EU Accession, NGOs, and Human Rights:Discrimination against the Roma in Slovenia and

Croatia∗

Ana Bracic†

Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of LawStanford University

Draft date: August 27, 2013

This paper measures discrimination against the Roma (commonlyknown by the disfavored term ‘Gypsies’) to test the ground level ef-ficacy of two strategies of human rights improvement: top-down dif-fusion and bottom-up change. The study spans three towns, MurskaSobota and Novo mesto in Slovenia and Cakovec in Croatia, and in-cludes over 600 subjects. Levels of discrimination were estimated viatrust games played with money, which are particularly appropriate be-cause the Roma are widely stereotyped as cheaters and thieves. Thefindings suggest that the EU accession process, widely regarded as anexceptionally strong incentive-based mechanism of rights diffusion, doesnot severely reduce discrimination on the ground. Instead, they sug-gest that ground level organizing aimed at improving relations betweenRoma and non-Roma helps reduce discrimination.

∗I would like to thank George Downs, Michael Gilligan, Bernarda Bracic and W. Nicholson Price II forinvaluable help in developing this project. I am also very grateful to Eva Bracic, Stefan Bajic, Vanessa Bo-betic, Dragan Bogdan, Zeljko Balog, Mojca Becaj, Jozek Horvat Muc, Manja Munda, Ziva Kleindienst, VeraKlopcic, Jaka Kukavica, Rebecca Morton, Tena Posel, Sabina Ranogajec, Monika Sandreli, David Stasavage,Filip Skiljan, Joshua Tucker, Milena Tudija, Lucija Vihar, and an anonymous Croatian government official.†Postdoctoral fellow at the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, Stanford University.

email: anabracic@gmail.com. web: www.anabracic.com. 301 821 5887.

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For a Roma, the easiest personal document

to obtain, by far, is the death certificate.1

This fact, wryly passed around as a joke within circles of government experts, NGO

workers, and activists, speaks clearly to the depth of discrimination against the Roma ob-

served in Central and Eastern Europe today. In many of these states ethnic minorities are

protected by law, and discrimination is no longer a matter of state policy.2 Instead, rights

violations now occur as a result of personal bigotry. For example, a Roma job applicant

might look good on paper but be refused an interview once her ethnic identity becomes

evident.3 A man with Roma-like features is more readily mistreated by police when in cus-

tody.4 A Roma is more likely to end up as the sole patient in a room of six whose hospital

bed receives frequent changes of sheets as the result of the humiliating presumption that he

or she is dirty.5 Such slights and rights violations are no less real for their not being state

sanctioned and they have endured well past the time when the state has addressed its more

egregious discriminatory practices.

In what follows I investigate the relative efficacy of two strategies of human rights

improvement widely believed to reduce such ground level discrimination: top-down diffusion

and bottom-up change. I proceed by first testing the received wisdom that the EU accession

process, a strong incentive-based mechanism of rights change, drastically reduces ground level

1. I encountered versions of this statement in Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic and Croatia, betweensummer 2010 and winter 2012. It refers to administrative barriers that Roma face when trying to obtainpersonal documents. Often these barriers are not a matter of bureaucracy; administrative officials mayhinder the process by witholding information or aid, in extreme cases by stating that obtaining documentsis not possible. Macabrely, no such barriers exist when a death certificate is needed.

2. Efforts to protect Roma rights are extensive. In May and June 2011, EU member states made anunprecedented commitment to promoting Roma inclusion and within that framework produced state-levelpolicy strategies. For more information on country-specific plans, see European Commission, “EU Frameworkfor national Roma integration strategies,” 2011, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/roma/national-strategies/index en.htm.

3. Zeljko Balog, Interview by author. Voice recording. Sitnice, 2011.4. U.S. Department of State, “2011 Human Rights Reports: Bulgaria,” 2012, http://www.state.gov/j/

drl/rls/hrrpt/2011/eur/186338.htm; U.S. Department of State, “2011 Human Rights Reports: Hungary,”2012, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2011/eur/186359.htm.

5. Anonymous government official from the Office for National Minorities in Croatia, Interview by author.Voice recording. Zagreb, 2012.

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discrimination against the Roma,6 which then gradually increases once the state becomes

a member of the EU.7 I find no support for this belief. Second, I test a norms promotion

claim:8 ground level non-governmental organizing geared towards improving Roma/non-

Roma relations helps reduce discrimination. I find initial evidence in favor of this hypothesis.

The study spans three towns, Murska Sobota and Novo mesto9 in Slovenia and Cakovec in

Croatia, and includes over 600 subjects.

In favor of comparing levels of discrimination in towns that vary in attributes dictated

by the two hypotheses but match closely on a host of other factors relevant to human rights

in general and Roma rights in particular, I collect data from only three locations. While

the sample size is a limitation, this project explores how the two strategies of human rights

improvement perform at the ground level. Further work, motivated and guided by the

findings here, will endeavor to examine the effects of these strategies cross-nationally.

Despite the project’s field-level focus on the Roma in Croatia and Slovenia, its con-

clusions can be broadly applied. The Roma are the largest European minority; they reside

in most if not all European states and experience discrimination and rights violations ev-

erywhere. More importantly, the Roma are the archetype of a minority that has been

6. Frank Schimmelfennig, Stefan Engert, and Heiko Knobel, “Costs, commitment and compliance: theimpact of EU democratic conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey,” Journal of Common MarketStudies 41 (2003): 495518; Milada Anna Vachudova, Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, & IntegrationAfter Communism (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2005).

7. Stanko Daniel, Interview by author. Notes. Budapest, 2010; Djordje Jovanovic, Interview by author.Notes. Budapest, 2010; Laco Oravec, Interview by author. Notes. Bratislava, 2010; Brano Tichy, Interviewby author. Notes. Bratislava, 2010.

8. For more on the role of NGOs in rights change see Kathryn Sikkink, “Human Rights, principled issue-networks, and sovereignty in Latin America,” International Organization 47, no. 3 (1993): 411–441; MarthaFinnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” International Or-ganization 52, no. 4 (1998): 887–917; Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders:Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998); Thomas Risseand Kathryn Sikkink, “The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: In-troduction,” in The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change, ed. Thomas Risse,Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 1–38; SanjeevKhagram, James V. Riker, and Kathryn Sikkink, “From Santiago to Seattle: Transnational Advocacy GroupsRestructuring World Politics,” in Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks,and Norms, ed. Sanjeev Khagram, James V. Riker, and Kathryn Sikkink (Minneapolis, MN: University ofMinnesota Press, 2002), 3–23.

9. The lack of a capital “M” in “mesto,” while unusual in English, is grammatically correct in Slovene(“mesto” means city).

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discriminated against, abused, and ignored for centuries. I demonstrate that it is possible

to dramatically reduce discrimination even in such a seemingly intractable case. This shows

promise for studying and guiding human rights improvement in various other problematic

populations that historically have been denied or have themselves resisted integration. The

findings might, for example, generalize to the lives of Jews in Argentina, Uzbeks in Tajik-

istan, the San in Namibia, and persons of African descent in Brazil, Ecuador, Panama,

Venezuela, and Peru.10

In the following section I briefly present the Roma and the discrimination they com-

monly face. I next present the two hypotheses. Case selection, methodology, and results

follow. The last section discusses questions left unanswered and concludes.

Who are the Roma?

The Roma, commonly referred to by the disfavored term “Gypsies,”11 are the largest

ethnic minority in Europe. Population counts are unreliable, but estimates report that as

many as 9 million Roma currently reside in Europe.12 The Roma first arrived in Europe at the

end of the 13th century, having emigrated from north-western India centuries before.13 Con-

trary to romanticized popular perceptions, they are generally no longer itinerant14—some

groups, in fact, were never peripatetic.15 Until very recently many engaged in traditional

10. For more information regarding these populations see Minorities at Risk Project, “Minorities at RiskDataset,” 2009, http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/.

11. Roma are also called Romanies, Rrom, Tsingani, Zigeuner, Cigani, Gitanos. See Ian F. Hancock, Weare the Romani People (Hertfordshire: University of Hertfordshire Press, 2002).

12. Zoltan Barany, The East European Gypsies: Regime Change, Marginality, and Ethnopolitics (Cam-bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Miriam Polzer-Srienz, “Romi in Evropska Integracja: PrimerjavaStanja v Sloveniji, Avstriji in na Hrvaskem,” in Evropa, Slovenija in Romi: Zbornik Referatov na Mednaro-dni Konferenci v Ljubljani, 15. februarja 2002, ed. Vera Klopcic and Miroslav Polzer (Ljubljana, Slovenia:Institut za narodnostna vprasanja, 2003), 93–104.

13. Barany lists Punjab as the region of origin; Courthiade instead lists the city of Kannauj in UttarPradesh. See Barany, The East European Gypsies: Regime Change, Marginality, and Ethnopolitics; Mar-cel Courthiade, “The Ganetic City of Kannauj: Original Cradle-town of the Rromani People,” in Evropa,Slovenija in Romi: Zbornik Referatov na Mednarodni Konferenci v Ljubljani, 15. februarja 2002, ed. VeraKlopcic and Miroslav Polzer (Ljubljana, Slovenia: Institut za narodnostna vprasanja, 2003), 145–168.

14. Yaron Matras, “Romani Migrations in the Post-communist Era: Their Historical and Political Signifi-cance,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 13, no. 2 (2000): 32–50.

15. Barany, The East European Gypsies: Regime Change, Marginality, and Ethnopolitics.

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economic activities which primarily defined their tribal identities.16 While modernization

rendered many of those crafts obsolete, tribal diversity survives and to a large extent char-

acterizes Romani individuals.17 Although there are exceptions, most Roma speak a dialect

of Romani.18 The largest concentration of Roma in Eastern Europe is in Romania, followed

by Hungary.19

The Roma have historically faced persecution and discrimination. In Romanian prin-

cipalities of Moldavia and Walachia Romani slavery was institutionalized and persisted until

1864.20 In the middle of the 18th century, British and Portuguese powers sought to resolve

the “Gypsy problem” by deporting the Roma to the colonies; Maria-Theresa and Joseph II

of the Austro-Hungarian Empire attempted to “civilize” the Roma by forcible assimilation,

forbidding the Roma from speaking Romani, marrying amongst themselves, and raising Ro-

mani children older than five years of age.21 The Roma were massively exterminated during

the Holocaust,22 and relentlessly assimilated into socialist societies afterwards, sometimes

with tolerance, as in states like the former Yugoslavia, and sometimes with a heavy coercive

hand, as in states like Bulgaria.23

While today many Roma have integrated into their respective majority populations,

most remain segregated. The segregated populations are generally socially disadvantaged

and bear the brunt of discrimination. In many states, Roma children are schooled in remedial

special schools for mentally disabled, whether or not they have actual disabilities.24 Roma

16. For example, blacksmiths, drill makers, umbrella makers, knife sharpeners, stone masons, mud housebuilders, mud oven builders, basket weavers, fortune tellers, horse traders, and pot menders. See PavlaStrukelj, Romi na Slovenskem (Ljubljana, Slovenia: Cankarjeva Zalozba v Ljubljani, 1980).

17. Barany, The East European Gypsies: Regime Change, Marginality, and Ethnopolitics.18. The most notable exceptions are Romi Bajasi from Croatia and Hungary who speak a variant of ancient

Romanian. See Ivan Rumbak, Potrebe/Problemi Romske Populacije U Republici Hrvatskoj: Integracija bezAsimilacije (Zagreb, Croatia: Vlastita naklada, Ivan Rumbak, 2003); Marijan Vugrincic and Robert Siladi, IzZivota Roma: Kreativnost Roma, Doprinos Kulturi i Turizmu (Cakovec, Croatia: Medjimurski savez sportskerekreacije “Sport za sve”, 2008)

19. Barany, The East European Gypsies: Regime Change, Marginality, and Ethnopolitics.20. Barany, The East European Gypsies: Regime Change, Marginality, and Ethnopolitics.21. Barany, The East European Gypsies: Regime Change, Marginality, and Ethnopolitics, 93.22. Barany, The East European Gypsies: Regime Change, Marginality, and Ethnopolitics; Rajko Djuric,

Povijest Roma: Prije i Poslije Auschwitza (Zagreb, Croatia: Prosvjeta, 2007).23. Barany, The East European Gypsies: Regime Change, Marginality, and Ethnopolitics.24. Claude Cahn, Roma Rights: Race, Justice and Strategies for Equality (New York, NY: International

5

face significant barriers in accessing employment, frequently live without electricity or sew-

erage, generally receive substandard health care, and are often deemed undeserving of social

welfare.25 Many do not have personal documents and are effectively stateless; they are more

likely than non-Roma to be abused by the police in general, while in detention, and while

in prison.26 These marginalized populations are therefore predominantly poor, unemployed

and undereducated. To survive, numerous Roma engage in illicit activities that range from

small scale theft of scrap metal to usury and transnational trafficking in weapons, drugs

and humans.27 Flagrant criminality fuels the already existing intolerance and discrimination

and, in a downward spiral, strengthens the barriers that drive the Roma to crime in the first

place.

