regarding the causal connection between tribalism and political istability that serves as the focus of inquiry in this paper.

The literature on Africa-both popular and scholarly-is inclined to love from tlie meie coexistence of instability and tribalism within African :ates to tlie presumption that the former stems from the latter. The iperficial evidence often leads us to believe that there is indeed a :lationship between the two factors. The prominent actors in strife-torn Jents are often identified in newspaper reports according to their tribal iembership; wlien groups collide, their tribal make-up is often their most

loticeable feature; and scholars who devote their lives to the study of .frican affairs are often highly sensitive to the differences among tribes nd are likely to attach significance to them in interpreting the flow of {ents. But, still, appearances can be deceiving, and we are obliged as social :ientists to probe beneath the surface in examining our basic assumptions.

UTlIORS NOTE: The aiithor gratefitlly ackiroicledges the contril?ictioris of ayriiorid Ditvall, idio madz itlarzy helpfirl suggestions arid patieti f ly guided this irdy past a iiiiriiber of rriethodological pitfalls.

OMPARATIVE POLIT ICAL STUDIES, Vol. 9 No. 2. July 1976 11976 Sage Publications, Inc.


I1401 COXlPARATlVE POLITICAL STUDIES /JULY 1976

Does cultural diversity lead to strife, or is instability the result of other factors?

Before proceeding with this examination, however, it is necessary to lay to rest the terms tribe and tribalism. They are perfectly respectable when referring to certain rural forms of government and society which prevailed throughout much of Africa during precolonial times and which in certain areas still prevail, although usually in sharply restricted fashion. But they are inadequate for conveying the meaning of the group identities that have been growing in importance and intensity throughout contempo- rary Africa.

Ethnic group and ethnicity serve thus purpose more nobly for two main reasons. First, they have far greater comparative relevance than tribe and tribalism, allowing us, for instance, to compare, as essentially the same kind of phenomenon, the conflict between Ibos and Hausas in Nigeria with the conflict between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland; furthermore, by using the more general terms we are not so apt t o foreclose other cultural distinctions-religion, for instance-which may have relevance for the formation and behavior of identity groups withhi the African context. Second, the term tribe conjures up images of primitiveness, primordiality, and staticness-precisely the wrong associations for populations that are experiencing shifting loyalties, uncertain identities, the emergence of new groups, and the redefinition of old groups. Ethnicity is a more flexible term which allows for this kind of flux. People can and do redefine their ethnic identifications according to situational criteria. Changed circumstances can lead to a whole variety of ethnic group phenomena: new groups may emerge or old ones disappear into the social backdrop; two or more groups may fuse or one group may split; a particular cultural distinction may gain or lose importance as a cue for ethnic group behavior. Ethnicity is complex and dynamic, a response to modern conditions that is likely to enjoy enhanced relevance 3s modernization continues. Tribe, on the other hand, connotes simplicity, stasis, and obsolescence. Following Wallerstein (1960), we can refer to tribalism as loyalty to a particular form of rural government (e.g., chieftaincy), whereas etlinicity means loyalty to an urban-based community that is likely to have a rural component but that is unlikely to be sentimentally attached to tribal political structures. In other words, the subjective element that underlies tribal communities can be detached from the agrarian structures and directed toward new groups-ethnic groups- that arise amidst .the competitive interaction characteristics of life in conteniporary African states.


Barrows / ETHNIC DIVERSITY [ 141 1

Our purpose here is to examine the relationship between ethnic liversity and political instability in Black Africa. Two dimensions of thnic diversity can be specified: (1) ethnic distribution and (2) ethnic luralism. Erlutic disrriburion refers simply to the configuration of ethnic roups within a particular society. The possibilities range from a situation 1 which society and ethnic group are coterminus-the ethnic group is the iciety-to one in which a society is made up of a multiplicity of ethnic roups. One well-known typology of the patterns of primordial senti- ients found commonly in the new states is presented by Geertz (1963). is five patterns are based on the relative size of groups:

(1) a large group which dominates a minority group (e.g., Cyprus); (2) one central group juxtaposed against a number of peripheral groups

(3) two more or less evenly balanced groups (Lebanon); (4) an even gradation progressing in size from several small through

(5) a multiplicity of small groups (Zaire).

similar typology might draw an analogy with the classification used ten in the field of international relations, which distinguishes among iipolar, bipolar, tripolar, and multipolar distributions of power in :ernational systems; hence, we might speak of kindred distributions of lnic groups within African states. It is relatively easy to construct typologies of ethnic distributions; it is

ire difficult to posit a causal relationship between ethnic distribution d political instability. Neither logic nor commonsense is of much help. I the one hand it seems reasonable to suppose that the fewer the ethnic )ups which make up a society-that is, the fewer the languages, the ver the ways of life, and the fewer the claimants for material and moral ids-the less the likelihood of political instability. On the other hand, a .suasive argument can be made for the stability of a society composed many small groups, no one of which is in a position to dominate the iers..President Nyerere of Tanzania has pointed to the ethnic fragmenta- 1 of his country as one factor making for political order:

The more tribes we have the better.. . . If there were only five tribes, there might be serious clashes. . . . My own tribe is 35,000 people; my brother is the chief. If my brother wanted to be a nuisance, he couldnt be much of a nuisance. [quoted in Bienan, 1970: 421

(Indonesia);

several medium-sized to several large groups (India); and

ies hladison would have well understood Nyerercs point.


[ 1421 COXIPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / JULY 1976

The scholarly literature devoted to political integration is likeivise contradictory regarding the impact of distribution. Deutsch (1957: 62) lays emphasis on core areas capable of assuming the burdens of integration; indeed, he finds that increases in ethnic or linguistic differentiation contribute to disintegration. On the other hand, Coleman (1960: 368) is quite specific in proposing the presence of many groups more or less equal in size as a factor favorable for the peaceful unification of societies:

The multiplicity of tribes within a state is not everywhere an obstacle to the creation of a broader political nationality. Indeed, the larger their number and the smaller their size, the better are the chances for effective amalgamation.

Debate regarding the impact of distribution upon stability forms a running dialectic in the literature of social science. International rela- tionists have argued for a decade over which type of system, bipolar or multipolar, is the more stable; two-party and multiparty systems have been the subject of extended controversies regarding the conditions of democratic stability; in economics, the issue appears as debate concerning the relative stability of capitalism versus socialism (or, perfect versus monopolistic competition); and sociologists have long juxtaposed the Parsonian concept of society, which stresses a single normative consensus as the wellspring of order and stability, with the conflict theories of Simmel and his disciples, which point t o the integrative effects of cross-cutting conflicts, multiple loyalties, and interlocking coalitions among a plurality of groups.

Rather than entering this controversy on one side or the other, it would be well to assume an agnostic posture. Instead of proposing (and then promoting) a particular hypothesis about such-aid-such a relationship between ethnic diversity and political instability, we can design our research enterprise for attempting to discover whether my relationship exists in the first place. Hence, we can advance the null hypothesis that 120 relationship exists and then devote our efforts to discarding it. This accords with the Popperian philosophy of science which maintains that since we can never prove a proposition but only fail to disprove it, our energies sliould be channeled toward rejecting hypotheses, not toward authenticating them.

