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RELIGIOUS EDUCATION AND REFORMIST

ISLAM IN THAILANDS SOUTHERN BORDER

PROVINCES: THE ROLES OF HAJI SULONGABDUL KADIR AND ISMAIL LUTFI JAPAKIYA

JO S E PH CH I N YO N G L I O WS. Rajaratnam School of International Studies,

Nanyang Technological University

INTRODUCTION

The topic of Islamic education in southern Thailand has been the subjectof relatively extensive academic inquiry. However, most of this scholar-ship has centred on the relationship between the Thai state and theMalay community of Pattani,1 Yala, and Narathiwat, commonly referredto in the literature as the southernmost border provinces of Thailand.From the prevailing literature, a number of assumptions can be gleanedthat inform the states perception of the Islamic schools in theseprovinces.2 First, schools are often seen to encourage separatism byperpetuating Malay culture in an insular and exclusivist manner. Second,the system of Islamic education privileges religious over academic andvocational training, and by that token does not prepare students formodern Thai society. Concomitantly, this has resulted in the widening ofthe gulf between communal and national identities. Finally, many

1 This paper uses Patani to denote the historical Malay-Muslim kingdom,and Pattani as the current administrative province in southern Thailand.

2 Uthai Dulyakasem, Education and Ethnic Nationalism: A Study of theMuslim-Malays in Southern Siam, PhD diss. (Stanford University), 1981; SurinPitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism: A Case Study of the Malay-Muslims ofSouthern Thailand (Bangkok: Thai Khadi Research Institute, ThammasatUniversity, 1985); Wan Kadir Che Man, Muslim Separatism: The Moros of

Southern Philippines and the Malays of Southern Thailand (Singapore: OxfordUniversity Press, 1990).

The Author (2009). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Oxford Centre for Islamic

Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: [email protected]

Journal of Islamic Studies (2009) pp. 1 of 30 doi:10.1093/jis/etp026

Journal of Islamic Studies Advance Access published June 29, 2009

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quarters within the Thai political establishment see Islamic schoolsteaching a radical brand of Islam that legitimizes violence against thestate.

Needless to say, these assumptions fundamentally contradict those

held by the Malay community itself regarding the nature and function ofreligious education. To them, Islamic education is seen as a core featureof Malay identity, which is in turn built on a historical narrative thatspeaks of the greatness of the independent Patani Sultanate that wasannexed by Siam in 1909. According to this narrative, the centrality ofIslamic education is expressed in the ubiquitous institution of the pondokor Islamic boarding school, a key institution in traditional Malay culturaland communal life. Nowhere is this uniqueness and exclusivity morepatently expressed than in the realm of language. Malays in the border

provinces by and large speak a local dialect commonly but problema-tically referred to in Thai as Jawi or Yawi (local Malays refer to it asBahasa Tempatan or the local language), and which is linguisticallysimilar to the dialect spoken in the neighbouring northern Malaysianstate of Kelantan.3 Given the significance of linguistic disjuncture, it isnotable how they carry religious overtones as well. Here, Omar Faroukobserves:

it is only in recent times that the Thai language has been elevated as the language

of Islam in Thailand. Consequently, there is a growing corpus of Islamic religious

literature in Thai. There have already been a few versions of translations of the

Qur8:n. Collections of Hadiths too have been translated into Thai. The

expanding role of the Thai language within Thailands Muslim public sphere,

however, has not dislodged the entrenched position of Malay as the traditional

language of Islam, especially among the Malay Muslims of Thailand.4

Notwithstanding the salience of these anachronistic dichotomies, thereis a tendency evident in both trains of thought to view the Malaycommunity and Islamic education in the southern border provinces as

monolithic entities. Bearing this in mind, it should not be surprising tofind that these perspectives paper over major shifts and trends in Islamiceducation in the southern provinces. In addition, the fact that the vastmajority of the literature that deals with Islamic education in the

3 The allusion to Jawi or Yawi as a Malay dialect is problematic as Jawi ismore accurately described as a written script rather than a spoken language.Scholars know of the spoken dialect as either Kelantanese or simply the Pattanidialect or language.

4 Omar Farouk Bajunid, Islam, Nationalism, and the Thai State in Wattana

Sugunnasil (ed.), Dynamic Diversity in Southern Thailand (Chiang Mai:Silkworm Books, 2005), 10.

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southernmost provinces privileges the separatist conflict in the region asthe point of entry further obscures the complex nature of this topic. Thispaper aims to move the discussion away from the separatist conflict andto identify shifts and trends in Islamic knowledge and education in

Thailands Malay-majority southernmost provinces. It focuses inparticular on the rise of reformist conceptions of Islamic knowledgeand education (reformist in that they challenge prevailing religiousthought and praxis) personified in two prominent ulema, and criticallyscrutinizes the impact that they have had on the religious and culturalterrain of Thailands southern border provinces.5

ISLAM, HISTORY, AND TRADITIONALISM

Historically, the Patani Sultanate consisted of the area that today more orless corresponds geographically to the provinces of Pattani, Yala, andNarathiwat in southern Thailand, and was known between the sixteenthand eighteenth centuries as a d:r al-Isl:m. At the same time, Patani wasalso a flourishing centre of commerce and trade, where traders fromSoutheast Asia met and transacted with counterparts from elsewhere onthe Asian continent as well as Europe.6

More specifically for our purpose here, it is important to note thatPatani was during this time emerging as a major centre for Islamiclearning in Southeast Asiato the extent that scholars would laterdescribe it as the cradle of Islam in Southeast Asia, not unlike Aceh orMelaka.7 The pondok schools of southern Thailand and particularly the

5 This paper is cognizant of the fact that ethnic Malays are not solelycongregated in Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat. For instance, Satun, anotherprovince in what is broadly known as southern Thailand or even a southern

border province, has a large number of ethnic Malays who nevertheless havebeen assimilated into Thai culture, as indicated by the popularity of the Thailanguage, as opposed to Malay, in the province. That said, the focus of the paperis on Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, where most Islamic schools are found, andwhere tension remains between Thai and Malay cultural practices and identitymarkers.

6 One of the foremost progenitors of this nationalist narrative of Patanihistory is Ibrahim Syukri. See History of the Malay Kingdom of Patani (SejarahKerajaan Melayu Patani), transl. Conner Bailey and John N. Miksic (Bangkok:Silkworm Books, 2005).

7 In this respect, Patani competed with Aceh, Kelantan, and Melaka for themantle of Serambi Mekkah or the Veranda of Makka.

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southern border provinces, played a critical role in establishing andsustaining this reputation.

Pondok schools have a long tradition in Malay history.8 The pondokplays an integral role in Malay society in the southern border provinces

of Thailand, including the key task of providing religious instruction.To Thailands Malay minority however, these schools are not merelyreligious institutions; as a physical and symbolic entity the pondoks areclosely associated with Malay identity in that they function asrepositories and progenitors of Malay language, history, and culture.

By the nineteenth century Patani had gained a reputation as a regionalcentre for Islamic learning, where Muslim students from both theSoutheast Asian mainland (primarily Cambodia) and the archipelagowould sojourn in any of the several hundred pondok schools in the

provinces, before making the trip to the Middle East and North Africa tofurther their religious education.9 Patani was renowned for its religiousteachers and scholars, a point already well documented in the works ofAzyumardi Azra, Peter Riddell, and Hassan Madmarn.10 Aside from thepath-breaking work of Raymond Scupin however, comparatively less isknown of scholars associated with patterns and trends of reformist Islamin Thailand.11 Patani Muslims were notable educators in major Islamicinstitutions in the Arab-Muslim world, and in the nineteenth and earlytwentieth century several Patani scholars such as Ahmad Patani, Zayn al-

Abidin Patani, and Daud ibn Abd-Allah Patani taught in the MalayAalaqa (study circle) at Masjid al-Earam in Makka, where they werepopularly known as 6ulam:8 J:w;.12 Back home, tok guru (pondokreligious teachers) were instrumental in translating religious commen-taries and sermons from Arabic to Jawi (the modified classical Malayscript that includes, among others, Arabic and Khmer influences),

8 The definitive study of Islamic schools in southern Thailand available in theEnglish language remains Hasan Madmarns Pondok and Madrasah in Patani(Bangi: Penerbit University Kebangsaan Malaysia, 1999).