Hypothesis I: The EU Accession Process

The EU accession process is arguably the strongest mechanism for Roma rights change

today. Over the past two decades, the EU has become increasingly concerned with the Roma

and has launched numerous programs designed to combat discrimination and social exclu-

sion.28 The accession process is exceptional both in the requirements it sets and in its ability

to enforce change.29 To qualify for membership, candidate states must fulfill the Copenhagen

Criteria, of which the first requires “stable institutions guaranteeing . . . human rights and

Debate Education Association, 2002); European Roma Rights Centre, The Situation of Roma in an EnlargedEuropean Union (Budapest: European Roma Rights Centre, 2004).

25. Cahn, Roma Rights: Race, Justice and Strategies for Equality ; European Roma Rights Centre, TheSituation of Roma in an Enlarged European Union.

26. European Roma Rights Centre, Profession: Prisoner. Roma in Detention in Bulgaria (Budapest: Eu-ropean Roma Rights Centre, 1997).

27. Anonymous government official from the Office for National Minorities in Croatia, interview by author;Silvo Mesojedec, Interview by author. Voice recording. Novo mesto, 2012.

28. For a list of projects and funding see European Commission, “EU and Roma, Projects and Funding,”2012, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/roma/project-funding/index en.htm.

29. Schimmelfennig, Engert, and Knobel, “Costs, commitment and compliance: the impact of EU demo-cratic conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey”; Vachudova, Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage,& Integration After Communism.

6

respect for and protection of minorities.”30 Ratification of human rights agreements31 is

necessary but not sufficient; the EU demands changes in state policies and practices that

range from political representation to education and infrastructure.32 Unlike most other re-

quirements where the EU demands that candidate states attain a standard commonly held

in current EU members, the requirement regarding minority rights is a product of a clear

and persisting double standard. The Eastern Enlargement candidates were and are required

to meet goals which the Western EU member states have not set for themselves.33 The

attainment of these goals is carefully evaluated and visibly enforced; the European Com-

mission constantly monitors each candidate, producing yearly Progress Reports that detail

the states’ rights situation and its shortcomings.34 In the context of the Roma, for example,

settlement visits and conversations with their inhabitants are included in the monitoring

process. A state does not become an EU member, with that status’ concomitant benefits,

30. European Commission, “Enlargement, Conditions for Membership,” 2012, http : / / ec . europa . eu /enlargement/policy/conditions-membership/index en.htm.

31. Among the required agreements are the European Convention on Human Rights and FundamentalFreedoms, the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, the European Charter forRegional and Minority Languages, and the UN Convention on Civil and Political Rights. See EuropeanCommission, “Croatia Progress Report,” 2005, http ://www.delhrv .ec . europa .eu/uploads/dokumenti/3a87bfc3ab7e5d6740a3a4b1aef3e26a.pdf.

32. The 2005 Progress Report for Croatia, for example, lists the following problems: the implementation ofthe Constitutional Law on the Rights of National Minorities (CLNM) is far too slow; changes are needed inother legislation to reflect the CLNM; there are problems with reserved seats for minority representatives inlocal and regional governments, as well as in state administrative and judicial bodies and the police; there isno program to ensure implementation of the minority representation provisions; discrimination is common-place; as data are unavailable Croatia urgently needs to provide statistical data on representation; there isa lack of awareness with respect to the function of local minority councils and their financial attainability isnot guaranteed; and the media are not optimally representing minorities. Roma issues explicitly mentionedare: the Roma are not integrated; 89 percent of Romani households are without a single member with apermanent income; discrimination is widespread in employment and education; the problem of segregationin schools remains; some local authorities are unwilling to finance Roma programs; and Roma face difficul-ties in obtaining citizenship. The report also states that the funds currently represented as sufficient forimplementing measures to improve the position of the Roma will not be sufficient.

33. Bruno De Witte, “The Impact of Enlargement on the Constitution of the European Union,” in The En-largement of the European Union, ed. Marise Cremona (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003), 209–252; Vachudova, Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, & Integration After Communism; Vera Klopcic,Interview by author. Voice recording. Ljubljana, 2011.

34. Vachudova, Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, & Integration After Communism. For particularexamples of reports, see, for example, European Commission, “Europa Gateway to the European Union:Reports 2001,” 2007, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/key documents/reports 2001 en.htm.

7

until the requirements are satisfied; at that time, monitoring stops as well.35 Scholars widely

hold that the treatment of ethnic minorities in the Eastern Enlargement is one of the most

striking examples of successful EU conditionality.36

Within the international relations literature on diffusion, this incentive-based mech-

anism is widely classified as ‘coercion.’37 Coercion is generally exercised by governments,

international organizations, and nongovernmental actors that set requirements in exchange

for aid, loans, or other benefits.38 Conditions in return for benefits tend to reflect the pref-

erences of the donor, but a states’ choice to commit to such an agreement is predominantly

voluntary.39 In the context of human rights, for example, a government can sign a Prefer-

ential Trade Agreement with a “hard” human rights clause, thus subjecting itself to stricter

human rights standards in exchange for preferred trade conditions.40

35. Vachudova, Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, & Integration After Communism. See also Eu-ropean Commission, “Europa Gateway to the European Union: How does a country join the EU?” 2007,http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement process/accession process/how does a country join the eu/index en.htm.

36. Lynn M. Tesser, “The Geopolitics of Tolerance: Minority Rights Under EU Expansion and East-CentralEurope,” East European Politics and Societies 17, no. 3 (2003): 483–532; Nida M. Gelazis, “The EuropeanUnion and the Statelessness Problem in the Baltic States,” European Journal of Migration and Law 6(2004): 225–242; Judith Kelley, “International Actors on the Domestic Scene: Membership Conditionalityand Socialization by International Institutions,” International Organization 58, no. 3 (2004): 425–457;Vachudova, Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, & Integration After Communism; Geoffrey Pridham,“The EU’s Political Conditionality and Post-Accession Tendencies: Comparisons from Slovakia and Latvia,”Journal of Common Market Studies 46 (2008): 365–387.

37. Frank Dobbin, Beth Simmons, and Geoffrey Garrett, “The Global Diffusion of Public Policies: SocialConstruction, Coercion, Competition, or Learning?” Annual Review of Sociology 33 (2007): pp. 449–472;Frank Dobbin Simmons Beth and Geoffrey Garrett, The Global Diffusion of Markets and Democracy, 1st ed.(New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

38. Jose Antonio Sanahuja, “Trade, Politics, and Democratization: The 1997 Global Agreement betweenthe European Union and Mexico,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 42, no. 2 (2000): 35–62; John M. Owen, “The Foreign Imposition of Domestic Institutions,” International Organization 56, no.2 (2002): pp. 375–409; Mohsin S. Khan and Sunil Sharma, “IMF Conditionality and Country Ownershipof Adjustment Programs,” The World Bank Research Observer 18, no. 2 (2003): pp. 227–248; Dobbin,Simmons, and Garrett, “The Global Diffusion of Public Policies: Social Construction, Coercion, Competition,or Learning?”; Simmons and Garrett, The Global Diffusion of Markets and Democracy.

39. Governments may even accept IMF loans because they want to be subject to conditions or find hav-ing unpopular but ultimately necessary policies externally imposed optimal because it alleviates domesticopposition pressures. See James Raymond Vreeland, The IMF and Economic Development (Cambridge Uni-versity Press, 2003) and Allan Drazen, “Conditionality and Ownership in IMF Lending: A Political EconomyApproach,” IMF Staff Papers 49 (2002): 36–67.

40. Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, “Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements Influence Gov-ernment Repression,” International Organization 59, no. 3 (2005): pp. 593–629. A hard human rights clauseties agreement benefits to member compliance with specific human rights principles. While soft laws referto voluntary cooperation and do not require changes in behavior in return for benefits, hard laws are legally

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The power of EU conditionality lies in factors not generally found together in other

conditional mechanisms, such as those employed by the IMF or the World Bank.41 First, the

requirements are non-negotiable.42 Second, the benefits of EU membership are tremendous,

ranging from political to sociocultural and economic; the costs of exclusion are accordingly

severe.43 Third, the process itself comes with help; the EU financially supports the de-

velopments necessary to close the negotiation chapters and among those are improvements

required for sufficient respect of Roma rights.44 Finally, as the EU reserves the greatest

reward for the end, the process does not require retroactive sanctions. If a state is not pro-

tecting rights to a sufficient degree, instead of taking the promised benefit of membership

away as punishment, the EU need not grant it in the first place.

When it comes to human rights, states tend to respond positively to conditionality. For

example, when they sign Preferential Trade Agreements with hard human rights clauses, they

generally follow through and better protect the physical integrity rights of their citizens.45

This study examines the effect of strong conditionality at a different level. It does not

ask if the process of accession leads to better behavior regarding rights at the state level;

that it does, at least to a degree, seems obvious as candidate states make commitments

by signing the required human rights agreements46 and carry out policy and ground-level

changes requested (and later evaluated) by the EU Commission.47 Instead, I ask if a strong

binding obligations that are precise and that delegate authority for interpreting and implementing the law.For more, see Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, “Hard and Soft Law in International Governance,”International Organization 54, no. 3 (2000): 421–456.

41. Vachudova, Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, & Integration After Communism.42. Vachudova, Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, & Integration After Communism.43. For more, see Vachudova 2005, Chapters 3 and 5. It bears mentioning that given the current crisis

situation, EU membership may not be as desirable as before. For the purposes of this study, however, thisfact is less relevant as Croatia’s bid for membership began in 2003 and successfully concluded in 2011.

44. The program providing access to communal infrastructure and utilities to Romani settlements in Med-jimurje (Croatia), in particular Sitnice, is a good example. See Phare, Phare Project Fiche 2005: RomaSupport Project, Croatia, 2005.

45. Hafner-Burton, “Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements Influence GovernmentRepression.”

46. Simmons shows that committing to human rights agreements is effective for states in transitionalperiods and leads to higher levels of respect for rights. See Beth A. Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights:International Law in Domestic Politics, 1st ed. (Cambridge; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press,2009)

47. For an evaluation of the project in Sitnice mentioned in a previous footnote, see Instrument for Pre-

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coercive mechanism can reliably reduce discrimination on the ground. In short, do the

requirements put forth by the EU trickle down to affect individual behavior?

Demands for policy changes issued at the international level have an attenuated link to

individual behavior. In the case of state capture and corruption, however, EU conditionality

does appear to have effects that manifest themselves at the level of the individual. For

example, some conditions of the Eastern Enlargements in 2004 and 2007 required a lowering

of barriers to entry for new firms, which reduced the influence of powerful firms over the

political process. The policy changes were quickly embraced and promoted by citizens who

were not members of the existing elites; as a result, new domestic interest groups emerged,

which then continued to support measures required by the EU well after the accession process

was complete.48

Moreover, among the participants of this study, accession to the EU is an extremely

salient political issue. When asked to identify the conditions for entry, 75 percent of the

randomly sampled Croatian subjects knew that human rights49 were among them, and 44

percent pointed out minority rights specifically. In fact, respect for human rights was identi-

fied as a condition for entry more times than any other negotiation chapter; justice, freedom

and security50 came as a close second, with 69 percent of participants identifying it as a

requirement. It seems that Croats know that rights play a role in EU accession, but the

extent to which that changes their behavior is less certain.

I initially hypothesized that the EU accession process, through its demands regarding

human rights and its promise of the benefits of EU membership, reduces levels of discrimi-

nation as a form of diffusion. In-depth interviews with Roma rights experts confirmed and

further refined my hypothesis; they claimed that the accession process only temporarily

accession Assistance, IPA 2008 Croatia Project Fiche: Roma Support Project - Phase III, 2008.48. James Hollyer, “Conditionality, compliance, and domestic interests: State capture and EU accession

policy,” The Review of International Organizations 5(4) (2010): 5(4) (2010): 387–431.49. Human rights fall under Negotiations Chapter 23. For more, see European Commission, “Enlargement,

How Does a Country Join the EU? Chapters of the Acquis,” 2012, http ://ec .europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement process/accession process/how does a country join the eu/negotiations croatia turkey/indexen.htm.

50. Justice, freedom and security fall under Negotiations Chapter 24.

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reduces discrimination, which returns once the process is complete and the state named a

member of the EU.51 While the post-accession increase in discrimination is obviously not

an occurrence that the EU supports, there is some merit to this claim. In trade agreements

with clear and enforceable human rights requirements, benefits can be suspended in light

of rights violations;52 a continuation of trade under favorable conditions is therefore a per-

sistent incentive. Once a state becomes a member of the EU, in contrast, the incentive of

membership is gone. The EU neither systematically monitors its member states with respect

to rights protection nor enforces the standards it sets for candidate states.53

Findings regarding backsliding on accession reforms are mixed: conditions on corrup-

tion, state capture,54 and some aspects of rule of law55 tend to have persistent effects, but

requirements regarding politically salient EU law transpositions56 and the politicization of

civil service57 do not. Respect for Roma rights is likely in the latter group. At the level of

the individual, Levitz and Pop-Eleches attribute support for reforms and the resulting lack

of backsliding to the exposure of citizens—through work, study, and travel—to the desired

policies in place in Western European countries.58 Such positive exposure is much less likely

in the context of Roma rights, however; instead of observing exemplary rights protection, cit-

izens witness rights violations that range from refusing state entry to Roma visitors (United

51. Stano Daniel, interview by author; Djordje Jovanovic, interview by author; Laco Oravec, interviewby author; Brano Tichy, interview by author. Laco Oravec, a Romani rights activist and NGO worker, forexample, said that “the pre-accession period was unique because of the strong requirements for Roma,” whileBrano Tichy, director of Amnesty International in Slovakia, commented that “...accession is a great tool topush for changes, but the tool is not applied after the countries are in.”

