UNDERSTANDING the WAR in IZOS ovo

Editors FLORIAN BIEBER

European Center for Minority Issues, Belgrade AIDAS DASKALOVSKI

Central European University, Budhpest

FRANK CASS LONDON PORTLAND, OR

2 033

REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE KOSOVO CONFLICT!

Hammel, E. A. and Soc, D., 'Lineage Cycle in Yugoslavia', Anrerican A vol. 75 (1973). 16

Hammel, E. A. and Yarbrough, C., 'Social Mobility and the Durability Journal ofAnthropologica1 Resenrch vol. 29, no. 3 (1973).

, . Hannen, U., Cultural Complexity (New York: Columbia University , , Herafeld, M., Anfhropoloffy Through the Looking-Glass (Cambridger~Csrnlv' '

University Press, 1987). : , " j , . Horowitz, D., 'Democracy in Divided Societies', Global Issues in Pansitiori, I, r 8

"Serbia After the Kosovo War: uanuary 1994). . , . . The Defeat of Nationalism and

International Crisis Group, 'The Albanian question in Macedonia: Implications 0 1 IIIL Kosovo Conflict for Inter-Ethnic Relations in Macedonia', 11 Augus~199X. Change of Regime

JovanoviC, A,, Manirawe na semejstuoto vo Republika Makedonija - Demogri~/ikt Florian Biebm socioloski aspekti (Ph.D. dissertation, Skopje: University of Sts..Cyril a i Methodius, 1994). .'., ,

Mickey, R., 'Citizenship, Status, and Minority Political Participation: The Fvidcncc from the Republic of Macedonia', in Nonneman, Niblock and Szajkowski, Mt~slitir Communities in the New Europe (Berkshire: lthaca Press, 1996). - . .

Miller, R. and Ivanovit, M., 'Macedonia: the Creation of a Nation and the Stntr h i 1 of Ethnic Conflict', inT. D. Sfikasand C. Williams (eds), E t h n i c i t y m t d N ~ t i o ~ ~ ~ ~ I i s ~ n ~ ' in the East-CentralEuropeand in the Balkans (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1994), p. i 12.

Najcevska, M. and Gaber, N., Survey Results andLega1 BackgroundRegardi,z,q,l'ib,iic The war in Kosovo has had different kinds of impact on the population of Issues in the Republic of Macedonia (Skopje: Institute for Sociological, I'oiiii~.al and Juridical Research, 1995). i,. Yugoslavia and on most Serbs. Obviously the NATO bombing inflicted

Najcevska, M., Simoska, E. and Gaber, N., 'Muslims, State and Society inihe Rt much suffering among the civilian population. In addition, it placed the of Macedonia: The View from Within', in Nonneman, Niblock and Szajl Yugoslav regime for the first time in visible conflict with and opposition to (eds), Muslim Communities in the New Europe (Berkshire: Ithaca,Press, I! the international community. Prior to the NATO bombing, the confron-

Perry, D. M., 'The Republic of Macedonia: Finding its Way', in K: Dawishn and tation between the regime and Western countries had never before taken B. Parrott (eds), Politics, Power and the Struggle for Democracy'in Sbtrt/,-E~st

, , , , , such direct and explicit form. The bombing of Serb positions in Bosnia in Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). . i,

Semini, L., Kosovo Eledion Campaign Violence, at www.iwpr.ne~index:p1.~?;~rchii.e~ , '1995 occurred a t a moment when MiloSevit had already broken most links bcrlbcr-20000915-2-eng.txt. ,,.,-, , , with the Serb leadership in the Republika Srpska. The sanctions between

Simit, A., 'Ageing in the US and Yugoslavia: Contrasting Models of Integr; 1992 and 1995, and since 1999 -although having a detrimental effect on Relationships',AnthropologicalQuarterly, vol. 50, no. 2 (1977), p,rS8. the population of Serbia - never positioned Western countries in the same

Surroi, \I, 'Kosovo Tributes', Balkan Crisis Report, no. 172 (2000). , 4 ..!. confrontation as the war in early 1999. The war in Kosovo, o r rather the Szajkowski, B., 'Macedonia: An Unlikely Road to Democracy', in G! Prldha~

T. Gallagher (eds),Erperimenting with Democracy: Regime Changer in theH, wars, the bombing of Yugoslavia by NATO o n one side and the campaign (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 249. ~ ( ~ , , j " of mass expulsions and murder in Kosovo by the Yugoslav army and

The 1994 Cmus of Population, Households, Dwellings and Agriculturdl~Holdi paiamilitary groups on the other, had contradictory effects o n Serbia itself the Republic of Macedonia, Population According to Declared Ethnic:Affiiu~i, and on nationalism, which has been a dominant phenomenon in Serbian Religious Affiliation, Mother Tongue and Citizenship (Skopje: Statistical Offic, politics of the past decade. Macedonia, 1996). . . , , . , This chapter will seek to put forth some considerations on the role Todorova, M., Imagining the Ralkans (Oxford: Oxford University Prcn,:1998).

Trifunoski, J., Albansko stanovnistvo u Makedoniji: anfropogeografka i eino,yrizl nationalism playedprior to and during the Kosovo war in Serbia. It will also . ;? . , lstrauivanjn (Belgrade: Knjizevne Novine, 1988). highlight some of the consequences of the loss of Kosovo in the Serbian

Wolf, E., Europe and the Peoples Without History (Berkeley: University bf.C;~lI(~~r political scene after June 1999. First, the chapter will explore the role of Press, 1997). .I. .,:; ! the government in mobilizing a 'patriotic' policy vis-i-vis Kosovo, and the

Wolf, E., 'Race, Culture, Ethnicity: Perilous Ideas', Current Anthropology, j,ol. "0.1 (1994). 11ubIic support (or the lack thereof) it managed to secure. It will then lhighlight the impact of the loss of Kosovo o n the political opposition, and

the impact of Kosovo on the regime change in September/October 2000. In its concluding parts, the chapter will discuss the role of conspiracy

eories in relation to nationalism, as reinforced by the war in 1999, and

320 321

rbin, ocal :y in,

, ,

; . ,

REGIONAL IMPLlcATloNs OF THE Kosovo CoivFLIa- SERBIA AFTER THE Kosovo WAR discuss some of the post-war attempts to address the crimes c 4:: the intentions of our foreign enemies, we can neutralize the intents of the name of the Serbian people. ; those who live within our borders ... I am referring to those who are

.# ! seeking territorial autonomy, a state within a state. That will not 2 . happen in Serbia.'