9 William R. Roff, The Origins of Malay Nationalism (Kuala Lumpur:Oxford University Press, 2nd edn., 1994), 435.

10 See Madmarn, Pondok and Madrasah in Pattani; Peter Riddell, Islam andthe MalayIndonesian World: Transmission and Responses (Singapore: HorizonBooks, 2001), 184204; Azyumardi Azra, The Origins of Islamic Reformism inSoutheast Asia (New South Wales: Allen & Unwin, 2004), 1226.

11 See Raymond Scupin, Muslim Accommodation in Thai Society, Journal ofIslamic Studies 9/2 (July 1998): 22958.

12 Numan Hayimasae, Hj Sulong Abdul Kadir (18951954): Perjuangan danSumbangan Beliau Kepada Masyarakat Melayu Patani [Haji Sulong Abdul

Kadir (18951954): His Struggle and Contributions to the Malay Community ofPatani] (MSc. diss., University Sains Malaysia, 2002), 85.


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making them accessible to a wider audience largely illiterate in Arabic.It is informative to register the reflections of Snouck Hugronje, the Dutchbureaucrat and scholar of Islam in the Dutch East Indies, on the influenceof the Patani ulema in Makka:

During his visit to Mecca in the 1880s, Snouck Hugronje had occasion to have

extensive contacts with the Malay community there, and to observe who were

the most influential writers living in the community at the time. One of his

interesting observations was that the writings of scholars originating from the

Patani area were significant, as measured by the regularity of their publication by

Meccan presses. Thus those Patani thinkers who made a mark in Mecca must

have left a legacy throughout the Malay world via returning students.13

While the prominence of Patani as a regional centre par excellence of

Islamic education and Malay identity may have eroded over the decades,its historical legacy continues to inform the conception of identity amongthe Malay population in the southern border provinces and henceremains poignant to any assessment of contemporary Islamic education.

By the early twentieth century, just as a reawakening of religiousconsciousness was underway across the Muslim world, Patani had thelargest number of pondok schools in the Malay Peninsula, drawingstudents from all over the Southeast Asian region. Following theadministrative consolidation of Siamese rule over the Sultanate in 1909

after the signing of the Anglo-Siamese Treaty, southern resistance to thecentralization policies quickly emerged, led by aristocratic Malay elitesdisplaced as a result of these changes. Indeed, it would be these eliteswho would lead Malay resistance to Siamese rule for the first half of thetwentieth century. Nevertheless, the Siamese governments attempts toexert control over traditional institutions such as the pondok and Shar;6acourtsthe educational and judicial backbone of Malay societyensured that disenchanted religious teachers and jurists also provided afertile source of intellectual leadership and religio-cultural legitimacy for

movements opposing the incorporation of the southern provinces intothe Siamese central state. Religious leaders were further emboldened bythe Islamic reformist movement of the early twentieth century that sweptthrough the Malay world. As we will see later, this reformist tidewitnessed an influx of ideas from scholars that threatened to transformMuslim mindsets and assertiveness, placing them further at odds notonly with central authorities, who in any case never fully comprehendedthe implications of Islamic reformism for Muslims in Thailand, but alsothe traditional Malay religious monopoly.

13 Riddell, Islam and the Malay-Indonesian World, 198.


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CHALLENGING THE STATUS QUO: HAJISULONG ABDUL KADIR

At the time of its inception, Islamic reformism in Southeast Asia differed

from ongoing trends in the rest of the Muslim world in a number ofrespects. In particular, reformism in the region was primarily a reactionto folk traditions, seen as expressions of decadence and indulgence in thepractices of the j:hiliyya (the age of pre-Islamic ignorance), and wasaimed more at purifying Southeast Asian Islam through the exercise ofijtih:d (independent judgement) rather than rejecting classical commen-taries of the Qur8:n and Aad;th. These early reformers also rejected theconvention of uncritical acceptance of textual sources and prevailingreligious authority. Rather, they advocated a return to the true and

authentic sources of Islamthe Qur8:n and Sunnain their emphasis ontawA;d, the oneness of God. One of the initiatives undertaken byreformists to facilitate this was the move to translate the Qur8:n into thevernacular languages (Thai in Bangkok and Malay in the southernprovinces) in order to make it accessible to ordinary Muslims, and tohave the khu3ba (Friday sermon) delivered in the vernacular as well sothat the public could comprehend the messages.14 Given its reliance onuncritical acceptance of authority and rote memory of the Qur8:n andAad;th, it is hardly surprising to find that reformists were highly sceptical

of Islamic education in Thailand, which they saw as on the verge ofdecline.15

One of the most prominent leaders of the reform movement inThailands southern border provinces was Haji Sulong Abdul Kadir. Bornin 1895 in Kampung Anak Ru (now transformed into a thriving tradingand commercial district serving as a gateway to Pattani town), HajiSulong came from a line of eminent 6:lims. The most renowned of themwas his grandfather, Syeikh Zainal Abidin bin Ahmad al-Fatani, whocontinues to be fondly remembered by the Malays of the border

provinces as Tok Minal.16

Following his family tradition, Haji Sulongwas schooled in Arabic and Islamic texts. Kamal Zaman notes that Haji

14 The traditionalists however, had insisted that the language of the Qur:nand the khu3ba remain Arabic, the original language of Islam. The debate overtranslation and the khu3ba was won by the reformists. Today, sermons areconducted in the vernacular: Thai in Bangkok and the north as well as in theupper southern region, and Malay in the southern border provinces. These were,however, until more recently, two of the rare victories for the reformists.

15 This contention will be expanded in greater detail below.16 Muhammad Kamal K. Zaman, Fatani 13 Ogos [Pattani 13 August] (Kota

Bahru: n.p, 1996), 1.


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Sulong was a gifted and intelligent student who memorized the entireQur8:n by the tender age of eight.17 Haji Sulong attended Pondok HajiAbdul Rashid in Kampung Sungei Pandang, Patani, for his early Islamiceducation before proceeding to Makka Ma8had D:r al-6Ul

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Shafi6i school. Additionally, while participating in the Malay Aalaqas inSaudi Arabia, Haji Sulong also came into close contact with Egyptianscholarly circles, during the Aajj, many of whom were prominentreformists and modernists. Haji Sulongs previous exposure to anti-

colonial Malay nationalism sparked in him further interest in the Arabnationalism that was at the time sweeping across the Arabian Peninsula,and which was distinctly captured in Islamist thinking emanating fromEgypt. He became further acquainted with the reformist ideas of 6Abduh,as well as the works of Jam:l al-D;n al-Afgh:ni (18391897), alsopopularly known as the Awakener of the East, through these exchangeswith Egyptian Islamists and intellectuals, and witnessed on a daily basishow the ulema led the struggle to bring justice to the umma on the Arabsocio-political scene.21 Coupled with his active interest in Malay

nationalism, Haji Sulong increasingly began to see his role as an :limextending beyond the teaching of religion and into the socio-politicalsphere. In turn, this generated in him an abiding interest in political andsocial activism which was to preoccupy him for the rest of his life, andcatapulted him to a position of prominence as a leader of southernThailands Malay community.

RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL ACTIVISM

Haji Sulongs early activism in Patani was focused primarily on the taskof guiding the community back to the path of pristine Islam from whichthey had strayed. To him, Islam was not just a spiritual obligation builtaround the five pillars of faith but rather a total ideological orientationthat encompassed both personal and public spheres, thereby governingevery aspect of Muslim life. On his return to Patani, Haji Sulongapparently saw in the local Muslim community a people who were poorand backward, akin to the j:hiliyya society in pre-Islamic Arabia.22

Patani, once the cradle of Islam in Southeast Asia, now seemed, in hiseyes, to be plagued with declining religious consciousness and analarming dilution of faith and piety.