52. See Hafner-Burton (2005), 609-614, for examples.53. De Witte, “The Impact of Enlargement on the Constitution of the European Union”; Vachudova, Europe

Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, & Integration After Communism.54. Hollyer, “Conditionality, compliance, and domestic interests: State capture and EU accession policy.”55. Philip Levitz and Grigore Pop-Eleches, “Why No Backsliding? The European Union’s Impact on

Democracy and Governance Before and After Accession,” Comparative Political Studies 43 (2010): 457–485;Pridham, “The EU’s Political Conditionality and Post-Accession Tendencies: Comparisons from Slovakia

and Latvia.”56. Antoaneta Dimitrova and Dimiter Toshkov, “Post-accession compliance between administrative co-

ordination and political bargaining,” In Frank Schimmelfennig and Florian Trauner (eds.), Post-accessioncompliance in the EUs new member states, European Integration online Papers 13 (2009): 1–18.

57. Jan-Hinrik Meyer-Sahling, “The Changing Colours of the Post-Communist State: The Politicization ofthe Senior Civil Service in Hungary,” European Journal of Political Research 47 (2008): 1–33.

58. Levitz and Pop-Eleches, “Why No Backsliding? The European Union’s Impact on Democracy andGovernance Before and After Accession.”

11

Kingdom)59 to razing of settlements60 (Italy) and forced deportations (France).61

With the absence of the previously strong conditionality and evidence of discrimination

in old EU member states, the new members can take advantage of the double standard

mentioned above and backslide in their respect for rights. The first hypothesis is therefore

as follows:

H1: The EU accession process reduces ground level discrimination against the Roma;

once a state becomes an EU member, however, discrimination increases.62

To this test of a top-down strategy of rights improvement I add another, of a strategy

that operates on the ground.

Hypothesis II: NGO Action

Human rights NGOs strive for change. They play a central role in transnational hu-

man rights advocacy,63 help local social movements and advocacy groups exert pressure

from below,64 and inspire third parties, be they governments or international organizations,

to join in the advocacy effort and apply pressure from above.65 NGO action, particularly

59. European Roma Rights Centre, “British officials continue policy of stopping Roma at Czech airport;Czech Roma and ERRC sue U.K. government,” 2001, http://www.errc.org/cikk.php?cikk=1289. See alsothe resulting asylum case R (European Roma Rights Centre) v Immigration Officer at Prague Airport [2004]UKHL 55.

60. European Roma Rights Centre et al., Security a la Italiana: Fingerprinting, Extreme Violence andHarassment of Roma in Italy (Budapest, Hungary: Fo-Szer Bt., 2008).

61. Steven Erlanger, “Expulsion of Roma Raises Questions in France,” August 19, 2010, The New YorkTimes (2010); David Jolly, “French President Shuts Down Roma Camps and Seeks Relocation for Roma,”August 9, 2012, The New York Times (2012).

62. The hypothesis is further strengthened by the lack of support the experts showed for alternative factorsthat may have positively influenced the treatment of the Roma. Laco Oravec, for example, observed thatgovernments and NGOs are not particularly interested in learning about effective policies from each other,while Stano Daniel was quietly cynical about democratization, citing post-accession campaigns against theRoma of certain right-wing political parties.

63. Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in InternationalPolitics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).

64. Alison Brysk, “From Above and Below: Social Movements, the International System, and Human Rightsin Argentina,” Comparative Political Studies 26 (1993): 259–285.

65. Brysk, “From Above and Below: Social Movements, the International System, and Human Rights inArgentina.”

12

when coupled with third party or local engagement,66 can lead to changes in human rights

domestically and transnationally.67 Much is accomplished through the mechanism of naming

and shaming,68 which typically involves campaigns that inform domestic and international

audiences of human rights infractions committed by governments and state actors, but that

mechanism is not the only avenue for advocacy.

A subset of activities in which human rights NGOs may engage directly aims to reduce

prejudice and discrimination by promoting interaction between members of groups that

experience discrimination and members of groups that discriminate. The need to mobilize

for change at the level of the individual is particularly salient in situations such as that of

the Roma in many Central and Eastern European states, where discrimination is not state

sanctioned but nonetheless happens on the ground. Scholarship on intergroup contact and

prejudice, originally designed to capture the effects of contact on racial and ethnic prejudice,

illustrates the potential benefits of Roma/non-Roma interaction.69

For example, an early study of white housewives from racially segregated (black and

white residents assigned to different buildings) and desegregated (residents assigned to apart-

ments irrespective of race and personal preference) public housing projects in New York City

and Newark showed that the women from the desegregated projects had more direct contact

with their black neighbors, held their black neighbors in higher esteem, and expressed far

more support for interracial housing.70 Decades later, contemporary research overwhelm-

ingly shows that intergroup contact typically reduces prejudice.71 Intergroup anxiety, which

66. Amanda Murdie and David R. Davis, “Shaming and Blaming: Using Events Data to Assess the Impactof Human Rights INGOs,” International Studies Quarterly 56 (2012): 1–16.

67. Sam R. Bell et al., “Taking the Fight to Them: Neighborhood Human Rights Organizations and Do-mestic Protest,” British Journal of Political Science (forthcoming).

68. Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, “Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights EnforcementProblem,” International Organization 62, no. 4 (2008): pp. 689–716; David R. Davis, Amanda Murdie, andCoty Garnett Steinmetz, “Makers and Shapers: Human Rights INGOs and Public Opinion,” Human RightsQuarterly 34 (2012): 199–224.

69. Thomas F Pettigrew and Linda R. Tropp and, “A meta-analytic test of intergroup contact theory,”Journal of personality and social psychology 90, no. 5 (2006): 751–783.

70. Morton Deutsch and Mary Evans Collins, Interracial Housing (Minneapolis, MN: University of Min-nesota, Jones Press, Inc, 1951).

71. Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) find that while establishing Allport’s optimal conditions generally enhancesthe positive effects of contact, the conditions are not essential to show a significant relationship between

13

people feel when they are uncertain about how to act around members of the outgroup and

worry about how they will be perceived,72 likely mediates the link between contact and prej-

udice. Lower levels of anxiety result in stronger positive contact effects;73 intergroup contact,

in turn, can effectively reduce feelings of intergroup anxiety.74 Promoting Roma/non-Roma

interaction in a non-threatening context may therefore be a key component in successfully

reducing prejudice at the level of the individual.

If promoting Roma/non-Roma interaction reduces prejudice, might it reduce discrimi-

nation as well? Recent experimental75 and longitudinal76 analyses, as well as numerous pre-

vious studies,77 show that prejudice leads to discriminatory behavior, and that an increase

in intergroup contact results in a decrease in both prejudice and discriminatory intent.78

Moreover, intergroup contact effects tend to generalize beyond participants in the immedi-

ate contact situation; people who experience contact may change their attitudes towards the

entire outgroup, outgroup members in other situations, and even outgroups not involved in

the contact situation at all.79 Extensive cross-national80 evidence on the relationship between

contact, prejudice, and discrimination therefore suggests that efforts on the part of NGOs

to increase contact between Roma and non-Roma at the local level may lead to a decrease

contact and prejudice. For more on the optimal conditions, see Gordon Willard Allport, The Nature ofPrejudice (Addison-Wesley, 1954).

72. Wendy Berry Mendes et al., “Challenge and Threat During Social Interactions With White and BlackMen,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 28 (2002): 939–952.

73. Rupert Brown and Miles Hewstone, “An integrative theory of intergroup contact,” Advances in Exper-imental Social Psychology, Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 37 (2005): 255 –343.

74. Irene V. Blair, Bernadette Park, and Jonathan Bachelor, “Understanding Intergroup Anxiety: Are SomePeople More Anxious than Others?” Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 6, no. 2 (2003): 151–169; JimBlascovich et al., “Perceiver Threat in Social Interactions With Stigmatized Others,” Journal of Personalityand Social Psychology 80 (2001): 253–267.

75. John F. Dovidio et al., “Contemporary Racial Bias: When Good People do Bad Things,” in The socialpsychology of good and evil, ed. Arthur G. Miller (New York, NY: Guilford Press, 2004), 141–167.

76. Ulrich Wagner, Oliver Christ, and Thomas F Pettigrew, “Prejudice and Group-Related Behavior inGermany,” Journal of Social Issues 64, no. 2 (2008): 403–416.

77. Heidi Schutz and Bernd Six, “How strong is the relationship between prejudice and discrimination? Ameta-analytic answer,” International Journal of Intercultural Relations 20 (1996): 441–462; John F. Dovidioet al., “Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination: Another Look,” in Stereotypes & Stereotyping, ed. C.Neil Macrae, Charles Stangor, and Miles Hewstone (New York, NY: The Guilford Press, 1996), 1–10.

78. Wagner, Christ, and Pettigrew, “Prejudice and Group-Related Behavior in Germany.”79. Pettigrew and and, “A meta-analytic test of intergroup contact theory.”80. See Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) for a meta-analysis.

14

in prejudice and discrimination at that level as well.

Entities and individuals who promote Roma rights in Europe today are a part of a mas-

sive transnational Roma rights advocacy network.81 The number of Roma NGOs in Europe

has risen dramatically over the past two decades, and they have led the charge in Roma rights

advocacy efforts. In the international and state milieux these efforts are remarkably visible.

Organizations exclusively dedicated to the Roma cause—like the European Roma Rights

Centre at the international level or Romani Criss in Romania at the state level—operate

on multiple fronts, engaging in documentation of human rights abuses, research, strategic

litigation, and advocacy.82 Human rights organizations that focus on rights generally, like

Amnesty International, engage in advocacy and, most notably, naming and shaming.83 Lo-

cal organizations, generally smaller in capacity, focus less on international initiatives and

changes to law and policy, but vary in purpose. Many are dedicated to the general well-

being of the Roma and aim to help them overcome obstacles they face in education,84 health

care,85 legal and administrative matters,86 issues relating to infrastructure,87 and social ser-

vices more generally.88 Others focus instead on Roma/non-Roma relations, aiming to create

81. Sikkink, “Human Rights, principled issue-networks, and sovereignty in Latin America”; Keck andSikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics; Risse and Sikkink, “TheSocialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction”; Khagram, Riker,and Sikkink, “From Santiago to Seattle: Transnational Advocacy Groups Restructuring World Politics”; VeraKlopcic, Interview by author. Voice recording. Ljubljana, 2011 and 2012.

82. For an overview of the strategic priorities and actions of the European Roma Rights Centre, seewww.eerc.org. For the same at Romani Criss, see romanicriss.org.

83. See Amnesty International Slovakia at www.amnesty.sk.84. See, for example, Cega (Bulgaria) at http://www.cega.bg/; Romi za Rome Hrvatske (Croatia);

Chance for Children Foundation (Hungary) at http://www.cfcf.hu/; and Romaversitas (Macedonia) athttp://www.romaversitas.edu.mk/.

85. See, for example, Drom (Czech Republic) at http://www.drom.cz/ and Daja - Roma Women Organi-zation in Macedonia (Macedonia) at http://www.daja.org.mk/.

86. See, for example, IQ Roma Servis (Czech Republic) at http://www.iqrs.cz/; Romani Baht Foundation(Bulgaria) at http://baht2000.free.bg/; Zvule Prava (Czech Republic) at http://www.zvuleprava.cz/; Neki(Hungary) at http://www.neki.hu/; Praxis (Serbia) at http://www.praxis.org.rs/; and L’udia Proti Rasizmu(Slovakia) at http://www.rasizmus.sk/.

87. See, for example, Roma-Lom (Bulgaria) at http://www.roma-lom.org/; Amaro Drom (Albania) athttp://www.unioniamarodrom.org/; and Phralipe (Hungary) at http://www.phralipe.com/.

88. See, for example, Clovek v Tısni (Czech Republic) at http://www.clovekvtisni.cz/; SpolecneJekhetane (Czech Republic) at http://www.jekhetane.cz/; Opera Nomadi Reggio Calabria (Italy) athttp://www.operanomadirc.it/; Romsky Institut (Slovakia) at http://www.romainstitute.sk/; and Romod-rom (Czech Republic) at http://www.romodromcz.cz/.

15

a friendly atmosphere where Roma and non-Roma can socialize, often through cultural and

sporting events.89

Local efforts are less visible internationally, and sometimes escape attention at the

national level as well. Nonetheless, literature on contact, prejudice, and discriminatory intent

would single out a subset of those as particularly relevant to reducing discrimination on the

ground. To dramatically reduce discrimination at the level of the individual, I hypothesize

that an organization is needed that thrives on the ground and tailors its actions to the

people that surround it. Moreover, such an entity must promote Roma/non-Roma contact

and hence include in its activities non-Roma as well as Roma. The second hypothesis is

therefore as follows:

H2: Effective ground level organizing geared towards improving Roma/non-Roma relations

reduces discrimination against the Roma.