THE 'PATRIOTIC POLICY' OF THE GOVERNMENT, '

A,!

Only one attempt was made by the regime to garner legitimacy for its policy There is little evidence that the government actually enjoyed widesli towards Kosovo after the elections of 1997 with the referendum held in support for its policy of expelling as many Albanians as possible dutinh ' April 1998. The referendum only addressed foreign mediation in the NATO bombardment of Yugoslavia. While support for ~ i l o ~ e v i i and I- escalating conflict, however. A poster of the Yugoslav Left in English serves Socialist Party continuously declined throughout the 1990% the' lack as: a good (and amusing) example of the government position: 'Citizents criticism for the government's nationalist policies from large segments [sic]! Do you agree that strangers should interfere with what you do in your the 'real' and 'false' opposition, have created the appearance of a 131 country? NO. We all think the same!" Although the 75 per cent rejection consensus over the policies pursued in Kosovo. was celebrated by the regime as a 'historical "No"' comparable to the 1941

The last elections in Serbia, which took place in 1996 and 1997foc1 coup against the German-Yugoslav alliance and the 1948 break with the less on national issues than any previous election. Instead, they represe Soviet Union, it rather demonstrated (illustrated) the regime's understand- attempts by parts of the electorate to vote for a 'normalization' of Sel ingof democracy by holding a referendum at very short notice, and posing as indicated by the victory of the opposition alliance Zajedno it1 I a'strongly biased question with little concrete meaning for the outcome.' A elections in November 1996. The elections for the Serbian ptesider~r few months later the Holbroohe-MiloSevit agreement over the stationing the following year reflected general dissatisfaction with the internal sg of up to 2,000 unarmed OSCE observers in Kosovo (Kosovo Verification bling of the democratic opposition, as witnessed by the riseof Voiislav S Mission, KVM) exposed the referendum as being nothing more than a bluff. as the alternative to the Socialist Party and its candidates Zoranl LiliC :. The intensification of the conflict in Kosovo, largely triggered by the later Milan MilutinoviE. Despite the importance of other issues durini, ha1 response to the growing Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), prompted election, the question of Kosovo nevertheless featured prominently i n tl .shift in the policy of the Socialist Party of Serbia. In the early phase of electoral campaign. The government continued to advance a positiorr 111 MiloSeviC's rule, while it still existed as the League of Communists of Serbia, proposed dialogue and 'compromise' with the Albanian population, but ti1 ,, he party combined the rhetoric of a centralized Yugoslavia with calls for a rejected any significant degree of territorial autonomy, rendering the < ng Serbia. Between 1991 and 1993, the new Socialist Party shifted de facto worthless. The Yugoslav Left (JUL) generally, sought to portra! ard a more outright nationalist position, justifying the wars in Croatia more 'conciliatory'wing of the government, as exemplified by the folio\ Bosnia. Starting with the later phase of the Bosnia war until the begin- statement by LjubiSa RistiC, its pesident: ...,

. , ,

fling of the Kosovo conflict, the party adopted a 'pro-peace' line and , .

. . presented itself domestically and internationally as a factor and guarantor It was our duty and obligation to launch dialogue with o&,fello~ of'stability.' Since 1998, the Socialist Party has positioned itself as a countrymen of Albanian ethnicity with a view to finding a s'olutiorl 'patriotic' party and has engaged in more blatant acts of outright authori- their status and their participation in the political life of the cu~intl,.

, taiianism than in the previous eight years. Obviously such a dialogue cannot be initiated with thosc who Between April and October 1998, the Yugoslav regime attacked the stubbornly insist upon separation of Kosovo, its independencc':ll~d

~~pposition on three fronts: on the question of Kosovo, the universities and separatism ... Hence the left coalition will not talk about Kosovo :IS ;I the media, thereby dealing successive painful blows from which the state or Republic within the FRY.'

. ,

opposition was unable to recover quickly, and which effectively weakened The dominant Socialist Party, on the other hand, supported a similaspr rheir re~olve.~ A new university law passed in May 1998 eliminated the while taking a stronger line against separatism, linking it with ,'for :~i~tonomy of the universities and demanded a written declaration of loyalty enemies', as its first presidential candidate, Zoran LiliC explained: . ' , , : . to'the I , regime. This law confirmed a political climate of

, ,

... [we] will have to fend off the attacks of those who would:like t o ir authoritarian consolidation of the political regime in Serbia, which is spoil [what we achieved]. There are such people in Vojvodina;Kosovo I., manifested in increasingly overt regime's reliance on forms of direct and Metohija, in Ragka and beyond our borders. If we cannot prevc and indirect repression and increasingly more open production of

322 323

uncertainty, insecurity and fear, destruction and suppressio autonomous enclaves of civil society resisting the existing aut tarian rule.'