21 Hayimasae, Hj Sulong Abdul Kadir, 109; Imtiyaz Yusuf, The Role ofChularajmontri/Shaikh al-Islam in Resolving Ethno-religious Conflict inSouthern Thailand: The Human Security Dimension, 1315. Available athttp://humansecurityconf.polsci.chula.ac.th/Documents/Presentations/

Imtiyaz.doc.22 Hayimasae, Hj Sulong Abdul Kadir, 86.

http://humansecurityconf.polsci.chula.ac.th/Documents/Presentations/http://humansecurityconf.polsci.chula.ac.th/Documents/Presentations/

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Sharing the Islamic reformist ideals of the aforementioned thinkers,one of Haji Sulongs immediate courses of action was to transform thestagnant traditional pondok education system that he identified as one ofthe root causes for the socio-religious backwardness of the Malays in

Patani. He observed that the approximately 500 pondok that existed atthe time (ca. 1929) were not effective in addressing the diminution ofreligion in Malay society by virtue of being enslaved in non-Islamiccultural practices. Furthermore, he observed that the pondok curriculum,which was relatively informal and far from the comprehensive,standardized, and rounded curriculum of modern academic institutions,lacked much-needed structure and direction. The pondok model ofeducation and its scope relied heavily on the tok guru, and hence wasdictated by the area and scope of his expertise.23 In addition, ineffective

administration allowed students to enrol and leave the pondok at will.This created the problem of assessment, particularly when pondokstudents were to be assessed alongside their counterparts from thenational education system in order to ascertain potential for scholasticplacement and advancement. Because of the lack of a proper accredita-tion system and excessive reliance on the personal assessment of the tokguru, even a well-established pondok would not continue its tradition ofscholarly excellence if its tok guru did not annoint a successor to replacehim upon his retirement or death. This effectively meant that the

pondoks, particularly the better-known ones, were in danger of eitherlosing their reputation and status, or the successors of the tok guru mightbe ill-equipped to transmit his teachings, thereby leading to thepossibility of misinterpretation and misrepresentation.

Haji Sulong found such shortcomings unacceptable if the communityand its educational institutions were to progress. To him, the study ofgeneral academic subjects such as mathematics, geography and sciencewas a critical facet to Islamic education, and hence had to be taughtalongside the religious curriculum. He also stressed the need for greaterstructure and regulation on matters such as the entry age of pondokstudents, standardized duration of study courses, as well as compulsoryannual examinations to assess and track academic development. In orderto address these concerns, Haji Sulong began by teaching Islam as a tokguru through tabl;gh, travelling across the Patani region from one villageto another. Very soon, his teachings attracted a mass following amongthe Malays.

As one can no doubt imagine, the traditional religious elite did nottake kindly to these veiled charges of incompetence, and Haji Sulongs

23 For instance, if a particular tok guru was learned in fiqh, most likely thepondok would focus the majority of its syllabus on the study of fiqh.


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growing popularity met with not a small degree of disdain from them.24

They opposed Haji Sulongs reformist religious outlook, whichinvariably undermined their religious authority and status within thestrictly hierarchical Malay community. Furthermore, his ideas were

construed as an attempt to undermine the centuries-old institution of thepondok. At the height of this opposition from traditionalist quarters, thepondok religious elite accused Haji Sulong of undermining establishedauthority, dividing the Malay community, fostering instability, andthreatening the peace in the region.25 They subsequently mobilized theirconsiderable influence to repel the reformist vision of a new Malayreligious identity. Complaints were registered with local governmentauthorities, and Haji Sulongs activities came under intense scrutiny.26

Though Haji Sulong was summoned for investigation as a result of these

complaints, he was released soon after as the charges made against himby the traditional religious elite could not be substantiated. Needless tosay, this experience only served to further inspire Haji Sulong andconvince him of the need to push through Islamic education reforms.

At the same time that he had evoked the ire of the traditional religiousleadership, Haji Sulong also enjoyed significant popular support fromvarious segments of the local community.27 With this support, HajiSulong established Patanis first private Islamic school, Madrasah al-Maarif al-Wataniah Fatani, in 1933.28 Madrasah al-Maarif was a

modern Islamic school which sought to craft a curriculum aroundreligious, academic and vocational education, and to introducesystematic evaluation to replace the arbitrary assessment of traditionalpondok. The curriculum at the madrasa spanned both Islamic andsecular sciences and humanities. Under Islamic science, the subjectstaught were qir:8:t (recitation of the Qur8:n), tafs;r, Aad;th, fiqh, nahw

24 Hayimasae, Hj Sulong Abdul Kadir, 118.25 Ibid.26 Indeed, Haji Sulongs popularity and activism had also begun to occasion

discomfort in the central government. In particular, the Bangkok leadership werenever sure of either his intentions or those of his followers. One highly suspiciouselement was his political affiliation with Tengku Mahmud Mahyuddin, youngestson of the former raja of Patani who nursed ambitions of independence. In theevent the government approved pressures for Malay autonomy, it has beenargued that Haji Sulong had intended to appoint Tengku Mahmud as the firstMalay-born head of the autonomous Patani. See Pitsuwan, Islam and MalayNationalism, 157.

27 Thanet Aphornsuvan, Origins of Malay Muslim Separatism in SouthernThailand, Asia Research Institute Working Paper Series no.32 (Singapore: Asia

Research Institute, 2004), 16.28 Zaman, Fatani 13 Ogos, 8.


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and sarf(grammar and conjugation), tawA;d(theology), ta8r;kh (history),and akhl:q (ethics). The general education syllabus comprised science,geography and mathematics.29

The opening of Madrasah al-Maarif came at the time when Thailand

itself was undergoing a major transformation from absolute monarchy toconstitutional government. In its bid to improve its relationship with theMalays in the south and demonstrate greater sensitivity to andaccommodation of their cultural needs, the Peoples Party-led govern-ment, returned to power immediately after the war, embarked on severalinitiatives to relax the assimilation policies of preceding administrationsthat had strained relations with the community.30 These included theestablishment of the Patronage of Islam Act, restoration of Islamic lawsgoverning private and family affairs, and the reinstatement of the office

of the Chularajmontri.31

To further drive home the point, Prime MinisterPhyara Phahol made a personal donation to Haji Sulongs Islamic schoolbuilding project and later even attended its inauguration ceremony as agesture of the governments support.32 Such demonstrations of supportfor the Malay community on the part of the Bangkok establishment wereunprecedented given the erstwhile suspicion and antagonism that existedbetween the Thai state and the Malay population.

On his part, Haji Sulong was aware that the greatest opposition to hisreform initiatives would likely come not so much from the state, but

from the tok guru of the traditionalist pondok schools. This was because

29 Hayimasae, Hj Sulong Abdul Kadir, 145.30 Part of the reason for this confluence of interests between the Peoples Party

government and Haji Sulong was the fact that the anti-feudal, egalitarian, andmodernizing (with a strong socialist influence, one should add) ideology of theformer was, broadly speaking, very much in line with Haji Sulongs idea ofIslamic reformism.

31 The office of the Chularajmontri or Shaykh al-Isl:m was first introduced

during the court of Ayutthaya, and the person occupying the position was taskedto advise the court on matters pertaining to Islam. The Chularajmontri is todayseen as the official, if titular, head of Thailands Muslim community. He isformally appointed by royal decree, and holds the office for a life term. In termsof institutional capacity, the Chularajmontri supervises Thailands 29 provincialIslamic committees and the Islamic Centre of Thailand, which was established in1945 as an outgrowth of the Patronage of Islam Act. The Chularajmontri iselected by the presidents of the 29 provincial Islamic committees (which togethermake up the Provincial Council of Islamic Affairs) and 36 members of theNational Council of Islamic Affairs housed at the Islamic Centre, and then

endorsed by the king by royal decree.32 Hayimasae, Hj Sulong Abdul Kadir, 142.