It was impossible to test the two hypotheses without collecting original data. To

avoid ethnic stereotyping, most Eastern European states no longer collect data based on

ethnicity; if they do, the data are not available to the general public.90 Even the most

basic population counts of Roma are grossly inconsistent: while rights activists tend to

overestimate population counts,91 official estimates are often too low, resulting in gaps as

wide as 2.5 million people.92 Since systematic and reliable cross-time quantitative data on

Roma rights do not exist, I constructed an original measure of discrimination, described after

the section on case selection.

89. See, for example, Vzajemne Souzitı (Czech Republic) at www.vzajemnesouziti.estranky.cz/clanky/o-nas-.html and L’udia Proti Rasizmu (Slovakia) at http://www.rasizmus.sk/.

90. Stano Daniel, interview by author; Brano Tichy, interview by author; Marek Hojsik, Interview byauthor. Notes. Bratislava, 2010; Stepan Ripka, Interview by author. Notes. Prague, 2010.

91. Barany, The East European Gypsies: Regime Change, Marginality, and Ethnopolitics; European RomaRights Centre, The Situation of Roma in an Enlarged European Union.

92. Romania. See Barany, The East European Gypsies: Regime Change, Marginality, and Ethnopolitics.

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Case Selection

I measured discrimination levels in two overlapping pairs of towns, one pair per hy-

pothesis. While differing on the crucial covariate—EU accession process or inclusive Roma

NGO activity,—the two town pairs match formidably on a set of factors that may influence

human and Roma rights, at state, regional, and town levels. To select the towns I performed

nearest neighbor matching, using relevant covariates,93 on all towns in Slovenia and Croatia

that have not experienced war violence in the Yugoslav wars in the early 1990s94 and have

a Roma population of at least 50.95 To test the two hypotheses with the lowest possible

number of subjects, participants were recruited from three towns; data from one of these

towns is therefore used to test both hypotheses. Matching singled out Cakovec in Croatia

and Murska Sobota in Slovenia as the best pair to test Hypothesis 1; Murska Sobota and

Novo mesto, also in Slovenia, were selected as the best pair to test Hypothesis 2 (see Figure

1 for a map). Since the three towns have shared characteristics, the remainder of this section

first discusses the common factors and then examines each town pair separately.

[Figure 1 about here]

Factors Common to All Three Locations

The three towns share demographic and historical characteristics. The regions in which

the towns are located have the highest percent of Romani inhabitants in their respective

93. The covariates used in nearest neighbor matching were town population, Roma inhabitants as pro-portion of total population, ethnic majority as proportion of total population, proximity to Slovene/Croatborder, a regional capital dummy, a tri-border region dummy (Hypothesis 1), and dummies for the EUaccession process (Hypothesis 1) and inclusive Roma NGO action (Hypothesis 2). The pair of towns usedto test Hypothesis 1 was selected first; the pair used to test Hypothesis 2 was selected second.

94. The Central Intelligence Agency, Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict1991 -1995 (Washington, DC: US Central Intelligence Agency., 2002).

95. Daniel E. Ho et al., “Matching as Nonparametric Preprocessing for Reducing Model Dependence inParametric Causal Inference,” Political Analysis 15, no. 3 (2007): 199–236; Daniel E. Ho et al., “Matchit:Matching as Nonparametric Preprocessing for Parametric Causal Inference,” Journal of Statistical Software(2007).

17

countries. Medjimurje in Croatia (Cakovec) and Prekmurje in Slovenia (Murska Sobota),

rank first in the proportion of Roma, while Dolenjska in Slovenia (Novo mesto) ranks second.

The three towns are regional capitals and have the largest Romani populations in their

respective regions—Roma make up 3.59 percent of the population in Cakovec, 2.27 percent

in Murska Sobota, and between 1.2 and 2.8 percent in Novo mesto.96 The towns are each

about 10 miles away from the Slovene-Croat border, and are of comparable sizes, having

between 20,000 and 30,000 inhabitants.97

Each town has had a Roma population for at least 200 years.98 In each town, the vast

majority of Roma live in one heavily Romani neighborhood, Kursanec in Cakovec, Pusca in

Murska Sobota, and Brezje-Zabjak in Novo mesto; these neighborhoods are on the outskirts

of the towns and are separated from the main town centers by a stretch of fields and some

trees.99 The Roma are represented in the local governments and Romani NGOs are active

in all three locations.100 Primary school curricula used in the towns do not cover the Roma;

they mention neither their history nor their rights.101

96. The lower estimate is based on the 2002 census; a local source, Silvo Mesojedec, estimates the higherproportion (interview with author). Also see Statisticni urad Republike Slovenije, “Popis prebivalstva,” 2002,http://www.stat.si.

97. Republika Hrvatska - Drzavni Zavod za Statistiku, “Popis stanovnistva, Kucanstava i Stanova,” 2001,http://www.dzs.hr/; Statisticni urad Republike Slovenije, “Popis prebivalstva.”

98. The first recoded birth of a Romani child in Murska Sobota is from 1741, the first mention in Novo mestowas in 1812, and the first mention in Cakovec was in 1688. Romi Bajasi (ancestors of the current populationin Cakovec) were first mentioned in Cakovec in 1860. For more, see Jozek Horvat-Muc, Romska Skupnost vSloveniji: Zgodovina in Kultura Romov (Murska Sobota, Slovenija: Zveza Romov Slovenije, Romani Union,2011) and Vugrincic and Siladi, Iz Zivota Roma: Kreativnost Roma, Doprinos Kulturi i Turizmu. This is ofsome importance because many locations throughout the former Yugoslavia have experienced an influx ofRoma relatively recently, as some were displaced during the conflict in the 1990s. In some such locationsthe dynamics between Roma and non-Roma are different from those in locations where Roma are considered“indigenous” as the refugee population may have integrated far more successfully (Vera Klopcic, Interviewby author. Voice recording. Ljubljana, 2012).

99. Karmen Ajdic, Diplomsko delo: Romska Naselja kot Primer Prostorske Segregacije v Sloveniji (Ljubl-jana: Univerza v Ljubljani, Fakulteta za druzbene vede, 2008); Hrvoje Slezak, “Prostorska SegregacijaRomskog Stanovnistva u Medjimurskoj Zupaniji,” Hrvatski Geografski Glasnik 71(2) (2009): 65–81.100. Jozek Horvat-Muc, Interview by author. Voice recording. Murska Sobota, 2011; Bajro Bajric, Interviewby author. Voice recording. Cakovec, 2012; Milena Tudija, Interview by author. Voice recording. Novo mesto,2012.101. Dijana Vican and Ivan Milanovic Litre, Nastavni Plan i Program za Osnovnu Skolu (Zagreb: Min-istarstvo znanosti, obrazovanja i sporta, 2006); Pavla Karba, Program Osnovna Sola: Drzavljanska in Do-movinska Vzgoja ter Etika (Ljubljana: Ministrstvo za solstvo in sport, Zavod RS za solstvo, 2010).

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Hypothesis I: Cakovec, Croatia, and Murska Sobota, Slovenia

A meaningful study of discrimination in the context of EU accession and membership

would necessarily span several years if limited to one country. To test Hypothesis I within

a short time span, I looked at cross-sectional snapshots of towns that, although in different

countries, match on the factors most relevant to Roma rights. The pressure to significantly

improve Roma rights in the few years that span the accession process has been applied to

almost all states of the Eastern Enlargements, including, most recently, Croatia. For reasons

explained below, the cleanest and most compelling cross-national comparison to a town in

Croatia is a town in its northern neighbor, Slovenia. Slovenia acceded to the EU in 2004

and, since accession, has experienced little pressure, if any, to improve its treatment of the

Roma.102

At the end of June 2011, the EU closed negotiations for membership with Croatia;

accession is foreseen for July 1st 2013.103 Chapter 23, the negotiation chapter most relevant

to Roma rights, was among the last three to be closed;104 in early summer 2011, when

Croatia was still reminded of the challenges faced by the Roma minority in the context of

accession negotiations, this project was already in place. I was therefore able to capture

people’s attitudes towards the Roma during a particularly critical period: when Croatia’s

treatment of Roma rights was among the last few things keeping Croatia from the EU.105

While the two towns are located in different countries, they match nearly perfectly on

the state and regional characteristics that most strongly influence human rights generally,

and just as well on factors that tend to affect Roma rights specifically.

State level

102. Vachudova, Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, & Integration After Communism.103. European Commission, “Press Release: EU closes accession negotiations with Croatia,” 2011, http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/11/824.104. European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and theCouncil: Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2010-2011 (European Commission, 2010).105. For a discussion on how significant progress tends to happen towards the end of the accession process,see Pridham, “The EU’s Political Conditionality and Post-Accession Tendencies: Comparisons from Slovakiaand Latvia.”

19

First, Roma make up a nearly identical fraction of the population in both: 0.18 percent

in Croatia and 0.19 percent in Slovenia.106

Second, Slovenia and Croatia were a part of Yugoslavia for almost fifty years and to-

gether formed the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes before that. Yugoslavia’s policies

regarding the Roma were at the time remarkably inclusive and constructive, especially when

compared to those of the surrounding states. Yugoslav nationality and minority policy was

based on the principle of tolerant ethnic harmony—federally enforced, when necessary.107

Tito’s government vastly preferred integration to assimilation, and Yugoslav Roma were

able to organize socially and culturally relatively free of state control.108 Any comparison

of Croatia with a non-Yugoslav state that would otherwise match well as a new democracy

with a significant Roma population would need to account for a legacy of several tolerant

decades. In Slovakia, for instance, assimilationist pressures resulted in a program offering

sterilization to Romani women; in Bulgaria, Roma were forcefully sedenterized and pro-

hibited from speaking Romani and dancing in public.109 In a comparison with Slovenia, in

contrast, the relative civility of Yugoslav policies does not pose a confounding factor. The

regime’s restrictions on general rights are not problematic either, since they applied across

the Federation.110

Third, both states are new Central European democracies and share the experience

of transitioning from the same system, which includes the rise in intolerance towards the

Roma that followed the demise of strict egalitarian Yugoslav policies.111 They are both

parliamentary representative democratic republics.112

106. The estimates are from the National Censuses. See Statisticni urad Republike Slovenije, “Popis prebi-valstva”; Republika Hrvatska - Drzavni Zavod za Statistiku, “Popis stanovnistva, Kucanstava i Stanova.”107. Barany, The East European Gypsies: Regime Change, Marginality, and Ethnopolitics.108. Donald Kenrick, “Former Yugoslavia: a patchwork of destinies,” in Between Past and Future: the Romaof Central and Eastern Europe, ed. Will Guy (Hertfordshire, UK: University of Hertfordshire Press, 2001),93–116; Barany, The East European Gypsies: Regime Change, Marginality, and Ethnopolitics.109. Barany, The East European Gypsies: Regime Change, Marginality, and Ethnopolitics.110. Barany, The East European Gypsies: Regime Change, Marginality, and Ethnopolitics.111. Barany, The East European Gypsies: Regime Change, Marginality, and Ethnopolitics.112. For more, please see entries on Slovenia and Croatia on PARLINE database on national parliaments;PARLINE database on national parliaments, “Entries on Slovenia and Croatia,” 2011, http://www.ipu.org/parline

20

Fourth, both states have either ratified or succeeded to all the core human rights

treaties,113 and have membership in a comparable number of international NGOs: by January

2000, Croatia was a member of 1080 organizations and Slovenia a member of 1130.114

Fifth, and perhaps most crucially, respect for Roma rights and the general circum-

stances of Roma existence were quite similar in the two states around the period before they

began the accession process. Slovenia formally applied for membership in 1996; Croatia in

2003. Both governments adopted a program of measures intended to help the Roma; Slove-

nia in 1995 (supplemented by education-specific measures in 1996), and Croatia in 2003.115

With these programs the two countries focused especially on education. As they were not

adequately proficient in Slovene or Croatian, younger Romani children from both countries

faced significant difficulties in integrating with their non-Romani peers in schools; they had

trouble following lessons as well. Klopcic observed this in Croatia around 2003,116 while

Tancer observed it in Slovenia in early to mid-1990s.117 In neither country were the Roma

recognized as a nation;118 they were, however, recognized as an ethnic minority in Slovenia

in 1991119 and as a national minority in Croatia in 2000.120 The Roma in both states were

largely unemployed: in Slovenia in 1990 about 17 percent worked,121 while in Croatia in

2001 17.1 percent of Roma had a job.122 The vast majority of Roma in both countries lived