In the wake of the first threats by NATO to bomb Yugoslavia, ment imposed severe restrictions on the freedom of the media, leading to the progressive closure of most independent media outlets. The confiscatioii of the equipment of the important independent daily Naia Borba inOctober 1998 exemplifies the ways in which the regime used the crisis in Kosovo to eliminate opposition from all sides. The ban was justified because the newspaper had published reports from Kosovo critical of the govern'ment? including statements by Adem Demagi, the KLA spokesman at

The publishingof invalid political assessments by representa terrorist organizations, including the supplement titled: Preconditions', spreads fear, panic and defeatism and is contrdry t the resolutions by the Federal Parliament and the People:sAssenib of the Republic of Serbia, since non-existent and unrecogniied orgar zations are thus given an oppormnity to jeopardize the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Yugoslavia.' , , 1t8

Both the army and police campaign in Kosovo, and the suppressioh bf i l ~ c opposition within Serbia, need to be considered in the context of the stror~g opposition to the regime during the demonstrations in the 'wintcr i ~ i 1996197. The 'normalization', which Serbia began to experience nc i t emerged from five years of participation in wars, sanctions and an30vcr.ill breakdown of social order, proved to he more threatening to.the regiillc than all the previous years of crisis. While the regime succeeded in'divi

-mmF SERBIA AFTER THE KOSOVO WAR

some degree of unity, by establishing a joint opposition platform in January 2000 and with the calling of Yugoslav elections the adoption of a joint list . , of candidates and a political programme, which contained a relatively detailed plan for political, social and economic recovery." , . . ,

The election campaign in August and September 2000, which lead to the, ' victory of the opposition, rested essentially on three pillars. Firstly, the movement 'Otpor', consisting mostly of students and pupils mobilized against MiloSevif, put unity of the opposition on the top of the political agenda. Secondly, the joint opposition campaign mostly sought to promote the programme of economic reform, paying only little attention. Thirdly, the presidential candidate KoStunica did pay great importance to Kosovo; travelling there during his campaign and criticizing the international admin- istration for its failure in protecting Serbs." These multi-level campaign$ although eventually successful, highlighted the lack of agreement within th4 opposition over the issue of Kosovo. There is no consensus today.dh8 whether the loss of Kosovo remains mainly on the surface of the political agenda, with no significant role in internal Serbian politics, or whether the stance of political parties on Kosovo does determine their success or failure. Vladan BatiC, president of the Christian Democratic Party insisted, inan interview in November 1999, that the issue of Kosovo is very low on the list of priorities of the electorate, in sixth place after poverty and quality.of life, crime and corruption, democracy and human rights, the participation in international organizations, and the return of the young generationin exile." This trend seems to be confirmed by an opinion poll carried~out in September 1999 when, among the four most important issues the popu- lation fears, a renewed war with NATO was in third place, after the fear of illness in the absence of proper health care and a civil war followed bythe fear of hunger." On the other hand, the former leader of the Civic Alliance in Serbia, Vesna PeSiC has argued that nationalism is still an important'fotce in Serbian politics, among the government as well as among the oppo~ition,'~

Along these lines the united Serbian opposition issued a statemenoih January 2000, asking the international community to act againsi?'!all attempts by criminals to infiltrate the territory of Kosovo ... [and] against Albanian terrorists and thieves in Ko~ovo ' . ' ~ Most pronounced on the Issue of Kosovo, was Vojislav KoStunica throughout the war and in its aftermatlr. He and his Democratic Party of Serbia have strongly condemn6d::thi: international administration and claimed that it acts in collusion with'thc Albanian leadership in establishing an independent Kosov~.~" KoStunica emphasized the need to challenge MiloSeviC on the national question:

. .

\ < l , '

In Serbia the national question will have a significant impact.[during elections] because of the situation in which Serbia is because'of the bombing, because of the propaganda of MiloSevit. One cannorpdiit aside. We must have an answer to that. Large part of theSerbia11

opposition is not aware of this fact. So it is underestimating the importance of the national issue. We have to try to find ... the possi- bility to compromise between the importance of the national issue and the importance oI Serbia being a normal member of international organizations ... I think that part of the opposition underestimated this national issue of Kosovo."

Despite the variation of importance attributed to Kosovo after the war by the former opposition, its programmatic visions of the province remain very much alike. The coalition which came to power in October 2000, as well

,: as the now marginalized Serbian Renewal Movement, accept the iuter- national administration of the province for a long transition period, while emphasizing the need to keep the province as part of Serbia and/or Yugo- slavia. As the minimum demands of the political representation of Serbs and Kosovo Albanians in regard to a final status of the province lack common ground, only little political discussion in Serbia has focused on proposals for a final settlement. Most attention concentrates on the return of Serbian refugees to Kosovo and the improvement of the security situation for Serbs. With the participation of most Kosovo Serb political leaders in the opposition, any discussion on the status of Kosovo after the change of regime is more likely to include the interests and position of Kosovo Serbs."

THE KOSOVO WAR AS A CONSPIRACY

The seemingly united front of NATO countries determined to wage a (limited) war againstYugoslavia, and the limited criticism of this policy from Russia, China and non-European countries, all seemed to confirm the romantic notion of Serbia standing alone, the whole world thereby height- ening the real and perceived isolation of Serbia." The war also gave rise to a number of other conspiracy theories that point to more sinister reasons for NATO's waging the war: geopolitical domination, economic interest, +d the desire to divide the Balkans into small, powerless states. As Marko ZivkoviC's work on Serbian nationalist narrative points out, the policy of the West, combined with the historical experience of great power interference, did little to discredit conspiracy theories and in fact helped undermine their critics."

Since their beginning, the wars of Yugoslav succession have been ! accompanied by conspiracy theories from all sides. Even before the out- ' break of the hostilities, the media in Serbia, as well as in the other republics, reported imaginary plans by the 'other side' or some outside powers to dominate or destroy Yugoslavia or a t least the nation in question." While the media war has been adequately documented elsewhere, conspiracy theories, as one of the main tools of the propaganda campaign in the media

REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE KOSOVO CONFLICT

and through other channels of communication have not been adequately explored. First, let us consider these theories as a tool of nationalism.