In specific terms the null hypothesis reads:

11;: There is no relationship between ethnic distribution and political instability in Black Africa.


Bmows / ETHNIC DIVERSITY [ 1431

our efforts t o disprove it will entail tlie analysis of correlations. As a rough decision rule, the hypothesis will be rejected if the independent variable (etlmic distribution) explains 10% or more (r2 Z .lo) of the dependent

(political instability) with a statistical significance level (p) of .05 01 smaller.2

Hypothesis-testing should be an imaginative, not a mechanical, exercise. This calls for more than merely computing the correlation between two variables, for it is necessary also to search for those intervening factors that may confound or compound the relationship. This serves as a check gainst accepting spurious correlations. There is no limit to the number of

intervening variables, so in the interests of economy we are to select, from an infinitude of possibilities, those factors that

appear to present the most promising opportunities for rejecting the null hypothesis. This screening process is a major function performed by theories and models; they alert us to what are, it is hoped, the relevant variables. One of the most familiar social scientific concepts, Karl Butschs notion of social mobilization, is clearly relevant in this context Social mobilization is the process in which major clusters of old social, economic and psychological commitments are eroded or broken and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behavior (Deutsch, 1961: 155). It is a major consequence of modernization and economic development, and it in turn has important consequences for political development and political stability. Specifically, according to Deutsch (1961: 167-168):

the stage of rapid social mobilization may be expected.. . t o promote the consolidation of states whose peoples share the same language, culture, and major social institutions; while the same process may tend t o strain or destroy the unity of states whose population is already divided into several groups with different languages or cultures or basic ways of life.

For our purposes we can infer from this that social mobilization is likely to reinforce the impact that ethnic distribution has on political instability. Indeed, he is proposing social mobilization as the activating ingredient. In the presence of social mobilization, factionated configurations of ethnic groups are unlikely to be stable, while the opposite holds true for configurations characterized by the presence of one major group. Deutsch encourages us to examine two components of social mobilization in any particular society: its level and its rate of change. It seems more than


11441 COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES /JULY 1976

plausible that either or both will affect the nexus between our independent and dependent variables. Hence, we a n treat as intervening variables (a) social mobilization (level) and (b) social mobilization (change).

Another key variable is (c) inequality. A particular configuration of ethnic groups may coexist in a stable relationship with each other in one case because values-power, wealth, education, and the like-are shared more or less proportionately among them, whereas in another case the same configuration may prove highly unstable because benefits are unequally distributed. An extreme example of this latter case is Rwanda, where-prior to a bloody revolution-a tiny minority dominated almost every aspect of life at the expense of the majority ethnic group. Horowitz (1971) draws our attention to the importance of hierarchical relations among groups. Vertical differentiation among groups leads to patterns of ethnic interaction different from those prompted by horizontal differentiation (what we have been calling ethnic distribution). He suggests strongly that the greater the vertical differentiation among groups, the less stable the system is likely to be, but the same is not necessarily true of the horizontal dimension:

Some vertical ethnic systems may be transformed by revolution; some, whose lower strata have produced relatively large elites, may be reordered on horizontal lines; conceivably some may become largely non-ascriptive class systems. But rarely will it be possible, without the application of considerable coercion, to maintain a system of ethnic stratification. Horizontally ordered ethnic configurations, however, do not suffer from the same ideological disabilities. Parallel groups therefore have much more ability to survive as separate units. [Horowitz, 1971: 2361

Other thinkers have made similar distinctions between the vertical and horizontal dimensions, often stressing the complex interaction between them (Bates, 1972; Lemarchand, 1972;.Alelso1i and Wolpe, 1970). Our purpose here w i l l be to examine the extent to which vertical inequalities affect the relationship between ethnic distribution and political instability. Inequality for our purposes refers to inequality among groups, not among individuals. It means a disproportionality be tween the size of groups and their respective shares of values available in a society.


Barrows / ETHNIC DIVERSITY [ 1451

A number of.scholars in recent analyses have pointed to a factor which seems worth examining as an additional intervening variable. They have treated ethnicity as essentially an interest-group phenomenon (Bates, 1972; Cohen, 1969; Rabushka and Shepsle, 1972). Ethnic groups emerge and become politically activated as vehicles for securing from the state benefits such as jobs, schools, roads, churches, representation, and recognition. Like interest groups, ethnic groups behave in response to opportunities for making gains or avoiding losses from the application of public authority. The greater tlie scope of government, the more such opportunities will be available and the more intensively and extensively ethnic groups will compete for public resources, even to the point of strife. Hence, if this model is fruitful we should expect scope of government to be a potent variable, one that is likely to affect the relationship between ethnic distribution and political instability. As with social mobilization, we will examine two components of this variable-level and rate of change- since the key consideration may not be the scope of government activity itself so much as the degree to which it is expanding or contracting. Ethnic groups-cum-lobbies may respond more to marginal changes in the public pie than to its absolute size. Thus, (d) scope of government (level) and (e) scope of government (change) can be added to our list of intervening variables.

With these five additional variables we are in a position to scrutinize more fully the basic relationship postulated in the null hypothesis. To reflect the possibility of intervening influences the hypothesis now reads:

H t : The relationship between ethnic distribution and political instability in Black Africa is not affected by: (a) social mobilization (level); (b) social mobilization (change); (c) inequality; (d) scope of government (level); and/or (e) scope of government (change).

The proposition will be tested by examining partial correlations between the independent and dependent variables, holding each of the intervening variables constant. To deal with the possibility that two of tlie intervening variables might exert an influencc in combination, second-order partial correlations will also be examined. Again, our basic rule of thumb will allow us to reject the null hypothesis ifi after holding the intervening


[ 1461 COAIPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / JULY 1976

variables constant, the independent variable explains 10% or more of the dependent variable with no more than a .05 probability that t]le result arose from chance.

The second dimension of ethnic diversity is e t h i c phira/ist)1, which refers t o the extent to which the groups within a society differ from one another culturally and institutionally. hlorrison et a]. (1972: 166) define it as the degree of variation in the cultural characteristics of ethnic groups, in a nation. Even a highly fractionated pattern of ethnic distribution would score low on ethnic pluralism if all its groups were more or less identical, whereas a distribution composed of only a few groups would score high if they embodied appreciably different ways of life.

As with ethnic distribution, there is no firm consensus in the literature regarding the relationship between the variable ethnic pluralism ad political instability. Morrison and Stevenson (1 972) find a respectable positive correlation between them; but Foltz (1974) argues that cultural differences among ,groups can put social distance between them, reducing the number of issues over which they are apt to come to blows:

clear-cut and reinforced ethnic cleavage diminishes the salience of status comparisons with other groups. If the other group is clearly of a totally different sort from ones own, its peculiar value position does not threaten one. One must extend ones own identity far enough to include the other group, at least symbolically, for the comparison to make sense, and thereby motivate action.

Since plausible cases can be built to support either side of the argument, our strategy will be again to posit a null hypothesis:

H:: There is no relationship between ethnic pluralism and political

Our efforts to reject the null hypothesis will be constrained by the same decision rule applied above to the relationship between ethnic distribution and political instability. And in exploring for the potential effects of additional factors we will employ the same set of intervening variables, rendering the final null hypothesis:

instability in Black Africa.