113. For details, see entries on Slovenia and Croatia at The University of Minnesota Human Rights Center,“Human Rights Library: Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties,” 2011, http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/research/ratification-index.html.114. These numbers are from data for Emilie M. Hafner-Burton and Kiyoteru Tsutsui, “Justice Lost! TheFailure of International Human Rights Law to Matter Where Needed Most,” Journal of Peace Research 44,no. 4 (2007): pp. 407–425.115. In Slovenia, Program ukrepov za pomoc Romom, 1995 and Vladne podlage za posebne pogoje izo-brazevanja, 1996. In Croatia, Nacionalni program za Rome. See Vera Klopcic, Polozaj Romov v Sloveniji:Romi in Gadze (Ljubljana, Slovenia: Institut za narodnostna vprasanja, 2007).116. Klopcic, Polozaj Romov v Sloveniji: Romi in Gadze.117. Mladen Tancer, “Izobrazevanje Romov v Sloveniji,” in Evropa, Slovenija in Romi: Zbornik Referatovna Mednarodni Konferenci v Ljubljani, 15. februarja 2002, ed. Vera Klopcic and Miroslav Polzer (Ljubljana,Slovenia: Institut za narodnostna vprasanja, 2003), 67–76.118. To date, the Roma have been recognized as a nation only in Macedonia. See Ivan Rumbak, Od Legendado Povijesti, od Prica do Stvarnosti (Zagreb, Croatia: Print za vas, 2009).119. Polzer-Srienz, “Romi in Evropska Integracja: Primerjava Stanja v Sloveniji, Avstriji in na Hrvaskem.”120. Polzer-Srienz, “Romi in Evropska Integracja: Primerjava Stanja v Sloveniji, Avstriji in na Hrvaskem.”121. Mladen Tancer, Vzgoja in Izobrazevanje Romov na Slovenskem (Maribor, Slovenia: Zalozba ObzorjaMaribor, 1994).122. Nenad Pokos, “Demografska Analiza Roma na Temelju Statistickih Podataka,” in Kako Zive Hrvatski

21

in isolated settlements.123

Finally, both Slovene and Croatian press in that time period presented Roma in a

predominantly negative light, by using discriminatory language and by referring to alleged

criminals as members of the Romani community and not as individuals.124 In the fall of

1997, major Slovene news sources were surveyed for mentions of the Roma. Of the 131

times the Roma appeared in the news in that time period, only once did the article report

on a non-conflict situation.125 In Croatia in 2003, the Roma received more mentions than

any other Croatian minority in the two newspapers with highest readership. In 2001, 27

percent of articles on national minorities had a sensationalistic discriminatory title; in 2003

the proportion was reduced to 18 percent.126

Regional level

The regions in which the towns are located, Prekmurje and Medjimurje, match even

better than the countries do. First, the two regions are geographically close. Medjimurje in

Croatia is located immediately to the south of Prekmurje in Slovenia; the regions share the

river Mura and are separated only by the Slovene-Croat border.

Second, the GDPs per capita of Prekmurje and Medjimurje are closer than national

Slovene and Croatian GDPs per capita; since Medjimurje is one of the most prosperous

regions of Croatia and Prekmurje is the least prosperous region of Slovenia,127 the wealth

Romi, ed. Maja Stambuk (Zagreb, Croatia: Institut drustvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar, 2005), 35–53.123. Ivan Rogic, “Neke Socijalnoekologijske Odrednice Romskih Naselja,” in Kako Zive Hrvatski Romi, ed.Maja Stambuk (Zagreb, Croatia: Institut drustvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar, 2005), 53–90; Vanek Siftar, “Romi- Narodnostna ali Etnicna Skupnost?” Razprave in Gradivo 24 (1990): 80–84.124. Karmen Erjavec, Sandra B. Hrvatin, and Barbara Kelbl, Mi o Romih: Diskriminatorski Diskurz vMedijih v Sloveniji (Ljubljana, Slovenia: Open Society Institute, 2000); Igor Kanizaj, “PredstavljenostNacionalnih Manjina u Hrvatskim Dnevnim Novinama Komparativni Pregled 2001-2003,” Politicka Misao41, no. 2 (2004): 30–46.125. Erjavec, Hrvatin, and Kelbl, Mi o Romih: Diskriminatorski Diskurz v Medijih v Sloveniji. Interestingly,of all sources on articles or reports on the Roma, only 12.4 percent of the sources were Romani.126. Kanizaj, “Predstavljenost Nacionalnih Manjina u Hrvatskim Dnevnim Novinama Komparativni Pre-gled 2001-2003.”127. For more, see Statisticni urad Republike Slovenije, “Povprecne mesecne place po dejavnostih (SKD2008), statisticne regije,” 2011, http://www.stat.si and Republika Hrvatska - Drzavni zavod za statistiku,“Prvi rezultati,” 2011, http://www.dzs.hr/.

22

gap is dramatically reduced.

Finally, the two regions have additional common history: during the era of the Austro-

Hungarian Empire, when many Roma were forcibly settled, they were both under the Hun-

garian rule.128 Located in the tri-border area between Slovenia, Croatia and Hungary, the

regions have historically been highly ethnically diverse.129 This diversity resulted in an in-

triguing commonality: the dialects spoken in the two towns, though based on different

languages, are quite similar.130 The subjects in both towns, for example, referred to money

with the word “penezi,” which is neither Slovene nor Croatian but is derived from Hungarian.

Cakovec and Murska Sobota are only 20 miles apart, share an experience of over forty

formative years for ethnic tolerance in the Balkans, and match exceptionally well on state-,

regional-, and town-level factors that tend to affect human and Roma rights. The two towns

are excellent candidates for a border study of the effects of the EU accession process.

Hypothesis II: Murska Sobota, Slovenia and Novo mesto, Slovenia

Testing Hypothesis II, on the other hand, utilizes a within-country design. National

and EU laws regarding Roma rights are self-evidently the same in Novo mesto as in Murska

Sobota, as are state level factors that may have historically shaped the relationship between

Roma and non-Roma. The two towns see different types of Romani NGO action, however,

and this discrepancy is instrumental to testing Hypothesis II, which claims that ground

level Romani NGO action that aims to improve Roma/non-Roma relations and addresses

non-Roma as well as Roma helps reduce discrimination at the level of the individual.

Roma NGO activity in Murska Sobota aims to improve Roma/non-Roma relations

128. Vanek Siftar, Cigani: Minulost v Sedanjosti (Murska Sobota: Pomurska Zalozba, 1970).129. Anton Vratusa, “Panonski Prostor in Ljudje med Dvema Tromejama: Kulturno-zgodovinski inDruzbeno-ekonomski Oris,” in Narodne manjsine 6, Ziveti z mejo, Panonski Prostor in Ljudje ob DvehTromejah: Zbornik Referatov na Znanstvenem Posvetu v Murski Soboti, 9.-11. novembra 2007, ed. VeraKlopcic and Anton Vratusa (Ljubljana: Slovenska akademija znanosti in umetnosti, Institut za narodnostnavprasanja, 2008), 18–32.130. Djuro Blazeka, “Gornji Medjimurski Poddialekt,” in Diahronija in Sinhronija v DialetoloskihRaziskavah, ed. Marko Jesensek Jozica Ceh and Bernard Rajh, vol. 41, ZORA (Maribor: Slavisticno drustvo,2006), 108–116.

23

and is inclusive: it effectively engages the non-Roma just as much as it engages the Roma.

Romani NGO activity in Novo mesto does not. For example, fairly early in its tenure

Romani Union - Zveza Romov in Murska Sobota began organizing events that would improve

local awareness and relations between Roma and non-Roma. Initially, it was challenging to

convince local non-Roma that the events are intended for all, but the organization succeeded

in 1992 with Ciganska noc (“Gypsy night”), an annual concert of Romani music and dances

that traditionally evolves into a lively party.131 Once that barrier was breached, non-Roma

began attending book launches, plays, workshops and the Romani summer camps as well.132

A sister organization runs a Romani radio, Radio Romic, and there, too, non-Roma listeners

are invited to tune-in. Connecting Roma and non-Roma through culture and awareness is the

organizations’ chief objective, which they have apparently attained.133 Not only do Roma and

non-Roma attend the events together, but the number of non-Roma among event participants

and radio listeners recently surpassed the number of Roma.134 As it connects Roma and non-

Roma in a friendly, non-threatening context, Romani Union likely lowers Roma/non-Roma

anxiety—doing precisely what recent literature on contact, intergroup anxiety, and prejudice

finds particularly effective.135

131. Jozek Horvat-Muc, 20 let Romani Union Murska Sobota: 1990-2010 (RD Romani Union, 2010); MonikaSandreli, Interview by author. Voice recording. Murska Sobota, 2012. The party is a true testament tothe cultural exchange between the Roma who are generally more exuberant and Slovenes who tend to bemore reserved. The relaxed atmosphere promotes familiarity and provides an opportunity for personalacquaintance or even friendship. For more on successful intergroup contact, see Allport, The Nature ofPrejudice; Thomas F. Pettigrew, “Inttergroup Contact Theory,” Annual Review of Psychology 49 (1998):65–85; Norman Miller, “Personalization and the Promise of Contact Theory,” Journal of Social Issues 58(2002): 387–410.132. In 2000, Romani Union started a small, independent publishing house, which published local Romanifiction and non-fiction, a newspaper, and proceedings from conferences as well as recordings of music andRomani fairy tales. Several activists from Romani Union are members of the Romani Union amateur theatergroup and the Romani Union amateur folklore group. Each year since 1994 Romani Union has organizeda week-long international Romani summer camp where Roma and non-Roma, children, professionals andactivists can learn about Romani history, language, culture, and contemporary issues that affect Roma acrossthe globe. For more, see Horvat-Muc, 20 let Romani Union Murska Sobota: 1990-2010.133. An additional and possibly vital characteristic of organizing in Murska Sobota is that Roma andnon-Roma are always presented as equal. Instead of generally proclaiming that the Roma need help, theorganization demonstrates the ways in which, while equal, they are different and interesting. Enteringthe contact situation with equal status may additionally reduce bias. See James Moody, “Race, SchoolIntegration, and Friendship Segregation in America,” American Journal of Sociology 107 (2001): 679–716.134. Monika Sandreli, interview by author.135. Brown and Hewstone, “An integrative theory of intergroup contact”; Blair, Park, and Bachelor, “Un-

24

The most active organization in Novo mesto, in contrast, generally does not address

relations between Roma and non-Roma. Romano Veseli has a very strong presence in the

Romani communities and focuses on socio-economic aid provision and efforts related to

education of both Romani children and adults.136 Aside from an occasional volunteer, non-

Roma are not involved in the organization’s activities. The leading activist is well known

and respected among the Roma in Novo mesto, however; every randomly sampled Romani

subject who participated in the study was able to identify her by name and many profusely

praised her efforts. The organization in Novo mesto is of somewhat lower capacity than that

in Murska Sobota, but is growing.137

As neither was randomly assigned, expansive inclusive organizing in Murska Sobota

and somewhat less expansive non-inclusive organizing in Novo mesto suggest an omitted

variable bias, namely the possibility that any difference in discrimination today and the

scope and type of organizing in each town could be related to a difference in respect for

Roma rights prior to organizing. Before Romani organizing began in Murska Sobota in early

1991,138 however, Roma in Murska Sobota and Novo mesto received very similar treatment.

In fact, immediately before Slovene independence,139 relations between Roma and non-Roma

in Murska Sobota and Novo mesto were as alike as they have ever been. Uniform and strict

Yugoslav policies on minorities had by then been in effect for several decades, not only across

Slovenia but across other Yugoslav republics as well.140 The two main settlements in both

towns had Romani kindergartens.141 Romani primary school attendance in both towns was

derstanding Intergroup Anxiety: Are Some People More Anxious than Others?”; Blascovich et al., “PerceiverThreat in Social Interactions With Stigmatized Others.”136. Milena Tudija, interview by author.137. Jozek Horvat-Muc, interview by author; Monika Sandreli, interview by author.138. Horvat-Muc, 20 let Romani Union Murska Sobota: 1990-2010.139. Slovenia declared independence on June 25th 1991.140. Vanek Siftar, “Romi Vceraj . . . Pojutrisnjem?” Znamenje 2 (1989): 122–137. As previously mentioned,respect for minorities in Yugoslavia was paramount, but those identities gave way to unity; they “were acolorful nation . . . but all, including the Roma, Yugoslavians.” (Stane Baluh, interview by author).141. Mladen Tancer, “Romi v Sloveniji,” in Strpnost do Manjsin: Zbornik Referatov MednarodnegaZnanstvenega Simpozija, ed. Zlatko Tisljar and Alojz Sirec (Pedagoska fakulteta Maribor, Inter-kulturo Mari-bor, 1997), 94–99; Jozek Horvat-Muc, Romska Skupnost v Sloveniji: Zgodovina in Kultura Romov (MurskaSobota, Slovenija: Zveza Romov Slovenije, Romani Union, 2011); Dusica Balazek, interview by author.

25

low, especially in the higher grades.142 Due to employment policies centered on equality,

Romani levels of employment in both towns were quite high during the 1980’s and much

higher than during the transition period in the decade that followed.143 As the transition

to market economy began, the Roma were among the first to lose jobs,144 partly due to

low levels of education which were previously less of an obstacle to employment.145 Murska

Sobota and Novo mesto began experiencing general unemployment particularly early.146 In

both towns protection of socio-economic rights as well as the relative standard of living were

higher during the Yugoslav times than during the transition that followed147 and possibly at

their peak during the late 1980’s.