A conspiracy theory is unconfirmed information which seeks to explain events as resulting from an elaborate plan, often a secret and clandestine project. The root of any conspiracy theory is the rumour, an unofficial piece of information spread by word of mouth. Sudhir Kakar has explained the role of the rumour in the example of riots between Hindus and Muslims in India:

At the high point of a riot, the content of the rumours is at its most threatening and the speed at which they circulate are the highest. For it is at this particular time when three of the four conditions for the generation and transmission of rumours - personal anxiety, general uncertainty, and topical importance -are a t their highest level. The ... condition [of] credulity [is] no longer in operation since, at high levels of anxiety, disbelief in rumour is suspended, that is, rumours will be believed regardless how farfet~hed. '~

Conspiracy theories have functioned along the same lines during all phases of the war. The dissemination of such theories by newspapers further contributed to their widespread belief. Another reason for their acceptance is the sheer number of them. The proliferation of such theories has overwhelmed public opinion to the extent that a significant proportion of the theories are believed to be true, or at least that there 'has to be a kernel of truth' within the reports. There is, however, another level of relevance of the conspiracy theories. Beyond the element of misinformation and discrediting of information conspiracy has been defined as 'joining or acting together, as if by sinister design'." The conspiracy is beyond the realm of those affected by it. Again, comparable to the rumour as Kakar described it, '[dleriving from and reinforcing the paranoid potential which lies buried in all of us, they were the conversational food which helped the growth of a collective ... body'." The conspiracy clearly delineates between two sides in a conflict - black and white - and allows the supposed victims to interpret evenseemingly positive acts by the other side as a part of a larger, inevitably sinister plan.

Accordingly, under threat from a conspiracy, members of the 'own' nation not participating in the 'own' national project become 'traitors'?' The modern traitors were the members of the Serbian opposition and independent media who protested and criticized the war."The government - and its media organs defined treachery in Serbia. This task became easier with the media law passed in October 1998 that also institutionalized the dichotomy of 'patriotic' versus 'pro-Western media'." As a result, most of the anti-regime media were not only branded as traitors but also

SERBIA AFTER THE KOSOVO WAR

banned, decimating one of the last niches of independence in Serbia. Once again, traitors were jeopardizing Serbian unity: 'By invoking an external conspiracy with its connections to internal traitors, the latent function of this theory is to assist the internal mobilization and unification of the p~pulation.'~'

Beyond reaffirming the nation's collective identity and enforcing the perceived differences from the 'other' - the enemy - the conspiracy theory further emphasizes the helplessness and the victimhood of those affected by the conspiracy. As conspiracy assumes a group acting against the interest of the tictim', it describes per definition the relationship between perpetrator and victim. The victim, however, is not only the weaker element in the relationship; the victim also inevitably belongs to the group that is 'just', regardless of the conspirators' claim, as their true intentions remain obscure and hidden, and therefore sinister and 'unjust'. Such an inter- pretation enables the self-perceived victims to deny reality to the point of justifying their own crimes. Consequently, the instigators of violence and ethnic hatred can redefine the balance of guilt through the claim of battling a conspiracy.

In rhe case of Kosovo, the crimes that have been committed by some Albanians against Serbs since the beginning of the international adminis- tration function within this structure to 'prove' the premeditated nature of war, and help not only to justify the Yugoslav resistance to Western intervention, but also the previous decade of repression. In the aftermath the regime attempted to retain the country in a state of emergency, which was being fed increasingly openly with conspiracies, plots and rumours. Especially the UnitedYugoslav Left (JUL) of Slobodan MiloSevit's wife Mira Markovit engaged in 'uncovering' plots of domestic and international enemies seeking to destroy, kill or undermine the government. Goran Matit, member of JULaud federal minister of information, frequently went public in 1999 and 2000 with reports about various spy and assassination rings." While primarily serving to legitimize suppression of the opposition and independent media, it also intended to extend the state of siege symbol- ized by the Kosovo war in 1999. However, public perception diverged from the increasingly obscure accusations of the regime.

Nevertheless, the international isolation of Serbia, the experience of recent years in conjunction with its instrumentalization of the regime has extended the power of conspiracy theories beyond the power of Miloievit. He is frequently identified in Serbia as an American stooge, who helped in the destruction of Yugoslavia and the establishment of American control in the region." Even after the end of the 'extended Kosovo War' with the change of regime on 5 October 2000, the conspiracy theory as an element of contemporary nationalism is alive without a broad and comprehensive discussion of the wars and crimes of the 1990s.

REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE KOSOVO CONFLICT

ADDRESSING THE PAST

While the war in Kosovo has contributed to and reinforced the isolatio~l in which Serbia found itself in 199912000, intensifying the effectiveness of nationalism, it has also had some contrary effects. The direct involvement of the Yugoslav government in the expulsion of Albanians from Kosovo, and the crimes committed at that time, have established a clear line of responsibility that was not as visible in the case of the previous wars in Croatia and Bosnia.

The crimes committed by Yugoslav military and paramilitary forces were first addressed by the 'usual suspects' - NGO activists, members of human rights groups, and independent trade unions - in an open letter to their Albanian friends in April 1999:

We are writing to you in these difficult moments of our shared suffering. Convoys of Albanians and other citizens of Kosovo, among whom many of you, were forced to leave their homes. The killings and expulsions, homes destroyed and burnt, bridges, roads and indus- trial buildings demolished - paint a sombre and painful picture of Kosovo, Serbia and Montenegro, as indicating that life together is no longer possible. We, however, believe that it is necessary and possible. The better future of citizens of Kosovo, Serbia and Montenegro, of Serbs and Albanians, as citizens of one state or closest neighbours, will not arrive by itself, or over night. But it is something we can and must work on together, as we have many times in the past, not so long ago."

This clear opposition to the actions of the regime, however, came from many of the same groups and individuals that had protested against the regime during the previous wars. Their protests, thus, did not indicate a significant shift in public opinion, or among a different segment of the intellectual elite for that matter, toward a more differentiated evaluation of Serbian responsibility in the war.