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his agenda of reform and his establishment of the madrasa were seen asan attempt to undermine the traditional primacy of the pondok andchallenge the revered status of the tok guru. Not only did Haji Sulonganticipate these objections, he attempted to pre-empt them by embarking

on a public campaign to persuade the tok guru of the traditional pondokof the benefits of his modern conception of Islamic education. Theseattempts received an initial boost when Haji Sulongs efforts wereendorsed by several of Patanis more prominent educators like HajiMohammad Idris, a widely respected scholar of Islam, popularly knownas Tok Guru Bermin, Jambu.33

Support for Haji Sulongs education reform initiative was howevershort-lived. As anticipated, his efforts were paradoxically undone not byelements from within the state but by members of the Malay community

itself, the very community he sought to uplift. The reservations of tokguru towards Haji Sulongs reformist agenda persisted despite hisattempts to win them over, and they continued to view his initiatives notonly as a threat to the status quo, but also as an attempt to underminetheir longstanding authority and influence over the local community.34

The response was the initiation of yet another round of concertedattempts to discredit Haji Sulong in the eyes of the Thai state by callinghis loyalty into question. Efforts were made to sow suspicion in theminds of government officials with vivid depictions of Haji Sulongs

megalomania. Thanet Aphornsuvan describes one such attempt: thefollowers [of Haji Sulong] even knelt down to take off Haji Sulongsshoes and clean his feet for him before entering a masjid. Others wereready to carry the umbrellas to protect [him from] the sun when hevisited the Muslim communities in the four southern provinces includingsome districts in Songkhla.35 Given the fact that by then Haji Sulongpossessed the credentials of a prominent Islamic scholar and eloquentspeaker with a wide following among the local population, and alsoenjoyed a political base by virtue of his position as Chairman of thePattani Provincial Islamic Council, it was not difficult to see how awhispering campaign of the above nature could resonate with detractorswho had been carefully scrutinizing his movements.

Viewed with some consternation by a state not entirely comfortablewith his transformative agenda, and unable to harness extensive supportfrom the traditional religious elite, Haji Sulongs madrasa was closeddown in 1935 on suspicions that it was operating as a politicalorganization. This act of closing down the modernist school however,

33 Ibid, 146.34 Hayimasae, Hj Sulong Abdul Kadir, 146.35 Aphornsuvan, Origins of Malay Muslim Separatism, 22.


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only served to further harden the madrasa as a symbol of the Malay-Muslim struggle, around which resistance would later coalesce when itspremises became the covert base for meetings and assemblies among theMalay political leadership. The most significant event hosted by the

madrasa was the meeting of Malay elders convened by Haji Sulong tochart the future of Greater Patani that culminated in the historic seven-point demand for autonomy presented by the Malay leadership to thegovernment in July 1947. Among other things, this document called forthe appointment of local Malays as governors of the Malay provinces,the reservation of up to eighty percent of government administrativepositions in the region for Malays, and the creation of a Muslim board togovern religious affairs.36 Hence, while not originally intended to be acentre of subversive activity, Madrasah al-Maarif nevertheless became

an important symbol of resistance, as did its founder Haji Sulong.It is important to note here that despite the closure of Madrasah al-

Maarif and the circumspection towards Haji Sulongs attempts atreform, the momentum of change had, to certain extent, already been setin motion. Gradually, more and more pondoks began to introduce thereform curriculum conceptualized by Haji Sulong into their syllabuses, inso doing transforming the pondok into an institution of systematiceducation. This, however, was not captured in Hasan Madmarns majorstudy on the transformation of pondok education.37 In Pondok and

Madrasah in Pattani, Madmarn attributed the transformation to changesin government educational policies which began in the 1960s and gainedmomentum in the 1970s. He reasoned that the pondoks were compelledto change or face the threat of irrelevance and extinction, and evendemonization, when new legislation enforced the teachings of generaland academic subjects in all Islamic educational institutions. Thoughlegislative pressure was undoubtedly one of the catalysts that precipi-tated change, the study of the evolution of Islamic education systems inthe southern border provinces needs also to appreciate and acknowledge

Haji Sulongs contributions in generating the subterranean momentumfor change, particularly since this occurred well before the advent of statelegislation to regulate education in the southern provinces with thecreation of the Islamic private school.

36 For a list of the demands, see Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism, 152.37 To be fair, it was not Madmarns intention to deal substantively with Haji

Sulongs legacy in Islamic education. Be that as it may, because he does addressthe issue of curricula it is important to consider this particular aspect of the

historical context behind various attempts, including Haji Sulongs, to transformand improve the system.


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Notwithstanding the (halting) progress of his reformist project, HajiSulongs demise in 1952, when he mysteriously disappeared after beingarrested by Thai police, led to its swift deceleration owing to the lack ofcharismatic leaders of the calibre and popularity of Haji Sulong and of

firmly established structures. Indeed, with Haji Sulong removed from thereligio-cultural scene, it certainly appeared that the reformist movementin the southern border provinces had run its course.

THE CONTEMPORARY REFORMISTMOVEMENT AND ISMAIL LUTFI JAPAKIYA

Tension between traditionalists and reformists that echo the Kaum Tua

Kaum Muda contestations in the pre-war Malay world, and which wereillustrated by Haji Sulongs attempt to transform Islamic education, havesurfaced again in Thailands southern border provinces.38 This time, thecontestation finds expression in the form of the threat posed by Salafireformists to mainstream traditionalist Islamic education. This challengeechoes in part Haji Sulongs previous attempts at transforming Islamiceducation and takes the familiar form of a movement seeking to reformIslamic education through the introduction of academic and generalsubjects into the curriculum of Islamic schools, yet with a distinct

emphasis on the need to Islamize epistemology and pedagogy. In theminds of this new generation of reformists, it is in Islam (and specifically,the Qur8:n) that Muslims will find the resources to address the manyproblems they face as they struggle to find their place in the modernworld. How the reformists attempt and explain this reconciliation ofknowledge and faith will be addressed later in a discussion on thecurriculum of the Yala Islamic University. Suffice for now to note that forthese reformist intellectuals, this could be accomplished by combiningIslamic knowledge with familiarity with Western scholarship in sciences,

whilst at the same time advocating a return to a Salafist interpretation ofpristine Islam.39

Echoing the logic of those who came before, this move was describedby reformists as stemming at least in part from the realization thattraditional institutions of Islamic learning required urgent reform.Additionally, it was also largely a consequence of the perceivedfailure of traditionalists and secularists from the Islamic educational

38 Kaum Tua refers to the traditionalists or older generation, and KaumMuda to the reformists-modernists or young turks.

39 Interview at Yala Islamic University (formerly Yala Islamic College),Pattani, 15 January 2006.


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establishment to meet the demands of an Islamic community increasinglyconscious of the challenge posed by Western intellectual traditions andpolitico-strategic hegemony.40 Hence, while the austere and literalistinterpretations of the Qur8:n commonly associated with Salafism anchor

these transformational ideas, in the realm of education they are alsodistinctly reformist and modernist in the sense that they challenge thetraditional perspectives of religious education, which, among otherthings, are premised primarily on the authority of the tok guru, the use ofJawi (as opposed to Arabic) literature, and resistance to the introductionof sciences and other general academic and vocational subjects into theIslamic curriculum of the pondok. Beyond its attempt to restructureIslamic education in terms of contents and pedagogies, the contemporaryreformist movement also aims to contest the ideational and cultural

practices associated with the Malay-Muslim community, which theydeem to be either shirk or bid6a (unIslamic innovation).

This contemporary reformist movement is led by Ismail Lutfi Japakiyaor Ismail Lutfi al-Fatani, who graduated in 1986 from the IslamicUniversity of Imam Muhammad bin Saud with a doctorate in Shar;6a.Ismail Lutfi is widely seen as the leading reformist Muslim educator inThailand today, and on the back of his connections with various Saudi-based interests cultivated during his sojourn in the Kingdom he hasplayed an instrumental role in charting the course and directing the

expansion of the contemporary reformist movement in the southernborder provinces.41 Summarizing the impact of Ismail Lutfi and hisbrand of reformist Islam on the landscape of Islamic education in theMalay south, Alexander Horstmann writes: Lutfis scholarship chal-lenges the authority of the traditional ulama.42 A popular reformistscholar not unlike Haji Sulong in his heyday, Lutfis appeal hasundoubtedly been facilitated by the influx of large amounts of financialsupport from the Saudi government and Saudi-linked charities that haveoverseen the establishment of a number of mosques and madrasas.