While several decades of unified policies on minorities and, more importantly, of equal-

ity in employment imposed upon all citizens do not guarantee that attitudes towards the

Roma in the early 1990’s were the same in Murska Sobota and Novo mesto, they do weaken

the threat of omitted variable bias. In addition, interview evidence suggests that the reason

behind expansive organizing in Murska Sobota is that the Roma themselves found it easier

to work together there,148 and did not scatter as much upon becoming educated.149

To establish the extent to which the general population of each town is familiar with

Romani organizing, I added questions about NGOs to the exit survey given to participants

142. Siftar, “Romi Vceraj . . . Pojutrisnjem?”; Tancer, “Romi v Sloveniji.”143. Dusica Balazek, interview by author; Vera Klopcic, interview by author, 2012. In some companies,specific minority quotas were in effect (Klopcic).144. Siftar, “Romi Vceraj . . . Pojutrisnjem?”; Dusica Balazek, interview by author; Vera Klopcic, interviewby author, 2012.145. Vera Klopcic, interview by author, 2012. Vanek Siftar predicted that as well, in 1989. See Siftar, “RomiVceraj . . . Pojutrisnjem?”146. Siftar, “Romi Vceraj . . . Pojutrisnjem?”147. Milena Tudija, interview by author.148. Generally, the Roma tend to fragment along clan and family lines (Barany, The East European Gypsies:Regime Change, Marginality, and Ethnopolitics; Vera Klopcic, interview by author, 2012). Those from Novomesto arrived in several waves and some of the divisions originating from that persist despite the fact thatthe Roma have been in the region for over 200 years (Klopcic). In Murska Sobota, on the contrary, only onedivision seems to be relevant, meaning that one side of the divide is large enough to provide enough peopleto run and staff the organization (Anton Stihec, Interview by author. Notes. Murska Sobota, 2011 ).149. Vera Klopcic, interview by author, 2012. In Romani communities across Central and Eastern Europeeducated Roma often choose to ‘assimilate’ completely into the majority population and no longer identifyas Roma; in many cases they are also rejected by the community and have no choice but to leave (EvaSalnerova, interview by author). In recent years this trend has begun to change as more young educatedRoma remain involved with their communities (Salnerova).

26

in Novo mesto. For comparison, the same questions were asked of 100 randomly chosen

individuals in Murska Sobota.150 Forty-six percent of randomly surveyed individuals in

Murska Sobota were familiar with local Romani organizations. In Novo mesto, only two

percent of senders were familiar with the same.151 This finding confirms the expectation from

comparing types of organizing in Murska Sobota and Novo mesto: activism in Murska Sobota

reaches almost every other individual from the non-Roma population, whereas activism in

Novo mesto—understandably—reaches only a few. In testing the effectiveness of organizing

at the ground level, Novo mesto is therefore a suitable counterpart to Murska Sobota.

Methodology

Games

Between the summers of 2011 and 2012, I collected data to construct an original mea-

sure of discrimination at the ground level dimension of everyday relationships between Roma

and non-Roma in Cakovec, Murska Sobota, and Novo mesto. The measure focuses on only

one of many dimensions in which discrimination occurs, discrimination at the level of the

individual. Rights violations that Roma may experience in seeking employment or health

care, in detention or in prison are not directly recorded in my data. The measure does, how-

ever, capture the basic, visceral, and quotidien discrimination upon which other violations

are frequently based.

Data on discrimination were collected through simple games that have been shown

to demonstrate risk preferences and other-regarding behavior. The games measured (1)

150. The NGO questions were unfortunately not included on the original exit survey in Murska Sobota.151. Thirty-three percent of senders indicated that they knew of a Romani NGO; only eighteen percent wereable to name an entity and only two percent in fact named a relevant organization. The municipal office forsocial benefits was the most commonly named “NGO” that dealt with Roma issues. I exclude the mentionsof two organizations in reporting the data. The first is a volunteer work organization (Drustvo za razvojprostovoljnega dela) that, among other things, also works with the Roma but is neither staffed by Romanor primarily concerned with Roma issues. Six percent of senders mentioned this organization. The secondis Civilna iniciativa, which is an initiative formed by non-Roma that aims to resolve the “Roma question.”It was evident that the senders who mentioned Civilna iniciativa understood it to be an organization thatdoes not fight for Roma rights but rather to protect the non-Roma from the (actual or perceived) negativeconsequences of living close to the Roma settlement. Two percent of senders named that organization.

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risk preferences (lottery),152 (2) altruism (dictator game),153 (3) trust in one’s community

members (trust game),154 and (4) trustworthiness with respect to one’s community members

(trust game).155 The chief rationale for using the games was the difficulty of measuring

individual levels of discrimination. People may not admit to racist preferences if asked

directly; in fact, participants in both Croatia and Slovenia often agreed to participate on the

grounds that no personal questions would be asked, but did not mind the game set-up.156

Briefly, the lottery revealed a subject’s willingness to gamble. A subject was given

a choice between five lotteries, ranging from one with no risk to one with high risk. The

expected value of all the lotteries was the same. The subject picked which one she preferred

and so revealed her willingness to gamble for a higher return.157

The dictator game revealed a subject’s level of altruism. A subject was given an

endowment and asked to decide how much of it to keep for herself and how much to donate

to a needy family in her community. The name of the family or any other characteristics

were not revealed. The subject divided the sum; the amount donated measures the level of

altruism.

In the trust game subjects were assigned to play the role of a sender or a receiver

152. Charles A. Holt and Susan K. Laury, “Risk Aversion adn Incentive Effects,” American Economic Review92 (2002): 1644–1655.153. Elizabeth Hoffman et al., “Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games,” Gamesand Economic Behavior 7 (1994): 346–380.154. Joyce Berg, John Dickhaut, and Kevin McCabe, “Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History,” Games andEconomic Behavior 10 (1995): 122–142.155. See also Colin Camerer and Ernst Fehr, “Measuring Social Norms and Preferences Using ExperimentalGames: A Guide for Social Scientists,” in Foundations of Human Sociality: Economic Experiments andEthnographic Evidence from Fifteen Small-Scale Societies, ed. Joseph Heinrich et al. (Oxford, UK: OxfordUniversity Press, 2004), Donna Bahry et al., “Ethnicity and Trust: Evidence from Russia,” American PoliticalScience Review 99, no. 4 (2005): 521–532, and Rebecca Morton and Kenneth C. Williams, ExperimentalPolitical Science and the Study of Causality: From Nature to the Lab (New York, NY: Cambridge UniversityPress, 2010).156. While the trust game involves an actual interaction between two people, it is nonetheless a simulationof a real-life situation. Whether the game captures discriminatory intent or merely prejudice may be upfor debate, but the issue is not dispositive. Both experimental (Dovidio 2004) and longitudinal (Wagner2008) analyses demonstrate that the two are closely connected, and that prejudice is causally linked todiscriminatory behavior.157. See the Online Appendix for the game protocols. The protocols are based on those in Michael J. Gillian,Benjamin J. Pasquale, and Cyrus D. Samii, “Civil War and Social Capital: Behavioral-Game Evidence fromNepal” (2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1911969.

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and were then randomly and anonymously paired with a partner. Both sender and receiver

began the game with an identical endowment. The sender chose how much of the endowment

to share with the receiver, knowing that the amount sent would be doubled and that the

receiver would have the chance to return to the sender a portion of his total amount. The

doubled amount was then given to the receiver. The receiver decided how much of his total

amount—that is, his initial endowment plus the doubled amount—to send back. The amount

sent was used as a measure of trust and the amount returned as a measure of trustworthiness.

Subjects were randomly paired to play the trust game with an anonymous randomly chosen

Roma or non-Roma partner from their community. The treatment was delivered in person:

subjects were told that their partner was randomly chosen and anonymous, either Roma or

non-Roma, and that there would be no direct interaction with the partner.158 Whether the

participant received a treatment or a control condition was determined beforehand, with a

coin toss. Subjects’ decisions in the dictator and trust games were confidential and made in

private.159

The trust game played for a monetary sum is exceptionally suitable as a measure of

discrimination because negative stereotypes and general dislike of the Roma are largely based

on distrust regarding money.160 Roma are often stereotyped as thieves and beggars;161 they

158. Partners never met. Trust game pairs were determined through identifier cards that subjects drew inthe beginning—the receiver was paired with the sender who had drawn the same identifier from a collectionof cards. The subjects were instructed to keep their identifier hidden; the examiners knew neither who drewwhat identifier nor who was paired with whom.159. The subjects were instructed to place the amount of money they wished to send to the family in need(dictator) or their partner (trust) in an empty envelope, which they then sealed, marked only with theiridentifier, and put in the appropriate ballot box (green box for dictator, blue box for trust). They wereinstructed to put the money they wished to keep in their pocket or in an envelope we provided, whichthey kept hidden. The examiners made sure that the instructions were well understood, left the room, andre-entered only when the subject confirmed that she had placed the envelope in the appropriate ballot boxand the remaining money in her pocket/hidden envelope. For more detail, see the protocols in the onlineAppendix.160. The expected total payoff from the three games, for one subject, was approximately 60% of a dailywage, in Slovenia approximately the equivalent of ¿16 and in Croatia of 106 kuna.161. Siftar, “Romi Vceraj . . . Pojutrisnjem?”; European Roma Rights Centre, The Situation of Roma in anEnlarged European Union; Suat Kolukirik, “The Perception of Gypsies in Turkish Society,” Roma Rights:Quarterly Journal of the European Roma Rights Centre 3 (2007): 31–36; Henry Scicluna, “Anti-RomaniSpeech in Europes Public Space: The Mechanism of Hate Speech,” Roma Rights: Quarterly Journal of theEuropean Roma Rights Centre 3 (2007): 47–55; Leonid Raihman, “Between Litigation and Freedom ofSpeech,” Roma Rights: Quarterly Journal of the European Roma Rights Centre 3 (2007): 105–108.

29

have historically been accused even of stealing children.162 The trust game was well received

in the Romani communities; Romani activists from Slovenia and Croatia thought that the

game was an appropriate and ingenious way of capturing the sentiment that motivates much

discrimination at the personal level.163

The primary quantity of interest was the difference between the trust that non-Roma

exhibited in interactions with Roma and that which they exhibited in interactions with

non-Roma. The lottery and the dictator game were included to control for characteristics

that likely influence subjects’ responses in the trust game and might confound the results.

A highly altruistic person may, for example, offer more money in the trust game, but not

necessarily because she trusts her potential partner.164 Likewise a risk-loving person might

offer a large sum because of the thrill, not trust.165

Non-Roma subjects participated individually, in their homes. Roma subjects partici-

pated individually in several central locations, including an NGO common room, a kinder-

garten, and several homes.166 Participation generally lasted between 10 and 20 minutes.

Participation began with reading and signing the consent form, continued with the

three games, and concluded with a short exit survey. The survey asked general questions

concerning the age, gender, education, income bracket, the nationality and ethnicity of the

participant, as well as two questions on the EU accession process. Participants were asked if

they had heard about this study or the games before; if they answered yes, they were asked

to specify when and in what context. If they heard about the games from a person who had

162. Hancock, We are the Romani People.163. Conversations with staff at Romani Union-Zveza Romov, a Roma NGO in Murska Sobota; Interviewwith Zeljko Balog; conversation with interested Roma in the Sitnice settlement (8 men).164. James C. Cox, “How to Identify Trust and Reciprocity,” Games and Economic Behavior 46 (2004):260–281.165. See Laura A. Schechter, “Traditional Trust Measurement and the Risk Confound: An Experiment inRural Paraguay,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 62 (2007): 272–292 but also Catherine C.Eckel and Rick K. Wilson, “Is Trust a Risky Decision?” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 55(2004): 447–465.166. While they were unwilling to come to a central location, mostly blaming the inconvenience of travel,non-Roma subjects quite willingly participated in their homes. Romani subjects, on the other hand, weremuch more comfortable participating in a central location.

30

participated, they were removed from the sample.167

Stratified Random Sampling

The random population sample consisted of 202 subjects from each town.168 Simple

random sampling was used to draw participants from the two strata, the non-Roma gen-

eral population and the Roma general population. The Roma community was oversampled

because it is substantially smaller. All streets in the town or the Romani settlement were

numbered and re-ordered based on a random number sample. Participants were recruited

from the chosen streets - one person from each house, with a systematic iteration between

genders.169 Any individual over the age of 18 was eligible to participate in the study. The

response rate was approximately 60 percent.170 In total, 606 people from the general popu-

lation participated in the games, 202 from each town.171

Results

As this paper discusses levels of discrimination against the Roma in Slovenia and

Croatia, I am here concerned only with the behavior of the subjects who were senders in the

167. Only two people had heard about the study (one had a friend who had participated and the other heardabout the study from her husband, who learned about it from a friend); they were both excluded from theanalysis.168. For a moderate effect size (around 0.25) and a power of 0.8, I required 50 subjects per treatment tofind a statistically significant difference at the 5 percent level. This demanded 200 subjects per town: 100non-Roma senders of which half were paired with 50 non-Roma receivers and half with 50 Roma receivers.For more, see Jacob Cohen, Statistical Power Analysis for Behavioral Sciences (Hillsdale, NJ: LawrenceErlbaum Associates, 1988).169. As the streets are relatively short, we did not encounter trouble with contagion; only two people wereremoved from the sample.170. Research teams attempted recruiting at a house on a selected street three times. Reports on averageresponse rates from various surveys administered by the Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia confirmthat a response rate of 60 percent is not unusually low; the office reports response rates that generally rangefrom 60 to 80 percent and vary with the topic of the survey for which participants are recruited. See, forexample, Lenart Lah, Katja Rutar, and Irena Svetin, “Trg dela: Labour market,” in Statisticne Informacije:Rapid Reports, ed. Statisticni Urad Republike Slovenije, 11 (Ljubljana, Slovenia: Statisticni Urad RepublikeSlovenije, 2011), 1–23 and Matija Remec, “Zivljenjska raven: Level of living,” in Statisticne Informacije:Rapid Reports, ed. Statisticni Urad Republike Slovenije, 21 (Ljubljana, Slovenia: Statisticni Urad RepublikeSlovenije, 2005), 1–10. I thank Matej Divjak (Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia) for his consultationregarding response rates.171. Two people decided to withdraw from the study shortly after participating, one from Murska Sobotaand one from Cakovec.