H t : The relationship between ethnic pluralism and political instability in Black Africais not affected by: (a) social mobilization (level); (b) social mobilization (change);


Barrows / ETHNIC DIVERSITY 11471

(c) inequality; (d) scope of government (level); and/or (e) scope of government (change).

Before actually testing these hypotheses it is necessary to provide operational definitions for each of the variables employed.

DEPENDENT VARIABLE

Political iristability in this study does not refer to frequent collapses of cabinets or administrations, a way in which the term often has been employed in the past. Rather, by political instability we mean a condition in political systems in which the institutionalized patterns of authority break down, and the expected compliance to political authorities is replaced by violence intended to change the personnel, policies, or sovereignty of the authorities through injury to persons or property (Morrison et al., 1972: 122). Violence is the key element in this definition of political instability. A number of studies have shown that domestic strife is not a unidimensional phenomenon; rather it can be broken down into types of violence that are related to but distinct from each other (Bwy, 1968; Gurr, 1968; hlorrison and Stevenson, 1971; Runimel, 1966). The terminology varies from study to study, but the basic dimensions are remarkably similar. In this paper we will rely upon Black Africa: A Cunzparative Handbook (Morrison et al., 1972: 122-124), which distinguishes among three types of violence: (1) elite iristability, which involves elite groups bent on replacing governmental personnel through irregular means, the military coup ddtat being the most typical manifestation of this in Black Africa; (2) coi?~~?iiuraI hstability, which refers to extensive violence among ascriptive groups, such as groups based on language, ethnicity, religion, or region; and ( 3 ) tiirnioil, which encom- passes such strife events as riots, strikes, and demonstrations.

hlorrison et al. (1972: 128-130) provide operational definitions for these variables by weighting and summing political events in each country for the period between its independence and December 1969. Their indexes for the three types of instability are derived from the following formulae:

Elite instability = ( 5 x civil wars) + (4 x rebellions) t (1 x plots).


(148 J COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES /JULY 1976

Communal instability = (5 x civil wars) t (4 x rebellions) + (3 irredentist events) t (1 x ethnic clashes) (Each event was also weighted by its duration). Turmoil = (1 x riots) t (1 x demonstrations) t (1 x strikes) t (1 declarations of emergency).

The events data which served as the basis for these indexes were provided by the African National Integration ProjeFt of Northwestern University, as reported in Black Africa: A Comparative Hat~dbook.~ We have relied entirely upon these sources for data relating to political instability; indeed, they have provided the major mine of information for most of the variables analyzed in this study.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

. DIMENSIONS OF ETHNIC DIVERSITY

(a) Ethnic distribtition. Three separate measures of ethnic distribution have been devised in order to capture, as much as possible, the complexity of this variable. The fluidity of ethnic-group boundaries and the gaps in our knowledge for some parts of Africa militate against designing a single all-purpose indicator of ethnic distribution that is both valid and reliable. So in the interest of veracity, although unfortunately not of elegance, three streams of information have been provided.

1. The first measure of ethnic distribution, called linguistic fractionalization, is used here on the assumption that there is a strong positive correlation between language and ethnicity. Taylor and Hudson (1 972: 271-274) provide indexes of linguistic fractionalization derived from raw data in the Atlas Naradov llfira according to the formula:

where ni is the size of the ith language and N is the total population of the society. This produces a measure which varies from 0 (i.e., everybody in the society speaks the same language, and only that language) to 1 (i.e., everybody speaks a different language). These scores were used as our first indicator of ethnic distribution for each of the 32 Black African countries.


Bmows / ETHNIC DIVERSITY (1491

2. The secondindicator is quite similar, except that instead of using linguistic data, ethnic groups themselves were used as the raw material for producing an index of ethnic fractionalization. In order more strongly to emphasize the impact of large groups, the formula for fractionalization ws altered somewhat to:

where p1 is the percentage size of the largesi ethnic group in the population and pi is the percentage size of the it group. For our African data this produced measures of ethnic fractionalization which ranged from .06 for Lesotho (where there is virtually only one ethnic group) to 15 for Tanzania (where there are many small ethnic groups).

As we have suggested, identifying ethnic groups is neither an easy nor a clear-cut task. What appears on an official population census or in an ethnographers report as tribes may reflect little of what is relevant as far as political interaction among ethnic groups is concerned. The officially recognized group may be composed of subgroups that are in fact the key reference units for people in their everyday political activities; or in the course of political competition it may have submerged itself into a more comprehensive ethnic grouping that the census-takers did not, and perhaps will not, observe. Furthermore, the census-taker in one country is apt to mean by tribe something different from h is counterpart in another country. To deal with these issues of aggregation and comparability, we have followed hlorrison et al. (1972: 419-422) in differentiating ethnic identity groups from what they call ethnic types and ethnic clusters. People who share a common identity in addition to common institutions and values are classified as belonging to an ethnic identity group, whereas people whose institutions and/or values are the same but who do not recognize a common identity are categorized (by the observer) as belonging to an ethnic type or ethnic cluster. Ethnic identity groups are what interest us in the context of political competition, so we have treated them as the unit of analysis in producing our index of ethnic fractionalization. hlost of the data \vas provided by hlorrison et al. (1972), but in a number of cases I have supplemented or altered their information with my own judgments based upon the relevant literature or upon personal observation. It is important for the reader to appreciate the degree to which judgniental considerations have shaped these data-as it issues both from Black Africa: A Comparative Handbook and from my own


[ 1501 COhlPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDiES / JULY 1976

contributions-since the analysis that follows cloaks the subjective element with tlie spurious certitude of hard statistics.

3. Ethnic identity groups also serve as the unit of analysis for our tllird indicator of ethnic distribution. Entitled ethnjc polarity, this measure attempts to locate societies along a continuum which ranges from unipolar tluough bipolar to multipolar configurations of ethnic groups. For this purpose a 17-point scale was devised which attempted to describe not only the primary pattern of polarity among groups in a society, but the secondary pattern as well. For example, if a society were made up of two groups of more or less equal size we would call it bipolar and assign it a score of 6; but if these two groups were accompanied by a third which is too small to make the pattern tripolar but too large to be ignored, we would label the society bipolar with a tripolar tendency and assign it a score of 7. Table 1 lists the entire spectrum of possibilities and the criteria for distinguishing among them. Using these criteria, for instance, countries like Botswana, Rwanda, and Lesotho, each of whose ethnic make-up is dominated by virtually only one group, are designated hegemonic and given a score of 0; while Chad, composed of groups, which claim 46%, 28%, 996, 5% . . . of the total population, is called bipolar with a unipolar tendency and given a score of 5; and Tanzania, made up of many groups the largest of wlucl~ is only 12% of the population, fits solidly into the 6niultipolar category with a score of 16.

That these indicators seem to be capturing different but related aspects of the u m e concept-ethnic distribution-is suggested by tlie following correlations:

Fl Fe pe

Ethnic Polarization = P, -

Linguistic Fractionalization = Fl - .46 -57 Ethnic Fractionalization = F, - .66

(b) Ethiiic pliiralism was measured by a quite different process. Factor analysis was employed to construct a single composite index derived from multiple-indicators of ethnic pluralism. This procedure entails weighting individual indicators according to how strongly they are associated with an underlying factor obtained from intercorrelations among the whole set of indicators; the weighted indicators are then summed to yield a general index. An iniportant assumption, upon which this technique rests, is the notion that the general variable-ethnic pluralism in this case-represents a


Barrows / ETIINIC DlVERSlTY [ 15 11

TABLE 1 Ethnic Polarization Scale

Condltionr

I?:

A > 213 P

1/3 A > B, and A (213 ?