Yet after the war, some members of the intellectual establishment began speaking out more openly against the crimes committed. In July 1999, a number of writers, including the member of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, Predrag Palavestra, demanded the punishment of those responsible for crimes against civilians, because otherwise 'guilt and shame for that crime would fall on the entire Serb pe?ple'.J"imilarly a number of nationalist intellectuals, including Dobrica CosiC and Matija BeCkoviC, demanded Slobodan MiloSevif's resignation at the annual convention of the Serbian Academy in July 1999." One must he cautious with an evalu- ation of such statements, however, as demands for resignation from nationalist intellectuals frequently reflect a dissatisfaction with the failure

I beseech you in the name of the living God never to put us again in a situation in which we cannot face our flock and our people. After all that Mr. MiloSeviC has done to the Serbian (and not only Serbian)

i ! ~

people in the last ten years; after the tragedy he has brought in Kosovo ! , and Metohija both on the Albanian and the Serbian people, and 1 ' especially in the last two years; after the Serbian Orthodox Church i

I ' ' has resolutely demanded MiloSevif's resignation and stepping down so as to save the people and the state ... your acceptance of MiloSevit's

I 1 invitation and the fact that you personally congratulated him for the ' ! birthday of a state that died ten years ago, a birthday which this year I has turned into 'the national celebration of the abolition of the ,

monarchy' of the Serbian people, has shocked and puzzled many of , , , our brethren archpriests, honourable clergy and monkery and the vast

majority of orthodox Serbs ..."

,

! Breaking with the nature of previous criticism of the regime, the bishop further criticized the Serbian Orthodox Church for having supported the

, 8 , , regime and breaking with Milorevit 'only when it became dissatisfied with

his success in waging wars'.'"The war in Kosovo has thus exposed a deep split within the leadership of the Serbian Orthodox Church, which in the

, . past decade tried to walk the tightrope of calling for inter-confessional

SERBIA AFTER THE KOSOVO WAR

to win wars, rather than an outrage with the crimes committed in the process.

Segments of the Serbian Orthodox Church have been more outspoken than many intellectuals on the issue of responsibility. While the Church has been critical of the regime in the past, past criticism generally focused on the government's refusal to adopt the Church's demands. During the war in Bosnia, the Church had come into conflict with the regime for not siding with the more traditionalist and church-friendly Serb leadership in Bosnia. The war in Kosovo, however, led to a shift in the Church's position. On 15 June 1999, the Holy Synod of the Serbian Orthodox Church demanded the

i,. resignation of MiloSeviC and the federal government, and their replacement with 'new persons, eligible [acceptable] to the home and foreign public'."

. Bishop Artemije, a t the Diocese of RaSka and Prizren (including Kosovo), emerged as the most outspoken critic of the regime's policy in Kosovo and has since became a leading political representative of the Serbs remaining in Kosovo.

Nevertheless the confrontational line has been eroded with Patriarch 1 ', Pavle's participation at the reception for the Day of the Republic on 29

November 1999 hosted by the Yugoslav president. Pavle's visit prompted an open letter by Bishop Artemije outlining the critical position towards the regime that he and other members of the Church had adopted:

REGIONAL IMPLlCATIONS OF THE KOSOVO CONFLICT 1 SERBIA AFTER THE KOSOVO WAR dialogne and reconciliation on one hand, and supporting Serb nationalist 1 PROSPECTS . policies on the other.

Bishop Artemije met with Hashim Thasi and a delegation of Kosovo Albanians in early July 1999 to sign a joint statement calling for the return of refugees and the creation of a multi-ethnic Kosovo." The discussion of the responsibility for the Kosovo war on the part of the Yugoslav government and Serbian nationalism, and a re-examination of Serbia's role in this and past wars, have been severely hampered by the continuing violence against Serhs in Kosovo, which has shifted the attention away from a critical evaluation of nationalism in Serbia.

In an extremely polarized political climate, these first steps are signs of courage, which express also the high degree of frustration of a significant, butnevertheless marginalized, group of public figures. But these steps reveal the limitations of such an attempted reconciliation. They are part of ongoing attempts between some Serbian intellectuals and counterparts from other parts of former Yugoslavia to engage in dialogue which not only address the issues of guilt, responsibility and reconciliation, but also more pragmatic issues, such as a political solution to the conflict?'This dialogue cannot yet be interpreted as pertaining to the reconciliation of the two nations. Especially as the Serhian representatives of this dialogue have remained disregarded by the public mainstream and were often branded as 'traitors'."

Only the change of regime in Serbia opened the door to engaging in a more comprehensive process of dialogue and addressing past crimes." The former opposition in Serbia is today divided on the issue of addressing responsibility, which is mostly a result of their role in the past. While some smaller parties (i.e., Civil Alliance of Serbia) have been vocal critics of the

1.

Only with the end of the rule of MiloSeviC, nearly a decade after the collapse of the second Yugoslavia, has a dialogue on the territorial and political system of Serbia become possible. However, the issue of Kosovo remains unresolved, potentially even after a formal settlement of the final status of the province. Serbian social scientist Boiidar JakSiC asserted before the beginning of the war that

the anathema of highly set national goals would hurt Serbs, if Kosovo 1 : really remains 'an internal affair of Serbia'. The reason is simple:

In 1998, Dragan Stavljanin similarly wrote that '[blearing in mind the complexity of the Kosovo situation, it seems impossible for Serbia to become a fully democratic society as long as Kosovo is part of it'." Even with the de facto loss of Kosovo, the failure to put the issue to rest has the danger of continuing to hear a negative impact on democratization in Serbia. A conditional independence, as suggested by the Independent Commission for Kosovo,l' seems to be the most probable long-term outcome for the province, if this is pursued too hastily and prematurely, however, it might run the risk of endangering the process of democratization and reform in S ~ ~ h i n

,

'I . I . I 1, 8 I,,

' : wars in ;he 1990s, others, includingYngoslav President Vojislav KoStunica"

, , have in one way or another endorsed some of the crimes comtnitted by the , , Serbian regime in Croatia. Bosnia and Kosovo. In the immediate aftermath 1 , ' ,

Serhia lacks the material, organizational and moral strength for solv- ,

ing this problem. Many years ago, Leon Trotsky, reporting from the Balkan front in the year 1912, insightfully remarked: 'With the

, , annexation of Kosovo, Serbia got a millstone around the neck of its development'."

.