Ismail Lutfi is currently the rector of the Yala Islamic University, whichboasts modern educational facilities in both its campuses in Pattani andYala. Lutfi is also principal of Bamrung Islam Mukim Pujud, a madrasalocated in Muang, Pattani, where he teaches and holds weekly lecturesfor the general public from its mosque, often in front of audiences in

40 Interview at Bamrung Islam Mukim Pujud, Pattani, 14 January 2006.41 This is despite the fact that Lutfis formative years were spent in a

traditionalist Malay-Muslim family, and his father was a traditionalist tok guru.42 Alexander Horstmann, Class, Culture and Space: The Construction and

Shaping of Communal Space in South Thailand (Tokyo: Research Institute forthe Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 2002), 80.


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excess of a thousand people. In addition to his high profile as an 6:limand educator, Lutfi enjoys an accommodative relationship with the Thaigovernment, and as a consequence holds a number of prominentpositions, such as Chairman of the Consultative Committee of the

Foundation for Islamic Education in Southern Thailand and a Memberof Parliament under the interim government of Prime Minister SurayudChulanont. More recently, Lutfi has also been appointed advisor to theChularajmontri as well as Amir al-Haj (leader of those making thepilgrimage to Makka) by the Thai government.43 Apart from hisreligious, educational, and political responsibilities, Lutfi is also apopular speaker in Islamic scholarly circles in northern Malaysia (he iswell-known in the religious circles of the Parti Islam Se-Malaysia or PAS,the Islamist opposition party that runs the state government of

Kelantan), though he himself notes that since September 11 his speakingengagements in Malaysia have been markedly reduced.44 The intensity ofhis preaching and forcefulness of his personality, not to mention personalcharisma, have ensured that, while certain aspects of his reformist dogma,which challenge long-held traditional beliefs, are met with caution by thetraditionalist custodians of the faith (a point discussed further below),he himself has emerged as one of the most popular religious scholarsin Thailand. Here it should be noted that Lutfis competence and fluencyin Arabic have proven a strength, allowing him to demonstrate a deep

knowledge and access to authentic scripture that few among ThailandsIslamic religious intelligentsia can match. Because of this, Lutfi is viewedas a scholar who has the ability to simplify complex concepts of Islamicthought, a factor which has no doubt contributed to his appeal.45

Ismail Lutfis overall popularity has been enhanced by his embrace ofmodern technology. His transmission of knowledge is often facilitated bycommunication devices such as microphones, cassette recorders, andCDs, clearly distinguishing him from traditional religious teachers. Asidefrom his religious credentials and oratorical skills, Lutfis popularity is,

as alluded to earlier, further augmented by his access to substantialamounts of Saudi financial support, which he manages and disbursesthrough local Islamic charity networks across the three Malay provinces.The Saudi government, in particular, had been instrumental in the

43 See Ernesto Braam, Yala Islamic University as an agent of theinstitutionalization of Islamic reformism in South Thailand, paper presentedat the workshop Studying Islam in Southeast Asia: State of the Art and NewApproaches (Leiden, 78 July 2008), 15.

44 Ibid.45 This view was expressed on numerous occasions to the author in the course

of regular conversations with locals.


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establishment of Yala Islamic University. That said, it is observed thatwhile Ismail Lutfi is no doubt an immensely popular and respected 6:limin Thailand and his public lectures and khu3bas attract audiences in thethousands, his pool of committed followersthose who imbibe his

reformist ideas to the extent that they are prepared to critique theirtraditional religious leadersis likely from anecdotal evidence to besignificantly smaller, probably because most Malays in the southernprovinces remain respectful followers of long-held practices.

Yala Islamic University

The Yala Islamic University, founded by Ismail Lutfi, and to a lesserextent the College of Islamic Studies at the Prince of Songkhla University(Pattani Campus) have been major conduits of reformist Islam in thesouthern provinces. A major component of ilmu in the Yala IslamicUniversity curriculum is its attempt to make Islamic studies speak tomodern science in a manner that emphasizes the Qur8:nic roots ofmodern knowledge, and for that matter, modernity itself. Lutfiseducation project stresses the adoption of an exclusively Islamicvocabulary, and rests on the twin concerns for the moral health of theMuslim community as well as the dangers of excessive rationalism,which, to his mind, lures Muslims away from tawA;d in its attempt toconquer nature.46 To Lutfi and his reformist colleagues, reforming

Islamic education through the introduction of general academic subjectsinto the traditional education system is in line with the teachings ofIslam. Accordingly, deans at the Yala Islamic University have been taskedto expand their curriculum so as to embrace information technology,business and finance, and the social sciences in a manner which allowsthe injection of Islamic principles and considerations into these erstwhilesecular fields.47 The idea of how the sacred and the secular can be fusedinto a modern curriculum is envisaged in the following description of theUniversitys degree programmes which is worth quoting in its entirety:

The commencement of the initial conception [sic] Islamic educational philosophy

set forth by the founders of the college is to offer courses like sharia, usul-addin,

and Arabic language so as to pave the way for the YICs [Yala Islamic Colleges]

infrastructural platform of fardain. After four years of its first phase the YIC

submitted its proposal for establishing new departments in order to fulfil the fard

kifayah in its second phase. They are Department of Public Administration,

Department of Finance and Banking, and Department of Information

46 Interview with Ismail Lutfi, Pattani, 14 January 2006.47 Interview with Sukree Langputeh (Yala Islamic University), Pattani, 15

January 2006. The Yala Islamic University was initially Yala Islamic College.


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Technology. This second phase reminds us of the task of the Prophets Madinan

period while the first phase of the college presents a picture of the first period of

Islam in Makkah. The categories of fardain and fard kifayah are integratively

[sic] blended into the YICs curriculum in order to do justice to each individual by

respecting ones unique capacities and interests. Fardain knowledge is religiouslyobligatory. It is to be studied and mastered by all mature and free Muslims,

whereas fard kifayah is obligatory not for all, but for a sufficient number of such

Muslims in the community.48

It appears from the above statement that insofar as the reformistagenda is concerned, the Yala Islamic University is seen to be as amicrocosm which reflects the Prophet in knowledge and action in itsduty to produce Muslim men and women who reflect the qualities of theProphet as much as possible according to their respective potentialities

and abilities. This is the noble task for every Muslim to uphold theQur8:nic dictum that the Prophet is the best model for Muslims (UswahHasanah).49 Explaining further their mission in the field of education, aSaudi-trained Salafi ust:dh stated that those who graduated fromIslamic studies in Saudi Arabia return to build schools with the aim ofgiving back to the community in a way that allows them to live a pureIslamic lifestyle that reflects the practices of Muslims during the era ofthe Prophet in every aspect of their lives.50 It is clear from thesestatements that the objectives of education were not so much to

contribute to the national developmental and economic enterprise;instead, it was driven foremost by a moral ethos and a sense of individualpersonal obligation, and referred ultimately to the religion of Islam andteachings of the Prophet as they understand it. Instructors at the YalaIslamic University however hesitated to dismiss the secular educationthat currently forms the bulk of national education as unIslamic.Rather, it was often described as not Islamic enough.

Traditionalists, reformists, and arenas of contestation

There is no question that Ismail Lutfi views his reformist agenda fortransformation of Islamic education in the southern provinces as part of

48 Sukree Langputeh, The Islamization of the Discipline of PublicAdministration in a Thai Higher Education Institution: The Experience of YalaIslamic College, paper presented at the International Workshop on Voices ofIslam in Europe and Southeast Asia (Nakhon Si Thammarat, 2022 January2006).

49 Ibid.50 Interview at Suksana Sasana Witthaya, Narathiwat, 19 April 2007. Clearly,

the ust:dh interviewed is of the opinion that most, if not all, scholars trained inSaudi Arabia are of the reformist persuasion.