113 A 213 B I13 A 213 B,

and D) 213 C

112 A < a 213 A B > 213 A. and 213 B > C > 112 B B ) 2/3 A, and 2 1 3 B) C ) 112 1.

and D) 213 C

112 A 213 B 112 A 213 A, and C > 213 B B > 213 A, and C > 213 1.

aad 112 C < D < 213 C 112 A < n < 213 A, and c > 213 I,

and D > 213 C

112 A 2/3 C

l t 2 A 213 A, and C > 213 1, and

D > 2/3 C

Where: P - t o t a l popa la t ioa A - lit l a r g e a t e thn ic arwp B - 2nd l a r g e a t e t h n i c group C - 3rd l a m e r t ethnic group D - 4 th Ia-ert e t h n i c group

Description

= ha- i c

= un ipo la r - unipolar v l b i p o l a r tendency = unipolar v/trlpolar tcndency

= unipolar v / m l t l p o l r r tendcncy

= b ipo la r v /un lpo la r teadency - b ipn la r = b i p o l a r vltrlpolar tendency

= bipolar v / r n l r i p o l a r tendency

0 t r i p o l a r vlunlpolar tendency

- t r i p o l a r v b i p o l a r tendency = tripolar

= t r i p o l a r v l P u l t i p o l a r tendency

- mltipolar v / m i p o l a r tendency - m l t i p o l a r v l b i p o l a t tendency = m r l t i p o l a r vltripolar tendcocy

= m r l t i p o l a r

Score -

- 0

= l

= 2

= 3

a 4

= 5 ~

= 6

= 7

= B

- 9

= 10 - 11 - 12 - 13 - 14

15

= 16

[ 1521 COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / JULY 1976

unidimensional phenomenon. It would make little Sense to weight and then sum indicators of a concept whose underlying nature is multidime,- s ion i .

The African National Integration Project provides data on ethnic pluralism that are amenable to statistical manipulation of this sort. Its authors have constructed a number of scales which indicate the degree of variation among groups within each of the 32 Black African countries for such cultural and institutional characteristics as dependence on agricul. ture, family organization, settlement patterns, class stratification;, and type of authority system. Table 2 displays the results of factor analyzing 12 of these indicators. The table reveals, first, that we are justified in retaining the unidimensional assumption, since the first principal factor accounts for 60% of the total variation. We can call this factor ethnic pluralism. Second, each of the indicators loads (correlates) heavily on the factor. These loadings could serve as the basis for assigning weights to each of the indicators, but since they reflect the effects of

First Principal Factor: Ethnic Pluralism (60% of variance, 8 iterations)

TABLE 2

Variables* Factor Factor Score L3adiIlgS Coefficienta

Dependence on Animal Husbndv -70.5 -198

Dependence on Agriculture .764 .001

Fami ly Organization .8oq .w Patrilineal Kin Groups ,835 ,321

Agricultural Developent .a .013

Settlement Patterns .707 - ,096 Levels of Hierarchy ,829 .339

Hierarchy Above Family -770 ,123

Class Stratif icat ion s836 .284

Inheritance Systen ,799 - a 0 5 6 Type of Authority System 0665 - ,043 Descent System s6.50 .026

*standard deviations within each country for each indicatcr


Bmows / ETHNIC DIVERSITY [ 153)

interaction upon each other, a better weighting scheme employs the factor score coefficients, which can be interpreted as standardized partial correlations between tlie indicator and the factor.Hence, we shall use the factor score coefficient as the basis for determining the relative weight of each indicator. In brief, the method for measuring the degree of ethnic pluralism in each country is expressed in the formula:

EPi = C , Zil + C, Zi2 + C3 Zi3 . . . . + Cj Zjj

wliere EP, is the ethnic pluralism index for the ith country; Cj is the factor score coefficient for the jth indicator; and Zij is the standard score of the jth indicator for country i. This produced a scale of ethnic pluralism for the 32 Black African countries which ranged from a low of -2.15 (for Botswana, Burundi, Lesotho, Rwanda, and Somalia) to a high of t1.13 (for Nigeria).

INTERVENING VARIABLES

(a) Social illobilizatioii (level) was operationalized by means of the same teclmique: a composite measure was created through factor analysis of multiple indicators. Deutsch in his famous (1961) article suggested a number of constituent processes of social mobilization that could serve as indicators of the larger concept; among them are exposure to mass media, change from agricultural occupations, literacy, and per capita income. He assumed that if social mobilization were a single underlying process these indicators, and others like them, would intercorrelate highly as a demonstration of unidimensionality. The following attempt to devise a single measure of social mobilization (level) rests on that assumption.

From the wvcaltli of data provided by the African National Integration Project a series of variables conceivably related to social mobilization was selected and factor analyzed. The analysis indeed revealed a single underlying dimension, since the first principal factor explained 59% of the total variance among the 12 indicators. Tliere is thus ample justification for entitling this factor level of social mobilization. Table 3 shows this factor and its correlations (loadings) witli the constituent variables.

The factor score coefficients sliowvn in Table 3 remove tlie effects of interaction among tlie variables and thus indicate the weight of each variable in contributing to the factor. These weights were used to compute


I1541 COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES /JULY 1976

an overall social mobilization (level) score for each country in precisely the same manner adopted in constructing our measure of ethnic pluralism. This yielded a scale which ranged from a low of -1 .I 1 for Niger to a hi& of 2.39 for Gabon.

(b) Social Mobilizatioii (chilge) proved to be a more difficult concept to deal with using this technique. Factor analysis of those social mobilization variables for which change data are available revealed a first principal factor which explains only 33% of the total variance. Clearly this does not support the assumption of a single underlying dimension insofar as rates of change are concerned. Hence, it seems as if this component of social mobilization is too unstable a concept to measure using multiple- indicator techniques, at least for Black Africa. For this reason this variable was dropped from further analysis?

(c) Inequality among ethnic groups was measured by constructing a g-point scale that ranks countries according to the degree of dispropor-

TABLE 3 First Principal Factor: "Level of Social Mobilization"

(59% of variance, 7 iterations)

V a r i a b b

Wage Earners as ,% of Active Pop. (1963)

% Labor Force in Agriculture (c. 1968)

GNP per Capita (1968)

Primary School EN.ollment per 1,000 1966)

Sec. School Enrollment per 10,OOO (1966)

Higher Education, % of Age G m u p (1961)

Radios per 1,ooO (1966)

TeleMones per 1,ooO (1967)

Collneercial Vehicles per 100,ooO (1966)

Cars per 10,ooO (1966)

h v ' t Spending per Capita (1966)

Urban Pop., % of Total Pop. ( 1965)


Barrows / ETHNIC DIVERSITY [155]

tionality between the size of ethnic groups and their share of political power and/or other values (wealth, education, and the like). Table 4 explicates the criteria by which countries have been scored. For purposes of definition, a small group is one that represents less than 15% of the total population; a minority group comprises from 15% to 49% of the population; and a majority group is one claiming 50% or more of the total. Ethnic identity groups are the unit of analysis.