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trust game—in total, 303 randomly chosen individuals. Table 1 summarizes key variables for

senders. Based on the activists’ claims, Hypothesis I posited lower levels of discrimination

in Cakovec, at the height of the EU accession process, than in Murska Sobota, part of an EU

member state. I found the opposite. Average treatment effects and results from a generalized

linear model indicate that people from Murska Sobota do not discriminate against the Roma,

but that people from Cakovec do. Hypothesis II predicted higher levels of discrimination in

Novo mesto, where Roma NGO organizing is not inclusive, than in Murska Sobota, where

it is. The findings support this hypothesis: average treatment effects and results from a

generalized linear model indicate that while people from Murska Sobota do not discriminate

against the Roma, people from Novo mesto do.

[Table 1 about here]

The main quantity of interest—the dependent variable in the model—is the amount

participants sent to their respective partners in the trust game. As the currencies in which

participants were playing were not the same, the relevant variables (amounts sent in trust

and dictator games) are coded as proportions of total endowment. Thus, if upon receiving

the endowment of ¿6 a participant decided to send the ¿6 to their partner, the participant

was assigned a value of 1 in the trust variable.

Figure 2 presents the average proportion of total trust game endowment that senders in

each town sent to Roma and non-Roma partners. The average treatment effect is negligible

in the case of Murska Sobota, where senders on average sent 57 percent of their endowment to

non-Roma and 58 percent to Roma partners, a statistically insignificant difference-in-means.

The average treatment effect in Cakovec, on the other hand, is statistically significant at

the p < 0.05 level. Senders there sent 75 percent of endowment to non-Roma and 65

percent to Roma partners. Finally, senders from Novo mesto on average sent 73 percent of

endowment to non-Roma and 59 percent to Roma partners. The average treatment effect

in Novo mesto is statistically significant at the p < 0.05 level. The absence of a significant

32

average treatment effect in Murska Sobota and the presence of one in Cakovec and Novo

mesto indicate that senders from Murska Sobota did not discriminate against their Romani

partners, while senders from Cakovec and Novo mesto did.

[Figure 2 about here]

Curiously, senders from Cakovec and Novo mesto on average sent more to their partners

than did senders from Murska Sobota. Similarly, in the dictator game senders from Murska

Sobota sent significantly less to the anonymous local family in need than did senders from

Cakovec and Novo mesto (on average donating 70, 87, and 83 percent of their endowment,

respectively).172 This discrepancy suggests a higher average level of social capital in Cakovec

and Novo mesto. Nonetheless, the people there appear to discriminate.

Regression analysis provides further insight. The appropriate specification for a model

in which the dependent variable is a proportion is a generalized linear model with the bino-

mial variance and the logit link function.173 To estimate the treatment effect, the model in-

cludes interaction terms between the control function and the treatment variable (Roma).174

Since partner ethnicity in the trust game was randomly assigned within each town, the

observations were accordingly weighted.175

Table 2 presents results from the model that includes the lottery chosen, the proportion

of the endowment sent to the family in need in the dictator game,176 town dummies, and the

172. The difference between Murska Sobota and Cakovec is statistically significant at the p < 0.01 level; thedifference between Murska Sobota and Novo mesto is statistically significant at the p < 0.05 level.173. See Leslie E. Papke and Jeffrey Wooldridge, “Econometric methods for fractional response variableswith an application to 401(k) plan participation rates.,” Journal of Applied Econometrics 11 (1996): 619–632;Allen McDowell and Nicholas J. Cox, “How do you fit a model when the dependent variable is a proportion,”2004, http://www.stata.com/support/faqs/stat/logit.html. The results are substantively unchanged whenan ordinary least squared regression or a tobit regression is used instead. Results available upon request.174. All the control covariates are interacted with the treatment variable. For more information, see page116 in Morton and Williams, Experimental Political Science and the Study of Causality: From Nature to theLab.175. As each town was treated as a block, each treated observation (sender partnered with a Roma receiver)was weighted by the inverse of the proportion of subjects in its block (town) who were assigned to thetreatment condition and each control subject was weighted by the inverse of the proportion of subjects in itsblock who were assigned to the control condition. For more, see Alan S. Gerber and Donald P. Green, FieldExperiments: Design, Analysis, and Interpretation (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 2012).176. Behavior in the dictator game (family in need) was a strong predictor of behavior in the trust game.Plots on predicted mean proportion of endowment sent in the trust game, for both the lottery chosen and

33

main population controls—age group, gender, education level and income bracket—as well

as the interaction effects between these covariates and the treatment (Roma) as independent

variables.177 The interaction term of Roma and Cakovec is negative and statistically signifi-

cant, again suggesting that Croats from Cakovec discriminate against the Roma.178 Similarly,

the interaction term of Roma and Novo mesto is negative and statistically significant, also

suggesting that people from Novo mesto discriminate against the Roma.179

[Table 2 about here]

Conditional marginal effects demonstrate the effect on the predicted mean proportion

of the total endowment sent in the trust game as partner ethnicity changes from non-Roma

to Roma.180 The marginal effect for Murska Sobota is not statistically significant: essentially,

there is no evidence that a randomly chosen sender from Murska Sobota would send any less

or any more to a Roma partner than she would to a non-Roma partner. In Cakovec, on the

other hand, the change in the proportion of the endowment sent is statistically significant

at the p < 0.01 level. A randomly chosen sender from Cakovec would send about 30 percent

less to a Roma partner than to a non-Roma partner. The marginal effect is also statistically

significant in the case of Novo mesto. There, too, a randomly chosen sender would on average

send 30 percent less to a Roma partner (p < 0.01).

Unexpectedly, participants from Novo mesto offered unsolicited statements regarding

the Roma. In most cases the statements were given after or during the exit survey; a few

the proportion of endowment sent to the family in need in the dictator game, are in the Online Appendix(Figure 4 - lottery, Figure 5 - dictator game).177. Numerous iterations of the model were run, with various numbers and combinations of control variables.The findings are robust to all additions. Since I was a member of one of the two person research teams thatconducted the games, some iterations included a variable controlling for my presence in the research team.This control variable is consistently insignificant. All results available upon request.178. The statistically significant coefficient of the Roma x Cakovec interaction term also demonstrates thatthe differences between the respective treated and control groups in the two towns are significantly differentfrom each other (difference-in-differences).179. The results presented here are from a model in which observations from the three towns were pooled.Findings from analyses where the relevant towns are compared in pairs (Cakovec and Murska Sobota, andMurska Sobota and Novo mesto) are substantively unchanged and available upon request.180. The conditional marginal effects were calculated with all control covariates held at their means.

34

participants commented on the Roma during the trust game. One participant, tellingly,

mistook a research team for a pair of Roma going door to door asking for money. We

received comments from senders paired with Roma and non-Roma alike; whether or not

they were assigned the treatment had no effect on the substance of the comments. Thirty-

six percent of senders made unsolicited comments; one percent was positive, eleven percent

were neutral and twenty-four percent were negative. The most remarkable comment included

a half-joking threat that “we will send a couple of bus-loads of our Roma to your hometown

and you’ll see what it’s like.” Unsolicited statements were not nearly as common in the other

two towns. In Murska Sobota, one subject remarked upon receiving the treatment that she

did not see why it would matter that her partner was a Roma or a non-Roma. In Cakovec

we received three negative comments; the most remarkable, “The hell will he send,” referred

to the possibility that a Romani partner may return some of the endowment to his partner

in the trust game.181

Two concerns arise in light of these findings. First, senders from Cakovec and Novo

mesto might have sent less to Roma partners because the Roma in Cakovec and Novo mesto

are actually less likely to reciprocate in such a context, compared to the Roma in Murska

Sobota. A comparison of responses by Romani receivers, however, indicates that this is

not the case. There is no statistically significant difference between what the Roma from

all three locations returned to their partners, as a proportion of the total pot. The Roma

played consistently.

Second, the non-random assignment of the type of organizing in Murska Sobota and

Novo mesto also suggests a possible endogeneity problem, namely that the activists from

both towns might have chosen their respective foci because they believed that those would be

effective while any others would be ineffective in their respective towns. Extensive interviews

with the leading activists, however, suggest that this is not the case. Activists in Murska

181. A closer comparison of the behavior of senders in the two towns that discriminate reveals no significantdifference in the levels of discrimination against the Roma. The results of a generalized linear model on datafrom Cakovec and Novo mesto are available upon request.

35

Sobota focus strongly on Roma/non-Roma relations because they are themselves passionate

about the issue and have been so from the very start.182 Likewise, activists in Novo mesto

focus on providing socio-economic and educational aid because they believe it to be by far

the most important cause.183 Interview evidence does not resolve the endogeneity problem,

but does mitigate it.

These findings have three implications. First, the EU accession process does not nec-

essarily lower discrimination such that it will be lower in an accessing state than in an EU

member. Second, discrimination can be remarkably low, even absent, in an EU member

state. Third and finally, inclusive organizing that aims to improve Roma/non-Roma rela-

tions helps reduce ground level discrimination.

A few caveats are in order. Crucially, the findings do not assess the absolute ground

level effect of the EU accession process. The sample does not include observations from a

location that has not yet been affected by the accession process or one that is entirely outside

the purview of the EU. Without such a baseline, an evaluation of the efficacy of the process

as a whole is nearly impossible to make. Therefore, while the findings demonstrate that the

EU accession process does not necessarily lower ground level discrimination below that in

an EU member, they do not address the claim that the EU accession process as a whole is

ineffective in reducing ground level discrimination against the Roma.

Next, while the results demonstrate that discrimination can be remarkably low in an

EU member state, this is not universally the case. It is abundantly clear that many Roma

who live in EU member states, Eastern and Western, do not consistently enjoy enviable

rights and equal treatment. At the state level, the treatment of immigrant Romani popula-

tions by Sarkozy184—and recently Hollande185—was self-evidently intolerant, as are Italy’s

182. Jozek Horvat-Muc, interview by author; Monika Sandreli, interview by author.183. Milena Tudija, interview by author.184. Erlanger, “Expulsion of Roma Raises Questions in France.”185. Jolly, “French President Shuts Down Roma Camps and Seeks Relocation for Roma.”

36

efforts to destroy makeshift dwellings in settlements outside Milan.186 Hateful acts inspired by

personal bigotry range from creating fictional administrative barriers that impede obtaining

social benefits187 to participating in impromptu188 or planned189 demonstrations that usually

take place in Romani settlements and frequently involve Molotov cocktails.190 To this col-

lection of specific events, this study adds statistically significant evidence that ground-level

discrimination can still exist within EU member states, and that it varies within countries,

likely at the town level.

Finally, the results do not ensure that we would observe the same effect of inclusive

Roma organizing throughout the EU space or beyond it, or that we would observe the same

if inclusive organizing were randomly assigned. They also do not speak conclusively to the

degree of a direct link between the EU and Roma organizing. Roma issues are a high priority

within the EU space; the EU organizes and supports countless agendas and programs dedi-

cated to improving Romani lives,191 offers grants to Romani NGOs in member states,192 and

funds settlement infrastructure projects in candidate states.193 In the context of violence

against women, the combination of local autonomous feminist activism and regional or in-

ternational normative mechanisms is remarkably effective at spurring change.194 Drawing on

186. European Roma Rights Centre et al., Security a la Italiana: Fingerprinting, Extreme Violence andHarassment of Roma in Italy.187. U.S. Department of State, “2008 Human Rights Reports: Bulgaria,” 2009, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/eur/119072.htm.188. U.S. Department of State, “2008 Human Rights Reports: Czech Republic,” 2009, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/eur/119075.htm.189. U.S. Department of State, “2006 Human Rights Reports: Slovak Republic,” 2007, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78838.htm.190. In a particularly horrific event a three-year-old Romani girl, Natalka Kudrikova, suffered severe burnsand lost 80 percent of her skin. See Andrew Tkach, “Burned Girl a Symbol of Roma Hate and Hope,” 2010,http://articles.cnn.com/2010-06-25/world/roma.prejudice 1 arson-attack-molotov-cocktail-attack-anti-roma? s=PM:WORLD.191. For example: EUroma, “European Network on Social Inclusion and Roma under the Structural Funds,”2012, http://www.euromanet.eu/; European Commission, “The European Platform for Roma Inclusion,”2012, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/roma/roma- platform/index en.htm; Roma Decade,“Decade of Roma Inclusion 2005-2015,” 2012, http://www.romadecade.org/hom.192. Stane Baluh, Interview by author. Voice recording. Ljubljana, 2012; anonymous government officialfrom the Office for National Minorities in Croatia, interview by author.193. For an example of such a project see Phare, Phare Project Fiche 2005: Roma Support Project, Croatia;Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance, IPA 2008 Croatia Project Fiche: Roma Support Project - Phase III.194. Mala Htun and S. Laurel Weldon, “The Civic Origins of Progressive Policy Change: Combating Violenceagainst Women in Global Perspective, 1975-2005,” American Political Science Review 103 (2012): 548–569.