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the advancement of Islamic knowledge in the region, and it is preciselythis view that has caused some disquiet in mainstream traditionalistIslamic circles. Reminiscent of their reaction to Haji Sulong when heattempted to transform traditionalist Islamic education practices decades

earlier, Lutfis charisma and communicative skills have raised concerns incertain circles among the traditionalist religious establishment who fearthe appeal his brand of Islam appears to enjoy among the youngergeneration. Among the more vocal tok guru of the Kaum Tua who speakout against the Salafi-reformists are Heng Lubok Sawa (or Tuan GuruIbrahim, from Narathiwat), Loh Saroh (or Tuan Guru Abdullah, fromPattani), and perhaps the most famous of Pattanis contemporarygeneration of 6ulam:8 J:w;, Tuan Guru Ismail Sepanjang of the famedPondok Darul Muhajirin in Pattani. The points of departure between

Kaum Tua and Kaum Muda have been described in the followingmanner:

The conflict usually arises when those in masyarakat bawahan [grassroots] that

accept these new teachings through an interlocutor who himself does not have in-

depth knowledge, is biadat[lacking in courtesy], and who claims that Kaum Tua

are not adhering to the correct Islamic teachings. Likewise, those who reject the

Salafi-Wahhabi movement do so in a harsh manner as well. Usually, the conflicts

arise due to trivial comparative religious issues such as the prohibition of

weaving a three-sided ketupat [rice dumpling] because it is associated with

Hinduism and the worship of Hindu idols, the recitation of qunut [specialprayers] during subuh [dawn prayers], celebrating mawlud nabi [the Prophets

birthday], and others. The Salafi-Wahhabi movement always rejects such

observances which have become customary to the local population without

considering the positive or negative aspects of these issues, and whether it is

really against religious teachings or not. But we [Kaum Tua] see that if such

observances do not contradict the religion, then it should be protected, but the

Salafi-Wahhabi movement view it categorically as bid6a which is prohibited in

religion.51

Crucially, the root of this disquiet, as suggested earlier, can perhaps befound in Lutfis perspective on Patanis place in the history of Islamicknowledge in Southeast Asia. Contrary to conventional wisdom thatportrays Patani as a centre of excellence in Islamic studies, Lutfi arguescontroversially that earlier epochs of Islam in Thailand (for which hemeans periods prior to the advent of the current wave of reformistthinking) could be characterized as ilmu kurang (lacking in knowl-edge).52 It follows then, that the advent of reformist Islam was both a

51 Interview with Babo Broheng Payedueramae, Narathiwat, 21 May 2008.52 Interview with Ismail Lutfi, Pattani, 14 January 2006.


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basis and consequence of an increase in ilmu. In Lutfis own words,Islamic knowledge in Thailand used to be weak, and traditional Islamwas based on this lack of knowledge. But it [ilmu] has improved overtime. This leads to a deeper understanding of Islam.53 In making this

argument, Lutfi is in effect donwplaying an important part of Patanihistory and identity.

Schools associated with the contemporary reformist agenda in thesouthern border provinces are predominantly run by Saudi-trainedteachers who do not subscribe to the traditional emphasis of the Shafi6imadhhab that characterizes the jurisprudential inclinations of the vastmajority of Malays, not just in the provinces but across the Malayarchipelago as well.54 Indeed, such has been the deviation of thereformist template from the norms of Sufi and Shafi6i Islamic

traditionalism in southern Thailand that it has been opined in certainquarters that some of these teachers returning from Saudi Arabia areintroducing a new school offiqh.55 To say that these reformists reject theShafi6i school, the dominant legal tradition in Southeast Asia, is,however, not entirely accurate for these schools do provide madhhabinstruction, including Shafi6i jurisprudence. More appropriately, thesereformist scholars do not consider the Shafi6i madhhab, or any of theother traditional schools of Islamic law for that matter, to be the blanketauthoritative statement of Islam on any given issue. These Salafi scholars

are quick to remind that the madhhabs, while an important compass forMuslims in their conduct, were ultimately written by man and hencecould not be accorded a status similar to the Qur8:n or Sunna.

Aside from Saudi and some Kuwaiti-trained instructors, there aremore than a hundred graduates from the Yala Islamic University whocurrently teach in Islamic private schools throughout southernThailand.56 To be sure, there would be much interest in the possible,and in all likelihood, probable, correlation at least in certain respectsbetween religious instruction in Saudi Arabia and Wahhabi ideological

inclinations. That said, while such links may be instructive of trends inIslamic thought and education, one should be careful not to interpret therelationship in an overly-deterministic and axiomatic fashion, as isoften the case in popular perception, particularly among those seekingindicators of the phenomenon of Arabization of local Muslim

53 Ibid. In the course of my interview I had used the term traditional Islam torefer to the predominant Shafi6i-Sunni as well as Sufi Islam that continues to bewidely practised in southern Thailand.

54 Interview at Sad Samaki School, Pattani, 16 January 2006.55 Interview at Chongraksat Witthaya, Pattani, 14 February 2006.56 Interview with Ismail Lutfi, Pattani, 14 January 2006.


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communities. Given its geographic location and symbolism in Islamichistory, Saudi Arabia has logically been a location of preference forMalays seeking a more authentic religious education experience. Yet,while numerous Malays from the southern border provinces have over

the years studied in noted Salafi and Wahhabi institutions, many amongthem have also been actively involved and trained in distinctly MalayAalaqas at the Masjid al-Earam, where instruction commonly takesplace in Jawi, and where lessons are sometimes contextualized withreference to Malay culture and history.57 Indeed, several prominenttraditionalist 6ulam:8 J:w; from the provinces, including IsmailSepanjang, continue to teach in these Aalaqas today.

Predictably, as was the case in the 1930s with Haji Sulongs Madrasahal-Maarif al-Wataniah, the presence of these schools has been viewed as

a challenge to the traditional Islamic institutions and ideas, and has attimes elicited negative responses from religious teachers. One tok guruinterviewed assailed the reformists as sangat takbur (very arrogant) intheir attitude towards more established schools of Islamic thought.58

Others described the residual tension between the Kaum Muda andKaum Tua as being that between those who thought themselvesfaultless (yang merasa sempurna) and traditionalists who resistchange.59 Several traditionalist ust:dhs have berated their reformistcounterparts who criticize local beliefs and practices as part of Islamic

education. Others see this influence as incompatible with local adat(customary law) which remains an important institution in Malayculture.60 Such tensions are captured in the following remarks by AbdulAziz Yanya, President of the Pondok Association of Southern Thailand(Persatuan Pengajian Pondok Lima Wilayah Thailand Selatan):

The Wahhabi [i.e. Ismail Lutfi and his followers] understanding which brushes

aside generations of amalan sunnah [traditional religious practice] of the Islamic

ummah in this country can be said to be spreading among the educated and

young intellectuals. They reject the rituals of reading the Qur8:n for the dead,

recitation of Yasin, qunut, tahil, berdoa, berzikir [different types of formal

prayers], ziarah kubur [visiting of graves], and other rituals of the Ahli Sunnah

Wal Jamaah which have been allowed and encouraged.61

57 Interview with Nidae Waba, Pattani, 14 January 2006; interview withHasan Madmarn, Pattani, 16 January 2006.

58 Interview at Darunsat Witthaya School, Pattani, 5 February 2005.59 Interview at Saiburi Islam Witthaya School, Pattani, 24 February 2005.60 Interview at Aliman Foundation, Narathiwat, 18 January 2006.61 Interview with Abdul Aziz Yanya, Pattani, 17 May 2008.


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While these reformists justify their attack on tradition as improvingthe communitys understanding of and adherence to Islam, traditional-ists have retorted that the former are, in the words of a tok guru from thefamed Pondok Dalor, self-righteous.62 In response, Yanya suggests that

even though these young reformists condemn traditional rituals as bid6ahdan khurafat (innovations and superstitions), in truth they are onlyattracted to the new thinking because they want to perform their ritualsfast and quick.63

Such is the acrimony that some traditionalist institutions, such asCharoen Witthaya Nusron in Sai Buri (Pattani), make it official policynot to engage reformist Salafi teachers.64 There are, of course,traditionalists who are more measured in their response to the reformists.The following opinion for instance, conveys a more conciliatory note:

fiqh starts with Qur8an and Sunna, and then some lean towards Sh:fi6;but not too much. Traditional practices are left for individuals to decide,especially when they go home. There is no condemning the locals beliefsand practices.65

Given the stature of Ismail Lutfi and other more prominent ulemaassociated with the Salafi-reformist movement, such as Ismail Ali,Abdulghani Kahama, Yusuf Sidek, and Ismail Dusong-nyo,66 and thebroad respect they command among the local population (not least fortheir eloquence in Arabic), some traditionalist scholars have attempted to

avoid direct confrontation by distinguishing between the religiousideology of the reformists, which to these scholars is still acceptable,and their approach. The following comment by a prominenttraditionalist scholar is instructive in this regard:

I am not against the ideology of the Wahhabi movement under the leadership of

Dr. Ismail Lutfi and his companions as they teach and preach the Islamic ummah

to stay within the boundaries of the religion; I am less agreeable with their

approach that mengumpaskan [deliberates on] khil:fiyya [comparative

religious issues], which can result in conflict between Muslims and the public

62 Interview at Pondok Dalor, Pattani, 19 January 2006.63 Interview with Abdul Aziz Yanya, Pattani, 17 May 2008.64 Interview at Charoen Witthaya Nusron, Pattani, 18 January 2006.65 Interview at Narawi Islam, Narathiwat, 2 August 2006. The ust:dh

interviewed was a retired officer from the Royal Thai Army.66 Ismail Ali is an Assistant Professor at the Prince of Songkhla University

Pattani Campus, Abdulghani Kahama is Secretary of the Islamic Private SchoolAssociation and Principal of Prachasongkroh Bede Islamic School, Yusuf Sidek is

a lecturer at the Prince of Songkhla UniversityPattani Campus, while IsmailDusong-nyo has relocated to Bangkok.


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[non-Muslims]. And their thinking is not related to the organization that is

managed by the dakwah group, which is led by me.67

As the most prominent of the reformist scholars, it should be nosurprise that Ismail Lutfi has come to personify the challenge that thereform movement poses to traditionalists, and hence come under intensescrutiny. Nevertheless, typifying the patterns of contestations, Lutfi alsohas his ardent supporters:

I, as a student of Dr. Ismail [Lutfi], want to state that he never taught his students

to create divisions, but taught them to hold firmly to al-Qur 8:n and Sunnat al-

Nab; [tradition of the Prophet]. Everyone loves him and he is our :bi [father or

teacher] even when some parties despise, hate, and create lies about him. I am

sure Allah will protect and guard him and his message will take us to the right

path. Those who blame him should repent and use their free time to seekknowledge so as to understand the teachings of Dr. Ismail correctly.68

POINTS OF AMBIVALENCE

Despite his message on the need to transform Islamic knowledge, whichwould no doubt resonate with government authorities who have alwaysbeen of the view that resistance to change on the part of Islamic schools

in the south has been a constant source of provocation, Ismail Lutfi hasbeen demonized in some (primarily Western) media and counter-terrorism circles as a hardline Wahhabi cleric, as some pundits andanalysts have taken to calling him; his agenda for the transformation ofIslamic education in Thailand has likewise been dismissed as nothing buta cover for a more insidious programme to radicalize the Muslimpopulation of southern Thailand.69 Many of these allegations come fromsceptics who cast a suspecting eye on Salafism, often equating it toWahhabism, the highly politicized fundamentalist offshoot of broader

Salafi dogma which has admittedly enjoyed a chequered history both as areformist as well as militant movement, and which has captured theattention of the terrorism studies community since 9/11 with fairly

67 Interview with Nidir Waba, Pattani, 20 May 2008. Nidir Waba is theChairman of the Islamic Private School Association and a highly-respected 6:limin southern Thai Muslim circles.

68 Interview, Pattani, 20 May 2008.69 See for example, Jane Perlez, Cracks in Thailands Peace, New York

Times, 8 March 2004; John Bradley, Waking Up to the Terror Threat in

Southern Thailand, www.yaleglobalonline.com, 27 May 2004. Accessed athttp://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=3985.

http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=3985http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=3985

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at least on the surface to echo what many Muslim scholars who aretoday deemed progressive are propounding when discussing thequestion of rigidity in the application of Islamic law, though the actualsubstance of Ismail Lutfis personal understanding of jurisprudence itself

may, at the end of the day, depart fundamentally from the views of someliberal-progressive Islamic scholars. Given Lutfis perceived Wahhabicredentials, it is perhaps apropos to note here that while many havecriticized Wahhabism for its doctrinal conservatism and rigidity, weshould note that the importance of context is also a typical intellectualtrait of Wahhabi thought which believes, at least in theory, that the doorsof ijtih:d remain open.73 What is perhaps more important to registerthough is the fact that, whether Lutfi is indeed a scripturalist, literalistMuslim scholar, his emphasis on context speaks of an appreciation of the

complex and multifaceted nature both of the challenges confrontingIslam, and the avenues of response available to the Muslim community.

Some other aspects of Ismail Lutfis activities draw into furtherquestion his Wahhabi credentials. For instance, while mainstreamWahhabism rejects mawl;d (celebration of the Prophets birthday), thefact is that in the past two years Lutfi has contributed to an annualcollection of essays compiled by Thai Muslim scholars and published bythe Islamic Centre of Thailand on the occasion of the Prophets birthdayto propagate the valuable teachings of the great Prophet [. . .] to all

human beings.74

Luftis contribution to the 2006 volume is titled TheStatus and Roles of the Ulema in the Holy Qur8:n and Sunna, and isremarkable both for its reiteration of distinctively Salafi beliefs andpractices as well as departure from patently orthodox Wahhabiperspectives. In his discussion on the role and status of 6:lims inMuslim society for instance, while acknowledging that they are to berespected and sought out for their wisdom, Lutfi also cautioned, incharacteristic Salafi fashion, that esteem and respect from any societyfor an 6:lim should not be frenetic and indulgent. The love and respect

has to be based on the foundation of the Qur8:n and Sunna and inaccordance with the level of his ;m:n to Allah and His Messengers.75 Hegoes on further to elaborate that this is because however high the status

73 Natana J. Delong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to GlobalJihad (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 1078.

74 See Maulid Klang Organizing Committee of Thailand, Holding Fast to theIdeology of Harmony Among Thais (Bangkok: Islamic Committee of Thailand,2006).

75 Ismail Lutfi Chapakiya, Status and Roles of Ulama in the Holy Quran andSunna in ibid, 21.


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of an :lim, he is also a human being who will have defects and errors.76

Lutfis view here accords with the practice of Salafi teachings to cautionagainst excessive celebration of human capabilities, even those of notedreligious scholars.

Again, compared to some Wahhabi and Salafi scholars, Lutfi appearsto demonstrate a more sophisticated appreciation for nuances in theIslamic faith; his approach to Shi6ism departs from conventionalWahhabism, and in so doing draws attention once again to his ambiguity.While more orthodox Salafi and Wahhabi scholars tend to makesweeping accusations of Shi6ism as apostasy, and of Shi6i Muslims asheretics, in his discussion on bad and wicked ulema and the act offitna, where he alludes to key events in Islamic history associated withthe rise of Shi6ism, Lutfi reserves the harshest criticism for the Khaw:rij

as well as those who rejected the peace treaty between 6Al;, whom someMuslims believe to be the fourth Rightly Guided Caliph, andMu6:wiya:

They try to propagate the errors of the 6:lim, try to dramatize small errors and

amplify them. They further try to destroy the dignity and fame of the 6:lim in

vicious ways. This is a root of catastrophes and fitna [conflict] that is traceable to

the past, such as fitna from those who disagreed with 6Al; in the armistice with

Mu6:wiya, fitna from the group of Khaw:rij [the group that protested both 6Al;

and Mu6:wiya and their respective supporters], and others because the attitude

and positions of these two groups is not based on knowledge and justice, but on

ignorance and bigotry, which cause extremism.77

While Islamic scholars continue to discuss the impact of the Battle ofSiffin (from which the armistice between 6Al; and Mu6:wiya arose) onhow the office of Caliph evolved, it appears that embedded in Lutfismessage is rather more of an expression of concern for the unity of theumma as a whole than the polemics and hubris that often plagues thehistoriography of Islam.