NOTES

, ,

u

of the change of power in Serbia, two events symbolized the change in regard to discussing responsibility. Only a few days after the change of 1. Republika, 1 September 1997, quoted from S. Biserko and S. Stanojlovit (eds), Radicalization of the Serbian Society: Collection of Documents (Belgrade: regime the independent television station 'Studio B' showed a documentary Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, 1997), pp. 60-1. describing the rise of MiloSevit and showing crimes committed by the 2. Veternje Nouosti, 8 September 1997, quoted from Biserko and Stanojlovit (eds), Serbian armies during the wars of the past de~ade.'~ Less than a month after Radicalization ofthe Serbian Society, p. 67. the change of power, KoStunica similarly stated that 'I am ready to accept 3. The fact that the posters were in English indicates thatat least part of the intended

metsage of the referendum was towards the outside. the guilt for all those people who have been killed ... For what MiloSeviC 4. D. Stavljanin, 'The Ethnification of Politics -A Case Study: Serbia', Montenegro had done, and as a Serb, I will take responsibility for many of these, these

. , Journal ofForeign Policy 3, no. 314 (1998), p. 52.

crimes.'" These two events sienifv the fact that onlv a chanee of reeime 5. See the analysis of the oolitical camoaien in 1997 in S. Biserko and Stanoilovit

I"'!. : , , ' ,

u , u u

enabled a broader process to address responsibility during the wars, as the (ens), ~adicilization oithe Serbian Soc;ety, pp. 13-75. human rights activisr NataSa Kandit emphasized recently, 'We [Serbs] must 6. 1 am grateful to Marina Rlagojevit for her ideas on this topic. 7. S. Vujovif, 'The Society, State and University in Crisis', Sociologija 60, no. 4 come to terms with the crimes committed in our name. If KoStunica wants (October-December 1998), p. 484. to fulfil his promise to make Serbia a "normal place", he must spearhead 8. Edict of the Ministry of Information of the Republic of Serbia, no. 651.03- that process."' 292198.01 (15 October 1998).

332 333

REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS d~ THE IWSOVO CONFLICT 9 A Knmer M Pnl7er-Srlenz and M. F. Polzer. 'Politische OrdnunRsvorstellungen

~~

der Regierungund Oppositionsparteien ~eibiens sowie einig& ausgewahiter serbischer und albanischer Gruppierungen', in J. Marko (ed.), GordischerKnoten Kosovola: Durchschlagen oderEntwiven? (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999), pp. 35- 44: S. Troebst. Conflict in Kosovo; Failure of Prevention? An Analytical ~o>umentation; 1992-1998. ECMI Working Paper 1 (Flensburg: ECMI, 1998), pp. 12-16.

10. See V: Illit, S q s b opozicija tokom i posle NATO bombardovanja, HelsinSke Sveske 2, Potencijal za Prornene (Belgrade: HelsinSki Odbor za Ljudska Prava u Srbiji, 2000), pp. 86-135.

11. The general distrust towards the regime and opposition in autumn 1999 is visible in an opinion poll published in Vreme from September 1999, asking for the figure most likely to lead the country out of the crisis, serves as a valuable indicator of public opinion in Serbia. The most trusted person in this respect remained Slobodan MiloSeviC, although he could only obtain the confidence of a mere 9% of those surveyed. He was followed by Dragislav Avramovit, the former head of the Yugoslav Central Bank who is widely credited with ending hyperinflation in 1994, who-received 7% and Vuk DraSkovit with 4%. All other political figures, including Seselj, Djindjit and Panic, each earned no more than 2%. The clear winner of the poll was 'nobody'. Vreme, 25 September 1999.

12. M. MiloSeviC, Poliritki vodi; kroz Srbiju 2000 (Belgrade: Medija Centar, 2000), pp. 62-4; the change in attitudes is also visible in public opinion survey, see especially S. Mihailovif (ed.), ]am0 mnenje Srbije. Izmedu razohrenja I nade (Belgrade: Centar za proutavanje alternative, 2000).

13. The other pillars of the regime are the army, media and financial resources; D. PavloviC, 'Srpska opozicija pred lokalne izbore', Reporter, 1 March 2000. On this topic see also, M. Djurkovit, 'Nadziranje i podvobenje', Republib, 1 December 1999, pp. 19-24.

14. G17plus, Program Demokraiske Opozicije Srbije za Dmzokratsku Srbiju (Belgrade, 2000).

15. NIN, 7 September 2000. 16. Vreme, 13 November 1999. 17. Blic, 25 October 1999. 18. Reporter, 2 February 2000. 19. Betaweek, 13 lanuarv 2000. 2tr. (lec, h,r exntnplc,the prcsssr,ternrrtr 'Koo;l,nr.r Amp~~rarcs Kocov,,', lnic>rrn3r1~ltl

Srrv~cr. .,ithc 1)rmo;rarl. I'nrty oi Serhla, ' Apr~l 2.1110. 21. \! Kottumta. !nrr.rvlew w~rh r h ~ . ~uthor . LO Io l t 2llll~1. 22. lnternarional Crisis Group, Balkans ~ r i i f i n ~ : &actions in Kosovo to KoStunica3s

Victory, 10 October 2000. 23. See E. Gordy, 'Why MiloSevit Still?', Current History 99, no. 635 (March 2000),

p lo>. 24. M. Zivkovit. Stories Serbs Tell Themselves. unvublished Ph.D. dissertation

. .

(University of Chicago, 2000), ch. 6. 25. A number of interviews with leading intellecmals published in Politika in 1991

demonstrate the widespread usage of such theoriis. The interviews have been vublished as M. V~ttelit (ed.), Conversations with the Epoch (Belgrade: Serbian Ministry of Information, 1991).

26. S. Kakar, The Colors of Violence: Cultural Identities, Religion, and Conflict (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1996), p. 35.