The key operational phrase is controls a disproportionately large share of. . . . In the absence of other studies on the subject, my own personal judgment was the only source used for determining what was and what was not a matter of disproportionate distribution of values. So the reader is again warned about the subjective element that has no doubt crept into the analysis. The major danger is one of building in a systematic relationship between ethnic inequality and political instability. Every self-conscious effort was made to avoid this problem, but there is as of yet

TABLE 4 Ethnic Group Inequality Scale, Mid-1960s

- Score Description 9 A small group cont ro ls a u i s p r o p r t i o n a t e l y l a rge share of

p o l i t i c a l power and o the r values.

8 k snall group cont ro ls a d ispropor t iona te ly l a rge sham of o the r values but no t p o l i t i c a l power.

7 A n inor i ty group cont ro ls b dispropor t iona te ly l a rge share of p o l i t i c a l power and/or o ther values.

6 A feu r i n o r i t y Groups c o n t r o l a disproportior.ately l a rge share of p o l i t i c a l power and/or o ther values.

5 A m j o r i t y grobp cont ro ls a proportionately l a rge share of p o l i t i c a l power but lacks a proportionate share of o the r values.

4 A m j o r i t y grcup cont ro ls a disproportior,ately l a r&e share of

A s ing le ir inority group (or c l u s t e r of g r o u p , e.g., a region)

p o l i t i c a l pouer and o the r values.

l acks a proportionate share of p o l i t i c a l power and/or o the r values.

3

2 A o a j o r i t y group cont ro ls a d ispropor t iona te ly la r&e share of p o l i t i c a l power but no t of o the r values, which a r e shared proportionately =one all groups.

1 P o l i t i c a l power and o the r values are shared prcportionately among a l l Lroup.


I1561 COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES /JULY 1976

no independent source of information available as a check on my j ~ d g m e n t . ~ In scoring the countries I was sensitive to large deviations from proportionality, not to minor nuances. To give some examples: Liberia was assigned a score of 9 because the Americo-Liberian ethnic group, representing a tiny portion of the total population, still controls government and politics as well as much of the wealth in the country, even though in recent years the boundary between this group and the hinterland peoples has begun to blur; Ethiopia was scored as 7 because of the predominant position in all walks of life of the Amhara-Tigre, who comprise about 30% of the population; Ghanas score was 3 because of the backward condition of the peoples of the northern territory; and Tanzania received 1 because none of its many groups seems particularly favored above the others in terms of power or other values.

(d) Scope of goveninzent (level) was measured in straightforward fashion by two indicators provided by the African National Integration Project data bank. The first is government spending per capita in 1966, measured in U.S. dollars at the official exchange rate. The second is the ratio of civil servants to the number of wage earners in 1966/67-a measure of the importance of government h the labor force. This is a critical factor because for African countries the civil service is often the most significant employer in the economy. Unfortunately, data on this variabIe are available for only 19 of our 32 cases, so our ability to draw conclusions about its impact is likely to be constrained. However, there does not appear to be any systematic relationship between missing data for this variable and the other key variables in this study; the countries for which data are unavailable seem to be distributed randomly with respect to ethnic diversity, social mobilization, inequality, and political instability.

(e) Scope of goventmerit (cflartge) was measured simply by observing the rate of growth of government spending, expressed as a portion of the economy as a whole. Hence, the indicator ratio of government expenditure to GNP, rate of growth 1963-1968 serves as a surrogate for our more abstract concern with changes in the degree to which government influences society.

Table 5 recapitulates what has been said so far by listing each of the variables, the dimensions that underlie it, and the indicators that measure it.


DXTOWS / ETHNIC DIVERSITY [ 1571

RESULTS Inspection of correlations among our three measures of ethnic

distribution and our three measures of political instability offers no justification for rejecting the first null hypothesis HA (that there is no relationship between the two variables). Table 6 indicates that none of the linear associations between ethnic distribution and political instability meets the requirement stipulated by our decision rule. Furthermore, inspection of scatterplots revealed no curvilinear relationships. However, by relaxing the rule slightly we draw attention to the association between linguistic fractionalization and turmoil (r = .29, p = .06), which comes close to our critical cut-off points.

Somewliat stronger results obtained for the relationship between ethnic pluralism and political instability. Again, however, it is only turmoil that correlates appreciably with a measure of ethnic diversity. In this case, the correlation (.32)allowved ethnic pluralism to explain slightly more than 10% of turmoil, at a significance level of .04. So at this stage we can reject null hypothesis H: (which postulates no relationship between ethnic pluralism and political instability) only in a qualified sense. It seems to be the only one of the three dimensions of political instabilitythat is affected by ethnic pluralism. This statement, in combination with our discovery of a somewhat weaker association between ethnic distribution and turmoil, can be broadened to include ethnic diversity as a whole. Ethnic diversity

TABLE 5 Summary of Variables

Variable Dhcnsion Indicator

P o l i t i c a l Ins tab i l i ty a) E l i t e I n s k b i l i t y Weighted coup events b) cO1ruM1 Ins tab i l i ty c) Turmoil Riots , demnstrations, etc.

Weichted s t r i f e events

Ethnic Diversity a ) Ethnic Distribution i ) L h p i s t i c Fractiorullzation i i ) LthnCc FractioMLization i i i ) Ethnic Polarity

b) Ethnic Pluralism Conposite index

S o c b l Hobifi-zation Level

Inequality

Scope of Coverrner,t a) Level

Cocposite index

Ethnic tiroup Inequality Scale

i ) Covt sper,ding/pop. i i ) c i v i l serrants/uage

earners

Rate of growth of govt spenciing/~P

b) Change


[I581 COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / JULY 1976

appears to have an impact upon political instability restricted to those typically urban-oriented phenomena lumped under the rubric turmoil.,$

But we can have no confidence in accepting or rejecting hypotheses \vithout examining the effects of additional variables. The partial correlation produced by holding constant our intervening variables yielded ambiguous results. Of the 135 first-order and second-order partial correlations between the ethnic distribution and the political instability measures (controlling for each of the intervening variables as well as for combinations of variables), only 16 met or even closely approximated the criteria stipulated by the decision rule. These are shown in Table 7.

Strict application of our rule of thumb allows us to reject the null hypothesis H: (which states that the intervening variables do not affect the relationship between e t h i c distribution and political instability) only with respect t o the association between linguistic fractionalization and turmoil. In. this special case there is an appreciable strengthening of the correlation between them when civil servantslwage earners is held constant either singly or in combination with other intervening variables. This allows us also to reject Hf, in a similarly limited sense, since we have now demonstrated a respectable positive relationship between (one component of) ethnic distribution and (one component of) political instability.