Finally, while much is made of the financial support that Ismail LutfisYala Islamic University has received from the governments of SaudiArabia and Kuwait, little is said of the vast contributions that thegovernment of Qatar, not normally known for its scripturalist positionon matters of religion, has committed to the college.78 In this regard,

76 Ibid, 23.77 Ibid, 234.78 Although Wahhabi Islam played a special role in the establishment of the

nation-state of Qatar and the coming to power of its ruling familyAl Thaniin

the early 1970s, it has been used primarily as a legitimizing ideology rather thanenforced as a way of life. The Qatar Constitution recognizes Islam as the religion


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even more astonishing is the fact that the University had previouslyapplied to the U.S.-linked Asia Foundation for a grant in support ofEnglish language training for its faculty and study trips to Malaysia.79

While this is not the place to engage in a detailed discussion of

variations within Wahhabi ideology, due account must be taken of thefact that if Ismail Lutfi is indeed a Wahhabi (and not just a Salafi, as hehimself claims), there are clearly aspects to his brand and practice ofIslam that deviate from the dictates of Wahhabism as commonlyunderstood. In trying to reconcile this discrepancy, it bears recallingconventional wisdom on Islams arrival in the region, and how it hadadjusted itself to suit local cultures and belief systems when it arrived onSoutheast Asian shores, thereby giving rise to the syncretic Islam that hasbecome its trademark. Perhaps what we see in Lutfi is somewhat

analogous to thathis brand of Wahhabism might have undergone asimilar process of localization that has finessed it to an extent that someof its features in effect differ from what we might commonly associatewith mainstream Wahhabi thought and praxis. It should be noted thatLutfi himself refuses to acknowledge the term Wahhabi, but hasaccepted the label of Salafi. This is not to suggest that Lutfis Islamicthought is entirely devoid of explicit connections to Wahhabism, for hehas on other occasions also defended the teachings of Ibn 6Abd al-Wahh:b as well, and he does share in Wahhabisms traditional

apprehension of Sufi practices.80

Indeed, it is likely that, at the end ofthe day, concern for the negative reputation that Wahhabism has accruedrecently, not to mention the unsubstantiated yet persistent links being

of the state and the Shar;6a as the primary source of law, but also providesunderpinnings for the existence and functioning of secular courts as well. In thisregard, Qatars legal system can be characterized as dual. It recognizes thejurisdiction of both Shar;6a courts and 6adliyya courts (secular courts responsiblefor conflicts/issues in labour, trade, business, criminal law, etc.). This dualism is

also exemplified by the emergence of a new legal elitemostly educated abroadeither in the West or Egypt, Lebanon, and Jordanvis-a-vis the traditional arrayof muftis and q:@;s. Furthermore, though Qatar and Saudi Arabia haveWahhabism in common, Qatar is wary of its powerful neighbours ambition.Al Jazeeras criticism of the Saudi monarchy has already led to a seriousdiplomatic spat between the countries.

79 Interview at Asia Foundation Thailand Office, Bangkok, 17 January 2006.80 See for example, Ismail Lutfi, Penyebaran Ilmu Salafi Khususnya Penulis

Syeikh Muhammad Abdul Wahab [The Expansion of Salafi Knowledge in theWritings of Shaykh MuAammad 6Abd al-Wahh:b], paper presented at Seminar

Antarabangsa Shaykh MuAammad 6Abd al-Wahh:b in Perlis (Malaysia), 1617March 2006.


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made between Wahhabism and the ongoing conflict in the southernprovinces, must weigh heavily on how Lutfi locates himself.

CONCLUSION

This article began by identifying the dearth of knowledge and analysis ofthe Islamic reformist movements that have surfaced in Thailandssouthern border provinces. It has attempted to address this lacuna byconsidering the aforementioned phenomenon through the lens of twomajor scholars of Islam, Haji Sulong Abdul Kadir and Ismail LutfiJapakiya, who, while making their mark in different epochs of history,

can nevertheless be widely considered as reformist in how their ideasand activism challenged the monopoly of the traditional religious elite insouthern Thailand. By this token, several noteworthy observationsemerged.

In the first instance, it is immediately obvious that while there aresimilarities in how Haji Sulong and Ismail Lutfi sought to transformIslamic thought and practice in the southern border provinces byreforming the practice of traditionalist Islam overseen by the traditionalMuslim elite, there have also been discernible differences in the patternof activism and degree of impact that both have enjoyed. Whetherentirely deliberate or otherwise, Haji Sulongs reformist agendaeventually took on a decidedly political bent in how it was mobilizedto frame his approach to politics. While Haji Sulong never advocatedseparatism, his push for religio-cultural autonomy was read by many,including the Thai government, as an expression of sympathy for theseparatist agenda. Not surprisingly, this did not endear him to theauthorities, and subsequently led to major obstacles placed before him bythe state. Indeed, the situation was further aggravated with theprovocations of the local elite who nursed resentment towards his

reform agenda, which they interpreted to be an attempt to underminetheir authority and legitimacy as custodians of the faith. In contrast,Ismail Lutfi distanced his reformist agenda from any explicit ties topolitics. While undoubtedly a political personality himself, given thenumber of his appointments in local and state administration, not tomention a stint in parliament, Ismail Lutfi was careful to distance himselffrom the discourse of politics of the southern conflict. Indeed, insofar ashe has engaged in this discourse, it has been to speak out against theunIslamic violence perpetrated by insurgents. The striking consequence

of this is that while Haji Sulongs reformist agenda was curtailed by thestate, Ismail Lutfis was endorsed. This was demonstrated most vividly in


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the visit of the Crown Prince to the Yala Islamic University as well as theThai flag displayed proudly at the entrance to the university grounds.

In other words, regardless of Haji Sulongs contributions as an Islamicscholar, it is his political contributions that have been etched in Patani

memoryhow he had agitated for greater autonomy for the Malaypeople. Ismail Lutfi was far less prominent, though no less active, apolitical personality. Instead, what is striking about Ismail Lutfispolitics, as opposed to Haji Sulongs, is how closely aligned it is withthe Thai state. Indeed, if Haji Sulong had provoked suspicion in Bangkokcircles, Ismail Lutfis active criticism of ongoing violence in the southernprovinces and his attempt to refashion the curriculum of Islamiceducation in the provinces towards a more modernist orientation haswon the support and endorsement of the state.

Second, unlike the movement that Haji Sulong set in motion but whicheffectively petered out upon his demise, the contemporary reformmovement appears not only to be resilient, but to have grown noticeablyin strength, facilitated no doubt by his accommodating relationship withthe Thai state. As a consequence, it has gained a foothold in the southernprovinces on the back of immense financial support that in all likelihoodwas never available to Haji Sulong. This is expressed in the fact that theYala Islamic University, and the College of Islamic Studies at the Princeof Songkhla University (which, under Ismail Ali, has taken on a reformistbent as well), are now firmly entrenched in the terrain of Islamic thoughtin the provinces.

This is not to say, however, that the rise of the reformist movement inthe southern border provinces has not generated tensions within theMalay community. In fact, the resurgence of this Salafist genre ofreformist Islam has in many respects led to a reprise of the Kaum TuaKaum Muda that characterized intra-Muslim tensions across the Malayworld in the early twentieth century, and from which southern Thailandwas not immune. Reformist ideas on epistemology, methodology,culture, and identity have been greeted with circumspection, if not

outright hostility, in many traditionalist quarters that harbour misgivingsabout reformist dogma. Beyond the immediate tensions generated by thiscontest on the local terrain of Islamic thought and practice lies the deeperquestion of why the disjuncture exists between Patanis much-vauntedtraditional reputation of excellence in Islamic studies on the one hand,and its resistance to change on the other. Perhaps, it is a function of thehighly-securitized environment, where the backdrop of Malay separat-ism and ethno-nationalism has overshadowed the development ofIslamic thought in the region (particularly when Islamic schools have

historically been viewed with hostility and suspicion by the Thaigovernment); or perhaps the emaciation of religious knowledge as a


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result of decades of counter-insurgency policies that have taken theirtoll on the production of Islamic teachers, many of whom have beenrightly or wrongly accused and apprehended for being complicit with theseparatist movement. Perhaps it is a function of social trends within the

Muslim community itself, which has seen its identity gradually erode inthe wake of the assimiliationist policies of various Thai governments.Whatever the case may be, it is clear that, in the realm of Islamicknowledge and education, debates over authenticity and legitimacywithin the Muslim community are likely to define the terrain of Islamicthought and practice in the southern border provinces for many yearsto come.

E-mail: [email protected]