27. American Heritage Dictionary of the English hnguage, edn 3 (1996), electronic version.

I( SERBIA AFTER THE KOSOVO WAR

,I,,' 28. See Kakar, The Colors of Violence, p. 35. . , 29. Betrayal became one of the main motives of the commemoration of the Kosovo i': battle in 1989. On 28 June 1989, the most important Serbian daily, Politika, ran . ,

the headline 'The Serbian people celebrated its heroes, hut also recognized its traitors'. 0 . Zirojevit, 'Das Arnselfeld im kollektiven Gedachtnis', in T. Brenner,

, ,, N. Popov and H:G. Stobbe (eds), Serbiens Weg iiz den Krieg (Berlin: Arno Spitz , , Verlag, 1998), p. 60.

30. Unidentified men assassinated the publisher Slavko Curuvija in Belgrade in April , I 1999, after he had been accused of treachery in government media. Zoran , I/ DiindiiC was forced to seek refuge in Monteneero after his criticism of the war

, j! , , " - resulted in similar accusations. ' i , 4 31. See, for example, IWPRMedia Focus, 11 January 1999.

, , , 32. J. Zupanov, D. Sekulic and Z. Sporer, 'A Breakdown of the Civil Order: The . , I Balkan Bloodbath', International Journal of Politics, Cultrrre and Society 9, no. 3 , 119961. o. 404.

, ,,,

33. In October 1999, MatiC claimed, for example, that the enemy attempted to smuggle Dinar notes into the country to undermine the currency (Reuters, 27 October 1999); in November Matif identified opinion polls as part of a propaganda campaign against the regime (Politika Ekspress, 4 November 1999); the same month Matif announced the arrest of a French spy-ring code-named 'Spider' which supposedly sought to assassinate MiloSeviC, and later implicated Bernard Kouchner in the 'Spider'group (Danas, 10 December 1999); MatiC later accused DraSkoviC and other opposition politicians of being in contact with the French spies (Danas, 24 December 1999); MatiC joined SeSelj in February 2000, in accusing the independent media in Serbia of pursuing terrorist aims (Borba, 14 February 2000); Otpor was later blamed by Matit as being responsible for the assassination of BaSko PeroSeviC (Human Rights Watch, 1 June 2000); in August the minister revealed the arrest of four Dutch would-he assassins of MiloSeviC (Borba, 2 August 2000).

34. See the article by I? Maass, New York Times, 24 October 2000. 35. 'Letter to Albanian Friends from Non-Governmental Organizations', Belgrade,

30 April 1999, distributed electronically (on file with author). 36. S. Kostit, 'Awakening of Intellectuals. Who is Responsible for War Crimes?' AIM

Podgorica, 4 July 1999. 37. Ibid. 38. The journalist reporting on the decision notes cynically that 'MiloSeviC has

officially become disagreeable even to God'. V VujiC, 'Pre-Election Revival in Serbia', AIM Podgorica, 17 June 1999. The full text of the declaration is available at www.decani.yunet.comiresign.html.

39. B. MatiC, 'Divisions in the Serbian Orthodox Church', IUM Podgorica, 21 December 1999.

40. Ibid. 41. Betaweek, 8 July 1999. The statement is available at www.decani.yunet.com/

serbalb.htm1. 42. Troebst, Conflict in Kosovo, pp. 79-80, 91; HelsinSki Odbor za Ljudska Prava u

Srbiji, Srpsko-Albanski Dijalog, Ulcinj, 23-25 June 1997 (Belgrade: Prometej, 1997). -. . ,~

43. Albanian Intellectuals have run a similar risk. Veton Surroi described the crimes . , ,

committed by Albanians against Serbs as bringing 'shame on all Kosovo Albanians, not just the perpetrators of violence. And it's a burden we will have to bear

' I collectively.' Veton Surroi, 'Kosovo Fascism, Albanian's Shame', lWPR Balkan Crisis Report, 25 August 1999. His statements were followed by an accusation

REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE KOSOVO CONFLICI

that he was a spy for Serbia by the KLA Newsagency Kosovapress, see RFEIRL Newsline, 6 October 1999.

44. On the (past) hurdles to reconciliation see F. Bieber, 'Pomirenje u bivSoj Jugoslavji. SluEajevi Francuske iNemaEke kao modeli', in A. Fatit (ed.),Prohlemi Srpske politike (Belgrade: Centar za Menadiment, 2000), pp. 92-1 11.

45. Kogtunica has been particularly criticized for posing with a KalaSnikov in Kosovo in the Summer of 1998. NIN. 19 October 2000.

46. Gunrdian, 1 0 October 2000. 47. New York Zmes. 25 October 2000. The interview for the US station CBS was

also broadcast in Yugoslavia. Later some controversy emerged around the interview with claims by advisors to the president that the interview had been 'incorrectly'edited (AFP, 26 October 2000). Nevertheless, the interview marked an important step towards a discussion on the subject of responsibility.

48. N. Kandit, 'Our Unfinished llusiness in Serbia', Washington Post, 22 October 2000.

49. B. JakSiC, 'Kosovo - Prokletsrvo Etnonacionalnih Ciljeva' in Bozidar JakSit, BalkpmkiParadoksi (Belgrade: Beogradski K N ~ , 2000), p. 147.

50. See Savljanin, 'The Erhnification of Politics', p. 61. 51. Independent International Commission on Kosovo, TheKosouo Report: Conflict,

International Response, Lessons Learnt (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 283-94.

REFERENCES

AFP, 26 October 2000. American Heritage Dictiomry of the English Language, edn 3 (1996), electronic

ve~sion. ~-~~~~~ Betaweek, 8 July 1999. Betaweek. 13 lanuarv 2000.

. .

I{,eher, E, 'Pomtrenje u bwioj Jugosl~v~t. Slutajcr I 1:rancurke i NernaCkc kao modcli', ~n A. FarC (ed.), i'rohlenrt Srpske imbrtke (IlelgrrJe: Ccnrar za .Mcnad?n,ent.