A more lenient interpretation of the decision rule facilitates rejection of Hf, and H: in a more complete sense. If we let p < -10 rather than p Q -05 serve as the critical level of statistical significance, then ethnic fraction-

TABLE 6 Ethnic Diversity and Political Instability, Correlations

Ethnic Diversity: P o l i t i c a l I c s t a b i l i t x E l i t e Cornunal T u m c i l

a) E t h n i c D i s t r i b u t i o n

i) L i n g u i s t i c F r a c t i o n a l i z a t i o n .02 -17 .29 Q

ii) Ethnic F r a c t i o n a l i z a t i o n - .20 - -03 - .09 3) Ethnic F o l a r i t y - .I8 - -04 .1 1.

b) Ethnic P l u r i l l i s n e l 0 .24 Q .32 ++E

* p Q.10 ** p G.05 n = 32

Bxrows / ETHNIC DIVERSITY [ 1591

TABLE 7 Ethnic Distribution and Political Instability,

Partial Correlations ~

Ethnic Distribution

LinRuistic Fractionalization

simple correlations

p a r t i a l correlations, controlling for:

c i v i l servants

c i v i l servants and SOC. mb.

c i v i l servants and inequality

c i v i l servants and eov't s . c i v i l servants and gov't spend.

(levclPend

(change)

Ethnic Frac t ioruUut ion

simple correlations

p a r t i a l correlatioxs, controlling for:

Pol i t ica l I n s t a b U t --- h l i t e Cocwurra l &il

.02 -17 .a *

- .20 -.a - .@I

c i v i l servants

c ivi l servants

civil servants

Ethnic PoLaritx

ami SOC. mb. .39 46 - .40 * 23 and gov't spnd . -32 * - -39 f .I8 and gov't spend. A2 i~ -.36 * -32 *

( leve l )

(c-4

simple correlations - -18 - -04 . l l partial correlations, controlling for:

c i v i l servants -14 - a18 .32 c i v i l SeNalltS and inequality el3 . - 023 -32 * c i v i l servants and gov't spend. el6 - -19 .35 *

(change)

P Q.10 * * p Q 05 n = 32


[la01 COhIPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDlES / JULY 1976

alization develops noticeable relationships with the elite and communal dimensions of political instability once civil servantslwage earners (in combination with other variables) is controlled for. Interestingly, the% correlations run in opposite directions: ethnic fractionalization seems to have a positive impact on elite instability but a negative impact on communal instability; other things being equal, the more widely dispersed the ethnic group configuration, the greater the probability of coup activity but the less the probability of clashes among ethnic and other ascriptive groups.

Table 8 examines partial correlations between ethnic pluralism and the three measures of political instability. Again, clear-cut results do not emerge. Of the 45 partials computed by holding constant the intervening variables (and combinations of them), only 10 were statistically significant even at the p < .I0 level. Strictly speaking, we should reject the null hypothesis H: (wluch maintains that the intervening variables do not affect the relationship between ethnic pluralism and political instability) insofar as turmoil is concerned, because the one correlation which met our p < .05 decision criterion was reduced in stature to the .10 Q p Q .05 significance range when the intervening variables listed were controlled for.

TABLE 8 Ethnic Pluralism and Political Instability,

Partial Correlations

Ethnic Pluralisn

simple correht ions

p r t i a l correlations, controlling for:

soc ia l nob i l iwt ion

govlt spending ( l eve l )

Po l i t i ca l Instabi l i tp E l i t e Conmunal Turmoil

.10 .a* .3% - - -

govt spending (cfunge) .11 .uc .324

c i v i l servants and govl t .a .36* .33*

c i v i l servants and SOC. cob. 04 .37 .29

spendirz ( l eve l )

gov t spending ( cbnge) govl t spending ( l eve l ) and .I2 -30 .33*

c i v i l servants .10 -25 .33*

* P

Barrows / ETfiNIC DIVERSITY [ 1611

That is t o say, tlie intervening variables do affect the relationship between ethnic pluralism and turmoil, contrary to tlie null hypothesis.

However, it seems excessively mechanistic to adhere to the decision rule so rigidly, especially when the magnitude of the correlations on all three dimensions of political instability remained virtually unchanged when the intervening variables were held constant. The only exceptions to this were second-order partial correlations between communal instability and ethnic pluralism produced when civil servants/wage earners in combination with other indicators was held constant. So it seems more reasonable in tlie absence of firm, consistent evidence to retain the null hypothesis H:. This means that H: in its truncated version is still rejected. That is, if we accept the notion tliat tlie intervening variables have not washed out the relationship between e t h i c pluralism and tErr;loli, then the null hypothesis claiming no relationship between them can be discarded. As long as we are willing to accept the more lenient rule there is justification for maintaining tliat ethnic pluralism encourages turmoil; and, if we indulge our imaginations even further, there is some reason to believe that ethnic pluralism contributes to communal instability also, although the skeptic is likely to part company at tlus interpretive juncture.

CONCLUSIONS

Three major points emerge from the results of this study. First, ethnic diversity is less useful as a concept for understanding political instability in Black Africa than most area specialists have hitherto believed. Consider- able scholarly attcntion in recent decades has been devoted to the ethnic dimension of African politics-because it S C C I I Z S so important-yet this analysis suggests that ethnic variables can account for only a small portion of the instability events that have occurred on the continent during the 1960s. It makes more sense to economize scarce research resources by concentrating on variables that more powerfully deal with prominent features of African politics like instability. For instance, Duvall and Welfling (1 973) very profitably employ the concept party system institutionalization in developing a model that explains over 50% of the variation in measures of political instability quite similar to those used here. The canons of efficiency require us first to explore variables that proniise large rcwards; then, when those mines of information approach exhaustion, wc can turn to progrcssivcly less lucrative areas of investiga- tioil. Put diffcrently, Africanists during the 1960s and the 1970s have


11621 COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / JULY 1976

responded to the explosion of strife in Africa by scrutinizing the most conspicuous strife-makers-ethnic groups prime among them. Yet a strong possibility exists that ethnic conflicts are mere epiphenomena, pawns of more powerful forces. Instead of chasing what this study suggests are fugitive variables, it makes prudent sense to return to the more general and more explicitly political variables, particularly those such as institutionalization that revive the classical concern with government and other central institutions of the political system.

Second, to tha extent that ethnic diversity did influence political instability, the strongest and most consistent evidence suggested that it was confined to the turmoil dimension. By weakening our rules of evidence a few notches, we do gain an additional impression that ethnic distribution (but not ethnic pluralism) is associated positively with elite instability and negatively with communal instability. But the overall results support the school of thought that maintains that the greater the ethnic diversity, the greater the political instability, other things being equal-as long as political instability is defined stringently as turmoil alone.

This lends roundabout encouragement to the interest group model of ethnicity. Ethnic diversity has its greatest impact on conflict in precisely that area where one would expect groups pressing for public benefits to clash. Riots, demonstrations, strikes, terrorism-turmoil-reflect the vio- lent side of pressure tactics and the characteristic manifestations of antagonism among groups jostling in an urban environment for power, status, and wealth. According to this model, it is in the towns and cities, and in their direct or indirect relations with the government, that ethnic groups clash. Hence, it is in this context that diversity among them becomes relevant. A more direct test of this notion could entail replicating this study using ethnic group data from urban areus instead of from nations as wholes. We would expect the association between ethnic diversity and turmoil to become even stronger but the associations between ethnic diversity and elitelcommunal instability to diminish.