37

that, and considering the depth of EU involvement in the transnational Roma advocacy net-

work, possible EU effects cannot be ruled out. Activists and experts from Slovenia—Murska

Sobota, Novo mesto, and Ljubljana—however, are divided on the depth and importance of

the EU in local organizing.195 Some claim that the EU plays a strong role in motivating

activists,196 while others maintain that its role is negligible.197 Whether or not the EU,

in any form, is the primary driver behind the observed lack of discrimination is at present

uncertain, and more work is required to clarify that relationship.198 In the meantime, the

absence of animus in Murska Sobota is striking.

This finding best speaks to the literature on the promotion of human rights norms.199

It reveals possible efficacy of a strategy currently not central to the theoretical framework of

norms promotion; instead of focusing on naming and shaming, which has rightfully received

much scholarly attention,200 I focus here on norms promotion through activities that soften

the public mood201 and reduce inter-group anxiety. That is not to say that typical naming

and shaming efforts, quite visible at national and international levels,202 are ineffective in this

195. TahirovicThe attainment of these goals is carefully evaluated and visibly enforced; the European Commission constantly monitors each candidate;producing yearly Progress Reports that detail the states’ rights situation and its shortcomings2011.196. Vera Klopcic, interview by author; Dusica Balazek, Interview by author. Voice recording. Novo mesto,2012.197. Jozek Horvat-Muc, interview by author; Janja Roser, Interview by author. Notes. Murska Sobota, 2011.198. I was unable to obtain records of financial support given to the NGOs in Murska Sobota and Novo mesto.Neither the activists nor the Slovene Office for National Minorities were forthcoming with the information.199. Sikkink, “Human Rights, principled issue-networks, and sovereignty in Latin America”; Brysk, “FromAbove and Below: Social Movements, the International System, and Human Rights in Argentina”; Finnemoreand Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change”; Keck and Sikkink, Activists BeyondBorders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics; Risse and Sikkink, “The Socialization of InternationalHuman Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction”; Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink, “From Santiagoto Seattle: Transnational Advocacy Groups Restructuring World Politics.”200. Hafner-Burton, “Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human Rights Enforcement Problem”;Murdie and Davis, “Shaming and Blaming: Using Events Data to Assess the Impact of Human RightsINGOs”; Davis, Murdie, and Steinmetz, “Makers and Shapers: Human Rights INGOs and Public Opinion”;Htun and Weldon, “The Civic Origins of Progressive Policy Change: Combating Violence against Womenin Global Perspective, 1975-2005”; Bell et al., “Taking the Fight to Them: Neighborhood Human RightsOrganizations and Domestic Protest.”201. Edwin Amenta et al., “The Political Consequences of Social Movements,” Annual Review of Sociology36 (2010): 287–307.202. For examples of shaming at the international level, see Human Rights Watch (Human Rights Watch,“France: Renewed Crackdown on Roma,” 2013, http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/08/10/france-renewed-crackdown-roma) and European Roma Rights Center (European Roma Rights Centre, “Italian Policies areViolating Human Rights of Roma,” 2013, http ://www.errc . org/article/ italian - policies - are - violating -human-rights-of-roma/4140). For shaming at the national level, in Slovenia, see a campaign by Amnesty

38

context. The difference in discrimination levels in the three towns, however, suggests that

without very particular ground level action these efforts were insufficient. Indeed, inclusive

organizing on the ground in Murska Sobota may be seen as a variant of local action taking

a cross-national norm and adapting it to the local environment.203

This result thus contributes to scholarship that establishes the necessity of a local

presence in norms promotion,204 and offers a clarification: not just any type of organizing

will do. That does not mean that the only type of local action that helps improve human

rights is inclusive organizing; rather, it means that local action ought to be tailored to its

target audience. In this case, the actors expected to change, via inclusive organizing, were

individuals; naming and shaming, on the other hand, typically targets states and state actors.

Focusing on the behavior of individuals, this finding also bears upon literature in psy-

chology on contact, prejudice, and discrimination. Crucially, and unlike those in many

psychological studies, the subjects in this study were not treated with direct contact during

the course of participation. The study instead offers an assessment of long-term intergroup

contact—as it develops naturally on the ground—as a measure intended to reduce discrimina-

tion, and so provides a link between scores of convincing results from inter-group interactions

in laboratory settings and theories of human rights norm promotion.

Conclusion and implications for future work

This study first tests the received wisdom that the EU accession process dramati-

cally reduces discrimination against the Roma, which may rise again once the candidate

state becomes a member of the EU. Not only is this hypothesis, the first half in particular,

paradigmatic of an incentive-based understanding of rights change in international relations

International Slovenia (Amnesty International Slovenija, “Romi v Sloveniji,” 2013, http://www.amnesty.si/j7/kampanje/slovenija/115-romi-v-sloveniji.html).203. Sally Engle Merry, “Transnational Human Rights and Local Activism: Mapping the Middle,” AmericanAnthropologist 108(1) (2006): 38–51.204. Htun and Weldon, “The Civic Origins of Progressive Policy Change: Combating Violence againstWomen in Global Perspective, 1975-2005”; Murdie and Davis, “Shaming and Blaming: Using Events Datato Assess the Impact of Human Rights INGOs.”

39

literature, it is also championed by scholars of the EU accession process and experts on Roma

rights in Central and Eastern Europe. My result that finds no support for this hypothesis

is therefore surprising. Non-Roma from Cakovec, who were expected to discriminate com-

paratively little or not at all, did in fact discriminate—even as they were aware that respect

for human rights is a necessary condition for EU accession. In turn, non-Roma from Murska

Sobota who had not been exposed to EU pressure regarding Roma rights for over 8 years

treated Roma no differently than non-Roma. That the effects of an incentive-based rights

change mechanism as powerful as the EU accession process did not appear to trickle down

to the ground level is a sobering finding. It cautions against unconditionally relying on

state and international-level rights change measures—powerful as they may be in their own

right—to affect violations at the personal level.

The second hypothesis states that ground level organizing geared towards improving

Roma/non-Roma relations helps reduce discrimination. A within-country test provided ini-

tial evidence in its favor. Non-Roma from Murska Sobota, where expansive inclusive Roma

NGO action reaches almost every other non-Roma individual, did not discriminate against

the Roma; non-Roma from Novo mesto, not having been targeted by expansive inclusive or-

ganizing over the past 15 years but having otherwise lived in an environment quite similar to

that in Murska Sobota, discriminated against the Roma. This finding suggests that another

powerful mechanism of rights change exists and provides a possible answer to the puzzle of

observing rights violations in EU member states that seem to fly in the face of EU’s efforts

to eliminate discrimination against the Roma. The evidence supports the idea that the pro-

motion of norms can help decrease discrimination, with the related requirement of an entity

on the ground that directly engages the majority population. In the case of Novo mesto,

the absence of such an entity was linked to less success in lowering discrimination, even as

the transnational Roma advocacy network remained quite present at the international and

state levels.

The findings from Murska Sobota and Novo mesto provide solid initial support for

40

the second hypothesis, but many issues remain to be explored. Is the effect of ground level

organizing observed in Murska Sobota generalizable? Would we observe a similar effect if

the treatment of local level organizing or a simulation thereof were randomly assigned? To

what extent is the EU primarily responsible for the observed decrease in discrimination?

Would non-Roma from a town entirely outside the purview of the EU discriminate against

the Roma? Would non-Roma from such a town exhibit non-discriminatory attitudes if the

town had strong local level organizing like that in Murska Sobota?

As the EU plays a central role in supporting the transnational Roma advocacy network,

decoupling the effects of organizing from the influence of the EU would be a particularly

challenging task. Even as that remains unresolved, however, the findings speak against the

pessimism with which NGOs are often viewed. I posit here that some NGOs can be effective

in reducing discrimination, at least in certain settings. Although derived from one specific

context, my findings could have implications for lowering discrimination against other socially

disadvantaged groups elsewhere, ranging from immigrant populations in Europe to members

of LGBT communities in Africa.205

Further, they offer an answer to the question of what the international community

can do to promote human rights and fight discrimination: rights can be increased not only

through legal mandates, but also through the promotion of norms. Beyond the findings

presented here, this study provides original data to a field that often laments its scarcity.

With respect to the Roma, this study helps illuminate the relationships between people of

Europe’s largest ethnic minority and of two European nationalities, and so demonstrates

the potential of inter-ethnic cooperation that offers more than the popular stories of the

‘gypsies,’ their criminality, and their plight.

205. Among other populations for which these findings might have implications are, as mentioned, persons ofAfrican descent in numerous Central and Latin American countries, Jews in Argentina, Uzbeks in Tajikistan,the San in Namibia, Turks in Germany and Greece, Hungarians in Slovakia, Russians in Uzbekistan, Poles inBelarus, Koreans in Japan, Aboriginals in Australia, and indigenous populations in Guatemala, El Salvador,Bolivia, and Paraguay.

41

Novo mesto

Murska Sobota

Čakovec

app. 10 miles

Figure 1: A map of the three towns.

42

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43

Table 1: Summary of key variables for senders in Murska Sobota, Cakovec and Novo mesto

Variable Number of Mean Standard Minimum Maximumobservations Deviation

Paired with Roma 303 0.51 0.50 0 1receiver (treatment)

Proportion of endowment 303 0.65 0.33 0 1sent to trust game partner

Lottery chosen 303 2.97 1.31 1 5(1 - no risk, 5 - high risk)

Lottery payoff (as 303 1.03 0.59 0 2(proportion of expected value)

Proportion of endowment sent to 303 0.80 0.30 0 1family in need (dictator game)

Age group 1(18-24), 2(25-35), 302 3.30 1.25 1 53(36-49), 4(50-64), 5(65+)

Woman 302 0.59 0.49 0 1

Income bracket 282 1.68 0.69 1 3(1-lowest, 3-highest)

Education level (1-primary school, 300 2.38 0.67 1 42-secondary, 3-college, 4-post-graduate)

Primary nationality (1-Slovene in 303 0.97 0.17 0 1Slovenia, Croatian in Croatia;0-otherwise)

Primary ethnicity (1-Slovene in 303 0.92 0.28 0 1Slovenia, Croatian in Croatia;0-otherwise)

Murska Sobota (101 senders) 303 0.33 0.47 0 1

Cakovec (101 senders) 303 0.33 0.47 0 1

Novo mesto (101 senders) 303 0.33 0.47 0 1

Human rights identified as 90 0.83 0.37 0 1a requirement for EU accession

(senders from Cakovec only)

Minority rights identified as 90 0.44 0.50 0 1a requirement for EU accession

(senders from Cakovec only)

Author present in research team 303 0.61 0.49 0 1

44

Table 2: Effect of game partner ethnicity (Roma or non-Roma) in Croatia and Slovenia onthe amount sent in the trust game - generalized linear model with weighted data

Independent Coefficients Standardvariables errors

Roma dummy -0.301 0.993

Cakovec 0.603 ** 0.260

Cakovec x Roma -1.122 *** 0.413

Novo mesto 0.592 ** 0.289Novo mesto x Roma -1.135 *** 0.400

lottery 2 dummy 0.106 0.380lottery 3 dummy 0.254 0.351

lottery 4 dummy 0.483 0.400

lottery 5 dummy 0.312 0.417

lottery 2 x Roma -0.012 0.552

lottery 3 x Roma -0.149 0.512

lottery 4 x Roma -0.334 0.546

lottery 5 x Roma 0.514 0.652

proportion sent to family in need 2.573 *** 0.454

proportion sent to family x Roma 1.063 * 0.591

woman 0.010 0.219

woman x Roma -0.283 0.329

age (25-35) -1.119 * 0.611

age (36-49) -0.653 0.576

age (50-64) -0.511 0.604

age (65+) -0.718 0.602

age (25-35) x Roma 0.948 0.788

age (36-49) x Roma 0.567 0.737

age (50-64) x Roma 1.304 * 0.762

age (65+) x Roma 1.346 * 0.767

income bracket 2 0.051 0.253

income bracket 3 0.910 ** 0.437

income bracket 2 x Roma -0.412 0.386

income bracket 3 x Roma -0.937 0.640

secondary education -0.144 0.409

college education -0.258 0.438

post-graduate education -0.680 0.768

secondary education x Roma -0.762 0.707

college education x Roma -0.059 0.770

post-graduate education x Roma -0.398 1.091

const. -1.194 * 0.678

Number of observations 279

* p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .01; standard errors in parentheses.

45

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