. . . -

2000), pp. 92-111. Biserko, S. and StanojloviC, S. (eds), Radicalization of the Serbian Society: Collection

ofDocuments (Belarade: Helsinki Committee for Human Riehrs in Serbia. 1997). Blic, 25 October 1'999: Borha, 14 Februaw 2000. Borha; 2 August 2000. Dnnas, 10 December 1999. Danas, 24 Decemberl999. Djorkovit, M., 'Nadziranje i podvobenje', Republika, 1 December 1999, pp. 19-24. Edict of the Ministry of Information of the Republic of Serbia, no. 651-03-292198-

01 (15 October 1998). Gl7plus, Progrum Demokratske Opoziciie Srhije u? Demokratsku Srhiju (Belgrade,

2000). Gordy, E. 'Why MiloSeviC Still?', Current History 99, no. 635 (March 2000), pp. 99-

103. Guardian, 10 October 2000. HelsinBki Odbor za Ljudska Prava u Srbiji, Spko4lharukiDijalog, Ulcinj, 23-25 June

1997 (Belgrade: Prometej, 1997). Human Rights Watch, 1 June 2000. IlliC, V., Srpska Opozicija tokom i posle NATO bomhardovanja, HelsinPke Sveske 2,

I SERBLA AFTER THE KOSOVO WAR PotencijalzaPromene (Belgrade: Helsinrki Odbor za Ljudska Prava u Srbiji, 2000), pp. 86-135.

Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learnt (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

InformationService of the Democratic Party ofSerbia, 'Kouchner Amputates Kosovo', 7 April 2000.

lnternarional Crisis Group, Balkans Briefing: Reactions in Kosovo to Koitunica's Victory, 10 October 2000.

IWPR Balkan Crisis Report, 25 August 1999. IWPRMedia Focus, 11 January 1999. JakJiC, B., 'Kosovo - Prokletstvo Etnonacionalnih Ciljeva', in Boiidar JakSiC,

Balkanski Paradoksi (Belgrade: Beogradski Krug, 2000), pp. 145-50. Kakar, S., The Colors of Violence: Cultural Identities, Religion, and Conflict (Chicago

and London: University of Chicago Press, 1996). KandiC, N., 'Our Unfinished Business in Serbia', Washington Post, 2 2 October 2000. KostiC, S., 'Awakening of Intellectuals. Who is Responsible for War Crimes? AIM

Podgorica, 4 July 1999. Kostunica, Vojislav, interview with the author, 20 July 2000.

, Kumer, A,, Polzer-Srienz, M. and Polzer, M. F., 'Politische Ordnungsvorstellungen der Regierungund Oppositionsparteien Serbiens sowie einiger ausgewahlter serbischer und albanischer Cruppierungen', in J. Marko (ed.), GordischerKnoten Kosouola: Durchschlagen oder Entwirren? (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1999), pp. 35- 44. I 'Letter to Albanian Friends from Non-Governmental Organizations', Belgrade, 30 April 1999. MatiC, B., 'Divisions in the Serbian Orthodox Church', AIM Podgorica, 21 December 1999.

Mihailovit, S. (ed.), Jauno Mnenje Srhije. Izmedu razotarenja i node (Belgrade: Centar za proucavanje alternative, 2000).

MiloSevit. M.. Polititki vodit kroz Srhiiu 2000 (Belerade: Mediin Centar. 2000).

I - New York Tlmes, 24 October 2000. New York 7imes, 25 October 2000. NIN. 7 Seotember 2000. NIN; 1 9 dctober 2000. PavloviC. D . 'Sroska oooziciia ored lokalne izbore'. Reoorter. 1 March 2000

1 Polrtika ~ k s ~ e s s ; 4 ~ o v e m b e r i999. 1 Reporter, 2 February 2000. I Reuters. 27 October 1999.

I YEIRL'' Newsline, 6 0ctober 1999. Stavlianin. D.. 'The Ethnification of Politics - A Case Study: Serbia'. Montenezro 'I J ~ u r n ~ l o f ~ o r e i g n Policy 3, no. 314 (1998),pp. 41-65. ' I Troebst, S., Conflict in Kosovo: Failure of Prevention? An Analytical Documentation,

1 1992-1998, ECMI Working Paper 1 (Flensburg: ECMI, 1998). V m e , 25 Septernberl999. i Vreme, 13 November 1999. I VuEeliC, M. (ed.), Conversations with the Epoch (Belgrade: Serbian Ministry of I Information, 1991). 1 ' Vujit, V, 'Pre-Election Revival in Serbia', AIM Podgoria, 17 June 1999. I VujoviC, S., 'The Society, State and University in Crisis', Sociologija 60, no. 4

(October-December 1998), pp. 481-508. Zirojeuit, O., 'Dss Amalfeld im kollektiven Ceddchtnis', i n T Brenner, N. Popovand

. i

REGIONAL lMPLlCATlONS OF THE KOSOVO CONFLICT

H.-G. Stobbe (eds), Serbiens Weg in den Krieg (Berlin: Arno Spia Verlag, 1998), pp. 45-61.

f i v k o v i ~ . M.. Stories Serbs TeNThernselves, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation (Chicago: ~niv;rsit; of Chicago, 2000).

Zupanov, J., Sekulic, D. and Sporer, Z., 'A Breakdown of the Civil Order: The Balkan Bloodbath', International Journal of Pol;tics, Culture and Sociefy 9, no. 3 (1996), pp. 401-22.

ANEM BPA BTF CEI CEU CFSP CNN CSCE DPKO EBRD ECMI EIB EU FRY IAC ICJ ICTY IDP IMF JfiS JUL KFOR KLA KVM LBD LCY LDK NATO NGO NLM OSCE OTP

Abbreviations

Association of Independent Media Banking and Payment Authority Balkans Task Force Central European Initiative Central European University Common Foreign and Security Policy Cable News Network Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe Department of Peacekeeping Operations European Bank for Reconstruction and Development European Centre for Minority Issues European Investment Bank European Union Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Interim Administration International Court of Justice International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Internally Displaced People International Monetary Fund Joint Interim Administrative Structure United Yugoslav Left (Jugoslovenska Levica) Kosovo Force (NATO Peacekeeping Force) Kosovo Liberation Army Kosovo Verification MissiBn United Democratic Movement League of Communists of Yugoslavia Democratic League of Kosova (Lidhja Demokratike e I