Third, the behavior of the intervening .variables produced some surprises. Our measure of governmental involvement in the economy, civil servantslwage earners, proved itself the most consistently potent variable. Almost invariably. when it was held constant (either separately or in combination), the relationship between ethnic diversity and political instability was affected, most often appreciably. This suggests that for exploratory purposes civil servantslwage earners might be treated as the independent variable and our measures of ethnic diversity as the


Barrows / ETIINIC DIVERSITY [ 163 J

intervening variables. Thus, by reversing our previous procedures we can more adequately assess the relative impact of each variable on political instability. Table 9 shows the correlations between civil servants/wage earners and political instability, controllirtg for each of the ethnic diversity measures. Two observations issue from the table: (a) the relationship between civil servants/wage earners and political instability is substantial; and (b) the relationship is not strongly affected by holding ethnic diversity constant. By comparing Table 9 with Tables 7 and 8 we see that civil servantslwage earners has a greater and more consistent impact as an intervening variable than do our measures of ethnic diversity. It is unfortunatc that missing data for 13 countries constrain our ability to generalize further about the impact of civil servantslwage earners. Clearly, future data collection projects would do well to fill in the gaps and to improve our knowledge generai!y about the degree of governmental involvement in society and economy.

Incidentally, Table 9 again reveals coniinunal instability running counter to the other measures of political instability; it correlates negatively, while they correlate positively, with civil servants/wvage earners. An obvious interpretation of this is not easily forthcoming, but perhaps both elite instability and turmoil reflect efforts to control and profit from growing government-the more involved the government is in society, the more actively individuals and groups try to influence it by a variety of means, including violence. On the other hand, communal

Civil ServantsMfage Earners and Political Instability, Partial Correlations

TABLE 9

c i v i l ServantslthRe Earners Pol i t ica l I n s t a b i l i t x Elite C c m a l Turnoil

sir*ple correlations .58*i - .24 .31* p a r t i a l correlations, c o n t r o l l k g for:

l inguis t ic f ract ional izat ion -63 - -19 e41k et!uLic fract icnal izat ion .61% - .354 .33 etnnic polariLy .57= - -30 .4m ethrLic p l u n l i s n .P* - -29 .32

* P f . 1 0 ** D Q.05 n = 19


(164) COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / JULY 1976

instability, which usually entails extensive violence for long periods Over high stakes, is suppressed by large governments, both by their ability physically to counter insurrections and by their capacity to co-opt dissidents into the bureaucracy through the allocation of civil service jobs. But this interest group interpretation can only be tentative; further research on a larger data base is necessary before firm judgments can emerge.

The other intervening variables used in this study behaved in less exciting fashion. Neither social mobilization nor inequality carried much weight in affecting the relationships between ethnic diversity and political instabiiity; for concepts that bulk large in the theory and polemics of politics, this is surprising. It is especially surprising in the case of social mobilization, since Deutschs model is so well developed, so neatly applicable to the purposes pursued here, and so thoroughly absorbed into the collective consciousness of American political science. Social mobilization had little impact upon political instability not only when it was treated as an intervening variable but also when it was for experimental purposes treated as an independent variable. Table 10 shows no appreciable correlations between it and the measures of political instability. Only when holding civil servants/wage earners constant did the partial correlations reach magnitudes capable of meeting the criteria of our decision rule. Of 45 partial correlations only three met even the relaxed p < .10 condition. This eyecatching set of correlations shows a negative association between social mobilization and communal instability. Perhaps higher levels of social mobilization make available more goods and services for distribution among groups, thereby diminislung the desperate antago- nisms over high stakes that characterize communal instability. Whatever the interpretation, the most striking conclusion that emerges from this data on social mobilization is that it seems to be relatively unimportant insofar as political instability is concerned.

Inequality, on the other hand, maintained consistently high correlations with the political instability indicators, no matter which of the other variables was held constant (see Table 10). So, despite the fact that inequality had little intervening influence upon the relationship between e t h i c diversity and political instability, as an independent variable in its own right it seems to be quite strongly associated with political instability.

In summary, of all the variables examined in this study inequality and civil .servants/wage earners demonstrate the greatest potential for explaining political instability in Black Africa. Future research should take into full consideration not only the extent to which central authority


penetrates society-Nett1 (1968) calls thus stateness7--but also the extent to wllicli values are shared unequally among groups. Both of these variables are important components of an interest group model of politics, in which groups-including ethnic groups-in order to gain or retain benefits become active politically as government increases jts significance for society in general. They become vehicles for influencing government, with violence part of their panoply of techniques. Consistent with this model, ethnic diversity becomes important only insofar as it

TABLE 10 Social Mobilization and Equality with Political Instability,

Partial Correlations

Social Mobilization (level)

simple correlations - .at - *a s 05 p a r t i a l correlations, controlling for:

c i v i l servants - .27 - e3- .20 l inguis t ic f ract ional izat ion - -05 - - 3 3 - -05 ethnic pluralism - .06 - .3w - .01

Inequalitx

simp>e correlat ions

p a r t i a l correlations, controlling for:

soc ia l mobilization

c i v i l servants

govat spending ( level)

govt spending (change)

l inguis t ic fractionalization

ethnic f ract ional izat ion

ethnic polar i ty

ethnic pluralism

.31+

.4or;*

.30

. 3 P

. 3 w

e334

.33+

.3@

.41- e3-

.L- .3-

*42++ *w . 3 w .37*

.w .37*

.39 .34*

.41* .3m

.41H .38a+

.3* . 3 F

p Q.10 ** p Q.05 n = 32


[166] COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES /JULY 1976

contributes to turmoil, tlie aspect of political instability that is especially suited to pressure group tactics.

The interest group approach has been discredited in the past (e.g., hlacridis, 1961) because it purported to explain too much; in particular, group behavior tvas supposed to account for the nature of government and its outputs. But perhaps we can get more theoretical leverage from the obverse formulation: government and its outputs help explain the nature of group behavior. Ethnicity takes on importance for political conflict as a manifestation of group response to a growing public realm. In short, the results of this study interpreted in the light of an interest group model suggest that ethnic phenomena are better treated as intervening rather tlian independent variables insofar as political instability is concerned. The more fundamental factors seem to be unequal access to tlie benefits of modernity and the incentive to political mobilization held out by expanded government. These factors conspire to activate the ethnic group competition that often erupts into violence.

NOTES

1. Black Africa as it is used here refers to the independent states of Africa south of the Sahara. This excludes North Africa and the white-controlled states of southern Africa. (Included in the latter category are Angoh and hlozambique, states that have only recently won political independence from Portugal; during the 1960s these states, as well as Guinea Bisuu, were considered Portuguese territorics and thus do not receive attention in this study.) For a full listing of the 32 Black African states examined in this study, see hlorrison et 31. (1972: xxv).

2. An implicit assumption in this form of analysis is that causality flows from ethnic diversity to political instability and not the other way around. At first ghnce this seems to be a reasonable assumption, since ethnicity is normally presumed to have a givenness that political strife does not. At least in the short run, the characteristics of ethnic groups are unlikely to be s h p e d by the quantity or quality of political violence; hence, if for a short time period we discover a nonspurious correhtion between ethnic diversity and political instability we can assume that the former hs led to the htter. But in the long run this assumption probably has less validity. -Ethnic groups a n and do come into being or revamp their internal characteristics in response to the pressure of external violencc. On the segmentary type society as an adaptation for external aggression see Middlcton andTait (1958); on the formation of the Ashanti Confederation for military purposes see Apter (1963: 100-104); or on the characteristic features of constantly skirmishing blende political units during the precolonial period see Barrows (1975: ch. 3). However, since for the most part w e will bc concerned in this study with a relatively short time span-the decade of the 196Os-we a n adopt the assumption with reasonable safety.


Barrows / ETHNIC DIVERSlTY [I671

3. A debate among coUectors and nimipulators of events &ta concerns the issue of whether aggregate scores should be adjusted for popuhtion size in order to produce measures of instability rates or properties, such as deaths per million population. Those who argue in favor of controlling for popuhtion size chim, in essence, that big societies by virtue of having more people are more likely to experience instability events than little societies. Those who argue against this chim that instability phenomena are characteristics of societies, not individuals, and that if population size is important for instability it should be examined directly as an independent variable, not hidden away as part of a normalization procedure. I tend to fall in with the latter a m p , espechlly with respect to the elite dimension of instability. It is difficult for me to imagine measuring coup activity in a society in any way other t h m observing instances of coup-related behavior and in some fashion aggregating them. Dividing this score by population makes little theoretical sense, since a coup relates to the society as a unit and there seems no a priori reason why the number of sub-units-people-should be systematically taken into account. It makes somewhat more Sense to consider population size with respect to the turmoil and commurd dimensions. Here it is possible to think of local- and individual-level factors as contributing to instability phenomena, and therefore, all other things held equal, a larger number of localities and individuals will produce a hrger number of instability events. The counter-argument is that societywide factors subsume most local- and individual-level factors with respect to instability, and therefore it is not wise to distort their indicators by adjusting for population. I have proceeded on the basis of this latter assumption, although the possibility should be left open in future studies for a comparison of the two forms of measurement to determine which better reflects reality.

Another issue concerns the appropriateness of the procedures used in weighting the various aspects of each of our dimensions of instability. It u n be legitimately %id that there is an element of arbitrariness in, for instance, multiplying the number of successful coups by a factor of five and then adding the product to the number of unsuccessful coups multiplied by three. Why five and three and not six and two? Critics can fimd fault with the particular factors used for weighting; this is always a m t t e r of judgment and therefore somewhat arbitrary. But what Seems to me to be beyond dispute are (a) the need to rank aspects of instability in terms of their importance for the overall concept and (b) the order in which they are assigned importance in the scheme adopted by this pqe r . Is there any doubt that a successful coup is more important than an unsuccessfully attempted coup, which in turn is more important than a mere plot? Hence, we may quibble about details but the basic idea is valid.

Lastly, any study based on events data should announce its conclusions modestly and tentatively. Events data are prone to a number of difficulties that call into question their relibility and validity, the most important of which is unevenness of reportage, a form of srnpling error. Newspaper reports and radio broadcasts comprise the basic source of information from which cvents dzta are drawn. Hence, the social scientist is dependent upon a source over which he has no control: the newspaper editor decides where to send a reporter; the radio station selects its news output; governments are notoriously given to interfering in the news process through censure and propaganda. These problems are especially extant in Bhck Africa. Given this high potential for inaccuracy, the research u n only hope that the errors are not


[I681 COhlPARATlVE POLITICAL STUDIES / JULY 1976

systematically biased, although the likelihood is, for instance, that the pooreq countries receive lzss attention than their wealthier neighbors. The overridhl rationale for using events data despite their deficiencies is that they represent the best information available on political instability, particuhrly for Black Afr ia . F~~ discussions of events data reliability see Taylor and Hudson (1972: 391423) and Morrison et al. (1972: 124-125). but b y far the most careful assessnient of so^^^^ of error in African data is Welfling (1975);note pxticularly her discovery of s ignsgnt systematic measurement error in those indicators derived from tlie counting of events (p. 880).

4. Originally i t was decided t o rescue sochl mobilization (change) as a variable by imposing on it the underlying personality characteristics of its sochl mobilization (level) cousin. That is, since there was support for the unidimensionality assumption with respect t o the level component of sochl mobilization, this assumption lvas transferred to the change component, allowing us to generate ;I composite index of sochl mobilization (change). Technically, this meant weighting the c h g e indicators \\$th the factor score coefficients derived from the level indicators and then summing tlie products. However, an anonymous reviewer denounced this procedure as being inherently suspect, and so it was scrapped. I t should be added, however, that the vllriable social niobilization (change) 3s originally used produced no evidence that would alter the basic conclusions of this paper; indeed, it proved to be a mild and unexciting variablc.

5. Gurr (1966) has published the only cross-national measure of inequality that includes niost of the countries of Black Africa, insofar as I a m aware. His Discrimination Indes is conceptually quite close to my Ethnic Group Inequality Scale. I t masures the portion of a popuhtion substantially and systematically excluded from valued economic, political. and social positions because of ethnic, religious, linguistic or regional characteristics (p. 71). There are three factors, however. 11131 limit comparability between the two nicasures: (a) Gurr did not attempt to develop a measure so sensitive to inequality as my own (producing a hrge number of 0% scores); (b) the time of measurement was slightly different, Gurrs in the late 1950s and ar ly 1960s, mine in the mid-1960s; and, most importantly. (c) Curr considered colonialism a major form of discrimination (producing a number of 100% scores), whereas colonialism m s automatically excluded from my analysis shcc I investigated only politically independent societies in Black Africa. In short, despite an initial conceptual basis for comparability, Currs d a b are dissimihr in enough technical respects to eliminate their usefulness 3s an indcpendent check on my inequality scale.

REFERENCES

AMER, D. E. (1963) G h m a in Transition. New York: Atheneum. UARRO\\S, W. L. (1975) Grassroots Politics in an African State: Integration and

BATES. R . H. (1972) Ethnicity and niodcrnization incontemporary Africa. Sock1 Development in Sicrrii Leone. New York: Africana.

Science Working Papcr No. 16. Pasadcna: California lnstiliite of Tccltnology.



BIENAN, II. (1970) Tanzania: Party Transformtion and Economic Development. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press.

BWY, D. P. (1968) Political instability in Latin America: the cross-cultural test of a u u s a l model. Latin Amer. Research Rev. 3: 17-66.

COHEN, A. (1969) Custom and Politics in Urban Africa. Berkeley and Los Angcles: Univ. of California Press.

COLEhIAN, J. S. (1960) Conclusion, in G. Almond and J. S . Coleman, The Politics of the Developing Areas. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press.

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lValttv L. Barrotvs is Adjunct Assistant Professor of Intentational Relations and Chairman of the International Relations program with the Boston University Overseas Graduate Programns; lie is presently residing in Vicenza, Italy. His piiblicntions include articles in World Politics, Naval War College Review, and several non-American journals. His book on Grassroots Politics in an African State: Integration and Development in Sierra Leone was published this year.

ERRATUM

In the research note by Jack E. Vincent, Explorations in D-Space: An Application of Deviancz Theory, which appeared in the April 1976 (Vol. 9, No. 1) issue of Compnrative Political Studies, the following erratum should be noted:

In the text and in the titles of List 1 and List 2, the word Weiss should be amended to read WEIS


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